Anish Agarwal and Amit Sarawgi @ Amit Sarawagi V. Union of India, through Central Bureau of Investigation and Bank of India, through Branch Manager, Main Branch, Ranchi

Cr.M.P./2660/2021

AI Insights

The case involves multiple criminal miscellaneous petitions (Cr.M.P.) filed by Anish Agarwal and Amit Sarawgi against the Union of India through the C.B.I. and the Bank of India, challenging the criminal proceedings initiated against them. The allegations centered on a conspiracy involving the diversion of a loan obtained from the Bank of India for a textile business, which was allegedly used for other purposes, leading to a non-performing asset (NPA) status. The petitioners contested the competence of the C.B.I. to register the FIRs based on source information and argued procedural lapses in the investigation. The court, after considering the submissions and relevant legal provisions, upheld the proceedings, emphasizing the C.B.I.'s authority under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act and the adherence to procedural norms in the investigation.

• Counselvise Citation: [2022] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 698578 (HC-JHARKHAND)
• Appeal Type: Others
• Pronouncement Date: 22-11-2022
• Assessment Year: misc
• Other Referred Cases: G.Nakkeeran v. The Joint Director, Bank Securities & Fraud Cell and Another, Green Signal Bio-Pharma Pvt. Ltd. v. Union Government of India, Fertico Mktg. & Investment (P) Ltd. v. CBI, State of Karnataka v. Kuppuswamy Gownder, Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja, Kanwal Tanuj v. State of Bihar, Ashok Tshering Bhutia v. State of Sikkim, Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab, State represented by Inspector of Police, Chennai v. N.S. Gnaneswaran
• Laws Referred To: Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, Indian Penal Code, 1860
• Result in Favour of: Revenue
• Court: HIGH COURT
• Department Lawyers: ANIL KUMAR; RAJEEV SINHA
• Assessee Lawyers: AJIT KUMAR; SANJAY SAMDARSHI; SUMEET GADODIA
• Keywords: Bank of India; CBI; Criminal conspiracy; Fraud; Loan diversion; Shell companies; Suo-motu registration
• Section: 482; 420

Judgement Text

"1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND, RANCHI ---- Cr.M.P. No. 2660 of 2021 ---- Anish Agarwal, aged about 42 years, son of late Dhanraj Agarwal, resident of 605, R.S. Tower, Circular Road, Lalpur, P.O. and P.S. Lalpur, District- Ranchi ….. Petitioner -- Versus -- 1.Union of India, through Central Bureau of Investigation 2.Bank of India, through Branch Manager, Main Branch, Ranchi, Albert Ekka Chowk, P.O.-G.P.O., P.S.-Kotwali, District-Ranchi, Jharkhand …... Opposite Parties With Cr.M.P. No. 3140 of 2022 ---- Amit Sarawgi @ Amit Sarawagi, aged about 39 years, son of Shri Suresh Kumar Sarawgi, resident of Flat No.109, C-Block, Panchwati Residency, Chandani Chowk, Kanke Road, P.O.Ranchi University, P.S. Gonda, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand ….. Petitioner -- Versus -- The Union of India, through Central Bureau of Investigation, Economic Offence Branch, Ranchi, having its office at Kali Babu Street, P.O. G.P.O., Ranchi, P.S. Kotwali, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand .... Opposite Party With Cr.M.P. No. 2681 of 2022 ---- Amit Sarawgi, aged about 39 years, son of Shri Suresh Kumar Sarawgi, resident of Flat No.109, C-Block, Panchwati Residency, Chandani Chowk, Kanke Road, P.O. Ranchi University, P.S.Gonda, District-Ranchi-834008 ….. Petitioner -- Versus -- 1.The Union of India, through Central Bureau of Investigation, Economic Offence Branch, Ranchi, having its office at Kali Babu Street, P.O. G.P.O., P.S. Kotwali, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand 2.Bank of India, Ranchi Main Branch, through its Branch Manager, having its office at Albert Ekka Chowk, Main Road, P.O.-G.P.O., P.S.-Kotwali, District-Ranchi-834001 …... Opposite Parties ---- CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI --- For the Petitioners :- Mr. Ajit Kumar, Senior Advocate [Cr.M.P. No. 3140 of 2022] Mr. Sanjay Samdarshi, Advocate Mr. Sanjay Singh, Advocate Mr. Shadab Eqbal, Advocate [Cr.M.P. No.2660 of 2021] Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, Advocate Mr. Ritesh Gupta, Advocate Mr. Aditya Kumar, Advocate [Cr.M.P. No. 2681 of 2022] For the C.B.I. :- Mr. Anil Kumar, Addl. Solicitor General of India Ms. Chandana Kumari, A.C. to A.S.G.I. 2 [In all cases] For Bank of India :- Mr. Rajeev Kumar Sinha, Advocate Mr. Anoop Kumar Jha, Advocate [Cr.M.P. No.2660 of 2021 & Cr.M.P. No.2681 of 2022] ---- 13/22.11.2022 Heard Mr. Ajit Kumar, the learned Senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in Cr.M.P.No.3140 of 2022, Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in Cr.M.P.No.2681 of 2022, Mr. Sanjay Samdarshi, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in Cr.M.P.No.2660 of 2021, Mr. Anil Kumar, the learned A.S.G.I., appearing on behalf of the respondent- Central Bureau of Investigation (C.B.I.) in all the three cases as well as Mr. Rajeev Kumar Sinha, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-Bank of India. In all these cases, a common question of law has been involved and that is why with consent of all the parties, these petitions have been heard together. In Cr.M.P.No.2660 of 2021, the prayer is made for quashing of the entire criminal proceeding including the order dated 01.09.2021 passed in connection with R.C.01(S)/2019-EOW-Ranchi, pending before the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate-cum-Special Judicial Magistrate, C.B.I., Ranchi; in Cr.M.P.No.2681 of 2022, the prayer is made for quashing of the entire criminal proceeding arising out of CBI/EOW/Ranchi FIR No.RC0932019S0001 dated 10.01.2019 including the order dated 01.09.2021 in Case No.RC 01(S)/2019-EOW, Ranchi, pending before the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate cum-Special Judicial Magistrate, CBI, Ranchi; and in Cr.M.P. No.3140 of 2022 the prayer is made for quashing of the entire criminal proceeding in connection with CBI/EOW/Ranchi FIR No.RC0932018S0007 dated 16.07.2018 including the order dated 05.07.2021, pending before the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate cum-Special Judicial Magistrate, CBI, Ranchi. 3 The F.I.R. in Cr.M.P.No.2660 of 2021 and Cr.M.P.No.2681 of 2022 was registered alleging therein that Amit Sarawgi, Swati Sarawagi and other accused persons entered into a criminal conspiracy during 2015 to 2018 and in pursuance thereof, obtained loan of Rs.15.00 crores on 29.06.2015 from Bank of India, Ranchi, in the name of accused company, i.e. M/s Badri Kedar Udyog Ltd. for doing wholesale trade/business of cloth and textiles. The loan amount was not used to trading of clothes rather money was diverted to various Shell companies headquarter at Kolkata and subsequently, money was again transferred to the account of M/s Sarawagi Builders and Promoters Pvt. Ltd., Ranchi under the Directorship of the said Amit Sarawagi and Swati Sarawagi. The loan account became NPA on 31.03.2018 with outstanding amount of Rs.12.84 crores due to default in repayment of loan. It has been further alleged that the loan amounts were remitted in the account of shell companies on the basis of bogus/fabricated bills, raised by those companies. Later on, the funds were transferred in the current account of M/s Sarawgi Builders and Promoters Pvt. Ltd., which was a Real Estate Developers and Builders and nowhere connected with the business of clothes and textiles. The forged bills were raised by shell companies, on the basis of which loan amount was transferred from account no.490030110000120 of M/s Shree Badri Kedar Udyog Pvt. Ltd. to various shell companies situated at Kolkata. Most of the shell companies in which money was transferred are not doing any business and situated at the same address, i.e., 6/H/10, Shyampur Street, Kolkata, West Bangal. The name of such shell companies are (i) Nirjhar Saree Trading Pvt. Ltd., (ii) Periwinkle Agencies Pvt. Ltd., (iii) Marvellous Sarees Pvt. 4 Ltd., (iv) Dawkins