AI Insights
The case involves a group of petitioners, former executives of the Steel Authority of India Limited (SAIL), who challenged the decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT) at Ranchi, which had dismissed their application seeking arrears and fitment benefits for the period from 01.01.2017 to 31.03.2020. The petitioners argued that the denial of these benefits was discriminatory and violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The main legal contention revolved around the interpretation of the conditions under Clause 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 of the Office Order dated 18th November, 2021, which governed the salary revision and fitment benefits for SAIL executives. The High Court, after a detailed examination of the clauses and the arguments presented, upheld the CAT's decision, agreeing that the petitioners did not fulfill the necessary conditions for the benefits claimed.
Appeal Details
Counselvise Citation
[2024] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 800731 (HC-JHARKHAND)
Assessee PAN
Bench
Appeal Number
CRN Number
Appellant
Respondent
Appeal Type
Others
Pronouncement Date
20-02-2024
Assessment Year
misc
Judgement Text
" IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P. (S) No. 6206 of 2022 ----- 1. Ajay Kumar Verma, aged about 62 years, Son of Kripashankar Verma, Resident of Flat number B 2-1001 Everest Enclave, Vrindavan Yojna, Sector-13, P.O. – Vrindavan Colony, P.S.-PGI, District – Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh. 2. Anandamoy Sau, aged about 64 years, Son of Late Kali Charan Sau, Residing at Flat number 404 Block-F, Bokaro Steel Officer’s Housing Society Ltd. Ranipokhar, P.O. – Badimara, P.S. – Harla, Bokaro Steel City, District – Bokaro, Jharkhand. 3. Anil Kumar Thakur, aged about 63years, son of Late V.N. Thakur, Resident of J/402, Malti Luxuria City, P.O. – Sector – 6, P.S. – Chas Mufassil, Bokaro Steel City, District – Bokaro, Jharkhand. 4. Apurba Kanti Hazra, aged about 62 years, Son of Late Siddheshwari Prasad Hazra, Resident of Flat No. Gold 42, Ideal Enclave, Rajarhat Main Road, New Derozio College, P.O. – Rajarhat Gopalpur, P.S. – Narayanpur, District – 24 Paraganas (N), West Bengal. 5. Ashok Kumar, aged about 63 years, Son of Shiv Prasad Singh, Resident of Flat No. 2011, Sector 4-D, P.O. & P.S. – Bokaro Steel City, District – Bokaro, Jharkhand. 6. Ashok Kumar, aged about 64 years, Son of Late Sham Sarup, Resident of B-1201 Amrapali Empire, opposite ABES College, P.O. – Crossings Republic, P.S. – Vijay Nagar, District – Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh. 7. Ashok Kumar Srivastava, aged about 64 years, Son of Murali Manohar Prasad Shrivastava, Resident of Flat No. – A/-37, K.K. Singh Colony, P.O. – Chira Chas, P.S. – Chas, District – Bokaro, Jharkhand. 8. Avadhesh Kumar Gupta, aged about 63 years, Son of Late Gajanand Gupta, Resident of Flat No. 103, Building No. A-1, Kumar Pebble Park Housing Society, Handewadi Road P.O & P.S Hadapsar, District-Pune, Maharashtra. 9. Awanindra Kumar Mishra, aged about 65 years, Son of late Shambhu Nath Mishra, Resident of B-20, K.K Singh Colony P.O Chira Chas, P.S- Chas, District- Bokaro, Jharkhand. 10. Bijay Kumar Prasad, aged about 62 years, Son of late Sada Nand Prasad, Resident of House No- 47 Road-C Phase-5, 2 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] K. K. Singh Colony, P.O Chira Chas, P.S. Chas, District Bo- karo, Jharkhand. 11. Debabrata Adhikary, about 63 years, Son of late Radheshyam Adhikary, Resident of Flat. No. 45, Kokpara P.O. Kokpara, P.S Dhalbhumgarh, District-East Singhbhum, Jharkhand. 12. Deo Krishna Jha @ Deo Kumar Jha, aged about 64 years, Son of B N Jha, Resident of Ramnagar, P.O- Perjuar, P.S- Arer, District Madhubani, Bihar. 13. Devavrata Kumar Saha, aged about 62 years, Son of late Chhote Lal Saha, Resident of 22 MH Street P.O & P.S- Asansol, District Bardhaman, West Bengal. 14. Goutam Sen, aged about 62 years, Son of late Benoy Sen, Resident of 4B, Block CC-16 Krishna Ashirbad Cooperative Housing Society, Action Area 1 New Town, PO & P.S New Town Kolkata, District- 24 Pargana, Kolkata, West Bengal. 15. Jagdish Prasad Bhagat, aged about 65 years, Son of late Chhatu Prasad Bhagat, Resident of E/95 Kunj Vihar, PO Chira Chas, P.S-Chas District Bokaro Jharkhand. 16. Jiban Lal Chattaraj, aged about 62 years, Son of Late Jahar Lal Chattaraj, Resident of 806 Block-I, Bokaro Steel Officer's Housing Cooperative Society, PO-Sector 9, PB-Harla, District Bokaro, Jharkhand. 17. Kamal Kumar Sinha, about 62 years, Son of late Phanindra Nath Sinha, Resident of 201 B Block. Anand Vihar Phase 1, P.O. Chira Chas, P.S-Chas, District Bokaro, Jharkhand. 18. Kuntal Kumar Sanyal, aged about 62 years, Son of late N.C. Sanyal, Resident of D-208, Malati Luxuria City, P.O Sector 6, P.S.-Chas Mufasail, Bokaro Steel City District - Bokaro, Jharkhand. 19. Madhusudan Das, aged about 64 years, Son of late Bhuban Mohan Das, Resident of Flat no- 7A block-CC16, Krishna Ashirbad Cooperative Housing Society, PO & PS-Newtown, District North 24 Parganas, Kolkata, West Bengal. 20. Mahendra Bhujabal, aged about 63 years, Son of Narendra Bhujbal, Resident of Flat no. 1305, Tower No. 3, TATA ARIANA PO- Ghatikia Kalinga Nagar, PS- Tamando, Dist- Khorda Bhubaneswar, Odisha. 3 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] 21. Mukund Kumar, aged about 63 years, Son of late S. N. Sahay, Resident of E6/5D, SAIL City, New Pundag, P.O- SAIL City, P.S Pundag, District-Ranchi, Jharkhand. 22. Nilakanth Sahu, aged about 64 years, Son of late Bhimasen Sahu, Resident of Plot No. 1745 / 4413 Dwarika Vihar, Patia Station Road, P.O-KIIT, BBSR, P.S- Infocity, Dist- Khorda, Bhubaneswar, Odisha. 23. Om Prakash Sinha, aged about 63 years, Son of Govind Prasad, Resident of A-79, SAIL Satellite Township P.O- Dhurwa, P.S- Jagarnathpur, Dist- Ranchi, Jharkhand. 24. Palas Chandra Mukhopadhyay, aged about 62 years, Son of Dwijapada Mukhopadhyay, Resident of Aurobindo Pally, Lower Beniasole, P.O & P.S- Adra, District Purulia, West Bengal. 25. Pankaj Kumar Gupta, aged about 62 years, Son of late Raghu Nandan Prasad, Resident of Flat No. GF 02, Block B, Anand Vihar Phase 1, PO & P.S- Chira Chas, District- Bokaro, Jharkhand. 26. Pitabasa Nayak, aged about 63 years, Son of late Dinabandhu Nayak, Resident of House no.10-4C/1253, Sector-10, CDA, Cuttack Sadar, P.O- Sector 11 CDA, Cuttack, P.S- CDA Phase 2 Sector 11, District-Cuttack, Odisha. 