M/S.HOTEL ALAKANANDA & ANOTHER V. THE COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER & OTHERS

WA/1861/2007

AI Insights

The case revolves around the interpretation and application of Section 7(b) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963, which was amended by the Kerala Finance Act, 2006, with retrospective effect from July 1, 2006. The primary legal questions were whether this amended provision could be applied to dealers who had previously opted for a compounded tax scheme under the unamended Section 7, and whether the amended provisions violated Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India. The court examined the legislative intent, the structure of the amended provision, and its application in the context of the tax paid by the dealers in the preceding years.

• Counselvise Citation: [2018] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 732861 (HC-KERALA)
• Appeal Type: Others
• Pronouncement Date: 03-01-2018
• Assessment Year: misc
• Other Referred Cases: Civil Appeal No.2936 of 2009, M/s. Varkisons Engineers vs. State of Kerala, Commissioner of Sales tax, U.P. vs. Modi Sugar Mills Ltd., State of Kerala vs. Alex George, Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Wealth Tax (Central), Krishnamurthi and Co. vs. State of Madras, Entertainment Tax Officer-I vs. Ambae Picture Palace, Mycon Construction Ltd. vs. State of Karnataka, Builders Association of India vs. State of Kerala, Commissioner of Income tax (Central), Calcutta vs. Moon Mills Ltd.
• Laws Referred To: Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963
• Result in Favour of: Revenue
• Court: HIGH COURT
• Department Lawyers: C K GOVINDAN
• Assessee Lawyers: A VASUDEVAN; JOSE JOSEPH
• Keywords: Legal fiction; Retrospective amendment; Turnover Tax; Compounding tax
• Section: 7-B

Judgement Text

" IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT: THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.R.RAMACHANDRA MENON & THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE ANU SIVARAMAN WEDNESDAY, THE 3RD DAY OF JANUARY 2018 / 13TH POUSHA, 1939 WA.No. 1861 of 2007 ------------------ WP(C) 16110/2007 of THIS HON'BLE COURT ------------ APPELLANT/PETITIONERS : --------------------- 1 M/S.HOTEL ALAKANANDA MAIN ROAD, PARIPPALLY-, KOLLAM, REPRESENTED BY MR.ARAVINDHAKSHAN,PARTNER. 2 D.RAJ KUMAR,AGED 45 YEARS, S/O. DAMODARAN,, CHATHANNOOR P.O. KOLLAM, RESIDING AT KOCHUVILAYIL PALACE ROAD, KOLLAM WEST VILLAGE, KOLLAM. BY ADVS.SRI.A.SUDHI VASUDEVAN (SR.) SRI.JOSE JONES JOSEPH RESPONDENTS : ----------- 1. THE COMMERCIAL TAX OFFICER DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCIAL TAXES,CHATHANNOOR. 2. THE COMMISSIONER OF COMMERCIAL TAXES PUBLIC BUILDING, MUSEUM JUNCTION, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM-695 033. 3. THE STATE OF KERALA REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT TAXES DEPARTMENT SECRETARIAT, THIRUVANANTHAPURAM. BY SPL.GOVERNMENT PLEADER SRI.C.K.GOVINDAN THIS WRIT APPEAL HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 13/10/2017, ALONG WITH WA 1861/2007 AND CONNECTED CASES,THE COURT ON 03-01-2018 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: bp [CASE REPORTABLE] P.R. RAMACHANDRA MENON & ANU SIVARAMAN, JJ. .............................................................................. W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 & W.P.(C)Nos.9733, 9783,10172, 10758, 11004, 11048, 11297, 11492 11561, 11854, 11956 &, 13680 of 2007 & 19972 of 2009 & 35105 of 2010 & 1586, 11694 & 9126 of 2011 & 10608, 11593, 11637 & 12528 of 2012 & 9568, 10422, 12178, 24362 & 25089 of 2013 & 8309, 8388 & 8577 of 2014 & 35060 of 2015 & 11252 of 2016 ......................................................................... Dated this the 3rd January, 2018 JUDGMENT P.R. Ramachandra Menon, J. Whether Section 7(b) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 (for short KGST Act), introduced on 24.10.2006 with retrospective effect from 01.07.2006, could be applied to those dealers who had contracted for payment of turnover tax at the compounded rate (by way of the alternate method of taxation provided for), under the W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 2 unamended Section 7 of the 1963 Act for the assessment year 2006- 07? Whether Section 7(a) and 7(b) of the 1963 Act operate in different spheres and if not, would the the said amended provision violate Article 14 and Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India as contended in the writ petition? These are the two questions framed by the Apex Court, while disposing of Civil Appeal No.2936 of 2009(arising from SLP(C)19982 of 2007) and connected matters as per the order dated 23.04.2009, while setting aside the verdict dated 28.09.2007 passed by a Division Bench of this Court, for fresh consideration in accordance with law. 2. W.A.No.1865 of 2007 (arising from W.P(C)No.8711 of 2007) is treated as the lead case. Mr. Sudhi Vasudevan , the learned Sr. Counsel led the arguments on behalf of the appellants/writ petitioners, supported by other learned lawyers appearing for the other appellants/writ petitioners. The arguments on behalf of the State/Department were putforth by Mr. Govindan , the learned Spl. Government Pleader (Taxes). 3. The pleadings and proceedings are referred to as given W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 3 in W.A.No.1865 of 2007, except where it is separately dealt with, based on the context. At the very outset , it is to be noted that there is not much controversy on the facts. The issue involves pure legal questions, particularly with regard to the scope of Section 7(b) of the Act, which was introduced by the Kerala Finance Act, 2006 (Act 22 of 2006) incorporating an amendment to the existing provision on 24.10.2006, retrospectively w.e.f. 01.07.2006 [the date on which the Bill was introduced in the Legislature]. 4. The assessees were running Bar Hotels in Kerala, which were not having 'Three Star Status' or above and they were satisfying tax in terms of Section 5(2) of the KGST Act till 2005. The said statute was amended on 28.08.2005 as per Annexure A1, whereby a provision for satisfying tax as an alternate method, by way of compounding, was introduced for the first time w.e.f. 01.04.2005. As per the said provision, an option was given to the assessees to pay Turn Over Tax at the rate specified W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 4 under Section 5(2) of the KGST Act on the turn over of Foreign Liquor calculated at: (a): 140% of the purchase price of such liquor in the case of those situated within the area of Municipal Corporation/Municipal Council/cantonment; and (b): at the rate of 135% in the case of those situated in any other place, as given under Section 7. It is stated that the assessees were satisfying the tax accordingly, availing the benefit under the compounding provision. 5. While so, as per the Finance Act, 2006, Section 7 was amended, whereby the existing rates in respect of the fields covered by (a) and (b) were grouped together as (a) and a new provision was introduced as (b), after adding the word “OR” to the former and stipulating that: (b) at 115% of the highest Turn Over Tax payable by it , as conceded in the return or accounts or the turn over tax paid for any of the previous consecutive three W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 5 years , whichever is higher. Pursuant to the above amendment, the modalities as to how it was to be given effect to in a proper manner, was explained by the Commissioner, Dept. of Commercial Taxes, Thiruvananthapuram, by issuing Ext.P2 Circular (Circular bearing No.44/06) pointing out that the tax under both the Heads (a) and (b) were to be separately worked out and the 'higher amount' shall be reckoned as the proper compounding tax for the assessment year in question. As per clause (5) of said Circular, taking note of the fact that the option for compounding for the year 2006-07 in accordance with the pre-amended provision of the Act was filed and accepted, such dealers were found eligible to pay tax in accordance with the pre-amended provisions only upto 30.06.2006, (observing that there could be no promissory estoppel against the statute); however giving a chance to the said dealers to opt out of the new compounding Scheme, in accordance with the amended provision effective from 01.07.2006 by filing fresh option. W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 6 6. Based on the above Circular, Ext.P1 notice was issued to the appellant/assessee, pointing out that there was some deficit in the compounded tax satisfied