ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CORPORATE CIRCLE-1(1), CHENNAI, CHENNAI V. JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT LTD, KANCHEEPURAM

ITTPA 26/CHNY/2025

AI Insights

The case involves Joyson Anand Abhishek Safety Systems Pvt. Ltd., which entered into international transactions with its Associated Enterprises (AEs) and maintained transfer pricing documentation. The TPO proposed a transfer pricing adjustment, which was contested by the assessee on grounds of limitation. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) ruled in favor of the assessee, stating that the TPO's order was barred by limitation. The revenue appealed against this decision, leading to the current judgment by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, which upheld the CIT(A)'s decision and dismissed the revenue's appeal.

• Counselvise Citation: [2025] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 822526 (ITAT-CHENNAI)
• Duration Of Justice: 2 month(s) 27 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax (Transfer Pricing) Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 22-12-2025
• Appeal Filed By: Department
• Order Result: Dismissed
• Bench Allotted: D
• Assessment Year: 2016-2017
• Appeal Filed On: 25-09-2025
• Other Referred Cases: Pfizer Healthcare India vs. Commissioner of Income-tax, Saint Gobain India (P.) Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income-tax
• Laws Referred To: Income-tax Act, 1961
• Result in Favour of: Assessee
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: SADDIK AHMED
• Assessee Lawyers: VIKRAM VIJAYARAGHWAN; SADDIK AHMED
• Keywords: Transfer pricing; International transaction; Question of law; Period of limitation
• Section: 147; 148; 144; 143(3); 154; 263; 11; 131; 133A; 92C; 92E; 92D

Judgement Text

"आयकर अपीलीय अिधकरण, ’ड ’ \u000eयायपीठ, चे\u000eनई। IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL ‘D’ BENCH: CHENNAI \u0001ी मनु क ुमार िग र, \u000eाियक सद\u0012 एवं \u0001ी एस. आर. रघुनाथा, लेखा सद\u0012 क े सम BEFORE SHRI MANU KUMAR GIRI, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SHRI S.R.RAGHUNATHA, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER आयकर अपील सं./IT(TP)A No.26/Chny/2025 िनधा\u0018रण वष\u0018/Assessment Year: 2016-17 The DCIT, Corporate Circle-1(1), Chennai. v. JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. Survey No.43/4, 215, Thenur, Ammanampakkam Post, Chengalpattu, Kanchipuram 603002 Tamil Nadu [PAN: AACCT7200N] (अपीलाथ /Appellant) ( यथ /Respondent) अपीलाथ क ओर से/ Appellant by : Mr. Saddik Ahmed, JCIT यथ क ओर से /Respondent by : Mr. Vikram Vijayaraghwan, Advocate आयकर अपील सं./CO. No.85/Chny/2025 (Arising in IT(TP)A No.26Chny/2025) िनधा\u0018रण वष\u0018/Assessment Year: 2017-18 JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. Survey No.43/4, 215, Thenur, Ammanampakkam Post, Chengalpattu, Kanchipuram 603002 Tamil Nadu The DCIT, Corporate Circle-1(1), Chennai. [PAN: AACCT7200N] अपीलाथ क ओर से/ Appellant/cross objector by : Mr. Vikram Vijayaraghwan, Advocate यथ क ओर से /Respondent by : Mr. Saddik Ahmed, JCIT सुनवाईक तार ख/Date of Hearing : 18.12.2025 घोषणाक तार ख /Date of Pronouncement : 22.12.2025 Printed from counselvise.com JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. PER MANU KUMAR GIRI, JM This appeal [IT(TP)A No.26/Chny/2025] Cross Objection [CO. No.85/Chny/2025] against the order of the Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) [CIT(A)] Chennai-16 dated 2. The assessee, Takata India Private Limited, is a joint venture between Asia Investments Private Limited and T in the manufacture of automotive safety components such as seat belts and airbags. During the relevant previous year, the assessee entered into international transactions with its Associated Enterprises (“AEs”) and maintained prescribed transfer pricing documentation. 2. The return of income for AY 2016 subsequently revised on of Rs.12,72,80,767/-. The case was selected for scrutiny and notice under section 143(2) of the Income During the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (“AO”) made a reference under section 92CA(1) of the Act to the Transfer Pricing Officer (“TPO”) for determination of the arm’s le IT(TP)A No.26/Chny/2025 & CO 85/Chny/2025 JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. :: 2 :: आदेश / O R D E R MANU KUMAR GIRI, JM: IT(TP)A No.26/Chny/2025] filed by the revenue CO. No.85/Chny/2025] filed by the assessee are against the order of the Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) dated 11.07.2025 for Assessment Year 201 Takata India Private Limited, is a joint venture between Asia Investments Private Limited and Takata Corporation, Japan, engaged in the manufacture of automotive safety components such as seat belts and airbags. During the relevant previous year, the assessee entered into international transactions with its Associated Enterprises (“AEs”) and ned prescribed transfer pricing documentation. The return of income for AY 2016-17 was originally filed and subsequently revised on 24.11.2017, declaring a total loss . The case was selected for scrutiny and notice under 143(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”) was issued. During the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (“AO”) made a reference under section 92CA(1) of the Act to the Transfer Pricing Officer (“TPO”) for determination of the arm’s length price (“ALP”) & CO 85/Chny/2025 (AY 2016-17) JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. filed by the revenue and the assessee are directed against the order of the Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), for Assessment Year 2016-17. Takata India Private Limited, is a joint venture between akata Corporation, Japan, engaged in the manufacture of automotive safety components such as seat belts and airbags. During the relevant previous year, the assessee entered into international transactions with its Associated Enterprises (“AEs”) and 17 was originally filed and 24.11.2017, declaring a total loss . The case was selected for scrutiny and notice under tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”) was issued. During the course of assessment proceedings, the Assessing Officer (“AO”) made a reference under section 92CA(1) of the Act to the Transfer ngth price (“ALP”) Printed from counselvise.com JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. of international transactions entered into by the assessee with its AEs. The TPO passed an order under section 92CA(3) dated 01.11.2019, proposing transfer pricing adjustment of account of price penetration Based on the said TPO order, the AO passed the final assessment order under section 143(3) read with section 144C(3)on determining total loss at 3. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred During appellate proceedings, the assessee raised grounds contending that the TPO order dated 01.11.2019 was limitation in terms of section consequential assessment The Ld. CIT(A) allowed additional ground of the assessee and held that the TPO order dated 01.11.2019 is barred by limitation and is treated as void. 4. Before us, the revenue Whether on the facts an ld.CIT(A) is correct 01.11.2019 as void fact that the last date for the 01.11.2019 for the re section 92CA(3A), t IT(TP)A No.26/Chny/2025 & CO 85/Chny/2025 JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. :: 3 :: of international transactions entered into by the assessee with its AEs. TPO passed an order under section 92CA(3) dated 01.11.2019, proposing transfer pricing adjustment of Rs.6,12,02,043/ account of price penetration adjustment and working capital adjustment. Based on the said TPO order, the AO passed the final assessment order 143(3) read with section 144C(3)on determining total loss at Rs.6,60,78,720/-. Aggrieved, the assessee preferred appeal before the Ld. CIT(A). During appellate proceedings, the assessee raised contending that the TPO order dated 01.11.2019 was in terms of section 92CA(3A) of the Act, and therefore, the consequential assessment was void ab initio. allowed additional ground of the assessee and held that the TPO order dated 01.11.2019 is barred by limitation and is treated revenue has raised the following ground: Whether on the facts and circumstances of the case is correct in treating the TPO’s order dat 01.11.2019 as void and barred by limitation ignoring the fact that the last date for the TPO to pass the order will be for the reason that as per the provisions CA(3A), the Order under section 92CA(3) m & CO 85/Chny/2025 (AY 2016-17) JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. of international transactions entered into by the assessee with its AEs. TPO passed an order under section 92CA(3) dated 01.11.2019, /-, primarily on adjustment and working capital adjustment. Based on the said TPO order, the AO passed the final assessment order 143(3) read with section 144C(3)on 30.01.2020, appeal before the Ld. CIT(A). During appellate proceedings, the assessee raised additional contending that the TPO order dated 01.11.2019 was barred by of the Act, and therefore, the allowed additional ground of the assessee and held that the TPO order dated 01.11.2019 is barred by limitation and is treated the following ground: d circumstances of the case, the in treating the TPO’s order dated ignoring the to pass the order will be ons of the CA(3) may be Printed from counselvise.com JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. made at any time before sixty days prior AY 2016-17 and by counting 31.12.2019, 31 days in December 2019 and 29 days in November 2019 up to 02.11.2019, from 30.11.2019, the last date to pass the order u/s 92CA(3) would be 01.11.2019. 5. The Ld. Counsel for the assessee submitted that for AY 2016 per section 92CA(3A) (as applicable for the year), the TPO order was required to be passed at least 60 days prior to the time under section 153 for completion of assessment. the time-limit for passing the assessment order expired on and therefore, the TPO order ought to have been passed on or before 31.10.2019. Since the TPO order was passed on same was barred by limitation and void. judgments of the Hon’ble Madras High Cou (P.) Ltd. v. DCIT [2021] 124 Commissioner of Income taxmann.com 215 (Madras)/[2022] 444 ITR 636 6. Per contra, the Ld. DR submitted that the assessment was completed within time and the TPO order was valid. Act and provisions of the Act. the fact that the last date for the TPO to pass the order will be 01.11.2019 for the reason that as per the provisons of the section 92CA(3A), the Order under section 92CA(3) may be made at any time IT(TP)A No.26/Chny/2025 & CO 85/Chny/2025 JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. :: 4 :: time before sixty days prior to 31.12.2019 17 and by counting 60 days backward from 31.12.2019, 31 days in December 2019 and 29 days in November 2019 up to 02.11.2019, from 30.11.2019, the last date to pass the order u/s 92CA(3) would be The Ld. Counsel for the assessee submitted that for AY 2016 (as applicable for the year), the TPO order was at least 60 days prior to the time-limit prescribed for completion of assessment. It was contended that limit for passing the assessment order expired on and therefore, the TPO order ought to have been passed on or 31.10.2019. Since the TPO order was passed on 01.11.2019, the same was barred by limitation and void. The ld.AR placed Hon’ble Madras High Court in Pfizer Healthcare India [2021] 124 taxmann.com 536 (Madras) Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Saint Gobain India (P.) Ltd. [2022] 137 taxmann.com 215 (Madras)/[2022] 444 ITR 636 (Madras)[31 he Ld. DR submitted that the assessment was completed within time and the TPO order was valid. He also referred General clauses Act and provisions of the Act. He further stated that the ld.CIT(A) ignor the fact that the last date for the TPO to pass the order will be 01.11.2019 for the reason that as per the provisons of the section 92CA(3A), the Order under section 92CA(3) may be made at any time & CO 85/Chny/2025 (AY 2016-17) JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. to 31.12.2019 for days backward from 31.12.2019, 31 days in December 2019 and 29 days in November 2019 up to 02.11.2019, from 30.11.2019, the last date to pass the order u/s 92CA(3) would be The Ld. Counsel for the assessee submitted that for AY 2016-17, as (as applicable for the year), the TPO order was limit prescribed It was contended that limit for passing the assessment order expired on 31.12.2019, and therefore, the TPO order ought to have been passed on or 01.11.2019, the reliance on the Pfizer Healthcare India 536 (Madras) and Deputy tax vs. Saint Gobain India (P.) Ltd. [2022] 137 (Madras)[31-03-2022]. he Ld. DR submitted that the assessment was completed He also referred General clauses the ld.CIT(A) ignored the fact that the last date for the TPO to pass the order will be 01.11.2019 for the reason that as per the provisons of the section 92CA(3A), the Order under section 92CA(3) may be made at any time Printed from counselvise.com JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. before sixty days prior to 31.12.2019 for AY 2016 days backward from 31.12.2019, 31 days in December 2019 and 29 days in November 2019 up to 02.11.2019, from 30.11.2019, the last date to pass the order u/s 92CA(3) would be 01.11.2019. 6. We have carefully considered the rival submissi material on record. The undisputed dates (a) Due date for completion of assessment under section 153 Act is 31.12.2019. (b) Date of TPO order under section 92CA(3) As per section 92CA(3A), the days prior to the date on which the time assessment expires. 7. Applying the above provision, the TPO order in the present case ought to have been passed passed on 01.11.2019, it is clearly 8. The Hon’ble Madras High Court in Ltd. (supra) has categorically held that an order passed beyond the limitation prescribed under section 92CA(3A) is and any consequential adjustment cannot survive. IT(TP)A No.26/Chny/2025 & CO 85/Chny/2025 JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. :: 5 :: before sixty days prior to 31.12.2019 for AY 2016-17 and days backward from 31.12.2019, 31 days in December 2019 and 29 days in November 2019 up to 02.11.2019, from 30.11.2019, the last date to pass the order u/s 92CA(3) would be 01.11.2019. We have carefully considered the rival submissions and perused the The undisputed dates for AY 2016-17 are Due date for completion of assessment under section 153 31.12.2019. Date of TPO order under section 92CA(3) is 01.11.2019 92CA(3A), the TPO order must be passed days prior to the date on which the time-limit for completion of Applying the above provision, the TPO order in the present case ought to have been passed on or before 31.10.2019. Since the orde 01.11.2019, it is clearly beyond the period of limitation. The Hon’ble Madras High Court in Pfizer Healthcare India (P.) (supra) has categorically held that an order passed beyond the limitation prescribed under section 92CA(3A) is void and unenforceable, and any consequential adjustment cannot survive. & CO 85/Chny/2025 (AY 2016-17) JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. by counting 60 days backward from 31.12.2019, 31 days in December 2019 and 29 days in November 2019 up to 02.11.2019, from 30.11.2019, the last date to ons and perused the are as under: Due date for completion of assessment under section 153 of the 01.11.2019. TPO order must be passed at least 60 limit for completion of Applying the above provision, the TPO order in the present case on or before 31.10.2019. Since the order was beyond the period of limitation. Pfizer Healthcare India (P.) (supra) has categorically held that an order passed beyond the void and unenforceable, Printed from counselvise.com JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. 