ITA Nos. 108 & 109/Jab/2018 (AYs. 2013-14 & 2014-15) Dy. CIT v. Jila Sahkari Kendriya Bank Maryadit 1 | P a g e IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, JABALPUR BENCH, JABALPUR BEFORE SH. SANJAY ARORA, HON'BLE ACCOUNTANT MEMBER & SH. MANOMOHAN DAS, HON’BLE JUDICIAL MEMBER ITA Nos. 108 & 109/JAB/2018 Assessment Years: 2013-14 & 2014-15 Deputy Commissioner Of Income Tax, Circle -1(1), Jabalpur vs. Jila Sahkari Kendriya Bank Maryadit, Wright Town, Jabalpur (M.P.) [PAN: AAAJJ 0118J] (Appellant) (Respondent) Appellant by Ms. Maya Maheshwari, CIT-DR Respondent by Sh. Neeraj Agrawal, C.A. Date of hearing 02/05/2022 Date of pronouncement 17/06/2022 ORDER Per Bench This is a set of two Appeals by the Revenue agitating the appellate Order under section 250(6) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’ hereinafter), allowing the assessee’s appeal contesting its’ assessments for assessment years (AYs) 2013-14 & 2014-15. The appeals raising common issues, were heard together, and are being disposed of per a common, consolidated order. We shall proceed year-wise. AY 2013-14 2.1 Vide the first ground, the Revenue claims non-compliance of rule 46A of the Income Tax Rules, 1962 (‘the Rules’ hereinafter); the same reading, as under: ‘1. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Ld. CIT (A)erred in restricting the provision to Rs. 2,40,00,000/- from Rs.3 crore made by the AO on account of disallowance of provision on interest on deposits on the ITA Nos. 108 & 109/Jab/2018 (AYs. 2013-14 & 2014-15) Dy. CIT v. Jila Sahkari Kendriya Bank Maryadit 2 | P a g e basis of working provided by the assessee. The Ld.CIT (A) has allowed the relief was allowed merely on the ground of production of certificate by bank.’ 2.2 Ms. Maheshwari, the ld. CIT-DR, would toward this take us through the assessment as well as the impugned order. It was, she would submit, only at the first appellate stage, that the assessee furnished the working of the interest payable as at the year-end, i.e., 31/03/2013, for which the provision was disallowed in assessment, explaining that due to the ongoing implementation of the core banking services (CBS), the interest payable on the deposit accounts for the latter half of the year, i.e., from October 2012 to March 2013, remained to be applied, resulting in an ad hoc manual provision for Rs. 300 lacs when it was later realized that no provision had been made by CBS. Subsequent actual working of the interest payable for the said period, however, revealed it to be at Rs. 240 lacs. The ld. CIT(A) allowed part relief on that basis, refurbished by a bank certificate, without allowing any opportunity to the AO to verify the claim. 2.3 The assessee’s case, on the other hand, is that the issue survives no longer inasmuch as it was the subject matter of the assessee’s appeal (for the same year) as well, and which stands since decided by the Tribunal (in ITA No. 74/Jab/2018, dated 05/04/2019), and toward which Sh. Agrawal, the ld. counsel for the assessee, would read out the relevant part of its order (at PB pgs. 33-35). Per the same, it stands explained by the Tribunal that the interest payable (for the period 01/10/2012 to 31/03/2013) as per the interest chart produced by the assessee was in fact at Rs. 540 lacs. There was thus in fact a short provision for Rs. 240 lacs, which had been misunderstood by the ld. CIT(A) to mean an excess provision by Rs. 60 lacs, and who accordingly confirmed the disallowance to that extent, since deleted in adjudication of the assessee’s appeal thereagainst, so that no issue, in substance, arises for consideration. 3. We have heard the parties, and perused the material on record. ITA Nos. 108 & 109/Jab/2018 (AYs. 2013-14 & 2014-15) Dy. CIT v. Jila Sahkari Kendriya Bank Maryadit 3 | P a g e The Revenue’s case is not qua the merits of the case per se, but qua the non-verification and non-examination (of the assessee’s claim) on account of non-observance of the principles of natural justice enshrined in rule 46A. The ld. CIT(A) does not, as a reading of his order shows, record any finding of the assessee’s case as falling under any of the clauses of r. 46A, mandatory in character. Further, not only does he not call for the AO’s comments thereon, i.e., the interest claim, produced by the assessee before him for the first time – which he ought to have, he also did not cause verification thereof himself, which thus continues to outstand. This aspect, arising from the impugned order, it needs to be appreciated, is qualitatively different from that decided by the Tribunal inasmuch as a denial of admission of additional evidence, being in breach of r. 46A, would result in cancellation of the relief, allowed successively by the first