by the assessee and hence the differential portion was required to be satisfied; to be in conformity with the amended provisions of the Statute. This made the assessee to feel aggrieved, who approached this Court by filing W.P(C) 8711 of 2007 with the following prayers: “i) to call for the records leading to Exhibit P2 circular and quash the same by issuing a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, direction or order, ii)to call for the records leading to Exhibit P1 Notice and quash the same by issuing a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, direction or order; iii) to declare that the petitioners are entitled to pay tax at the rate prescribed in Clause (a) of Section 7 of the KGST Act of the purchase of liquor during the assessment year 2006-07, namely 140% or 135% as the case may be. iv) To declare that amended provisions of Section 7(a) and (b) of the KGST Act have no retrospective operation in the case of those who have paid compounded tax for the assessment year 2006-2007 before the amendment was W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 7 published. (v)to stay the recovery of the amount in pursuance of Exhibit P1 notice till the disposal of this writ petition. (vi) to grant such other relief as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit on the facts and in the circumstances of the case.“ 7. It is pointed out from the part of the State that since similar disputes were raised by other assessees as well and since there was no disputed question of fact, but for the challenge against the legal provision and the course sought to be pursued by the Department, a counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the State/Department in W.P(C)8696 of 2007 [W.A.No.1877 OF 2007 filed challenging the judgment therein stands dismissed as not pressed, today] and the same was sought to be relied on in the other cases as well. After hearing both the sides, the learned Single Judge passed a common verdict on 30.05.2007, holding that the petitioners had no right to challenge the amendment, because the scheme of payment of tax at the compounded rate was only optional and that there was no room for any controversy in W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 8 determination of the sales turn over. It was also observed that the entire liquor supplied to the assessees was by the Beverages Corporation-a Govt. of Kerala Undertaking and that the details of sales of liquor were made available by the said Undertaking to the Department/officers concerned. As such, there could be no dispute on the assessees' purchase turn over and if the assessees wanted to settle the liability under the compounding scheme, the tax should be paid at the prescribed rate on the purchase Turn Over. On the other hand, if the petitioners did not want to remit the tax at the compounded rate, they were free to remit the turnover tax on the sales turnover determined by way of assessment proceedings under Section 5(2) of the KGST Act. Observing that the amendment was to have effect only from 01.07.2006, the learned Single Judge held that the assessees were entitled to enjoy the compounding facility as per the unamended provision till that day and thereafter, it shall be as modified by the amendment from 01.07.2006. W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 9 8. Interpreting the scope of the Section 7(a) and 7(b), the learned Single Judge illustrated the manner of calculation to be pursued, in paragraph 2 of the verdict, which is extracted below: “(1) Find out the purchase turnover of liquor of the bar hotel and determine the turnover tax liability at the rate provided under Section 5(2) of the Act on 140% or 135% of the purchase price depending on whether the bar hotel is located in a Municipal area or in a non-Municipal area. (2) Verify the returns and details of payment of turnover tax on liquor by the bar hotel in the three years immediately preceding 2006-2007 and find out the highest turnover tax payable or paid in any of the said preceding years. (3) Compare the amount of tax determined under Clause (1) with 115% of the turnover tax payable or paid as found in clause (2) and adopt the higher amount as the turnover tax liability for payment for the year 2006-2007.” 9. It was in the said circumstance that the learned Single Judge held that the clarification issued by the Commissioner, as per Ext.P2 Circular was not necessary to determine the tax liability (as interpreted by the Court) and hence it was not W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 10 necessary to consider the challenge against the said clarification. It was also made clear that the tax payable under clause (b) of Section 7, after the amendment, should not be reckoned with reference to the assessed Turnover tax contested in appeal or any other proceedings and that 115% of the highest turnover tax to be reckoned for the three years would be the turnover tax payable, based on the returns filed or the accounts maintained or the tax paid on assessment without any contest and if contested , the tax ultimately sustained as and when the assessment order would become final. The learned Single Judge was also generous enough to hold that, since the writ petitions were pending for quite sometime, the petitioners/assessees should be given an opportunity to pay the arrears of tax without interest either under the revised compounding scheme or to file regular returns and remit the differential tax if any, for which time was granted till 31.07.2007, to exercise 'fresh option' and file returns and remit the tax either under the revised compounding scheme or based W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 11 on the sales turn over. It was further made clear that, if upto date arrears in accordance with the returns were paid on or before 31.07.2007, no interest under Section 23(3) or Section 23(3A) should be charged for the belated payment of tax. 10. The above judgment, particularly as to granting of a chance to exercise 'fresh option' and as to 'waiver of the interest' under Section 23(3) or 23(3A) was never chosen to be challenged by the State. But the assessees/writ petitioners felt aggrieved, who approached the Division Bench of this Court by filing W.A.1865 of 2007 and connected cases . The matter was heard in detail and the Division Bench, as per common judgment dated 28.09.2007, held that there was no merit in the appeals and they were dismissed. However, after pronouncement of the judgment, based on the submission made on behalf of the assessees to grant permission either to opt for compounding under the new provision of law or in the alternative, to permit them to request the assessing authority to complete the W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 12 assessment as provided under the unamended charging provision, it was found reasonable, whereby the right to exercise 'option' within one month from 28.09.2007, the date of judgment, was granted accordingly. 11. It is seen that the assessees were still aggrieved, who sought to challenge the said verdict by approaching the Apex Court by filing SLPs and on granting leave, the matters were numbered as Civil Appeals, which were heard and remanded, referring to the course pursued in a similar matter (M/s. Varkisons Engineers vs. State of Kerala and another [SLP(C)No.1471 of 2008] for re-consideration, as per order dated 23.04.2009. It was accordingly, that the common judgment passed by the Division Bench on 28.09.2007 was set aside, framing the two questions to be dealt with by this Court, as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment. 12. The main contention raised on behalf of the appellants/petitioners is that the assessees had opted for W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 13 compounding, based on the provision as it was existing on the first day of the commencement of the assessment year , i.e. on 01.04.2006, which was accepted by the Department . As it stands so, the subsequent amendment brought about w.e.f. 01.07.2006 cannot in any manner be applied to the case of the assessees for the year 2006-07. It is further contended that Clause (b) of Section 7 operates in a different sphere, than the field governed by Clause (a) of Section 7 and as such, there cannot be any instance to compare the tax to be worked out under Section 7(a) and the quantum payable under Section 7(b). It is pointed out that, to work out the figures under Clause (b) of Section 7, accounts have to be maintained, which is totally alien to the concept of 'compounding' as the purpose of the 'compounding' itself is to relieve the assessee from the duty to maintain the accounts. It is contended that no machinery to work out the tax under Clause 7(b) is provided by the Legislature, which in fact has been contributed only by the W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 14 Commissioner as per Ext.P2 Circular, which cannot be a substitute to the legal provision. It is also pointed out that, interpretation of a provision in a taxing statute is to be strict and there is no room for any equity principle or that the lacuna, if any, cannot be filled up either by the Executive or by the Court. If there is any doubt or confusion, the benefit has to go to the assessee, submits the learned Counsel. Reliance is sought to be placed on the verdict passed by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Commissioner of Sales tax, U.P. vs. Modi Sugar Mills Ltd. AIR 1961 SC 1047 (paragraphs 11 and 13). 