"IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT HYDERABAD FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AND THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH Reserved on : 07-3-2017 & Delivered on : 14-3-2017 Coram : The Honourable Mr. Justice V.RAMASUBRAMANIAN and The Honourable Ms. Justice J.UMA DEVI Writ Petition No.20045 of 2011 Aashirvad Films, Rep. by its Proprietor Sri Rajan Sharma, New Malakpet, Hyderabad-500 024, Andhra Pradesh … Petitioner Vs. 1. Union of India, Rep. by Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Shastri Bhawan, New Delhi-110 001 2. State of A.P., Rep. by Prl. Secretary, Revenue Department, Secretariat, Hyderabad, A.P. 3. The Commissioner, Commercial Taxes Dept., C.T. Complex, Nampally, Hyderabad, A.P. 4. State of Telangana, Rep. by its Prl. Secretary, Revenue Dept., Secretariat, Hyderabad, Telangana State 5. The Commissioner, Commercial Taxes Dept., Govt. of Telangana, C.T. Complex, Nampally, Hyderabad, Telangana State … Respondents For Petitioner : The petitioner appearing in person For Respondent No.1 : Mr. B.Narayana Reddy, Assistant Solicitor General For Respondents 3&5 : Mr. M.Govinda Reddy, Special Standing Counsel For Respondent No.4 : Government Pleader for Revenue (Telangana) VRS, J. & JUD, J. wp_20045_2011 2 HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V.RAMASUBRAMANIAN AND HON’BLE Ms. JUSTICE J.UMA DEVI Writ Petition No.20045 of 2011 Order: (per V.Ramasubramanian, J.) The petitioner has come up with the present writ petition challenging a notification issued by the Government of Andhra Pradesh granting exemption from payment of entertainment tax to certain categories of films, in exercise of the power conferred by Section 19-A of the A.P. Entertainment Tax Act, 1939. 2. Heard Mr. Rajan Sarma, the petitioner appearing in person and Mr. M. Govinda Reddy, learned special standing counsel appearing for the Commercial Tax. 3. The State of Andhra Pradesh enacted the Andhra Pradesh Entertainment Tax Act, 1939, which was deemed to have been enacted in terms of Entry No.62 of List-II of the VII Schedule to the Constitution. Under the Act, the State of Andhra Pradesh issued a notification, levying tax at the rate of 10% on Telugu films and a rate of 24% on non-Telugu films. 4. Challenging the said notification, the petitioner filed a writ petition on the file of the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution in W.P. (Civil) No.709 of 2004 (Aashirvad Films v. Union of India). The said writ petition was allowed by the Supreme Court on 18-5-2007 on the ground that the impugned levy was discriminatory in nature. VRS, J. & JUD, J. wp_20045_2011 3 Paragraph 25 of the decision of the Supreme Court reads as follows: “25. The purported classification only on the basis of language without anything more and in particular having regard to the difference in the rate of tax, in our opinion is ex-facie arbitrary. The burden was, therefore, on the State to show that the imposition was justified. Different rates of entertainment tax had not been levied having regard to the nature of theatre, the area where they were situated or extent of occupancy etc. It has not been explained as to whether cinema theatres exhibiting Telugu films suffer from any disadvantage which others had not been. It has not been shown as to why the same theatre where films in different languages are exhibited would be a class apart, only because at different times exhibit films produced in different languages. Moreover, how Telugu films have been treated as a separate class have not been stated. Although the legislature enjoys a greater freedom and latitude in chosing person upon whom and suggest upon which it can levy tax, it is true that taxing legislation are not immune from attack based on Article 14. It is also not the case of the respondent State that in imposing different rate of tax, they intend to achieve an avowed object envisaged under Part IV of the Constitution of India…..” 