and second appellate authorities. Their orders are predicated on the asseessee’s working being correct, which may not necessarily be so. Further, as a mere browse of r. 46A(3) would show, verification of a claim does not necessarily imply and, in any case, is not confined to the quantum alone, i.e., the arithmetical accuracy thereof, and may have well have other aspects to it. Also, and even as apparent from the grounds before the Tribunal and it’s findings, it is wholly incorrect to say, as Sh. Agrawal would before us, of the matter not surviving the disposal of the assessee’s appeal by the Tribunal. Under the circumstances, we only consider it proper to remit the matter back to be file of the ld. CIT(A) for causing compliance of rule 46A. And decide after allowing due opportunity of hearing to both the sides before him per a speaking order and in accordance with law. In this regard, we discern certain aspects of the matter that call for consideration/inquiry in the matter, which we therefore bring forth. It is not clear whether the manual provision referred to stands made in the books of account, or outside them, as in the computation of taxable income, an aspect not clear from the material on record. A provision outside books, though not disqualified per se, and valid where ITA Nos. 108 & 109/Jab/2018 (AYs. 2013-14 & 2014-15) Dy. CIT v. Jila Sahkari Kendriya Bank Maryadit 4 | P a g e otherwise in order, the subsequent accounting treatment assumes relevance as the same would require an adjustment (to that extent), in computing taxable income, of the profit/loss disclosed per the operating statement for the period in which the said interest is accounted for in books. It also gives rise to the question of as to how the assessee has accounted for the interest short provided (Rs. 240 lacs), i.e., in the subsequent (succeeding) year/s. This is as the depositor would need to be allowed the contracted interest, and which the assessee, being obliged to, would have surely provided for later, even as it, following mercantile system of accounting, cannot claim the same for the relevant previous year in view of an omission to provide for it for the relevant year. This, it needs to be borne in mind, is not a case of a provision being made on the basis of the best information available, adjusted subsequently on crystallization or resolution of a dispute or the relevant facts. Another related aspect is the applicability of s. 40(a)(ia). Inasmuch as and to the extent the interest provided is subject to tax deduction at source, non- deduction thereof would attract disallowance u/s. 40(a)(ia). It needs to be appreciated that the AO disallowed the claim in the absence of any details, while implicit in its allowance is it being toward an ascertained liability, even if on estimated basis, in respect of identified payees. We may though clarify that as the actual provision by the bank (Rs. 300 lacs) is far lower than that exigible (Rs. 540 lacs), the assessee-bank is at liberty to appropriate the provision made against the depositor accounts on which no (or minimal) tax is deductible, i.e., with a view to avoid or minimize the incidence of s. 40(a)(ia), subject to which only deduction u/s. 36(1)(iii) is admissible. This however would not disturb the appropriation already made. We may not, we though clarify, be construed as having issued of any final finding/s, but as only highlighting the areas that, among others, arise for consideration and adjudication. Where and to the extent, however, there has already been a specific consideration, followed by a definite finding/s, the same ITA Nos. 108 & 109/Jab/2018 (AYs. 2013-14 & 2014-15) Dy. CIT v. Jila Sahkari Kendriya Bank Maryadit 5 | P a g e cannot be visited again inasmuch as the AO cannot review his order. The foregoing, if anything, only points to the vital need for deciding cross appeals together, as exhorted by the hon’ble higher courts of law time and again, as well as by having regard to the due process of law. We decide accordingly. 4. Per Ground 2, the second and the only issue raised by the Revenue is in respect of allowance of appropriation of profit by the assessee for: a) Statutory Reserve (Rs. 120 lacs); b) Agriculture Credit Fund (Rs. 60 lacs); and c) Building Fund (Rs. 9.60 lacs) , i.e., toward certain contingencies and/or applications. The ld. CIT(A) allowed the same on the basis that the same were in view and in terms of the guidelines and the directions by the regulatory bodies, being RBI and NABARD. 