SUBHASH CHAND NAWAL (HUF), AJMER V. INCOME TAX OFFICER, AJMER

ITA 1037/JPR/2017

• Counselvise Citation: [2018] 121 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 6185 (ITAT-JAIPUR)
• Duration Of Justice: 3 month(s) 14 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 10-04-2018
• Appeal Filed By: Assessee
• Order Result: Allowed
• Bench Allotted: SMC
• Assessment Year: misc
• Appeal Filed On: 27-12-2017
• Result in Favour of: Assessee
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: J C KULHARI JCIT DHK
• Keywords: Right to appeal; Condonation of delay

Judgement Text

VK;DJ VIHYH; VF/KDJ.K] T;IQJ U;K;IHB] T;IQJ IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, JAIPUR BENCHES, JAIPUR JH HKKXPAN] YS[KK LNL; ,OA JH DQY HKKJR ] U;KF;D LNL; DS LE{K BEFORE: SHRI BHAGCHAND, AM & SHRI KUL BHARAT, JM VK;DJ VIHY LA-@ ITA NO. 1037/JP/2017 FU/KZKJ.K O'KZ@ ASSESSMENT YEAR : 2014-15(26Q 1ST, 2ND, 3RD & 4TH QTR) SUBHASH CHAND NAWAL (HUF), K-21, KRISHAN GANJ, ANASAGAR ROAD, AJMER-305001 CUKE VS. INCOME TAX OFFICER, TDS, AJMER. TAN/PAN NO. JDHS 06728 B VIHYKFKHZ@ APPELLANT IZR;FKHZ@ RESPONDENT FU/KZKFJRH DH VKSJ LS@ ASSESSEE BY : NONE (ONE SET W.S. FILED) JKTLO DH VKSJ LS@ REVENUE BY : SHRI J.C. KULHARI (JCIT) LQUOKBZ DH RKJH[K@ DATE OF HEARING : 09/04/2018 MN?KKS'K.KK DH RKJH[K @ DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT : 10/04/2018 VKNS'K@ ORDER PER: KUL BHARAT, J.M. THIS IS AN APPEAL FILED BY THE ASSESSEE EMANATES FR OM THE ORDER OF THE LD. CIT(A), AJMER DATED 10/11/2017 FOR THE A.Y. 2014-15(26Q 1ST, 2ND, 3RD & 4TH QTR), WHEREIN THE ASSESSEE HAS RAISED SOLE EFFECTIVE GROUND OF APPEAL, WHICH IS AGAINST NOT DELETING THE PENALTY OF RS. 89,760/- LEVIED U/S U/S 234E OF THE INCOME TAX ACT , 1961 (IN SHORT THE ACT). 2 3. IN THIS APPEAL, THE ONLY ISSUE INVOLVED IS NOT A DMITTING THE APPEAL AND NOT DELETING THE PENALTY LEVIED U/S 234E OF RS. 89,760/- FILED BY THE ASSESSEE FOR THE REASON THAT NOTICE OF DEMAND WAS SE NT TO THE ASSESSEE ON 30/05/2014 ON E.MAIL NO. [e-mail] . THE LD CIT(A) HAS HELD THAT AS PER SECTION 249(2) OF THE AC T, THE APPEAL HAS TO BE PRESENTED WITHIN 30 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF SERVICE OF NOTICE OF DEMAND. THE APPELLANT HAS NOT FILED THE APPEAL WITHIN THE SPECIFIED PERIOD AND THERE WAS AN INORDINATE DELAY IN FILING THE APPEAL. THE ASSESSEE DID NOT HAVE ANY SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR NOT PRESENTING THE APPEAL WITHIN THE PERIOD SPECIFIED U/S 249(2) OF THE ACT. 4. NONE ATTENDED ON BEHALF OF THE ASSESSEE BUT A WRI TTEN SUBMISSIONS HAS BEEN FILED AND PRAYED TO ALLOW THE A PPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE. 5. ON THE CONTRARY, THE LD DR HAS SUPPORTED THE ORD ER OF THE LOWER AUTHORITIES. 6. AFTER HEARING BOTH THE SIDES ON THIS ISSUE, WE AR E OF THE VIEW THAT THE LD. CIT(A) WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN DISMISSING THE A PPEALS FOR THE REASON THAT THE ASSESSEE DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR NOT PRESENTING THEN APPEAL WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME U/S 249(2) OF THE ACT. THE HON'BLE 3 SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF COLLECTOR LAND & ACQUI SITION VS. MST KATIJI & OTHERS (1987) 167 ITR 471 (SC) HELD AS UNDER: THE LEGISLATURE HAS CONFERRED POWER TO CONDONE DE LAY BY ENACTING SECTION 5 OF THE LIMITATION ACT, 1963, IN ORDER TO ENABLE THE COURTS TO DO SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE TO PARTIES BY DISPOSING OF MATT ERS ON MERITS. THE EXPRESSION ' SUFFICIENT CAUSE ' IN SECTION 5 IS ADEQUATELY ELA STIC TO ENABLE THE COURTS TO APPLY THE LAW IN A MEANINGFUL MANNER WHICH SUBSERVE S THE ENDS OF JUSTICE-- THAT BEING THE LIFE-PURPOSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE INSTITUTION OF COURTS. A JUSTIFIABLY LIBERAL APPROACH HAS TO BE ADOPTED ON P RINCIPLE. 'EVERY DAY'S DELAY MUST BE EXPLAINED' DOES NOT IMPL Y A PEDANTIC APPROACH. THE DOCTRINE MUST BE APPLIED IN A RATIONA L, COMMON SENSE AND PRAGMATIC MANNER. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUALITY BEFORE LAW DEMANDS THAT AL L LITIGANTS, INCLUDING THE STATE AS A LITIGANT, ARE ACCORDED THE SAME TREA TMENT AND THE LAW IS ADMINISTERED IN AN EVENHANDED MANNER. THERE IS NO W ARRANT FOR ACCORDING A STEP-MOTHERLY TREATMENT WHEN THE STATE IS THE APPLI CANT PRAYING FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY. 