Ajay Kumar Singh V. The Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Science and Technology and CSIR-Central Institute of Mining and Fuel Research (CIMFR) and The Finance and Accounts Officer, CSIR-CIMFR and The Administrative Officer, CSIR-CIMFR and Section Officer, CSIR-CIMFR

WPC/5927/2022

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Ajay Kumar Singh, a retired scientist from CSIR-CIMFR, approached the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi after the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) denied him gratuity due to ongoing criminal proceedings against him. Singh argued that since his pension was being disbursed, his gratuity should also be released, citing the Tribunal's earlier findings of only casualness in his departmental proceedings. The respondents defended the decision based on Rule 69(1)(c) of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, which prohibits gratuity payment during the pendency of judicial proceedings. The High Court agreed with the respondents on the legal interpretation but set aside the Tribunal's imposition of costs on Singh.

• Counselvise Citation: [2024] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 800161 (HC-JHARKHAND)
• Appeal Type: Others
• Pronouncement Date: 12-11-2024
• Assessment Year: misc
• Other Referred Cases: State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh, Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala, Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai v. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala, State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements, Zuari Cement Ltd. v. Regional Director ESIC Hyderabad, L. Chander Kumar Versus Union of India, West Bengal Central School Service Commission v. Abdul Halim, T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa
• Laws Referred To: Article 226 of the Constitution of India, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, Civil Services Classification and Control Appeal Rules, 1965, CCS(Leave) Rules, 1972
• Result in Favour of: Revenue
• Court: HIGH COURT
• Department Lawyers: RADHAN GUPTA; K S KHOYA; ABHAY PRAKASH; DURGESH AGARWAL
• Assessee Lawyers: RUPESH SINGH
• Keywords: Criminal prosecution; Departmental proceeding; Gratuity; Leave encashment; Pension; Judicial proceeding
• Section: 13(2); 14; 13(1)(d); 120-B; 120-B; 420; 471; 467; 39(3); 9(2)(b); 69(1)(c)

Judgement Text

" IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(S). No. 5927 of 2022 ------ Ajay Kumar Singh, aged about 65 years, son of Late Dhananjay Prasad Singh, resident of 406, Madhuri Palace, Bartand, P.O. & P.S. Dhanbad, District Dhanbad, Jharkhand. ... ... Petitioner Versus 1. The Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Science and Technology, Technology Bhawan, New Mehrauli Road, P.O. and P.S.-Mehrauli, New Delhi, 110016. 2. CSIR-Central Institute of Mining and Fuel Research (in short “CIMFR”), through its Director, having its Office at Barwa Road, P.O. & P.S. Dhanbad, District Dhanbad, Jharkhand. 3. The Finance and Accounts Officer, CSIR-CIMFR, having its Office at Barwa Road, P.O. & P.S. Dhanbad, District Dhanbad, Jharkhand. 4. The Administrative Officer, CSIR-CIMFR, having its Office at Barwa Road, P.O. & P.S. Dhanbad, District Dhanbad. 5. Section Officer, CSIR-CIMFR, having its Office at Barwa Road, P.O. & P.S. Dhanbad, District Dhanbad, Jharkhand. … … Respondents ----- CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVNEET KUMAR -------- For the Petitioner : Mr. Rupesh Singh, Advocate For the Respondent(s) : Mr. Radhan Krishan Gupta, CGC Mr. K.S. Khoya, CGC Mr. Abhay Prakash, Advocate Mr. Durgesh Agarwal, Advocate -------- 07 / Dated: 12th November, 2024 Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J. Prayer: 1. The writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India wherein the order dated 21.10.2022 passed by the learned 2 WP(S) No.5927 of 2022 Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), Patna Bench, Circuit Bench at Ranchi in O.A. No. 771/2019 has been challenged by which the grievance of the writ petitioner for disbursement of gratuity has been declined to be granted in favour of the writ petitioner with a cost of Rs.5,000/-. Factual Matrix: 2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the writ petition which requires to be enumerated herein, reads as under: The petitioner had joined the respondent organization as Scientist in Grade-B in the month of March, 1988 and thereafter promoted to Grade-C in the month of March,1991 and finally up to Grade-E-1 in the month of March, 1996. Till the year 2003 there was no any complaint against the satisfactory service rendered by the petitioner but unfortunately an F.I.R. bearing No. RC1(A)/2003/D7 was registered on 28.01.2003 on the allegations that the officials / employees of CISR-CIMFR including the petitioner, have indulged in misconduct amounting to loss of approximately Rs. 50,00,000/- to the organization in purchase of chemicals, other consumable items and equipments. The