"[2026:RJ-JP:4514] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5747/2025 RC Power Project Limited, (Formerly Known as R.C. Enterprises), P.No. B4/32, South Part Chitrakoot, Vaishali Nagar, Jaipur- 302021, Through Its Director- Mr. Ramesh Choudhary ----Petitioner Versus 1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Additional Chief Secretary, Department Of Energy, Secretariat, Jaipur (Raj.) 2. Chairman And Managing Director, Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd., Vidyut Bhawan, Janpath, Jaipur. 3. Superintendent Engineer (TW), Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd., Old Power House, Near Ram Mandir, Bani Park, Jaipur. ----Respondents Connected With S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5748/2025 RC Power Project Limited, (Formerly Known as R.C. Enterprises), P.No. B4/32, South Part Chitrakoot, Vaishali Nagar, Jaipur- 302021, Through Its Director- Mr. Ramesh Choudhary ----Petitioner Versus 1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Additional Chief Secretary, Department Of Energy, Secretariat, Jaipur (Raj.) 2. Chairman And Managing Director, Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd., Vidyut Bhawan, Janpath, Jaipur. 3. Superintendent Engineer (TW), Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd., Old Power House, Near Ram Mandir, Bani Park, Jaipur. ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Kamlakar Sharma, Sr. Adv. assisted by Mr. Sandeep Pathak, Adv. Ms. Jaya Pathak, Adv. Ms. Shefali Sharma, Adv. Ms. Palak Saraswat, Adv. Mr. Harshit Bansal, Adv. Printed from counselvise.com [2026:RJ-JP:4514] (2 of 21) [CW-5747/2025] For Respondent(s) : Mr. Rajendra Prasad, AG (Sr. Adv.), Mr. Umang Gupta, Adv. Mr. Tarang Gupta, Adv. Ms. Vidhi Mitruka, Adv. Mr. Tanay Goyal, Adv. Mr. Sheetanshu Sharma, Adv. Ms. Dhriti Laddha, Adv. Ms. Harshita Thakral, Adv. HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRAVEER BHATNAGAR Judgment 1. Date of conclusion of arguments 08/01 /2026 2. Date on which the judgment was reserved 08/01 /2026 3. Whether the full judgment or only the operative part is pronounced Full Judgment 4. Date of pronouncement 31 /01/2026 1. These two writ petitions, having been heard together, are decided by this common judgment. 2. The present writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arises out of and relates to the tender process initiated by the respondent– Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited, (hereinafter, to be referred as 'JVVNL') under Tender-NIT No. JVVNL/SE(TW)/TN-545 & JVVNL/SE(TW)/TN-546 and the contract awarded pursuant thereto for execution of works relating to 33/11 KV Grid Sub-Stations on 'BOOT' model basis. 3. The petitioner has approached this Court assailing the termination of the said contract vide order dated 09.04.2025, along with the consequential actions including issuance of show- cause notice and the order of debarment dated 13.08.2025 and has prayed for quashing of the said orders on the ground that the Printed from counselvise.com [2026:RJ-JP:4514] (3 of 21) [CW-5747/2025] same are arbitrary, violative of the principles of natural justice, contrary to the terms of the contract and in breach of the provisions of the Rajasthan Transparency in Public Procurement Act, 2012 (in short, ‘Act of 2012’) and the Rajasthan Transparency in Public Procurement Rules, 2013 (in short, ‘Rules of 2013’) framed thereunder. Argument Advanced by Counsel for the Petitioner:- 4. Learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the impugned termination order dated 09.04.2025 and the consequential debarment order dated 13.08.2025 are ex facie arbitrary, unreasonable and unsustainable in law. It is contended that the respondents have acted in a pre-determined manner, without adhering to the contractual framework governing the parties and have sought to justify the termination retrospectively by relying upon internal enquiry reports and audit observations. It is argued that once a contract is lawfully awarded after scrutiny by the respondents’ own committees and substantial work has been executed thereunder, the respondents cannot abandon the contractual terms and resort to extra-contractual considerations to terminate the agreement. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the preliminary objection raised by the respondents regarding non- maintainability of the present writ petition is unsustainable in law. It is argued that the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 is not ousted merely because the dispute arises out of a contractual relationship. In order to buttress his argument reliance was placed on the case of ABL International Ltd. v. Export Credit Printed from counselvise.com [2026:RJ-JP:4514] (4 of 21) [CW-5747/2025] Guarantee Corporation of India Ltd., (2004) 3 SCC 553, Vice Chairman & Managing Director, CIDCO v. Shishir Realty Pvt. Ltd., (2022) 16 SCC 527, Subodh Kumar Singh Rathour v. Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority, (2024) SCC OnLine SC 1682 and State of U.P. v. Sudhir Kumar Singh, (2021) 19 SCC 706, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that when the State or its instrumentalities are parties to a contract, they remain bound by the mandate of Article 14 to act fairly, reasonably and non-arbitrarily and that arbitrary repudiation or termination of contractual obligations is amenable to judicial review. 6. Learned counsel further submits that the mere existence of disputed questions of fact does not, by itself, bar the exercise of writ jurisdiction and while placing reliance on the judgments of Unitech Ltd. v. Telangana State Industrial Infrastructure Corporation, (2021) 16 SCC 35 and UMC Technologies Pvt. Ltd. v. Food Corporation of India, (2021) 2 SCC 551, it is contended that where the challenge is directed to the decision- making process and the material facts are borne out from admitted documents, correspondence and the record itself, this Court is competent to examine whether the action of the State is vitiated by arbitrariness, unfairness or mala fides. It is urged that the respondents cannot avoid judicial scrutiny merely by raising a plea of disputed facts when the essence of the challenge lies in the legality of the impugned decision. 7. On the point of Clause 36.2.1 of the General Conditions of Contract, learned counsel submits that before terminating the Printed from counselvise.com [2026:RJ-JP:4514] (5 of 21) [CW-5747/2025] contract, the respondents were required to issue a show cause notice and afford a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The impugned termination order does not reflect compliance with the requirements or consideration of the petitioner’s explanation, rendering the action arbitrary. 8. Learned counsel further submits that the show-cause notice dated 07.10.2024 was issued at the time when the internal enquiries had already been initiated and the respondents were proceeding on allegations of collusion and corruption, which were never put to the petitioner in a meaningful manner. The subsequent reliance on the same allegations to justify termination stands in clear violation of the principles of natural justice. 9. It is vehemently argued that the respondents’ reliance on internal enquiry reports, audit observations and preliminary Anti- Corruption Bureau proceedings is wholly misconceived. Learned counsel submits that such enquiries neither result in a finding of guilt against the petitioner nor override the contractual mechanism governing termination. It is contended that allegations of collusion or corruption have not been established by any competent forum and remain at a preliminary stage and yet the respondents have treated such allegations as conclusive, which in turn implicate the petitioner in grave consequences without following the due process of law. 10. Learned counsel further argues that even assuming that there were irregularities in the tender process, the petitioner cannot be penalised for the same after the contract was awarded following approval by the Corporate Level Purchase Committee Printed from counselvise.com [2026:RJ-JP:4514] (6 of 21) [CW-5747/2025] (CLPC) and Bid Evaluation Committee (BEC), both comprising senior officers of the respondents themselves. It is urged that the petitioner acted bona-fide on the basis of a validly awarded contract and has executed substantial work thereunder and that alleged lapses on the part of the respondents’ own officials cannot be used as a ground to terminate the contract to the detriment of the petitioner. 11. Furthermore, learned counsel submits that the debarment proceedings are wholly independent and distinct from the termination of the contract and could not have been mechanically initiated or concluded merely on the basis of the termination order or internal enquiry reports. It is argued that debarment is a drastic administrative measure having serious civil and commercial consequences, as it effectively excludes a person from entering into lawful commercial relations with the State, and therefore warrants strict adherence to the principles of fairness and natural justice and in support of this reliance was placed on the judgment of Erusian Equipment & Chemicals Ltd. v. State of West Bengal, (1975) 1 SCC 70, wherein it was held that blacklisting creates a civil disability and must be founded on objective satisfaction after affording due opportunity. It is contended that the show-cause notice issued under the Rules of 2013 was vague, the detailed reply submitted by the petitioner was not meaningfully considered and the final debarment order reflects non-application of mind and mechanical exercise of power, rendering the action legally unsustainable. Printed from counselvise.com [2026:RJ-JP:4514] (7 of 21) [CW-5747/2025] 12. It is lastly contended that the petitioner has invested more than Rs. 236 Crores in execution of the project and has not received any payment owing to the BOOT structure of the contract. The abrupt termination of the contract, coupled with debarment, is stated to have the effect of inflicting irreparable financial prejudice and civil consequences upon the petitioner. It is submitted that such drastic action, taken without adherence to contractual safeguards and statutory procedure, is disproportionate