9. Similarly, in Saint Gobain India (P.) Ltd. Court (Division Bench) has affirmed that once the TPO order is barred by limitation, the AO is bound to dele Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court has 4.1 The writ petitioner is a private limited company, engaged in the business of manufacturing generic drugs, exporting the same to group entities and contrac development services for pharmaceutical products. For the assessment year 2016 on 30-11-2016. On receipt of the same, a notice dated 18 2017 was issued to the writ petitioner under section 143(2) of the Act. Subsequently, a reference was made by the second appellant to the first appellant for determining the arm's length price of the international transactions reported in Form No. 3CEB. On 10 92CA(2) of the Act was issu upon the writ petitioner to furnish certain particulars. The first appellant, thereafter, passed the order under section 92CA(3) of the Act on 1 petitioner, was passed, after the time l passing such order until 31 dated 1-11-2019 passed by the first appellant is beyond the period of limitation as stipulated under section 92CA(3A) of the Act. ………………………………………………………… 12.3 In the cases before us, the order of the TPO has been challenged on the ground of limitation, which goes to the root of authority/jurisdiction. It is not in dispute that what was disputed is only the addition made on account of the order of the TPO. There is the order was passed, which is 1 the receipt of such orders for the purpose of calculation of limitation. What was called upon to be adjudicated is the interpretation of the provision, law in the present cases. Therefore, we are of the view that the writ petitions are maintainable and has been rightly entertained by the Learned Judge. IT(TP)A No.26/Chny/2025 & CO 85/Chny/2025 JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. :: 6 :: Saint Gobain India (P.) Ltd. (supra), the Hon’ble High has affirmed that once the TPO order is barred by bound to delete the transfer pricing adjustment. Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court has been held as under: 4.1 The writ petitioner is a private limited company, engaged in the business of manufacturing generic drugs, exporting the same to group entities and contract research and development services for pharmaceutical products. For the assessment year 2016-2017, they filed their return of income 2016. On receipt of the same, a notice dated 18 2017 was issued to the writ petitioner under section 143(2) the Act. Subsequently, a reference was made by the second appellant to the first appellant for determining the arm's length price of the international transactions reported in Form No. 3CEB. On 10-12-2018, a notice under section 92CA(2) of the Act was issued by the first appellant calling upon the writ petitioner to furnish certain particulars. The first appellant, thereafter, passed the order under section 92CA(3) of the Act on 1-11-2019, which according to the writ petitioner, was passed, after the time limit prescribed for passing such order until 31-10-2019. Therefore, the order 2019 passed by the first appellant is beyond the period of limitation as stipulated under section 92CA(3A) of …………………………………………………………………………………………………… the cases before us, the order of the TPO has been challenged on the ground of limitation, which goes to the root of authority/jurisdiction. It is not in dispute that what was disputed is only the addition made on account of the order of the TPO. There is no dispute on facts about the date on which the order was passed, which is 1-11-2019 in all the cases or the receipt of such orders for the purpose of calculation of limitation. What was called upon to be adjudicated is the interpretation of the provision, which is a pure question of law in the present cases. Therefore, we are of the view that the writ petitions are maintainable and has been rightly entertained by the Learned Judge. & CO 85/Chny/2025 (AY 2016-17) JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. (supra), the Hon’ble High has affirmed that once the TPO order is barred by te the transfer pricing adjustment. The 4.1 The writ petitioner is a private limited company, engaged in the business of manufacturing generic drugs, exporting the t research and development services for pharmaceutical products. For the 2017, they filed their return of income 2016. On receipt of the same, a notice dated 18-7- 2017 was issued to the writ petitioner under section 143(2) the Act. Subsequently, a reference was made by the second appellant to the first appellant for determining the arm's length price of the international transactions reported 2018, a notice under section ed by the first appellant calling upon the writ petitioner to furnish certain particulars. The first appellant, thereafter, passed the order under section 2019, which according to the writ imit prescribed for 2019. Therefore, the order 2019 passed by the first appellant is beyond the period of limitation as stipulated under section 92CA(3A) of ………………………………………… the cases before us, the order of the TPO has been challenged on the ground of limitation, which goes to the root of authority/jurisdiction. It is not in dispute that what was disputed is only the addition made on account of the order of no dispute on facts about the date on which 2019 in all the cases or the receipt of such orders for the purpose of calculation of limitation. What was called upon to be adjudicated is the which is a pure question of law in the present cases. Therefore, we are of the view that the writ petitions are maintainable and has been rightly Printed from counselvise.com JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. Legal position 13.1 Secondly, we shall deal with the provisions of law, determination of the issue arisen in the instant cases. Much reliance has been placed upon the provisions of the General Clauses Act on the side of the appellants/Revenue to contend that in computation of time limit, the day referred to as \"from\" has to be excluded and the day referred to as \"to\" has to be included. It is the contention of the Revenue that if 31 12-2019 is included, then the last date for passing the order by the TPO would be 1 would be in time. This sta treating 1-1-2020 as the last date for passing orders under section 153 of the Income said contention, it is apropos to refer to the relevant provisions. 13.2 Section 92CA of the Income Reference to Transfer Pricing Officer and the same reads as under: \"Section 92CA. (1) Where any person, being the assessee, has entered into an international transaction or specified domestic transaction in any previous year, and the Officer considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, with the previous approval of the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner refer the computation of the arm's length price in relation to the said international transaction or specified domestic transaction under section 92C to the Transfer Pricing Officer (2) Where a reference is made under sub Transfer Pricing Officer shall serve a notice on the assessee requiring him to produce or cause to be produced on a date to be specified therein, any evidence on which the assessee may rely in support of the computation made by him of the arm's length price in relation to the international transaction or specified domestic transaction referred to in sub (1). 2A. Where any an international transaction referred under sub comes to the notice of the Transfer Pricing Officer during the course of the proceedings before him, the provisions of this Chapter shall apply, as if su IT(TP)A No.26/Chny/2025 & CO 85/Chny/2025 JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. :: 7 :: 13.1 Secondly, we shall deal with the provisions of law, determination of the issue arisen in the instant cases. Much reliance has been placed upon the provisions of the General Clauses Act on the side of the appellants/Revenue to contend that in computation of time limit, the day referred to as o be excluded and the day referred to as \"to\" has to be included. It is the contention of the Revenue that if 31 2019 is included, then the last date for passing the order by the TPO would be 1-11-2019 and hence all the orders would be in time. This stand is taken by the Revenue by 2020 as the last date for passing orders under section 153 of the Income-tax Act. Before dealing with the said contention, it is apropos to refer to the relevant 13.2 Section 92CA of the Income-tax Act, 1961, deals with Reference to Transfer Pricing Officer and the same reads as \"Section 92CA. (1) Where any person, being the assessee, has entered into an international transaction or specified domestic transaction in any previous year, and the Assessing Officer considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, with the previous approval of the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner refer the computation of the arm's length price in relation to the said international transaction or specified domestic transaction under section 92C to the Transfer (2) Where a reference is made under sub-section (1), the Transfer Pricing Officer shall serve a notice on the assessee requiring him to produce or cause to be produced on a date specified therein, any evidence on which the assessee may rely in support of the computation made by him of the arm's length price in relation to the international transaction or specified domestic transaction referred to in sub (1). 2A. Where any other international transaction other than an international transaction referred under sub-section (1) comes to the notice of the Transfer Pricing Officer during the course of the proceedings before him, the provisions of this Chapter shall apply, as if such other international transaction & CO 85/Chny/2025 (AY 2016-17) JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. 13.1 Secondly, we shall deal with the provisions of law, for determination of the issue arisen in the instant cases. Much reliance has been placed upon the provisions of the General Clauses Act on the side of the appellants/Revenue to contend that in computation of time limit, the day referred to as o be excluded and the day referred to as \"to\" has to be included. It is the contention of the Revenue that if 31- 2019 is included, then the last date for passing the order 2019 and hence all the orders nd is taken by the Revenue by 2020 as the last date for passing orders under tax Act. Before dealing with the said contention, it is apropos to refer to the relevant Act, 1961, deals with Reference to Transfer Pricing Officer and the same reads as \"Section 92CA. (1) Where any person, being the assessee, has entered into an international transaction or specified Assessing Officer considers it necessary or expedient so to do, he may, with the previous approval of the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner refer the computation of the arm's length price in relation to the said international transaction or specified domestic transaction under section 92C to the Transfer section (1), the Transfer Pricing Officer shall serve a notice on the assessee requiring him to produce or cause to be produced on a date specified therein, any evidence on which the assessee may rely in support of the computation made by him of the arm's length price in relation to the international transaction or specified domestic transaction referred to in sub-section other international transaction other than section (1) comes to the notice of the Transfer Pricing Officer during the course of the proceedings before him, the provisions of this ch other international transaction Printed from counselvise.com JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. is an international transaction referred to him under sub section (1). 2B. Where in respect of an international transaction the assessee has not furnished the report under section 92E and such transaction comes to the not Officer during the course of the proceeding before him, the provisions of this Chapter shall apply as if such transaction is an international transaction referred to him under sub (1) 2C. Nothing contained in sub Assessing Officer either to assess or reassess under section 147 or pass an order enhancing the assessment or reducing a refund already made or otherwise increasing the liability of the assessee under section 154, for any assessment proceedings for which have been completed before the 1st day of July 2012. (3) On the date specified in the notice under sub or as soon thereafter as may be, after hearing such evidence as the assessee may produce, including any informa documents referred to in sub after considering such evidence as the Transfer Pricing Officer may require on any specified points and after taking into account all relevant materials which he has gathered, the Transfer Pricing Officer shall, by order in writing, determine the arm's length price in relation to the international transaction or specified domestic transaction in accordance with sub-section (3) of section 92C and send a copy of his order to the Assessing Off a reference was made under sub day of June 2007 but the order under sub been made by the Transfer Pricing Officer before the said date, or a reference under sub after the 1st day of June, 2007, an order under sub (3) may be made at any time before sixty days prior to the date on which the period of limitation, referred to in section 153 or as the case may be, in section 153B for making the order of assessment or reassessment or recomputation or fresh assessment, as the case may be, expires. Provided that in the circumstances referred to in clause (ii) or clause (x) of Explanation 1 to section 153, if the period of limitation available to the T an order is less than sixty days, such remaining period shall IT(TP)A No.26/Chny/2025 & CO 85/Chny/2025 JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. :: 8 :: is an international transaction referred to him under sub 2B. Where in respect of an international transaction the assessee has not furnished the report under section 92E and such transaction comes to the notice of the Transfer Pricing Officer during the course of the proceeding before him, the provisions of this Chapter shall apply as if such transaction is an international transaction referred to him under sub 2C. Nothing contained in sub-section (2B) shall empower the Assessing Officer either to assess or reassess under section 147 or pass an order enhancing the assessment or reducing a refund already made or otherwise increasing the liability of the assessee under section 154, for any assessment proceedings for which have been completed before the 1st (3) On the date specified in the notice under sub-section (2), or as soon thereafter as may be, after hearing such evidence as the assessee may produce, including any informa documents referred to in sub-section (3) of section 92D and after considering such evidence as the Transfer Pricing Officer may require on any specified points and after taking into account all relevant materials which he has gathered, the Pricing Officer shall, by order in writing, determine the arm's length price in relation to the international transaction or specified domestic transaction in accordance section (3) of section 92C and send a copy of his order to the Assessing Officer and to the assessee. 