prosecution after investigation submitted charge sheet against the accused persons being Charge Sheet No.3 dated 19.04.2006 and the petitioner as on date is facing the criminal prosecution in the aforesaid case registered under Section 120-B, 420, 467 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code read with Section 13(2) and 13(1) (D) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The petitioner was simultaneously proceeded against under departmental proceeding and two memorandums of charges dated 22.11.2002 and third Memorandum of Charge dated 31.12.2002 under Rule- 14 of the Classification, Control 3 WP(S) No.5927 of 2022 and Appeal Rules, 1965 (as adopted with modifications) were served upon the petitioner for the alleged misconduct in capacity of member of SPC-1 resulting in purchase of items leading to loss to the organization. In the aforesaid charge sheet dated 31.12.2002 and other two charge sheets dated 22.11.2002, the applicant was held to be guilty of charges levelled against him vide orders dated 11.09.2006, 14.09.2006 and 15.09.2006 which was issued by the Adhoc Disciplinary Authority, inflicting punishment of reduction of one lower stage in the time scale of pay for a period of one year which will have the effect of postponing the future increments of pay of the applicant. The petitioner moved before the appellate-authority but on account of non-disposal of the appeal, he filed Ο.Α. No. 179/2006 before the Hon'ble Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench at Ranchi, which was disposed vide order dated 17.01.2007 directing the appellate-authority to decide the appeal within a period of three months. The appellate-authority upheld the order of disciplinary authority vide order dated 20.04.2007 without referring to the issues and point raised by the petitioner and therefore, the petitioner again moved before the Hon'ble Central Administrative Tribunal Ο.Α. No. 180/2007 bringing on record the relevant materials which after appreciation, the Hon'ble Tribunal set aside the appellate order vide judgment dated 16.04.2009 and directed the petitioner to prefer an additional appeal. Accordingly, the petitioner preferred the additional appeal on 29.04.2009. The appellate-authority after hearing the petitioner was pleased to modify the order of penalty dated 11.09.2006, 4 WP(S) No.5927 of 2022 14.09.2006 and 15.09.2006 to that of the minor penalty of censure vide order dated 22.12.2009 in which all the three departmental proceedings were conjointly dealt with by the Appellate Authority. The petitioner being aggrieved of the order of censure passed by the appellate-authority in spite of finding of only casualness against the petitioner, the petitioner again challenged the same before the Hon'ble Central Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No. 253/2010 and the Hon'ble Central Administrative Tribunal after hearing the parties was pleased to remand the matter back to the Appellate Authority for fresh consideration. Accordingly, the Appellate Authority vide order dated 01.05.2014 was pleased to modify order of punishment of censure to that of warning. The petitioner had participated in one of the meetings of SPC-I held on 29.04.1999 in the capacity of Scientist Member in Standing Purchase Committee and in the said meeting dated 29.04.1999, as per petitioner nothing had concluded with respect to the tender process for purchase of material / equipment and the petitioner had subsequently resigned from the post of Scientist Member in Standing Purchase Committee- I before the next meeting could be held. In the meantime, the petitioner while facing, as on date, the agony of trial in the aforesaid criminal case registered by the C.B.I. has attained the age of superannuation on 30.06.2017 and retired from the services of the respondent. The petitioner was not being released his admitted post- retirement benefits as such he made several representations before the Respondent No.2 and also before the Chairman of the Local Grievance Committee, CSIR-CIMFR, Dhanbad. The 5 WP(S) No.5927 of 2022 respondent vide letter bearing reference no. 471 dated 13.07.2017 was pleased to release the Provident Fund dues of the petitioner and the same has been released in his favour. The petitioner is also in receipt of his monthly provisional pension which was sanctioned vide P.P.O. No. 2251/ CIMFR / 2017 dated 04.07.2017. The petitioner made an application before the Chairman, Local Grievance Committee on 23.01.2018 due to non- payment of leave encashment and gratuity. He also made an application on 04.05.2018 raising the grievance with respect to non-payment of leave encashment and gratuity and when nothing substantial came out of the aforesaid representation, the petitioner again represented before the respondent on 30.05.2018. On account of large number of employees / officers / Scientists facing the criminal trial under the C.B.I. cases aforesaid, several applications / representations were made by the affected persons raising their grievance