13. In support of the contention that the amendment/enhancement of the rate of tax during the middle of the assessment year cannot be applied to the year in question, but for the next year, is sought to be substantiated with reference to the dictum in State of Kerala vs. Alex George and another [AIR 2005 SC 1224](paragraphs 23 and 24). Reference is also made to the verdict of the Apex Court in W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 15 Kesoram Industries and Cotton Mills Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Wealth Tax (Central) [1966 KHC 616 = AIR 1966 SC 1370]. It is contended by the learned counsel that, Section 7(b) of the Act gives three options to the assessee and that the term “highest” stipulated therein is to be reckoned with reference to the amounts shown in the return or in the accounts or the tax paid and that the said provision does not enable the State/Department to have a comparison between the clauses (a) and (b) of Section 7 and to reckon the higher amount between (a) and (b). The learned counsel also points out that the terms “whichever is higher” stipulated under Section 7(b) are to be confined to the circumstances mentioned under Section 7(b) itself and it does not enable the State/Department to make a comparison with the figures worked out under Section 7(a). 14. Another argument putforth on behalf of the assessees is that the alternate method of satisfaction of tax under the 'compounding scheme' is on the basis of a fiction as to the W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 16 turnover introduced by the statute/KGST Act. Such a provision cannot be changed by the Finance Act, it being a substantial provision. According to the assessees, only the rate of tax alone can be changed by the Finance Act. According to the learned counsel, two fictions have been brought about by way of Section 7(a) and 7(b) and the latter has been introduced as per the Finance Act 2006, which is not permissible. The fiction created by the statute/KGST Act under Section 7(a) is definite and workable which can immediately/easily be understood by the assessees; whereas the fiction now created as per the amendment by way of Section 7(b) is not clearly understandable and is quite obscure. When fiction is created, only one fiction can be there, which cannot be enlarged by another fiction. Support is sought to be drawn from the observations of the Apex Court in Commissioner of Income tax (Central), Calcutta vs. Moon Mills Ltd. [AIR 1966 SC 870] (paragraph 8). Fiction has to be certain and it shall not lead to any mind boggling exercise . It is W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 17 pointed out that Section 7(b) of the Act does not provide for any 'machinery' to work out the figures, which is stipulated for the first time by the Commissioner as per Ext.P2 Circular and thereafter by the learned Single Judge, which is not legally permissible under any circumstance. 15. The learned counsel for the assessees addressed the Court, also with reference to the legal provisions under the Income Tax Act and the verdicts rendered by the Apex Court with reference to the position under other similar statutes as well. It is pointed out that, under the Income Tax Act, the 'unit of assessment' is the 'whole year' and the position as it existed on first day of April of the assessment year has to be reckoned; adding that the amendment brought about thereafter cannot have any application to the said assessment year. Even though the position is different in respect of the 'unit of assessment' under the KGST Act (for regular assessment), it is rather similar to the Income Tax Act, when it comes to the 'Compounding W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 18 Scheme', where the basis has to be the 'whole year'. There is no machinery to compute the liability in two different ways in a single financial year, i.e. upto 01.07.2006 on one hand and thereafter from 01.07.2006 on the other hand. In the absence of any machinery provided by the Legislature in the KGST Act itself (Section 7(b)), no bifurcation of the assessment year is stated as possible. Reliance is sought to be placed on the verdict passed by a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in The Karimtharuvi Tea Estate Ltd. vs. State of Kerala [AIR 1966 SC 1385 ] (para 6 onwards) and AIR 1961 SC 1047 (paragraph 13) (cited supra) pointing out that, though retrospective amendment of the rate of tax is possible under a Taxing Statute, necessary 'machinery' had to be supplied by the Legislature in the statutory provision itself, but for which it can be applied only from the next year onwards. Support is sought to be drawn also from the verdict passed by the Apex Court in AIR 2005 SC 1224 (paragraphs 12, 13, 15 and 16) (cited supra). Towards the end of W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 19 the submissions, the learned counsel points out that the 'compounding' opted by the assessees is on the basis of a contract governed by the provisions of the Indian Contract Act (Central Legislation). Since the proposal has been accepted, the terms cannot be changed thereafter unilaterally, in view of the mandate under Section 5 or 6 of the Contract Act (which provide the circumstances under which modification is possible). By virtue of the amendment brought about by the State, inconsistency has been resulted between the Central Statute and the State enactment, resulting in violation of the Article 251 of the Constitution of India. It is also pointed out that the amendment/course pursued by the State /Department is not sustainable on equity as well and that the same has got a cascading effect, which requires to be intercepted by this Court. 16. The main argument advanced by the learned Spl. Govt. Pleader (Taxes) is that, satisfaction of tax by way of 'compounding' is only optional and that there is no compulsion at W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 20 all, by virtue of which, the provisions for compounding cannot be challenged by the assessees. Since the compounding provision was introduced only as per the Finance Act 2005, the assessees, till such time, were governed by regular assessment under Section 5 and they were very much aware of the tax payable/paid by them for the preceding three years, 2002- 03.2003-04 and 2004-05. This being the position, there is absolutely no confusion under Section 7(b) of the Act in calculating the amount and the contention raised to the contrary has no basis at all. It is also pointed out that, even if a dealer or assessee opts for compounding, by virtue of the mandate under the relevant provisions of law, all dealers/assessees shall file returns every month and if not filed, it is open for the assessing officer to effect assessment even on a monthly basis. 