5. We have heard the parties, and perused the material on record. The accounting treatment apart, the income chargeable to tax is to be computed as per the provision of the Act (see, inter alia, Poona Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. CIT [1965] 57 ITR 521 (SC); Southern Technologies Ltd. v. Jt. CIT [2010] 320 ITR 577 (SC)). It is not clarified at any stage, including before us, as to under which provision of law the impugned sums are being claimed as deduction in the computation of income chargeable to tax as income from business, assessable u/s. 28. The ld. CIT(A) has not clarified the specific guideline or direction where-under the ‘reserve’ has been created, as for example ‘building fund’, nor has the same been pointed out to us. In fact, the nature of the sum/s under reference as an appropriation (of profit) or as ‘reserve’ is not in dispute. The same is only an appropriation of profit, set aside for some specific purpose, even if in terms of the guidelines by the regulatory body, and not a provision toward any business liability, much less ascertained, and therefore ineligible for deduction. Even as the law in the matter is well-settled, the Revenue relies on the decision in Associated Power Corporation Ltd. v. CIT [1996] 218 ITR 195 ITA Nos. 108 & 109/Jab/2018 (AYs. 2013-14 & 2014-15) Dy. CIT v. Jila Sahkari Kendriya Bank Maryadit 6 | P a g e (SC). In fact, no serious objection thereto was raised before us by Sh. Agrawal. We, accordingly, have no hesitation in, reversing the findings by the ld. CIT(A), allowing the Revenues’ relevant Ground. We decide accordingly. AY 2014-15 6. Grounds 1 & 2 for this year relate to the disallowance of Gratuity Payable (GP) u/s. 43B of the Act, as under:- (a) Gratuity Payable : Rs. 1,09,36,936/- (b) Gratuity Payable 464 : Rs. 1,61,31,488/- The ld. CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s claim qua (a) as there was, due to change in the system from manual to CBS, no provision for Rs. 109.37 lacs obtaining for the relevant year, the provision (for gratuity payable) as on 31/03/2014, the year-end, being the same as the provision (for gratuity payable) as on 31/03/2013, so that the incremental provision for f.y. 2013-14, i.e., the relevant previous year, was nil. For (b), the ld. CIT(A) allowed the assessee’s claim as, against the available opening (as on 31/03/2013) provision for Rs. 179.29 lacs, the closing provision (as on 31/03/2014) was at Rs. 161.31 lacs, so that no fresh provision had been booked during the relevant year so as to warrant any disallowance. 7. We have heard the parties, and perused the material on record. 7.1 Our first observation in the matter is that the Revenue’s ground before us is again as to the absence of opportunity to the AO (Gd.1). Ms. Maheshwari, the ld. CIT-DR, would emphasize on the disallowances being made only on the basis of the audit report (para 26(i)(B)(b)), which clearly provides for sums specified in sec. 43B which stand debited to the profit & loss account (for the relevant year) though not paid during the said year. Shri Agrawal would, on the other hand, rely on the balance-sheets dated 31/03/2013 & 31/03/2014, as well ITA Nos. 108 & 109/Jab/2018 (AYs. 2013-14 & 2014-15) Dy. CIT v. Jila Sahkari Kendriya Bank Maryadit 7 | P a g e as the ledger accounts furnished before the ld. CIT(A) in clarification of the assessee’s case, none of them being however brought on record. 7.2 In relation to the sum of Rs. 109.37 lacs, while the AO mentions of the same being an outstanding liability for f.y. 2013-14 on the basis of the audit report, the ld. CIT(A) states it to be nil. How could this be? Does it mean that the audit report, which is the assessee’s evidence and, further, only based on its’ accounts, is factually wrong? Further, even so, does it further mean that either the provision (as on 31/03/2013) has been reversed on 01/04/2013 (by credit to the profit & loss account), or the entire gratuity payable outstanding for payment as on 31/3/2013 paid during fy 2013-14, the relevant financial year? No answer was forthcoming during hearing. Rather, one wonders as to why the assessee has maintained two accounts of gratuity payable. Even Shri Agrawal would state that the two provisions (and the corresponding disallowances) be regarded separately. As it appears to us, the two accounts (which represent liability on the same account) arise only on account of a change in the manner of account-keeping, i.e., from manual to CBS. Taking the two provisions together, which can have no adverse impact, the position (as per the assessee) is summarized as under:- (Amount in Rs. lacs) Provision as on 31/03/ 2014 2013 GP A/c 1 - 109.37 GP A/c 2 161.31 179.29 Total (GP 1 + GP 2) 161.31 288.66 Difference (opg. – clg.) 127.35 Now, there ought to be a credit (due to reversal of provision) to the profit & loss account or a payment of gratuity, or both, to the extent of Rs. 127.35 lacs during f.y. 2013-14, the previous year