5. In implementation of the decision of the Supreme Court, the Government passed an order in G.O.Ms.No.604 Revenue dated 22-04-2008. By the said order, the Government made a different classification of the feature films, depending upon the place where they were produced. The relevant portion of the G.O.Ms.No.604 is as follows: “(i) in respect of all feature films of all languages, produced outside of Andhra Pradesh including dubbed films, the Entertainment Tax payable shall be as prescribed under section 4(1) and 4(1-A) of the A.P. Entertainment Tax Act, 1939 (as amended by Act No.32 of 2005). VRS, J. & JUD, J. wp_20045_2011 4 (ii) In cases of all feature films of all languages, produced in Andhra Pradesh, the Entertainment Tax payable shall be as prescribed in Annexures I and III appended to this G.O.; and (iii) In respect of all low budget feature films produced in Andhra Pradesh and in respect of old (5 years and above) and repeat run films, the Entertainment Tax leviable shall be as prescribed under the Annexure-II & IV appended to this G.O.” 6. In addition, the Government also issued a notification under the very same Government Order, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 19 A of the Act, granting exemption from the entertainment tax leviable under Sections 4(1) and 4(1-A) of the Act, as shown in the Annexures I to IV appended to the notification. Annexures I to IV to the exemption notification may have to be reproduced, for easy appreciation of the issues raised in the writ petition. Hence, they are reproduced as follows: ANNEXURE-I Statement showing the rate of Entertainment Tax exemption under Section 19-A of the Andhra Pradesh Entertainment Tax Act, 1939 which is payable under Section 4(1) of the said Act and the net tax payable after such exemption for the theatres in the local areas as specified therein for screening the Feature Films produced in the State of Andhra Pradesh. Local Area Theatre Amount of Tax payable u/S.4(1) Tax Exempted u/S.19-A Tax payable after exemption as shown in column (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) a) Municipal Corporations including Secunderabad Contonment Area 1) Air Con- dition & Air Cooled 2) Others 20% 18% 5% 5% 15% of the amount collected on actual sale of tickets for admission to every show. 13% of the amount collected on actual sale of tickets for admission to every show. b) Selection Grade 1) Air Con- dition & 20% 6% 14% of the amount collected on actual VRS, J. & JUD, J. wp_20045_2011 5 Municipalities Air Cooled 2) Others 18% 6% sale of tickets for admission to every show. 12% of the amount collected on actual sale of tickets for admission to every show. c) Special Grade Municipalities 1) Air Con- dition & Air Cooled 2) Others 20% 18% 7% 7% 13% of the amount collected on actual sale of tickets for admission to every show. 11% of the amount collected on actual sale of tickets for admission to every show. ANNEXURE-II Statement showing the rate of Entertainment Tax exemption under Section 19-A of the Andhra Pradesh Entertainment Tax Act, 1939 which is payable under Section 4(1) of the said Act and the net tax payable after such exemption for the theatres in the local areas as specified therein for screening the low budget Feature Films produced in the State of Andhra Pradesh which are five (5) years and above old and repeat run of such Films. Local Area Theatre Amount of Tax payable u/S.4(1) Tax Exempted u/S.19-A Tax payable after exemption as shown in column (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) a) Municipal Corporations including Contonment Area All Categories of theatres 20% 13% 7% of the amount collected on actual sale of tickets for admission to every show. b) Selection Grade Municipalities All Categories of theatres 20% 13% --do-- c) Special Grade Municipalities All Categories of theatres 20% 13% --do-- ANNEXURE-III Statement showing the rate of Entertainment Tax exemption under Section 19-A of the Andhra Pradesh Entertainment Tax Act, 1939 which is payable under Section 4(1-A) of the said Act in respect of the theatres in the local areas as specified therein for screening the Feature Films produced in the State of Andhra Pradesh. Local Area Theatre Amount of Tax payable u/S.4(1) Tax Exempted u/S.19-A Tax payable after exemption as shown in column (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) a) First Grade Municipalities All Categories of Theatres 10% 5% 5% of the Gross Collection capacity per show multiplied by 21. b) Second Grade Municipalities All 4% of the Gross VRS, J. & JUD, J. wp_20045_2011 6 c) Third Grade Municipalities Categories of Theatres 9% 5% Collection capacity per show multiplied by 21. d) Gram Panchayats, Town ships and other Local Authorities All Categories of Theatres 8% 5% 3% of the Gross Collection capacity per show multiplied by 17. 1) With a population of 15,000 and above i)Permanent and semi permanent ii) Touring and temporary 7% 7% 4% 5% 3% of the Gross Collection capacity per show multiplied by 14. 2% of the Gross Collection capacity per show multiplied by 10. 