17. According to the learned Govt. Pleader, Section 3 of the KGST Act authorises the Board of Revenue (which duty is now being performed by the Commissioner) to issue necessary W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 21 directions to give effect to the provisions of the Act and it was accordingly, that Ext.P2 Circular was issued on 27.11.2006 to regulate the procedure. It is pointed out that the Circular does not amend or alter the statutory provisions under the Act/Rules, but for clearly mentioning the procedure to be followed. The learned Single Judge has only interpreted the scope of the provision, i.e. Section 7(b), which alone has been done by the Commissioner as well, while issuing Ext.P2 . Even otherwise, the learned Single Judge has given a chance to the assessees to submit 're-option' and such a chance is mentioned in Clause (5) of Exhibit P2 Circular as well. Despite the chance given by the learned Single Judge and also by the Division Bench of this Court, it was never made use of by the assessees and as such, no further relief is liable to be extended to them. 18. With reference to Rule 30 of the KGST Rules, the learned Spl.Govt. Pleader points out that a specific procedure is mentioned there, as to the course to be followed on submitting W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 22 an application for compounding, which has to be in Form No.21. Such application has to be filed on or before the 30th of April, under Rule 30(2)(iii). On obtaining sanction/preliminary order, return has to be filed in Form No.9, showing the statement of purchases, invoices, dates etc., also effecting monthly payment of tax at the compounded rate. If wrong particulars are given and any lesser tax is paid, on inspection, all other normal procedure/consequences will follow, which has to be based on the accounts to be maintained by every dealer. On compounding, the ordeal of regular assessment can be avoided by the dealer, which does not mean that the dealer is not bound to maintain accounts or file returns or that he can satisfy tax without any regard to the actual facts and figures. It is pointed out by the learned Govt. Pleader that, by virtue of the verdict passed by a learned Judge of this Court in Prakash Jewellery and another vs. State of Kerala [2014 (12) KTR 543](paragraph 3), the rate of tax means, as modified by the Finance Act, which dictum W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 23 has been approved by a Division Bench of this Court in the writ appeal preferred therefrom. It is also pointed out that, as per the verdict passed by another learned single Judge in Sasi vs. the Commercial Tax Officer [2010 (1)KLT 661] (para 4), rate fixed for compounding can be varied during the middle of the year in view of the Circular issued in this regard, which has been upheld by a Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.284 of 2010. Once the dealer has opted for compounding, he cannot turn back to have regular assessment, in view of the law declared by a Division Bench of this Court in Zodiac (M/s) vs. Commissioner of Commercial Taxes [2011(3)KHC 332 (DB)]. 19. The learned Govt.Pleader seeks to place reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Krishnamurthi and Co. vs. State of Madras and another [(1973) 31 STC 190] as to the legislative power and scope for interference. Reference is made to the verdict of the Apex Court in Entertainment Tax W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 24 Officer-I and another vs. Ambae Picture Palace [1995(96)STC 338], with regard to the retrospective effect of the amendment. The scope of option submitted by the dealer/assessee is sought to be asserted with reference to the verdict passed by the Apex Court in Mycon Construction Ltd. vs. State of Karnataka and another [2002 (127) STC 105] (paragraphs 15, 16 and 17). Referring to the procedure to be followed in cases involving 'compounding', the learned Govt. Pleader points out that, on acceptance of the option for compounding, a provisional order/sanction will be given; based on which, monthly return has to be filed by the assessee, giving the particulars as prescribed, also satisfying the requisite extent of tax. The actual amount can be worked out only by the end of the financial year, upon which a formal assessment would be passed under the compounding provision as to the actual tax on compounding, giving the total monthly tax paid and the deficit if any, to be cleared by the assessee. Placing reliance on State of W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 25 Kerala and another vs. Builders Association of India and others [AIR 1997 SC 3640], the learned Govt. Pleader points out that compounding is only 'optional' and as such, no challenge against the provision is maintainable. It is also pointed out that there is absolutely no ambiguity in Section 7(b) and that the 'machinery' is discernible from the said provision itself; adding that Ext.P2 Circular only explains the said position and nothing more. The crux of the judicial precedents in this field is only to the effect that the amendment of the rate during the middle of the year is not possible; unless the 'machinery' is stipulated by the Legislature. In so far as the 'machinery' provided is discernible from Section 7(b) itself and further since the procedure is clearly spelt out by the Commissioner as per Ext.P2 Circular issued in exercise of the power under Section 3 of the KGST Act, there is nothing irregula, much less illegal. No prejudice has been caused to the assessees, as chance for 're- option' is given even as per Clause (5) of Ext.P2 Circular and also W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 26 by the learned Single Judge, which was extended by the Division Bench as well. Referring to paragraph 4 of the Statement dated 16.08.2007 filed in the Writ Appeal, the learned Govt. Pleader submits that the circumstance under which the amendment was brought about is clear from the 'Budget Speech' and as such there is nothing wrong in having issued Ext.P2 Circular, to explain what was intended under Section 7(b) of the Act (brought in as per the amendment). Reliance is sought to be placed on 1994(104) STC 134 (cited supra) as well, pointing out that the provision for compounding is only 'optional' and that there is no basis for the challenge with reference to the option to be exercised 20. The learned counsel for the assessees submits in reply, that the verdicts passed by the Division Bench of this Court in W.A.No.284 of 2010 (affirming 2010 (1)KLT 661), in STR 33 of 2014, in WP(C)12429 of 14 and in STR 59 of 2012 are having no application to the case in hand. It is reiterated that the W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 27 words “or”/”whichever is higher” appearing in Section 7(b) are disjunctive and not conjunctive. For answering the questions framed by the Apex Court, with reference to the scope and mandate of the amended provision ,i.e. Section 7(b) of the KGST Act, it will be worthwhile to examine the compounding provision as it existed prior to 01.07.2006 and the position that remains after the amendment i.e. from 01.07.2006. Section 7 as it stood earlier, i.e. before the amendment reads as follows: . “S.7: “Payment of tax at compounded rates: Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) of Section 5, any bar attached hotel, not being a star hotel of and above three star hotel, heritage hotel or club, may at its option, instead of paying turnover tax on liquor in accordance with the provisions of the said sub-section, pay turnover tax at the rate specified under the said sub- section on the turnover of foreign liquor calculated at the following percentage of the purchase price of such liquor, namely: a) In the case of those situated : One hundred and within the area of a municipal forty percentage corporation, municipal council or cantonment W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 28 b) In the case of those situated in : One hundred and any other place thirty five percent.” 21. Section 7 after its amendment w.e.f. 01.07.2006 is reproduced below: “7. Payment of tax at compounded rates:- Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) of Section 5, any bar attached hotel, not being a star hotel of and above three star hotel, heritage hotel or club, may, at its option instead of paying turnover tax on foreign liquor in accordance with the provisions of the said sub- section pay turnover tax on the turnover of foreign liquor calculated. (a) at one hundred and forty per cent of the purchase value of such liquor in the case of those situated within the area of a municipal corporation or a municipal council or a cantonment, and at one hundred and thirty five percent of the purchase value of such liquor in the case of those situated in any other place; or (b) at one hundred and fifteen percent of the highest turnover tax payable by it as conceded in the return or accounts or the tax paid for the previous consecutive three years, whichever is higher” 22. The basic principles as to the interpretation of a Taxing W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 29 Statute have been enunciated by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in AIR 1961 SC 1047 (cited supra). Paragraphs 11 and 13 of the said decision alone will be necessary, to have a clear idea as to the course to be followed, which hence are reproduced below: “(11). The Government of the United Provinces had by notification dated 8/06/1948, altered the rate of tax in the matter of various