3A. Where a reference was made under sub-section (1) before the 1st day of June 2007 but the order under sub-section (3) has not been made by the Transfer Pricing Officer before the said date, or a reference under sub-section (1) is made on or after the 1st day of June, 2007, an order under sub (3) may be made at any time before sixty days prior to the date on which the period of limitation, referred to in section 153 or as the case may be, in section 153B for making the der of assessment or reassessment or recomputation or fresh assessment, as the case may be, expires. Provided that in the circumstances referred to in clause (ii) or clause (x) of Explanation 1 to section 153, if the period of limitation available to the Transfer Pricing Officer for making an order is less than sixty days, such remaining period shall & CO 85/Chny/2025 (AY 2016-17) JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. is an international transaction referred to him under sub- 2B. Where in respect of an international transaction the assessee has not furnished the report under section 92E and ice of the Transfer Pricing Officer during the course of the proceeding before him, the provisions of this Chapter shall apply as if such transaction is an international transaction referred to him under sub-section (2B) shall empower the Assessing Officer either to assess or reassess under section 147 or pass an order enhancing the assessment or reducing a refund already made or otherwise increasing the liability of the assessee under section 154, for any assessment year, proceedings for which have been completed before the 1st section (2), or as soon thereafter as may be, after hearing such evidence as the assessee may produce, including any information or section (3) of section 92D and after considering such evidence as the Transfer Pricing Officer may require on any specified points and after taking into account all relevant materials which he has gathered, the Pricing Officer shall, by order in writing, determine the arm's length price in relation to the international transaction or specified domestic transaction in accordance section (3) of section 92C and send a copy of his icer and to the assessee. 3A. Where section (1) before the 1st section (3) has not been made by the Transfer Pricing Officer before the said is made on or after the 1st day of June, 2007, an order under sub-section (3) may be made at any time before sixty days prior to the date on which the period of limitation, referred to in section 153 or as the case may be, in section 153B for making the der of assessment or reassessment or recomputation or Provided that in the circumstances referred to in clause (ii) or clause (x) of Explanation 1 to section 153, if the period of ransfer Pricing Officer for making an order is less than sixty days, such remaining period shall Printed from counselvise.com JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. be extended by sixty days and the aforesaid period of limitation shall be deemed to have been extended accordingly (4) On receipt of the order under sub Assessing Officer shall proceed to compute the total income of the assessee under sub conformity with the arm's length price as so determined by the Transfer Pricing Officer (5) With a view to rectifying any mistake record, the Transfer Pricing Officer may amend any order passed by him under sub section 154 shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly (6) Where any amendments is made by the Transfer Pricing Officer under sub order to the Assessing Officer who shall thereafter proceed to amend the order of assessment in conformity with such order of the Transfer Pricing Officer (7) The Transfer Pricing Officer may, for the purpo determining the arm's length price under this section, exercise all or any of the powers specified in clauses (a) to (d) of sub-section (1) of section 131 or sub section 133 or section 133A Explanation:- For the purposes of this sectio Pricins Officer means a Joint Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner authorised by the Board to perform all or any of the functions of the Assessing Officer specified in sections 92C and 92D in respect of any person or class of persons.\" 13.3 Section 153 of the Income \"Section 153. (1) No Order of assessment shall be made under section 143 or section 144 at any time after expiry of twenty one months from the end of the assessment year in which the income was first assessable. Provided further that in respect of an order of assessment relating to the assessment year commencing on or after the 1st day of April 2019, the provisions of this sub have effect, as if for the words \"twenty words \"eighteen months\" had been substituted. (2) No order of assessment, reassessment or recomputation shall be made under section 147 after the expiry of nine months from the end of the financial year in which the notice under section 148 IT(TP)A No.26/Chny/2025 & CO 85/Chny/2025 JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. :: 9 :: be extended by sixty days and the aforesaid period of limitation shall be deemed to have been extended accordingly (4) On receipt of the order under sub-section (3), the Assessing Officer shall proceed to compute the total income of the assessee under sub-section (4) of section 92C in conformity with the arm's length price as so determined by the Transfer Pricing Officer (5) With a view to rectifying any mistake apparent from the record, the Transfer Pricing Officer may amend any order passed by him under sub-section (3), and the provisions of section 154 shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly (6) Where any amendments is made by the Transfer Pricing nder sub-section (5), he shall send a copy of his order to the Assessing Officer who shall thereafter proceed to amend the order of assessment in conformity with such order of the Transfer Pricing Officer (7) The Transfer Pricing Officer may, for the purpo determining the arm's length price under this section, exercise all or any of the powers specified in clauses (a) to section (1) of section 131 or sub-section (6) of section 133 or section 133A For the purposes of this section. Transfer Pricins Officer means a Joint Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner authorised by the Board to perform all or any of the functions of the Assessing Officer specified in sections 92C and 92D in respect of any ass of persons.\" 13.3 Section 153 of the Income-tax Act, reads as follows : \"Section 153. (1) No Order of assessment shall be made under section 143 or section 144 at any time after expiry of twenty one months from the end of the assessment year in the income was first assessable. Provided further that in respect of an order of assessment relating to the assessment year commencing on or after the 1st day of April 2019, the provisions of this sub-section shall have effect, as if for the words \"twenty-one months, the words \"eighteen months\" had been substituted. (2) No order of assessment, reassessment or recomputation shall be made under section 147 after the expiry of nine months from the end of the financial year in which the notice under section 148 was served. & CO 85/Chny/2025 (AY 2016-17) JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. be extended by sixty days and the aforesaid period of limitation shall be deemed to have been extended accordingly n (3), the Assessing Officer shall proceed to compute the total income section (4) of section 92C in conformity with the arm's length price as so determined by apparent from the record, the Transfer Pricing Officer may amend any order section (3), and the provisions of section 154 shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly (6) Where any amendments is made by the Transfer Pricing section (5), he shall send a copy of his order to the Assessing Officer who shall thereafter proceed to amend the order of assessment in conformity with such order (7) The Transfer Pricing Officer may, for the purpose of determining the arm's length price under this section, exercise all or any of the powers specified in clauses (a) to section (6) of n. Transfer Pricins Officer means a Joint Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner or Assistant Commissioner authorised by the Board to perform all or any of the functions of the Assessing Officer specified in sections 92C and 92D in respect of any tax Act, reads as follows : \"Section 153. (1) No Order of assessment shall be made under section 143 or section 144 at any time after expiry of twenty one months from the end of the assessment year in Provided further that in respect of an order of assessment relating to the assessment year commencing on or after the section shall one months, the (2) No order of assessment, reassessment or recomputation shall be made under section 147 after the expiry of nine months from the end of the financial year in which the notice Printed from counselvise.com JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. Provided that where the notice under section 148 is served on or after the 1st day of April 2019, the provisions of this sub-section shall have effect, as if for the words \"nine months\", the words \"twelve months\" had been substituted. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub and (2), an order of fresh assessment in pursuance of an order under section 254 or section 263 or section 264, setting aside or cancelling an assessment may be made at any time before the expiry of nine m the financial year in which the order under section 254 is received by the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner or, as the case may be, the order under section 263 or section 264 is passed by the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner. Provided that where the order under section 254 is received by the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner or, as the case may be, the order unde Principal Commissioner or Commissioner on or after the 1st day of April 2019, the provisions of this sub have effect, as if for the words \"nine months\", the words \"twelve months\" had been substituted. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub (2) and (3), where a reference under sub section 92CA is made during the course of the proceeding for the assessment or reassessment, the period available for completion of assessment be, under the said sub extended by twelve months ……… ...……. Provided further that where the period available to the Transfer Pricing Officer is extended to sixty days in accordance with th 92CA and the period of limitation available to the Assessing Officer for making an order of assessment, reassessment or recomputation, as the case may be, is less than sixty days, such remaining period shall be exte the aforesaid period of limitation shall be deemed to be extended accordingly.\" IT(TP)A No.26/Chny/2025 & CO 85/Chny/2025 JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. :: 10 :: Provided that where the notice under section 148 is served on or after the 1st day of April 2019, the provisions of this section shall have effect, as if for the words \"nine months\", the words \"twelve months\" had been substituted. ithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1) and (2), an order of fresh assessment in pursuance of an order under section 254 or section 263 or section 264, setting aside or cancelling an assessment may be made at any time before the expiry of nine months from the end of the financial year in which the order under section 254 is received by the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner or, as the case may be, the order under section 263 or section is passed by the Principal Commissioner or Provided that where the order under section 254 is received by the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner or, as the case may be, the order under section 263 or 264 is passed by the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner on or after the 1st day of April 2019, the provisions of this sub-section shall have effect, as if for the words \"nine months\", the words \"twelve months\" had been substituted. Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3), where a reference under sub-section (1) of section 92CA is made during the course of the proceeding for the assessment or reassessment, the period available for completion of assessment or reassessment, as the case may be, under the said sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) shall be extended by twelve months Provided further that where the period available to the Transfer Pricing Officer is extended to sixty days in accordance with the proviso to sub-section (3A) of section 92CA and the period of limitation available to the Assessing Officer for making an order of assessment, reassessment or recomputation, as the case may be, is less than sixty days, such remaining period shall be extended to sixty days and the aforesaid period of limitation shall be deemed to be extended accordingly.