2) With a population of 7,500 and above but below 15,000 i)Permanent and semi permanent ii) Touring and temporary 6% 6% 4% 5% 2% of the Gross Collection capacity per show multiplied by 14. 1% of the Gross Collection capacity per show multiplied by 10. 3) With a population of less than 7,500 i)Permanent and semi permanent ii) Touring and temporary 5% 5% 4% 4% 1% of the Gross Collection capacity per show multiplied by 14. 1% of the Gross Collection capacity per show multiplied by 7. ANNEXURE-IV Statement showing the rate of Entertainment Tax exemption under Section 19-A of the Andhra Pradesh Entertainment Tax Act, 1939 which is payable under Section 4(1-A) of the said Act, in respect of the theatres in the local areas as specified therein for screening the low budget Feature Films produced in the State of Andhra Pradesh which are five years and above old and repeat run of such Films. Local Area Theatre Amount of Tax payable u/S.4(1) Partial Exemption granted u/S.19-A Tax payable after exemption as shown in column (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) a) First Grade Municipalities All Categories of Theatres 10% 7% 3% of the Gross Collection capacity per show multiplied by 21. b) Second Grade Municipalities c) Third Grade Municipalities All Categories of Theatres 9% 7% 2% of the Gross Collection capacity per show multiplied by 21. d) Gram Panchayats, Town ships and other Local Authorities All Categories of Theatres 8% 7% 1% of the Gross Collection capacity per show multiplied by 17. i) With a population of 15,000 and above i)Permanent and semi permanent 7% 6% 1% of the Gross Collection capacity per show multiplied by 14. VRS, J. & JUD, J. wp_20045_2011 7 ii) Touring and temporary 7% 6% 1% of the Gross Collection capacity per show multiplied by 10. ii) With a population of 7,500 and above but below 15,000 i)Permanent and semi permanent ii) Touring and temporary 6% 6% 5% 5% 1% of the Gross Collection capacity per show multiplied by 14. 1% of the Gross Collection capacity per show multiplied by 10. iii) With a population of less than 7,500 i)Permanent and semi permanent ii) Touring and temporary 5% 5% 4% 4% 1% of the Gross Collection capacity per show multiplied by 14. 1% of the Gross Collection capacity per show multiplied by 7. 7. Challenging the said notification, the petitioner again filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution in W.P. (Civil) No.484/2009 on the file of the Supreme Court. On 06-11-2009, the Supreme Court ordered the issue of notice. It appears that there were similar matters arising from different States and hence, the second writ petition filed by the petitioner was tagged along with the batch of cases. 8. Eventually, the petitioner withdrew the writ petition with liberty to approach this Court under Article 226 and hence, by an order dated 28-09-2010, the Supreme Court dismissed the writ petition with liberty. Thereafter, the petitioner has come up with the present writ petition challenging G.O.Ms.No.604, dated 22-04-2008. 9. The short ground on which the petitioner has come up with the above writ petition is that what was prohibited by the Supreme Court to be done directly, is sought to be done indirectly by the order impugned in the writ petition and that VRS, J. & JUD, J. wp_20045_2011 8 the impugned Government Order is clearly an attempt to overreach the judgment of the Supreme Court. The contention of the petitioner is that discrimination in the matter of taxation on the basis of place of production, amounts to unreasonable classification. 10. The State has filed a counter affidavit contending, inter alia, that the Telugu Film Industry was originally functioning from the city of Chennai and that later, most of the persons involved in the industry shifted to Hyderabad, setting up several Studios in and around Hyderabad. After the Supreme Court struck down the differential rates of tax for Telugu and non-Telugu films, the Government examined the issue and decided to place all language films on the same footing. However, the Government sought to grant a concession to films produced within the State of Andhra Pradesh, irrespective of the language of the film. Hence, what was sought to be done by the Government was only to remove the mischief that affected the vires of the previous notification in the year 2003. Insofar as the grant of exemption to films produced within the territory of Andhra Pradesh is concerned, the State has taken a stand that persons who produce films outside the State and those who produce inside the State belong to two different classes. Therefore, the State contends that there was no hostile discrimination offending Article 14. 