Suppliers Pvt. Ltd., (v) Evenstar Marketing Pvt. Ltd., (vi) Shitalmay Distributors Pvt. Ltd., (vii) Afterlink Vinimay Pvt. Ltd., (viii) Musty Distributors Pvt. Ltd. Thereafter, money was re-transferred from these shell companies to the account of M/s Sarawagi Builders Pvt. Ltd., Ranchi in which Amit Sarawgi and his wife Swati Sarawgi are Directors. It has also been alleged that loan was sanctioned against collateral security in the form of stocks and book debts, flat, land and building. The loan was sanctioned and disbursed without stock audit. Later on, stock audit for the period 01.04.2016 to 28.01.2017 was carried out by C.A M/s Mukherjee, Choudhary & Associates, who submitted adverse report vide report dated 04.02.2017. Therefore the above said company M/s Shree Badri Kedar Udyog Pvt. Ltd., Amit Sarawgi, Swati Sarawgi, both Directors of M/s Shree Badri Kedar Udyog Pvt. Ltd. and M/s Sarawgi Builder and Promoters Pvt. Ltd. entered into criminal conspiracy with other unknown persons and in furtherance the said criminal conspiracy, fraudulently raised bogus/fabricated bills and an amount of about Rs.12.84 crores was diverted/misappropriated by these persons and the loan account became NPA on 31.03.2018. Thereby, they caused wrongful loss of Rs.12.84 crores to the Bank and corresponding wrongful gain to themselves. Hence the present case has been registered. Mr. Sanjay Samdarshi, the learned counsel for the petitioner in Cr.M.P.No.2660 of 2021 submits that the F.I.R has been registered on 10.01.2019 by the C.B.I. on the basis of source information. He submits that the C.B.I is not competent to register the F.I.R. on source information or suo-motu. He further submits that the allegation is made with regard to shell company which were made in the year 2012 to 2013, however, the petitioner in Cr.M.P.No.2660 of 2021 is a Chartered 5 Accountant and he has resigned from the auditorship of the said company on 31.10.2015. He submits that the suo-motu registration of the F.I.R. was considered by the Madras High Court in the case of “G.Nakkeeran v. The Joint Director, Bank Securities & Fraud Cell and Another” [Crl.O.P.(MD) No.4044 of 2016] wherein it has been held that when the R.B.I. guideline is there, the C.B.I cannot take up the case suo- motu. He submits that the allegations are made of taking of the loan from the bank and by way of drawing the attention of the Court to the Annexure-A/3, he submits that at paragraph no.4 it has been disclosed the firm’s auditor and prepared balance sheet and the stock audit was carried out by other C.A. M/s KRA & Co. that was closed on 12.10.2017. By way of drawing the attention of the Court to point no.(iv) which is discussion of evidence. He submits that when the business was started in the name of M/s Hari Collection in lieu of M/s Hari Furnishing and the bank has lodged the FIR against Sri Choudhary on 10.08.2017 for misappropriation of hypothecated goods and diversion of funds. On the same document, at Annexure-1, he submits that it has come that transactions are genuine and the complaint is fabricated. He further submits that there are parameters of lodging the complaint if any fraud is made and there are check-list. By way of referring Annexure-A/4, he submits that in the last column which is with regard to as to whether the borrower’s account is reported as RFA to CRILC? – it has come that the said column is filled as ‘negative’. He further submits that the identical was the issue before the Madras High Court again in the case of ‘Green Signal Bio-Pharma Pvt. Ltd. v. Union Government of India’ [Crl.O.P.Nos.8348 & 9611 of 2011] as contained in Annexure-A/5 of the supplementary affidavit and by way of referring to paragraph nos.112/113 of the said judgment, he submits that the Madras High Court has held that the C.B.I is not competent to register the F.I.R on source information. He also placed reliance on the Circular of the Reserve 6 Bank of India as contained at Annexure-S.A-I and S.A-II in the supplementary affidavit and by way of referring to the various clauses of the Circular, he submits that the circular speaks that even the fraud is reported and suo-motu case has been taken up in that case also the report is required to be submitted which is not the case in hand. He further submits that the Circulars of the year 2014, 2015 and 2016 are on similar footing. He further submits that counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the C.B.I wherein at paragraph no.3 it has been disclosed that whereas the persons swear the affidavit, is authorized, however, the proof of that, that has not been annexed with the counter affidavit. By way of referring to Annexure-S.A/I and II dated 01.07.2016 and 03.07.2017, he submits that Chapter-VIII speaks of clause-8.2 which is loan frauds and new framework. By way of referring to clause-8.11 of the affidavit, he submits that the banks are required to lodge the complaint with the law enforcement agencies immediately on detection of fraud. According to him, the bank has not reported to the C.B.I., however, the C.B.I. has suo-motu registered the F.I.R and has submitted charge sheet which is not in accordance with the circular of the R.B.I. and in that view of the matter, the entire criminal proceeding is bad in law. He put emphasis on the two judgments of the Madras High Court as contained in the said petition itself. On this ground, he submits that the entire criminal proceeding may kindly be quashed. Mr. Ajit Kumar, the learned Senior Advocate appears on behalf of the petitioner in Cr.M.P.No.3140 of 2022. He has also relied on the two judgments Madras High Court which is annexed with the petition of this petitioner and he has taken the Court to the Circular of 2014 of the R.B.I. referring counter affidavit of the C.B.I. which is the circular of R.B.I. dated 01.7.2014. By way of referring several clauses of the said circular, particularly, clause 2.3 which speaks to ensure uniformity and to avoid duplication, frauds involving forged instruments may be reported 7 only by the paying banker and not by the collecting banker. He also refers to clause 2.3.1 and submits that it speaks of reporting of fraud to be done to Central Fraud Monitoring Cell of the Department of Banking Supervision. He refers to clause-4, reporting of frauds to Reserve Bank of India. He also refers to clause-3.1, fraud involving Rs.One lakh and above and took the Court to the different paragraphs of the said clauses. He also placed reliance on the fraud cases involving amount more than One lakh upto 50 lakhs. He draws the attention of the Court to clause-3.3, which speaks of frauds involving Rs.100 lakhs and above. By way of referring clause-6, he submits that the guidelines for reporting frauds to police/C.B.I is there, however, in the case in hand, without following the guideline the case has been registered by the C.B.I. By way of placing this document, he further submits that this guideline is followed in the Policy of 2015 and 2016 which has not been overruled and identical guidelines are there and in that view of the matter, in the light of the judgment of the Madras High Court, the entire criminal proceeding is fit to be quashed. He further submits that the entire business of the petitioner has been interrupted only due to suo-motu interference of the C.B.I. Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner in Cr.M.P.No.2681 of 2022 has also adopted the argument of Mr. Ajit Kumar, the learned Senior counsel and Mr. Sanjay Samdarshi, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners in respective above cases, and submits that two of the judgments relied by the learned counsels are on the identical issue and he has also placed reliance on those two judgments. He draws the attention of the Court to the F.I.R. which is at page-21 and by way of referring to the contents of the F.I.R he submits that in F.I.R it has been disclosed that information has been received from the reliable source to the effect that the petitioner was the Director and without disclosing the source of 8 information the F.I.R has been registered. He further elaborated his argument by way of submitting that in a fraud case if on the strength of defalcation of money of bank the F.I.R is registered, the Bank officials are required to lodge the FIR or the complaint, however, the Bank has not lodged the F.I.R and there is no Prevention of Corruption Act is involved and in that view of the matter in light of the provisions made in Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, 1946, the C.B.I is not competent to register the F.I.R suo-motu. He further refers to the Section-3 of the said Act and submits that if the Central Government may, by Notification in the Official Gazette, specifies the offences or classes of offences, which are to be investigated by the Delhi Special Police Establishment then only the C.B.I. is required to interfere, however, in absence of any complaint on behalf of the Bank or any official, the C.B.I has suo-motu registered the F.I.R. which is against the mandate of law. He further submits that the C.B.I is having its own Crime Manual and submits that as per the clauses-8.2, 8.3 and 8.5 of the said Manual, the C.B.I. has registered the case and to buttress his argument, he took the Court to the judgment in the case of “Green Signal Bio-Pharma Pvt. Ltd. v. Union Government of India” of the Madras High Court on which all the counsels have heavily placed reliance, particularly, paragraph nos.7, 8 and 9 of the said judgment, which are quoted herein below: “7. Complaints and source of information comes under Chapter 8 of CBI (Crime) Manual. In clause 8.2 it is envisaged that the Superintendent of Police (including those working in the Special Units) are required to have a preliminary look at each complaint and decide whether it falls within the purview of CBI and would merit its attention. In case the complaint pertains to a subject outside the purview of CBI or the allegations contained therein are too trivial or vague it should be forwarded at the earliest to the department concerned with an endorsement that no enquiry has been made by CBI. The disposal would be noted in the records maintained for this purpose. 8. In clause 8.3 it is stated that all other complaints 9 would be analyzed with a view to see whether a criminal offence can be made out requiring any action by CBI. In case, the analysis reveals that the complaint deals with a substantial issue which falls within the ambit of CBI and needs further verification, the permission of the Competent Authority will be obtained to verify the same. The Competent Authority is one who could order registration of a regular case for the particular rank of officer against whom the complaint has been made. 9. In Clause 8.5, in order to ensure uniformity in dealing with complaints, the following broad guidelines are given. Ordinarily, no verification of complaint of the following nature should be taken up except for special reasons; (i)Complaints which are anonymous and pseudonymous. (ii)Complaints containing vague and unverifiable allegations. (iii)Where the allegations relate to service matters, which can be better looked into the departmental authorities. (iv)Complaints of petty nature not involving specific allegations of bribery or corruption which can be better dealt with by the Vigilance Wing of the department or local police. (v)Complaints not otherwise falling within the purview of CBI. (vi)Complaints which have already been looked in to or are being looked into by the department or its Vigilance Wing and the allegations prima facie do not reveal that these would require an open investigation by CBI. (vii)Complaints pertaining to matters/incidents, which have occurred in the distant past. (viii)Complaints involving only State Government servants or private individuals and which are of no interest to CBI.\" He further draws the attention of the Court to Section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and by way of referring to the said section, he submits that only aggrieved persons, who have been cheated can file the F.I.R. He submits that the C.B.I is only to make out the offence under section 420 of the I.P.C, in counter affidavit of the Bank at page nos.127 and 128, in Annexures-G and H in Cr.M.P.No.2660 of 2021. By way of referring to the Annexure-G contained at page 127 dated 28.01.2019, he submits that although a fraud case has been tried to be instituted by the concerned officer of the bank, however, the bank has not instituted the 10 F.I.R. However, by way of referring Annexure-H, he submits that the C.B.I has informed the Bank that they have registered the F.I.R. On these grounds, he submits that the entire criminal proceeding is fit to be quashed. On the other hand, Mr. Anil Kumar, the learned A.S.G.I. appearing on behalf of the respondent-C.B.I submits that the charge sheet has already been submitted and the learned court has taken the cognizance and in that view of the matter, even if there is any illegality or irregularity, at this stage, the High Court are generally restraining itself to quash the entire criminal proceeding under section 482 Cr.P.C. He draws the attention of the Court to clause-3.1.2 of the Circular of the R.B.I. dated 01.07.2014 and submits that the C.B.I has not restricted it and registered the case suo-motu as has been said there, the only rider is that the fraud report should also be submitted in that case. He further submits that now the new circular is in operation which has been brought on record as Annexure-S.A/2 of the supplementary counter affidavit filed by the C.B.I. dated 01.07.2016 and again refers to clause- 3.2.3 of the said circular and submits that suo-motu registration is not restricted as has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners. By way of referring the guidelines for reporting fraud to the police/C.B.I, Chapter-VI of the said guidelines, he submits that on the strength of the amount involved who is the competent agency to investigate has disclosed therein and so far as the C.B.I is concerned, it has been disclosed that if the amount involved is 30 million and above and 250 million it has to be investigated by the Anti-Corruption Branch of the C.B.I. where the staff involvement is there in economic offence the C.B.I. is competent to investigate the offence. By way of referring Annexure-3 of the said document, he submits that the circular of 07.05.2015 has been repealed with the new circular of the year 2016. By way of relying on this document submits that the C.B.I is competent to register the 11 F.I.R suo-motu. On the point of illegality with the investigation and miscarriage of justice, the proceeding cannot be quashed. He relied in the case of “Fertico Mktg. & Investment (P) Ltd. v. CBI,”, (2021) 2 SCC 525, paragraph nos.22 to 26 of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow: “22. As early as in 1955, the question arose for consideration before this Court, as to whether an investigation carried out by a police officer below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police, under Section 5(4) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, without the order of the Magistrate of First Class, was mandatory or directory? While holding that the provision is mandatory, this Court considered a question as to whether and to what extent, the trial which follows such investigation, is vitiated. The Court in H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi [H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, (1955) 1 SCR 1150 : AIR 1955 SC 196 : 1955 Cri LJ 526] , observed as under : (AIR p. 204, para 9) “9. … If, therefore, cognizance is in fact taken, on a police report vitiated by the breach of a mandatory provision relating to investigation, there can be no doubt that the result of the trial which follows it cannot be set aside unless the illegality in the investigation can be shown to have brought about a miscarriage of justice. That an illegality committed in the course of investigation does not affect the competence and the jurisdiction of the Court for trial is well