27. Prakash Chandra Jha, aged about 64 years, Son of Late Kameshwar Jha, Resident of B-101, Bokaro Steel Officers’ Housing Cooperative Society P.O-Baidmara, P.S- Harla, District Bokaro, Jharkhand. 28. Prasanta Kumar Dutta, aged about 64 years, Son of late Kshitish Chandra Dutta, Resident of Kshitish Bhavan, Natun Pally, PO & P.S-Bishnupur, District- Bankura, West Bengal. 29. Rabindra Kumar Sinha, aged about 63 years, Son of Late Braj Nandan Prasad, Resident of 301 Leela Apartment, Anand Vihar Extension Phase 1, P.O Chira Chas, P.S Chas, District Bokaro, Jharkhand. 30. Rakesh Chandra Misra, aged about 65 years, Son of Surendra Nath Misra, Resident of Flat No. A9-703, Saviour Greenisle, P.O Crossing Republic, P.S-Vijay Nagar, Ghaziabad, District -Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh. 4 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] 31. Rama Chandra Sahoo, aged about 64 years, Son of B.N. Sahoo, Resident of Plot no. 2148, Chintamaniswar Temple Road, P.O & P.S- Laxmisagar, Bhubaneswar, District- Khorda, Odisha. 32. Sachidanand Mishra, aged about 63 years, Son of Late A.K. Mishra Resident of Flat No. 616, tower-4, Royal Lagoon, Raghunathpur P.O Kalarahanga, P.S-Nandan Kanan, Bhubaneswar, District Khorda, Odisha. 33. Santosh Kumar Awasthi, aged about 63 years, Son of Late Shankar Lal Awasthi, Resident of B-11, Shashak, Sector-2, Srishti complex, P.O-Mira Road (East), P.S-Kashi Mira, District- Thane, Maharashtra. 34. Shree Kant Upadhyay, aged about 63 years, Son of Late Kapil Muni Upadhyay, Resident of A-44 ST-1PH-1, K.K. Singh Colony, P.O Chira Chas, P.S. Chas, District Bokaro, Jharkhand. 35. Som Nath Ojha, aged about 62 years, Son of Ajit Kumar Ojha, Resident of F-801, Malti Luxuria City, P.O - Sector 6, P.S.- Chas Mufassil Bokaro Steel City, District - Bokaro, Jharkhand. 36. Sumitro De, aged about 63 years, Son of late Pramatha Nath De, Resident of Flat No. 54 - DD - 12, Mangal Ganthi, Anupama Housing Complex, VIP Road Kolkata, P.O-Airport P.S. Baguiati, Dist- North 24 Pargana, West Bengal. 37. Susil Kumar Ghosh, aged about 63 years, Son of late Ajit Kumar Ghosh, Resident of Flat no- B2, 2nd floor, Ramkrishna Apartment, 11/16C (74 M), Sree Guru Park, Kailash Ghosh Road, P.O Barisha, P.S-Haridevpur, Kolkata, West Bengal. 38. Tyagarajan Soundararajan, aged about 64 years, Son of K. Tyagarajan, Resident of Soundar Nivas, Number 6, Plot 2 and 3, 27th Street Sri Krishna Nagar, PO & P.S- Maduravoyal, Chennai, Tamil Nadu. 39. Tapan Kumar Haldar, aged about 62 years, Son of late Satish Chandra Haldar, Resident of F/402 Bokaro Steel Officers' Housing Cooperative Society, P.O Baidmara P.S Harla Sector 9, Dist-Bokaro, Jharkhand. 40. Tejinder Pal Singh, aged about 62 years, Son of late Bishan Singh, Resident of Flat No. D2-1508, Spring Meadows, (Located in Techzone-4, Greater Noida West), P.O 5 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] & P.S- Bisrakh, District- Gautam Buddh Nagar, Uttar Pradesh. 41. Uttam Kumar Sinha, aged about 64 years, Son of Late Bisheshwar Prasad Sinha, Resident of O-24, Mangalmurty Tower, Ashiyana Garden Phase 4, P.O- Chira Chas, P.S- Chas, District Bokaro, Jharkhand. 42. Vennapusa Raghunatha Reddy, aged about 64 years, Son of Vennapusa Bayapu Reddy, Resident of Flat no. 1-4-391, HLC Colony Extension, P.O- Georgepet, P.S- 3 Town Anantapur, District Anantapur, Andhra Pradesh. … … Petitioners -Versus- 1. Union of India, through the Secretary, Ministry of Steel, Government of India, Udyog Bhavan, P.O., P.S. & District – New Delhi. 2. Chairman, Steel Authority of India Limited, Ispat Bhawan, Lodhi Road, PO, PS & Dist- New Delhi. 3. Director (Personnel), Steel Authority of India Limited, Ispat Bhawan, Lodhi Road, PO, PS & Dist- New Delhi. 4. Executive Director (P & A), Steel Authority of India Limited, Ispat Bhawan, Lodhi Road, PO, PS & Dist- New Delhi. 5. Director in-charge (Bokaro Steel Plant), 1st Floor, Ispat Bhawan, Admin Building, P.O. & PS- Bokaro, Dist- Bokaro Steel City, Jharkhand. 6. Executive Director (P & A), (Bokaro Steel Plant), 1st Floor, Ispat Bhawan, Admin Building, P.O. & PS Bokaro, Dist- Bokaro Steel City, Jharkhand. 7. Executive Director, Centre for Engineering and Technology (CET), Ranchi, 4th Floor, RDCIS Building, Shyamali, PO & PS- Doranda, Dist-Ranchi, Jharkhand. … … Respondents ------- CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE PRADEEP KUMAR SRIVASTAVA ------- For the Petitioners : Mr. Diwakar Upadhyay, Advocate. For the Respondent-UOI : Mr. Anil Kumar, ASGI. For the Respondent-SAIL : Mr. Bibhash Sinha, Advocate. ------ 6 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] Order No. 21/Dated 20th February, 2024 1. The writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking therein the following reliefs:- (a) For issuance of an appropriate writ(s) / order(s) / direction(s) in the nature of ‘Certiorari’ for quashing and setting aside the order dated 17.10.2022 passed in O.A. No. 051/000787/2022 by the Hon’ble Central Administrative Tribunal, Circuit Bench, Ranchi, whereby and whereunder the Hon’ble Tribunal has been pleased to dismiss the case of the petitioners on the ground of being devoid of merits; and further to give direction upon the respondents to extend all benefits as prayed for by the petitioners before the Hon’ble Central Administrative Tribunal, Circuit Bench, Ranchi as prayed for in O.A. No. 051/000787/2022 after quashing the aforementioned impugned order. And / or (b) Pass any other order / writ / direction as your Lordships may deem fit & Proper in the facts and circumstances of the case and accordance with law. 2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ petition, reads as under :- 3. The writ petitioners, for redressal of their grievance, have approached to the learned Central Administrative Tribunal by invoking its jurisdiction as conferred under Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985. The learned Tribunal has called upon the respondents. However, 7 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] no written statement was filed, but the issue was argued on merit particularly, on the maintainability of the Original Application by taking the ground of financial condition of the Company. In consequence thereof, the arrears were denied to the other employees. The learned Tribunal after appreciating the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties has dismissed the Original Application, denying the benefit of arrears for the period from 01.01.2017 to 31.03.2020. The learned Tribunal has also made observation that the ground of discrimination and violation of Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India is not being taken into cognizance, since, there is no pleading to that. The aforesaid order is under challenge before this Court. The matter was heard at length by this Court on 5th February, 2024. The following order was passed, for reference the said order is referred hereunder:- Order No. 20/Dated 5th February, 2024 1. The instant writ petition is under Article 226 of the Constitution of India whereby and whereunder the order dated 17.10.2022 passed by Central Administrative Tribunal, Circuit Bench, Ranchi in O.A. No.051/000787/2022 has been assailed. 