Bajaj Auto Limited V. Union of India and Central Excise and Service Tax, Large Tax Payer Unit, Mumbai

WPMS/2222/2011

AI Insights

Bajaj Auto Limited filed a writ petition challenging a show cause notice issued by the Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, Mumbai, which denied them exemption from NCCD under Notification No. 50/2003. The petitioner argued that the notification, part of a broader industrial policy to promote investment in Uttarakhand, should exempt them from NCCD as it is a duty of excise. The respondent countered that NCCD was not included in the notification and thus not exempt. The court examined the principles of liberal interpretation of exemption notifications and the specific terms of the industrial policy and notification, ultimately deciding against the petitioner.

• Counselvise Citation: [2014] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 806356 (HC-UTTARAKHAND)
• Appeal Type: Others
• Pronouncement Date: 09-10-2014
• Assessment Year: misc
• Other Referred Cases: Indo Farm Tractors and Motors vs. Union of India, Calcutta Discount Company Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, Companies District, I and another, Siemens Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, Gammon India Ltd. vs. CCE, Goa, State of Bihar and ors. vs. Suprabhat Steel Ltd., State of Jharkhand and ors. vs. Tata Cummins Ltd., Bajaj Tempo Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax, Commissioner of Customs (Import), Mumbai vs. M/s. Konkan Synthetic Fibres, CCE vs. Hari Chand Sri Gopal & others, Novopan Indian Ltd., Hansraj Gordhandas v. CCE and Customs, Surbhi Industries V. CCE, Modi Sugars, Modi Rubber, CCE vs. Hari Chand Sri Gopal & others
• Laws Referred To: Central Excise Act, 1944, Finance Act, 2001, Finance (No.2) Act, 2004, Central Excises and Salt Act
• Result in Favour of: Revenue
• Court: HIGH COURT
• Department Lawyers: SHOBHIT SAHARIA
• Assessee Lawyers: ARSHAD HIDAYATULLAH; POOJA BANGA
• Keywords: Excise duty exemption; Industrial Policy; National Calamity Contingent Duty; Implementing notification
• Section: 5A; 136(3)

Judgement Text

"HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL Writ Petition No. 2222 of 2011 (M/S) Bajaj Auto Limited. ……..Petitioner Versus nion of India and three others. …….Respondent U Mr. Arshad Hidayatullah, Senior Advocate with Ms. Pooja Banga, Advocate for the petitioner. Mr. Shobhit Saharia, Senior Standing Counsel for Central Excise. Dated: October 9, 2014 Hon’ble V.K. Bist J. Government of India, Ministry of Commerce & Industry (Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion) issued an Office Memorandum on 7th January, 2003 in lieu of New Industrial Policy and other concessions for the State of Uttaranchal (Now State of Uttarakhand) and State of Himachal Pradesh to work out ‘Tax and Central Excise concessions to attract investments in the industrial sector for the Special Category States, including Uttarakhand. The industries eligible for such incentives would have to be environment friendly with potential for local employment generation and use of local resources’. The core issue of the announcement related to Ministries/ agencies on the issue inter-alia, infrastructure, development, financial concessions and to provide easy market access. The new initiatives were to provide the required incentives as well as an enabling environment for industrial development, improve availability of capital and increase market access to provide a fillip to the private investment in the state. 2 2. Accordingly, it has been decided to provide the package of incentives for these States. In Clause 3.1 (a), (b) it has been set out as under:- “Clause 3.1 (a) 100% (hundred percent) outright excise duty exemption for a period of 10 years from the date of commencement of commercial production. (b) 100% income tax exemption for initial period of five years and thereafter 30% for companies and 25% for other than companies for a further period of five years for the entire states of Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh from the date of commencement of commercial production. 3. It is asserted that in implementation of the excise duty, exemption promised by the said Industrial Policy and in exercise of power conferred under Section 5A of the Central Excise Act, 1944, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue through the Central Board of Excise & Customs (CBE&C for short) issued a notification (annexure no.2) no. 50 of 2003 CE dated 10th June, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the notification’), thereby granting full exemption from duty of excise levied on the goods specified in Schedule I and Schedule II of the Tariff Act in respect of specified excisable goods, subject to, amongst other, the fulfillment of condition that the excisable goods are cleared by new industrial undertaking set up located in the area of State of Uttarakhand, during the period of June 2003 upto 31st March, 2010. 4. District Udham Singh Nagar is set out in annexure- 3 of the table to the implementing notification. Pant Nagar Industrial Estate and Khasra Nos. 372 to 428, where the petitioner’s factory is located are specifically set out as areas. It is asserted that the petitioner is eligible for 100% outright excise duty exemption under the Industrial 3 Policy, as its factory falls within a specified location and the said location is specifically mentioned in annexure-3 of the implementing notification, granting exemption from payment of the whole of duty of excise. 