and arbitrary, warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. Argument Advanced by Counsel for the Respondents:- 13. Contrarily, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of respondents submits that the present writ petition is not maintainable, as the dispute arises purely out of a contractual relationship governed by the tender conditions and executed agreements. It is contended that the petitioner essentially seeks enforcement of contractual obligations and re-appreciation of disputed questions of fact which is beyond the pale of writ jurisdiction under Article 226. In this regard, reliance is placed on the judgment of Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Radha Krishna Agarwal v. State of Bihar, (1977) 3 SCC 457, wherein it has been held that once a contract is entered into the rights and obligations flow from the contract and not from statute and writ jurisdiction is ordinarily not attracted in matters of alleged breach of contract, particularly where alternative remedies exist. Printed from counselvise.com [2026:RJ-JP:4514] (8 of 21) [CW-5747/2025] 14. It is contended that the impugned termination was not founded merely on alleged delay in execution, but was preceded by serious allegations of malpractice, collusion and breach of statutory procurement norms. Upon receipt of a complaint dated 21.12.2023 before the Anti-Corruption Bureau in relation to Tender Nos. TN-545 and TN-546, inquiry committees were constituted to examine the tender process, evaluation, approvals granted and escalation of project cost. The Inquiry Committee, in its report dated 18.07.2024, recorded grave irregularities and violations of the Act of 2012 and the Rules of 2013, including discouragement of competition and unjustified enhancement of the project cost. 15. Learned counsel further submits that the scope of judicial review in tender and government contract matters is extremely limited. It is submitted that in the matter of Silppi Constructions Contractors v. Union of India, (2020) 16 SCC 489, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the High Court while exercising power under Article 226 does not sit as an appellate authority over administrative or commercial decisions of the employer, judicial interference is permissible only where the decision-making process is vitiated by arbitrariness, mala fides or perversity, and not merely because another view is possible or because the contractor disputes the assessment of performance. 16. On the issue of violation of principles of natural justice, learned counsel while placing reliance on the judgment of the Assistant Excise Commissioner & Ors. v. Issac Perter & Ors., (1994) 4 SCC 104, has submitted that the doctrine is not Printed from counselvise.com [2026:RJ-JP:4514] (9 of 21) [CW-5747/2025] inflexible and its application depends upon the contractual framework and nature of the action. It is argued that issuance of the show-cause notice dated 07.10.2024 satisfied the requirement of fairness and no further pre-decisional hearing was mandated under the contract. 17. Learned counsel on the issue of debarment, submits that the action has been taken strictly in accordance with the Rules of 2013. In order to buttress his argument reliance was placed on the judgment of Kulja Industries Ltd. v. Chief General Manager, BSNL, (2014) 14 SCC 731, wherein the Supreme Court held that debarment is a permissible administrative action intended to protect public interest, provided it is founded on relevant material and proportionality is maintained. It is contended that the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to submit its reply and the competent authority passed the debarment order after due consideration. 18. It is thus submitted that the impugned termination and debarment orders are supported by contractual provisions, statutory rules and binding judicial precedents and no case for interference under Article 226 is made out. 19. Heard learned counsels for the parties and perused the material available on record. Scope of Judicial Review under Article 226 in Government Contractual Matters 20. At the outset, it is necessary to delineate the jurisdictional scope of this Court under Article 226 in matters arising out of government contracts. The Hon’ble Apex Court, while dealing with Printed from counselvise.com [2026:RJ-JP:4514] (10 of 21) [CW-5747/2025] the similar issue, in the case of JSW Infrastructure Ltd. Vs. Kakinada Seaports Ltd., (2017) 4 SCC 170, observed as under: “8. We may also add that the law is well settled that superior courts while exercising their power of judicial review must act with restraint while dealing with contractual matters. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Tata Cellular v. Union of India [Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651] held that: (i) there should be judicial restraint in review of administrative action; (ii) the court should not act like court of appeal; it cannot review the decision but can only review the decision-making process; (iii) the court does not usually have the necessary expertise to correct such technical decisions; (iv) the employer must have play in the joints i.e. necessary freedom to take administrative decisions within certain boundaries. 