commodities including non-edible oils with effect from 9/06/1948. The Sales Tax Officer was right in his view that the levy of tax at the altered rate was not to operate on sales effected before 9/06/1948. Initially, when the liability of the assessee to pay tax on edible oils for the assessment year arose, the rate was undoubtedly 3 pies per rupee on the turnover, and the question which falls to be determined is whether by reason of the alteration of the rate and its incidence in the course of the year, the assessee became liable to pay tax at the higher rate on a part of the turnover of the previous year and if so, on what basis. A tax payer who adopted the previous year's turnover had under S. 7 and R. 40 to submit his return within sixty days of the commencement of the assessment year, and no provision for submission of any supplementary returns in the case W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 30 of alteration of rates in the course of the year was made in the Act or the Rules: nor was any method provided for retrospective modification of an assessment once made. There were under the Act and the Rules two distinct and clear-cut schemes to assess sales tax, (1) where the tax payer elected to submit his return based on the turnover of the previous year and (2) where he elected to or was bound by law to submit his return on the turnover of the year of assessment. Under these two schemes the points of time at which liability arose and the turnover on which liability was to be assessed were in their nature not identical. The tax payers paying tax under the first scheme paid it on the turnover of the previous year & at the rate in force after the end of the period and applicable to it. The tax payer paying tax under the second scheme paid tax in quarterly installments based on the previous quarter's actual turnover and at the rate or rates prevalent in the quarter or applicable to it. Was it intended, when alteration was made in the rate of tax or its incidence during the course of the year, to assimilate these two schemes of taxation so as to permit of a departure from the one to the other? There is no express provision in the Act or in the Rules in that behalf. Nor does the notification suggest that it was so intended. In the case of a dealer who adopts the turnover of the year of assessment for purposes of taxation, the application of W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 31 the notification altering the rate of tax and the incidence of tax does not present any difficulty. The notification enjoins levy of the tax at the altered rate only in respect of sales taking place after the fixed date, and all sales which preceded that date are to be taxed at the original rate. In the fact of the language employed sales anterior to the date specified could not be affected. The question next arises: Is any machinery provided in the Act or the Rules for projecting this division of the year of assessment into the previous year, and for apportioning the turnover of that year ? Express provision in that behalf there is none: and it is difficult to imply such a provision in the Act. The dates of commencement and closure of the previous year of a tax payer may vary according to the system of accounting adopted by the assessee. The year may commence from any day of any recognised calendar year, and the year may not consist of 365 days. The method of antedating by one year the date on which the alteration is made in the rate or incidence will be manifestly inappropriate. The method of division of the turnover proportionate to the period of the assessment year before the alteration of the rate and after such alteration though prospective, must be deemed to have been made retrospectively in the previous year, and on a day which is removed from the commencement of the year of account by the number of days by which the date W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 32 of alteration of rate is removed from the commencement of the year of assessment. But the adoption of the turnover of the previous year as the taxable turnover for the year of assessment is itself based on a fiction and in the absence of any express provision either in the Act or the Rules or even in the notification setting out machinery for such a division of the year, we are unable to hold that this scheme of a fictional division may be projected into the previous year to make an artificial division of the turnover for imprinting thereon the altered rate of assessment as from the date of the division. Counsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh submitted several hypothetical cases suggesting that by refusing to adopt this method of division of the previous year of assessment for the application of the altered rate, several anomalies may arise in working out the liability to tax. He submitted that a person who was not a manufacturer or an importer of goods included in the schedule to the notification under S. 3-A may, if he has adopted the turnover of the previous year as his taxable turnover be liable even though it was the intention of the Government to absolve him from liability to pay tax. But a tax payer adopting the turnover of the previous year for payment of tax makes his choice voluntarily and subject to the advantages and disadvantages which that step involves. The fact that he may have to pay tax from which persons choosing the W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 33 alternative method of submitting of return may partially be exempted, because of an exemption granted in the course of the year, may not, in our judgment, be a ground for not giving full effect to the provisions of the Act as they stand. In interpreting a taxing statute, equitable considerations are entirely out of place. Nor can taxing statutes be interpreted on any presumptions or assumptions. The court must took squarely at the words of the statute and interpret them. It must interpret a taxing statute in the light of what is clearly expressed : it cannot imply anything which is not expressed; it cannot import provisions in the statutes so as to supply any assumed deficiency. (12) xx xx xx 13. It is not provided that in giving effect to the alteration of the rate during the course of the year of assessment an artificial division of the turnover of the previous year should, in applying the altered rate be made. The Legislature having failed to provide machinery for working out the liability, the attempted projection becomes unworkable. A legal fiction must be limited to the purposes for which it has been created and cannot be extended beyond its legitimate field. The turnover of the previous year is fictionally made the turnover of the year of assessment : it is not the actual or the real turnover of the year of assessment. By the imposition of a different W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 34 tariff in the course of the year, the incidence of tax liability may competently be altered by the Legislature, but for effectuating that alteration, the Legislature must devise machinery for enforcing it against the tax payer and if the Legislature has failed to do so, the court cannot resort to a fiction which is not prescribed by the Legislature and seek to effectuate that alteration by devising machinery not found in the statute.” It was by virtue of the view expressed by the 'majority', that the appeal preferred by the State/Department came to be dismissed. 23. A subsequent Constitution Bench, as per the decision in AIR 1966 SC 1385 (cited supra), was dealing with a case, which went up from this Court . The appellant Company was assessed to Agricultural Income tax under the Kerala Agricultural Income Tax Act 1950. Surcharge at the rate of 5% on the Agricultural Income Tax and Supertax were levied and collected for the year 1957 and 1958. The appeal preferred before the first appellate authority and before the Tribunal did not turn to be fruitful, which ended up in a Reference to the High Court, to decide the W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 35 question of law framed by the Tribunal as to whether any surcharge could be levied as above, for the assessment year 1957-58. The contention of the appellant was that the Kerala Surcharge on Taxes Act had come into force only on 01.09.1987 and it had no retrospective operation. The tax liability was to be fixed only with reference to the position as it existed on 01.04.1957, ie. the date of commencement of the assessment year, in conformity with the provisions of the Income Tax Act, by virtue of which, the subsequent variation could be made applicable only for the next year. Reliance was sought to be placed on the verdict passed by the Apex Court in Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay vs. Scindia Steam Navigation Co.Ltd. [AIR 1961 SC 1633] affirming the view taken by the Mumbai High Court in this regard. 