HONORARY COMMISSONED OFFICERS WELFARE ASSOCIATIONS OF HIMACHAL PRADESH V. UNION OF INDIA

CWP/1258/2015

AI Insights

The case revolves around the grievances of the Honorary Commissioned Officers Welfare Association of Himachal Pradesh, who are retired officers of the Indian Army conferred with honorary ranks of Lieutenant or Captain. The petition challenged the application of Regulation 178 of the Army Regulations, which allegedly undermined the status and benefits of these officers compared to regular Commissioned Officers. The petition sought judicial intervention to restore entitlements in various sectors including medical and canteen services, and to recalibrate pensions as per the IV Central Pay Commission. The respondents, including the Union of India, defended the application of Regulation 178, asserting it did not confer additional powers or status to Honorary Commissioned Officers over regular officers.

• Counselvise Citation: [2016] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 680852 (HC-HIMACHAL_PRADESH)
• Appeal Type: Others
• Pronouncement Date: 20-10-2016
• Assessment Year: misc
• Other Referred Cases: Union of India and others v. Major General Shri Kant Sharma
• Laws Referred To: Article 226 of the Constitution of India, Army Act, 1950, Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007
• Result in Favour of: Revenue
• Court: HIGH COURT
• Department Lawyers: ASHOK SHARMA; AJAY CHAUHAN
• Assessee Lawyers: RAVINDER JASWAL
• Keywords: Judicial review; Honorary Commissioned Officers; PARCHMENT; Regulations for the Army; Service Matters
• Section: 178; 2.1; 3(xii); 3(o)

Judgement Text

"HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH AT SHIMLA CWP No. 1258 of 2015 Reserved on: October 6, 2016 Decided on: October 20, 2016 --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Honorary Commissioned Officers Welfare Association of Himachal Pradesh ..Petitioner Versus The Union of India and others …Respondents --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Coram Hon'ble Mr. Justice Mansoor Ahmad Mir, Chief Justice Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- For the petitioner Mr. Ravinder Singh Jaswal, Advocate For the respondents: Mr. Ashok Sharma, Assistant Solicitor General of India with Mr. Ajay Chauhan, Advocate. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Per Sandeep Sharma, Judge: By way of the present writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs: “i) That the respondents may kindly be directed to withdraw the Extract of Para 178 of Regulations for the Army (Revised Edition 1987) which is violation rights guaranteed under the PARCHMENT by the Supreme Commander of Armed Forces and is in violation to the Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India. ii) That the respondents may further be directed to ensure prompt and timely restoration of facilities in Medical Sector, CSD Canteen and also in Mess as per their entitlement. iii) That the respondents further be directed to calculate the pension of Honorary Commissioned 1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 Officers as per the ratio given under the IV Central Pay Commission which was equal to the Commissioned Officers and also release the arrear alongwith interest till the realization of the same. iv) That the respondents may further be directed to ensure equivalent status to the Honorary Commissioned Officers to the Commissioned Officers as promised by the Supreme Commander of Armed Forces i.e. President of India.” 2. Petitioner-association is a registered association of Honorary Commissioned Officers retired from active service of the Indian Army in different years from their respective Units/Regiments. Record reveals that the members of petitioner-association during their service were granted honorary rank of Lieutenant/Captain in active service on the occasion of Republic Day by the Supreme Commander of Armed Forces i.e. President of India vide office corps order (annexure P-1). With the grant of aforesaid honorary rank of Lieutenant/Captain in the Army, persons on whom such rank is conferred, gets following benefits/ facilities and privileges:- “a). That the Honorary Commissioned Officers wears the Rank/Badges of the Commissioned Rank during the Active service till his retirement; b). That the Honorary Commissioned Officers having the same dress code and also have been given funds for Officers Kit (Mess Uniform for entering the offices mess) c). That the Honorary Commissioned Officers draws the rations/ allowances on the scales as is applicable to the officers equivalent to the Commissioned Officers; d). That the Honorary Commissioned Officer when admitted in the service hospitals, their ration is drawn as per Officers entitlement and served accordingly and also charged nominally. 3 e). That the Honorary Commissioned Officers draws the same pay as given to the Commissioned Officers in regular Army. f). That the Honorary Commissioned Officers having the canteen facilities equivalent to the Commissioned Officers. g). That the Honorary Commissioned Officers have also been conferred additional power of command during service in regular army.” 3. Perusal of annexure P-2 i.e. PARCHMENT given by the Supreme Commander of Armed Forces suggests that with the conferment of the honorary rank, as referred to herein above, individual, on whom such honour is conferred, is given and granted full power and authority to have, hold and enjoy the said honorary rank with all and singular privileges thereunto belonging. By way of the aforesaid order, Supreme Commander also commanded all the officers and men of the regular Army to acknowledge the individual as Honorary Lieutenant/Captain, as the case may be. In nutshell, case of the petitioner-association is that despite there being a specific order of the President of India, members of the petitioner- association are being subjected to insult and harassment at the hands of Commissioned Officers, soldiers and also civil employees, whenever they visit canteen and military hospitals run by the respondents. Petitioner-association, in the body of the petition has indicated certain instances, when they were subjected to humiliation, insult and harassment by the respondents during their visit to the canteens and Army hospitals. As per the petitioner-association, they being 4 holders of honorary rank, though have been granted full power/ authority to have, hold and enjoy honorary rank and all and singular privileges belonging to the rank, but respondents often do not acknowledge them to be Lieutenant/Captain, to which rank they are entitled pursuant to the specific orders. Since the petitioners were not being provided facilities as per their rank, they filed an application under Right to Information Act, seeking information on the status of ration and clothing provided to the officers and officers mess etc. Respondents, in turn, informed that all the Commissioned Officers are authorized for ration as per their scales. In reply to other queries, they have simply handed over extract copy of AG/CW-2 (annexure P-9) i.e. extract of regulation 178 of the Regulations for Army (revised Edition 1987), wherein it is provided as under: “178. Status (a) The status of the JCO as such is not affected by the grant to him of the honorary rank of Lieut. or Captain, nor does the commission granting him that rank confer on him any additional powers of command. (b) Such honorary commissioned officers will take rank according to their Junior Commissioned Officers rank and will accordingly be junior to all officers. No promotion to or in the cadre of JCOs will be made in the place of a JCO granted a commission as honorary officer. (c) Similarly, the seniority of a Naib Subedar Head Clerk will not be affected by the grant of honorary rank as a Risaldar or Subedar.” 