9. In Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa [Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa, (2007) 14 SCC 517] this Court held that evaluation of tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions and if the decision is bona fide and taken in the public interest the superior courts should refrain from exercising their power of judicial review. In the present case there are no allegations of mala fides and the appellant consortium has offered better revenue sharing to the employer. 10. In Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corpn. Ltd. [Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corpn. Ltd., (2016) 16 SCC 818] this Court held as follows: “13….a mere disagreement with the decision-making process or the decision of the administrative authority is no reason for a constitutional court to interfere. The threshold of mala fides, intention to favour someone or arbitrariness, irrationality or perversity must be met before the constitutional court interferes with the decision-making process or the decision. Printed from counselvise.com [2026:RJ-JP:4514] (11 of 21) [CW-5747/2025] 15. We may add that the owner or the employer of a project, having authored the tender documents, is the best person to understand and appreciate its requirements and interpret its documents. The constitutional courts must defer to this understanding and appreciation of the tender documents, unless there is mala fide or perversity in the understanding or appreciation or in the application of the terms of the tender conditions. It is possible that the owner or employer of a project may give an interpretation to the tender documents that is not acceptable to the constitutional courts but that by itself is not a reason for interfering with the interpretation given...The view taken in Afcons was followed in Montecarlo Ltd. v. NTPC Ltd., (2016) 15 SCC 272. Thus it is apparent that in contractual matters, the writ courts should not interfere unless the decision taken is totally arbitrary, perverse or mala fide.” (Emphasis Supplied) Similarly, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa, (2007) 14 SCC 517, observed as under: “22. Judicial review of administrative action is intended to prevent arbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and mala fides. Its purpose is to check whether choice or decision is made “lawfully” and not to check whether choice or decision is “sound”. When the power of judicial review is invoked in matters relating to tenders or award of contracts, certain special features should be borne in mind. A contract is a commercial transaction. Evaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentially commercial functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stay at a distance. If the decision relating to award of contract is bona fide and is in public interest, courts will not, in exercise of power of judicial review, interfere even if a procedural aberration or error in assessment or prejudice to a tenderer, is made out. The power of judicial review will not be permitted to be invoked to protect private interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractual disputes. The tenderer or contractor with a grievance can always seek damages Printed from counselvise.com [2026:RJ-JP:4514] (12 of 21) [CW-5747/2025] in a civil court...Such interferences, either interim or final, may hold up public works for years, or delay relief and succour to thousands and millions and may increase the project cost manifold. Therefore, a court before interfering in tender or contractual matters in exercise of power of judicial review, should pose to itself the following questions: (i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authority is mala fide or intended to favour someone; or Whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary and irrational that the court can say: “the decision is such that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached”; (ii) Whether public interest is affected. If the answers are in the negative, there should be no interference under Article 226...” (Emphasis Supplied) 21. It is thus clear that the power of judicial review is not excluded in contractual matters, however, its exercise is circumscribed. The Court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 is primarily concerned with examining the decision- making process and not the merits of the decision itself, interference is warranted only where the action of the State or its instrumentalities is shown to be arbitrary, irrational, mala fide, or in violation of statutory provisions or constitutional guarantees. 