5. The petitioner is aggrieved with the show cause notice dated 26th August, 2011 issued by the Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, Large Tax Payer Unit, Mumbai, whereby the respondent no.2 is purporting to deny exemption from levy of National Calamity Contingent Duty (NCCD for short) under the said implementing notification. Further, in the notice it was admitted that NCCD is a duty of excise, but that it was not exempted under the implementing notification because it was not a duty specified in the I & II Schedule of the Central Excise Tariff act, 1985, nor an Additional Duty of Excise, as specified in the implementing notification. It is submitted that the impugned notice is based upon the law lay down by Himachal Pradesh High Court in ‘Indo Farm Tractors and Motors vs. Union of India’ and it also relies on two decisions of Tribunal, inter-alia, to the effect that the absence of inclusion of NCCD under the concerned notification, would mean that NCCD was not exempt thereunder. 6. It is then asserted that so far the question of filing writ petition, against the show cause notice dated 26th August, 2011 is concerned, there are exceptions firstly, where it is manifest that the show cause notice proceeds on an apparent misconstruction of the statute, secondly, where the show cause notice reveals that the minds of the respondents are made up and showing cause in such circumstances would be a futile exercise and thirdly, 4 where the notice itself is issued after undue delay the settled principles is that same is barred by limitations as in the case in hand. In this context, the petitioner relied upon the judgments of Hon’ble Supreme Court, rendered in ‘Culcatta Discount Company Ltd. v. Income Tax Officer, Companies District, I and another’, 1961 (48) AIR 372 SC, ‘Siemens Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra’, 2007 (207) ELT 168 SC and ‘Gammon India Ltd. vs. CCE, Goa’, 2002 (146) ELT 173, affirmed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in 2002 (146) ELT A313. 7. The issue pertains to the scope of the notification no. 50 of 2003 dated 10.06.2003 issued under Section 5A of Central Excise Act, 1944 granting area based exemption in respect of certain duties of excise mentioned under the notification no. 50 of 2003. 8. It is asserted by the petitioner that the notification is an ‘implementing notification’, implementing the Industrial Policy wherein ex-facie in Clause 3.1 there is ‘100% outright excise duty exemption’. The petitioner submits that the 100% outright excise duty exemption extended by the Industrial Policy was sought to be curtailed by the impugned notice, alleging that though NCCD was a duty of excise, it was not specified for exemption under the implementation notification. 9. The respondent no.3, denying the averments made in the petition and raising preliminary objection, filed counter affidavit with the contention firstly, that writ petition has been filed assailing the ‘show cause notice’ and it is settled principle of law that a writ petition is not maintainable against a show cause notice that too in 5 revenue matters. Secondly, in paragraph-18 of the petition, the petitioner itself admits this fact, however taking recourse of three judgments, the petitioner has tried to wriggle out and overcome the per-se non- maintainability of the petition. Thirdly, the case of the petitioner does not fall within the ambit of law propounded in the cases referred thereto, as the first case of Calcutta Discount Company (supra) relates to income tax and is dealing with the fact that there must be reason to believe, that there had been under assessment, whereas in Central Excise, the assessees are provided with the facility of self assessment and still, as per the show cause notice, petitioner has deliberately suppressed the facts and committed the act of evasion of Govt. revenue. In Seimens’s case (supra), since it involved demanding cess on value of goods to be imported from outside the territory of Bombay Municipal Corporation, whereas in the present case, the issue is non-payment of NCCD and cesses thereon, as leviable under Finance Act 2001 & Finance (No.2) Act, 2004. In Gammon India Limited’s case (supra), since it involved the issuance of SCN, after two years of completion of enquiry, whereas in the case in hand, as per the show cause notice, the delay was from petitioner side, as the officers of the Central Excise, Rudrapur Range, Pant Nagar tried to investigate the matter, but the petitioner/assessee was reluctant to cooperate with the investigation for a long time and refused to give details to the range staff. The assessee, first of all, submitted its reply to the range audit team on 04.03.2009. Further this case was transferred to the respondent and the assessee submitted data upto the period of June, 2011. On the basis of data made available to the respondent’s office, the show cause notice for the 6 extended period i.e. April, 2007 to June, 2011 has been worked out. 10. The other preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the writ petition is that the petitioner has an alternate and efficacious and statutory remedy available under the Central Excise Act, 1944 & Rules, hence on this ground alone, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 11. Heard Mr. Arshad Hidayatullah, learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner and Mr. Shobhit Saharia, Senior Standing Counsel for Central Excise. 12. Learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner, first of all, argued that the person, who issued the impugned notice, is himself the adjudicating authority, hence the notice is pre-determination of the issue against the petitioner, as to whether the petitioner was entitled to 100% outright excise duty exemption. The respondent no. 3’s mind is made up and showing cause before him would, therefore, be futile. Similarly, filing appeal before the Tribunal would be futile, because apart from the large amount of duty purported to be demanded in the context of levy of NCCD, Education Cess and Secondary Education Cess, which would have to be pre-deposited. The Tribunal had also pre-determined the issue against the assessee, hence there was no alternative remedy except to file instant petition. Learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner then contended that existence of alternate remedy is not a bar on entertaining a writ petition. He submits that if a remedy exists, but is not efficacious, the High Court ought to entertain a petition 7 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. He vehemently contended that the Tribunal and Adjudicating Authority are creatures of the Statute, they have no powers to strike down the Statute or Notification. 13. Learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner contended that judgment of Himachal Pradesh High Court is per- incuriam, as the judgment of State of Bihar and ors. vs. Suprabhat Steel Ltd. (1999 (86) AIR 302 SC) was not noticed by Himachal Pradesh High Court nor was it considered in coming to the conclusion that it has reached. He contends that implementing notification has to be read in the context of Industrial Policy when an assessee is promised with the tax exemption for setting up an industry in backward area. He contended that judgment of Himachal Pradesh High Court is not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case, inasmuch as, it was dealing with automobile cess, which petitioner has been paying right from the inception of the New Industrial Unit in the State of Uttarakhand. He vehemently argued that implementing notification has to be interpreted liberally and general principle of strict interpretation of an exemption notification in taxation is not applicable. He contended that it is settled legal position that in interpretation of an implementing notification, the industrial policy will prevail. He further submitted that purported demand and recovery of duties of excise viz. NCCD, Education Cess and Secondary Higher Education Cess, as contained in the impugned notice, is in breach of the unequivocal ‘100% outright excise duty exemption’ promised in the industrial policy, therefore the said demand is in gross violation of settled law on promissory estoppel. 8 14. Learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner contended that it is settled principle of law that where there is an Industrial Policy granting fiscal incentives (such as exemption from Excise Duty, Customs Duty, Income Tax, Sales Tax, etc.) to set up industry in backward areas of the State to encourage setting up of new industries in backward areas, the implementing notification issued thereunder, have to be given a liberal interpretation and the rule of strict interpretation has no application. In this context, learned Senior Advocate relied upon the judgments of Hon’ble Apex Court, rendered in ‘State of Jharkhand and ors. vs. Tata Cummins Ltd. & ors.’, 2006 (SC1) GJX 205 SC (in Appeal (Civil) 10272 of 2003 decided on March, 24, 2006), ‘Bajaj Tempo Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax’, 1972 (79) AIR 1622 SC, ‘Commissioner of Customs (Import), Mumbai vs. M/s. Konkan Synthetic Fibres, 2012-TIOL- 29-SC-CUS. 15. Learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner contended that principle of interpretation of incorporation by reference is embodied in Section 136 (3) of the Finance Act, 2001. He submitted that provisions of Section 5A of the Central Excise Act, 1994 and the implementing notification no. 50 of 2003 have to be read as a part of the exemption from Central Excise Duties granted under the Industrial Policy in the implementation of 100% outright excise duty exemption. He submitted that reference to the Amendment and Validation Act, 1982 read with Ordinance of 1982 makes it clear that the validation and amendment could only be of Notification then in force under Rule 8 could not refer to or validate anything in the form of a Notification or a provision which 9 was yet to be enacted or issued. A validating Act retrospectively validates that which was held invalid by a judgment by removing the invalidity by re-enacting the said provision to remove the invalidity. 