BHAGWAN DIN TIWARI, RAIPUR,RAIPUR V. INCOME TAX OFFICER-4(5), RAIPUR, RAIPUR

ITA 435/RPR/2024

AI Insights

The case involves Bhagwan Din Tiwari, who appealed against penalty orders under sections 271D and 271E of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for the assessment year 2013-14. The penalties were imposed for accepting cash in violation of Section 269SS. The appeals were initially dismissed by the CIT(Appeals) due to a significant delay in filing. The assessee's request for condonation of the delay was based on his unawareness of the penalty orders, which he claimed were not communicated to him in a timely manner. However, the CIT(Appeals) and the Tribunal found that the assessee had been negligent and had not taken appropriate steps to pursue the matter within the prescribed time limit.

• Counselvise Citation: [2024] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 35724 (ITAT-RAIPUR)
• Duration Of Justice: 1 month(s) 14 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 25-11-2024
• Appeal Filed By: Assessee
• Order Result: Dismissed
• Next Hearing Date: 19-11-2024
• Assessment Year: 2013-2014
• Appeal Filed On: 11-10-2024
• Other Referred Cases: N. Balakrishnan V. M. Krishnamurthy, Baswaraj and Ors Vs. the Spl Land Acquisition officer, Sri Venkatesa Paper & Boards Ltd. vs. D.C.I.T., Collector, Land Acquisition v Mst. Katiji And Others, State of West Bengal vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality, Ram Mohan Kabra vs. CWT, Vidya Shankar Jaiswal Vs. ITO, Ward-2, Ambikapur, M/s. BPS Infrastructure Vs. ITO, Ward-1(3), Raipur
• Laws Referred To: Income-tax Act, 1961
• Result in Favour of: Revenue
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: MOHAL AGRAWAL
• Keywords: Condonation of delay; Reasonable cause; Onus to prove; Bonafide belief; Period of limitation; Principle of natural justice; Time period of passing order
• Section: 143(3); 271D; 271E

Judgement Text

"आयकर अपीलȣय अͬधकरण Ûयायपीठ रायपुर मɅ। IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, RAIPUR BENCH, RAIPUR BEFORE SHRI RAVISH SOOD, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SHRI ARUN KHODPIA, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER आयकर अपील सं. / ITA Nos. 435 & 436/RPR/2024 Ǔनधा[रण वष[ / Assessment Year: 2013-14 Bhagwan Din Tiwari, 1/2/1, Tikrapara, Raipur (C.G.)-491 226 PAN: AFLPT1411J .......अपीलाथȸ / Appellant बनाम / V/s. The Income Tax Officer-4(5), Raipur (C.G.) ……Ĥ×यथȸ / Respondent Assessee by : None Revenue by : Shri Mohal Agrawal, Sr. DR सुनवाई कȧ तारȣख / Date of Hearing : 19.11.2024 घोषणा कȧ तारȣख / Date of Pronouncement : 25.11.2024 2 Bhagwan Din Tiwari Vs. ITO-4(5), Raipur ITA Nos. 435 & 436/RPR/2024 आदेश / ORDER PER RAVISH SOOD, JM: The captioned appeals filed by the assessee are directed against the respective orders passed by the Commissioner of Income-Tax (Appeals), National Faceless Appeal Center (NFAC), Delhi, dated 13.08.2024, which in turn arises from the respective orders passed by the A.O under Sec.271D and 271E of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (in short ‘the Act’) dated 16.03.2022 for the assessment year 2013-14. As the facts and issues involved in the captioned appeals are common, therefore, the same are being taken up and disposed off by way of a consolidated order. 2. We shall first take up the appeal filed by the assessee in ITA No.435/RPR/2024 for assessment year 2013-14, wherein the assessee has assailed the impugned order on the following grounds of appeal before us: “1. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, CIT(A) erred in not condoning the delay of 351 days in filing the appeal. Hence, dismissed the appeal without considering merits of the case. 2. CIT(A) erred in not appreciating that assessee's chartered accountant received email on his email address on 22nd February, 2023 from ITO-4(1), Raipur when he was out of station, showing outstanding demand against two Penalty Orders u/s. 271E & 271D at Rs.70.20 Lakhs and Rs.90 Lakhs respectively of Shri. Bhagwandin Tiwari for the A.Y.2013-14. This was for the first time, assessee's chartered accountant came to know that two penalty orders have been passed on 16th March, 2022. 3. CIT(A) erred in not appreciating that assessee's chartered accountant replied on email after returning from out of station 3 Bhagwan Din Tiwari Vs. ITO-4(5), Raipur ITA Nos. 435 & 436/RPR/2024 on 1\" March, 2023 to ITO-4(1)'s email dated 22nd February, 2023 informing him that he shall comply with the directions accordingly. 4. CIT(A) erred in not appreciating that, after replying to ITO- 4(1)'s email on 1st March, 2023, assessee's chartered accountant met ITO-4(1), Raipur and collected the said two penalty orders from him u/s. 271E and 271D sometimes in the first week of March, 2023 and also took print out of the penalty orders from assessee's eportal in the first week of March, 2023 which was received on e-portal on 16th March, 2022. 