relevant for AY 2014-15. There is no such finding by the ld. CIT(A). He has in fact issued no finding qua any debit or credit to the profit & loss account which, where so, would only be on the basis ITA Nos. 108 & 109/Jab/2018 (AYs. 2013-14 & 2014-15) Dy. CIT v. Jila Sahkari Kendriya Bank Maryadit 8 | P a g e of the material on his record, not before the AO, even as he was bound to do so only upon observing the prescribed procedure in its respect (r. 46A). This becomes all the more incumbent in view of his finding/s being inconsistent with the Auditors’ report. Neither the balance-sheets (as on 31/3/2014 & 31/3/2013), nor the audit report nor even the computation of income, is a part of the record. Again, there is no finding by him if the provision is based on actuarial valuation, as he himself notes the law to be (para 5, page 12 of his order). The matter would, under the circumstances, necessarily require being restored to the file of the AO for determination afresh in accordance with law per a speaking order after hearing the assessee. We direct so, vacating the findings by the ld. CIT(A). The AO shall, to the extent his order is inconsistent with the audit report, also seek clarification therefrom as to the basis of their report/s, making it a part of his order. He shall also ascertain about the disallowance, if any, u/s. 40A(7) or u/s. 43B, in respect of the opening provision. It may here be relevant to state that regard is to be had in the matter of both sec. 40A(7) and sec. 43B inasmuch as s. 43B applies only to sums ‘otherwise allowable’. It is thus only the sum allowable u/s. 37(1) r/w s. 40A(7) that shall be allowed subject to the condition of actual payment, as mandated by sec. 43B; the balance getting excluded (disallowed) u/s. 40A(7) itself. The aspect of the provision booked being in accordance with the actuarial valuation (or otherwise scientifically and empirically validated), would also have to be clarified. 7.3 We decide accordingly. 8. Ground 3 by the Revenue is toward denial of any opportunity to the AO to ascertain the veracity of the assessee’s claim in respect of NPA provision, i.e., for bad and doubtful debts; the same reading as: ‘3. The Ld. CIT(A) deleted the disallowance made on the NPA provisions of Rs.6,97,23,579/- accepting the detailed working of NPA without giving any opportunity to the AO to ascertain the veracity of the claim made.’ ITA Nos. 108 & 109/Jab/2018 (AYs. 2013-14 & 2014-15) Dy. CIT v. Jila Sahkari Kendriya Bank Maryadit 9 | P a g e The AO, in assessment, allowed it at Rs. 22.76 lacs, disallowing the balance Rs. 697.24 lacs. The ld. CIT(A), in first appeal, justified the claim u/s. 36(1)(viia) at Rs. 720 lacs, i.e., at 7.5% of income (before any provision) plus 10% of the aggregate average advances made by the rural branches of the bank. 9. Before us, while the Revenue’s case was of non-verification of its’ claim by the assessee before the AO, the assessee would submit otherwise; Shri Agrawal adducing letter dated 10/11/2016 to the AO, enclosing the working of the provision at Rs. 720 lacs. He was, however, on asking, unable to answer as to if the assessee had reversed the opening provision or, in the alternative, made incremental provision or made a fresh provision (i.e., on the basis of the average balance obtaining during the relevant year), in addition to the carried over provision. The AO has, restricting the allowance for the provision for bad and doubtful debts to only 7.5% of the income, relied on the Auditors’ observations in the report, which reads as under: (para 2, pg. 3 of the assessment order) “The bank does not have a real time system of identification of NPA accounts. The NPA accounts are identified at the year-end on the basis of information provided by the branches. The unrealized interest and other bank charges in all such case have been booked as income during the year, which has resulted in overstatement of profit for the year. This wrong classification of advances as mentioned above, would also affect the provision made by the bank as standard & NPA accounts, which in turn would also affect the profit shown by the branch. We are unable to quantify the turn effect of the same, due to voluminous transaction and inability expressed by the bank to provide proper details. This explains the exclusion of the sum reckoned with reference to the average balance of the advances made by the rural branches of the bank in allowing the provision u/s. 36(1)(viia) by the AO. The ld. CIT(A) has rendered his findings de hors that by the AO, or even addressing the reason/s recorded by him, and on which his order is based. The assessee’s auditors have found no proper system of identification of NPA accounts. Also, the bank booking