for non-payment of aforesaid benefits and accordingly, CSIR-CIMFR vide Memo No.783 dated 12/13.06.2018 constituted a Five Member Committee to look into the grievance of eight persons, all retired Scientists including the applicant. The said Committee constituted vide Memo dated 12/13.06.2018 and was reconstituted vide Memo No. 1092 dated 20.11.2018 wherein the 6th member was inducted in the said Committee. That, when nothing substantial came out from the said Committee, the applicant again made a representation to CISR-CIMFR on 24.12.2018. The respondents vide Memo No. 203 dated 31.01.2019 had released the amount of leave encashment for 300 days in favour of the petitioner. However, the said Office Memorandum 6 WP(S) No.5927 of 2022 further reads that in the light of the Committee Report, the competent authority was pleased to direct withholding of Rs. 35,110.23/-. Resultantly, the petitioner is now in receipt of his Earned Leave Encashment amount after deduction of Rs.35,110.23. A perusal of the minutes of the meeting dated 10.12.2018 enclosed to the aforesaid Memorandum dated 31.01.2019 would disclose that the Committee has taken into consideration a total loss of Rs. 64,00,000/- (Rupees Sixty Four Lacs) by the organization and recommended to withhold the maximum value of loss in respect of seven individual accused Scientists against the admissible Leave Encashment including that of the applicant on pro-rata basis. There are other employees also who are not Scientists and are facing allegation of causing loss to the employer organization upon whom rest of the alleged loss may be saddled by the respondents in future. In the light of grievance raised by the petitioner before the Chairman, Local Grievance Committee, after appreciating the facts and circumstances of the case was pleased to record that for withholding of the amount of leave encashment, the entire matter be placed before the competent Authority i.e. the Director CSIR- CIMFR, Dhanbad. Accordingly, the same was placed before the Director, who in the light of the minutes of meeting dated 10.12.2018 had directed to withhold the amount of Rs. 35,110.23/- in respect of the petitioner. The grievance of the petitioner relating to non-payment of Gratuity was not paid heed to by the Respondents in spite of several requests. Under such circumstances, the petitioner move before the Hon'ble Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench at Ranchi 7 WP(S) No.5927 of 2022 vide O.A. No.771/2019 praying for direction upon the respondents to release the entire gratuity amount as also the amount deducted from the leave encashment of the petitioner. The Hon'ble Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench at Ranchi issued notice upon the respondents and the respondents filed their written statement in the matter. The O.A. No.771/2019 was finally disposed by pronouncement of the order / judgment on 21.10.2022, whereby the Hon'ble Central Administrative Tribunal, Patna Bench at Ranchi has dismissed the Original Application with cost of Rs.5,000/-. 3. It is evident from the factual aspects that the writ petitioner while in service had been dealt with a departmental proceeding under Section 14 of the Civil Services Classification and Conduct Rule, 1965. Simultaneously, a criminal proceeding has also been instituted being RC-1(A)/2003/D7. The petitioner on superannuation after attaining the normal age of superannuation has got the pension in view of the provision of Rule 9(2)(b) of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred as the “Rule 1972”) but the gratuity has been declined to be released in view of the embargo as provided under Rule 69(1)(c) of the Rule, 1972. The pension has been paid but when the gratuity has not been paid, the representation was filed for disbursement of the gratuity and in course of pending decision by the authority concern, the petitioner has approached to the learned Tribunal for disbursement of the amount of gratuity on the ground that in the meanwhile, the departmental proceeding has been concluded by inflicting punishment of censure but the learned Tribunal has 8 WP(S) No.5927 of 2022 rejected the Original Application with a cost of Rs.5,000/-. The writ petitioner being aggrieved with the said order has approached to this Court by filing this writ petition. Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner: 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has taken following grounds assailing the order passed by the learned Tribunal:- (i) The learned Tribunal has failed to appreciate the position of law that once the pension has been decided to be disbursed in favour of the petitioner, then there was no occasion or reason to withhold the gratuity. (ii) The ground has been taken that the justice demand that the law as provided under Rule 69(1)(c) is required to be followed with flexibility herein depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case particularly in the factual scenario of the present case wherein even though departmental proceeding has been concluded with warning but on the garb of pending judicial proceeding which is lying pending in the competent court of criminal jurisdiction since the year 2003, the amount of gratuity has not yet been paid in the garb of the rider as provided under Rule 69(1)(c) of the Rule 1972. The learned Tribunal being the constitutional forum ought to have taken into consideration this aspect of the matter, having failed so, the impugned order suffers from an error, hence, the present writ petition. (iii) Third issue is that the leave encashment which has been withheld by the authority in view of the provision of Rule 39(3) of CCS(Leave) Rules, 1972 and the Tribunal has declined to pass positive direction in favour of the writ petitioner. 9 WP(S) No.5927 of 2022 Submission of the learned counsel for the respondents: 5. Per contra, Mr. Abhay Prakash, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent by defending the impugned order has submitted that there is no error in the impugned order reason being that the Tribunal has taken note of the statutory provision as provided under Rule 69(1)(c) of the Rule, 1972 which put barrier in disbursement of the amount of gratuity either in course of pending departmental proceeding or judicial proceeding. 6. The ground has been agitated that the said Rule 1972 has been adopted by the respondent-CIMFR and as such what has been argued on behalf of the writ petitioner that the statutory provision ought to have been considered with flexibility cannot be said to be acceptable in view of the fact that the moment statutory provision has been legislated, the same is required to be followed in its strict sense and the moment there will be any relaxation in the statutory provision, the same will be said to be arbitrary exercise of the power of the authority. 7. The learned Tribunal by taking into consideration the aforesaid aspect of the matter and considering the restriction in view of the provision of Rule 69(1)(c) of the Rules, 1972, it has rejected the claim of the writ petitioner for disbursement of the amount of gratuity, the same cannot be said to be suffered from an error. Analysis: 8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone across the finding recorded by the learned Tribunal in the impugned order and factual aspect as available in the pleading. 9. So far as third issue as has been raised by the petitioner in his submission is concerned i.e. the leave encashment which has been withheld by the authority in view of the provision of Rule 10 WP(S) No.5927 of 2022 39(3) of CCS(Leave) Rules, 1972 is concerned which has been declined by the Tribunal to passed positive direction in favour of the writ petitioner, this Court has gone through the provision as contained under Rule 39(3) of CCS (Leave) Rules, 1972 and found there from that the power has been conferred to the authority to withhold the leave encashment in view of the provision of Rule 39(3) of CCS (Leave) Rules, 1972. 10. For the reference, Rule 39(3) of CCS (Leave) Rules, 1972 is referred herein:- “(3) The authority competent to grant leave may withhold whole or part of cash equivalent of earned leave in the case of a Government servant who retires from service on attaining the age of retirement while under suspension or while disciplinary or criminal proceedings are pending against him, if in the view of such authority there is a possibility of some money becoming recoverable from him on conclusion of the proceedings against him on conclusion of the proceedings, he will become eligible to the amount so withheld after adjustment of Government dues, if any.” 11. This Court after having referred the statutory provision and adverting to the finding so recorded by the learned Tribunal is of the view that if the positive direction has not been passed by the learned Tribunal with respect to the issue of leave encashment, the same cannot be said to be suffered from any error in view of the provision as contained under Rule 39(3) of CCS (Leave) Rules, 1972. 12. The question which requires consideration in the present 11 WP(S) No.5927 of 2022 writ petition is as to whether the Tribunal while rejecting the claim of the writ petitioner on the basis of the provision of Rule 69(1)(c) of the Rules, 1972 has erred? 13. This Court before considering the said issue needs to refer herein the undisputed fact and the law which is applicable to the parties concerned. 14. Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972 is the central legislation to look into the issue of pension/gratuity of the public servant working under the Central Government. The respondent- CIMFR although which is not a central government establishment but under the control of the central government i.e. under CSIR registered under the Co-operative Society Act. The CIMFR is to run on the basis of the decision which is to be taken by the Governing Body. Herein the Governing Body has taken decision to adopt the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. 