'WHEN SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE AND TECHNICAL CONSIDERATI ONS ARE PITTED AGAINST EACH OTHER, THE CAUSE OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTIC E DESERVES TO BE PREFERRED, FOR THE OTHER SIDE CANNOT CLAIM TO HAVE A VESTED RI GHT IN INJUSTICE BEING DONE BECAUSE OF A NON-DELIBERATE DELAY.' THE FEE FOR DEFAULT IN FURNISHING STATEMENT U/S 234E OF THE ACT CAN BE LEVIED FOR A PERSON WHO VIOLATES THE PROVISIONS OF S ECTION 200(3) OF THE ACT. THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 200(3) OF THE ACT IS AS UNDER:- (3) ANY PERSON DEDUCTING ANY SUM ON OR AFTER THE 1S T DAY OF APRIL, 2005 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOREGOING PROVISIONS OF THIS CHAPTER OR, AS THE CASE MAY BE, ANY PERSON BEING AN EMPLOYER REFER RED TO IN SUB- SECTION (1A) OF SECTION 192 SHALL, AFTER PAYING THE TAX DEDUCTED TO THE CREDIT OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WITHIN THE PRESCRI BED TIME, PREPARE SUCH STATEMENTS FOR SUCH PERIOD AS MAY BE PRESCRIBE D AND DELIVER OR CAUSE TO BE DELIVERED TO THE PRESCRIBED INCOME-TAX AUTHORITY 6 OR THE PERSON AUTHORISED BY SUCH AUTHORITY SUCH STATEMENT IN SUCH FORM 7 AND VERIFIED IN SUCH MANNER AND SETTING FORTH SUCH PART ICULARS AND WITHIN SUCH TIME AS MAY BE PRESCRIBED: 4 IT IS ALSO LEVIED FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 206C (3) OF THE ACT, WHICH IS AS UNDER:- (3) ANY PERSON COLLECTING ANY AMOUNT UNDER SUB-SEC TION (1) OR SUB-SECTION (1C) 29 [ *** ] SHALL PAY WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED 30 TIME THE AMOUNT SO COLLECTED TO THE CREDIT OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OR AS THE BOAR D DIRECTS : PROVIDED THAT THE PERSON COLLECTING TAX ON OR AFTER THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 2005 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOREGOING PROVISIONS OF THIS SECTION SHALL, AFTER PAYING THE TAX COLLECTED TO THE CREDIT OF THE CENTRAL GOVE RNMENT WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME, PREPARE SUCH STATEMENTS FOR SUCH PERIOD AS MA Y BE PRESCRIBED AND DELIVER OR CAUSE TO BE DELIVERED TO THE PRESCRIBED INCOME-TAX AUTHORITY 31 , OR THE PERSON AUTHORISED BY SUCH AUTHORITY, SUCH STATE MENT IN SUCH FORM AND VERIFIED IN SUCH MANNER AND SETTING FORTH SUCH PART ICULARS AND WITHIN SUCH TIME AS MAY BE PRESCRIBED. 32 THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 200(3) OF THE ACT PUT AN O BLIGATION ON A PERSON WHO HAS DEDUCTED A SUM ON OR AFTER 1 ST DAY OF APRIL, 2005 TO PREPARE STATEMENTS AS PRESCRIBED AND DELIVER OR CAU SE TO BE DELIVERED TO THE PRESCRIBED INCOME TAX AUTHORITY OR THE PERSON A UTHORIZED BY SUCH AUTHORITY A STATEMENT IN SUCH FORM AND VERIFIED IN SUCH MANNER AND SETTING FORTH SUCH PARTICULARS AND WITHIN SUCH TIME AS MAY BE PRESCRIBED. RULE 31A OF THE INCOME TAX RULES, 1962 (IN SHORT THE RULES) PROVIDED FOR QUARTERLY STATEMENT OF DEDUCTION OF TAX AS PER SUB-SECTION (3) OF SECTION 200 OF THE ACT WHEREIN EVERY PERSON BEING A PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR DEDUCTION OF TAX UNDER CHAPTER XVIIB SHALL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SUB-SECTION (3) OF SECTION 200, DELIV ER OR CAUSE TO DELIVER OR CAUSE TO BE DELIVERED TO THE DIRECTOR GENERAL O F INCOME TAX SYSTEMS OR THE PERSON AUTHORIZED BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF SYSTEMS QUARTERLY 5 STATEMENTS IN FORM NO. 24Q AND 26Q AS THE CASE MAY BE ON OR BEFORE 15 TH OF JULY, 15 TH OF OCTOBER AND 15 TH OF JANUARY IN RESPECT OF FIRST THREE QUARTERS OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR AND 15 TH JUNE FOR THE LAST QUARTER OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR. THE PROVISIONS OF LEVY OF FEES U/S 234E OF THE ACT FOR FAILURE IN FURNISHING THE STATEMENTS HAS BEEN INSER TED BY THE FINANCE ACT, 2012 W.E.F. 01/7/2012. FOR FAILURE TO FILE STAT EMENT WITHIN TIME PRESCRIBED IN SUB-SECTION (3) OF SECTION 200 OF THE ACT OF RS. 200 EVERY DAY DURING WHICH FAILURE CONTINUED BUT NOT EXCEEDING THE TAX DEDUCTIBLE WAS THE AMOUNT OF FEE TO BE LEVIED. THE