22. Moreover, it is equally well settled that in matters arising out of contractual relations and the principles of natural justice and equity, in contractual matters, operate in a limited manner and remain circumscribed by the contractual framework governing the parties. The High Court does not sit as an appellate authority over administrative or commercial decisions, nor does it re-appreciate technical or contractual disputes. Printed from counselvise.com [2026:RJ-JP:4514] (13 of 21) [CW-5747/2025] Analysis:- 23. Before adverting to the rival submissions, it would be apposite for this Court to lay down the necessary facts giving rise to the present writ petition. The petitioner- 'RC Power Project Limited' is a company engaged in execution of electrical and infrastructure projects. It is undisputed that respondent No.2- Jaipur Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited, a distribution licensee of the State of Rajasthan, issued Tender-NIT No. JVVNL/SE(TW)/TN-545 & JVVNL/SE(TW)/TN-546 dated 31.07.2023 for survey, design, supply, erection, testing, commissioning and thereafter ten years comprehensive operation and maintenance of 33/11 KV Grid Sub- Stations and associated infrastructure on build, own, operate and transfer ('BOOT') model. It is also not disputed that estimated project cost for two projects were assessed at Rs.75.58 Crores (TN-545) and Rs. 88.46 Crores (TN-546). It is also undisputed that a pre-bid meeting was conducted where the petitioner was the sole bidder and submitted its bid on 11.09.2023 and quoted his rate as Rs. 264.52 Crores (TN-545) and Rs. 309.10 Crores (TN-546) and upon its own bid the petitioner-company was awarded contracts at the rate of Rs. 262.54 (TN-545) Crores and Rs. 306.62 Crores (TN-546). 24. Thereafter, on the complaint filed by a private person, the respondent- JVVNL constituted an Enquiry Committee to examine the aspects of tender process including the biding conditions, evaluation process, approval granted by the Competent Committee, escalation of projects cost and compliance with the provisions of the Act of 2012 and of Rules of 2013. The Enquiry Printed from counselvise.com [2026:RJ-JP:4514] (14 of 21) [CW-5747/2025] Committee upon examining the record submits its report dated 18.07.2024 and noted violation of various provisions of Rules of 2013. Thereafter, the respondents issued an order dated 09.04.2025, terminating the contract citing grounds of collusion and corrupt practices and also issued a show cause notice proposing debarment of the petitioner and subsequently, final order of debarment dated 13.08.2025, came to be passed against the petitioner. 25. Before examining the action of the respondent in terminating the contract, it is necessary to refer to the general conditions of contract which defines the terms and conditions of the contract. Clause 36 of the General Conditions of Contract deals with the termination on several grounds and Clause 36.2.1 specifically deals with termination of contract on the grounds of corrupt or fraudulent practices and the relevant clause in this regard is 36.2.1(c). The relevant part of Clause 36.2.1 reads as under:- “36.2 Termination for Contractor's Default:- 36.2.1 The Employer, without prejudice to any other rights or remedies it may possess, may terminate the Contract forthwith in the following circumstances by giving a/notice of termination and its reasons therefore to the Contractor, referring to this, GCC Sub-Clause 36.2: (a) ... (b) If the Contractor assigns or transfers the Contractor any right or interest therein in violation of the provision of GCC Clause 37. (c) If the Contractor, in the judgment of the Employer has engaged in corrupt or fraudulent practices in competing for or in executing the Contract. (d) If the contractor fails to achieve mutually agreed deadline (as set in mutually agreed Project Execution Plan/PERT chart) for consecutive 3 months, Employer shall issue contract termination notice giving suitable time Printed from counselvise.com [2026:RJ-JP:4514] (15 of 21) [CW-5747/2025] to contractors which may be up to time agreed between employer and contractor. In case, contractor does not improve its performance as per contract termination notice, which shall be within overall plan under mutually agreed project execution plan, employer will terminate the contract and encash performance securities. For the purpose of this Sub-Clause: \"Corrupt practice\" is the offering, giving, receiving or soliciting, directly or indirectly, of anything of value to influence improperly the actions of another; \"fraudulent practice\" is any act or omission, including a misrepresentation, that knowingly or recklessly misleads or attempts to mislead a party to obtain a financial or other benefit or to avoid an obligation...” 26. It is aptly clear that the Department may terminate the contract forthwith in the circumstances as given under the Clause 36.2.1 by giving a notice of termination and its reason therefore, to the contractor. It is nowhere specified in the provision that before terminating the contract, the Department is under an obligation to serve show cause notice. It is further to be mentioned that Clause 36 itself contains several grounds for terminating the contract, for example in Clause 36.2.1(d), \"if the contractor fails to achieve mutually agreed deadline (as set in mutually agreed Project Execution Plan/PERT chart) for consecutive 3 months,\" the Department after giving a notice of termination is under obligation to give suitable time to the contractor and if after giving suitable time the contractor does not improve its performance than through the termination notice, the department may terminate the contract. 