\" & CO 85/Chny/2025 (AY 2016-17) JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. Provided that where the notice under section 148 is served on or after the 1st day of April 2019, the provisions of this section shall have effect, as if for the words \"nine months\", the words \"twelve months\" had been substituted. sections (1) and (2), an order of fresh assessment in pursuance of an order under section 254 or section 263 or section 264, setting aside or cancelling an assessment may be made at onths from the end of the financial year in which the order under section 254 is received by the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner or, as the case may be, the order under section 263 or section is passed by the Principal Commissioner or Provided that where the order under section 254 is received by the Principal Chief Commissioner or Chief Commissioner or Principal Commissioner or Commissioner or, as the case r section 263 or 264 is passed by the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner on or after the 1st section shall have effect, as if for the words \"nine months\", the words sections (1), section (1) of section 92CA is made during the course of the proceeding for the assessment or reassessment, the period available for or reassessment, as the case may sections (1), (2) and (3) shall be Provided further that where the period available to the Transfer Pricing Officer is extended to sixty days in section (3A) of section 92CA and the period of limitation available to the Assessing Officer for making an order of assessment, reassessment or recomputation, as the case may be, is less than sixty days, nded to sixty days and the aforesaid period of limitation shall be deemed to be Printed from counselvise.com JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. 13.4 Section 9 of the General Clauses Act reads as follows; \"9. Commencement and termination of time. any Central Act]or commencement of this Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word \"from\", and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word \"to\": >Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any act or proceeding to which the \"Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (15 of 1877)\", applies (2) This section applies also to all Central Acts made after the thi Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887.\" 14. In the present cases, the Financial Year is 2015 the assessment year is 2016 would commence on 31 on 31-12-2018 normally and the extended period would end on 31-12-2019 and not on 1 appellants that the time to pass the assessment order would end at 00.00 hours on 1 would end at 23:59:59 and 00.00 is regarded as the next day. A day for the purpose of reckoning the date ends before the stroke of midnight and the next date would commence at midnight immediately after the expiry of the previous day. The last date would be t 2019), which cannot be the first day of the next month (01 1-2020). The \"date\" must not be reckoned with respect to sun rise but with respect to the time of 24 hours in a day. The moment last minute of the day expires, the d the next moment which is the first moment of the next day becomes irrelevant for the purpose of reckoning the period of limitation. 15. As per the details given in the website of National Institute of Standards and Technology of the United Sta Government, the Times and Frequency Division, while dealing with FAQ's on times of day suggests the following: \"Is midnight the end of a day or the beginning of a day? IT(TP)A No.26/Chny/2025 & CO 85/Chny/2025 JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. :: 11 :: 13.4 Section 9 of the General Clauses Act reads as follows; \"9. Commencement and termination of time. any Central Act]or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word \"from\", and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or ny other period of time, to use the word \"to\": >Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any act or proceeding to which the \"Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (15 of 1877)\", applies (2) This section applies also to all Central Acts made after the third day of January, 1868, and to all Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887.\" 14. In the present cases, the Financial Year is 2015 the assessment year is 2016-17. The period of 21 months would commence on 31-3-2017, the assessment year ended 2018 normally and the extended period would end 2019 and not on 1-1-2020. The contention of the appellants that the time to pass the assessment order would end at 00.00 hours on 1-1-2020, is fallacious as 31- ld end at 23:59:59 and 00.00 is regarded as the next day. A day for the purpose of reckoning the date ends before the stroke of midnight and the next date would commence at midnight immediately after the expiry of the previous day. The last date would be the last day of the month (31 2019), which cannot be the first day of the next month (01 2020). The \"date\" must not be reckoned with respect to sun rise but with respect to the time of 24 hours in a day. The moment last minute of the day expires, the day ends and the next moment which is the first moment of the next day becomes irrelevant for the purpose of reckoning the period of 15. As per the details given in the website of National Institute of Standards and Technology of the United Sta Government, the Times and Frequency Division, while dealing with FAQ's on times of day suggests the following: \"Is midnight the end of a day or the beginning of a & CO 85/Chny/2025 (AY 2016-17) JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. 13.4 Section 9 of the General Clauses Act reads as follows; \"9. Commencement and termination of time.—(1) In Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word \"from\", and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or >Provided that nothing in this section shall apply to any act or proceeding to which the \"Indian Limitation (2) This section applies also to all Central Acts made rd day of January, 1868, and to all Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of 14. In the present cases, the Financial Year is 2015-16 and 17. The period of 21 months essment year ended 2018 normally and the extended period would end 2020. The contention of the appellants that the time to pass the assessment order would -12-2019 ld end at 23:59:59 and 00.00 is regarded as the next day. A day for the purpose of reckoning the date ends before the stroke of midnight and the next date would commence at midnight immediately after the expiry of the previous day. he last day of the month (31-12- 2019), which cannot be the first day of the next month (01- 2020). The \"date\" must not be reckoned with respect to sun rise but with respect to the time of 24 hours in a day. ay ends and the next moment which is the first moment of the next day becomes irrelevant for the purpose of reckoning the period of 15. As per the details given in the website of National Institute of Standards and Technology of the United States Government, the Times and Frequency Division, while dealing \"Is midnight the end of a day or the beginning of a Printed from counselvise.com JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. When someone refers to \"midnight tonight\" or \"midnight last night\" the reference of However, if a date/time is referred to as \"at midnight on Friday, October 20th\" the intention could be either midnight the beginning of the day or midnight at the end of the day. To avoid ambiguity, specification of an event as occurring on a particular day at 11:59 p.m. or 12:01 a.m. is a good idea, especially legal documents such as contracts and insurance policies. Another option would be to use 24 to refer to midnight at the beginning of a given date) and 2400 to designate the end of a given day (or date).\" 16. As per the International Standards Organization, ISO 8601- 1:2019 midnight may only be referred to as \"00:00\", corresponding to the beginning of a calendar day. The earlier use of reference to 24.00 hours to mark the end of the day, was dropped. 17. In India, the midnight or 00.00 hours has been always used to denote the beginning of the next date. A reference could be made to our Independence day, wherein the stroke of midnight at 00.00 hours on 15 moment of Independence as per the Indian Independence Act, 1947. 18. Also, it is not out of place to mention here that the new year eve of every year, through out the world is celebrated at 00.00 hours and i and not as an extension of the previous day. 19. A reference can also be made to various insurance policies, wherein the beginning of the day is reckoned as 00.00 hours and the end of the day at 23:59:59 hours. 20. Even as per the contentions of the appellants, the assessing officer has time upto 23:59:59 hours on 31 2019 to pass assessment orders. However, according to them, the time limit expires at/on 00.00 hours of 1 The fallacy in such contention IT(TP)A No.26/Chny/2025 & CO 85/Chny/2025 JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. :: 12 :: When someone refers to \"midnight tonight\" or \"midnight last night\" the reference of time is obvious. However, if a date/time is referred to as \"at midnight on Friday, October 20th\" the intention could be either midnight the beginning of the day or midnight at the end of the day. To avoid ambiguity, specification of an event as n a particular day at 11:59 p.m. or 12:01 a.m. is a good idea, especially legal documents such as contracts and insurance policies. Another option would be to use 24-hour clock, using the designation of 0000 to refer to midnight at the beginning of a given date) and 2400 to designate the end of a given day (or 16. As per the International Standards Organization, ISO 1:2019 midnight may only be referred to as \"00:00\", corresponding to the beginning of a calendar day. The earlier reference to 24.00 hours to mark the end of the day, 17. In India, the midnight or 00.00 hours has been always used to denote the beginning of the next date. A reference could be made to our Independence day, wherein the stroke t 00.00 hours on 15-8-1947 is considered as the moment of Independence as per the Indian Independence 18. Also, it is not out of place to mention here that the new year eve of every year, through out the world is celebrated at 00.00 hours and it is regarded as the beginning of a new day and not as an extension of the previous day. 19. A reference can also be made to various insurance policies, wherein the beginning of the day is reckoned as 00.00 hours and the end of the day at 23:59:59 hours. 20. Even as per the contentions of the appellants, the assessing officer has time upto 23:59:59 hours on 31 2019 to pass assessment orders. However, according to them, the time limit expires at/on 00.00 hours of 1- The fallacy in such contention is that 00.00 hours of 1 & CO 85/Chny/2025 (AY 2016-17) JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. When someone refers to \"midnight tonight\" or time is obvious. However, if a date/time is referred to as \"at midnight on Friday, October 20th\" the intention could be either midnight the beginning of the day or midnight at the To avoid ambiguity, specification of an event as n a particular day at 11:59 p.m. or 12:01 a.m. is a good idea, especially legal documents such as contracts and insurance policies. Another option would hour clock, using the designation of 0000 to refer to midnight at the beginning of a given day (or date) and 2400 to designate the end of a given day (or 16. As per the International Standards Organization, ISO 1:2019 midnight may only be referred to as \"00:00\", corresponding to the beginning of a calendar day. The earlier reference to 24.00 hours to mark the end of the day, 17. In India, the midnight or 00.00 hours has been always used to denote the beginning of the next date. A reference could be made to our Independence day, wherein the stroke 1947 is considered as the moment of Independence as per the Indian Independence 18. Also, it is not out of place to mention here that the new year eve of every year, through out the world is celebrated at t is regarded as the beginning of a new day 19. A reference can also be made to various insurance policies, wherein the beginning of the day is reckoned as 00.00 hours and the end of the day at 23:59:59 hours. 20. Even as per the contentions of the appellants, the assessing officer has time upto 23:59:59 hours on 31-12- 2019 to pass assessment orders. However, according to -1-2020. is that 00.00 hours of 1-1- Printed from counselvise.com JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. 2020 denotes not only the beginning of the next day of the month, but also the fact that it comes after 23:59:59 hours on 31-12-2019 and by such time, the time limit had already expired. By resorting to such fallacious argument, department wants to relate 00:00 hours of 1 12-2019 and stretch it to 1 limitation for the entire day of 1 permitted. Even as per section 153, no order can be passed at any time after the order has to be passed before 23:59:59 hours on 31 2019. The provision cannot be considered ignoring the words \"at any time after expiry\", in the opinion of this court. 21. It will be useful to refer to t Court in B.N. Agarwalla v. State of Orissa [1995] 6 SCC 509, taking into consideration section 5 of the General Clauses Act and the relevant passage of the same reads as under: \"6.Sub-section (7) of section 41A provides for automatic transfer to the Arbitration Tribunal of all arbitration proceedings of the kind specified in sub section (1) which were \"pending before any arbitrator on the date of commencement\" of the said Act and \"in which no award had been made by the said date\". Obviously, the expression \"by the said date\" here means by the date of commencement of the Arbitration (Orissa Amendment) Act, 1982. The first expression clearly means an arbitration proceeding pending before any arbitrator on the date of commencement of the Act, namely, 26 expression should be consistent with that of the first expression since the two could not be used to create a conflict. The purpose of sub arbitrator of authority to make the a arbitration proceedings which were pending before the arbitrator on the date of commencement of the said Act and to provide for their automatic transfer to the Arbitration Tribunal. The General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that unless the co shall be construed as coming into operation immediately on the expiration of the day preceding its commencement. There being no contrary indication in the Act, it must be held that the said Act came into IT(TP)A No.26/Chny/2025 & CO 85/Chny/2025 JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. :: 13 :: 2020 denotes not only the beginning of the next day of the month, but also the fact that it comes after 23:59:59 hours 2019 and by such time, the time limit had already expired. By resorting to such fallacious argument, department wants to relate 00:00 hours of 1-1-2020 to 31 2019 and stretch it to 1-1-2020 to extend the period of limitation for the entire day of 1-1-2020, which cannot be permitted. Even as per section 153, no order can be passed expiry of twenty one month's implying that the order has to be passed before 23:59:59 hours on 31 2019. The provision cannot be considered ignoring the words \"at any time after expiry\", in the opinion of this court. 