Devendra Nath Mishra V. Union Of India And 3 Others

WRIA/8295/2023

AI Insights

Devendra Nath Mishra, a former Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-IV, Kolkata, faced disciplinary proceedings initiated by the Union of India, which were based on allegations of misconduct in handling 78 cases under Sections 263 and 264 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The Central Administrative Tribunal dismissed Mishra's application challenging these proceedings, leading to his writ petition in the High Court. The main legal contention revolved around whether a quasi-judicial authority like Mishra could be subjected to disciplinary action for procedural lapses and lack of reasoning in decisions. The High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, emphasizing that disciplinary action is permissible when an officer acts negligently, recklessly, or without good faith in the discharge of his duties, even if such actions do not directly pertain to the correctness of the quasi-judicial decisions made.

• Counselvise Citation: [2023] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 694116 (HC-ALLAHABAD)
• Appeal Type: Others
• Pronouncement Date: 25-09-2023
• Assessment Year: misc
• Other Referred Cases: Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar Vs. Union of India and others, The Union of India and 4 others Vs. Subachan Ram and another, Secretary, Ministry of Defence and others Vs. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha, Union of India Vs. Upendra Singh, Union of India and others Vs. K.K. Dhawan
• Laws Referred To: Income Tax Act, 1961
• Result in Favour of: Revenue
• Court: HIGH COURT
• Department Lawyers: MANOJ SINGH
• Assessee Lawyers: ANIL SRIVASTAVA
• Keywords: Central Administrative Tribunal; Charge Sheet; Disciplinary Proceedings; Misconduct; Quasi-judicial authority
• Section: 263; 264

