"1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR Order Reserved on 28.02.2022 Order delivered on 15/03/2022 WPT No. 27 of 2022 • Bharat Krishi Kendra Through Partner Ramesh Kumar Parmar ( Age 65 Years), Shop No. 3, Nigam Complex, Ganj Para, Durg, Ps And District- Durg, Chhattisgarh, Pin 491001, Chhattisgarh, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh ---- Petitioner Versus 1. Union of India Through- Secretary, Central Board of Direct Taxes, North Block, New Delhi. 2. Principal Commissioner of Income-Tax, Raipur-1, Aaykar Bhawan, Civil Lines, Raipur (CG) 3. Joint Commissioner Of Income Tax, Range-1, Aaykar Bhawan, New Civic Centre, Bhilai, District- Durg, Chhattisgarh. 4. Income Tax Officer, Ward-1(1), Aaykar Bhawan, New Civic Centre, Bhilai, District- Durg, Chhattisgarh. ---- Respondents For Petitioner : Mr. S. Rajeshwar Rao & Mr. Manoj Sinha, Advocates. For Respondent No.1 : None. For Respondent No.2 to 4 : Mrs. Naushina Afrin Ali, Mr. Ajay Kumrani & Mr. Topilal Bareth, Advocates on behalf of Mr. Amit Chaudhary, Advocate. Hon'ble Mr. Justice Parth Prateem Sahu CAV Order 1. Feeling aggrieved by issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short 'the Act of 1961'), petitioner has filed this petition seeking for following relief:- “(i) to call for the relevant records of the respondents for its kind perusal. (ii) to quash the impugned notice issued under section 148 and all proceedings following said notice being based on unsigned and undated 2 reasons, unsigned proposals. (iii) to declare that the reassessment proceedings initiated under section 147 through impugned notice under section 148 are illegal and without jurisdiction being based on borrowed jurisdiction. (iv) to declare that the reassessment proceedings initiated under section 147 through impugned notice under section 148 are illegal and without jurisdiction for requisite sanction under section 151 of the Act was granted by an authority other than the authority designated in sub-section (2) of section 151 of the Act. (v) to stay all proceedings pursuant to the impugned notice (Annexure P/1) and direct respondent No.4 not to pass final orders till disposal of present petition. (vi) to pass such other order and/or further order and/or orders as the Hon'ble High Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 2. Mr. S. Rajeshwar Rao, learned counsel for petitioner would submit that respondents have started proceedings of re- assessment of income tax returns submitted by petitioner for the assessment year 2017-18 without following the procedure established in this regard under the Act of 1961. Section 147 of the Act of 1961, as prevailing during relevant period, requires the Assessing Officer to record 'reasons to believe' for issuing notice under Section 148 of the Act of 1961. Perusal of notice Annexure P-1 issued under Section 148 of the Act of 1961 would reveal that there is no mention that authority had reason to believe for starting re-assessment process, hence notice 3 issued to petitioner does not satisfy requirement of Section 147 of the Act of 1961, which is a pre-condition. In the impugned notice it is only mentioned that the assessee escaped assessment of income in returns submitted by him for the assessment year 2017-18, whereas the assessee in income-tax returns disclosed entire amount deposited in bank accounts that too within specified period i.e. from 9.11.2016 to 13.12.2016. Petitioner is having total four bank accounts in which he is depositing cash and this fact has also been disclosed to respondent Department. In income tax return, petitioner has disclosed Bank Account No.910030017071357 maintained at Axis Bank Ltd. showing cash deposit of Rs.63,27,990/- within prescribed period, which is separately mentioned because this is the bank in which petitioner wanted refund of tax, if any, to be deposited by respondent Department, therefore, this account has been separately shown under Column-13 of the income-tax return. In Column-13B other bank accounts which the petitioner is operating and are within records of respondent Department, are shown wherein cash deposit within prescribed period, deposit of above Rs.2 Lakh has been specifically mentioned. Hence, petitioner has declared entire cash deposits in his return and it cannot be said that the same has been escaped assessment. He contended that Assessing Officer has only taken cash deposits of one bank account and held that there was total cash deposit of Rs.85,45,710/-. Difference between two has been treated escaped assessment, which cannot be said to be correct in 4 view of income tax returns submitted by petitioner. He further submits that as per provisions of Section 151 of the Act of 1961, as prevailing in the year 2017-18, approval has to be obtained from the officer competent, as mentioned therein. Referring to Section 151 of the Act of 1961 he submits that if notice for re-assessment beyond four years of submission of income tax return is to be issued, then approval of the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax is required. If it is within four years then approving authority would be the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax. In case at hand, the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax has given approval under Section 151 of the Act of 1961, which is contrary to the provisions of Section 151 of the Act of 1961. Hence, it cannot be said that approval has been obtained from the competent authority. He contended that when Statue authorizes a specific officer to accord approval for issuing notice under Section 148 of the Act of 1961, then it is for that officer only i.e. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, to accord approval and not for any other officer even superior in rank. In support of his contention, he places reliance upon judgements of Bombay High Court in case of Ghanshyam K Khabrani vs. ACIT reported in 2012 (3) TMI 266 and The Commissioner of Income Tax Central-4 vs. Aquatic Remedies Pvt. Ltd. reported in 2018 (8) TMI 135. Another ground raised by learned counsel for petitioner is that approval, as stated to have been granted to the Assessing Officer under Section 151 of the Act of 1961, does not contain 5 signature of designated authority. He submits that even if it is computer generated approval in the Form then also it should bear 'digital signature' as appearing in the notice (Annexure P- 1) under Section 148 of the Act of 1961. In absence of signature, approval under Section151 of the Act of 1961 cannot be said to be valid approval granted by the designated authority. In facts of present case, there is no valid approval of designated authority, hence petition deserves to be allowed. He contended that looking to multiplicity of litigations under the Act of 1961 in issuance of notice under Section 148, the High Court of Delhi had issued certain guidelines to the respondent Department in case of Sabh Infrastructure Ltd. v. Asstt. Commissioner of Income Tax reported in 2017 (9) TMI 1589, based upon which the Department had issued Standard Procedure on 10.1.2018 (Annexure P-9). In 4th Paragraph of the Standard Procedure, it is specifically mentioned that before issuance of notice under Section148, the Assessing Officer has to issue summons under Section 131 and before recording satisfaction, enquiry is to be made by Assessing Officer by issuing summons under Section 133 of the Act of 1961. In case at hand, Assessing Officer has not complied with the procedure prescribed under Annexure P-9 dated 10.1.2018 because Assessing Officer has not issued any summon under Section 131 of the Act of 1961. Standard Procedure for recording satisfaction under Section 147 of the Act of 1961 is mandatory, hence in absence of compliance of any of procedures as 6 mentioned in Annexure P-9, the entire proceedings stand vitiated and no action can be taken against petitioner in pursuance of proceeding, as initiated against the petitioner. 3. Mrs. Naushina Afrin Ali, learned counsel for respondents vehemently opposes submissions of learned counsel for petitioner and submits that the Department has followed the procedure prescribed under the Act of 1961 as also the Standard Procedure formulated by the Department vide letter dated 10.1.2018. The Assessing Officer received information from the Deputy Director of Income Tax (Investigation), Raipur (for short 'DDIT') who had issued notice/summons under Section 133 of the Act of 1961. Mere mentioning of deposits or transactions in income tax return, which are accepted at the time of submission of income tax return, will not debar the authorities to reopen case for re-assessment. In case at hand, though petitioner has disclosed deposits in other bank accounts but did not explain source of that amount in proper manner in return and this was the basis for initiating proceeding against petitioner. The DDIT taking into consideration returns and other documents submitted, called upon petitioner to furnish details and explanation by issuing summons, which was replied by petitioner. Reply submitted was not found to be satisfactory, therefore, case was forwarded to the Assessing Officer, who based on information received from DDIT and considering the return as also the bank statement, issued notice under Section 148 of the Act of 1961. Petitioner finding that there is no 7 specific mention of reasons to believe for initiating proceeding of re-assessment, submitted request letter to Assessing Officer, which was replied by Assessing Officer, along with copy of reasons recorded for opining to issue notice under Section 148 of the Act of 1961, which is also placed on record by petitioner from Page No.32 onwards of writ petition. A glance of Page No.32 of writ petition would show that after the chart showing different deposits in different banks, the Assessing Officer has mentioned that petitioner was asked to give documentary evidence and produce details in support of cash deposits made during demonetization period. Reply submitted by the petitioner was found unsatisfactory, which is also specifically mentioned. if income tax authority accepts income tax return/document without raising any question then it does not mean that at subsequent point of time, return/documents placed along with return cannot be revisited and assessee cannot be noticed. In support of aforementioned contention she places her reliance on judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of M/S. Phool Chand Bajrang Lal vs Income-Tax Officer reported in (1993) 4 SCC 77. With respect to submission of learned counsel for petitioner that approval as provided under Section 151 of the Act of 1961 has not been accorded to the Assessing Officer, she submits that Assessing Officer has initially sought approval from the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax and it is Joint Commissioner who forwarded case to the Principal 8 Commissioner of Income Tax after application of mind. In Annexure P-5 this fact is very much appearing. Referring to Annexure P-5, she submits that in 'recommendation details' there is mention of name of Joint Commissioner. As against 'recommendation remarks' there is mention that the Joint Commissioner is satisfied with reasons recorded by AO for issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act of 1961. As against 'remarks of approving authority' i.e. Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (PCIT), who had also recorded satisfaction for issuance of notice under Section 148, it is mentioned that it is fit case for issuance of notice. Hence, in view of recommendation remarks and opinion of the Joint Commissioner recording satisfaction with the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer, it cannot be said that approval, as provided under Section 151 of the Act of 1961, was not provided. She submits that submission of learned counsel for petitioner that approval under Section 151 of the Act of 1961 in absence of digital signature is not an approval in the eyes of law, is not correct. Referring to provisions of Section 282A of the Act of 1961, she submits that any document or notice shall be deemed to be authenticated if the name and office of a designated income-tax authority is printed, stamped or otherwise written thereon. There is specific mention of name and designation of the authority, who had granted approval under Section 151 of the Act of 1961, in Annexure P-5. Hence, 9 this submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is not acceptable. The Assessing Officer has also issued notice under Section 142 of the Act of 1961 for furnishing details of accounts and documents specified in Annexure to notice. Hence, there is compliance of 4th Paragraph of the Standard Procedure dated 1.10.2018 for recording satisfaction as issued by the Central Board of Direct Taxes. In 4th Paragraph of Standard Procedure, it is mentioned that enquiry which is to be made by Assessing Officer must have a live-link with the information received / collected / found by him. In view of contents of 4th Paragraph, it is Assessing Officer who has to link the procedure initiated by him with the proceedings of information received/ collected by other officers also. Here in this case, the DDIT issued summons under Section 131 of the Act of 1961 and when reply of petitioner was not found satisfactory, the DDIT forwarded the case to Assessing Officer. Thus, there is compliance of the provisions of 4th Paragraph of Standard Procedure dated 10.1.2018. Learned counsel submits that the word 'reasons to believe' as used under the Act of 1961 has to be considered in wider sense and in support of her submission, she places reliance on judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Kalyanji Mavji & Co. v. CIT reported in (1976) 1 SCC 985; Raymond Woolen Mills Ltd. vs. ITO, Centre Circle XI, Range Bombay & ors reported in (2008) 14 SCC 218. She submits that in case of Kalyaji Mavji (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court in 10 Para-9 has elaborately dealt with issue as to what will be information received by Assessing Officer. She further contended that this Court while considering challenge to notice issued under Section 148 of the Act of 1961 held that scope of interference at the time of issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act of 1961 exercising judicial review is very limited and it is to be seen whether procedure prescribed under the Statute, which is pre-condition for issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act of 1961, is complied with or not, and not the merits of claim of petitioner. In support of her contention she places reliance on the judgment of Division Bench of this High Court dated 14.2.2020 in Writ Appeal No.399/2019, parties being Hariom Rice Mill Pvt. Ltd. vs. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax. She submits that in view of above facts of the case and dictum of Hon'ble Supreme Court and High Court in above rulings, there is no substance in this petition. 4. At this stage learned counsel for petitioner would submit that submission of learned counsel for respondents that notice issued under Section 142 (1) of the Act of 1961 by Assessing Officer is before issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act of 1961 is not correct, as notice under Section 142 (1) of the Act of 1961 is issued only in the month of December, 2021, whereas notice under Section 148 of the Act of 1961 is issued in the month of March, 2021. From the fact of issuance of notice 11 under Section 142 (1) by the Assessing Officer itself it is clear that Assessing Officer at the time of issuing notice under Section 148 of the Act of 1961 was not having sufficient material for reasons to believe that petitioner escaped assessment. Hence, impugned notice be quashed. He also pointed out that Section 282A (1) of the Act of 1961 is in two parts, therefore, submission of learned counsel for respondent that mentioning of name and designation of authority will authenticate documents, is not correct. He submits that the Act of 1961, as prevailing in the year 2017-18, or issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act of 1961, it is mandatory and pre- condition to record satisfaction of reasons to believe by Assessing Officer and it is not for him to consider mode of information received as it was prevailing in the Act of 1961 prior to the year 2017-18. 