21. It will be useful to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in B.N. Agarwalla v. State of Orissa [1995] 6 SCC 509, taking into consideration section 5 of the General Clauses Act and the relevant passage of the same reads as under: section (7) of section 41A provides for c transfer to the Arbitration Tribunal of all arbitration proceedings of the kind specified in sub section (1) which were \"pending before any arbitrator on the date of commencement\" of the said Act and \"in which no award had been made by the said date\". viously, the expression \"by the said date\" here means by the date of commencement of the Arbitration (Orissa Amendment) Act, 1982. The first expression clearly means an arbitration proceeding pending before any arbitrator on the date of commencement of the Act, namely, 26-3-1983. The meaning of the second expression should be consistent with that of the first expression since the two could not be used to create a conflict. The purpose of sub-section (7) is to divest the arbitrator of authority to make the award in all such arbitration proceedings which were pending before the arbitrator on the date of commencement of the said Act and to provide for their automatic transfer to the Arbitration Tribunal. The General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that unless the contrary is expressed, an Act shall be construed as coming into operation immediately on the expiration of the day preceding its commencement. There being no contrary indication in the Act, it must be held that the said Act came into & CO 85/Chny/2025 (AY 2016-17) JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. 2020 denotes not only the beginning of the next day of the month, but also the fact that it comes after 23:59:59 hours 2019 and by such time, the time limit had already expired. By resorting to such fallacious argument, the 2020 to 31- 2020 to extend the period of 2020, which cannot be permitted. Even as per section 153, no order can be passed expiry of twenty one month's implying that the order has to be passed before 23:59:59 hours on 31-12- 2019. The provision cannot be considered ignoring the words \"at any time after expiry\", in the opinion of this court. he judgment of the Apex Court in B.N. Agarwalla v. State of Orissa [1995] 6 SCC 509, taking into consideration section 5 of the General Clauses Act and the relevant passage of the same reads as under: section (7) of section 41A provides for c transfer to the Arbitration Tribunal of all arbitration proceedings of the kind specified in sub- section (1) which were \"pending before any arbitrator on the date of commencement\" of the said Act and \"in which no award had been made by the said date\". viously, the expression \"by the said date\" here means by the date of commencement of the Arbitration (Orissa Amendment) Act, 1982. The first expression clearly means an arbitration proceeding pending before any arbitrator on the date of commencement of the 1983. The meaning of the second expression should be consistent with that of the first expression since the two could not be used to create a section (7) is to divest the ward in all such arbitration proceedings which were pending before the arbitrator on the date of commencement of the said Act and to provide for their automatic transfer to the Arbitration Tribunal. The General Clauses Act, 1897 ntrary is expressed, an Act shall be construed as coming into operation immediately on the expiration of the day preceding its commencement. There being no contrary indication in the Act, it must be held that the said Act came into Printed from counselvise.com JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. force on the midnight on preceding its commencement, i.e., the midnight between 25 doubt that if the second expression \"in which no award has been made by the said date \" was not also present in sub-section (7), then first expression would be that an arbitration proceeding in which no award had been made up to the midnight between 25- arbitration proceeding which automatically stood transferred to the therefore, is whether the further words used in the second expression in sub different conclusion. The construction of the first expression being unambiguous, the second expression must be cons permissible construction of the expression \"by the said date\". 7. It does appear to us that the second expression, namely, \"in which no award has been made by the said date\" was further used in sub cautela to clarify the meaning of pending proceedings by indicating that only those arbitration proceedings in which the award also had been made \"by the said date \" were excluded from the operation of sub and that every other arbitra those in which the award alone remained to be made \"by the said date \" stood transferred to the Arbitration Tribunal. In other words, if the arbitration proceedings had been closed but the arbitrator had not made the award till th 1983 when the Act came into force, it was a pending arbitration proceeding governed by sub Acceptance of the appellant's contention would amount to holding that even though the Act had come into force on the midnight between 25 1983, an award made thereafter on 26 a pending arbitration proceeding on the date of commencement of the Act. Unless meaning of the expression \"by the said date \" used in sub be only that su appellant, the construction which would harmonise with IT(TP)A No.26/Chny/2025 & CO 85/Chny/2025 JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. :: 14 :: force on the midnight on the expiration of the day preceding its commencement, i.e., the midnight between 25-3-1983 and 26-3-1983. There can be no doubt that if the second expression \"in which no award has been made by the said date \" was not also present section (7), then the undoubted result of the first expression would be that an arbitration proceeding in which no award had been made up to the midnight between 25-3-1983 and 26-3-1983 would be a pending arbitration proceeding which automatically stood transferred to the Arbitration Tribunal. The question, therefore, is whether the further words used in the second expression in sub-section (7) must lead to a different conclusion. The construction of the first expression being unambiguous, the second expression must be construed harmoniously unless that is not a permissible construction of the expression \"by the said 7. It does appear to us that the second expression, namely, \"in which no award has been made by the said date\" was further used in sub-section (7) ex abundante cautela to clarify the meaning of pending proceedings by indicating that only those arbitration proceedings in which the award also had been made \"by the said date \" were excluded from the operation of sub-section (7) and that every other arbitration proceeding including those in which the award alone remained to be made \"by the said date \" stood transferred to the Arbitration Tribunal. In other words, if the arbitration proceedings had been closed but the arbitrator had not made the award till the midnight between 25-3-1983 and 26 1983 when the Act came into force, it was a pending arbitration proceeding governed by sub-section (7). Acceptance of the appellant's contention would amount to holding that even though the Act had come into he midnight between 25-3-1983 and 26 1983, an award made thereafter on 26-3-1983 was not a pending arbitration proceeding on the date of commencement of the Act. Unless meaning of the expression \"by the said date \" used in sub-section (7) be only that suggested by learned counsel for the appellant, the construction which would harmonise with & CO 85/Chny/2025 (AY 2016-17) JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. the expiration of the day preceding its commencement, i.e., the midnight 1983. There can be no doubt that if the second expression \"in which no award has been made by the said date \" was not also present the undoubted result of the first expression would be that an arbitration proceeding in which no award had been made up to the midnight 1983 would be a pending arbitration proceeding which automatically stood Arbitration Tribunal. The question, therefore, is whether the further words used in the section (7) must lead to a different conclusion. The construction of the first expression being unambiguous, the second expression trued harmoniously unless that is not a permissible construction of the expression \"by the said 7. It does appear to us that the second expression, namely, \"in which no award has been made by the said abundante cautela to clarify the meaning of pending proceedings by indicating that only those arbitration proceedings in which the award also had been made \"by the said date section (7) tion proceeding including those in which the award alone remained to be made \"by the said date \" stood transferred to the Arbitration Tribunal. In other words, if the arbitration proceedings had been closed but the arbitrator had not made the 1983 and 26-3- 1983 when the Act came into force, it was a pending section (7). Acceptance of the appellant's contention would amount to holding that even though the Act had come into 1983 and 26-3- 1983 was not a pending arbitration proceeding on the date of commencement of the Act. Unless meaning of the section (7) ggested by learned counsel for the appellant, the construction which would harmonise with Printed from counselvise.com JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. the meaning of the earlier expression, must be given to the provision. 8. We may now consider the meaning of the word 'by' for ascertaining the meaning of the express said date \". Meaning of the word 'by' in some of the dictionaries is: Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Edn.) \"Before a certain time; ... not later than a certain time; on or before a certain time;……\" The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary \"... On or before, not later than. ...\" 9. No doubt the word 'by' means \"before a certain time \" as well as \"on or before a certain time\". The question is: whether, the word 'by' in the expression \"by the said date \" would mean in other words 'before' or 'on' 26-3-1983 in the present context? We have already indicated the meaning of the first expression \"pending before any arbitrator on the date of commencement\" to mean clearly and unambiguously pending up to the midnight between 25 before commencement of the date 26 time of expiry of the preceding day i.e. 25 other expression must, therefore, be construed in this context and since the word 'by' means 'before' also, in this context it must be held to mean ' 'on' the date of commencement of the Act. So construed, the second expression would read as \"in which no award has been made before the said date\" i.e. in which no award has been made before the date of commencement of the Act, namely, 26 would be the harmonious construction of the two expressions in the provision. 10. Obviously, an award made on 26 said to be an award made before 26 therefore, the award in the present case having been made on 26 date of commencement of the Act, the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to make the award as it was a pending arbitration proceeding which automatically stood transferred to the Arbitration Tribunal.\" IT(TP)A No.26/Chny/2025 & CO 85/Chny/2025 JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. :: 15 :: the meaning of the earlier expression, must be given to the provision. 8. We may now consider the meaning of the word 'by' for ascertaining the meaning of the expression \"by the said date \". Meaning of the word 'by' in some of the dictionaries is: Black's Law Dictionary (Sixth Edn.) \"Before a certain time; ... not later than a certain time; on or before a certain time;……\" The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary On or before, not later than. ...\" 9. No doubt the word 'by' means \"before a certain time \" as well as \"on or before a certain time\". The question is: whether, the word 'by' in the expression \"by the said date \" would mean in other words 'before' or 'on' 1983 in the present context? We have already indicated the meaning of the first expression \"pending before any arbitrator on the date of commencement\" to mean clearly and unambiguously pending up to the midnight between 25-3-1983 and 26-3-1983, i.e., efore commencement of the date 26-3-1983 or at the time of expiry of the preceding day i.e. 25-3-1983. The other expression must, therefore, be construed in this context and since the word 'by' means 'before' also, in this context it must be held to mean 'before' and not 'on' the date of commencement of the Act. So construed, the second expression would read as \"in which no award has been made before the said date\" i.e. in which no award has been made before the date of commencement of the Act, namely, 26-3-1983. This would be the harmonious construction of the two expressions in the provision. 10. Obviously, an award made on 26-3-1983 cannot be said to be an award made before 26-3-1983 and, therefore, the award in the present case having been made on 26-3-1983 and not before 26-3-1983, the date of commencement of the Act, the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to make the award as it was a pending arbitration proceeding which automatically stood transferred to the Arbitration Tribunal.\" & CO 85/Chny/2025 (AY 2016-17) JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. the meaning of the earlier expression, must be given to 8. We may now consider the meaning of the word 'by' ion \"by the said date \". Meaning of the word 'by' in some of the \"Before a certain time; ... not later than a certain time; 9. No doubt the word 'by' means \"before a certain time \" as well as \"on or before a certain time\". The question is: whether, the word 'by' in the expression \"by the said date \" would mean in other words 'before' or 'on' 1983 in the present context? We have already indicated the meaning of the first expression \"pending before any arbitrator on the date of commencement\" to mean clearly and unambiguously pending up to the 1983, i.e., 1983 or at the 1983. The other expression must, therefore, be construed in this context and since the word 'by' means 'before' also, in before' and not 'on' the date of commencement of the Act. So construed, the second expression would read as \"in which no award has been made before the said date\" i.e. in which no award has been made before the date 1983. This would be the harmonious construction of the two 1983 cannot be 1983 and, therefore, the award in the present case having been 1983, the date of commencement of the Act, the arbitrator had no jurisdiction to make the award as it was a pending arbitration proceeding which automatically stood Printed from counselvise.com JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. 