27. Similarly, Clause 36.2.2 deals with the provision where on several grounds the contract may be terminated, however, subject to providing a notice to the contractor, stating the nature of Printed from counselvise.com [2026:RJ-JP:4514] (16 of 21) [CW-5747/2025] default and requiring the contractor to remedy the same. If the contractor fails to remedy or to take necessary steps to remedy the same within 14 days of its receipt of such notice, then the Department may terminate the contract. The termination order dated 09.04.2025 reflects that the respondent exercised a contractual power expressly reserved to them based on material placed before the Competent Authority. The clause does not require the respondent to issue a show cause notice before terminating the contract, as phraseology used in the aforesaid clause, in unequivocal terms states that right vest with the Department to terminate the contract forthwith after specifically assigning the reason for terminating the contract. 28. It is referred in the notice of termination that on the basis of the complaint lodged with the Anti-Corruption Bureau, raising allegations of serious corruption by stating connivance of respondent Officials with the petitioner with regard to aforesaid contracts, the matter was enquired and inquiry committee pointed out serious violations of provisions of the Act of 2012 and Rules of 2013, manipulation of tender conditions with connivance and unethical practices in awarding the work orders to the petitioner. 29. It is also mentioned in the notice that the committee has recommended to initiate proceedings under Section 166 of the Companies Act against erring officers who were involved in the contract process. The earlier notice issued to the petitioner pertained to adherence to timelines and compliance with the installation process. The relevant GCC clause specifically provides for issuance of a show cause notice before termination of the Printed from counselvise.com [2026:RJ-JP:4514] (17 of 21) [CW-5747/2025] contract on the ground of non-adherence to timelines. Thus, the clause under which the petitioner's contract was terminated is distinct and the writ court cannot substitute its own analogy or change the terms of condition as the parties are bound by the terms of the agreement. The enquiry report as well as the audit report also concurred with the findings that there were violation of the provisions of the Act of 2012 and Rules of 2013 and the contract was granted to the petitioner company at highly escalated rates, thus, the decision of the department is based on the enquiry report and not on any extraneous matter. 30. It is argued by learned counsel for the respondents that the contract was granted on 05.10.2023 and the petitioner company has substantially complied with the work assigned to it. The complaint was lodged in the year 2023, however, the action of terminating the contract given to petitioner's company was taken at belated stage after a lapse of almost two years. Thus, the action of the respondent is questionable and clearly shows mala- fide intention on part of the respondent. 31. The arguments of learned counsel for the petitioner is not acceptable because firstly, the decision of the department is based upon the enquiry report as well as the audit report, both of which record specific findings that the contract was awarded in violation of the Act of 2012 and was awarded at a highly escalated rates. Secondly, the material forming the basis of termination discloses serious allegations of malpractice. Thirdly, the principles of natural justice, in the context of purely contractual relationship, cannot be expanded so as to rewrite the terms of the agreement or to Printed from counselvise.com [2026:RJ-JP:4514] (18 of 21) [CW-5747/2025] impose procedural requirements beyond what the contract itself contemplates. Fourthly, the pendency of any inquiry by Anti Corruption Bureau cannot be a ground to interfere with the termination notice, as the inquiry process is inherently cumbersome process and may take a considerable period of time to conclude and it would be highly impractical for the department to hold off the proceedings indefinitely before acting. The enquiry report, supported by the audit report, clearly illustrates that there was no valid reason for committee to approve the work orders for the petitioner's company at inflated rates that exceeded the limits set for the items in Basic Schedule Rates or Schedule of Issue Rates, without any survey or market price being obtained for the items. The writ court cannot override the definitive conclusions reached by the enquiry committee or the audit report and sit as an appellate authority over the administrative decisions performed by the committee. 