4. Perusal of aforesaid Regulation suggests that status of Junior Commissioned Officers upon whom honorary rank of Lieutenant/Captain is conferred is neither affected by such 5 conferment, nor the commission granting him that rank confers on him any additional powers of command. It further suggests that the already commissioned officers would take rank according to their JCO rank and they would be junior to all the officers. As per petitioner-association, Junior Commissioned Officers stand defined under the Army Act, 1950, which provides as under: “Section 3 (xii) \" junior commissioned officer\" means a person commissioned, gazetted or in pay as a junior commissioned officer in the regular Army or the Indian Reserve Forces, and includes a person holding a junior commission in the Indian Supplementary Reserve Forces. or the Territorial Army, 2[ who is for the time being subject to this Act; 5. Similarly, para-177 of the Regulations of Army provides about honorary officers, which is as under: “(a) JCOs who have rendered specially distinguished service, and who are serving, in the Regular Army, may be granted commissions as Honorary Officers in the rank of Captain or Lieutenant. (b) Nomination for the grant of commissions as honorary officers and for promotion to Captain of JCOs holding the commission of Honorary officer with the rank of Lieutenant will be made by the Chief of the Army Staff. (c). the ratio of honorary commissions for each Republic Day and Independence Day will be: (i). Hony. Capts. – 1 for every 4 Hony Lieuts. (ii). Hony. Lieuts – 12 for every 1000 JCOs.” 6. Case of the petitioner-association is that once they are conferred honorary commissioned rank of the officers by the Supreme Commander of Armed Forces, they are entitled to equivalent status as of Commissioned Officers. Hence, para- 178, as reproduced hereinabove, needs to be withdrawn 6 because otherwise same would be in violation of specific order as contained in aforesaid PARCHMENT, Annexure P-2. 7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records of the case carefully. 8. Close scrutiny of the documents made available on record reveals that before approaching this Court by way of instant petition, one of the members of the petitioner- association had approached the Armed Forces Tribunal by way of OA No. 2430/2012, praying therein similar reliefs as have been claimed in the present petition. Further, order dated 3.4.2014 (annexure P-27) suggests that aforesaid member withdrew the said Original Application, before the matter could be adjudicated by the Tribunal on the merits. 9. Perusal of order passed by the Tribunal clearly suggests that pursuant to Original Application filed by said member, respondents and the applicant had filed reply and replication, respectively. Aforesaid order nowhere spells out reasons, if any, for withdrawing the Original Application. Aforesaid order suggests that the applicant withdrew the Original Application to seek remedy before this Court. There is no order, if any, of the Tribunal, on merits qua the claim of the original applicant, who is admittedly a member of the petitioner- association. Hence, it can not be concluded that the Original 7 Application referred to herein above was returned by the Armed Forces Tribunal on the ground of jurisdiction. 10. Since, during the proceedings of the instant case, counsel representing the respondents raised specific issue with regard to maintainability and jurisdiction, this Court intends to take up issue of maintainability and jurisdiction, at the first instance, before proceeding to decide the case on merits. 11. It is undisputed before us that the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 (herein after referred to as ‘Act’) was assented by the President of India on 25.12.2007 and published in the Gazette of India on 28.12.2007, meaning thereby that the Act is in operation. It would be relevant to reproduce herein Section 2 of the Act: “2. Applicability of the Act :(1) The provisions of this Act shall apply to all persons subject to the army Act, 1950, (46 of 1950) the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957) and the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950) (2) This Act shall also apply to retired personnel subject to the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950) or the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957) or the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950) including their dependants, heirs and successors, in so far as it relates to their service matters.” 12. Perusal of aforesaid Section clearly suggests that the provisions of this Act apply to all the persons subject to the Army Act, 1950, the Navy Act, 1957 and the Air Force Act, 1950. It further suggests that the Act also applies to retired personnel subject to the aforesaid Acts. It also includes their dependants, heirs and successors, in so far as it relates to 8 their service matters. Close reading of Section 2 clearly suggests that the service matters relating to Army personnel, who are in active service or retired, would be adjudicated by the Armed Forces Tribunal in terms of the Act ibid. At this stage, it would be profitable to refer to the definition of ‘Service Matters’, as provided under Section 3(o) of the Act: “3. (o) “service matters”, in relation to the persons subject to the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950) the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957) and the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950) mean all matters relating to the conditions of their service and shall include— (i) remuneration (including allowances), pension and other retirement benefits; (ii) tenure, including commission, appointment, enrolment, probation, confirmation, seniority, training, promotion, reversion, premature retirement, superannuation, termination of service and penal deductions; (iii) summary disposal and trials where the punishment of dismissal is awarded; (iv) any other matter, whatsoever, but shall not include matters relating to— (i) orders issued under section 18 of the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950) sub-section (1) of section 15 of the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957) and section 18 of the Air Force Act, 1950; (45 of 1950) and (ii) transfers and postings including the change of place or unit on posting whether individually or as a part of unit, formation or ship in relation to the persons subject to the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950) the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957) and the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950); (iii) leave of