22. From section 153, th assessment order ends on 31 the matter being referred to TPO, the time limit to pass assessment order would lapse on 31 be forgotten, while interpreting a taxing statute, explicit and clear language used by the parliament while enacting the law. If the language employed in any statute is clear and unambiguous from its plain and natural meaning, external aid for interpretation are unnecessary. In the present case, we limitation applicable to TPO under section 92CA(3A) and incidentally under section 153. 23. On the applicability of the General Clauses Act, it is relevant to point out the ratio laid down in the Constitutional Bench Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Dilip Kumar & Co. [2018] 95 taxmann.com 327/69 GST 239, which reads as under: \"17. In doing so, the principles of interpretation have been evolved in common law. It has als practice for the appropriate legislative body to enact the Interpretation Acts or the General Clauses Act. In all the Acts and Regulations, made either by Parliament or Legislature, the words and phrases as defined in the General Clauses Act and laid down in the General Clauses Act are to be necessarily kept in view. If while interpreting a statutory law, any doubt arises as to the meaning to be assigned to a word or a phrase or a clause used in an enactment and s specifically defined, it is legitimate and indeed mandatory to fall back on the General Clauses Act. Notwithstanding this, we should remember that when there is repugnancy or conflict as to the subject or context between t statutory provision which falls for interpretation, the Court must necessarily refer to the provisions of the statute.\" IT(TP)A No.26/Chny/2025 & CO 85/Chny/2025 JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. :: 16 :: 22. From section 153, the regular time for passing the assessment order ends on 31-12-2018 and with extension on the matter being referred to TPO, the time limit to pass assessment order would lapse on 31-12-2019. What is not to be forgotten, while interpreting a taxing statute, explicit and clear language used by the parliament while enacting the law. If the language employed in any statute is clear and unambiguous from its plain and natural meaning, external aid for interpretation are unnecessary. In the present case, we are called upon to adjudicate the period of limitation applicable to TPO under section 92CA(3A) and incidentally under section 153. 23. On the applicability of the General Clauses Act, it is relevant to point out the ratio laid down in the Constitutional Bench Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Dilip Kumar & Co. [2018] 95 taxmann.com 327/69 GST 239, which reads as \"17. In doing so, the principles of interpretation have been evolved in common law. It has also been the practice for the appropriate legislative body to enact the Interpretation Acts or the General Clauses Act. In all the Acts and Regulations, made either by Parliament or Legislature, the words and phrases as defined in the General Clauses Act and the principles of interpretation laid down in the General Clauses Act are to be necessarily kept in view. If while interpreting a statutory law, any doubt arises as to the meaning to be assigned to a word or a phrase or a clause used in an enactment and such word, phrase or clause is not specifically defined, it is legitimate and indeed mandatory to fall back on the General Clauses Act. Notwithstanding this, we should remember that when there is repugnancy or conflict as to the subject or context between the General Clauses Act and a statutory provision which falls for interpretation, the Court must necessarily refer to the provisions of the & CO 85/Chny/2025 (AY 2016-17) JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. e regular time for passing the 2018 and with extension on the matter being referred to TPO, the time limit to pass 2019. What is not to be forgotten, while interpreting a taxing statute, is the explicit and clear language used by the parliament while enacting the law. If the language employed in any statute is clear and unambiguous from its plain and natural meaning, external aid for interpretation are unnecessary. In the are called upon to adjudicate the period of limitation applicable to TPO under section 92CA(3A) and 23. On the applicability of the General Clauses Act, it is relevant to point out the ratio laid down in the Constitutional Bench Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Commissioner of Customs (Import) v. Dilip Kumar & Co. [2018] 95 taxmann.com 327/69 GST 239, which reads as \"17. In doing so, the principles of interpretation have o been the practice for the appropriate legislative body to enact the Interpretation Acts or the General Clauses Act. In all the Acts and Regulations, made either by Parliament or Legislature, the words and phrases as defined in the the principles of interpretation laid down in the General Clauses Act are to be necessarily kept in view. If while interpreting a statutory law, any doubt arises as to the meaning to be assigned to a word or a phrase or a clause used in an uch word, phrase or clause is not specifically defined, it is legitimate and indeed mandatory to fall back on the General Clauses Act. Notwithstanding this, we should remember that when there is repugnancy or conflict as to the subject or he General Clauses Act and a statutory provision which falls for interpretation, the Court must necessarily refer to the provisions of the Printed from counselvise.com JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. 24. The finding so rendered by the Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court can be related to Arti of the Constitution of India, which reads as follows: \"367. Interpretation requires, the General Clauses Act, 1897 , shall, subject to any adaptations and modifications that may be made therein under Article 3 of this Constitution as it applies for the interpretation of an Act of the Legislature of the Dominion of India\". 25. The above Article commences with the words, \"unless the context otherwise requires\". Therefore, the inte sought to be projected by the department cannot be accepted as the General Clauses Act cannot override any interpretation propounded by the parliament/Legislature in the clear, distinct and express language with an intention to convey a certaint ratio laid down by the Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court is squarely applicable to this case. 26. Further, the general interpretation by resorting to the meaning conveyed under the General Clauses Act cannot adopted while interpreting 92CA (3A), because, the context and the language employed therein are completely different and it is pertinent to note that the words \"from\" and \"to\" have not been used. Even the employment of the General Clauses Act will not be disclosed a little later in this judgment. But, right now, it is relevant to consider the scope of the word \"to\". 27. The word \"to\" is used as a preposition or as an adverb. In popular sense, it is used to expr person, thing, or time travels. The flow of direction is to be gauged from the preceding word or words used, like \"prior to\" or \"upto\". Keeping the same in mind, if we look at the wording of section 92CA (3A), we cannot accept contention of the Revenue that the time to be reckoned is from 31-12-2019 and not 30 done by the learned Judge. IT(TP)A No.26/Chny/2025 & CO 85/Chny/2025 JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. :: 17 :: 24. The finding so rendered by the Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court can be related to Article 367 (1) of the Constitution of India, which reads as follows: \"367. Interpretation––(1) Unless the context otherwise requires, the General Clauses Act, 1897 , shall, subject to any adaptations and modifications that may be made therein under Article 372, apply for the interpretation of this Constitution as it applies for the interpretation of an Act of the Legislature of the Dominion of India\". 25. The above Article commences with the words, \"unless the context otherwise requires\". Therefore, the interpretation sought to be projected by the department cannot be accepted as the General Clauses Act cannot override any interpretation propounded by the parliament/Legislature in the clear, distinct and express language with an intention to convey a certainty as to how time is to be calculated. The ratio laid down by the Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court is squarely applicable to this case. 26. Further, the general interpretation by resorting to the meaning conveyed under the General Clauses Act cannot adopted while interpreting 92CA (3A), because, the context and the language employed therein are completely different and it is pertinent to note that the words \"from\" and \"to\" have not been used. Even the employment of the General Clauses Act will not aid the Revenue, the reason of which will be disclosed a little later in this judgment. But, right now, it is relevant to consider the scope of the word \"to\". 27. The word \"to\" is used as a preposition or as an adverb. In popular sense, it is used to express the direction in which a person, thing, or time travels. The flow of direction is to be gauged from the preceding word or words used, like \"prior to\" or \"upto\". Keeping the same in mind, if we look at the wording of section 92CA (3A), we cannot accept contention of the Revenue that the time to be reckoned is 2019 and not 30-12-2019 as has been rightly done by the learned Judge. & CO 85/Chny/2025 (AY 2016-17) JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. 24. The finding so rendered by the Constitutional Bench of cle 367 (1) (1) Unless the context otherwise requires, the General Clauses Act, 1897 , shall, subject to any adaptations and modifications that may be made 72, apply for the interpretation of this Constitution as it applies for the interpretation of an Act of the Legislature of the Dominion of India\". 25. The above Article commences with the words, \"unless the rpretation sought to be projected by the department cannot be accepted as the General Clauses Act cannot override any interpretation propounded by the parliament/Legislature in the clear, distinct and express language with an intention to y as to how time is to be calculated. The ratio laid down by the Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court 26. Further, the general interpretation by resorting to the meaning conveyed under the General Clauses Act cannot be adopted while interpreting 92CA (3A), because, the context and the language employed therein are completely different and it is pertinent to note that the words \"from\" and \"to\" have not been used. Even the employment of the General aid the Revenue, the reason of which will be disclosed a little later in this judgment. But, right now, it 27. The word \"to\" is used as a preposition or as an adverb. In ess the direction in which a person, thing, or time travels. The flow of direction is to be gauged from the preceding word or words used, like \"prior to\" or \"upto\". Keeping the same in mind, if we look at the wording of section 92CA (3A), we cannot accept the contention of the Revenue that the time to be reckoned is 2019 as has been rightly Printed from counselvise.com JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. 28. The word \"date\" in section 92CA(3A) would indicate 31 12-2019. But the preceding words \"prior to\" would ind that for the purpose of calculating the 60 days, 31 must be excluded. The usage of the word \"prior\" is not without significance. It is not open to this court to just consider the word \"to\" by ignoring \"prior\". The word \"prior\" in the present context, not only denotes the flow of direction, but also actual date from which the period of 60 days is to be calculated. It is settled law that while interpreting a statute, it is not for the courts to treat any word(s) as redundant or superfluous and i pertinent to note the judgment of the Apex Court in Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs 2002 taxmann.com 1803, wherein, it was held as follows : \"10. No words or expressions used in any statute can be said to be redundant or superfluous. In matters of interpretation one should not concentrate too much on one word and pay too little attention to other words. No provision in the statute and no word i be construed in isolation. Every provision and every word must be looked at generally and in the context in which it is used. It is said that every statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting any word gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the court to take upon itself the task of amending or alternating (sic altering) the statutory provisions. Wherever the language is clear the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. While doing so, what has been said in the statute a also what has not been said has to be noted. The construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words has to be avoided. As stated by the Privy Council in Crawford v. Spooner [(1846) 6 Moore 179] \"we cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend and, by construction make up deficiencies which are left there\". In case of IT(TP)A No.26/Chny/2025 & CO 85/Chny/2025 JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. :: 18 :: 28. The word \"date\" in section 92CA(3A) would indicate 31 2019. But the preceding words \"prior to\" would ind that for the purpose of calculating the 60 days, 31- must be excluded. The usage of the word \"prior\" is not without significance. It is not open to this court to just consider the word \"to\" by ignoring \"prior\". The word \"prior\" in context, not only denotes the flow of direction, but also actual date from which the period of 60 days is to be calculated. It is settled law that while interpreting a statute, it is not for the courts to treat any word(s) as redundant or superfluous and ignore the same. In this connection, it is pertinent to note the judgment of the Apex Court in Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs 2002 taxmann.com 1803, wherein, it was held as follows : \"10. No words or expressions used in any statute can be said to be redundant or superfluous. In matters of interpretation one should not concentrate too much on one word and pay too little attention to other words. No provision in the statute and no word in any section can be construed in isolation. Every provision and every word must be looked at generally and in the context in which it is used. It is said that every statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting any word while considering a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the t to take upon itself the task of amending or alternating (sic altering) the statutory provisions. Wherever the language is clear the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. While doing so, what has been said in the statute a also what has not been said has to be noted. The construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words has to be avoided. As stated by the Privy Council in Crawford v. Spooner [(1846) 6 Moore PC 1 : 4 MIA 179] \"we cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend and, by construction make up deficiencies which are left there\". In case of & CO 85/Chny/2025 (AY 2016-17) JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. 