5. Learned counsel for respondents would submit that submission of learned counsel for petitioner with respect to digital signature in approval under Section 151of the Act of 1961 is also not correct for the reason that when there is mention of DIN and Document Number in the notice, the signature of designated authority becomes immaterial because DIN & Document Number is issued based on code provided to a particular officer. She places her reliance upon Instructions dated 4.3.2021 (Annexure R2 to 4/2) issued by Ministry of Finance, Govt. of India, New Delhi 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the 12 record. 7. So far as first submission of learned counsel for petitioner that before issuing notice under Section 148 of the Act of 1961 the Assessing Officer has material to record reasons to believe that income chargeable to tax escaped assessment for that year. Perusal of documents placed on record by petitioner as also respondents would show that on demand being made by petitioner, the Assessing Officer supplied copy of reasons recorded which led him to believe that income escaped assessment. While recording reasons, the Assessing Officer discussed dates and events as also proceedings drawn by the DDIT for issuance of summons under Section 131A of the Act of 1961 to the bank of petitioner. Further, summons under Section 131 of the Act of 1961 was also issued by the DDIT calling upon petitioner to produce evidence and relevant documents of all cash deposits made in four bank accounts during period of demonetization. The DDIT recorded that entire cash deposits has not been declared and found part of total deposit as unexplained cash deposit, which was forwarded to the Assessing Officer. The Assessing Officer verified PAN details available on ITBA and came to conclusion that amount of Rs.22,17,720/- remained unexplained for financial year 2016- 17. Reasons for issuance of notice under Section 148, as recorded in proposal, would reflect that Assessing Officer has considered present case to be of escapement of income from assessment under clause (b) of Explanation-2 to Section 147 of the Act of 1961. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Kalyanji 13 Mavji (supra) while dealing with provisions of Section 34 of the Income Tax Act, 1922 has held thus:- “Another pertinent fact which may be mentioned here is that although Section 34 was the subject of several amendments, yet the word `information' which was introduced in 1939 has not been defined at all. Since the word `information' has not been defined, it is difficult to lay down any rule of universal application. At the same time it cannot be disputed that the object of the Act was to see that the tax collecting machinery is made as perfect and effective as possible so that the tax-payer is not allowed to get away with escaped Income-tax. The fact that the adjective `definite' qualified the word `information' and the word `discovers' which were introduced in the Income Tax (Amendment) Act, 1939 were deleted by the Amendment Act of 1948 would lead to the irresistible inference that the word `information' is of the widest amplitude and comprehends a variety of factors. Nevertheless the power under Section 34 (1) (b), however wide it may be, is not plenary because the discretion of the Income-tax officer is controlled by the word \"reason to believe\". It was so held by this Court in Bhimraj Pannalal v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1961) 41 ITR 221 (SC) : TC 51 R. 300, while affirming the decision of the Patna High Court in Bhimraj Panna Lal v. Commissioner of Income Tax (1957) 32 ITR 289 (Pat) : TC 51R 301. This legal proposition, however, is not disputed. It, therefore, follows that information may come from external sources or even from materials already on the record or may be derived from the discovery of new and important matter or fresh facts. The word `information\" will also include true and correct state of the law derived from relevant judicial decisions either of the 14 Income-tax authorities or other courts of law which decide income-tax matters. Where the ground on which the original assessment is based is held to be erroneous by a superior court in some other case, that will also amount to a fresh information which comes into existence subsequent to the original assessment. A subsequent Privy Council decision is also included in the word `information'. Thus it is very difficult to lay down any hard and fast rule. But this Court has in two leading cases laid down some objective tests and principles to determine the applicability of Section 34 (1) (b) of the Act which we shall now discuss. xxx xxx xxx An analysis of this case would clearly show that the information as contained in Section 34 (1) (b) must fulfil the following conditions: (1) The information may be derived from an external source concerning facts or particulars as to law relating to matter bearing on the assessment; (2) That the information must come after the previous or the original assessment was made. In fact the words \"in consequence of information\" as used in Section 34 (1) (b) clearly postulate that the information must be subsequent to the original assessment sought to be reopened; and (3) That the information may be obtained even on the basis of the record of the previous assessment from an investigation of the materials on the record, or the facts- disclosed thereby or from other enquiry or research into facts or law. These categories are in addition to the categories laid down by this Court in Maharaj Kumar Kamal Singh's 15 case which has been consistently followed in several decisions of this Court as shown above. On a combined review of the decisions of this Court the following tests and principles would apply to determine the applicability of Section 