any kind; (iv) summary court martial except where the punishment is of dismissal or imprisonment for more than three months; 13. Definition, as provided under Section 3 of the Act clearly provides that all the matters relating to conditions of service of Army personnel need to be adjudicated upon by the Armed Forces Tribunal in terms of the Act ibid. Section 3(o)(ii) 9 of the Act includes the matters, if any, relating to the tenure, commission, appointment and enrolment, probation, confirmation, seniority, training, promotion and reversion, premature retirement, superannuation, termination of service and penal deductions. Service matters relating to the Commission are also included in the aforesaid definition. Section 3(o)(iv) includes other matters, whatsoever, meaning thereby any matter relating to service can be adjudicated by the Armed Forces Tribunal in terms of the Act. Under section 3 of the Act, following are the matters which have not been included in the definition of ‘Service Matters’: - “(iv) any other matter, whatsoever, but shall not include matters relating to— (i) orders issued under section 18 of the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950) sub-section (1) of section 15 of the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957) and section 18 of the Air Force Act, 1950; (45 of 1950) and (ii) transfers and postings including the change of place or unit on posting whether individually or as a part of unit, formation or ship in relation to the persons subject to the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950) the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957) and the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950); (iii) leave of any kind; (iv) summary court martial except where the punishment is of dismissal or imprisonment for more than three months;” 14. Perusal of aforesaid clause suggests that the grievances put forth on behalf of the petitioner-association, as emerged from the record, fall in the category of ‘service matters’. 10 15. This Court, after bestowing thoughtful consideration on the pleadings as well as provisions of law, as have been detailed herein above, has no hesitation to conclude that the present matter is a ‘Service Matter’ and needs to be adjudicated, at the first instance, by the Armed Forces Tribunal in terms of the Act ibid, and, this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the present petition. At the cost of repetition, it may be stated that the petitioner-association is aggrieved by the action of the respondents, whereby its members are being denied certain benefits, powers and privileges, to which the members of the petitioner-association are entitled to, in terms of PARCHMENT issued by the Supreme Commander of Armed Forces i.e. President of India, whereby it has been specifically ordered that the Honorary Commissioned Officers would get full power and authority to have, hold and enjoy the honorary rank with all and singular of the privileges thereunto belonging. Since the members of the petitioner-association are claiming “service benefits” in terms of the honorary rank conferred upon them, it can be safely inferred that the instant matter is purely a service matter in terms of Section 3 of the Act. 16. In view of above, this Court is of the view that the present writ petition is not maintainable, in view of the specific mechanism provided under the Act. Moreover, 11 perusal of the relief clause, especially clause iii) itself suggests that a direction has been sought against respondents to calculate the pension of Honorary Commissioned Officers in terms of recommendations of 4th Central Pay Commission, which was allegedly equal to Commissioned Officers. Similarly, petitioner has prayed for a direction to the respondents to ensure prompt and timely restoration of facilities in medical sector, CSD Canteen and also in Mess as per their entitlement. Perusal of aforesaid reliefs leaves no doubt in the mind of the Court that these all are “service benefits”, to which an individual is entitled, in lieu of the service rendered by him in the Organization. Though, in clause i) of the reliefs, petitioner-association has prayed that respondents may be directed to withdraw extract of para-178 of the Regulations for the Army (Revised Edition 1987) being in violation to the right granted under PARCHMENT issued by the President of India, petitioner- association has nowhere laid challenge to the vires, if any, of the aforesaid provisions, rather, prayer has been made for withdrawing the para 178. This Court after perusing the provisions as contained in the Act, is of definite view that Armed Forces Tribunal has the jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the correctness, if any, of para-178 of the Regulations. 12 Otherwise also, there is no challenge to the provisions contained in para-178. 17. Having said so, this Court sees no force in the contentions put forth on behalf of the petitioner-association that the present matter needs to be adjudicated by this Court, while exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. To the contrary, this Court is of the view that the Armed Forces Tribunal has the power to decide the controversy at hand, in terms of the provisions of the Act ibid. 18. Hon'ble Apex Court has categorically held that Courts of law, while exercising jurisdiction should have due regard to the legislative intent evidenced in various statutes and exercise jurisdiction consistent therewith. In the present case also, dispute, if any, raised in the petition, can be adjudicated by the Armed Forces Tribunal and this Court has no power to exercise powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Reliance is placed on (2015) 6 SCC 773, Union of India and others v. Major General Shri Kant Sharma, wherein their Lordships of the Hon'ble Apex Court have held as under: “16. Constitution of India In this context, it is also necessary to notice Articles 32 and 33 of the Constitution. Article 32 falls under Chapter III of the Constitution which deals with fundamental right. The said article guarantees the right to move before the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the 13 enforcement of the fundamental rights conferred by the Part III. Article 32 reads as follows: \"Article 32. Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part.-(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part is guaranteed. (2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part. (3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1) and (2), Parliament may by law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2). (4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution.\" 17. Article 33 empowers the Parliament to restrict or abrogate the application of fundamental rights in relation to Armed Forces, Para Military Forces, the Police etc. (refer: Ous Kutilingal Achudan Nair vs.Union of India, (1976) 2 SCC 780). The said article reads as follows: \"Article 33. Power of Parliament to modify the rights conferred by this Part in their application to Forces, etc.