28. The word \"date\" in section 92CA(3A) would indicate 31- 2019. But the preceding words \"prior to\" would indicate -12-2019 must be excluded. The usage of the word \"prior\" is not without significance. It is not open to this court to just consider the word \"to\" by ignoring \"prior\". The word \"prior\" in context, not only denotes the flow of direction, but also actual date from which the period of 60 days is to be calculated. It is settled law that while interpreting a statute, it is not for the courts to treat any word(s) as redundant or gnore the same. In this connection, it is pertinent to note the judgment of the Apex Court in Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs 2002 taxmann.com \"10. No words or expressions used in any statute can be said to be redundant or superfluous. In matters of interpretation one should not concentrate too much on one word and pay too little attention to other words. No n any section can be construed in isolation. Every provision and every word must be looked at generally and in the context in which it is used. It is said that every statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of while considering a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the t to take upon itself the task of amending or alternating (sic altering) the statutory provisions. Wherever the language is clear the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. While doing so, what has been said in the statute as also what has not been said has to be noted. The construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words has to be avoided. As stated by the Privy Council PC 1 : 4 MIA 179] \"we cannot aid the legislature's defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add or mend and, by construction make up deficiencies which are left there\". In case of Printed from counselvise.com JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. an ordinary word there should be no attempt to substitute or paraphrase of g Attention should be confined to what is necessary for deciding the particular case. This principle is too well settled and reference to a few decisions of this Court would suffice. (See : Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Cust SCC 785 : AIR 1990 SC 1747] , Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 323 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 248 : (1992) 19 ATC 219 : AIR 1992 SC 96] , Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse [(1 v. Press Council of India [(2002) 3 SCC 722 : JT (2002) 3 SC 21] .)\" 29. The language employed is simple. 31 date for the assessing officer to pass his order under section 153. The TPO has to pass or last date. The 60 days is to be calculated excluding the last date because of the use of the words \"prior to\" and the TPO has to pass order before the 60th day. In the present case, the word \"before\" used before \"60 days\" wo an order has to be passed before 1 31-10-2019 as rightly held by the Learned Judge. 30. Even considering for the purpose of alternate interpretation, the scope of section 9 of the General Clauses Act, it is to be noted that an inverted calculation of the period of limitation takes place here. If the last date is taken to be the first date from which the period of 60 days is to be calculated, reading down the provision with the use of the word \"from\", which denotes direction in general parlance, would mean that 60 days \"from the last date\". Even going by section 9 of the General Clauses Act, when the word \"from\" is used, then, that date is to be excluded, implying here that 31 After excluding 31 calculated, the 60th day would fall on 1 must have passed the order on or before 31 orders are to be passed before the 60th day. Therefore, either way the contention of the Revenue is a fallacy and has no legs to stand. IT(TP)A No.26/Chny/2025 & CO 85/Chny/2025 JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. :: 19 :: an ordinary word there should be no attempt to substitute or paraphrase of general application. Attention should be confined to what is necessary for deciding the particular case. This principle is too well settled and reference to a few decisions of this Court would suffice. (See : Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. Custodian of Vested Forests [1990 Supp SCC 785 : AIR 1990 SC 1747] , Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 323 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 248 : (1992) 19 ATC 219 : AIR 1992 SC 96] , Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse [(1997) 6 SCC 312] and Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India [(2002) 3 SCC 722 : JT (2002) 3 SC 21] .)\" 29. The language employed is simple. 31-12-2019 is the last date for the assessing officer to pass his order under section 153. The TPO has to pass order before 60 days prior to the last date. The 60 days is to be calculated excluding the last date because of the use of the words \"prior to\" and the TPO has to pass order before the 60th day. In the present case, the word \"before\" used before \"60 days\" would indicate that an order has to be passed before 1-11-2019 i.e on or before 2019 as rightly held by the Learned Judge. 30. Even considering for the purpose of alternate interpretation, the scope of section 9 of the General Clauses noted that an inverted calculation of the period of limitation takes place here. If the last date is taken to be the first date from which the period of 60 days is to be calculated, reading down the provision with the use of the word \"from\", which denotes the starting point or period of direction in general parlance, would mean that 60 days \"from the last date\". Even going by section 9 of the General Clauses Act, when the word \"from\" is used, then, that date is to be excluded, implying here that 31-12-2019 must be excluded. After excluding 31-12-2019, if the period of 60 days is calculated, the 60th day would fall on 1-11-2019 and the TPO must have passed the order on or before 31-10- orders are to be passed before the 60th day. Therefore, the contention of the Revenue is a fallacy and has & CO 85/Chny/2025 (AY 2016-17) JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. an ordinary word there should be no attempt to eneral application. Attention should be confined to what is necessary for deciding the particular case. This principle is too well settled and reference to a few decisions of this Court would suffice. (See : Gwalior Rayons Silk Mfg. (Wvg.) odian of Vested Forests [1990 Supp SCC 785 : AIR 1990 SC 1747] , Union of India v. Deoki Nandan Aggarwal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 323 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 248 : (1992) 19 ATC 219 : AIR 1992 SC 96] , Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price 997) 6 SCC 312] and Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India [(2002) 3 SCC 722 : JT (2002) 2019 is the last date for the assessing officer to pass his order under section der before 60 days prior to the last date. The 60 days is to be calculated excluding the last date because of the use of the words \"prior to\" and the TPO has to pass order before the 60th day. In the present case, uld indicate that 2019 i.e on or before 30. Even considering for the purpose of alternate interpretation, the scope of section 9 of the General Clauses noted that an inverted calculation of the period of limitation takes place here. If the last date is taken to be the first date from which the period of 60 days is to be calculated, reading down the provision with the use of the the starting point or period of direction in general parlance, would mean that 60 days \"from the last date\". Even going by section 9 of the General Clauses Act, when the word \"from\" is used, then, that date is to be must be excluded. 2019, if the period of 60 days is 2019 and the TPO -2019 as orders are to be passed before the 60th day. Therefore, the contention of the Revenue is a fallacy and has Printed from counselvise.com JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. Mandatory or Directory 31. The next contention that has been raised by the learned senior standing counsel for the appellants is that the usage of the word \"may\" in section 92CA (3A) in fixed is only directory, a guideline, not mandatory and is for the sake of internal proceedings. 32. Let us now examine the relevant procedures relating to Transfer Pricing. After an international transaction is noticed subject to satisfaction of section 92B, a reference is made to the TPO under sub The TPO after considering the documents submitted by the assessee is to pass an order under section 92CA (3) of the Act. As per section 92CA(3A), th before the expiry of 60 days prior to the date on which the period of limitation under section 153 expires. As per 92CA(4), the assessing officer has to pass an order in conformity with the order of the TPO. After receipt of the order from the TPO determining ALP, the assessing officer is to forward a draft assessment order to the assessee, who has an option either to file his acceptance of the variation of the assessment or file his objection to any such variation with the Dispute Resolution Panel and also the Assessing Officer. Sub section (5) of section 144C of the Act provides that if any objections are raised by the assessee before the Dispute Resolution Panel, the Panel is empowered to issue such direction as it thinks fit for Officer after considering various details provided in Clauses (A) to (G) thereof. Sub Act provides that upon receipt of directions issued under sub section (5) of section 144C of the Act, th shall in conformity with the directions complete the assessment proceedings. It goes without saying that if no objections are filed by the Assessee either before the DRP or the assessing officer to the determination by the TPO, section 92CA(4) would come into operation. Therefore, it is very clear that once a reference is made, it would have an impact on the assessment unless a decision on merits is taken by DRP rejecting or varying the determination by the TPO. IT(TP)A No.26/Chny/2025 & CO 85/Chny/2025 JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. :: 20 :: Mandatory or Directory 31. The next contention that has been raised by the learned senior standing counsel for the appellants is that the usage of the word \"may\" in section 92CA (3A) indicates that the time fixed is only directory, a guideline, not mandatory and is for the sake of internal proceedings. 32. Let us now examine the relevant procedures relating to Transfer Pricing. After an international transaction is noticed tisfaction of section 92B, a reference is made to the TPO under sub-section (1) of section 92CA of the Act. The TPO after considering the documents submitted by the assessee is to pass an order under section 92CA (3) of the Act. As per section 92CA(3A), the order has to be passed before the expiry of 60 days prior to the date on which the period of limitation under section 153 expires. As per 92CA(4), the assessing officer has to pass an order in conformity with the order of the TPO. After receipt of the der from the TPO determining ALP, the assessing officer is to forward a draft assessment order to the assessee, who has an option either to file his acceptance of the variation of the assessment or file his objection to any such variation with the Resolution Panel and also the Assessing Officer. Sub section (5) of section 144C of the Act provides that if any objections are raised by the assessee before the Dispute Resolution Panel, the Panel is empowered to issue such direction as it thinks fit for the guidance of the Assessing Officer after considering various details provided in Clauses (A) to (G) thereof. Sub-section (13) of section 144C of the Act provides that upon receipt of directions issued under sub section (5) of section 144C of the Act, the Assessing Officer shall in conformity with the directions complete the assessment proceedings. It goes without saying that if no objections are filed by the Assessee either before the DRP or the assessing officer to the determination by the TPO, section 92CA(4) would come into operation. Therefore, it is very clear that once a reference is made, it would have an impact on the assessment unless a decision on merits is taken by DRP rejecting or varying the determination by the TPO. & CO 85/Chny/2025 (AY 2016-17) JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. 31. The next contention that has been raised by the learned senior standing counsel for the appellants is that the usage of dicates that the time fixed is only directory, a guideline, not mandatory and is for 32. Let us now examine the relevant procedures relating to Transfer Pricing. After an international transaction is noticed tisfaction of section 92B, a reference is made to section (1) of section 92CA of the Act. The TPO after considering the documents submitted by the assessee is to pass an order under section 92CA (3) of the e order has to be passed before the expiry of 60 days prior to the date on which the period of limitation under section 153 expires. As per 92CA(4), the assessing officer has to pass an order in conformity with the order of the TPO. After receipt of the der from the TPO determining ALP, the assessing officer is to forward a draft assessment order to the assessee, who has an option either to file his acceptance of the variation of the assessment or file his objection to any such variation with the Resolution Panel and also the Assessing Officer. Sub- section (5) of section 144C of the Act provides that if any objections are raised by the assessee before the Dispute Resolution Panel, the Panel is empowered to issue such the guidance of the Assessing Officer after considering various details provided in Clauses section (13) of section 144C of the Act provides that upon receipt of directions issued under sub- e Assessing Officer shall in conformity with the directions complete the assessment proceedings. It goes without saying that if no objections are filed by the Assessee either before the DRP or the assessing officer to the determination by the TPO, section 92CA(4) would come into operation. Therefore, it is very clear that once a reference is made, it would have an impact on the assessment unless a decision on merits is taken by DRP rejecting or varying the determination by the TPO. Printed from counselvise.com JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. 