24. Verdict already rendered by another Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in AIR 1961 SC 1047 (cited supra) holding that a legal fiction must be limited to the purpose for which it has W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 36 been created and it cannot be extended beyond its legitimate field, is sought to be pressed into service by the Assessees. In the said decision, the Apex Court had held that the Turn over of the previous year was fictionally made the turn over of the year of assessment and when a different Tariff is brought about in the course of the year, the incidence of tax liability may competently be altered by the Legislature, only if sufficient machinery for enforcing it against the tax payer was introduced by the Legislature. In so far as the Surcharge Act was not having retrospective operation by any express intendment or necessary implication, it could not be made applicable from 01.04.1957, as the Act came into force only from 01.09.1957. It was accordingly, that the verdict passed by this Court was set aside and the appeal was allowed by the Apex Court. 25. The issue dealt with by the Apex Court in AIR 1966 SC 870 (cited supra) was also in relation to the provisions under the Income Tax Act , 1922. With reference to Section 10(2) (vii), the W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 37 Apex Court held that the '4th proviso' to the provision introduced a fiction, whereby so much of the excess mentioned therein will be deemed to be the profits of the previous year in which such money was received. Though, in fact, the said compensation represents a capital asset, to the extent mentioned in the proviso, the compensation is deemed to be the profits of the previous year in which such money was received. It was accordingly held that, what was not a profit in the previous year would be deemed to be a profit in the relevant year and the previous year will be that year in which such moneys were received, which fiction was an indivisible one, which cannot be enlarged by importing another fiction; namely that if an amount was receivable during the previous year, it must be deemed to have been received during that year. It was accordingly held that the compensation (to the extent mentioned in the proviso) received only in the accounting year was by fiction treated as profit and therefore there was no scope for holding that the W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 38 expression ”received” meant “receivable”, in turn declaring that the amount received in the accounting year could not be assessed during the assessment year. 26. In support of the contention of the appellant/assessee that the Finance Act is only to prescribe the rate and it cannot bring in any substantive assessment with regard to the statutory provision, reliance is sought to be placed on 1966 KHC 616 (= AIR 1966 SC 1370)[cited supra]. Correctness of 'three' questions referred to the High Court of Calcutta under Section 27 of the Wealth Tax Act was the subject matter of consideration. The three questions referred were the following: (1) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Wealth Tax Officer was justified in taking the value of the assets of the assessee as shown in its balance- sheet on the relevant valuation date. (2) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, in computing the net wealth of the assessee the amount of proposed dividend was deductible from its total assets. (3) Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 39 case, in computing the net wealth of the assessee, the amount of the provision for payment of income-tax and super-tax in respect of the year of account was a debt owed within the meaning of S. 2 (m) of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957, and as such a deductible in computing the net wealth of the assessee. The High Court answered the three questions against the assessee. The Apex Court held, per majority, that the High Court was right in answering the first question in the affirmative and the second question in the negative; whereas the third question answered in the negative was held as not correct, which in turn was answered in the 'affirmative'. It was in the course of such discussion, as given in paragraph 25, that the Apex Court mentioned that the primary object of the Finance Act was only to prescribe the rates, so that the tax can be charged under the Income Tax Act, pointing out that the Income Tax Act was a permanent Act, whereas the Finance Act was passed every year, the main purpose of which was to fix the rates to be charged under the Income Tax Act for that year. The said decision is not W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 40 an authority to hold that the amendment brought about through the Finance Act, as per Section 7 (b) of the KGST Act w.e.f. 01.07.2006 stipulating as to how the compounded tax is to be worked out, is against the statutory prescription or beyond the power of the Legislature. This is more so, when it has been declared by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court that change in the rate of tax is possible if sufficient 'machinery' is provided by the Legislature; which machinery is discernible from Section 7(b) of the Act itself and also as clarified in Ext.P2 Circular issued in exercise of power under Section 3 of the KGST Act. 27. The above decision was subsequently considered by a co-ordinate Bench of Apex Court in AIR 2005 SC 1224 (cited supra). The substitution of Schedule No.1 of the Kerala Plantations (Additional Tax) Rules, as amended by the Kerala Finance Act 18 of 1987, in the middle of the year was intercepted by the Apex Court holding that such amendment was not only W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 41 revising the rate of tax, but also the Tariff category and tariff structures. With reference to the relevant provisions of law, the Division Bench of this Court had held that the assessees were liable to be taxed for the assessment year 1987-88 on the basis of the rates specified in Schedule I as on 01.04.1987 and as such, the liability to pay the tax had got crystallised on that date as mentioned in Section 3(2) of the Act, by virtue of which the amendment of the Schedule could be given effect to only from the next year onwards. It was in the said circumstance, that the Apex Court observed that in AIR 1966 SC 1370 (cited supra) that the chargeability was independent of passing of the Finance Act and further that the Finance Act had to be read in consonance with the provisions of the charging section; besides holding that the State can always revise the rates in the middle of the financial year; provided the assessable extent of the lands comprised in the plantation as on 1st of April of each year was not altered. Reference was also made to AIR 1966 SC 1385 (cited W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 42 supra), holding that imposition of different tariffs in the course of the year could be altered by the Legislature, provided the Legislature had devised the 'machinery' for computing it, in the absence of which, such a course cannot be pursued resorting to a fiction, which is not prescribed by the Legislature (paragraph 26). In paragraph 28, it was made clear that the scope of the said judgment was confined only to the insertion of Schedule I in the said 1960 Act by the Kerala Finance Act 18 of 1987 and that it will not apply to amendments under other enactments, viz., the KGST Act, 1963 and the Kerala Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1976. 