-Parliament may, by law, determine to what extent any of the rights conferred by this Part shall, in their application to,- (a) the members of the Armed Forces; or (b) the members of the Forces charged with the maintenance of public order; or (c) persons employed in any bureau or other organisation established by the State for purposes of intelligence or counter intelligence; or (d) person employed in, or in connection with, the telecommunication systems set up for the purposes of any Force, bureau or organisation referred to in clauses (a) to (c), be restricted or abrogated so as to ensure the proper discharge of their duties and the maintenance of discipline among them.\" 18. Article 226 empowers High Court to issue prerogative writs. The said Article reads as under: \"Article 226. Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.- (1) Notwithstanding anything in article 32 every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises 14 jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including 1[writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warran to and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. (3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1), without- (a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order; and (b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand vacated. (4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of article 32.\" 19. Article 227 relates to power of superintendence of High Courts over all Courts and Tribunals. It reads as follows: \"Article 227. Power of superintendence over all courts by the High Court.- (1) Every High Court shall have superintendence over all courts and 15 tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. (2) Without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing provision, the High Court may- (a) call for returns from such courts; (b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and proceedings of such courts; and (c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such courts. (3) The High Court may also settle tables of fees to be allowed to the sheriff and all clerks and officers of such courts and to attorneys, advocates and pleaders practising therein: Provided that any rules made, forms prescribed or tables settled under clause (2) or clause (3) shall not be inconsistent with the provision of any law for the time being in force, and shall require the previous approval of the Governor. (4) Nothing in this article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court powers of superintendence over any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.\" 20. In this context, it is also necessary to notice Article 136 of the Constitution which provides special leave to appeal to Supreme Court: \"136. Special leave to appeal by the Supreme Court.-(1) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter, the Supreme Court may, in its discretion, grant special leave to appeal from any judgment, decree, determination, sentence or order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal in the territory of India. (2) Nothing in clause (1) shall apply to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.\" In view of clause (2) of Article 136 which expressly excludes the judgments or orders passed by any Court or Tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to Armed Forces, the aggrieved persons cannot seek leave under Article 136 of Constitution of India; to appeal from such judgment or order. But right to appeal is available under Section 30 with leave to appeal under Section 31 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007. 21. We may also refer to Article 227(4) of the Constitution, which reads as under: \"Article 227(4) Nothing in this article shall be deemed to confer on a High Court powers of superintendence over any court or tribunal 16 constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces.\" 22. Judicial review under Article 32 and 226 is a basic feature of the Constitution beyond the plea of amendability. While under Article 32 of the Constitution a person has a right to move before Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution, no fundament right can be claimed by any person to move before the High Court by appropriate proceedings under Article 226 for enforcement of the rights conferred by the Constitution or Statute. 23. In L. Chandra kumar vs. Union of India, (1997)3 SCC 261 a Bench of seven-Judge while dealing with the essential and basic features of Constitution - power of review and jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Article 226/227 and on the Supreme Court under Article 32 held as follows: \"75. In Keshav Singh, (1965) 1 SCR 413 while addressing this issue, Gajendragadkar, C.J. stated as follows: (SCC at pp. 493-494) \"129 If the power of the High Courts under Article 226 and the authority of this Court under Article 32 are not subject to any exceptions, then it would be futile to contend that a citizen cannot move the High Courts or this Court to invoke their jurisdiction even in cases where his fundamental rights have been violated. The existence of judicial power in that behalf must necessarily and inevitably postulate the existence of a right in the citizen to move the Court in that behalf; otherwise the power conferred on the High Courts and this Court would be rendered virtually meaningless. Let it not be forgotten that the judicial power conferred on the High Courts and this Court is meant for the protection of the citizens' fundamental rights, and so, in the existence of the said judicial power itself is necessarily involved the right of the citizen to appeal to the said power in a proper case.\" 76. To express our opinion on the issue whether the power of judicial review vested in the High Courts and in the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 is part of the basic structure of the Constitution, we must first attempt to understand what constitutes the basic structure of the Constitution. The doctrine of basic structure was evolved in Kesavananda Bharati case (1993 4 SCC 225). However, as already 17 mentioned, that case did not lay down that the specific and particular features mentioned in that judgment alone would constitute the basic structure of our Constitution. Indeed, in the judgments of Shelat and Grover, JJ., Hegde and Mukherjea, JJ. and Jaganmohan Reddy, J., there are specific observations to the effect that their list of essential features comprising the basic structure of the Constitution are illustrative and are not intended to be exhaustive. In Indira Gandhi case, (1975 Supp SCC 1), Chandrachud, J. held that the proper approach for a Judge who is confronted with the question whether a particular facet of the Constitution is part of the basic structure, is to examine, in each individual case, the place of the particular feature in the scheme of our Constitution, its object and purpose, and the consequences of its denial on the integrity of our Constitution as a fundamental instrument for the governance of the country. (supra at pp. 751- 752). This approach was specifically adopted by Bhagwati, J. in Minerva Mills case [(1980) 3 SCC 625] (at pp. 671-672) and is not regarded as the definitive test in this field of Constitutional Law. 77. We find that the various factors mentioned in the test evolved by Chandrachud, J. have already been considered by decisions of various Benches of this Court that have been referred to in the course of our analysis. From their conclusions, many of which have been extracted by us in toto, it appears that this Court has always considered the power of judicial review vested in the High Courts and in this Court under Articles 226 and 32 respectively, enabling legislative action to be subjected to the scrutiny of superior courts, to be integral to our constitutional scheme. While several judgments have made specific references to this aspect [Gajendragadkar, C.J. in Keshav Singh case, Beg, J. and Khanna, J. in Kesavananda Bharati [pic]case, Chandrachud, C.J. and Bhagwati, J. in Minerva Mills, Chandrachud, C.J. in Fertilizer Kamgar[(1981) 1 scc 568], K.N. Singh, J. in Delhi Judicial Service Assn. [(1991)4 scc 406], etc.] the rest have made general observations highlighting the significance of this feature.