34 (1) (b) to the following categories of cases: (1) Where the information is as to the true and correct state of the law derived from relevant judicial decisions; (2) Where in the original assessment the income liable to tax has escaped assessment due to oversight, inadvertence or a mistake committed by the Income-tax officer. This is obviously based on the principle that the tax- payer would not be allowed to take advantage of an oversight or mistake committed by the Taxing Authority; (3) Where the information is derived from an external source of any kind. Such external source would include discovery of new and important matters or knowledge of fresh facts which were not present at the time of the original assessment; (4) Where the information may be obtained even from the record of the original assessment from an investigation of the materials on the record, or the facts disclosed thereby or from other enquiry or research into facts or law. If these conditions are satisfied then the Income-tax officer would have complete jurisdiction to re-open the original assessment. It is obvious that where the Income-tax officer gets no subsequent information, but merely proceeds to re-open the original assessment without any fresh facts or materials or without any 16 enquiry into the materials which form part of the original assessment, Section 34 (1) (b) would have no application.” 8. In case at hand, the DDIT on the basis of information issued summons to assessee. In reply to summons, the assessee failed to satisfactorily explain source of cash deposit of Rs.22,17,720/- during demonetization period. Based on said information, Assessing Officer verified PAN details and recorded reasons to believe that cash deposit to the tune of Rs.22,17,720/- remained unexplained, which falls under clause (b) of Explanation to Section 147 of the Act of 1961. In case of Phool Chand Bajrang Lal (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering validity of reassessment notice has observed thus:- “From a combined review of the judgements of this Court, it follows that an Income-tax Officer acquires jurisdiction to reopen assessment under Section 147 (a) read with Section 148 of the Income Tax 1961 only if on the basis of specific, reliable and relevant information coming to his possession subsequently, he has reasons which he must record, to believe that by reason of omission or failure on the part of the assessee to make a true and full disclosure of all material facts necessary for his assessment during the concluded assessment proceedings, any part of his income, profit or gains chargeable to income tax has escaped assessment. He may start reassessment proceedings either because some fresh facts come to light which where not previously disclosed or some information with regard to the facts previously disclosed comes into his possession which 17 tends to expose the untruthfulness of those facts. In such situations, it is not a case of mere change of opinion or the drawing of a different inference from the same facts as were earlier available but acting on fresh information. Since, the belief is that of the Income-tax Officer, the sufficiency of reasons for forming the belief, is not for the Court to judge but it is open to an assessee to establish that there in fact existed no belief or that the belief was not at all a bona fide one or was based on vague, irrelevant and non-specific information. To that limited extent, the Court may look into the conclusion arrived at by the Income-tax Officer and examine whether there was any material available on the record from which the requisite belief could be formed by the Income-tax Officer and further whether that material had any rational connection or a live link for the formation of the requisite belief..” 9. In aforementioned ruling, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that reassessment proceedings can be started on fresh facts or some information with regard to fact previously disclosed comes into his possession which tends to expose the untruthfulness of those facts and that situations will not be a case of mere change of opinion or drawing of a different inference from the same facts. Hon'ble Supreme Court has further held that sufficiency of reasons for forming this belief is not for the Court to judge, but it is open to an assessee to establish that there exists fact not belief or that belief was not at all bona fide one. In present case, reasons assigned for issuance of proposal under Section 148 of the Act of 1961 clearly mentions about application of mind by Assessing Officer based on information 18 received from the DDIT and also about verification of PAN details of assessee. 10. In case of Raymond Wollen Mills (supra) Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering challenge to issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act of 1961 has held thus:- “3.In this case, we do not have to give a final decision as to whether there is suppression of material facts by the assessee or not. We have only to see whether there was prima facie some material on the basis of which the Department could reopen the case. The sufficiency or correctness of the material is not a thing to be considered at this stage. We are of the view that the court cannot strike down the reopening of the case in the facts of this case. It will be open to the assessee to prove that the assumption of facts made in the notice was erroneous. The assessee may also prove that no new facts came to the knowledge of the Income-tax Officer after completion of the assessment proceeding. We are not expressing any opinion on the merits of the case. The questions of fact and law are left open to be investigated and decided by the assessing authority. The appellant will be entitled to take all the points before the assessing authority. The appeals are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.” 