2. Mr. Diwakar Upadhyay, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners, at the outset, by making reference of office order dated 18.11.2021, as appended as Annexure-2, has submitted that he is not pressing now the prayer made as under 8A, 8B and 8C which are being referred hereunder as :- \"8.A. For quashing of Miscellaneous Clause 13(i) as contained in the Office Order dated 18.11.2021, bearing Number PER/IC-1213/2017 (Ann-2) issued under the signature of the Executive Director (P&A), SAIL, New Delhi, whereby and where under an erroneous decision has been taken by the Management of the Steel Authority of 8 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] India Ltd, to deny the payment of arrears towards Pay Revision to the employees (including the applicants herein) for the period 01.01.2017 to 31.03.2020. B. To hold and declare that the aforesaid impugned clause as contained in order dated 18.11.2021, denying the benefits of the salary revision coupled with payment of arrears to the applicants is unconstitutional, as the same amounts to discriminate the applicants and is thus violative of the Constitutional provisions as enshrined within Art. 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India. C. For further issuance of an appropriate order/direction to the respondents to grant the benefits of the pay revision coupled with payment of arrears and Fitment Benefits, due at the time of superannuation to the applicants alongwith statutory as well as penal interest as the same has been granted to the persons who are junior to the applicants herein and have superannuated much after the applicants. 3. The reason for not pressing such prayer is that in the office order dated 18.11.2021 the benefit of the salary revision has been decided to be given as per the decision of the Board that the revised pay scale will be effective from 01.01.2017 along with the fitment benefit which would be 15% of Basic Pay + IDA. 4. The methodology for pay fixation has also been referred therein wherein as per Clause 2.3.2 the above fitment shall be notionally w.e.f. 01.01.2017 and actual payment would commence from 01.04.2020 after incorporating the annual increment/promotional benefit, if any. 5. Mr. Diwakar Upadhyay, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, in course of argument, has submitted that in pursuance to the aforesaid office order, the notional benefit has been given from 01.01.2017 depending upon the date of separation from service of one or the other petitioners herein. 6. So far as the decision taken with respect to the fitment benefit, which would be 15% of Basic Pay + IDA, as per the office order dated 18.11.2021, the prayer had also been made before the learned Tribunal that the arrears be given on the basis of the notional benefit from 01.01.2017 to 01.04.2020 along with the fitment benefit which would be 15% of Basic Pay + IDA. 7. The learned Tribunal, however, has denied the relief of grant of benefit of arrears in consequence of revision for the reason that as per the office order dated 18.11.2021 the notional benefit was to be given and the learned counsel for the petitioners accepts that the notional benefit has been given till the date of superannuation of one or the other petitioners but the fitment benefit of 15% of Basic 9 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] Pay + IDA has not been given. 8. The learned Tribunal, based upon the aforesaid decision of the Board of the respondents, as contained in office order dated 18.11.2021, at least ought to have directed the respondents to extend the notional benefit on 4 the basis of the fitment benefit of 15% of Basic Pay + IDA. But, there is no finding to that effect by the learned Tribunal. 9. Mr. Upadhyay, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, based upon the aforesaid ground, has submitted that now he is keeping his prayer only with respect to entitlement of the petitioner regarding fitment benefit as per office order dated 18.11.2021. 10. Mr. Bibhash Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the Bokaro Steel Limited has sought for two weeks’ time to seek instruction and file affidavit in this regard as to whether the notional benefit has been given in favour of one or the other petitioners along with fitment benefit of 15% of Basic Pay + IDA. 11. Let such affidavit be filed on or before the next date of hearing. 12. List this case on 20.02.2024.” 4. It appears from the aforesaid order that the learned counsel for the petitioners by putting reliance upon Clause 2.3.2 of the fitment benefit has pursued. The writ petitioners confined their prayer only to the fitment benefit to be given notionally w.e.f. 01.01.2017 till the superannuation of one or other employees. This Court considering the said submission has allowed time to the learned counsel appearing for the Bokaro Steel Limited to seek instruction and file affidavit. 5. The affidavit has been filed pursuant to the said order passed by this Court. 6. Mr. Bibhash Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the Bokaro Steel Limited has submitted by referring to the Clause 2.2, which contains about the fitment benefit to be given in 10 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] favour of one or the other employee. The said fitment benefit is based upon one methodology for pay fixation, contending therein the process and the entitlement of one or other employee i.e. executives for the purpose of extending the benefit of fitment benefit. The reference of Clause 2.3.1 has been made. It has been contended that for the purpose of getting the fitment benefit on the basis of the methodology for pay fixation, the twin conditions are provided as under Clause 2.3.1 i.e. the executives are to be on the rolls of the Company as on 01.01.2017. With the aforesaid condition, the requisite condition is that such executives is to be continued on the rolls of the Company on 01.04.2020. The contention, therefore, has been made that the methodology for pay fixation of one or other executives be only to be taken recourse, if the executives are found to be on rolls of the Company on 01.01.2017 and continued to be on the rolls of the Company on 01.04.2020. 