\" 24. In S.N. Mukherjee vs.Union of India, (1990)4 SCC 594, this Court noticed the special provision in regard to the members of the Armed Forces in the Constitution of India and held as follows: [pic]\" 42. Before referring to the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules it may be mentioned that the Constitution contains certain 18 special provisions in regard to members of the Armed Forces. Article 33 empowers Parliament to make law determining the extent to which any of the rights conferred by Part III shall, in their application to the members of the Armed Forces be restricted or abrogated so as to ensure the proper discharge of their duties and the maintenance of discipline amongst them. By clause (2) of Article 136 the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution has been excluded in relation to any judgment, determination, sentence or order passed or made by any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces. Similarly clause (4) of Article 227 denies to the High Courts the power of superintendence over any court or tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to the Armed Forces. This Court under Article 32 and the High Courts under Article 226 have, however, the power of judicial review in respect of proceedings of courts martial and the proceedings subsequent thereto and can grant appropriate relief if the said proceedings have resulted in denial of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution or if the said proceedings suffer from a jurisdictional error or any error of law apparent on the face of the record.\" 25. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in R.K. Jain vs. Union of India & ors., (1993) 4 SCC 119, observed: \"66. In S.P. Sampath Kumar v. Union of India this Court held that the primary duty of the judiciary is to interpret the Constitution and the laws and this would predominantly be a matter fit to be decided by the judiciary, as judiciary alone would be possessed of expertise in this field and secondly the constitutional and legal protection afforded to the citizen would become illusory, if it were left to the executive to determine the legality of its own action. The Constitution has, therefore, created an independent machinery i.e. judiciary to resolve disputes, which is vested with the power of judicial review to determine the legality of the legislative and executive actions and to ensure compliance with the requirements of law on the part of the executive and other authorities. This function is discharged by the judiciary by exercising the power of judicial review which is a most potent weapon in the hands of the judiciary for maintenance of the rule of law. The power of judicial review is an integral part of our constitutional system and without it, there will be no government of laws and the rule of law would become a teasing illusion and a promise of 19 unreality. The judicial review, therefore, is a basic and essential feature of the Constitution and it cannot be abrogated without affecting the basic structure of the Constitution. The basic and essential feature of judicial review cannot be dispensed with but it would be within the competence of Parliament to amend the Constitution and to provide alternative institutional mechanism or arrangement for judicial [pic]review, provided it is no less efficacious than the High Court. It must, therefore, be read as implicit in the constitutional scheme that the law excluding the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 permissible under it, must not leave a void but it must set up another effective institutional mechanism or authority and vest the power of judicial review in it which must be equally effective and efficacious in exercising the power of judicial review. The tribunal set up under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 was required to interpret and apply Articles 14, 15, 16 and 311 in quite a large number of cases. Therefore, the personnel manning the administrative tribunal in their determinations not only require judicial approach but also knowledge and expertise in that particular branch of constitutional and administrative law. The efficacy of the administrative tribunal and the legal input would undeniably be more important and sacrificing the legal input and not giving it sufficient weightage would definitely impair the efficacy and effectiveness of the Administrative Tribunal. Therefore, it was held that an appropriate rule should be made to recruit the members; and to consult the Chief Justice of India in recommending appointment of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Members of the Tribunal and to constitute a committee presided over by Judge of the Supreme Court to recruit the members for appointment. In M.B. Majumdar v. Union of India when the members of CAT claimed parity of pay and superannuation as is available to the Judges of the High Court, this Court held that they are not on a par with the judges but a separate mechanism created for their appointment pursuant to Article 323-A of the Constitution. Therefore, what was meant by this Court in Sampath Kumar case ratio is that the tribunals when exercise the power and functions, the Act created institutional alternative mechanism or authority to adjudicate the service disputations. It must be effective and efficacious to exercise the power of judicial review. This Court did not appear to have meant that the tribunals are 20 substitutes of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. J.B. Chopra v. Union of India merely followed the ratio of Sampath Kumar.\" 26. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court in L. Chandra and S.N. Mukherjee, we find that the power of judicial review vested in the High Court under Article 226 is one of the basic essential features of the Constitution and any legislation including Armed Forces Act, 2007 cannot override or curtail jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Basic principle for exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution: 27. In Babubhai Muljibhai Patel vs. Nandlal Khodidas Barot and others, AIR 1974 SC 2105 this Court held as follows: \"10.....Exercise of the jurisdiction is no doubt discretionary, but the discretion must be exercised on sound judicial principles. When the petition raises complex questions of fact, which may for their determination require oral evidence to be taken, and on that account the High Court is of the view that the dispute should not appropriately be tried in a writ petition, the High Court may decline to try a petition (See Gunwant Kaur v.Bhatinda Municipality, AIR 1970 SC 802). If, however,on consideration of the nature of the controversy, the High Court decides, as in the present case, that it should go into a disputed question of fact and the discretion exercised by the High Court appears to be sound and in conformity with judicial principles, this Court would not interfere in appeal with the order made by the High Court in this respect.