11. Before testing the vires of the impugned notification on the touchstone of Article 14, we must remember that in VRS, J. & JUD, J. wp_20045_2011 9 view of the inherent complexity of fiscal adjustment of diverse elements, Courts permit a larger discretion to the Legislature in the matter of classification, when it comes to taxing statutes. In this regard, the power of the Legislature to classify, is of wide range and flexibility so that the State can adjust its system of taxation in all probable and reasonable ways (refer Khandige Sham Bhat v. Agricultural Income Tax Officer1 and V.Venugopala Ravi Varma Rajah v. Union of India2). 12. As pointed out by the Supreme Court in Anant Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat3, Article 14 forbids class legislation but not classification. The Court went to the extent of pointing out that in permissible classification, mathematical nicety and perfect equality are not required. To be more precise, the Supreme Court said that “similarity, not identity of treatment, is enough”. 13. Again in Murthy Match Works v. CCE4, the Supreme Court pointed out that a larger latitude is allowed to the State for classification upon a reasonable basis and that what is reasonable is a question of practical details and a variety of factors, which the Court will be reluctant and perhaps ill-equipped to investigate. In a lighter vein, the Court pointed out that in this imperfect world, perfection even in grouping, is an ambition hardly ever accomplished. 1 [1963] 48 ITR (SC) 21 2 [1969] 74 ITR 49 (SC) 3 (1975) 2 SCC 175 4 (1974) 4 SCC 428 VRS, J. & JUD, J. wp_20045_2011 10 14. Keeping the above principles in mind, if we come back to the decision of the Supreme Court in the petitioner’s own case (Aashirvad Films), it can be seen that the Supreme Court found the classification purely based upon language without anything more, to be arbitrary. We have already extracted paragraph-25 of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Aashirvad Films. It is clearly mentioned in the said paragraph that in that case, different rates of entertainment tax had not been levied having regard to the nature of theatre, the area where they were situated or the extent of occupancy. 15. In other words, the Supreme Court recognised the fact that it was permissible for the State to impose different rates of tax depending upon the area where the theatres were also located. As a matter of fact, Annexures-I to IV of the impugned notification tend to divide cinema theatres into (1) those located in Municipal Corporations, (2) those located in Selection Grade Municipalities, (3) those located within Special Grade Municipalities, (4) those located within Gram Panchayats and (5) those with a population of particular number. After classifying the cinema theatres depending upon their location, the Annexures to the impugned notification make a sub-categorisation by placing Air-conditioned theatres on one hand and non Air-conditioned theatres on the other hand. These classifications are obviously permissible and this is why the VRS, J. & JUD, J. wp_20045_2011 11 Supreme Court made the observation indicated above in paragraph-25 of its decision in Aashirvad Films. 16. In addition to the above, the impugned notification allows different types of exemption to films, irrespective of the language, if they are produced within the State. A discrimination based upon the location of the activity of production cannot be said to be arbitrary or whimsical. Courts have always distinguished hostile discrimination from protective discrimination. Day in and day out, the Governments invite investors to set up industries within their States, offering several concessions. Even within the State, certain areas are classified as backward areas and industries located therein are granted concessions even in the matter of taxation. 17. The above concession is based upon the premise that if an activity of production takes place at a particular location, the people of the area secure employment, trade and commerce within the area register an improvement and the economy of the State receives a boost, when an activity of production takes place within the State. 