7. The reference of Clause 2.3.2 has also been made, since, the substantial argument of the petitioner was by putting reliance upon Clause 2.3.2. It has been contended that what has been argued on behalf of the petitioners that merely because one or the other executives was on roll on 01.01.2017, the financial benefit is not to be given to such executives unless such executives is to be on the rolls of the 11 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] Company on 01.04.2020 also. 8. The submission has been made that the interpretation of Clause 2.3.1 is for fulfillment of both the conditions and only then the condition stipulated under Clause 2.3.2 will be applicable. 9. Learned counsel for the Bokaro Steel Limited based upon the aforesaid ground has submitted that the petitioners are not entitled for the said benefits and in view of the matter, if the learned Tribunal has dismissed the Original Application, the same cannot be said to suffer from an error. 10. In response, learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the said fitment benefit is based upon unreasonable classification and as such, it is in the teeth of Article 14 of Constitution of India, the reason being that merely because the petitioners have retired from service on attaining age of superannuation that cannot be taken as a ground to deny the said benefit. 11. Further reason is that it has been done intentionally in the garb of financial implication while there was no such financial implication available with the respondent Bokaro Steel Limited. The submission has also been made that the only requirement for the purpose of getting the financial benefit as per the fitment benefit is concerned, is that one or 12 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] the other executive is to be on the rolls of the Company as on 01.01.2017, who will be entitled for getting the fitment benefit. 12. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and appreciated their arguments as also considered the order passed by the learned Tribunal as impugned. 13. This Court on the basis of the argument advanced as referred hereinabove by the learned counsel for the parties needs to be interpreted the Clause 2.3.1 of Office Order dated 18th November, 2021 as to whether merely on the ground that one or the other executives, who were on rolls on 01.01.2017, can such executives are entitled for fitment benefit or the other condition i.e. such executives are to be on the rolls as on 01.04.2020 also. 14. The second question which requires consideration that Clause 2.3.2 can be taken separately or with Clause 2.3.1. Both the issues, since, are inter-link and as such are being considered and answered together. 15. It would be relevant for the purpose of deciding both these issues to consider and refer the Office Order dated 18th November, 2021. The same is for the purpose of salary revision for the executives holding Board Level and below Board Level posts. The said Office Order was issued in 13 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] pursuance of ‘Presidential Directives’ received from the Government of India, Ministry of Steel vide Letter No. S29026/94/2021-SAIL dated 18th November, 2021 and Board decision, the Management of Steel Authority of India Limited has announced the revision of the salary structure of executive of SAIL Steel Plants / Units holding Board Level and below Board Level Posts. The scope and coverage of said revision of scale is to all executives holding Board Level and below Board Level posts of SAIL Steel Plants / Units. The aforesaid Office Order is also with another decision for the fitment benefit as under Clause 2.2. 16. We are here to decide the issue of fitment benefit that is the core of the issue. The fitment benefit is carries with a methodology for pay fixation as per the tabular chart as furnished under Clause 2.3.1. The relevant for the purpose is the condition as stipulated under Clause 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, it needs to be interpreted both the conditions, which reads as under: 2.3.1 The executives who were on the rolls of Company as on 1.1.2017 and continue to be on the rolls of the Company on 01.04.2020 will be fitted in the corresponding revised scales of pay as per the following fitment methodology. A B C D (Revised BP as on 1.1.2017)* Basic Pay + Stagnation + IDA @ 119.5% as on + 15% of (A+B) = Aggregate amount 14 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] Increment as on 31.12.2016 1.1.2017 rounded off to the next Rs. 10. * In case revised BP as on 1.1.2017 arrived so is less than the minimum of the revised pay scale, pay will be fixed at the minimum of the revised pay scale. 2.3.2 The above fitment shall be notionally w.e.f. 1.1.2017 and actual payment would commence from 1.4.2020 after incorporating the annual increment/promotional benefit, if any. In case of bunching of pay, the same shall be dealt as per the methodology prescribed in DPE guidelines. 17. It is evident that Condition 2.3.1 that for the purpose of granting the fitment benefit, the executives, who were on roll on 01.01.2017 and continue to be on the rolls of Company on 01.04.2020 will be fitted in the corresponding revised scales of pay as per the fitment methodology. 18. The note has also given therein that in case revised basic pay as on 01.01.2017 arrived so is less than the minimum of the revised pay scale, pay will be fixed at the minimum of the revised pay scale. 19. The Clause 2.3.2 contains a condition that the fitment to the executives become entitle shall be notionally w.e.f. 01.01.2017 and actual payment would commence from 01.04.2020 after incorporating the annual increment / promotional benefit, if any. 20. It is, thus, evident from bare perusal of Clause 2.3.1 that two conditions are required to be followed by one or the 15 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] other executives that is one executive was to be on roll on 01.01.2017 and furtherance to the same continue to be on the rolls of the Company on 01.04.2020. 