PROVISIONS FO R PROCESSING OF STATEMENT OF TAX DEDUCTIBLE AT SOURCE WERE INTRODUC ED BY THE FINANCE ACT NO. 2 2009 W.E.F. 01/10/2010 WHEREIN THE FEE FO R FAILURE TO FURNISH THE STATEMENT U/S 234E WAS MADE AVAILABLE BY SUBSTIT UTING CLAUSE (C) TO (F) OF SECTION 200A BY THE FINANCE ACT 2015 W.E.F. 0 1/6/2015. THE HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF RASHMIKANT KUNDALIA VS. UNION OF INDIA (2015) 229 TAXMAN 596 (BOM) WHILE EX AMINING THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF SECTION 234E HAS UPHELD THE VALIDITY AND ALSO HELD AS UNDER: 9. WE HAVE HEARD THE LEARNED COUNSEL, AND PERUSED T HE PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE PETITION. SECTION 200 OF THE ACT DEALS WITH THE DUTY OF A PERSON DEDUCTING TAX. IT READS THUS : '200. DUTY OF PERSON DEDUCTING TAX.- (1) ANY PERSON DEDUCTING ANY SUM IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOREGOING PROVISIONS OF THIS CHAPTER SHALL PAY WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME, THE SUM SO DEDUCTED TO THE CREDIT OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OR AS THE BOARD DIRECTS. 6 (2) ANY PERSON BEING AN EMPLOYER, REFERRED TO IN SU B-SECTION (1A) OF SECTION 192 SHALL PAY, WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME, THE TAX TO THE CREDIT OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OR AS THE BOARD DIRECTS. (3) ANY PERSON DEDUCTING ANY SUM ON OR AFTER THE 1S T DAY OF APRIL, 2005 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOREGOING PROVISIONS OF THIS CHAPTER OR, AS THE CASE MAY BE, ANY PERSON BEING AN EMPLOYER RE FERRED TO IN SUB- SECTION (1A) OF SECTION 192 SHALL, AFTER PAYING THE TAX DEDUCTED TO THE CREDIT OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WITHIN THE PRESCRI BED TIME, PREPARE SUCH STATEMENTS FOR SUCH PERIOD AS MAY BE PRESCRIBE D AND DELIVER OR CAUSE TO BE DELIVERED TO THE PRESCRIBED INCOME TAX AUTHORITY OR THE PERSON AUTHORISED BY SUCH AUTHORITY SUCH STATEMENT IN SUCH FORM AND VERIFIED IN SUCH MANNER AND SETTING FORTH SUCH PART ICULARS AND WITHIN SUCH TIME AS MAY BE PRESCRIBED. *[PROVIDED THAT THE PERSON MAY ALSO DELIVER TO THE PRESCRIBED AUTHORITY A CORRECTION STATEMENT FOR RECTIFICATION OF ANY MISTAKE OR TO ADD, DELETE OR UPDATE THE INFORMATION FURNISHED IN THE STATEMENT DELIVERED UNDER THIS SUB-SECTION IN SUCH FORM AND V ERIFIED IN SUCH MANNER AS MAY BE SPECIFIED BY THE AUTHORITY.]' 10. ON A PERUSAL OF SECTION 200, IT IS CLEAR THAT S UB-SECTION (3) THEREOF, AND WITH WHICH WE ARE CONCERNED, INTER ALI A STIPULATES THAT ANY PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR DEDUCTING ANY SUM BY WAY OF TAX, ON OR AFTER 1ST APRIL, 2005 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOREGO ING PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER XVII OR, AS THE CASE MAY BE, ANY PERSON BEI NG AN EMPLOYER REFERRED TO IN SUB-SECTION (1A) OF SECTION 192 SHAL L, AFTER PAYING THE TAX SO DEDUCTED TO THE CREDIT OF THE CENTRAL GOVERN MENT WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME, PREPARE SUCH STATEMENTS FOR SUCH P ERIOD AS MAY BE PRESCRIBED AND DELIVER OR CAUSE TO BE DELIVERED TO THE PRESCRIBED INCOME TAX AUTHORITY OR THE PERSON AUTHORISED BY SU CH AUTHORITY, SUCH STATEMENTS, IN SUCH FORM AND VERIFIED IN SUCH MANNE R AND SETTING FORTH SUCH PARTICULARS AND WITHIN SUCH TIME AS MAY BE PRESCRIBED. THE PROVISO (WHICH WAS INSERTED W.E.F. 01-10-2014) FURT HER STIPULATES THAT A PERSON MAY ALSO DELIVER TO THE PRESCRIBED AUTHORI TY A CORRECTION STATEMENT FOR RECTIFICATION OF ANY MISTAKE OR TO AD D, DELETE OR UPDATE THE INFORMATION FURNISHED IN THE STATEMENT. SIMILAR LY, THE PROVISO TO SUB-SECTION (3) OF SECTION 206C AND WHICH DEAL WITH PROFITS AND GAINS FROM THE BUSINESS OF TRADING IN ALCOHOLIC LIQUOR, F OREST PRODUCE, SCRAP ETC. ALSO PROVIDE FOR SIMILAR PROVISIONS AS SET OUT IN SECTION 200(3). THOUGH IN THE PRESENT CASE WE ARE NOT CONCERNED WIT H SECTION 206C, WE ARE REFERRING TO IT IN PASSING ONLY BECAUSE THE PROVISO TO SUB- SECTION (3) OF SECTION 206C FINDS MENTIONS IN SECTI ON 234E, THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF WHICH IS CHALLENGED BEFO RE US. 11. SECTION 234E, THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF WH ICH IS CHALLENGED BEFORE US, WAS BROUGHT INTO THE INCOME TAX ACT, 196 1 WITH EFFECT FROM 1ST JULY 2012. THE SAID SECTION READS AS UNDER : 'G LEVY OF FEE IN CERTAIN CASES 234E. FEE FOR DEFAULT IN FURNISHING STATEMENTS.