18. In M/s. Video Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Punjab5, the Supreme Court was concerned with a batch of cases in which the attempt made by some of the States to give preferential treatment to the goods manufactured or produced within the States, by providing exemptions, incentives etc., 5 AIR 1990 SC 820 VRS, J. & JUD, J. wp_20045_2011 12 were under challenge. In one batch, notifications issued by the Government of Uttar Pradesh under Section 4A of the U.P. Sales Tax Act, 1948, granting exemption from payment of tax to the goods manufactured by a new industrial unit was under challenge. In one writ petition forming part of the batch, a notification issued by the Punjab Government prescribing a two different rates of tax, one in respect of the electronic goods manufactured within the State and another in respect of the electronic goods manufactured outside the State was under challenge. 19. While rejecting the argument of discriminatory treatment between new units and old units, the Supreme Court observed in para-22 of the decision as follows: “22. It has to be examined whether difference in rates per se discriminates so as to come within Arts. 301 and 304(a) of the Constitution. It is manifest that free flow of trade between two States does not necessarily or generally depend upon the rate of tax alone. Many factors including the cost of goods play an important role in the movement of goods from one State to another. Hence the mere fact that there is a difference in the rate of tax on goods locally manufactured and those imported would not amount to hampering of trade between the two States within the meaning of Art. 301 of the Constitution. As it manifest, Art. 304 is an exception to Art. 301 of the Constitution. The need of taking resort to exception will arise only if the tax impugned is hit by Arts. 301 and 303 of the Constitution. If it is not then Art. 304 of the Constitution will not come into picture at all. See the observations in Nataraja Mudaliar’s case at pp. 843-6(of 1968(3) SCR 829 : at pp. 156-58 of AIR 1969 SC 147 (supra) of the report. It has to be borne in mind that there may be differentiations based on consideration of natural or VRS, J. & JUD, J. wp_20045_2011 13 business factors which are more or less in force in different localities. A State might be allowed to impose a higher rate of tax on a commodity either when it is not consumed at all within the State or if it is felt that the burden falling on consumers within the State, will be more than that and large benefit is derived by the revenue. The imposition of a rates of sales tax is influenced by various political, economic and social factors. Prevalence of differential rate of tax on sales of the same commodity cannot be regarded in isolation as determinative of the object to discriminate between one State and another. Under the Constitution originally framed revenue from sales tax was reserved for the States.” 20. In para-26 of the report in M/s. Video Electronics Pvt. Ltd., the 3-member bench of the Supreme Court dealt with the argument based upon the concept of economic unity and also dealt with the power of exemption and held as follows: “26. It was submitted by the respondents that this is not the correct position. This argument ignores the basic feature of the Constitution and also the fact that the concept of economic unity may not necessarily be the same as it was at the time of Constitution making. The result of the same would be acceptance of the view that a State which was technically and economically weak in 1950 due to various factors, must always remain the same and cannot be helped to, develop economically by granting concessions/exemptions or allowing subsidies etc. for establishing new industries so as to be economically developed. It was also submitted that if all the parts of India i.e. to say all the States are economically strong or developed then only can economic unity as a whole be assured and strengthened. Hence, the concept of economic unity is every changing with very wide horizons and cannot and should not be imprisoned in a strait-jacket of the concept and notion as advocated by the petitioners. Economic unity of India is one of the constitutional VRS, J. & JUD, J. wp_20045_2011 14 aspirations of India and safeguarding the attainment and maintenance of that unity are objectives of the Indian Constitution. It would be wrong, however, to assume that India as a whole is already an economic unit. Economic unity can only be achieved if all parts of whole of Union of India develop equally, economically. Indeed, in the affidavits of opposition various grounds have been indicated on behalf of the respondents suggesting the need for incentives and exemptions, and these were suggested to be absolutely necessary for economic viability and survival for these industries in these States. These were based on cogent and intelligible reasons of economic