16. He then contended that reliance placed by the respondent on the judgment of Himachal Pradesh High Court in ‘Indo Farm Tractors and Motors vs. Union of India’, is totally misconceived and is not binding precedent, as by several verdicts rendered by Hon’ble Apex Court, an implementing Notification issued pursuant to an Industrial Policy, has to be given a liberal interpretation so as to effectuate the Policy and to confer the benefit was not raised or considered. Further, the principle of strict interpretation of an exemption Notification was applied without reference to the law relating to the principle as laid down in ‘Commissioner of Customs vs. M. Ambalal & Co., 2001 (2) SCC 74 that a beneficial Notification providing levy of duty at a concessional rate should be given a liberal interpretation, was not referred to. Moreover, the said judgment of Himachal Pradesh High Court does not deal with the issue specifically raised by the petitioner that an implementing Notification issued solely in furtherance of an Industrial Policy, has to be given a liberal interpretation to further the objective of the Policy as the Notifications are merely instruments giving effect to the Policy and a narrow interpretation of the same would defeat the object underlying the incentive Police as held out in State of Jharkhand vs. Tata Cummins and Bajaj Tempo (supra). 10 17. Per contra, Mr. Shobhit Saharia, learned Senior Standing Counsel for the Revenue submitted that as per the pleadings made in the writ petition and the material brought on record by the petitioner itself, it is clear that in the present case principles of promissory estoppel are not at all attracted, inasmuch as, petitioner has admittedly not acted upon the policy dated 07-01-2003 or any of its terms and clauses inasmuch as, as per the admission of the petitioner itself for the very first time petitioner approached the department for its registration and availing the tax exemption on 11.12.2006 and in the application it was specifically mentioned that it was as per the notification no. 50/2003 dated 10.06.2003. Further, nowhere it has been pleaded in the writ petition that petitioner in any manner whatsoever, believing on the policy decision dated 07.01.2003, took any steps detrimental to its interest, and thus, is in any manner whatsoever has the right of claiming the declaratory relief by invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel against the respondents. It is submitted that no any specific and categorical pleadings whatsoever have been made in the whole of the writ petition and nor any cogent material has been brought on record to even, prima-facie, show that the petitioner acted upon the policy decision dated 07.01.2003 and it is a settled principle of law that ‘for application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel the promisee must establish that he suffered in detriment or altered his position by placing reliance on the promise’. He contended that a bare reading of the replies submitted by the petitioner before the revenue and as brought on record, as well as specifically pleaded in paragraph no.13 of the writ petition is that by virtue of interpretation of Sub-Section 3 of Section 136 of the Finance Act, 2001, 11 NCCD, being a duty of excise, also stands exempted vide notification no.50 of 2003, and thus, it had never been the case of the petitioner that it acted upon any of the policy clauses dated 07.01.2003, much less clause no.3.1. 18. Counsel for the Revenue submitted that so far the question of declaration of the “existing law” and whether Act of 1982 is applicable on notification 50 of 2003, one can get answer to this question: by referring to what is provided by the Act of 1982, why it came and what preposition it declares on the “existing law” i.e. declaration is made on what law? He submitted that the Act of 1982 came after the Delhi High Court construed and interpreted the term “duty of excise” as including all the duties of excise be it special, auxiliary or any other kind. The Act of 1982 makes declaration of the law as to how the Exemption Notification (made before, on or after 24.09.1984) under the Central Excises and Salt Act, is to be construed and interpreted. He contended that Section 2(3) of the Act of 1982 specifically and categorically provides for that where any “Central Law” providing for the levy and collection of any duty of excise, makes the provisions of the Central Excises Act and the rules made hereunder applicable by reference to the levy and collection of the duty of excise under such Central Law, then until and unless any exemption notification made before, on or after 24.09.1984, expressly refers to the provisions of said Central law in the preamble or state by express words in such notification, such Central law, no notification made under the Central Excises and Salt Act, whether issued before, on or after 24.09.1984, shall have the effect of or be construed as, providing for exemption 12 from the duty of excise livable under the said Central Law, unless such notification or order- (i) Expressly refers to the provisions of the said Central law in the preamble; or (ii) By express words, provides for an exemption from the duty of excise livable under the said Central law.” 19. He submitted that in the case in hand “Central Law” is the Finance Act 2001, a declared provision within the meaning of section 2 of the