-(1) WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT, WHERE A PERSON FAILS TO DELIVER OR CAUSE 7 TO BE DELIVERED A STATEMENT WITHIN THE TIME PRESCRI BED IN SUB-SECTION (3) OF SECTION 200 OR THE PROVISO TO SUB-SECTION (3 ) OF SECTION 206C, HE SHALL BE LIABLE TO PAY, BY WAY OF FEE, A SUM OF TWO HUNDRED RUPEES FOR EVERY DAY DURING WHICH THE FAILURE CONTINUES. (2) THE AMOUNT OF FEE REFERRED TO IN SUB-SECTION (1 ) SHALL NOT EXCEED THE AMOUNT OF TAX DEDUCTIBLE OR COLLECTIBLE, AS THE CASE MAY BE. (3) THE AMOUNT OF FEE REFERRED TO IN SUB-SECTION (1 ) SHALL BE PAID BEFORE DELIVERING OR CAUSING TO BE DELIVERED A STAT EMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH SUB-SECTION (3) OF SECTION 200 OR THE PROVISO TO SUB-SECTION (3) OF SECTION 206C. (4) THE PROVISIONS OF THIS SECTION SHALL APPLY TO A STATEMENT REFERRED TO IN SUB-SECTION (3) OF SECTION 200 OR THE PROVISO TO SUB-SECTION (3) OF SECTION 206C WHICH IS TO BE DELIVERED OR CAUSED TO BE DELIVERED FOR TAX DEDUCTED AT SOURCE OR TAX COLLECTED AT SOURCE, AS THE CASE MAY BE, ON OR AFTER THE 1ST DAY OF JULY, 2012.' 12. ON A PERUSAL OF SUB-SECTION (1) OF SECTION 234E , IT IS CLEAR THAT A FEE IS SOUGHT TO BE LEVIED INTER ALIA ON A PERSON W HO FAILS TO DELIVER OR CAUSE TO BE DELIVERED THE TDS RETURN/STATEMENTS WIT HIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME IN SUB-SECTION (3) OF SECTION 200. THE FEE PRESCRIBED IS RS.200/- FOR EVERY DAY DURING WHICH THE FAILURE CONTINUES. SUB- SECTION (2) FURTHER STIPULATES THAT THE AMOUNT OF F EE REFERRED TO IN SUB-SECTION (1) SHALL NOT EXCEED THE AMOUNT OF TAX DEDUCTIBLE OR COLLECTIBLE AS THE CASE MAY BE. 13. IT IS NOT IN DISPUTE THAT AS PER THE EXISTING P ROVISIONS, A PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR DEDUCTION OF TAX (THE DEDUCTOR) IS REQUIRED TO FURNISH PERIODICAL QUARTERLY STATEMENTS CONTAINING THE DETA ILS OF DEDUCTION OF TAX MADE DURING THE QUARTER, BY THE PRESCRIBED DUE DATE. UNDOUBTEDLY, DELAY IN FURNISHING OF TDS RETURN/STAT EMENTS HAS A CASCADING EFFECT. UNDER THE INCOME TAX ACT, THERE I S AN OBLIGATION ON THE INCOME TAX DEPARTMENT TO PROCESS THE INCOME TAX RETURNS WITHIN THE SPECIFIED PERIOD FROM THE DATE OF FILING. THE D EPARTMENT CANNOT ACCURATELY PROCESS THE RETURN ON WHOSE BEHALF TAX H AS BEEN DEDUCTED (THE DEDUCTEE) UNTIL INFORMATION OF SUCH DEDUCTIONS IS FURNISHED BY THE DEDUCTOR WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME. THE TIMELY PROCESSING OF RETURNS IS THE BEDROCK OF AN EFFICIENT TAX ADMINIST RATION SYSTEM. IF THE INCOME TAX RETURNS, ESPECIALLY HAVING REFUND CLAIMS , ARE NOT PROCESSED IN A TIMELY MANNER, THEN (I) A DELAY OCCU RS IN THE GRANTING OF CREDIT OF TDS TO THE PERSON ON WHOSE BEHALF TAX IS DEDUCTED (THE DEDUCTEE) AND CONSEQUENTLY LEADS TO DELAY IN ISSUIN G REFUNDS TO THE DEDUCTEE, OR RAISING OF INFRUCTUOUS DEMANDS AGAINST THE DEDUCTEE; (II) THE CONFIDENCE OF A GENERAL TAXPAYER ON THE TAX ADM INISTRATION IS ERODED; (III) THE LATE PAYMENT OF REFUND AFFECTS TH E GOVERNMENT FINANCIALLY AS THE GOVERNMENT HAS TO PAY INTEREST F OR DELAY IN GRANTING THE REFUNDS; AND (IV) THE DELAY IN RECEIPT OF REFUN DS RESULTS INTO A CASH FLOW CRUNCH, ESPECIALLY FOR BUSINESS ENTITIES. 14. WE FIND THAT THE LEGISLATURE TOOK NOTE OF THE F ACT THAT A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF DEDUCTORS WERE NOT FURNISHING THEIR TDS 8 RETURN/STATEMENTS WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME FRAME WHICH WAS ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL. THIS LED TO AN ADDITIONAL WOR K BURDEN UPON THE DEPARTMENT DUE TO THE FAULT OF THE DEDUCTOR BY NOT FURNISHING THE INFORMATION IN TIME AND WHICH HE WAS STATUTORILY BO UND TO FURNISH. IT IS IN THIS LIGHT, AND TO COMPENSATE FOR THE ADDITIO NAL WORK BURDEN FORCED UPON THE DEPARTMENT, THAT A FEE WAS SOUGHT T O BE LEVIED UNDER SECTION 234E OF THE ACT. LOOKING AT THIS FROM THIS PERSPECTIVE, WE ARE CLEARLY OF THE VIEW THAT SECTION 234E OF THE ACT IS NOT PUNITIVE IN NATURE BUT A FEE WHICH IS A FIXED CHARGE FOR THE EX TRA SERVICE WHICH THE DEPARTMENT HAS TO PROVIDE DUE TO THE LATE FILIN G OF THE TDS STATEMENTS. 