\" 28. In Mafatlal Industries Ltd. and others vs.Union of India and others, (1997) 5 SCC 536, a nine-Judge Bench of this Court while considering the Excise Act and Customs Act held that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and this Court under Article 32 though cannot be circumscribed by the provisions of the said enactments, they will certainly have due regard to the legislative intent evidenced by the provisions of the said Acts and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the Act. This Court held: \"108. The discussion in the judgment yields the following propositions. We may forewarn that these propositions are set out merely for the sake of convenient reference and are not supposed to be exhaustive. In case of any doubt or ambiguity 21 in these propositions, reference must be had to the discussion and propositions in the body of the judgment. (i)...........While the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 - and of this Court under Article 32 - cannot be circumscribed by the provisions of the said enactments, they will certainly have due regard to the legislative intent evidenced by the [pic]provisions of the said Acts and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the Act. The writ petition will be considered and disposed of in the light of and in accordance with the provisions of Section 11-B. This is for the reason that the power under Article 226 has to be exercised to effectuate the rule of law and not for abrogating it. 29. In Kanaiyalal Lalchand and Sachdev and others vs. State of Maharasthra and others, (2011) 2 SCC 782, this Court considered the question of maintainability of the writ petition while an alternative remedy is available. This Court upheld the decision of the Bombay High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellants therein on the ground of existence of an efficacious alternative remedy under Section 17 of SARFASI Act and held: \"23. In our opinion, therefore, the High Court rightly dismissed the petition on the ground that an efficacious remedy was available to the appellants under Section 17 of the Act. It is well settled that ordinarily relief under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is not available if an efficacious alternative remedy is available to any aggrieved person. (See Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai and SBI v. Allied Chemical Laboratories7.) 24. In City and Industrial Development Corpn. v. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala this Court had observed that: (SCC p. 175, para 30) \"30. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 is duty- bound to consider whether: (a) adjudication of the writ petition involves any complex and disputed questions of facts and whether they can be satisfactorily resolved; (b) the petition reveals all material facts; (c) the petitioner has any alternative or effective remedy for the resolution of the dispute; (d) the person invoking the jurisdiction is guilty of unexplained delay and laches; (e) ex facie barred by any laws of limitation; 22 (f) grant of relief is against public policy or barred by any valid law; and host of other factors.\" 30. In Nivedita Sharma vs. Cellular Operators Association of India and others, (2011)14 SCC 337, this Court noticed that when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. The Court further noticed the previous decisions of this Court wherein the Court adverted to the rule of self- restraint that writ petition will not be entertained if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person as follows: 13. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa this Court observed: (SCC pp. 440-41, para 11) \"11. ... It is now well recognised that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of. This rule was stated with great clarity by Willes, J. in Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford in the following passage: (ER p. 495) '... There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established founded upon a statute. ... But there is a third class viz. where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it. ... The remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class. The form given by the statute must be adopted and adhered to.' The rule laid down in this passage was approved by the House of Lords in Neville v. London Express Newspapers Ltd. and has been reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant and Co. Ltd. and Secy. of State v. Mask and Co. It has also been held to be equally applicable to enforcement of rights, and has been followed by this Court throughout. The High Court was therefore justified in dismissing the writ petitions in limine.\" 14. In Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. (speaking for the majority of the larger Bench) observed: (SCC p. 607, para 77) \"77. ... So far as the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226-or for that matter, 23 the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32-is concerned, it is obvious that the provisions of the Act cannot bar and curtail these remedies. It is, however, equally obvious that while [pic]exercising the power under Article 226/Article 32, the Court would certainly take note of the legislative intent manifested in the provisions of the Act and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the enactment.\" 15. In the judgments relied upon by Shri Vaidyanathan, which, by and large, reiterate the proposition laid down in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad, it has been held that an alternative remedy is not a bar to the entertaining of writ petition filed for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights or where there has been a violation of the principles of natural justice or where the order under challenge is wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of the statute is under challenge. 16. It can, thus, be said that this Court has recognised some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy. However, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal v. Supt. of Taxes8 and other similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the field.