5. CIT(A) erred in not appreciating that assessee's chartered accountant was under the bonafide belief that since penalty proceedings were not initiated during the course of assessment proceedings and penalty was also not leviable u/s.275(1)(C) after 4-5 years from the date of passing of assessment order in the year 2016 Assessee's chartered accountant believed that penalty is dropped and penalty orders have not been passed. 6. CIT(A) erred in not appreciating that assessee's chartered accountant came to know about passing of two penalty orders u/s.271E and 271D respectively on 16th March, 2022 after going through ITO's email dated 22nd Feb. 2023 on 1st April, 2023 when he returned from out of station, only in the first week of March, 2023 when he met ITO-4(1), Raipur and collected both the penalty orders. Thereafter, he checked on the eportal of the assessee and found that the two penalty orders were already received on his eportal on 16th March, 2022. 7. CIT(A) erred in not appreciating that, during the course of penalty proceedings u/s.271D, assessee's chartered accountant had taken adjournments on 2-3 occasions from his email address. Thus, assessee's chartered accountant's email address was in possession of JOT, who passed the above penalty orders. Therefore, JCIT ought to have emailed both the penalty orders dated 16th March, 2022 on assessee's chartered accountant's email address on \"priority basis\" so that he could have filed appeal against the said penalty orders in time, apart from emailing the same on assessee's eportal. JCIT was aware that it is assessee's chartered accountant who is going to file appeal and, therefore, JCIT ought to have emailed penalty orders on assessee's chartered accountant's email address on \"priority basis\". This is a lapse on the part of JCIT which has resulted in delay of 351 days in filing the appeal. 4 Bhagwan Din Tiwari Vs. ITO-4(5), Raipur ITA Nos. 435 & 436/RPR/2024 8. Hon’ble CIT Appeals failed to appreciate the delay in filing Form No.35 was not intentional.” 3. Succinctly stated, the assessee had filed his return of income for A.Y.2013-14 on 30.09.2013, declaring an income of Rs.6,49,930/-. Original assessment was thereafter framed by the A.O vide his order passed u/s. 143(3) of the Act, dated 21.03.2016 wherein income of the assessee was determined at Rs.8,27,590/-. 4. After culmination of the assessment proceedings by the A.O u/s. 143(3) of the Act, dated 21.03.2016, the Jt.CIT/NFAC observed on a perusal of the case record that the assessee had during the year under consideration accepted an amount of Rs.90 lacs in cash from M/s. Kunal Enterprises, Raipur in violation of Section 269SS of the Act. Accordingly, the Jt.CIT/NFAC vide “Show Cause Notice” (SCN) dated 11.03.2020 called upon the assessee to put forth an explanation as to why he may not be saddled with penalty u/s. 271D of the Act. As the assessee had failed to come forth with any plausible explanation as regards the failure on his part to comply with the statutory provisions of Section 269SS of the Act, therefore, the Jt. CIT held a firm conviction that in absence of any mitigating factors, whatsoever, it was a fit case for imposing penalty u/s. 271D of the Act. Accordingly, the Jt. CIT/NFAC vide his order u/s.271D of the Act, dated 16.03.2022 imposed a penalty of Rs.90 lacs on the assessee. 5 Bhagwan Din Tiwari Vs. ITO-4(5), Raipur ITA Nos. 435 & 436/RPR/2024 5. Aggrieved, the assessee carried the matter in appeal before the CIT(Appeals). As the assessee had delayed the filing of the appeal before the CIT(Appeals) by 351 days, therefore, an application seeking condonation of the delay was filed by him a/w. the memorandum of appeal, which read as under: “As explained the Assessee had to close his liquor business due to state Government liquor policy since the allotment of liquor shops to private licence was stopped and the Assessee left the regular business premises long back and did not receive departments notices as he was residing at remote village area. And it was only when he came to know about his demand notice and he act for filing this appeal. Hence considering natural justice the delay in filing of Appeal may kindly be condoned.