"IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BANGALORE Dated this the I 7’’ day of September. 20 10 PRESENT THE HON’BLE MR JUSTICE D V SHYLENDRA KUMAR AND THE HON’BLE MR JUSTICE JAWAD RAHIM Misc Ct’l iVos 22583 & 224c[2009 ii’ Income Tax Appeal sNO 122 of 2000 Between: CANARA BANK HEAD OFFICE NO.1120,JCROAD BANGALORE - 560 002 ... COMMON APPELLANT/APPLICANT [By Smi Vani H. Aclv.] And: DEPUTY COi’vIMIS5IONER OF INCOME TAX (NOW JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX), SPECIAL RANGFLI (NOW SPECIAL RANGEVI), CENTRAL REVENUE BUILDING QUEENS ROAD. BANGALORE — 560 001 COMMON RESPONDENT [By Sri M V Seshachala. AcIv. 1 MISC. CVL. 22583 OF 2009 IS FILED UNDER SECTION 151 OP CODE OP CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1906 R/W SECTION 260A OP 2 THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961 PRAYING TO CONDONE THE DELAY IN FILING THE APPLICATION AND ETC., MISC. CVL. 22584 OF 2009 15 FILED UNDER SECTION 151 01 ( ODI OF’ C1 11 PROC EDL RE 1906 RR SFC]IO’ 2(jO OF HE I ( OML J CF 1)61 PRVING ‘TO RE( Al I IIIF ORDER DAlI F) 11 06 2006 PASSI D I’ I’1 NO 1222000 D RI’ S lORE TIlE APPEAL AND ETC.. THIS APPLICATIONS ARE COMING ON FOR ORDERS. THIS DAY, JAWAD RAHIM J., MADE THE FOLLO VING: ORDER The applicant in these applications presented the main appeal under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act. 196 1 tfor short, the Act]. questioning’ the order imposing tax of Rs 21.73,67.521/- and the matter relating to M/s Lakshmi Commercial Bank Ltd. The appeal had come up for consideration before this court on 14-6-2006 for considering the following substantial questions of law as formulated therein: c Whether on theJdcts and in circumstances of the case the Tribunal was justified in chs-allowzncj the claim of the appellant/br a deduction of a sum of Rs. 21.73,67,521/ in respect of deposits qf M/s. Lakshmi Commercial Banlc Ltd LL’hich were i’oluntczrily paid bij the appellant on the grounds of c’ommercial evped ienctj. ‘I 3 h) Whether on the facts and circumstances 0,! the case. the Tribunal was justUied in not allowing the deduction of 5O of the enlertctiriment expenses. ci Whether oi tlie facts and in the circumstances of the case. the Tribunal teas jusrijieci in rejecting the appellants claim Jor expenditure including depreciation etc., on the maintenance of holiday homesjbr its employees. 2. However. Sri Sarangan. learned Senior Counsel who was representinS the appellant, made a statement that necessary pelmission from the Committee of Disputes. Government of India, in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court was not granted and the application moved in that regard was still under consideration. He had made it clear that he had no instructions as on that day as to whether permission was granted or not and requested that the appeal may be disposed of as not being competent or maintainable. However, at his requesi. this court disposed of the appeal and in the course of the judgment, ve observed thus: In these circumstances, we deem it proper to dispose Qf the appeal as on iodaij as nor 4 maintainable. Liberty Is reserved to the appellant to reopen this ease in the event of obtaining permission to prosecute in terms of the ONGC’s case 3. Presently, these two applications are filed. Misc Civil No 22583 of 2009 is filed under Section 151 CPC read with Section 260A of the Act, praying to condone the delay of 1243 days in filing the application in Misc Civil 22584 of 2009 under like provisions to recall the order dated 14-6-2006, dIsmissing the main appeal. 4. We have heard Sri Sarangan, learned senior advocate appearing for the appellant-assessee on both these applications. 5. It is averred in the application seeking for main relief that after the disposal of the appeal in the manner aforesaid, the Committee of Disputes granted permission to present the appeal by its order dated 16-5-2007, a copy of which was obtained by the appellant on 23-5-2007. Thereafter, the appellant filed a memo in the registry on 25-6-2007 for reopening the case. In the application, it 5 Is further averred that since the memo was not considered and the appellant was advised to file an application, the present applications are filed. 6. Except for the cryptic statement as stated above, there is no elaboration on as to the circumstance in which no effort was made by the appellant to reopen the case, except filing a memo in the registry. However, we desired to consider whether the reasons assigned for condoning the delay in filing the application are worthy of acceptance? We have perused the grounds seeking condoning the delay, the reasons assigned for not fifing an application within a reasonable time are as follows: 2. Immediately after the rece4pt of the approval of COD dated 16.05.2007, the appellant made all efforts to furnish the approval before this Hon’ble Court and seek restoration of the appeal. The appellantfiled a memo on 25.06.2007 seeking restoration of the appeaL 3. However, very recently the appellant was informed that an application for recalling and restoration should befiled andfiling of a memo uould not be sufficient Therefore, the appellant has filed the accompanying application seeking recalling and iestoration of 6 the appeal. However, there is a delay of days, which is bonajide and not intentional. It is suhmitted that the appellant was prevented by stfficiertt and reasonable cause infiling this application for recalling and therefore, the delay f any may be condoned 7. This is the only averment in the application projecting it as ‘sufficient cause’ to be considered for condoning the delay. We are at loss to know the reason why there are no further averments as to whom the appellant contacted and who had advised the appellant ‘recently’ to file an application rather than a memo, The averments in paras 2 and 3 of the application are bereft of material information. Nothing is forthcoming to hold that the reasons assigned constitute sufficient to show indulgence to condone the delay, which is more than three years. Besides, the application is sought to be supported by only verifying affidavit of one N Selvaraj an, Deputy General Manager of the appellant-bank, in which no facts as deposed to, except verifying the statements in the application. ‘I 7 8. We must, at this juncture, observe that the appellant is not an individual or a person with no sufficient legal advice available to it. Instead, !t is a banking institution, a nationalized bank, which, we believe, has sufficient assistance for timely legal advice as also backed by finance. In the circumstance, we find no reason assigned by the appellant to be accepted as sufficient cause to condone the delay. 9. hi the result, we find no merit in the application filed for condonation of delay and consequently, the application ified for reopening the main appeal does not survive for consideration. Hence, both the applications are rejected as being bereft of merit. a I Sd/a JUDGE Sd! JUDGE pjk "