21. Both the date i.e. 01.01.2017 and 01.04.2020 has been added with the word ‘and’. 22. The word ‘and’ is required interpretation as to whether the said word ‘and’ is to be read out as disjunctive or conjunctive. 23. If the word ‘and’ would be read as disjunctive, then what has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner will be said to be correct, so far as his entitlement is concerned, but if the ‘and’ word will be read as conjunctive, then the argument which has been advanced by the respondent - SAIL will be said to be sustainable and in that view of the matter, the executives will not be entitled on the ground that they are not coming under Clause 2.3.1. 24. The sentence is to be read out by the very object and intent of such policy decision. The interpretation of the word to treat as conjunctive or disjunctive has been taken note by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal & Others [(2020) 8 SCC 129] wherein the larger Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court while considering the implication of Section 24(2) of the Right to 16 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] Fair Compenstion and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, a consideration has been given therein that the word ‘conjunctive’ or ‘disjunctive’ is to be considered on the basis of the very object and intent of the statutory provision. Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013 is the saving clause in order to deal with the situation that on the basis of the repealment of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and if the amount of compensation or possession has not been taken, how to deal with such situation. 25. Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 has been inserted in the statute book after repealment of the Act, 1894. 26. The issue was there having the difference of opinion of the different Benches of the Hon’ble Apex Court that ‘or’ means either the possession or the compensation, either of one of such condition will not be fulfilled, then the acquisition process which was initiated by virtue of the Act, 1894 will be treated to be under the New Act of 2013. 27. But the Hon’ble Apex Court subsequent thereto has referred the matter before the larger Bench and the issue has been set at rest that ‘or’ word will be read out as conjunctive or not disjunctive. Meaning thereby either the compensation or the possession any of them is available then the proceeding initiated by virtue of old Act, 1894 will be said to be concluded and same will not be shifted under the fold of the 17 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] Act of 2013. 28. The main reason for coming to such conclusion as would be evident from the aforesaid judgment is that the very object of the Act, 1894 is to acquire the land for the public purposes, but simultaneously the amount of compensation is to be paid and the possession is to be taken. 29. The very purpose of the Act of 1894 was to acquire the land for the public purposes, but the requirement was under the aforesaid Act to compensate the displaced person and once the amount has been paid, but not accepted, rather, it was deposited in the treasury of the concerned bank account then the same will not be counted as a condition that the amount for compensation has not been accepted. 30. Further, reason for coming to such conclusion as is evident from the aforesaid judgment that if a person from whose possession land is being acquired, he at all if agreed then the mechanism has been provided under the old Act as also the New Act for making application by way of reference for enhancement of compensation, but if no case without accepting the money, if deposited in the treasury or in the account, the ground cannot be taken that the money has not been accepted, so paid by way of compensation, otherwise the very object and purport of that will not be followed, which is primarily for acquisition of land for the public purposes. 18 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] For ready reference, the relevant paragraph of the judgment rendered in Indore Development Authority (supra) is quoted as under: “97. Section 24(2) carves out an exception to Section 24(1)(b), where the award has been passed, and the proceedings are pending, but in such proceedings, physical possession of the land has not been taken, or compensation has not been paid, proceedings shall lapse. There are twin requirements for the lapse; firstly, physical possession has not been taken and, secondly, compensation has not been paid. In case, possession has been taken but compensation has been paid, there is no lapse of the proceedings. The question which is to be decided is whether the conditions are cumulative i.e. both are to be fulfilled, for lapsing of acquisition proceedings, or the conditions are in the alternative (“either/or”). According to the State and acquiring agencies, in a situation where possession has been taken, and compensation is not paid, there is no lapse : also in case where compensation has been paid, but possession not taken in a proceeding pending as on 1-1-2014, there is no lapse. Sine qua non is that proceeding must be pending. They argue that the word “or” used in phrase “the physical possession of the land has been not taken, or the compensation has not been paid”, has to be interpreted as “and” as two negative requirements qualify it. Furthermore, argues the State when two negative conditions are connected by “or”, they are construed as cumulative, the word “or” is to be read as “nor” or “and”. Naturally, the landowners argue to the contrary i.e. that lapse of acquisition occurred if compensation were not paid, or possession were not taken, 5 years before the coming into force of the 2013 Act. 98. It would be useful to notice rules of statutory interpretation in this regard. Principles of Statutory Interpretation (14th Edn.) by Justice G.P. Singh, speaks of the following general rule of statutory interpretation of positive 19 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] and negative conditions whenever prescribed by a statute: “… Speaking generally, a distinction may be made between positive and negative conditions prescribed by a statute for acquiring a right or benefit. Positive conditions separated by “or” are read in the alternative [Star Co. Ltd. v. CIT, (1970) 3 SCC 864 : AIR 1970 SC 1559] but negative conditions connected by “or” are construed as cumulative and “or” is read as “nor” or “and” [Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar, (1965) 2 SCR 328 : AIR 1965 SC 1457; Punjab Produce & Trading Co. Ltd. v. CIT, (1971) 2 SCC 540; Brown & Co. Ltd. v. Harrison, 1927 All ER Rep 195, 203, 204 (CA)] .” The above rule of statutory interpretation is based upon the decision of this Court in Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar [Patel Chunibhai Dajibha v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar, AIR 1965 SC 1457] , in which this Court held : (AIR pp. 1464-65, para 19) “19. It may be recalled that amendments to Section 32 were made from time to time, and Bombay Act 38 of 1957 added to sub-section (1)(b), clause (iii) and the preceding “or”. It is to be noticed that the conditions mentioned in sub-sections (1)(a) and (1)(b) are mutually exclusive. In spite of the absence of the word “or” between sub-sections (1)(a) and (1)(b), the two subsections lay down alternative conditions. The tenant must be deemed to have purchased the land if he satisfies either of the two conditions. The appellant is not a permanent tenant, and does not satisfy the condition mentioned in sub-section (1)(a). Though not a permanent tenant, he cultivated the lands leased personally, and, therefore, satisfies the first part of the condition specified in sub-section (1)(b). The appellant's contention is that sub- sections (1)(b)(i), (1)(b)(ii) and (1)(b)(iii) lay down alternative conditions, and as he satisfies the condition mentioned in sub-section (1)(b)(iii), he must be deemed to have purchased the land on 1-4-1957. Colour is lent to this argument by the word “or” appearing between sub-section 20 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] (1)(b)(ii) and sub-section (1)(b)(iii). But, we think that the word “or” between sub-sections (1)(b)(ii) and (1)(b)(iii) in conjunction with the succeeding negatives is equivalent to and should be read as “nor”. In other words, a tenant (other than a permanent tenant) cultivating the lands personally would become the purchaser of the lands on 1-4-1957, if on that date neither an application under Section 29 read with Section 31 nor an application under Section 29 read with Section 14 was pending. If an application either under Section 29 read with Section 31 or under Section 29 read with Section 14 was pending 1-4-1957, the tenant would become the purchaser on “the postponed date”, that is to say, when the application would be finally rejected. But if the application be finally allowed, the tenant would not become the purchaser. The expression “an application” in the proviso means not only an application under Section 31 but also an application under Section 29 read with Section 14. If an application of either type was pending on 1-4-1957, the tenant could not become the purchaser on that date. Now, on 1-4- 1957, the application filed by Respondent 1 under Section 29 read with Section 31 was pending. Consequently, the appellant could not be deemed to have purchased the lands on 1-4-1957.” (emphasis supplied) The decision of this Court in Punjab Produce & Trading Co. Ltd. v. CIT [Punjab Produce & Trading Co. Ltd. v. CIT, (1971) 2 SCC 540], was relied upon in the discussion mentioned above, where provisions of Section 23-A of the Income Tax Act, 1922 and Explanations (b)(ii) and (iii) came up for consideration. This Court ruled with respect to “or” and held that it had to be read as “and” construing negative conditions thus : (SCC pp. 543-44, paras 7-8) “7. On behalf of the assessee a good deal of reliance has been placed on decision of this Court in Star Co. Ltd. v. CIT [Star Co. Ltd. v. CIT, (1970) 3 SCC 864 : AIR 1970 SC 1559] . In that case, sub-clause (b)(ii) came up for consideration, and it 21 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] was held that the two parts of the Explanation contained in that sub-clause were alternative. In other words, if one part was satisfied it was unnecessary to consider whether the second part was also satisfied. Thus, the word “or” was treated as having been used disjunctively and not conjunctively. The same reasoning is sought to be invoked with reference to sub-clause (b)(iii). 8. It is significant that the language of sub-clauses (ii) and (iii) of clause (b) is different. The former relates to a positive state of affairs whereas the latter lays down negative conditions. The word “or” is often used to express an alternative of terms defined or explanation of the same thing in different words. Therefore, if either of the two negative conditions which are to be found in sub-clause (b)(iii) remains unfulfilled, the conditions laid down in the entire clause cannot be said to have been satisfied. The clear import of the opening part of clause (b) with the word “and” appearing there read with the negative or disqualifying conditions in sub-clause (b)(iii) is that the assessee was bound to satisfy apart from the conditions contained in the other sub- clauses that its affairs were at no time during the previous year controlled by less than six persons and shares carrying more than 50% of the total voting power were during the same period not held by less than six persons. We are unable to find any infirmity in the reasoning or the conclusion of the Tribunal and the High Court so far as Question 1 is concerned.” It was observed that if either of the two negative conditions, which are to be found in sub-clause (b)(iii), remains unfulfilled, the conditions laid down in the entire clause cannot be said to have been satisfied. 99. It would also be useful to note that in Brown & Co. Ltd. v. Harrison [Brown & Co. Ltd. v. Harrison, 1927 All ER Rep 195, 203, 204 (CA)], the provisions contained in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 1924 came up for consideration before the Court of Appeal. The Court held that the word “or” in 22 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] Article IV, Rule 2(q), must be read conjunctively and not disjunctively. It has been observed that quite commonly collation of the word “or” can be meant in conjunctive sense and certainly where the disjunctive use of the word, leads to repugnance or absurdity. 