15. The CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 since has been adopted by the CIMFR and the present writ petitioner was working under the CIMFR and the moment Rule 1972 was adopted, the same will bind the writ petitioner also since he was an ex-employee of the CIMFR. 16. Moreover, the issue of adoption has never been challenged by the writ petitioner before any forum which also clarifies that the adoption of Rule 1972 will be applicable for all the employees working under the CIMFR so long as the adoption is in acceptance. 17. The CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 deals with the issue of pension and gratuity that with respect to disbursement and withholding the benefits of the pension or gratuity. Two Relevant provisions are necessary to be quoted herein. The first is Rule 9 and the second is Rule 69 thereof. 12 WP(S) No.5927 of 2022 18. Rule 9 deals with the issue of pension while Rule 69 put a rider. 19. Rule 69 particularly (1)(c) put a rider in disbursement of the amount of the gratuity, for the ready reference, Rule 9 and Rule 69 are being referred herein: “9. Right of President to withhold or withdraw pension-[(1) The President reserves to himself the right of withholding a pension or gratuity, or both, either in full or in part, or withdrawing a pension in full or in part, whether permanently or for a specified period, and of ordering recovery from a pension or gratuity of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Government, if in any departmental or judicial proceedings, the pensioner is found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence during the period of service, including service rendered upon re-employment after retirement : Provided that the Union Public Service Commission shall be consulted before any final orders are passed : Provided further that where a part of pension is withheld or withdrawn the amount of such pensions shall not be reduced below the amount of rupees three hundred and seventy-five per mensem.] (2) (a) The departmental proceedings referred to in sub-rule (1), if instituted while the Government servant was in service whether before his retirement or during his re-employment, shall, 13 WP(S) No.5927 of 2022 after the final retirement of the Government servant, be deemed to be proceedings under this rule and shall be continued and concluded by the authority by which they were commenced in the same manner as if the Government servant had continued in service : Provided that where the departmental proceedings are instituted by an authority subordinate to the President, that authority shall submit a report recording its findings to the President. (b) The departmental proceedings, is not instituted while the Government servant was in service, whether before his retirement, or during his re-employment, - (i) shall not be instituted save with the sanction of the President, (ii) shall not be in respect of any event which took place more than four years before such institution, and (iii) shall be conducted by such authority and in such place as the President may direct and in accordance with the procedure applicable to departmental proceedings in relation to the Government servant during his service (4) In the case of Government servant who has retired on attaining the age of superannuation or otherwise and against whom any departmental or judicial proceedings are instituted or where departmental proceedings are continued under 14 WP(S) No.5927 of 2022 sub-rule (2), a provisional pension as provided in [Rule 59] shall be sanctioned. (5) Where the President decides not to withhold or withdraw pension but orders recovery of pecuniary loss from pension, the recovery shall not ordinarily be made at a rate exceeding one- third of the pension admissible on the date of retirement of a Government servant. (6) For the purpose of this rule, - (a) departmental proceedings shall be deemed to be instituted on the date on which the statement of charges is issued to the Government servant or pensioner, or if the Government servant has been placed under suspension from an earlier date, on such date ; and (b) judicial proceedings shall be deemed to be instituted – (i) in the case of criminal proceedings, on the date on which the complaint or report of a police officer, of which the Magistrate takes cognizance, is made, and (ii) in the case of civil proceedings, on the date the plaint is presented in the court.” …….. 