28. In 1973 (31) STC 190 (cited supra), the dictum laid down by the Apex Court is that, it would be open to an affected party to contend that the retrospective operation of the Act completely alters the character of the tax imposed by it, so as to take it outside the limits of the entry, which gives the Legislature the competence to enact the law or it may be open to the party W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 43 to contend in the alternative, that the restrictions imposed by the Act are so unreasonable that they should be struck down, on the ground that they contravene the fundamental rights guaranteed under Section 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution. It was also found by the Apex Court that, it has to be borne in mind that the legislative power conferred upon the Legislature to enact laws in respect of the topics covered by several entries in the three lists can be exercised both prospectively and retrospectively. With regard to scope of retrospective amendment of a statute, it was held by the Apex Court in 1995 (96)STC 338 (cited supra) that, if the Parliament or the State Legislature have competence to legislate, they can do so prospectively as well as retrospectively and taxation laws are no exception to this power . The Apex Court observed that, though it is not for the State to justify or explain the necessity for the amendment, even in relation to retrospectivity of the Act, but obviously, on the face of it, there appeared to be a change of W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 44 policy by the succeeding Government on the policy pursued by its predecessor and on such occasion, the successor Government can have different rules from their predecessor including the matters relating to taxation or mode of taxation or basis of taxation or objects of taxation etc and that no explanation was required from the State for amending ethe Act having retrospective effect. 29. Coming to AIR 1997 SC 3640 (cited supra), it was a case involving validity of Section 7 (compounding provision) under the KGST Act 1963 in relation to 'works contract'. The Apex Court observed that the said provision is applicable only to the contractor who elects to be governed by it and that there is no compulsion. Validity of sub-sections 7, 7A, &7B of Section 7 and Rule 22 A and 30A of the KGST Act/Rules was challenged in a batch of writ petitions filed before this Court by several builders/contractors. A learned Judge of this Court dismissed the writ petitions, but on appeal, the Division Bench struck down the W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 45 aforesaid provisions on the ground that they were violative of Clause (29A) of Article 366 of the Constitution , which was taken up in appeal before the Apex Court by the State. The change in stand taken by the assessee, pointing out that they were not pressing the challenge against the validity of the above provisions before the Apex Court was noted , but it was observed that since the provisions were struck down by the High Court, the correctness thereof was to be examined. After referring to the relevant provisions of law and also the verdicts passed by the Apex Court on earlier occasions, it was held that the verdict passed by the Division Bench of this Court was liable to be set aside, which was ordered accordingly and the provisions were put back in position. The appeals filed by the State were allowed and the writ petitions filed by the assessees were dismissed, besides ordering a consolidated cost of Rs.25000/- 30. In 2002 (127) STC 105 (cited supra)(arising from Karnataka Sales Tax Act 1957], parity was found in comparison W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 46 with the provisions under the KGST Act and reliance was sought to be placed on the law declared by the Apex Court in (1997(2) SCC 183 = AIR 1997 SC 3640] (cited supra). The verdict passed by the Division Bench of this Court declaring sub-section (7) and (7A) of Sec.7 as unconstitutional, was interfered as per the above decision and it was made clear that a contractor who had not opted to the alternate method of payment of tax by compounding cannot complain against the said sub-section, nor can a Contractor who has opted for the said alternate method of taxation raise any valid complaint. The principle laid down by the Apex Court in AIR 1997 SC 3640 (cited supra) were reiterated and the validity of the provisions of the Karnataka Act were upheld, in turn dismissing the appeal preferred by the assessee. 31. In 2004(12)KTR 543 (Ker.) (cited supra), a learned Judge of this Court held that payment of tax at the compounded rate meant, the rate applicable as modified by the Finance Act. It was also observed by the learned single Judge that a W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 47 declaration was issued under the provisions of the Kerala Provisional Collection of Revenues Act, 1985 along with the Finance Bill, 2002 and that by virtue of the said declaration, the provisions of the Finance Bill will take effect from the beginning of the financial year, no matter that the Act was passed only later. The said declaration stands affirmed by the Division Bench. In the instant case, the amendment brought about on 24.10.2006 has however been given effect to, only from 01.07.2006 and opportunity was given to the assessees to submit re-option to have the tax satisfied at the compounded rate, (as amended) if they wished to avail the facility of alternate mode of taxation under the compounding provision. 32. The remaining issue is with regard to the scope of amendment brought about as per Sec.7(b) of the Act and whether the wordings therein are adequate enough to have the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge sustained. Or else, is there any element of confusion making the provision W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 48 unworkable, necessitating to have something else supplied into the above provision. So also it is to be considered whether the words appearing as “whichever is higher” under Section 7(b) have to be confined to the said provision or whether it is in relation to have a comparative exercise between the amounts workable under Section 7(a) and separately under Section7(b), to take out the 'higher one' to be reckoned as the compounded tax payable for the year in question. 33. At the very outset it is to be noted that the earlier provision (prior to amendment brought about w.e.f. 01.07.2006) contained two separate rates mentioned for the different areas (in the Municipal/Corporation Area/Cantonment area) under Section 7(a) with 140% tax and a lesser extent of 135% in respect of other areas as mentioned under Section 7(b). By virtue of the amendment, the above two different rates for different areas were put together without any change and bringing it as section 7(a), while another provision was W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 49 introduced as Section 7(b) as extracted below: “(b) at one hundred and fifteen percent of the highest turnover tax payable by it as conceded in the return or accounts or the tax paid for the previous consecutive three years, whichever is higher”.. While introducing Section 7(b), the conjunction “or” was also added to Section 7(a) as aforesaid. 34. As per Section 7(b), the amount has to be worked out at 115% of the highest turnover Tax payable by the assessee, as conceded in the returns OR accounts OR the turnover tax paid for any of the previous consecutive three years, whichever is higher. Going by the above provision there cannot be any doubt that 115% has to be worked out with reference to the highest turnover tax, in respect of any of the preceding consecutive three years. It could be the turnover tax as conceded in the return or accounts . It could be the turnover tax paid by the assessees as well. It has to be borne in mind that, when the term 'payable ' is used in the first limb, the Legislature was W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 50 conscious enough to specify that such turnover Tax payable was not the turnover Tax as to be assessed by the Department, but as conceded in the return or the accounts of the assessee. In other words, what is admitted/conceded by the assessee in the return/accounts alone was to be reckoned. Similarly, it was possible to work out 115% with reference to the turnover tax paid by the assessees for any of the previous three consecutive years. There also, no intention of the State to reckon the tax with reference to the turnover tax to be determined by the Department is expressed and what is shown by the assessee in the return/accounts or the turnover Tax paid by him during any of the previous three consecutive years will be reckoned and the highest turnover Tax shown in such return/accounts or the higher Turn Over Tax paid for any of the previous consecutive three years will be taken for effecting the calculation, i.e. to work out 115% and that is all. This being the position, the apprehension expressed that the provision has no clarity or that it creates W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 51 confusion or further that the accounts have to be maintained and regular assessment process will have to be preceded for working out the figures is without any pith or substance. 