15. AS STATED EARLIER, DUE TO LATE SUBMISSION OF TD S STATEMENTS MEANS THE DEPARTMENT IS BURDENED WITH EXTRA WORK WH ICH IS OTHERWISE NOT REQUIRED IF THE TDS STATEMENTS WERE F URNISHED WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME. THIS FEE IS FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE ADDITIONAL BURDEN FORCED UPON THE DEPARTMENT. A PERSON DEDUCTI NG THE TAX (THE DEDUCTOR), IS ALLOWED TO FILE HIS TDS STATEMENT BEY OND THE PRESCRIBED TIME PROVIDED HE PAYS THE FEE AS PRESCRIBED UNDER S ECTION 234E OF THE ACT. IN OTHER WORDS, THE LATE FILING OF THE TDS RET URN/STATEMENTS IS REGULARISED UPON PAYMENT OF THE FEE AS SET OUT IN S ECTION 234E. THIS IS NOTHING BUT A PRIVILEGE AND A SPECIAL SERVICE TO THE DEDUCTOR ALLOWING HIM TO FILE THE TDS RETURN/STATEMENTS BEYO ND THE TIME PRESCRIBED BY THE ACT AND/OR THE RULES. WE THEREFOR E CANNOT AGREE WITH THE ARGUMENT OF THE PETITIONERS THAT THE FEE T HAT IS SOUGHT TO BE COLLECTED UNDER SECTION 234E OF THE ACT IS REALLY N OTHING BUT A COLLECTION IN THE GUISE OF A TAX. 16. WE ARE SUPPORTED IN OUR VIEW BY A JUDGMENT OF A DIVISION BENCH OF THE CALCUTTA HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF HOWRAH TA X PAYERS' ASSOCIATION V. GOVERNMENT OF WEST BENGAL [2011] 5 C HN 430. BEFORE THE CALCUTTA HIGH COURT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDIT Y OF IMPOSITION OF A 'LATE FEE' UNDER SECTION 32(2) OF THE WEST BENGAL V ALUE ADDED TAX ACT, 2003 CAME UP FOR CONSIDERATION. AFTER ANALYSIN G THE PROVISIONS OF THE BENGAL VALUE ADDED TAX ACT, THE CALCUTTA HIGH C OURT HELD AS UNDER: '10. IN CASE OF LEVYING TAX THERE IS NO QUID PRO QU O BETWEEN THE TAX PAYER AND THE STATE. BUT ELEMENT OF QUID PRO QUO IS A MUST IN CASE OF IMPOSING FEE. BY VIRTUE OF IMPUGNED AMENDMENT, A DE ALER IS ENTITLED TO GET SERVICE INDIRECTLY FROM THE AUTHORITY UPON P AYMENT OF LATE FEE. HIS IRREGULAR FILING OF RETURN IS REGULARISED UPON PAYMENT OF LATE FEE WITHOUT BEING SUFFERED FROM PENAL CONSEQUENCES WHIC H CAN NOT BE CATEGORISED AS NOTHING BUT SPECIAL SERVICE. THUS, T HERE EXISTS QUID PRO QUO IN IMPOSING LATE FEE. 11. IN THIS CONTEXT IT IS PERTINENT TO MENTION HERE THAT THOUGH A FEE MUST BE CO-RELATED TO THE SERVICES RENDERED, SUCH R ELATIONSHIP NEED NOT BE MATHEMATICAL ONE EVEN CASUAL CO-RELATIONSHIP IN ALL THAT IS NECESSARY. THE VIEW OF THE APEX COURT IN (2005) 2 S CC 345 (REFERRED TO BY THE LEARNED TRIBUNAL AT PAGE 14 OF THE IMPUGN ED JUDGMENT) REMOVED ALL THE DOUBTS ON THIS ISSUE.' (EMPHASIS SU PPLIED) 9 17. IT WOULD ALSO BE APPOSITE TO REFER TO THE OBSER VATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE SONA CHANDI OAL COMMITTEE V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA [2005] 2 SCC 345 AND WHICH JUDGMENT HAS BEEN REFERRED TO BY THE CALCUTTA HIGH COURT. THE SUPREME COURT, IN PARAGRAPH 22 STATED THUS: '22. A THREE-JUDGE BENCH OF THIS COURT IN B.S.E. BR OKERS' FORUM V. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA [(2001) 3 SC C 482] AFTER CONSIDERING A LARGE NUMBER OF AUTHORITIES, HAS HELD THAT MUCH ICE HAS MELTED IN THE HIMALAYAS AFTER THE RENDERING OF THE EARLIER JUDGMENTS AS THERE WAS A SEA CHANGE IN THE JUDICIAL THINKING AS TO THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A TAX AND A FEE SINCE THEN. PLACING RELIANC E ON THE FOLLOWING JUDGMENTS OF THIS COURT IN THE LAST 20 YEARS, NAMEL Y, SREENIVASA GENERAL TRADERS V. STATE OF A.P. [(1983) 4 SCC 353] , CITY CORPN. OF CALICUT V. THACHAMBALATH SADASIVAN [(1985) 2 SCC 11 2 : 1985 SCC (TAX) 211], SIRSILK LTD. V. TEXTILES COMMITTEE [198 9 SUPP (1) SCC 168 : 1989 SCC (TAX) 219], COMMR. & SECY. TO GOVT., COMMERCIAL TAXES & RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS DEPTT. V. SREE MURUGAN FINANCING CORPN. [(1992) 3 SCC 488], SECY. TO GOVT. OF MADRAS V. P.R. SRIRAMULU [(1996) 1 SCC 345], VAM ORGANIC CHEMICALS LTD. V. STATE OF U.P. [(1997) 2 SCC 715], RESEARCH FOUNDATION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & ECOLOGY V. MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE [(1 999) 1 SCC 655] AND SECUNDERABAD HYDERABAD HOTEL OWNERS' ASSN. V. H YDERABAD MUNICIPAL CORPN. [(1999) 2 SCC 274] IT WAS HELD THA T THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF QUID PRO QUO IN A FEE HAS UNDERGONE CONS IDERABLE TRANSFORMATION. SO FAR AS THE REGULATORY FEE IS CON CERNED, THE SERVICE TO BE RENDERED IS NOT A CONDITION PRECEDENT AND THE SAME DOES NOT LOSE THE CHARACTER OF A FEE PROVIDED THE FEE SO CHA RGED IS NOT EXCESSIVE. IT WAS NOT NECESSARY THAT SERVICE TO BE RENDERED BY THE COLLECTING AUTHORITY SHOULD BE CONFINED TO THE CONT RIBUTORIES ALONE. THE LEVY DOES NOT CEASE TO BE A FEE MERELY BECAUSE THERE IS AN ELEMENT OF COMPULSION OR COERCIVENESS PRESENT IN IT , NOR IS IT A POSTULATE OF A FEE THAT IT MUST HAVE A DIRECT RELAT ION TO THE ACTUAL SERVICE RENDERED BY THE AUTHORITY TO EACH INDIVIDUA L WHO OBTAINS THE BENEFIT OF THE SERVICE. QUID PRO QUO IN THE STRICT SENSE WAS NOT ALWAYS A SINE QUA NON FOR A FEE. ALL THAT IS NECESSARY IS THAT THERE SHOULD BE A REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LEVY OF FEE AND THE SERVICES RENDERED. IT WAS OBSERVED THAT IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH THAT THOSE WHO PAY THE FEE MUST RECEIVE DIRECT OR SPECIA L BENEFIT OR ADVANTAGE OF THE SERVICES RENDERED FOR WHICH THE FE E WAS BEING PAID. IT WAS HELD THAT IF ONE WHO IS LIABLE TO PAY, RECEI VES GENERAL BENEFIT FROM THE AUTHORITY LEVYING THE FEE, THE ELEMENT OF SERVICE REQUIRED FOR COLLECTING THE FEE IS SATISFIED.' (EMPHASIS SUPPLIE D) 18. WE ARE THEREFORE CLEARLY OF THE VIEW THAT THE F EE SOUGHT TO BE LEVIED UNDER SECTION 234E OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 19 61 IS NOT IN THE GUISE OF A TAX THAT IS SOUGHT TO BE LEVIED ON THE D EDUCTOR. WE ALSO DO NOT FIND THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 234E AS BEING ON EROUS ON THE GROUND THAT THE SECTION DOES NOT EMPOWER THE ASSESS ING OFFICER TO CONDONE THE DELAY IN LATE FILING OF THE TDS RETURN/ STATEMENTS, OR THAT NO APPEAL IS PROVIDED FOR FROM AN ARBITRARY ORDER P ASSED UNDER SECTION 234E. IT MUST BE NOTED THAT A RIGHT OF APPEAL IS NO T A MATTER OF RIGHT BUT IS A CREATURE OF THE STATUTE, AND IF THE LEGISL ATURE DEEMS IT FIT NOT 10 TO PROVIDE A REMEDY OF APPEAL, SO BE IT. EVEN IN SU CH A SCENARIO IT IS NOT AS IF THE AGGRIEVED PARTY IS LEFT REMEDILESS. S UCH AGGRIEVED PERSON CAN ALWAYS APPROACH THIS COURT IN ITS EXTRAORDINARY EQUITABLE JURISDICTION UNDER ARTICLE 226/227 OF THE CONSTITUT ION OF INDIA, AS THE CASE MAY BE. WE THEREFORE CANNOT AGREE WITH THE ARG UMENT OF THE PETITIONERS THAT SIMPLY BECAUSE NO REMEDY OF APPEAL IS PROVIDED FOR, THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 234E ARE ONEROUS. SIMILAR LY, ON THE SAME PARITY OF REASONING, WE FIND THE ARGUMENT REGARDING CONDONATION OF DELAY ALSO TO BE WHOLLY WITHOUT ANY MERIT. 19. IT IS NOW WELL SETTLED THAT EVEN THOUGH THIS CO URT EXERCISING JURISDICTION UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA HAS THE POWER TO DECLARE A STATUTE (OR ANY PROVISION THEREO F) AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, IT SHOULD EXERCISE GREAT RESTRAIN T BEFORE EXERCISING SUCH A POWER. REALLY SPEAKING, THERE IS ONLY ONE GR OUND FOR DECLARING AN ACT OF THE LEGISLATURE AS INVALID, AND THAT IS I F IT CLEARLY VIOLATES SOME PROVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA IN SO E VIDENT A MANNER SO AS TO LEAVE NO MANNER OF DOUBT. BEFORE DECLARING A STATUTE TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL, THE COURT MUST BE ABSOLUTELY SURE THAT THERE CAN BE NO MANNER OF DOUBT THAT IT VIOLATES THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. IF TWO VIEWS ARE POSSIBLE, ONE MAKING THE STATUTE CONSTITUTIONAL AND THE OTHER MAKING IT UNCONSTITUTI ONAL, THE FORMER VIEW MUST ALWAYS BE PREFERRED. THE COURT MUST THERE FORE MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF A S TATUTE, EVEN IF IT REQUIRES GIVING THE STATUTORY PROVISION A STRAINED MEANING, OR A NARROWER OR WIDER MEANING, THAN WHAT APPEARS ON THE FACE OF IT. IT IS ONLY WHEN ALL EFFORTS TO DO SO FAIL SHOULD THE COUR T DECLARE A STATUTE TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 20. IT IS EQUALLY WELL SETTLED THAT A STATUTE RELAT ING TO ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE VIEWED WITH GREATER LATITUDE T HAN LAWS TOUCHING CIVIL RIGHTS SUCH AS FREEDOM OF SPEECH, FREEDOM OF RELIGION ETC. AS REGARDS ECONOMIC AND OTHER REGULATORY LEGISLATION I T IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE COURT EXERCISES JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND GRANTS G REATER LATITUDE TO THE LEGISLATURE WHILST JUDGING THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALID ITY OF SUCH A STATUTE. THIS IS FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT THE COURT DOES N OT CONSISTS OF ECONOMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERTS AND HAS NO EXPE RTISE IN THESE MATTERS. 