69. Provisional pension where departmental or judicial proceedings may be pending “ (1) (a) In respect of a Government servant referred to in sub-rule (4) of Rule 9, the Accounts Officer shall authorize the provisional pension equal to the maximum pension which would have 15 WP(S) No.5927 of 2022 been admissible on the basis of qualifying service up to the date of retirement of the Government servant, or if he was under suspension on the date of retirement up to the date immediately preceding the date on which he was placed under suspension. (b) The provisional pension shall be authorized by the Accounts Officer during the period commencing from the date of retirement up to and including the date on which, after the conclusion of departmental or judicial proceedings, final orders are passed by the competent authority. (c) No gratuity shall be paid to the Government servant until the conclusion of the departmental or judicial proceedings and issue of final orders thereon : 1Provided that where departmental proceedings have been instituted under Rule 16 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, for imposing any of the penalties specified in Clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) of Rule 11 of the said rules, the payment of gratuity shall be authorized to be paid to the Government servant. (2) Payment of provisional pension made under sub-rule (1) shall be adjusted against final retirement benefits sanctioned to such Government servant upon conclusion of such proceedings but no recovery shall be made where the pension finally sanctioned is less than the 16 WP(S) No.5927 of 2022 provisional pension or the pension is reduced or withheld either permanently or for a specified period.” 20. The admitted position herein is that the amount of pension, has already been finalized in view of the applicability of the provision of Rule 9(2)(b) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. 21. Further, admitted position herein is that the writ petitioner was dealt with by initiation of the departmental proceeding which culminated into an order of warning. Simultaneous to the initiation of the departmental proceeding, a criminal case was also instituted being RC-1A/2003/D7 which has been reported to be still pending before the competent Court of criminal jurisdiction at Dhanbad. 22. The writ petitioner has been disbursed with the pension. The writ petitioner had made a representation for disbursement of the amount of gratuity questioning the authority that the amount of gratuity cannot be withheld. The writ petitioner had approached to the Tribunal when the authority has taken no decision on the claim which was agitated by filing the representation for disbursement of the amount of gratuity. The said claim was rejected by the learned Tribunal after agreeing to the objection raised on behalf of the respondents with respect to the applicability of the provision of Rule 69(1)(c) of the (Pension) Rules, 1972. 23. The law is well settled that if any statutory provision is there, the same is to be complied with in its strict sense and the action is to be taken based upon the statutory provision without any deviation. Therefrom, a reference in this regard made to Judgment rendered in the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh, reported in AIR 1964 SC 358, 17 WP(S) No.5927 of 2022 wherein it has been held at paragraph 8 as under: “….its result is that if a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted….” Reference has also made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala, reported in (1999) 3 SCC 422, wherein it has been at paragraphs 31 & 32 as under: “31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The origin of this rule is traceable to the decision in Taylor v. Taylor which was followed by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor who stated as under: “[W]here a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all.” 32. This rule has since been approved by this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of V.P. and again in Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan. These cases were considered by a three-judge bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh and the rule laid down 18 WP(S) No.5927 of 2022 in Nazir Ahmad case was again upheld. This rule has since been applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by courts and has also been recognized as a statutory principle of administrative law.” 24. Reference to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court also needs to be made in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai v. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala, reported in (2002) 1 SCC 633, wherein it has been held at paragraph 27 as under: “….. it is a normal rule of consideration that when a statute vests certain power in an authority to be exercised in a particular manner then the said authority has to exercise it only in the manner provided in the statute itself….” 25. Reference is also made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements, reported in (2005) 1 SCC 368, wherein it has been held at paragraph 26 as under: “….it is the cardinal rule of interpretation that where a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way. It is also settled rule of interpretation that where a statute is penal in character, it must be strictly construed and followed …..” 