35. It is relevant to note that the legal position is not as if the dealer/assessee is not supposed to maintain any books of accounts , if he opts for satisfaction of tax by way of alternate method, ie by compounding. Even if the dealer/assessee seeks to satisfy the tax under the compounding system, he is bound to maintain the accounts and file proper returns on time, also satisfying the tax as worked out in terms of the relevant provisions under the Act and supported by the rules prescribed. 36. As mentioned already, the compounding application has to be submitted in Form No.21; on receipt of which, the procedure as contemplated under Rule 30(2) has to be pursued. Rule 30 (2)(iii) reads as follows: “30. Payment of tax at compounded rates:- Every dealer eligible to pay turnover tax at compounded rate under Section 7,, who desires to exercise the option W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 52 provided for under the said section may apply to the assessing authority concerned for permission to pay turnover tax at the rates specified therein in form No.21 or or before the 30th day of April of the year to which the option relates or along with the application for registration under the Act, whichever is later; xx xx xx (2)(i) xx xx (ii) xx xx (iii) The dealer to whom permission is granted under sub-rule (2) shall submit along with the monthly return in Form No.9 a statement of purchases of liquor made during the month showing invoice number and date, particulars of goods, quantity and value, along with photocopies of the purchase bill/invoices.” Once sanction is given enabling the assessee to satisfy the tax under the compounding system, it is for the assessee to submit return showing the particulars of purchase, invoices, dates etc and satisfy the tax on a monthly basis, the correctness of which could be assessed by the authorities in the due course. On completion of the transaction for the assessment year and on verification of the accounts, if it is found that the assessee was W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 53 not satisfying the compounded tax as per the provisions of the statute and the figures reflected from the accounts/returns, it is open for the Department to pursue further steps to collect the differential tax and take such other appropriate proceedings to impose penalty, if it is sustainable in the eye of law. In other words, it cannot be said that once opted for compounding, the assessee gets absolved from the liability to maintain accounts and to satisfy the proper tax to the requisite extent. To make it more clear, the option for compounding is not to do away with the burden to maintain proper accounts. It is always for the assessee to maintain proper books of accounts and satisfy the actual quantum of the tax in tune with the provisions of law(whether satisfaction of tax is by Regular assessment or by compounding method) and this burden is to be satisfied and substantiated, if at all called in question. The submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants/assessees that it is open for the assessee to opt the tax as payable, as shown in the W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 54 return or as shown in the accounts or the tax paid is not correct, because the assessee cannot show the tax wrongly in the accounts, contrary to the actual extent of transactions. So also, the assessee cannot legally show lesser extent of tax as payable in the return, contrary to the accounts. It is equally true that the assessee cannot have satisfied lesser extent of tax in respect of the quantum of transactions reflected from the returns/accounts. 37. This being the position, the term 'whichever is higher' used in Section 7(b) is not in respect of the three instances of the tax shown payable in the return, shown in the accounts or the tax paid in respect of the previous three consecutive years, but something else, which has to be dealt with more meticulously. It is in this context that the expression used- 'the highest turnover' in the very same provision requires consideration. Even going by the grammatical peculiarities and interpretations, 'super relative degree' is used in the first limb of the provision , qualifying the same with the word ”the”. In English language, 'comparative degree' is used only to compare W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 55 between two instances, whereas super relative degree is to be used when there are more instances than two. For the very same reason, usage of the expression 'the highest Turn Over Tax payable' as conceded by the assessees in the return or the accounts or the turnover tax paid, definitely refers to more than two instances and as such it, evidently, is in respect of the three previous consecutive years, i.e., the amount which is the highest in respect of three different consecutive years has to be reckoned for working out the quantum of 115%. The expression 'whichever is higher' is only an instance using 'comparative degree'. It cannot be with reference to the three different instances of the tax conceded in the return or accounts or turnover tax paid (as contended by the assessees) and it is definitely in respect of something else, as noted above. 38. That apart, since the highest figure is stipulated to be taken as contained in the first limb/opening part of the sentence, if the version of the assessees is accepted, the words 'whichever is higher ' used in the very same provision will become otiose. For this reason also, it has to be held that the expression “whichever is higher” is not confined to Section 7(b), but is in the context of a comparison to W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 56 be made between the two figures available under Section 7(a) and (b). As it stands so, the provision under Section 7(b) does not deal with a different sphere and it is in respect of the same sphere providing for reckoning the proper figure, i.e., the higher one of the figures worked out separately under Section 7(a) and Section 7(b). No violation of Article 14 or Article 19(1)(g) is made out by the assessees to call for interference of this Court. 39. It is to be noted further that the word used in Section 7(b) is with reference to the higher turnover tax payable by the assessee as conceded in the return or accounts. This means, the version of the assessee as such is taken for the purpose of calculation and no further questions are asked for the time being. In other words, it is never with reference to any detailed process of regular assessment and as such, the 'machinery' is well provided in the statute itself as to how the tax is to be worked out. It has to be worked out adopting a multiplier of 115% of the turnover Tax payable as shown/conceded by the assessee in W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 57 the return/accounts or the turnover Tax paid for any of the previous three consecutive years. Since the tax shown as 'payable' in the return or in the accounts or the tax paid in the previous three consecutive years is the undisputed figure as shown by the assessee, there is no question of any confusion or further deliberation to find out the correctness of the said figures. The only exercise to be pursued is to find out the highest one in respect of the previous consecutive three years and take it as a multiplicand, to be multiplied by the multiplier of 115%. As it stands so, the version putforth by the assessees that Section 7(b) suffers from confusion and that no machinery is provided to work out the figures is not correct or sustainable. It is answered against the assessees. 40. In the result, we answer the first question framed by the Apex Court in the 'Affirmative' and hold that the amended provision of Section 7(b) of the KGST Act introduced through the Finance Act with retrospective effect from 01.07.2006 could be applied to those W.A.No.1861, 1862, 1864, 1865, 1876 & 1883 of 2007 and connected cases. 58 dealers who had opted for payment of compounded tax for the year 2006-07 under the unamended provision as well. We answer the second question in the 'Negative' and hold that Section 7(a) and Section 7(b) of the Act do not operate in different spheres and it is in respect of the same sphere facilitating to identify the proper figures , i..e the higher one of the figures worked out separately under Sec.7(a) and under Sec.7(b). There is no violation of Article 14 or Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution of India in any manner. The appeals and writ petitions are devoid of any merit. Interference is declined and they stand dismissed. P.R. RAMACHANDRA MENON, JUDGE ANU SIVARAMAN, JUDGE lk "