100. In this Court's considered view, as regards the collation of the words used in Section 24(2), two negative conditions have been prescribed. Thus, even if one condition is satisfied, there is no lapse, and this logically flows from the 1894 Act read with the provisions of Section 24 of the 2013 Act. Any other interpretation would entail illogical results. That apart, if the rule of interpretation with respect to two negative conditions qualified by “or” is used, then “or” should be read as “nor” or “and”. Brown & Co. Ltd. v. Harrison [Brown & Co. Ltd. v. Harrison, 1927 All ER Rep 195, 203, 204 (CA)], ruled thus, about the interpretation of two negative conditions connected by the word “or” : (All ER pp. 203 I-204 B) “… I think it quite commonly and grammatically can have a conjunctive sense. It is generally disjunctive, but it may be plain from the collation of the words that it is meant in a conjunctive sense, and certainly where the use of the word as a disjunctive leads to repugnance or absurdity, it is quite within the ordinary principles of construction adopted by the court to give the word a conjunctive use. Here, it is quite plain that the word leads to an absurdity, because the contention put forward by the shipowners in this matter amounts to this, as my Lord said, that, if a shipowner himself breaks open a case and steals the contents of it, he is exempted from liability under Rule 2(q) if none of his servants stole the part of the case or broke it open. That seems to me to be a plain absurdity. In addition to that, there is a repugnancy because it is plainly repugnant to the second part of Rule 2(q). Therefore I say no more about that.” 366.3. The word “or” used in Section 24(2) between possession and compensation has to be read as “nor” or as “and”. The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings 23 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five years or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In other words, in case possession has been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession has not been taken then there is no lapse. 31. Coming to the facts of the present case here also the very object of the condition is based upon the financial exigency which SAIL has faced. 32. It needs to refer herein that the learned counsel for the petitioners has time and again repeated his argument by taking the ground that it is incorrect on the part of SAIL to take a ground of financial exigency or crunch, since, the Company in the meanwhile has earned profit but we are not concerned with such ground at this stage, since, the very scheme as contained in the Office Order dated 18th November, 2021 has not been questioned, rather, the case of the writ petitioners, wherein for holding them entitled for the fitment benefit based upon Office Order dated 18th November, 2021 itself, 33. Therefore, it is a case of interpretation of the condition stipulated for the purpose of coming to the conclusion regarding entitlement of one or the other executives on the basis of the condition stipulated under 24 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] Clause 2.3.1 read with 2.3.2 of the Office Order dated 18th November, 2021. 34. The condition, so stipulated under Clause 2.3.1 is behind the financial exigency as per the ground taken by the SAIL and that is the reason the financial benefit, although has been given by taking care of grant of such benefit notionally w.e.f. 01.01.2017 and the actual payment from 01.04.2020, but the condition precedent therein has been made, as would be evident from Clause 2.3.1 that the executives will only be entitled to get the said benefit if found to be on rolls of the Company on 01.01.2017 and continue to be on the rolls of the Company on 01.04.2020. 35. Condition stipulated under Clause 2.3.2 starts with the words “the above fitment shall be notionally w.e.f. 01.01.2017 and actual payment would commence from 01.04.2020 after incorporating the annual increment / promotional benefit, if any”, meaning thereby Clause 2.3.2 is only the consideration of the benefit to be counted notionally but the condition under Clause 2.3.2 is to be read together with Clause 2.3.1, if an executive is not coming under the fold of Clause 2.3.1, there cannot be calculation based upon the notional calculation from 01.01.2017 and actual payment from 01.04.2020 will arise. 25 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] 36. It is, thus, evident that for the purpose of entitlement with respect to the fitment benefit, a member of the Executive is to be on roll as on 01.01.2017 and continued to be on roll on 01.04.2020, that will the exact interpretation of both the conditions as stipulated under Clause 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. 37. Further, both the conditions are to be read together in view of the fact that the calculation for fitment benefit is to be made on the basis of Clause 2.3.1 while the requirement/eligibility is under Clause 2.3.2. 38. Further the notional benefit once has been directed to be given which itself suggests that the same is only for those who are on roll and continued to be on roll of the Company on 01.04.2020. 39. The matter would have been different, if another condition that continued on the rolls of the Company on 01.04.2020 would not have been there then certainly in such circumstances, the writ petitioners would have been entitled for the fitment benefit, rather herein the conditions are conjoined and executive is to be on roll on 01.01.2017 as also to be on roll on 01.04.2020 by way of continuation in service. 40. This Court on the basis of aforesaid discussion is of the view that so far as argument of unreasonable classification, the learned Tribunal has taken note in last para of the impugned order that there was no such pleading. 26 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] 41. We also have not found any pleading regarding violation of Articles 14 & 16 of Constitution of India and what has been argued is contrary to the pleadings. 42. This Court, since, is exercising power of judicial review in view of the judgment passed by the Apex Court rendered in the case of L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India & Others, reported in (1997) 3 SCC 261, whereby and whereunder the order passed by the learned Tribunal under Section 14 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 is amenable to be looked into by way of power of judicial review under Article 226 of Constitution of India. 43. We are conscious of the fact that the scope of judicial review is to be exercised under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as per the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court. 