settled as appears from the cases in Parbhu v. King Emperor [Parbhu v. King Emperor, 1944 SCC OnLine PC 1 : (1943-44) 71 IA 75 : AIR 1944 PC 73] and Lumbhardar Zutshi v. R. [Lumbhardar Zutshi v. R., 1949 SCC OnLine PC 64 : (1949-50) 77 IA 62 : AIR 1950 PC 26] These no doubt relate to the illegality of arrest in the course of investigation while we are concerned in the present cases with the illegality with reference to the machinery for the collection of the evidence. This distinction may have a bearing on the question of prejudice or miscarriage of justice, but both the cases clearly show that invalidity of the investigation has no relation to the competence of the Court. We are, therefore, clearly, also, of the opinion that where the cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case has proceeded to termination, the invalidity of the precedent investigation does not vitiate the result, unless miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby.” It could thus be seen that this Court has held that the cognizance and the trial cannot be set aside unless the illegality in the investigation can be shown to have brought 12 about miscarriage of justice. It has been held that the illegality may have a bearing on the question of prejudice or miscarriage of justice but the invalidity of the investigation has no relation to the competence of the court. 23. It will also be apposite to note the following observations of this Court in State of Karnataka v. Kuppuswamy Gownder [State of Karnataka v. Kuppuswamy Gownder, (1987) 2 SCC 74 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 280] , while considering the provisions of Section 465 CrPC : (SCC pp. 79-80, para 14) “14. The High Court, however, observed [Kuppaswamy Gounder v. State of Karnataka, 1981 SCC OnLine Kar 220 : (1981) 2 Kant LJ 509] that provisions of Section 465 CrPC cannot be made use of to regularise this trial. No reasons have been stated for this conclusion. Section 465 CrPC reads as under: ‘465. Finding or sentence when reversible by reason of error, omission or irregularity.—(1) Subject to the provisions hereinbefore contained, no finding, sentence or order passed by a court of competent jurisdiction shall be reversed or altered by a court of appeal, confirmation or revision on account of any error, omission or irregularity in the complaint, summons, warrant, proclamation, order, judgment or other proceedings before or during trial or in any inquiry or other proceedings under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution, unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. (2) In determining whether any error, omission or irregularity in any proceeding under this Code, or any error, or irregularity in any sanction for the prosecution has occasioned a failure of justice, the court shall have regard to the fact whether the objection could and should have been raised at an earlier stage in the proceedings.’ It is provided that a finding or sentence passed by a court of competent jurisdiction could not be set aside merely on the ground of irregularity if no prejudice is caused to the accused. It is not disputed that this question was neither raised by the accused at the trial nor any prejudice was pleaded either at the trial or at the appellate stage and therefore in the absence of any prejudice such a technical objection will not affect the order or sentence passed by the competent court. Apart from Section 465, Section 462 provides for remedy in cases of trial in wrong places. Section 462 reads as under: ‘462. Proceedings in wrong place.—No finding, sentence or order of any criminal court shall be set aside merely on the ground that the inquiry, trial or other 13 proceedings in the course of which it was arrived at or passed, took place in a wrong Sessions Division, district, sub-division or other local area, unless it appears that such error has in fact occasioned a failure of justice.’ This provision even saves a decision if the trial has taken place in a wrong Sessions Division or sub-division or a district or other local area and such an error could only be of some consequence if it results in failure of justice, otherwise no finding or sentence could be set aside only on the basis of such an error.” 24. This Court in Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja [Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja, (2003) 6 SCC 195 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1314] , while relying on the judgment of this Court in H.N. Rishbud [H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi, (1955) 1 SCR 1150 : AIR 1955 SC 196 : 1955 Cri LJ 526] , has observed thus : (Prakash P. Hinduja case [Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja, (2003) 6 SCC 195 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 1314] , SCC p. 210, para 21) “21. … The Court after referring to Parbhu v. King Emperor [Parbhu v. King Emperor, 1944 SCC OnLine PC 1 : (1943-44) 71 IA 75 : AIR 1944 PC 73] and Lumbhardar Zutshi v. R. [Lumbhardar Zutshi v. R., 1949 SCC OnLine PC 64 : (1949-50) 77 IA 62 : AIR 1950 PC 26] held that if cognizance is in fact taken on a police report initiated by the breach of a mandatory provision relating to investigation, there can be no doubt that the result of the trial, which follows it cannot be set aside unless the illegality in the investigation can be shown to have brought about a miscarriage of justice and that an illegality committed in the course of investigation does not affect the competence and the jurisdiction of the court for trial. This being the legal position, even assuming for the sake of argument that CBI committed an error or irregularity in submitting the charge-sheet without the approval of CVC, the cognizance taken by the learned Special Judge on the basis of such a charge-sheet could not be set aside nor could further proceedings in pursuance thereof be quashed. The High Court [Prakash P. Hinduja v. Union of India, 2002 SCC OnLine Del 679 : (2002) 64 DRJ 34] has clearly erred in setting aside the order of the learned Special Judge taking cognizance of the offence and in quashing further proceedings of the case.” 25. It could thus be seen that this Court held that even for the sake of argument that CBI had committed an error or irregularity in submitting the charge-sheet without the approval of CVC, the cognizance taken by the learned Special Judge on the basis of such a charge-sheet, would not be set aside nor could further proceedings in pursuance thereof be quashed. 26. Recently, a Bench of this Court consisting one of us 14 (Khanwilkar, J.) had an occasion to consider the aforesaid provisions of the DSPE Act, in Kanwal Tanuj v. State of Bihar [Kanwal Tanuj v. State of Bihar, (2020) 20 SCC 531 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 395] . In the said case, the question arose, as to whether when an offence was committed in the Union Territory and one of the accused was residing/employed in some other State outside the said Union Territory, the Members of DSPE had power to investigate the same, unless there was a specific consent given by the State concerned under Section 6 of the DSPE Act. The contention on behalf of the appellant before the High Court was that since the appellant was employed in connection with the affairs of the Government of Bihar, an investigation was not permissible, unless there was a specific consent of the State of Bihar under Section 6 of the DSPE Act. This Court rejected the said contention holding that if the offence is committed in Delhi, merely because the investigation of the said offence incidentally transcends to the territory of the State of Bihar, it cannot be held that the investigation against an officer employed in the territory of Bihar cannot be permitted, unless there was specific consent under Section 6 of the DSPE Act. While considering the argument on behalf of the State, that such a consent was necessary for CBI to proceed with the investigation, this Court held that the respondent State having granted general consent in terms