\" 31. In Southern Electricity Supply Co. of Orissa Ltd vs. Sri Seetaram Rice Mill, (2012) 2 SCC 108, a three- Judge Bench held: \"80. It is a settled canon of law that the High Court would not normally interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India where statutory alternative remedy is available. It is equally settled that this canon of law is not free of exceptions. The courts, including this Court, have taken the view that the statutory remedy, if provided under a specific [pic]law, would impliedly oust the jurisdiction of the civil courts. The High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can entertain writ or appropriate proceedings despite availability of an alternative remedy. This jurisdiction, the High Court would exercise with some circumspection in exceptional cases, particularly, where the cases involve a pure question of law or vires of an Act are challenged. This class of cases we are 24 mentioning by way of illustration and should not be understood to be an exhaustive exposition of law which, in our opinion, is neither practical nor possible to state with precision. The availability of alternative statutory or other remedy by itself may not operate as an absolute bar for exercise of jurisdiction by the courts. It will normally depend upon the facts and circumstances of a given case. The further question that would inevitably come up for consideration before the Court even in such cases would be as to what extent the jurisdiction has to be exercised. 81. Should the courts determine on merits of the case or should they preferably answer the preliminary issue or jurisdictional issue arising in the facts of the case and remit the matter for consideration on merits by the competent authority? Again, it is somewhat difficult to state with absolute clarity any principle governing such exercise of jurisdiction. It always will depend upon the facts of a given case. We are of the considered view that interest of administration of justice shall be better subserved if the cases of the present kind are heard by the courts only where they involve primary questions of jurisdiction or the matters which go to the very root of jurisdiction and where the authorities have acted beyond the provisions of the Act. However, it should only be for the specialised tribunal or the appellate authorities to examine the merits of assessment or even the factual matrix of the case.\" 32. In Cicily Kallarackal vs. Vehicle Factory 2012(8) SCC 524, the Division Bench of this Court held: \"4. Despite this, we cannot help but state in absolute terms that it is not appropriate for the High Courts to entertain writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against the orders passed by the Commission, as a statutory appeal is provided and lies to this Court under the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Once the legislature has provided for a [pic]statutory appeal to a higher court, it cannot be proper exercise of jurisdiction to permit the parties to bypass the statutory appeal to such higher court and entertain petitions in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Even in the present case, the High Court has not exercised its jurisdiction in accordance with law. The case is one of improper exercise of jurisdiction. It is not expected of us to deal with this issue at any greater length as we are dismissing this petition on other grounds. XXX XXX XXX XXX 25 9. ........, we hereby make it clear that the orders of the Commission are incapable of being questioned under the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, as a statutory appeal in terms of Section 27-A(1)(c) lies to this Court. Therefore, we have no hesitation in issuing a direction of caution that it will not be a proper exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts to entertain writ petitions against such orders of the Commission.\" 33. Another Division Bench of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax and others vs. Chhabil Dass Agrawal, (2014)1 SCC 603 held: \"11. Before discussing the fact proposition, we would notice the principle of law as laid down by this Court. It is settled law that non- entertainment of petitions under writ jurisdiction by the High Court when an efficacious alternative remedy is available is a rule of self-imposed limitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Undoubtedly, it is within the discretion of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226 despite the existence of an alternative remedy. However, the High Court must not interfere if there is an adequate efficacious alternative remedy available to the petitioner and he has approached the High Court without availing the same unless he has made out an exceptional case warranting such interference or there exist sufficient grounds to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. (See State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh, Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and State of H.P. v. Gujarat Ambuja Cement Ltd. 12. The Constitution Benches of this Court in K.S. Rashid and Son v. Income Tax Investigation Commission, Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Union of India v. T.R. Varma, State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh2 and K.S. Venkataraman and Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Madras have held that though Article 226 confers very wide powers in the matter of issuing writs on the High Court, the remedy of writ is absolutely discretionary in character. If the High Court is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere, it can refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. The Court, in extraordinary circumstances, may exercise the power if it comes to the conclusion that there has been a breach of the principles of natural justice or the procedure required for decision has not been adopted. [See N.T. Veluswami Thevar v. G. Raja Nainar, Municipal 26 [pic]Council, Khurai v. Kamal Kumar, Siliguri Municipality v. Amalendu Das, S.T. Muthusami v. K. Natarajan, Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant, Kerala SEB v. Kurien E. Kalathil, A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan, L.L. Sudhakar Reddy v. State of A.P., Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj) Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha v. State of Maharashtra, Pratap Singh v. State of Haryana and GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. ITO.] 13. In Nivedita Sharma v. Cellular Operators Assn. of India, this Court has held that where hierarchy of appeals is provided by the statute, the party must exhaust the statutory remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction for relief and observed as follows: (SCC pp. 343-45, paras 12- 14) \"12. In Thansingh Nathmal v. Supt. of Taxes this Court adverted to the rule of self-imposed restraint that the writ petition will not be entertained if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and observed: (AIR p. 1423, para 7) '7. ... The High Court does not therefore act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by the statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the machinery created under the statute to be bypassed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up.' 13. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa this Court observed: (SCC pp. 440-41, para 11) '11. ... It is now well recognised that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of. This rule was stated with great clarity by Willes, J. in Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford in the following passage: (ER p. 495) xxx xxx xxx xxx 27 14. In Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. (speaking for the majority of the larger Bench) observed: (SCC p. 607, para 77) '77. ... So far as the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226-or for that matter, the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32-is concerned, it is obvious that the provisions of the Act cannot bar and curtail these remedies. It is, however, equally obvious that while exercising the power under Article 226/Article 32, the Court would certainly take note of the legislative intent manifested in the provisions of the Act and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the enactment.'\" (See G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd., CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd., Ramendra Kishore Biswas v. State of Tripura, Shivgonda Anna Patil v. State of Maharashtra, C.A. Abraham v. ITO, Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, Excise and Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath and Sons, Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, [pic]Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd. v. State of Bihar, Sheela Devi v. Jaspal Singh and Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan.) 15. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognised some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy i.e. where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal case, Titaghur Paper Mills case and other similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the field. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation.\" 34. Statutory Remedy In Union of India vs. Brigadier P.S. Gill, (2012) 4 SCC 463, this Court while dealing with appeals under Section 30 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act following the procedure prescribed under Section 31 and its maintainability, held as follows: \"8. Section 31 of the Act extracted above specifically provides for an appeal to the Supreme 28 Court but stipulates two distinct routes for such an appeal. The first route to this Court is sanctioned by the Tribunal granting leave to file such an appeal. Section 31(1) in no uncertain terms forbids grant of leave to appeal to this Court unless the Tribunal certifies that a point of law of general public importance is involved in the decision. This implies that Section 31 does not create a vested, indefeasible or absolute right of filing an appeal to this Court against a final order or decision of the Tribunal to this Court. Such an appeal must be preceded by the leave of the Tribunal and such leave must in turn be preceded by a certificate by the Tribunal that a point of law of general public importance is involved in the appeal. 9. The second and the only other route to access this Court is also found in Section 31(1) itself. The expression \"or it appears to the Supreme Court [pic]that the point is one which ought to be considered by that Court\" empowers this Court to permit the filing of an appeal against any such final decision or order of the Tribunal. 10. A conjoint reading of Sections 30 and 31 can lead to only one conclusion viz. there is no vested right of appeal against a final order or decision of the Tribunal to this Court other than those falling under Section 30(2) of the Act. The only mode to bring up the matter to this Court in appeal is either by way of certificate obtained from the Tribunal that decided the matter or by obtaining leave of this Court under Section 31 for filing an appeal depending upon whether this Court considers the point involved in the case to be one that ought to be considered by this Court. 11. An incidental question that arises is: whether an application for permission to file an appeal under Section 31 can be moved directly before the Supreme Court without first approaching the Tribunal for a certificate in terms of the first part of Section 31(1) of the Act? 12. In the ordinary course the aggrieved party could perhaps adopt one of the two routes to bring up the matter to this Court but that does not appear to be the legislative intent evident from Section 31(2) (supra). A careful reading of the section shows that it not only stipulates the period for making an application to the Tribunal for grant of leave to appeal to this Court but also stipulates the period for making an application to this Court for leave of this Court to file an appeal against the said order which is sought to be challenged. 13. It is significant that the period stipulated for filing an application to this Court starts running 29 from the date beginning from the date the application made to the Tribunal for grant of certificate is refused by the Tribunal. This implies that the aggrieved party cannot approach this Court directly for grant of leave to file an appeal under Section 31(1) read with Section 31(2) of the Act. 14. The scheme of Section 31 being that an application for grant of a certificate must first be moved before the Tribunal, before the aggrieved party can approach this Court for the grant of leave to file an appeal. The purpose underlying the provision appears to be that if the Tribunal itself grants a certificate of fitness for filing an appeal, it would be unnecessary for the aggrieved party to approach this Court for a leave to file such an appeal. An appeal by certificate would then be maintainable as a matter of right in view of Section 30 which uses the expression \"an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court\". That appears to us to be the true legal position on a plain reading of the provisions of Sections 30 and 31.\" 35. Thus, we find that though under Section 30 no person has a right of appeal against the final order or decision of the Tribunal to this Court other than those falling under Section 30(2) of the Act, but it is statutory appeal which lies to this Court. 36. The aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court can be summarised as follows: (i) The power of judicial review vested in the High Court under Article 226 is one of the basic essential features of the Constitution and any legislation including Armed Forces Act, 2007 cannot override or curtail jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.(Refer: L. Chandra and S.N. Mukherjee). (ii) The jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 and this Court under Article 32 though cannot be circumscribed by the provisions of any enactment, they will certainly have due regard to the legislative intent evidenced by the provisions of the Acts and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the Act.(Refer: Mafatlal Industries Ltd.). (iii) When a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation. (Refer: Nivedita Sharma). (iv) The High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the 30 action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance. (Refer: Nivedita Sharma). 19. In view of the discussion made herein above, the present petition is dismissed alongwith pending applications, if any. However, petitioner-association is at liberty to approach appropriate forum, in accordance with law, for the redressal of the grievances as highlighted in the present petition. (Mansoor Ahmad Mir) Chief Justice (Sandeep Sharma) Judge October 20, 2016 (Vikrant) "