44. The reference is being made to the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob vs. Radhakrishnan & Others, A.I.R. 1964 SC 477, whereby the scope of judicial review conferred to the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in showing interference with the award passed by the adjudicator has been dealt with. Paragraph no.7 of the said judgment is being reproduced as under: 27 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] “The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind 28 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233); Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 : (AIR 1958 SC 398) and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168. In Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad Ishaque and Ors., AIR 1955 Supreme Court 233, the Hon'ble Supreme Court with regard to the character and scope of the writ of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be issued, the following propositions has been established in paragraph no.21 as under: “(1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. 29 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings in certiorari.” In Sawarn Singh and Anr. vs. State of Punjab and Ors., (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships, while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issuance of writ of certiorari, has been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as hereunder: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra) 13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to 30 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” In Heinz India (P) Ltd. and Anr. vs. State of U.P. and Ors., (2012) 5 SCC 443 their Lordships have been pleased to hold at paragraph nos.66 and 67 as hereunder: “66. That the court dealing with the exercise of power of judicial review does not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or executive or their agents as to matters within the province of either, and that the court does not supplant “the feel of the expert” by its own review, is also fairly well settled by the decisions of this Court. In all such cases judicial examination is confined to finding out whether the findings of fact have a reasonable basis on evidence and whether such findings are consistent with the laws of the land. 67. In Dharangadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra this Court held that decision of a tribunal on a question of fact which it has jurisdiction to determine is not liable to be questioned in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution unless it is shown to be totally unsupported by any evidence. To the same effect is the view taken by this Court in Thansingh Nathmal case where this Court held that the High Court does not generally determine questions which require an elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to enforce for which the writ is claimed.” 31 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] In the case of West Bengal Central School Service Commission & Others Vs. Abdul Halim & Others reported in (2019) 18 SCC 39, their Lordships have been laid down pleased to hold at paragraph no. 30 that the power of the judicial review must be exercised by the Court after determining that the impugned order is vitiated by an error apparent on the face of the record and the same has been established by a process of reasoning. Para-30 of the aforesaid judgment reads as under:- “30. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court is to see whether the decision impugned is vitiated by an apparent error of law. The test to determine whether a decision is vitiated by error apparent on the face of the record is whether the error is self-evident on the fact of the record or whether the error requires examination or argument to establish it. If an error has to be established by a process of reasoning, on points where there may reasonably be two opinions, it cannot be said to be an error on the fact of the record, as held by this Court in Satyanarayan Vs. Mallikarjuna reported in AIR 1960 SC 137. If the provision of a statutory rule is reasonably capable of two or more constructions and one construction has been adopted, the decision would not be open to interference by the writ Court. It is only an obvious misinterpretation of a relevant statutory provision, or ignorance or disregard thereof, or a decision founded on reasons which are clearly wrong in law, which can be corrected by the writ Court by issuance of writ of Certiorari.” 32 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] In the case of T.C. Basappa Vs. T. Nagappa reported in (1955) 1 SCR 250, their Lordship hold that the patent error in a decision can be corrected by writ of certiorari, when it is manifested by the error apparent on the face of the proceedings. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is quoted hereunder:- 10. ……….. An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari but it must be a manifest error apparent on the fact of the proceedings, e.g. when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. In other words, it is a patent error which can be corrected by certiorari but not a mere wrong decision. ……….. 45. The power of judicial review has been dealt by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments, wherein such power can be exercised, if the order impugned challenged under the Article 226 of Constitution of India, appears to be an error on the face of record. 46. This Court, therefore, is of the view based upon the aforesaid reason that it is not a case where the power of judicial review is to be exercised, since, there is no error apparent on the face of record. 47. Accordingly, in view the settled position of law as discussed hereinabove and after going through the conditions as stipulated under clause 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, we are of the view that the instant writ petition lacks merit and stands dismissed. 33 [W.P. (S) No. 6206/2022] 48. Consequently, pending I.A. is disposed of. (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) (Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.) Sunil/A.F.R. "
Other Referred Cases
Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal & Others, L. Chandra Kumar Vs. Union of India & Others, Syed Yakoob vs. Radhakrishnan & Others, Heinz India (P) Ltd. and Anr. vs. State of U.P. and Ors., T.C. Basappa Vs. T. Nagappa, West Bengal Central School Service Commission & Others Vs. Abdul Halim & Others
Laws Referred To
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985
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