Provisional Collection of Taxes Act, 1931, which provides for imposition of NCCD by virtue of its section 136 and as per the Act of 1982, in the exemption notification 50 of 2003, admittedly made after 24-09-1984, exemption from the provisions of Central law i.e. Finance Act 2001 cannot be read into, since provisions of Finance Act 2001 are neither mentioned in the preamble of the exemption notification issued under the Central Excises and Salt Act nor the notification 50/2003 expressly provides for exemption of duty of excise livable under the Finance Act 2001. It is further submitted that Act of 1982 is not only an Amendment Act but also a Validation Act and the law laid down by the Apex Court with respect to the “Validation Act” is that the object and purpose of the Validation Act is to remove the very basis and reason because of which an earlier judgment has been passed by the Higher Courts. He contended that the Validation Act of 1982 was passed in order to remove the very basis and the reason of passing of judgment by the Delhi High Court in the case of Modi Sugars, wherein the Delhi High Court had construed the term “duty of excise” in an exemption notification to 13 include all kinds of duty of Excise be it special, auxiliary etc. notwithstanding the fact that such a duty is mentioned in the exemption notification or not. After coming into effect of the Validation Act 1982, no Court can give an interpretation to an exemption notification as the Delhi High Court did in the Modi Rubber case and this was the specific reason for enactment of Validation Act 1982, which is in force and in effect as on day also. 20. He submitted that similar is the case in hand. Whether it is possible for any Court to construe or read into exemption notification 50/2003, provisions of Finance Act 2001, which is a Central Law in terms of section 2(1)(b) of the Act of 1982, notwithstanding the fact that neither the preamble of Exemption Notification 50/2003 refers to the Finance Act 2001 nor in the notification, there is any reference of Finance Act 2001 or of the Education Cess? It is submitted that the Amendment and Validation Act of 1982 made a declaration of the law as to how and in what manner a Exemption Notification is to be construed on, before or after 24.09.1982 and a bare reading of section 2(3) of the Act of 1982 would reveal that the declaration of law as made through it was not only retrospective but also prospective and the law with respect to construction and interpretation of exemption notification is effective, in force and applicable till date. 21. Counsel for the Revenue then contended that cases relied upon by the petitioner are herein under independently and separately dealt with to show that 14 none of them are attracted in the case in hand and none of them support the prayer made by the petitioner to construe the exemption notification 50/2003 in a manner that the provisions of Finance Act 2001 and the Education Cess can be read into it and deemed to be added in light of the Policy Statement. 22. I have considered the submissions advanced by the counsel for the respective party and have also gone through the law cited by them. 23. In the present petition, the petitioner has challenged the show cause notice dated 26.08.2011 issued by the Commissioner, Central excise & Service Tax, Mumbai by which the petitioner has been asked to show cause as to why National Calamity Contingent Duty (NCCD), Education Cess, Secondary & Higher Education Cess, interest and penalty should not be imposed. The petitioner has further prayed for declaring that the petitioner is entitled to avail the exemption under Notification No. 50/ 2003 dated 10th June, 2003 in respect of the exemption contained therein from the levy of the duty of excise known as NCCD for a period of ten years calculated from the date of commencement of commercial production by the petitioner. In fact, the petitioner is seeking from this Court to grant a declaratory relief. 24. The learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner submitted that showing cause before the respondent no.3 would be a futile exercise as he, being adjudicating 15 authority, has already made up his mind. This argument is not acceptable as view taken in the show cause notice is always tentative not decisive, inasmuch as, final decision is always taken after hearing the party, against whom notice is issued. Similarly, another argument of learned Senior Advocate that filing appeal before the Tribunal, would also be futile, has no legs to stand, as appellate authority is required to decide the case on its own merits. This Court is not dismissing the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy, because petition was admitted earlier and was heard on merit. But it is made clear that alternative remedy, if available to a party under the law, can always be availed. 