11. In aforementioned ruling Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in categorical terms that at the stage of issuance of notice for reopening of assessment, the Court is only to see whether there was prima facie material on the basis of which department could reopen the case and not the sufficiency or correctness of material to be considered. 19 12. If the facts of present case are tested in light of aforementioned rulings of Hon'ble Supreme Court, it is clear that the DDIT issued summons under Section 131 of the Act of 1961 to the assessee. Reply submitted by assessee was not found to be satisfactory. Matter was forwarded to the Assessing Officer, who in turn, verified PAN details of assessee, recorded reasons in terms of Section 147 of the Act of 1961 and thereafter issued notice to him under Section 148 of the Act of 1961. Hence, it cannot be said that at the stage of issuance of notice, there was no prima facie material for reasons to belief that income escaped assessment. Consequently, I do not find any force in first submission of learned counsel for petitioner and it is hereby repelled. 13. Coming to second submission of learned counsel for petitioner that approval accorded under Section 151 of the Act of 1961 is not by appropriate authority. Approval under Section 151 of the Act of 1961 is dated 30.3.2021 (Annexure P-5) and as per submission of learned counsel for respondent, in column headed as 'Recommendation Details' name and designation of officer mentioned is 'Joint Commissioner of Income Tax'. Proposal was approved by the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax. Submission of learned counsel for respondent that name of officer mentioned in column headed as 'Recommendation Details' holds the post of Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, is not disputed by learned counsel for petitioner. As against “Recommendation Remarks' under column headed as 'Recommendation Details', the Joint Commissioner of 20 Income Tax mentioned that “I am satisfied with the reason recorded by the AO that it is a fit case for issue of notice u/s 148 of IT Act 1961'. The words used while recommending for issuance of notice are sufficient to infer in clear terms that the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax applied his mind on proposal sent to him by the Assessing Officer, recorded his satisfaction for issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Act of 1961. Hence, in view of aforementioned facts, even if name of approving authority is mentioned to be 'Principal Commissioner of Income Tax', the same would not make the 'approval' itself invalid. The object of Section 151 of the Act of 1961 is that approval to be accorded by the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax (in the facts of case) and if Joint Commissioner approves the proceedings/ proposal sent by the Assessing Officer to be a fit case, then, in the opinion of this Court, the approval under Section 151 of the Act of 1961 giving details of approving authority as Principal Commissioner of Income Tax in itself will not make the approval invalid. Reliance on the judgment delivered in case of Ghanshyam K Khabrani (supra) placed by learned counsel for petitioner to support his contention that approval under Section 151 of the Act of 1961 is not in accordance with law, is of no help being distinguishable on facts. In aforementioned case, proposal forwarded by Assessing Officer to the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, who only recorded gist and sought approval. There was no application of mind by the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax by recording his satisfaction as required under Section 151 of the 21 Act of 1961. Provisions under Section 151 (2) of the Act of 1961 mandates the satisfaction of Joint Commissioner of Income Tax. In case at hand, Joint Commissioner of Income Tax recorded satisfaction on the proposal of Assessing Officer by mentioning that it is a fit case for issuance of notice. In view of above facts of the case, second ground raised is also not tenable. 14. Third submission of learned counsel for petitioner is that approval granted under Section 151 of the Act of 1961 does not bear digital signature of authority, referring to note appended to approval (Annexure P-5), is concerned, the note appended says “if digitally signed, the date of digital signature may be taken as date of document”. Submission of learned counsel for petitioner, in the opinion of this Court, is not acceptable in view of provisions of Section 282 (a) of the Act of 1961, which provides that notice or other documents to be issued for the purpose of the Act of 1961 by any income-tax authority shall be deemed to be authenticated if name and designation is provided. In approval under Section 151 of the Act of 1961, name, designation and office is printed. Hence, submission of learned counsel for petitioner that approval is not digitally signed is also not sustainable, more so when it bears DIN & Document Number. 15. For the foregoing reasons, I do not find any merit in this petition, the same is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- (Parth Prateem Sahu) Judge roshan/- "