\" The CIT(Appeals), after deliberating on the reasons given by the assessee for the delay in filing of the appeal did not find favour with the same. The CIT(Appeals), observed that the assessee had adopted a negligent approach and failed to take proper steps in filing the appeal before him within the stipulated time period. Refuting the assessee’s claim that the delay involved in filing of the appeal had occasioned for the reason that as he had left business premises, therefore, he had not received the notices, the CIT(Appeals) observed that a perusal of the penalty order revealed that the assessee had sought adjournments from the A.O on several occasions. Accordingly, the CIT(Appeals) not being inspired with the explanation of the assessee as regards the reasons leading to the delay in filing of the appeal before him relied on a host of judicial pronouncements and after 6 Bhagwan Din Tiwari Vs. ITO-4(5), Raipur ITA Nos. 435 & 436/RPR/2024 declining to exercise the discretion vested with him u/s.249(3) of the Act dismissed the appeal, observing as under: “2.2 I have carefully gone through the reasons advanced by the appellant for filing the appeal belatedly. There is a delay of 351 days in filing the appeal. As per section 249(2) of the I.T. Act, the assessee shall present its appeal within 30 days of service of notice of demand relating to the assessment. The section 249(3) of the IT Act, empowers the first appellate authority to admit the appeal after the expiry of limitation of time for filing the appeal if appellant had good and sufficient reasons for not presenting the appeal within the time period prescribed u/s. 249(2) of the Act. 3. The appellant regarding the delay in filing of appeal has submitted that he had left the business premises and did not receive the notices. However, on perusal of impugned penalty order it is seen that the appellant had sought adjournments from the AO. This shows that the appellant was aware of the proceedings and was receiving notices. Thus, the appellant has failed to provide any cogent reason that the delay occurred on account of any reasonable cause or genuine hardship for long delay in filing of appeal. Therefore, I do not find any merit in the plea made by the appellant for condonation of the delay. 4. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 prescribes that any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period. However, it is well established in law that the period of limitation has to be construed somewhat strictly as it has the effect of vesting for one and taking away right from the other. To condone the delays in a mechanical or a routine manner may amount to jeopardizing the legislative intent behind Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 4.1. Statutes of limitation interpose a statutory bar after a certain period giving quietus to the rights arising from a judgment which is sought to be impugned. In other words, it is enshrined in the maxim \"interest reipublicaeut sit finis litium\" (it is for the general welfare that a period be part to litigation). Where the parties chose to sleep over their rights 7 Bhagwan Din Tiwari Vs. ITO-4(5), Raipur ITA Nos. 435 & 436/RPR/2024 for prolonged periods without any just cause, can hardly claim equity in justice particularly faced with the statutory provisions of Section 5 of the Act. In construing enactments which provide period of limitation for institution of proceedings, the purpose is to intimate people that after lapse of certain time from a certain event, a proceeding will not be entertained where a strict grammatical construction is normally the safe guide. 4.2 The Apex Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan V. M. Krishnamurthy, AIR 1998 SC 3222 held as under:- \"11. Rules of limitation are meant to see that parties do not resort dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for laundering the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 4.3. Law is not an exercise in linguistic discipline but the substance of legislative intention can also not be frustrated merely by uncalled for equity or sympathy. The provision of limitation should be construed strictly but at best its application could be liberalized where actual sufficient cause in its true sense is shown by an applicant who has acted bona fide and with due care and caution. An interpretation or application of the statutory provisions which would frustrate its very object necessarily has to be avoided. The law of procedure undisputedly takes in its ambit and scope the need to act expeditiously and not to delay the progress of the legal proceedings. It is only by way of an exception and upon showing sufficient cause that appeals, if otherwise permissible, could be entertained beyond the prescribed period of limitation. 4.4. Hence, in the case of condonation of delay in filing appeal the entire issue would revolve on the showing or not of sufficient cause while praying for condonation of delay. To put it in other words, where there is sufficient cause shown and the application for condonation of delay has been moved 8 Bhagwan Din Tiwari Vs. ITO-4(5), Raipur ITA Nos. 435 & 436/RPR/2024 bonafide, the court would normally condone the delay but where the delay has not been explained at all and, in fact, there is unexplained and inordinate delay coupled with negligence or sheer carelessness, the discretion of the court in such cases would normally tilt against the applicant. 4.5. The legal position on the issue is discussed in the following paragraphs. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Baswaraj and Ors Vs. the Spl Land Acquisition officer AIR 2014 SC 746 held that:- -Sufficient cause is the cause for which Defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word \"sufficient\" is \"adequate\" or \"enough\", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word \"sufficient\" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, sufficient cause\" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has \"not acted diligently\" or \"remained inactive\". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any \"sufficient cause\" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. 4.6. In the case of State of West Bengal vs. Administrator, Howrah Municipality, AIR 1972 SC 749, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that:- …….....parties must act bonafidely, expeditiously and with due care. A casual or a negligent litigant who has acted with utter irresponsible attitude, cannot claim the condonation of delay in law when the right has accrued to the other side. The expression \"sufficient cause\" will always have relevancy to reasonableness. The actions which can be condoned by the Court should fall within the realm of normal human 9 Bhagwan Din Tiwari Vs. ITO-4(5), Raipur ITA Nos. 435 & 436/RPR/2024 conduct or normal conduct of a litigant. It is neither expected nor can it be a normal conduct of a public servant or a litigant that they would keep the files unmoved, unprocessed for months together on their tables. 4.7. The Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition v Mst. Katiji And Others-167 ITR 471 (SC) has held as under- (Pages 472) \"Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.\" 4.8. The Delhi High Court in the case of Sudhir Kumar Anand V. Dr.Vijay Kumar Anand and others AIR 2012 Delhi 97 has held as under: \"Limitation Act (36 of 1963) S.5- Condonation of delay – \"Sufficient cause\" Suit for declaration, partition and possession filed relying upon probate case filed earlier -After dismissal of probate case for non prosecution, plaint if lost interest in matter - No valid explanation given as to why no steps were taken for its restoration Mere statement that relevant file was lost in some office or some confusion about Advocates appearing in matter, cannot be treated 35 sufficient cause-Delay not condoned.\" The words \"sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation no doubt is to be applied in a reasonable manner but depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Party has to give satisfactory explanation. Unless sufficient cause is explained for condonation of delay, prayer may not be granted. In addition to this, the Court must take into account the conduct of the party and its bonafide. The Court has to see whether substantial justice would be done by condoning the delay. It cannot be overlooked that on expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for seeking legal remedy rights accrue in favour of other side. 4.9 The Hon'ble Delhi High Court in its decision in the case Surinder Kumar Boveja Vs. CWT 287 ITR 52 has 10 Bhagwan Din Tiwari Vs. ITO-4(5), Raipur ITA Nos. 435 & 436/RPR/2024 categorically held that delays cannot be routinely excused. In this decision, the Hon'ble High Court has further held as under: \"Where the delay is prolonged and the asse is not able to show that the delay had occurred in spite of exercise of due attention and diligence, the assessee cannot complain, if the delay is not condoned.\" 4.10 In the decision rendered in the case of Rankak and Ors. v Rewa Coalfields Ltd. reported at AIR 1962 SC 361, the Apex Court has held that the party has to show reason for delay on the last day of the limitation period and for each day thereafter. It was further held that condonation is not a matter of right and that the Courts have to exercise discretionary jurisdiction. 4.11 In the decision rendered in the case of Sri Venkatesa Paper & Boards Ltd. vs. D.C.I.T. reported at 98 ITD 200, the Tribunal held as follows: \"9. However, while deciding the prayer for condonation of delay, the Court cannot ignore or give a go-by to the basic principle that the burden to prove the existence of sufficient cause is always on the Assessee and there is no presumption that the delay occasioned in the filing of the appeal, is always bona fide and the condonation of delay is not the matter of course. The law of limitation is prescribed by the I.T. Act under the provisions of Section 249(3) of the Act which envisages that there should have been a sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal within that period as prescribed. Where the applicant has falled to show sufficient cause for condonation of delay, the application for condonation of delay is liable to be rejected.