21. THESE WELL SETTLED PRINCIPLES HAVE BEEN VERY SU CCINCTLY SET OUT IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF GO VERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH V. SMT. P. LAXMI DEVI [2008] 4 SCC 7 20 AND MORE PARTICULARLY, PARAGRAPHS 46, 67, 68, 78, 79 AND 80 THEREOF, WHICH READ THUS: '46. IN OUR OPINION, THERE IS ONE AND ONLY ONE GROU ND FOR DECLARING AN ACT OF THE LEGISLATURE (OR A PROVISION IN THE ACT) TO BE INVALID, AND THAT IS IF IT CLEARLY VIOLATES SOME PROVISION OF THE CON STITUTION IN SO EVIDENT A MANNER AS TO LEAVE NO MANNER OF DOUBT. THIS VIOLA TION CAN, OF COURSE, BE IN DIFFERENT WAYS E.G. IF A STATE LEGISL ATURE MAKES A LAW WHICH ONLY PARLIAMENT CAN MAKE UNDER LIST I TO THE SEVENTH SCHEDULE, IN WHICH CASE IT WILL VIOLATE ARTICLE 246(1) OF THE CONSTITUTION, OR THE LAW VIOLATES SOME SPECIFIC PROVISION OF THE CONSTIT UTION (OTHER THAN 11 THE DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES). BUT BEFORE DECLARING THE STATUTE TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL, THE COURT MUST BE ABSOLUTELY SURE THAT THERE CAN BE NO MANNER OF DOUBT THAT IT VIOLATES A PROVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION. IF TWO VIEWS ARE POSSIBLE, ONE MAKING THE STATUTE CONS TITUTIONAL AND THE OTHER MAKING IT UNCONSTITUTIONAL, THE FORMER VIEW M UST ALWAYS BE PREFERRED. ALSO, THE COURT MUST MAKE EVERY EFFORT T O UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF A STATUTE, EVEN IF THAT REQUIRES GIVING A STRAINED CONSTRUCTION OR NARROWING DOWN ITS SCOPE V IDE RT. REV. MSGR. MARK NETTO V. STATE OF KERALA [(1979) 1 SCC 23 : AI R 1979 SC 83] SCC PARA 6 : AIR PARA 6. ALSO, IT IS NONE OF THE CO NCERN OF THE COURT WHETHER THE LEGISLATION IN ITS OPINION IS WISE OR U NWISE. 67. HENCE IF TWO VIEWS ARE POSSIBLE, ONE MAKING THE PROVISION IN THE STATUTE CONSTITUTIONAL, AND THE OTHER MAKING IT UNC ONSTITUTIONAL, THE FORMER SHOULD BE PREFERRED VIDE KEDAR NATH SINGH V. STATE OF BIHAR [AIR 1962 SC 955] . ALSO, IF IT IS NECESSARY TO UPH OLD THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE TO CONSTRUE ITS GENE RAL WORDS NARROWLY OR WIDELY, THE COURT SHOULD DO SO VIDE G.P. SINGH'S PR INCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, 9TH EDN., 2004, P. 497. THUS THE WO RD 'PROPERTY' IN THE HINDU WOMEN'S RIGHT TO PROPERTY ACT, 1937 WAS C ONSTRUED BY THE FEDERAL COURT IN HINDU WOMEN'S RIGHTS TO PROPERTY A CT, 1937, IN RE [AIR 1941 FC 72] TO MEAN 'PROPERTY OTHER THAN AGRIC ULTURAL LAND', OTHERWISE THE ACT WOULD HAVE BECOME UNCONSTITUTIONA L. 68. THE COURT MUST, THEREFORE, MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF A STATUTE, EVEN IF THAT REQUIRES GIVING THE STATUTORY PROVISION A STRAINED MEANING, OR NARROWER OR WIDER MEANING, THAN WHAT APPEARS ON THE FACE OF IT. IT IS ONLY WHEN ALL EFFORTS TO DO SO FAIL SHOULD THE COURT DECLARE A ST ATUTE TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 78. IN PARA 8 OF THE CONSTITUTION BENCH DECISION IN R.K. GARG CASE [R.K. GARG V. UNION OF INDIA, (1981) 4 SCC 675 : 19 82 SCC (TAX) 30] IT WAS OBSERVED (AS QUOTED ABOVE) THAT LAWS RELATIN G TO ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE VIEWED WITH GREATER LATITUDE T HAN LAWS TOUCHING CIVIL RIGHTS SUCH AS FREEDOM OF SPEECH, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, ETC. THUS, THE CONSTITUTION BENCH DECISION IN R.K. GARG CASE [ (1981) 4 SCC 675 : 1982 SCC (TAX) 30] IS AN AUTHORITY FOR THE PROPOS ITION WHICH HAS BEEN STATED HEREIN, NAMELY, WHEN A LAW OF THE LEGIS LATURE ENCROACHES ON THE CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OF THE PEOP LE MENTIONED IN PART III OF THE CONSTITUTION (THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS), SUCH AS FREEDOM OF