Judgement Text

"Neutral Citation No. - 2023:AHC:185792-DB Court No. - 39 Case :- WRIT - A No. - 8295 of 2023 Petitioner :- Devendra Nath Mishra Respondent :- Union Of India And 3 Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Anil Kumar Srivastava Counsel for Respondent :- A.S.G.I.,Manoj Kumar Singh Hon'ble Saumitra Dayal Singh,J. Hon'ble Arun Kumar Singh Deshwal,J. 1. Heard Shri Anil Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Manoj Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the Union. 2. Present petition has been filed against the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, Allahabad, dated 2.5.2023 passed in Original Application No. 501 of 2022 (Devendra Nath Mishra Vs. Union of India and others). By that order, the learned Tribunal has dismissed the Original Application filed by the present petitioner arising from the sanction order dated 24.11.2020 and the charge sheet dated 24.12.2020. 3. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is, the charge sheet in question has been issued containing two articles of charge both pertaining to his functioning as a quasi judicial authority namely Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-IV, Kolkata. It is alleged, he had misconducted himself while dealing with 78 cases/proceedings under Section 263 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the \"Act, 1961\"). Second article of charge pertains to similar misconduct alleged with respect to proceedings arising under Section 264 of the Act, 1961. 4. Heavily relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar Vs. Union of India and others, (1999) 7 SCC 409 and a decision of a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in The Union of India and 4 others Vs. Subachan Ram and another, Neutral Citation 2022:AHC:185587-DB, dated 10.11.2022 as affirmed by the Supreme Court in Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No(s). 12537 of 2023 (Union of India and others Vs. Subachan Ram), decided on 4.5.2023, it has been asserted that a quasi judicial authority may not be subjected to disciplinary proceedings except where there exists a charge of \"something more than a mere mistake of law\". Thus, in the absence of any allegation of extraneous consideration influencing the quasi judicial order, no disciplinary proceedings may have arisen against the present petitioner. 5. Responding to the above, learned counsel for the Union has taken us through the charge sheet to establish that the article of charge clearly makes out allegations of recklessness, negligence, lack of good faith and devotion of duty etc. 6. Thus primarily, it has been submitted that the petitioner having first issued show cause notices under Section 263 of the Act, 1961 and having called for reply of the assessee concerned and a report of the assessing officer, he may not have closed the cases hurriedly, making a single line observation basically to the effect that no case existed. Those conclusions are wholly unreasoned and may smack of wrong doing. Insofar as giving reasons is a sine qua non for any quasi judicial order, the petitioner had clearly acted in contravention of the prescribed condition essential for the exercise of quasi judicial power. He has relied on Supreme Court in Secretary, Ministry of Defence and others Vs. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha, (2012) 11 SCC 565, Union of India Vs. Upendra Singh, (1994) SCC (3) 357 and Union of India and others Vs. K.K. Dhawan, 1993 2 SCC 56. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the record, we are not inclined to exercise our extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interfere with the order of the learned Tribunal that has not inferred with the charge-sheet and the ongoing disciplinary proceeding, at this preliminary stage. In the first place, it is not in dispute that the charge-sheet has been issued by the disciplinary authority with proper sanction. Therefore, there is no inherent lack of jurisdiction, seen to exist. 8. As to the further submission advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner that the jurisdictional fact to initiate a domestic enquiry proceeding does not exist as the petitioner had only performed a quasi judicial function, it may be observed that it is not the correctness of the conclusions drawn by the petitioner in those quasi judicial proceedings that is under scrutiny in the disciplinary proceedings being faced by him. On the contrary, it is the violation of the established procedure of law that has given rise to allegation of negligence, recklessness, lack of good faith and devotion of duty etc. 9. In Union of India and others Vs. K.K. Dhawan, 1993 2 SCC 56, it has been observed as under: \"28. Certainly, therefore, the officer who exercises judicial or quasi-judicial powers acts negligently or recklessly or in order to confer undue favour on a person is not acting as a Judge. Accordingly, the contention of the respondent has to be rejected. It is important to bear in mind that in the present case, we are not concerned with the correctness or legality of the decision of the respondent but the conduct of the respondent in discharge of his duties as an officer. The legality of the orders with reference to the nine assessments may be questioned in appeal or revision under the Act. But we have no doubt in our mind that the Government is not precluded from taking the disciplinary action for violation of the Conduct Rules. Thus, we conclude that the disciplinary action can be taken in the following cases: (i) Where the officer had acted in a manner as would reflect on his reputation for integrity or good faith or devotion to duty; (ii) if there is prima facie material to show recklessness or misconduct in the discharge of his duty; (iii) if he has acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a Government servant; (iv) if he had acted negligently or that he omitted the prescribed conditions which are essential for the exercise of the statutory powers; (v) if he had acted in order to unduly favour a party; (vi) if he had been actuated by corrupt motive, however small the bribe may be because Lord Coke said long ago \"though the bribe may be small, yet the fault is great. 29. The instances above catalogued are not exhaustive. However, we may add that for a mere technical violation or merely because the order is wrong and the action not falling under the above enumerated instances, disciplinary action is not warranted. Here, we may utter a word of caution. Each case will depend upon the facts and no absolute rule can be postulated.\" 10. To the extent, the quasi judicial authority may remain exposed to disciplinary proceedings in specified circumstances, there can be no quarrel. As to the facts in which such proceedings may be justified, as discussed above, we find absence of material to exercise our extra-ordinary jurisdiction. Suffice to note that the decision of the co-ordinate bench in Subhachan Ram (supra) is wholly inapplicable to the present case. In that case, the co-ordinate bench clearly noted that the substance of the charge levelled against the delinquent was - having allowed additional evidence to arise and precedent to be cited in the appeal proceedings before the delinquent. That charge was materially different from the charges being faced by the present petitioner. 11. It may be clarified, in that case, the charge itself indicated that the procedure established by law had been followed by the delinquent inasmuch as additional evidence may arise during appeal proceedings. Yet, he was faced with the disciplinary proceedings for reason of admitting that evidence on record. Thus, a clear ground of victimization or malafide may have existed in that case. In any case allowing additional evidence to arise and to allow precedent to be relied may never be an act of neglect or recklessness or lack of good faith etc. 12. In the present case, the facts are otherwise. The allegation is that the due procedure established by law had been completely violated. No reason had been assigned by the petitioner while closing numerous cases. In all those cases allegation existed of erroneous assessment orders that were prejudicial to the interests of the revenue. That aspect had been first considered and notice issued to the assessee to reply why the original assessment order may not be revised. Yet, after that reply had been received and upon report submitted by the Assessing Authority, the petitioner closed the proceedings without disclosing any application of mind to the facts brought before him. To adopt such unacceptable procedure (of not assigning reasons), in a large number of cases, clearly discloses a pattern. That may itself amount to satisfaction of condition specified in para 28 (iv) in K.K. Dhawan (supra). 13. While it may remain open to the petitioner to contend that he had followed that procedure in the face of charges levelled of the petitioner having closed numerous proceedings under Sections 263 and 264 of the Act, with cryptic observations, without assigning any reasons, we would not like to undertake that exercise at this preliminary stage. 14. Seen in that light, the learned Tribunal has neither erred in principle nor it has otherwise committed any patent error of law and/or of fact as may call for any interference by this Court, in exercise of judicial review. We therefore decline to exercise our jurisdiction in the facts of the instant case. All defences and opportunities are open to the petitioner. In absence of any other ground being pressed, no interference is warranted. 15. Writ petition is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs. Order Date :- 25.9.2023 SA (Arun Kumar Singh Deshwal, J.) (S.D. Singh, J.) Digitally signed by :- SALMAN ALI High Court of Judicature at Allahabad "