\" 4.12 The issue of condonation of delay had come up before Hon'ble Orissa High Court in the case of Brijbandhu Nanda (44 ITR 688). The facts in this case were that the assessee had sent three appeals on 2nd April 1954, the 56th day of the receipt of order, by registered post to Income Tax Tribunal, then at Bombay, in one packet. These appeals were received by the Tribunal on 7th April, 1954. The last date by which the 11 Bhagwan Din Tiwari Vs. ITO-4(5), Raipur ITA Nos. 435 & 436/RPR/2024 appeals were to be filed was 6th April, 1954 and so the appeals were out of time by one day. The delay was not condoned by the Tribunal and on further appeal, the Hon'ble High Court had held that there is no justification for the delay as under: \"Even assuming that the questions referred are questions of law, I am of opinion that there was no error on the part of the Tribunal in not condoning the delay in Its discretion. In fact, as appears from the assessee's own petition for condonation of delay in I.T.A. Nos. 85, 86 and 87 of 1954-55 dated May 5, 1955, the assessee does not appear to have explained why he waited for 56 days after he received the order on February 5, 1954, as aforesaid. It further appears from a letter dated April 9, 1954, from the Assistant Registrar of the Appellate Tribunal, Bombay, that the appeals were received by him on April 7, 1954, that is to say, one day beyond the period of limitation. In view of sub-rule (2) of rule 7, which provides that a memorandum of appeal, sent by post, shall be deemed to have been presented to the Registrar or to the officer authorised by the Registrar, on the day on which it is received in the office of the Tribunal at Bombay, it is clear that the appeals were received by the Registrar out of time. We have discussed the general mandatory aspect of the provisions of the Act and the rules thereunder in our decision in Govinda Chowdhury V. Commissioner of Income-tax referred to above………… In the present case, the assessee appears to have no justification for the delay In sending the appeals not until the 50th day from the date of receipt of the order of the Appellate Assistant Commissioner. There is no question of error of fact or misapprehension as to the position in law which could have been some explanation for the delay. The Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chathappan observed that the court is not prepared to hold that a mistake in law is under no circumstances a sufficient cause within the meaning of section 5 of the Limitation Act. The learned counsel for the assessee in course of his argument relied on the said Madras case, which, in my opinion, has also no application to the facts and 12 Bhagwan Din Tiwari Vs. ITO-4(5), Raipur ITA Nos. 435 & 436/RPR/2024 circumstances of the present case. There is no question of mistake in law in the present case.\" Thus, even the delay of one day was not condoned by the Hon'ble Orissa High Court. There is sanctity attached to the limitation prescribed under the law, since the finality of a decision is a valuable right which vests in a party not aggrieved by the order and the expiry of period of limitation acts as an assurance that the order has become final. Hence, the question of condonation of delay cannot be decided in a casual manner. 4.13 Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court has also held in the case of Ram Mohan Kabra (257 ITR 773) that \"the delay can be condoned only for good and sufficient reasons, supported by cogent and proper evidences.\" 5. Section 249(2) of Income Tax Act, 1961 states that \"The appeal shall be presented within thirty days of the following date, that to say,- (b)...where the appeal relates to any assessment or penalty, the date of service of the notice of demand relating to the assessment or penalty'..., (c) in any other case, the date on which intimation of the order sought to be appealed against is served. 6. Thus, it is trite law that the appellant must show that he was diligent in taking proper steps and the delay was caused notwithstanding his due diligence. It is for the appellant to explain the reason for the delay and it is not the function of authorities to find the cause for delay. The Appellate Authority has to examine whether the sufficient cause has been shown by the appellant for condoning the delay and whether such cause is acceptable or not. Even though substantial justice should not be defeated by technicalities but that does not mean that any plea without any possible or acceptable basis and even without hearing, semblance or rationality has to be accepted and delay has to be accepted and condoned which shall be against the very spirit of law. The time prescribed for 13 Bhagwan Din Tiwari Vs. ITO-4(5), Raipur ITA Nos. 435 & 436/RPR/2024 filing the appeal will become meaningless in such an event. Merely because substantial justice is to be done law of limitation cannot be ignored and that also when there is no sufficient and reasonable cause for such inordinate delay. 