26. Reference is also made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Zuari Cement Ltd. v. Regional Director ESIC Hyderabad (in Civil Appeal No. 5138-40/2007), reported in (2015) 7 SCC 690, wherein it 19 WP(S) No.5927 of 2022 has been held at paragraph 14 as under: “14. As per the scheme of the Act, the appropriate Government alone could grant or refuse exemption. When the statute prescribed the procedure for grant or refusal of exemption from the operation of the Act, it is to be done in that manner and not in any other manner. In State of Jharkhand v. Ambay Cements, it was held that : (SCC p. 378, para 26) 26…. it is the cardinal rule of interpretation that where a statute provides that a particular thing should be done, it should be done in the manner prescribed and not in any other way.” 27. It is the settled position of law that a thing is required to be done strictly in pursuance to the provisions of law, if any deviation, then ultimately the provision as contained under the statute will have no effect. Herein the pension has been disbursed in favour of the writ petitioner, in view of the provision of Rule 9. 28. We have considered the provision of Rule 9 wherein there is no embargo in disbursement of the pensionary benefit either in course of pending departmental proceeding or judicial proceeding. Therefore, while finalizing the pension, the authorities have acted in terms of the provision of Rule 9(2)(b) of CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 but while making a position to the claim of the gratuity before the Tribunal, the reference of provision of Rule 69(1)(c) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 has been raised. 29. This Court has gone through the provision as contained under Rule 69 which consists of three sub-provision, 20 WP(S) No.5927 of 2022 1(a)(b)(c)& 2. Herein the facts and circumstances, the (1)(C) is relevant when the embargo has been created in disbursement of the amount of gratuity in case of either the pending departmental proceeding or judicial proceeding. 30. Herein admittedly, a departmental proceeding has been culminated by passing an order of warning but the fact about pending judicial proceeding is admitted one. Therefore, if the learned Tribunal has accepted the objection so raised by the respondent before it by making reference of provision of Rule 69(1)(c) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 which according to our considered view cannot be said to be suffer from an error, in view of the principle that if the statute provides a provision, the same is to be adhered to in its strict sense. 31. This Court is conscious with the power which is to be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as has been laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of L. Chander Kumar Versus Union of India, (1997)3 SCC 261and its para 99 needs to be referred herein:- “99. In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that clause 2(d) of Article 323-A and clause 3(d) of Article 323-B, to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act and the “exclusion of jurisdiction” clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of Articles 323-A and 323-B would, to the same extent, be unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article 21 WP(S) No.5927 of 2022 323-A and Article 323-B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence to test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the Tribunal concerned falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the Tribunal concerned. Section 5(6) of the Act is valid and constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have indicated.” 32. The High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is to consider the propriety or impropriety of the order passed by the Tribunal under the power of judicial review and the judicial review has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Apex Court that is there is any error apparent on face of order, then such order needs to be interfered with. 33. The error apparent on the face of the order means that if the order appears on its face having with error, then only the power of judicial review is to be exercised. 34. In the case of West Bengal Central School Service Commission v. Abdul Halim, (2019) 18 SCC 39, their Lordships have been pleased to hold at paragraph-30 that the power of judicial review must be exercised by the Court after determining that the impugned order is vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record and not the same has been established by a process of reasoning. Paragraph-30 of the aforesaid judgment is being referred as under: “30. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the 22 WP(S) No.5927 of 2022 Court is to see whether the decision impugned is vitiated by an apparent error of law. The test to determine whether a decision is vitiated by error apparent on the face of the record is whether the error is self-evident on the face of the record or whether the error requires examination or argument to establish it. If an error has to be established by a process of reasoning, on points where there may reasonably be two opinions, it cannot be said to be an error on the face of the record, as held by this Court in Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Millikarjun BhavanappaTirumale [Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, AIR 1960 SC 137]. If the provision of a statutory rule is reasonably capable of two or more constructions and one construction has been adopted, the decision would not be open to interference by the writ court. It is only an obvious misinterpretation of a relevant statutory provision, or ignorance or disregard thereof, or a decision founded on reasons which are clearly wrong in law, which can be corrected by the writ court by issuance of writ of certiorari.” 35. Similarly, the Hon’ble Apex court in the case of Municipal Council, Neemuch v. Mahadeo Real Estate (2019) 10 SCC 738 has held as under : (SCC p. 746, para 16) “16. It could thus be seen that an interference by the High Court would be warranted only when the decision impugned is vitiated by an apparent error of law i.e. when the error is apparent on the face of the 23 WP(S) No.5927 of 2022 record and is self-evident. The High Court would be empowered to exercise the powers when it finds that the decision impugned is so arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person would have ever arrived at. It has been reiterated that the test is not what the Court considers reasonable or unreasonable but a decision which the Court thinks that no reasonable person could have taken. Not only this but such a decision must have led to manifest injustice.” 36. Further, In the case of T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, (1954) 1 SCC 905 : (1955) 1 SCR 250, their Lordship have held that the patent error in a decision can be corrected by writ of certiorari, when it is manifested by the error apparent on the face of the proceedings. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is quoted hereunder: “11. … An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari but it must be a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings e.g. when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error which can be corrected by certiorari but not a mere wrong decision.….” 37. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid settled legal position it is evident that the power of judicial review can be exercised, if error on the face of the order impugned, challenged under the Article 226 of Constitution of India, appears to be there. 38. This Court based upon the discussion made herein above and taking into consideration the fact that the Tribunal after considering the statutory provision as contained under Rule 24 WP(S) No.5927 of 2022 69(1)(c) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, since has declined to pass positive direction in favour of the writ petitioner which according to our considered view cannot be said to suffer from an error and as such in view of the power of judicial review, such order needs no interference. 39. At this juncture, Mr. Rupesh Singh, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioner has submitted that the writ petitioner has approached to the Tribunal, however, the Tribunal has rejected the Original Application with a cost of Rs.5000/- 40. He has questioned the said part of the order that why cost if the forum has been created under the Constitution, nobody can be debarred from approaching the forum irrespective of the results and imposing cost of Rs.5000/- is nothing, rather, by way of penalty. 41. This Court on consideration of the said submission is of the view that the petitioner even though conscious with the statutory provision as provided under Rule 69(1)(c) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 if he has approached to the learned Tribunal, the exercise is said to be sufficient by the concerned forum by answering the issue on merit and imposing cost by the forum will amount to depriving such litigant concerned to approached the Court of law for the purpose of consideration of the grievance by raising the points for its consideration. The points may not be said to be positive consideration or it may go negative to the litigant concerned but imposing cost will be said to be deterrent that as to why such litigant has approached to the Court of law. 42. The cost can be imposed if the forum has been approached on misconceived ground or by way of making a misleading statement but we after having heard the learned counsel for the 25 WP(S) No.5927 of 2022 writ petitioner and going through the pleading has tried to justify the claim that when the pension has been given why not gratuity. However, the said aspect of the matter we have already dealt with hereinabove. 43. This Court is therefore, of the view that part of the order by which the cost of Rs.5000/- has been imposed needs to be interfered with. 44. Accordingly, that part of the order of imposing cost of Rs.5000/- is hereby set aside. 45. The instant writ petition stands disposed of. 46. Pending IAs, if any, also stands disposed of. (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) (Navneet Kumar, J.) Basant/S.Das "