25. Main submission of learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner is on the concept of liberal interpretation. It is vehemently contended by him that implementing notification has to be interpreted liberally and general principle of strict interpretation of an exemption notification in taxation, is not applicable. In addition, he submitted that in interpretation of an implementing notification, the industrial policy would prevail. This submission of learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner is not acceptable to this Court, as exemption from paying NCCD cannot be read into the notification no. 50 of 2003 by simply applying the principles of liberal interpretation. Notification is to be read in plain and simple manner. Learned Senior Advocate for the petitioner referred the judgment passed by the Delhi High Court in the Modi Rubber case, where similar contention of the assessee was accepted by the Delhi High Court. But the benefit of said judgment cannot be granted to the petitioner, as the said 16 judgment was set-aside by the Hon’ble Supreme Court (1986 (4) SCC 66). Further, this Court is in agreement with the submission of learned counsel for the respondents that it is not possible for the High Court to construe or read into exemption notification 50/2003, provision of Finance Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also held that such notification has to be interpreted in the light of the words employed by it and not on any other basis. The observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the matter of CCE vs. Hari Chand Sri Gopal & others (2011) 1 SCC 236, are being referred hereinafter: “29. The law is well settled that a person who claims exemption or concession has to establish that he is entitled to that exemption or concession. A provision providing for an exemption, concession or exception, as the case may be, has to be construed strictly with certain exceptions depending upon the settings on which the provision has been placed in the Statute and the object and purpose to be achieved. If exemption is available on complying with certain conditions, the conditions have to be complied with. The mandatory requirements of those conditions must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly, though at times, some latitude can be shown, if there is a failure to comply with some requirements which are directory in nature, the non-compliance of which would not affect the essence or substance of the notification granting exemption. 30. In Novopan Indian Ltd., this Court held that a person, invoking an exception or exemption provisions, to relieve him of tax liability must establish clearly that he is covered by the said provisions and, in case of doubt or ambiguity, the benefit of it must go to the State. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Hansraj Gordhandas v. CCE and Customs held that (Novopan India Ltd. case, SCC p. 614, para 16) “16……such a notification has to be interpreted in the light of the words employed by it and not on any other basis. This was so held in the context of the principle that in a taxing statute, 17 there is no room for any intendment, that regard must be had to the clear meaning of the words and that the matter should be governed wholly by the language of the notification, i.e., by the plain terms of the exemption.” 26. The case of Surbhi Industries V. CCE, reported in 2007(208) ELT 578 AAR, covers the case in hand in which following principle was laid down: “From the discussion of the case law, the principle that emerges is that to avail the benefits of an exemption notification a person has to comply strictly with the terms of the notification. Nothing can be added to the notification not any part of it can be ignored in giving effect to it when the language is plain and unambiguous. The principle that a provision in a taxing statue granting incentives for promoting growth and development of industrial activity has to be construed liberally, applies to give effect to the intention of the legislature or industrial policy. The rule does not extend to reading in the exemption notification the provisions of other notifications issued under other statues”. 27. Though, in the case of State of Bihar vs. Suprabhat Steel, 1999 (1) SCC 31 and State of Jharkhand & others vs. Tata Cummins Ltd. 2006 (SCI) GJX-205 SC, a condition introduced in the exemption notification, which are to be fulfilled, before the benefit as provided under the policy, can be availed and such condition was found to be patently contrary to or repugnant to the policy decision by the Courts. But in all those cases, there was a specific challenge to such conditions. In Bajaj Tempto Ltd. vs. C.I.T. 1992 (3) SCC 78 and Commissioner of Customs (Import) Barbai vs. M/s Konkan Synthetics Fiber, the case of the parties was that they were wrongly denied the 18 benefit of exemption notification. But in the case in hand, the issue is comparatively different. The judgment of Himachal Pradesh High Court has not been set-aside by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 28. In fact, exemption granted by a notification must be read limited to the duty of excise as mentioned in the notification, and by simple interpretation it cannot be extended to cover any other kind of excise duty. Moreover, the petitioner is getting and is availing benefit of exemption notification 50/2003. The petitioner is not aggrieved by any condition contained in the notification nor there is any challenge to the notification. 29. For the reasons discussed in the preceding paragraphs, the writ petition lacks merit and is dismissed. 30. No order as to costs. (V.K. Bist, J.) 09.X.2014 NCM: "