6.1. Perusal of the facts shows that the appellant, in the present case appears to be negligent and has not taken appropriate steps to peruse the remedy till about 351 days and thus did not take appropriate action in filing the appeal within the prescribed time. As discussed in para 3 above, the plea of the appellant that he had left the business premises and did not receive the notices holds no ground as perusal of impugned penalty order shows that the appellant had sought adjournments from the AO several times. I find that there is no sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of appeal by the appellant and therefore, I am unable to condone the delay in terms of section 249(3) of the Act. Accordingly, the present appeal is not maintainable and, therefore, dismissed.” 6. The assessee being aggrieved with the order of the CIT(Appeals) has carried the matter in appeal before us. 7. On a perusal of the record, it transpires that captioned appeal was initially fixed for hearing on 28.10.2024. However, as the notice intimating the fixation of the appeal along with memorandum of appeal that was issued by the registry was returned unserved as no one was available at the address and also, the assessee could not be reached, therefore, the Ld. Sr. DR was directed to give effect service of notice through department. Accordingly, the case was adjourned to 19.11.2024. On 19.11.2024, neither the assessee participated in the proceedings before us nor any application for adjournment was filed by him. The Ld. Sr. DR submitted 14 Bhagwan Din Tiwari Vs. ITO-4(5), Raipur ITA Nos. 435 & 436/RPR/2024 that the A.O i.e. ITO-4(1), Raipur vide his letter dated 18.11.2024 had intimated that pursuant to the direction of the Tribunal for affecting service of notice intimating the fixation of the present appeal attempts were made on four dates to serve the same upon the assessee i.e. (i) on 06.11.2024 (11.30AM) ; (ii) on 08.22.2024 (07.30AM); (iii) 12.11.2024 (08.30AM); and (iv) 14.11.2024 (04.30AM) but on al the occasions the assessee’s door/house was found locked. The A.O vide his aforesaid letter dated 18.11.2024 (supra), had informed that due to the aforesaid reasons the service of notice intimating the fixation of hearing of the appeal before the Tribunal could not be carried out. Considering the aforesaid facts, we are constrained to proceed with and dispose of the appeal as per Rule 24 of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal Rules, 1963 after hearing the respondent revenue and perusing the orders of the lower authorities. 8. Admittedly, there is no gainsaying that the delay of 351 days involved in the appeals filed by the assessee before the CIT(Appeals) was inordinate. We have thoughtfully considered the explanation of the assessee as regards the failure of his part to file the appeal before the CIT(Appeals) within the prescribed time limit. As observed by the CIT(Appeals), and rightly so, the assessee’s claim that as he had left the business premises and had not received any notice is found to be factually incorrect as he had on several occasions sought adjournments from the 15 Bhagwan Din Tiwari Vs. ITO-4(5), Raipur ITA Nos. 435 & 436/RPR/2024 A.O. As the assessee had failed to come forth with any satisfactory/reasonable explanation as regards the delay involved in filing of the appeal before the CIT(Appeals), therefore, we find no infirmity on the latter’s part in declining to condone the inordinate delay of 351 days by exercising the discretion vested with him u/s. 249(3) of the Act. Our aforesaid view that in absence of a sufficient/reasonable cause leading to the delay in filing of an appeal, the same does not merit to be condoned is supported by the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pathapathi Subba Reddy (Died) Vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA), SLP (Civil) No.31248 of 2018, dated 08.04.2024. Apart from that, the view taken by the CIT(Appeals) in declining to condone the delay in filing of the appeal is supported by the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Chhattisgarh in the case of M/s. BPS Infrastructure Vs. ITO, Ward-1(3), Raipur, TAXC No.87 of 2024, dated 12.04.2024. The Hon’ble High Court in its aforesaid order had approved the order of Tribunal which had declined to condone the delay involved in the appeal that was filed by the assessee appellant. The Hon’ble High Court had after relying on a host of judicial pronouncements, observed that in the absence of a good/sufficient reason that would have justified condonation of the delay involved in filing of the captioned appeal, the Tribunal had rightly declined to condone the same. For the sake of clarity, the observation of the Hon’ble High Court are culled out as under: 16 Bhagwan Din Tiwari Vs. ITO-4(5), Raipur ITA Nos. 435 & 436/RPR/2024 “12. As has been rightly relied on by the learned ITAT that in the case of State of West Bengal v. Administrator, Howrah reported in 1972 AIR SC 749, the Hon'ble Apex Court had held that the expression \"sufficient cause should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, particularly when there is no motive behind the delay The expression \"sufficient cause will always have relevancy to reasonableness. The action which can be condoned by the court should fall within the realm of normal human conduct or normal conduct of a litigant. However, as the appellant/ assessee in the present case is acting in defiance of law, therefore there can be no reason to allow its application and condone the substantial delay of 690 days involved in preferring of the captioned appeal. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramlal, Motilal and Chotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. reported in AIR (1962) 361 (SC) that seeker of justice must come with clean hands, therefore, now when in the present appeal the assessee appellant had failed to come forth with any good and sufficient reason that would justify condonation of the delay involved in preferring of the captioned appeal, the ITAT declined to condone the delay of 690 days, without adverting to the merits of the case and hence dismissed the captioned appeal of the assessee as barred by limitation.” Also, a similar view had been taken by the Hon’ble High Court of Chhattisgarh in the case of Vidya Shankar Jaiswal Vs. ITO, Ward-2, Ambikapur, TAXC No.86 of 2024, dated 12.04.2024, wherein declining by the Tribunal to condone the delay of 166 days involved in filing of the appeal before the Tribunal was upheld. For the sake of clarity, the observations of the Hon’ble High Court are culled out as under: “15. As has been rightly relied on by the learned ITAT that in the case of State of West Bengal Vs. Administrator, Howrah, reported in 1972 AIR SC 749, the Hon’ble Apex Court had held that the expression “sufficient cause” should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, particularly when there is no motive behind the delay. The expression “sufficient cause” will always have relevancy to reasonableness. The action which can be condoned by the Court should fall within the realm of normal human conduct or normal conduct of a litigant. However, as the 17 Bhagwan Din Tiwari Vs. ITO-4(5), Raipur ITA Nos. 435 & 436/RPR/2024 assessee appellant in the present case is habitually acting in defiance of law, where he had not only delayed in filing of the present appeal but also had adopted a lackadaisical approach and not participated in the course of the proceedings before the CIT(A), therefore, there can be no reason to allow his application and condone the substantial delay of 166 days involved in preferring of the captioned appeal. Now, when in the present appeal the appellant / assessee had failed to come forth with any good and sufficient reason that would justify condonation of the substantial delay involved in preferring of the captioned appeal, we hereby dismiss the present appeal upholding the reasons assigned by the learned ITAT.” 9. We, thus, in terms of our aforesaid observations finding no infirmity in the view taken by the CIT(Appeals), who had in absence of a sufficient/justifiable reason rightly declined to condone the inordinate delay of 351 days involved in the appeal filed before him, uphold the same. 10. In the result, appeal of the assessee in ITA No.435/RPR/2024 for A.Y.2013-14 is dismissed in terms of the aforesaid observations. ITA No.436/RPR/2024 A.Y.2013-14 11. As the facts involved in the captioned appeal filed by the assessee remains the same as were there before us in the aforementioned ITA No.435/RPR/2024 for assessment year 2013-14, therefore, our order therein passed while disposing off the said appeal shall apply mutatis- mutandis for disposing off the captioned appeal, i.e., ITA No. 436/RPR/2024 for A.Y. 2013-14. In this case also, we on the same terms uphold the order CIT(Appeals) who in absence of any sufficient/ justifiable 18 Bhagwan Din Tiwari Vs. ITO-4(5), Raipur ITA Nos. 435 & 436/RPR/2024 reason explaining the inordinate delay of 351 days involved in the appeal filed before him, had rightly declined to exercise the discretion vested with him u/s. 249(3) of the Act and dismissed the appeal. 12. In the result, the appeal of the assessee in ITA No.436/RPR/2024 for A.Y.2013-14 is dismissed in terms of our aforesaid observations. 13. Resultantly, both the appeals filed by the assessee are dismissed in terms of our aforesaid observations. Order pronounced in open court on 25th day of November, 2024. Sd/- Sd/- ARUN KHODPIA RAVISH SOOD (ACCOUNTANT MEMBER) (JUDICIAL MEMBER) रायपुर/ RAIPUR ; Ǒदनांक / Dated : 25th November, 2024. ***SB, Sr. PS आदेश कȧ ĤǓतͧलͪप अĒेͪषत / Copy of the Order forwarded to : 1. अपीलाथȸ / The Appellant. 2. Ĥ×यथȸ / The Respondent. 3. The CIT(Appeals)-1, Raipur (C.G.) 4. The Pr. CIT, Raipur-1 (C.G) 5. ͪवभागीय ĤǓतǓनͬध, आयकर अपीलȣय अͬधकरण, रायपुर बɅच, रायपुर / DR, ITAT, Raipur Bench, Raipur. 6. गाड[ फ़ाइल / Guard File. आदेशानुसार / BY ORDER, // True Copy // Senior Private Secretary आयकर अपीलȣय अͬधकरण, रायपुर / ITAT, Raipur. "