encouragement and growth. There was a rationale in these which is discernible. The power to grant exemption is always inherent in all taxing Statutes. If the suggestions/submissions as advanced by the petitioners are accepted, it was averred, and in our opinion rightly, that it will destroy completely or make nugatory the plenary powers of the States. If the exemption is based on natural and business factors and does not involve any intentional bias, the impugned notifications to grant exemption for limited period on certain specific conditions cannot be held to be bad. Judged by that yardstick, the present notifications cannot be held to be violative of the constitutional provisions. An examination of Art. 304(a)would reveal that what is being prohibited by this article which is really an exception to Art. 301 will not apply if Art. 301 does not apply.” 21. Again in para-36 of the report in M/s. Video Electronics Pvt. Ltd., the Court summed up the possession with regard to the power of exemption as follows: “36. It has to be reiterated that sales tax laws in all the States provide for exemption. It is well-settled that the different entries in lists I, II and III of the 7th Schedule deal with the fields of legislation, and these should be construed widely, liberally and harmoniously. And these entries have been construed to include ancillary or incidental power. Power to grant exemption is inherent in all taxing legislations. Economic unity is a desired goal, economic VRS, J. & JUD, J. wp_20045_2011 15 equilibrium and prosperity is also the goal. Development on parity is one of the commitments of the Constitution. Directive principles enshrined in Arts. 38 & 39 must be harmonised with economic unity as well as economic development of developed and under-developed areas. In that light on Art. 14 of the Constitution, it is necessary that the prohibitions in Art. 301 and the scope of Art. 304(a) & (b) should be understood and construed. Constitution is a living organism and the latent meaning of the expressions used can be given effect to only if a particular situation arises. It is not that with changing times the meaning changes but changing times illustrate and illuminate the meaning of the expressions used. The connotation of the expressions used takes its shape and colour in evolving dynamic situations. A backward State or a disturbed State cannot with parity engage in competition with advanced or developed States. Even within a State, there are often backward areas which can be developed only if some special incentives are granted. If the incentives in the form of subsidies or grant are given to any part of units of a State so that it may come out of its limping or infancy to compete as equals with others, that, in our opinion, does not and cannot contravene the spirit and the letter of Part XIII of the Constitution. However, this is permissible only if there is a valid reason, that is to say, if there are justifiable and rational reasons for differentiation. If there is none, it will amount to hostile discrimination. Judged in this light, despite the submissions of Mr. Sanjay Parikh and Mr. Vaidyanathan, we are unable to accept the contentions that the petitioner sought to urge in this application.” 22. The above passage from the decision of the 3-member bench of the Supreme Court in M/s. Video Electronics Pvt. Ltd., clinches the issue on hand. This is due to the fact that the Government had imposed uniform rate of tax on all films irrespective of the language in which they are produced. But it has created 2 different types of VRS, J. & JUD, J. wp_20045_2011 16 classifications, namely, (1) those produced within the State and those produced outside the State and (2) the area in which the theatres are located. Such a classification cannot be stated to be unreasonable or arbitrary. It has a clear nexus with the object sought to be achieved namely to promote trade and commerce and improve the employment potential. Therefore, the classification does not fall foul of Article 14. 23. Hence, the writ petition is devoid of merits. Therefore, it is dismissed. The miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this writ petition shall stand closed. No costs. ___________________________ V.RAMASUBRAMANIAN, J. _______________ J.UMA DEVI, J. 14th March, 2017. Ksn/Ak Note:- Issue C.C. by tomorrow. (B/o) Cbs/Ak VRS, J. & JUD, J. wp_20045_2011 17 HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V.RAMASUBRAMANIAN AND HON’BLE Ms. JUSTICE J.UMA DEVI Writ Petition No.20045 of 2011 (per VRS, J.) 14th March, 2017. (Ak) "