of Section 6 of the DSPE Act vide Notification dated 19-2-1996, it was not open to the State to argue to the contrary.” By way of referring to this judgment, he submits that what has been argued on behalf of the learned counsel for the petitioners is the subject matter of trial and this Court, at this stage, may not interfere. He further submits that it is well settled that in absence of any clear and specific provision in the statute, the Courts treat it as general provision and on that ground only the entire proceeding cannot be quashed. To buttress his argument, he relied in the case of “A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak, (1984) 2 SCC 500, paragraph no.6 of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow: “6. It is a well recognised principle of criminal jurisprudence that anyone can set or put the criminal law into motion except where the statute enacting or creating an offence indicates to the contrary. The scheme of the Code of Criminal Procedure envisages two parallel and independent agencies for taking criminal offences to court. Even for the most serious offence of murder, it was not disputed that a private complaint can, not only be filed but can be entertained and proceeded with 15 according to law. Locus standi of the complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence save and except that where the statute creating an offence provides for the eligibility of the complainant, by necessary implication the general principle gets excluded by such statutory provision. Numerous statutory provisions, can be referred to in support of this legal position such as (i) Section 187-A of Sea Customs Act, 1878 (ii) Section 97 of Gold Control Act, 1968 (iii) Section 6 of Import and Export Control Act, 1947 (iv) Section 271 and Section 279 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (v) Section 61 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, (vi) Section 621 of the Companies Act, 1956 and (vii) Section 77 of the Electricity Supply Act. This list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. While Section 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits anyone to approach the Magistrate with a complaint, it does not prescribe any qualification the complainant is required to fulfil to be eligible to file a complaint. But where an eligibility criterion for a complainant is contemplated specific provisions have been made such as to be found in Sections 195 to 199 of the CrPC. These specific provisions clearly indicate that in the absence of any such statutory provision, a locus standi of a complainant is a concept foreign to criminal jurisprudence. In other words, the principle that anyone can set or put the criminal law in motion remains intact unless contra-indicated by a statutory provision. This general principle of nearly universal application is founded on a policy that an offence i.e. an act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force [See Section 2(n) CrPC] is not merely an offence committed in relation to the person who suffers harm but is also an offence against society. The society for its orderly and peaceful development is interested in the punishment of the offender. Therefore, prosecution for serious offences is undertaken in the name of the State representing the people which would exclude any element of private vendetta or vengeance. If such is the public policy underlying penal statutes, who brings an act or omission made punishable by law to the notice of the authority competent to deal with it, is immaterial and irrelevant unless the statute indicates to the contrary. Punishment of the offender in the interest of the society being one of the objects behind penal statutes enacted for larger good of the society, right to initiate proceedings cannot be whittled down, circumscribed or fettered by putting it into a strait-jacket formula of locus standi unknown to criminal jurisprudence, save and except specific statutory exception. To hold that such an exception exists that a private complaint for offences of corruption committed by public servant is not maintainable, the court would require an unambiguous statutory provision and a tangled web of argument for drawing a far fetched implication, cannot be a substitute for an express statutory provision. In the matter of initiation of proceeding before a 16 Special Judge under Section 8(1), the Legislature while conferring power to take cognizance had three opportunities to unambiguously state its mind whether the cognizance can be taken on a private complaint or not. The first one was an opportunity to provide in Section 8(1) itself by merely stating that the Special Judge may take cognizance of an offence on a police report submitted to it by an investigating officer conducting investigation as contemplated by Section 5-A. While providing for investigation by designated police officers of superior rank, the Legislature did not fetter the power of Special Judge to take cognizance in a manner otherwise than on police report. The second opportunity was when by Section 8(3) a status of a deemed public prosecutor was conferred on a private complainant if he chooses to conduct the prosecution. The Legislature being aware of a provision like the one contained in Section 225 of the CrPC, could have as well provided that in every trial before a Special Judge the prosecution shall be conducted by a Public Prosecutor, though that itself would not have been decisive of the matter. And the third opportunity was when the Legislature while prescribing the procedure prescribed for warrant cases to be followed by Special Judge did not exclude by a specific provision that the only procedure which the Special Judge can follow is the one prescribed for trial of warrant cases on a police report. The disinclination of the Legislature to so provide points to the contrary and no canon of construction permits the court to go in search of a hidden or implied limitation on the power of the Special Judge to take cognizance unfettered by such requirement of its being done on a police report alone. In our opinion, it is no answer to this fairly well-established legal position that for the last 32 years no case has come to the notice of the court in which cognizance was taken by a Special Judge on a private complaint for offences punishable under the 1947 Act. If some thing that did not happen in the past is to be the sole reliable guide so as to deny any such thing happening in the future, law would be rendered static and slowly wither away.\" On the principle of exercising power under section 482 Cr.P.C, he relied in the recent judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “State of Odisha v. Pratima Mohanty Etc.”, reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1222, paragraph no.14 of the said judgment is quoted hereinbelow: “14. At the outset, it is required to be noted that by the impugned judgment and order the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has quashed the criminal proceedings for the offences under Section 13(2) read with 17 Section 13(1)(d) of the Act and Section 420 read with Section 120B IPC. From the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has entered into the merits of the allegations and has conducted the mini-trial by weighing the evidence in detail which, as such, as observed and held by this Court in a catena of decisions is wholly impermissible. As held by this Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : AIR 1992 SC 604, the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. could be exercised either to prevent an abuse of process of any court and/or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In the said decision this Court had carved out the exceptions to the general rule that normally in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the criminal proceedings/FIR should not be quashed. Exceptions to the above general rule are carved out in para 102 in Bhajan Lal (supra) which reads as under: “102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable 42 PART E offence, no investigation is permitted by a police 18 officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” He further submits that in the matter of procedure does not go to the root of jurisdiction and once the cognizance has been taken by the court under the Cr.P.C it cannot be said that invalid police report is the foundation of jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance. He relied in the caes of “Ashok Tshering Bhutia v. State of Sikkim” (2011) 4 SCC 402, paragraph nos.19 to 26 of the said judgment are quoted below: “19. It has further been submitted that an invalid sanction cannot be the foundation for the prosecution and thus, the entire investigation and trial stood vitiated as the investigation without proper authorisation and invalid sanction goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the court and so the conviction cannot stand. 