32. Moreover, the verbiage used in clause 36.2.1 has its precise object and if the department concludes that the contract was awarded through corrupt practices, it would not be in the public interest to continue with the contract, as it would perpetuate the financial loss. Thus, to address the aforesaid contingency, the termination clause has been included and the same appears to be justified in public interest more-so, when the petitioner has failed to show any malafide on the part of the officials who issued the termination order. 33. Furthermore, the dismissal of the petitioner's earlier writ petition is inconsequential, as the cause of action for preferring Printed from counselvise.com [2026:RJ-JP:4514] (19 of 21) [CW-5747/2025] the writ was against a show-cause notice citing delay in the contract and upon filing of the writ petition by the respondent with a prayer to withdraw the earlier notice and proceed further on the complaint alleging corrupt practice, the Co-inordinate bench of this Court passed the following order:- \"Learned Advocate General appearing for respondents submits that he is ready to withdraw the impugned notice with liberty to proceed further in accordance with law. In view of above submission, prayer made in these writ petitions does not survive anymore. Accordingly, these civil writ petitions as well as pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of. However, petitioners would be at liberty to file fresh writ petition if any fresh notice is issued by the respondents.\" 34. The aforesaid order in no way indicates any malicious intent on the part of the department, there was enough material before the respondents to proceed further on the allegations in accordance with the terms of the contract. 35. The contention that the petitioners' company was not paid a single penny despite substantially completing the works under the contract is not the direct subject matter of the writ and the consequence of the termination. Further, as per the terms of the contract, the amount is payable upon successful completion and handover of the GSS for further maintenance and operation and the petitioner is free to put his claim for the part of the contract executed, before the respondents, in accordance with the Terms & Conditions of the agreement and his right to claim the amount has Printed from counselvise.com [2026:RJ-JP:4514] (20 of 21) [CW-5747/2025] been duly taken care of by the express term provided in Clause 36.2.5 GCC, and the same reads as follows:- \"36.2.5. Subject to GCC Sub-Clause 36.2.6, the Contractor shall be entitled to be paid the Contract Price attributable to the Facilities executed as of the date of termination, the value of any unused or partially used Plant and Equipment on the Site, and the costs, if any, incurred in protecting the Facilities and in leaving the Site in a clean and safe condition pursuant to paragraph (a) of GCC Sub-Clause 36.2.3. Any sums due to the Employer from the Contractor accruing prior to the date of termination shall be deducted from the amount to be paid to the Contractor under this Contract.\" 36. So far as the debarment proceeding is concerned, this Court finds that the said order was passed as per the terms of Sections 11 and 46 of the Act of 2012. Section 11(2)(a)(i) prescribes that “any offer, solicitation or acceptance of any bribe, reward or gift or any material benefit, either directly or indirectly, in exchange for an unfair advantage in the procurement process or to otherwise influence the procurement process” will lead to contravention of the Code of Integrity. Section 46(3) read with Section 11(3)(f) empowers the procuring entity, upon recording satisfaction regarding breach of the Code of Integrity, to take appropriate measures including exclusion from the procurement process and debarment for a period not exceeding three years. 37. The material placed on record indicates that the respondents initiated the debarment proceedings after forming a prima facie opinion regarding breach of the Code of Integrity, in exercise of powers expressly conferred by the statute and the impugned action, therefore, cannot be held to be without authority of law. In Printed from counselvise.com [2026:RJ-JP:4514] (21 of 21) [CW-5747/2025] the absence of any demonstrated violation of statutory procedure or denial of reasonable opportunity, this Court finds no ground to interfere with the debarment proceedings in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Conclusion:- 38. Resultantly, having regard to the settled legal principles and the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, it is evident that the impugned action is founded on an express contractual provision and is preceded by issuance of notices contemplated under the agreement, which in turn limits the scope of interference of this Court under Article 226. This Court cannot assume the role of an appellate forum to adjudicate disputed questions relating to performance of the contract, attribution of delay, sufficiency of resources or adequacy of explanations offered by the contractor. 39. Upshot to the above discussion, the instant writ petitions are devoid of any merits and are hereby dismissed. 40. All pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of. (PRAVEER BHATNAGAR),J Ashwani/ShubhamGandhi/-13-14 Printed from counselvise.com "