SPEECH, FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, EQUALITY BEFORE LAW, L IBERTY, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, ETC., THE COURT WILL NOT GRANT SUCH LA TITUDE TO THE LEGISLATURE AS IN THE CASE OF ECONOMIC MEASURES, BU T WILL CAREFULLY SCRUTINISE WHETHER THE LEGISLATION ON THESE SUBJECT S IS VIOLATIVE OF THE RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES OF THE CITIZENS, AND ITS APPRO ACH MUST BE TO UPHOLD THOSE RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES, FOR WHICH IT MAY SOMETI MES EVEN HAVE TO DECLARE A STATUTE TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 79. SOME SCHOLARS REGARDED IT A PARADOX IN THE JUDG MENTS OF HOLMES, J. (WHO, AS WE HAVE ALREADY STATED ABOVE, WAS A DIS CIPLE OF THAYER) THAT WHILE HE URGED TOLERANCE AND DEFERENCE TO LEGI SLATIVE JUDGMENT IN BROAD AREAS OF LAW-MAKING CHALLENGED AS UNCONSTITUT IONAL, HE SEEMED 12 WILLING TO REVERSE THE PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONA LITY WHEN LAWS INHIBITING CIVIL LIBERTIES WERE BEFORE THE COURT. 80. HOWEVER, WE FIND NO PARADOX AT ALL. AS REGARDS ECONOMIC AND OTHER REGULATORY LEGISLATION JUDICIAL RESTRAINT MUS T BE OBSERVED BY THE COURT AND GREATER LATITUDE MUST BE GIVEN TO THE LEG ISLATURE WHILE ADJUDGING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STATUTE BECA USE THE COURT DOES NOT CONSIST OF ECONOMIC OR ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERTS. IT HAS NO EXPERTISE IN THESE MATTERS, AND IN THIS AGE OF SPECIALISATION WHEN POLICIES HAVE TO BE LAID DOWN WITH GREAT CARE AFTER CONSULTING TH E SPECIALISTS IN THE FIELD, IT WILL BE WHOLLY UNWISE FOR THE COURT TO EN CROACH INTO THE DOMAIN OF THE EXECUTIVE OR LEGISLATIVE (SIC LEGISLA TURE) AND TRY TO ENFORCE ITS OWN VIEWS AND PERCEPTIONS.' 22. THEREFORE EVEN LOOKING AT IT FROM THE PERSPECTI VE AS SET OUT IN THE AFORESAID JUDGMENT, WE ARE OF THE CLEAR VIEW THAT S ECTION 234E OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961 DOES NOT VIOLATE ANY PROVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND IS THEREFORE INTRA VIRES, CONSTITU TION OF INDIA. 23. IN VIEW OF THE AFORESAID DISCUSSION IN THIS JUD GMENT, WE FIND NO MERIT IN THIS WRIT PETITION AND THE SAME IS HEREBY DISMISSED. RULE IS DISCHARGED. HOWEVER, IN THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, WE LEAVE THE PARTIES TO BEAR THEIR OWN COSTS. THUS, THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT HAD CONSIDERED THE ISSU E AND DECIDED IN PARA 18 OF THE ORDER. FURTHER WE WOULD LIKE TO MENTIO N THAT SECTION 246A OF THE ACT PROVIDES REGARDING THE APPEALABLE O RDER BEFORE THE CIT(A). THE OUTCOME OF PROCESSING UNDER SUB-SECTION ( 1) OF SECTION 200A ARE APPEALABLE W.E.F. 01/6/2015 ONLY. PRIOR TO THAT THE LEVY OF FEES U/S 234E WAS NOT AN APPEALABLE ORDER. THUS, THE FEES FOR FAILURE TO FURNISH THE STATEMENT AS PER SECTION 200 OF THE AC T IS LEVIED U/S 234E OF THE ACT AND THE PERIOD FROM 01/7/2012 TO 01/6/20 15 IS NOT APPEALABLE. THUS, THE FEES LEVIED FOR DEFAULT IN QUA RTER 4 OF FINANCIAL YEAR 2013-14 AND THE DEMAND WAS RAISED ON 30/05/2014 IS NOT APPEALABLE. HOWEVER, THE REVENUE HAD NOT PRODUCED AN Y EVIDENCE TO 13 ESTABLISH THIS FACT. AS PER THE ASSESSEES CLAIM TH E DEMAND NOTICE HAD NOT RECEIVED ON E.MAIL AS MENTIONED BY THE REVENUE. THE RELEVANT DATE OF SERVICE OF NOTICE OF DEMAND IS 28/11/2016, THERE FORE, THIS ISSUE IS RESTORED BACK TO THE FILE OF THE LD. CIT(A) TO BE DE CIDED ON MERIT. 7. IN THE RESULT, THE APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE IS ALL OWED FOR STATISTICAL PURPOSES ONLY. ORDER PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON 10/04/2018. SD/- SD/- HKKXPAN DQY HKKJR (BHAGCHAND) (KUL BHARAT) YS[KK LNL;@ ACCOUNTANT MEMBER U;KF;D LNL;@ JUDICIAL MEMBER TK;IQJ@ JAIPUR FNUKAD@ DATED:- 10 TH APRIL, 2018 *RANJAN VKNS'K DH IZFRFYFI VXZSFKR @ COPY OF THE ORDER FORWARDED TO: 1. VIHYKFKHZ @ THE APPELLANT- SHRI SUBHASH CHAND NAWAL (HUF), AJMER. 2. IZR;FKHZ @ THE RESPONDENT- THE ITO, TDS, AJMER. 3. VK;DJ VK;QDR @ CIT 4. VK;DJ VK;QDRVIHY @ THE CIT(A) 5. FOHKKXH; IZFRFUF/K] VK;DJ VIHYH; VF/KDJ.K] T;IQJ @ DR, ITAT, JAIPUR 6. XKMZ QKBZY @ GUARD FILE (ITA NO. 1037/JP/2017) VKNS'KKUQLKJ @ BY ORDER, LGK;D IATHDKJ @ ASST. REGISTRAR