20. The issues raised hereinabove are no more res integra. The matter of investigation by an officer not authorised by law has been considered by this Court time and again and it has consistently been held that a defect or irregularity in investigation however serious, has no direct bearing on the competence or procedure relating to cognizance or trial and, therefore, where the cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case has proceeded to termination, the invalidity of the precedent investigation does not vitiate the result, unless a miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby. The defect or irregularity in investigation has no bearing on the competence of the court or procedure relating to cognizance or trial. 19 (Vide H.N. Rishbud v. State of Delhi [AIR 1955 SC 196 : 1955 Cri LJ 526] , Munnalal v. State of U.P. [AIR 1964 SC 28 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 11] , Khandu Sonu Dhobi v. State of Maharashtra [(1972) 3 SCC 786 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 854 : AIR 1972 SC 958] , State of M.P. v. Bhooraji [(2001) 7 SCC 679 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1373] , State of M.P. v. Ramesh C. Sharma [(2005) 12 SCC 628 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 683] and State of M.P. v. Virender Kumar Tripathi [(2009) 15 SCC 533 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 667] .) 21. In Kalpnath Rai v. State [(1997) 8 SCC 732 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 134 : AIR 1998 SC 201] a case under the provisions of Section 20 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, this Court considered the issue as to whether an oral direction to an officer to conduct investigation could meet the requirement of law. After considering the statutory provisions, the Court came to the conclusion that as oral approval was obtained from the competent officer concerned, it was sufficient to legalise the further action. 22. In State (Inspector of Police) v. Surya Sankaram Karri [(2006) 7 SCC 172 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 225] , a two-Judge Bench of this Court had taken a contrary view without taking note of the earlier two-Judge Bench judgment in Kalpnath Rai [(1997) 8 SCC 732 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 134 : AIR 1998 SC 201] and held as under: (Surya Sankaram Karri [(2006) 7 SCC 172 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 225] , SCC p. 178, para 16) “16. … When a statutory functionary passes an order, that too authorising a person to carry out a public function like investigation into an offence, an order in writing was required to be passed. A statutory functionary must act in a manner laid down in the statute. Issuance of an oral direction is not contemplated under the Act. Such a concept is unknown in administrative law. The statutory functionaries are enjoined with a duty to pass written orders.” However, the Court taking note of subsequent proceedings recorded its conclusions as under: (Surya Sankaram Karri [(2006) 7 SCC 172 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 225] , SCC p. 179, para 21) “21. It is true that only on the basis of illegal investigation a proceeding may not be quashed unless miscarriage of justice is shown, but, in this case, as we have noticed hereinbefore, the respondent had suffered miscarriage of justice as the investigation made by PW 41 was not fair.” 23. In the instant case, the officer has mentioned in the FIR itself that he had orally been directed by the Superintendent of Police to investigate the case. It is evident 20 from the above that the judgments in Kalpnath Rai [(1997) 8 SCC 732 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 134 : AIR 1998 SC 201] and Surya Sankaram Karri [(2006) 7 SCC 172 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 225] have been decided by two-Judge Benches of this Court and in the latter judgment, the earlier judgment of this Court in Kalpnath Rai [(1997) 8 SCC 732 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 134 : AIR 1998 SC 201] has not been taken note of. Technically speaking it can be held to be per incuriam. There is nothing on record to show that the officer's statement is not factually correct. 24. We have no occasion to decide as to which of the earlier judgments is binding. It is evident that there was a direction by the Superintendent of Police to the officer concerned to investigate the case. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the issue as to whether the oral order could meet the requirement of law remains merely a technical issue. Further, as there is nothing on record to show that the investigation had been conducted unfairly, we are not inclined to examine the issue further. 25. Same remained the position regarding sanction. In the absence of anything to show that any defect or irregularity therein caused a failure of justice, the plea is without substance. A failure of justice is relatable to error, omission or irregularity in the sanction. Therefore, a mere error, omission or irregularity in sanction is not considered to be fatal unless it has resulted in a failure of justice or has been occasioned thereby. Section 19(1) of the PC Act, 1988 is a matter of procedure and does not go to the root of the jurisdiction and once the cognizance has been taken by the Court under CrPC, it cannot be said that an invalid police report is the foundation of jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance. [Vide Kalpnath Rai [(1997) 8 SCC 732 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 134 : AIR 1998 SC 201] , State of Orissa v. Mrutunjaya Panda [(1998) 2 SCC 414 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 644 : AIR 1998 SC 715] , State v. T. Venkatesh Murthy [(2004) 7 SCC 763 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 2140] , Shankerbhai Laljibhai Rot v. State of Gujarat [(2004) 13 SCC 487 : (2006) 1 SCC (Cri) 346] , Parkash Singh Badal v. State of Punjab [(2007) 1 SCC 1 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 193 : AIR 2007 SC 1274] and M.C. Mehta (Taj Corridor Scam) v. Union of India [(2007) 1 SCC 110 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 264 : AIR 2007 SC 1087] .] 26. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 : AIR 1992 SC 604] , this Court dealing with the same provisions held that a conjoint reading of the main provision, Section 5-A(1) (new Section 17) and the two provisos thereto, shows that the investigation by the designated police officer was the rule and the investigation by an officer of a lower rank was an exception. It has been ruled by the Court in several decisions that Section 6-A (new Section 21 23) of the Act was mandatory and not directory and the investigation conducted in violation thereof bears the stamp of illegality, but that illegality committed in the course of an investigation, does not affect the competence and the jurisdiction of the Court for trial and where the cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case has proceeded to termination, the validity of the proceedings is not vitiated unless a miscarriage of justice has been caused as a result of the illegality in the investigation.” On these grounds, he submits that the C.B.I is having suo-motu power to register the case. The case has already been investigated and the charge sheet has been submitted and the learned court has taken cognizance and there is no illegality in the procedure and what has been argued by the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the petitioners those are the subject matter of trial and this Court, at this stage, may not interfere with the matter and may not quash the entire criminal proceeding. Mr. Rajeev Kumar Sinha, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Bank of India submits that the Bank has also taken steps for recovery of the amount in question and has filed the Original Application before the Debts Recovery Tribunal as well as necessary action has been taken and the C.B.I has also been involved and by way of referring to Annexure-H, he submits that the C.B.I. has informed about the institution of the caes. In view of the above submissions of the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the parties, the Court has gone through the materials on record and finds that admittedly the C.B.I has registered the case on source information and there is no dispute with regard to the submission of the learned counsels for the parties. The Circular of 2016 speaks of suo-motu registration of the F.I.R by the C.B.I which is quoted hereinbelow: “3.2 Reporting of frauds to Reserve Bank of India- 3.2.3. Fraud report should be submitted in cases where 22 central investigating agencies have initiated criminal proceedings suo-motu and/or where the Reserve Bank has directed that such cases be reported as frauds.” This is the recent circular of the R.B.I and the earlier circulars have been repealed which is apparent from the Annexure-3 and looking into this circular, it transpires that the C.B.I. is having power to register the F.I.R suo-motu, however, rider is there that such information as report of fraud is required to be submitted. Admittedly, the Bank has involved the C.B.I later on and pursuant to that the C.B.I has been involved and the C.B.I has already registered the F.I.R, thus, so far as the rider clause of this circular is concerned, that has been complied with and the interpretation of that clause with regard to the report is the subject matter of trial and this Court is not required to answer the same in clear term. The judgments on which the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the petitioners have heavily relied in the case of “Green Signal Bio-Pharma Pvt. Ltd. v. Union Government of India” of Madras High Court, in that case, Circular of 2015 was considered, however, the said circular has been repealed in the year 2016. The arguments have been advanced on behalf of the learned counsels appearing on behalf of the petitioners that the same provision of earlier circular of 2014 and 2015 was again incorporated in the circular of 2016 and that is why those judgments are helping the petitioners are open to be decided in the trial or at appropriate stage. The principle of interfering under section 482 Cr.P.C is not in dispute; in appropriate cases, the High Court are rising to the occasion and quashed the proceeding, however, in economic offence cases, the Court is required to proceed slowly and that too, in a case where the charge sheet has been submitted and the learned court has taken cognizance. What has been argued by Mr. Ajit Kumar, the learned Senior counsel, Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, the learned counsel and Mr. Sanjay Samdarshi, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, these are the defence which can be only looked into in the 23 trial. The judgments relied by Mr. Anil Kumar, the learned A.S.G.I appearing on behalf of the respondent-C.B.I speaks of restrictions, if there is restriction in the statute as held in the case of “A.R. Antulay”(supra), the complaint can be proceeded with, which is helping the respondent-C.B.I. The procedure followed by CBI regarding the registration of FIR is traceable to the procedure laid down in the CBI Manual 2005, which has been prepared by CBI for registration of cases under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act. Therefore, non- compliance with Section 154 Cr.P.C if the case is registered on the basis of the information received suo motu by CBI after specifying that the information reveals prima facie cognizable offence and, not following the provisions of Section 154 does not vitiate the registration of FIR and further proceedings in the matter of registration. It is open for the CBI to proceed further in the matter to conduct investigation and proceed in accordance with law. A reference may be made to the judgment in the case of “State represented by Inspector of Police, Chennai v. N.S. Gnaneswaran” reported in (2013) 3 SCC 594, paragraph nos.24 to 28 of the said judgment are quoted hereinbelow: “24. CBI has prepared the Crime Manual of 2005 which is considered by this Court in Nirmal Singh Kahlon v. State of Punjab [(2009) 1 SCC 441 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 523] wherein the Supreme Court at para 30 has laid down the principle as under: (SCC p. 456, para 30) “30. Lodging of a first information report by CBI is governed by a manual. It may hold a preliminary inquiry; it has been given the said power in Chapter VI of the CBI Manual. A prima facie case may be held to have been established only on completion of a preliminary enquiry.” As per the said Manual, procedure is laid down under Chapter 8 regarding collection of source information under Paras 8.26, 8.27 and 8.28 which read as under: “8.26. As a part of their duty and in terms of annual programme of work, all investigating and supervisory officers are required to collect quality information regarding graft, misuse of official position, possession of disproportionate assets, fraud, embezzlement, serious economic offences, illegal trading in narcotics and psychotropic substances, 24 counterfeiting of currency, smuggling of antiques, acts endangering wildlife and environment, cyber crimes, serious frauds of banking/financial institutions, smuggling of arms & ammunition, forgery of passports, etc. and other matters falling within the purview of CBI and verify the same to ascertain whether any prima facie material is available to undertake an open probe. While all CBI officers are free to develop such information through discreet means, the officer developing any information must keep his superior officer informed regarding information being developed by him. The immediate superior officer may also keep the competent authority i.e. DIG/JD/ADCBI/SDCBI/DCBI informed in case the officer against whom information is being developed is of a rank against whom only such officer can order registration of a case. 8.27. The source information once developed must be submitted in writing giving all available details with specific acts of omissions and commissions and copies of documents collected discreetly. The internal vigilance enquiries or departmental enquiry reports should normally not be used as basis for submitting the source information. The SP concerned after satisfying himself that there is prima facie material meriting action by CBI and further verification is likely to result in registration of a regular case, would order verification if it falls within his competence. In the cases which are within the competence of higher officers, he will forward his detailed comments to the DIG and obtain orders from superior officer competent to order registration. The verification of SIRs must begin only after the competent authority has approved its registration. At this stage a regular SIR number will be assigned to the SIR which will also be entered in the source information sub-module of CRIMES Module with all other details. 8.28. The SIR may be classified as ‘SECRET’. These files must be maintained by the SP in his office. 