33. It would only be apr section 92CA (3A), if the time limit for the TPO to pass an order is less than 60 days, then the remaining period shall be extended to 60 days. This implies that not only is the time frame mandatory, but also that the TP within 60 days. 34. Further, the extension in the proviso referred above, also automatically extends the period of assessment to 60 days as per the second proviso to section 153. 35. Also, but for the reference to the TPO, the time completing the assessment would only be 21 months from the end of the assessment year. It is only if a reference is pending, the department gets another 12 months. Once reference is made and after availing the benefit of the extended period to p that the time limits are not mandatory. Hence, the contention raised in this regard is rejected. 36. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Ajay Vohra, learned senior counsel for the respondents in WA. Nos.1148 and 1149/2021, the word \"may\" has to be sometimes read as \"shall\" and vice versa depending upon the context in which it is used, the consequences of the performance or failure on the overall scheme and object of the provisions would have to be considered while determin or directory. 37. At this juncture, it is noteworthy to mention the commentary of Justice G.P.Singh on the interpretation of statutes, Principles of Statutory Interpretation (1st Edn., Lexis Nexis 2015), which is quoted below for ready reference: 'The intention of the legislature thus assimilates two aspects: In one aspect it carries the concept of \"meaning\" i.e. what the words mean and in another aspect, it conveys the concept of \"purpose and obje or the \"reason and spirit\" pervading through the statute. The process of construction, therefore, combines both literal and purposive approaches. In other words the legislative intention i.e. the true or IT(TP)A No.26/Chny/2025 & CO 85/Chny/2025 JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. :: 21 :: 33. It would only be apropos to note that as per proviso to section 92CA (3A), if the time limit for the TPO to pass an order is less than 60 days, then the remaining period shall be extended to 60 days. This implies that not only is the time frame mandatory, but also that the TPO has to pass an order 34. Further, the extension in the proviso referred above, also automatically extends the period of assessment to 60 days as per the second proviso to section 153. 35. Also, but for the reference to the TPO, the time completing the assessment would only be 21 months from the end of the assessment year. It is only if a reference is pending, the department gets another 12 months. Once reference is made and after availing the benefit of the extended period to pass orders, the department cannot claim that the time limits are not mandatory. Hence, the contention raised in this regard is rejected. 36. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Ajay Vohra, learned senior counsel for the respondents in WA. Nos.1148 and , the word \"may\" has to be sometimes read as \"shall\" and vice versa depending upon the context in which it is used, the consequences of the performance or failure on the overall scheme and object of the provisions would have to be considered while determining whether it is mandatory 37. At this juncture, it is noteworthy to mention the commentary of Justice G.P.Singh on the interpretation of statutes, Principles of Statutory Interpretation (1st Edn., 2015), which is quoted below for ready 'The intention of the legislature thus assimilates two aspects: In one aspect it carries the concept of \"meaning\" i.e. what the words mean and in another aspect, it conveys the concept of \"purpose and obje or the \"reason and spirit\" pervading through the statute. The process of construction, therefore, combines both literal and purposive approaches. In other words the legislative intention i.e. the true or & CO 85/Chny/2025 (AY 2016-17) JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. opos to note that as per proviso to section 92CA (3A), if the time limit for the TPO to pass an order is less than 60 days, then the remaining period shall be extended to 60 days. This implies that not only is the time O has to pass an order 34. Further, the extension in the proviso referred above, also automatically extends the period of assessment to 60 days as limit for completing the assessment would only be 21 months from the end of the assessment year. It is only if a reference is pending, the department gets another 12 months. Once reference is made and after availing the benefit of the ass orders, the department cannot claim that the time limits are not mandatory. Hence, the contention 36. As rightly pointed out by Mr. Ajay Vohra, learned senior counsel for the respondents in WA. Nos.1148 and , the word \"may\" has to be sometimes read as \"shall\" and vice versa depending upon the context in which it is used, the consequences of the performance or failure on the overall scheme and object of the provisions would have ing whether it is mandatory 37. At this juncture, it is noteworthy to mention the commentary of Justice G.P.Singh on the interpretation of statutes, Principles of Statutory Interpretation (1st Edn., 2015), which is quoted below for ready 'The intention of the legislature thus assimilates two aspects: In one aspect it carries the concept of \"meaning\" i.e. what the words mean and in another aspect, it conveys the concept of \"purpose and object\" or the \"reason and spirit\" pervading through the statute. The process of construction, therefore, combines both literal and purposive approaches. In other words the legislative intention i.e. the true or Printed from counselvise.com JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. legal meaning of an enactment is derived by considering the meaning of the words used in the enactment in the light of any discernible purpose or object which comprehends the mischief and its remedy to which the enactment is directed. This formulation later received the approval of the Supreme Court and was called the \"cardinal principle of construction\".' 38. In case of assessments involving transfer pricing, fixing of time limits at various stages sets forth that the object of the provisions is to facilitate faster assessment involving such determination. In the present case, as rightly held by the learned Judge in paragraphs 22 to 29 of the order dated 7 2020, the order of the TPO or the failure to pass an order before 60 days will have an impact in the order to be passed by the Assessing Officer, f been prescribed under sections 144C and 153 and is hence mandatory. What is also not to be forgotten, considering the scheme of the Act, the inter of the provisions to conclude the assessme consequence or the effect that follows, if an order is not passed in time. When an order is passed in time, the procedures under 144C and 92CA(4) are to be followed. When the determination is not in time, it cannot be relied upon by the assessin assessment proceedings. 39. Upon consideration of the judgments and the scheme of the Act, we are of the opinion that the word \"may\" used therein has to be construed as \"shall\" and the time period fixed therein has to be scrupulously followed. The word \"may\" is used there to imply that a day before 60 days and it is not that the order must be made on the day before the 60th day. The impact of the proviso to the sub-section clarifies the mandatory nature of the time schedule. The word \"may\" cannot be interpreted to the legislature never wanted the authority to pass an order within 60 days and it gave a discretion. Therefore, the learned Judge rightly held the orders impugned in the writ petitions as barred by limitation, as the Board, in the Central Action Plan, has specified 31 IT(TP)A No.26/Chny/2025 & CO 85/Chny/2025 JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. :: 22 :: legal meaning of an enactment is derived by idering the meaning of the words used in the enactment in the light of any discernible purpose or object which comprehends the mischief and its remedy to which the enactment is directed. This formulation later received the approval of the Supreme Court and was called the \"cardinal principle of construction\".' 38. In case of assessments involving transfer pricing, fixing of time limits at various stages sets forth that the object of the provisions is to facilitate faster assessment involving such ion. In the present case, as rightly held by the learned Judge in paragraphs 22 to 29 of the order dated 7 2020, the order of the TPO or the failure to pass an order before 60 days will have an impact in the order to be passed by the Assessing Officer, for which an outer time limit has been prescribed under sections 144C and 153 and is hence mandatory. What is also not to be forgotten, considering the scheme of the Act, the inter-relatability and inter-dependency of the provisions to conclude the assessment, is the consequence or the effect that follows, if an order is not passed in time. When an order is passed in time, the procedures under 144C and 92CA(4) are to be followed. When the determination is not in time, it cannot be relied upon by the assessing officer while concluding the assessment proceedings. consideration of the judgments and the scheme of the Act, we are of the opinion that the word \"may\" used therein has to be construed as \"shall\" and the time period fixed therein has to be scrupulously followed. The word \"may\" is used there to imply that an order can be passed any day before 60 days and it is not that the order must be made on the day before the 60th day. The impact of the proviso to section clarifies the mandatory nature of the time schedule. The word \"may\" cannot be interpreted to the legislature never wanted the authority to pass an order within 60 days and it gave a discretion. Therefore, the learned Judge rightly held the orders impugned in the writ petitions as barred by limitation, as the Board, in the Central Plan, has specified 31-10-2019 as the date on which & CO 85/Chny/2025 (AY 2016-17) JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. legal meaning of an enactment is derived by idering the meaning of the words used in the enactment in the light of any discernible purpose or object which comprehends the mischief and its remedy to which the enactment is directed. This formulation later received the approval of the Supreme Court and was called the \"cardinal principle of construction\".' 38. In case of assessments involving transfer pricing, fixing of time limits at various stages sets forth that the object of the provisions is to facilitate faster assessment involving such ion. In the present case, as rightly held by the learned Judge in paragraphs 22 to 29 of the order dated 7-9- 2020, the order of the TPO or the failure to pass an order before 60 days will have an impact in the order to be passed or which an outer time limit has been prescribed under sections 144C and 153 and is hence mandatory. What is also not to be forgotten, considering the dependency nt, is the consequence or the effect that follows, if an order is not passed in time. When an order is passed in time, the procedures under 144C and 92CA(4) are to be followed. When the determination is not in time, it cannot be relied g officer while concluding the consideration of the judgments and the scheme of the Act, we are of the opinion that the word \"may\" used therein has to be construed as \"shall\" and the time period fixed therein has to be scrupulously followed. The word n order can be passed any day before 60 days and it is not that the order must be made on the day before the 60th day. The impact of the proviso to section clarifies the mandatory nature of the time say that the legislature never wanted the authority to pass an order within 60 days and it gave a discretion. Therefore, the learned Judge rightly held the orders impugned in the writ petitions as barred by limitation, as the Board, in the Central 2019 as the date on which Printed from counselvise.com JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. orders are to be passed by the TPO, reiterating the time limit to be mandatory. V. Conclusion. 40. Ergo, we find no reasons to interfere with the order of the Learned Judge, which is impugned herein and dismiss these intra Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed 10. We note that dates of TPO order and AY are same Gobain India (P.) Ltd. binding precedents of the jurisdictional High Court, we hold that the order dated 01.11.2019 is barred by limitation and void. Cross Objection No.85/Chny/2025 filed by the assessee is also become infructuous in the light of the above fin 11. In the result, the Objection filed by the assessee Order pronounced on the Sd/- (एस. आर. रघुना था ) (S.R.RAGHUNATHA लेखा सद)य/ACCOUNTANT MEMBER चे\u000eनई/Chennai, *दनांक/Dated: 22nd December EDN, Sr. PS IT(TP)A No.26/Chny/2025 & CO 85/Chny/2025 JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. :: 23 :: orders are to be passed by the TPO, reiterating the time limit 40. Ergo, we find no reasons to interfere with the order of the Learned Judge, which is impugned herein and accordingly, dismiss these intra-court appeals, but without costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed We note that dates of TPO order and AY are same case (supra), therefore, respectfully binding precedents of the jurisdictional High Court, we hold that the order dated 01.11.2019 is barred by limitation and void. Cross Objection No.85/Chny/2025 filed by the assessee is also become infructuous in the light of the above finding of limitation. Appeal of the Revenue is dismissed Objection filed by the assessee is infructuous. rder pronounced on the 22nd day of December, 2025, in Chennai. S.R.RAGHUNATHA) /ACCOUNTANT MEMBER Sd/ (मनु क ुमार (MANU KUMAR GIRI \u000eयाियक सद)य/JUDICIAL MEMBER December, 2025. & CO 85/Chny/2025 (AY 2016-17) JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. orders are to be passed by the TPO, reiterating the time limit 40. Ergo, we find no reasons to interfere with the order of the accordingly, court appeals, but without costs. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petitions are closed”. We note that dates of TPO order and AY are same as in Saint espectfully following the binding precedents of the jurisdictional High Court, we hold that the TPO Cross Objection No.85/Chny/2025 filed by the assessee is also ding of limitation. evenue is dismissed and Cross , in Chennai. Sd/- क ुमार िग र) MANU KUMAR GIRI) /JUDICIAL MEMBER Printed from counselvise.com JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. 1. अपीलाथ\u0007/Appellant 2. \b थ\u0007/Respondent 3. आयकरआयु\u000f/CIT, Chennai / Madurai / Salem / Coimbatore. 4. िवभागीय\bितिनिध/DR 5. गाड\u0018फाईल/GF IT(TP)A No.26/Chny/2025 & CO 85/Chny/2025 JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. :: 24 :: , Chennai / Madurai / Salem / Coimbatore. & CO 85/Chny/2025 (AY 2016-17) JOYSON ANAND ABHISHEK SAFETY SYSTEMS PVT. LTD. Printed from counselvise.com "