25. Further, the learned Senior Counsel also placed reliance upon the procedure required to be followed by CBI laid down under Chapter 10 regarding registration of FIR by following the procedure under Para 10.1 which provides for registration of first information report on receipt of a complaint or after verification of an information or on completion of a preliminary enquiry taken up by CBI if it is revealed that prima facie a cognizable offence has been committed and the matter is fit for investigation to be undertaken by CBI, an FIR should be recorded under Section 154 CrPC and investigation be taken up. While considering registration of an FIR, it should be ensured that at least the main offence(s) have been notified under Section 3 of the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act and further he rightly placed reliance upon the judgment of V. Jayapaul [(2004) 5 SCC 223 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1607 : AIR 2004 SC 25 2684] wherein this Court, at para 4, has made the following observations which read as under: (V. Jayapaul case [(2004) 5 SCC 223 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1607 : AIR 2004 SC 2684] , SCC p. 226) “4. We have no hesitation in holding that the approach of the High Court is erroneous and its conclusion legally unsustainable. There is nothing in the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code which precluded the appellant (Inspector of Police, Vigilance) from taking up the investigation. The fact that the said police officer prepared the FIR on the basis of the information received by him and registered the suspected crime does not, in our view, disqualify him from taking up the investigation of the cognizable offence. A suo motu move on the part of the police officer to investigate a cognizable offence impelled by the information received from some sources is not outside the purview of the provisions contained in Sections 154 to 157 of the Code or any other provisions of the Code. The scheme of Sections 154, 156 and 157 was clarified thus by Subba Rao, J. speaking for the Court in State of U.P. v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi [AIR 1964 SC 221 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 140] ….” 26. In Shashikant v. CBI [(2007) 1 SCC 630 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 406] , in para 20, after referring to its earlier decision in State of U.P. v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi [AIR 1964 SC 221 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 140] referring to the provisions of Section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act, this Court has opined: (Shashikant case [(2007) 1 SCC 630 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 406] , SCC pp. 637-38) “20. … ‘8. … Even so the said police officer received a detailed information of the offences alleged to have been committed by the accused with necessary particulars, proceeded to the spot of the offence, ascertained the relevant facts by going through the railway records and submitted a report of the said acts. The said acts constituted an investigation within the meaning of the definition of “investigation” under Section 4(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure as explained by this Court. The decisions cited by the learned counsel for the State in support of his contention that there was no investigation in the present case are rather wide off the mark. In Nandamuri Anandayya, In re [AIR 1915 Mad 312] a Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that an informal enquiry on the basis of a vague telegram was not an investigation within the meaning of Section 157 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In M. Rangarajulu Naidu, In re [AIR 1958 Mad 368] Ramaswami, J. of the Madras High Court described the following three stages a policeman has to pass in a conspiracy case: (M. Rangarajulu Naidu, In re case [AIR 1958 Mad 368] , AIR pp. 371-72, para 29) “29. … hears something of interest affecting the public security and which puts him on the alert; makes discreet enquiries, takes soundings and sets up informants and is in the 26 second stage of qui vive or lookout; and finally gathers sufficient information enabling him to bite upon something definite and that is the stage when first information is recorded and when investigation starts.” This graphic description of the stages is only a restatement of the principle that a vague information or an irresponsible rumour would not in itself constitute information within the meaning of Section 154 of the Code or the basis for an investigation under Section 157 thereof. In State of Kerala v. M.J. Samuel [ILR 1960 Ker 783] a Full Bench of the Kerala High Court ruled that: “it can be stated as a general principle that it is not every piece of information, however vague, indefinite and unauthenticated it may be that should be recorded as the first information for the sole reason that such information was the first, in point of time, to be received by the police regarding the commission of an offence.” The Full Bench also took care to make it clear that whether or not a statement would constitute the first information report in a case is a question of fact and would depend upon the circumstances of that case.’ (Bhagwant Kishore Joshi case [AIR 1964 SC 221 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 140] , AIR p. 224, para 8)” 27. The said observations are made in the above decisions on the basis of the clarification made by this Court regarding the provisions of Sections 154, 156 and 157 CrPC in State of U.P. v. Bhagwant Kishore Joshi [AIR 1964 SC 221 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 140] upon which CBI rightly placed reliance in justification of the procedure followed by CBI regarding the registration of FIR, the same is traceable to the procedure laid down in the CBI Manual, 2005, which has been prepared by CBI for registration of cases under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act. Therefore, non-compliance with the mandatory provisions under Section 154 CrPC if the case is registered on the basis of the information received suo motu after specifying that the information reveals prima facie cognizable offence against the respondent herein and found that the matter is fit for investigation to be taken by the appellant herein, in not following the provisions of Section 154 does not vitiate the registration of FIR and further proceedings in the matter of registration. Therefore, the request made by the appellant to set aside the impugned order specifying the aforesaid procedure laid down under the Manual and also the decision of this Court referred to in Shashikant [(2007) 1 SCC 630 : (2007) 1 SCC (Cri) 406] and not complying with the mandatory procedure under Section 154 does not vitiate the registration of FIR against the respondent and further there is no need for this Court to await the larger Bench decision on the issue in Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P. [(2012) 4 SCC 1 : (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] 27 28. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, the impugned order is hereby set aside. It is open for CBI to proceed further in the matter to conduct investigation and proceed in accordance with law against the respondent. Thus, in the light of the above observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court to investigate on the basis of information received on some source has held is not out of the purview of the provision of sections 154 and 157 of the Code or any other provisions of the Code. The charge sheet has already been submitted and cognizance has also been taken. In light of the above discussion, reasons and the analysis, no case of interference is made out. Accordingly, Cr.M.P.No.2660 of 2021, Cr.M.P.No.3140 of 2022 and Cr.M.P.No.2681 of 2022 are dismissed. Interim orders passed earlier are vacated. It is made clear that the trial shall proceed in accordance with law, without being prejudiced of this order. ( Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.) SI/;; "