unrealized interest (on NPA accounts) as its’ income, the same also results in an inflation of the ITA Nos. 108 & 109/Jab/2018 (AYs. 2013-14 & 2014-15) Dy. CIT v. Jila Sahkari Kendriya Bank Maryadit 10 | P a g e provision for bad and doubtful debts. How, then, could the assessee’s claim be accepted as it is? The AO’s argument is unexceptional, and his findings, categorical. When he states that the assessee did not issue any clarification before him (at para 2 of his order), the AO was only referring to the non- clarification of the issues arising in the wake of the auditors’ report, referred to in the said para itself. The ld. CIT(A) has decided the matter without appreciating Revenue’s case. The same accordingly survives the assessee’s reply dated 10/11/2016, which has been though not referred to by the ld. CIT(A). Proper identification of NPA accounts is a pre-requisite for provisioning. This is as it is only the unrealized interest in such accounts that, though not received, is yet booked as income. Two, it is this interest which, on debit to the borrowers’ accounts, results in excess provision in respect of such interest, i.e., to the extent it forms part of the borrowers’ balance, resulting in a provision in excess of hundred percent of such interest. That is, firstly, by way of provision in respect of the unrealized interest, which is at hundred percent thereof and, then, on the balance outstanding in the borrower account (i.e., to the extent it includes interest), according to the rate specified for the relevant category of the sub-standard asset under which the NPA a/c falls, resulting thus in an overall provision against the unrealized interest in excess of the amount thereof. The matter has been examined in detail by this Tribunal in ITO vs. Jila Sahkari Kendriya Bank Maryadit, Seoni (ITA Nos. 97, 99 & 100/Jab/2018, dated 29/04/2022), and the matter restored to the file of the AO for verification and fresh determination in light thereof. Our detailed observations in the said order, discussing these aspects in greater detail, would be equally applicable to the assessee’s case as well and, thus, relied upon. In the instant case, the issue gets further compounded due to no proper identification of the NPA accounts in place, as observed by the Auditor. The provision afore-said, to the extent it relates to an account which is not a NPA, is wholly unwarranted, i.e., other than that eligible qua a standard asset. That is, ITA Nos. 108 & 109/Jab/2018 (AYs. 2013-14 & 2014-15) Dy. CIT v. Jila Sahkari Kendriya Bank Maryadit 11 | P a g e the verification for which the matter stands to be remanded to the AO, is premised on a correct identification of NPA accounts, i.e., as per the RBI norms. No proper verification is feasible without proper mechanism for identifying the NPA accounts, and which explains the reservation expressed by the Auditor, duly taken note of by the AO. We may though clarify that it does not imply, as the AO infers, that there are no NPA accounts, which led him to his not reckoning NPA provision insofar as it relates to advances by the rural branches of the bank. The provision for bad and doubtful debts qualifying u/s. 36(1)(viia) would obtain even in the absence of any NPA account. It is only the interest on such accounts, as the same is not to be, unless realized, accounted for, but kept in a memoranda account (for being recognized as income on receipt), that makes identification of NPA accounts relevant. The norms of NPA classification being well laid down, the assessee shall specify the AO qua the same. The AO may, at his discretion, require being satisfied on such accounts classified as NPA, or qua those identified by him on a sample basis. The matter, setting aside the impugned order qua the said issue, is restored to the file of the AO for fresh determination per a speaking order, with a view to allow the assessee an opportunity to establish its’ claims before him. Lest it may appear that we have extended the scope of the proceedings, we may clarify that this arises directly in consequence of the AO’s findings, not appreciated by the ld. CIT(A), and in fact also explains his omission of the component of provision u/s. 36(1)(viia) which is to be reckoned with reference to the average balance of the debts due by the rural branches of the bank during the relevant year. The issue is thus discerned as arising from a conjoint reading of the assessment and the first appellate order, i.e., being the correct/proper (i.e., as per law) quantification of the provision for bad and doubtful debts, particularly in view of the non-identification of NPA accounts and the consequence of booking of unrealized interest on such accounts as income. Further, we remand the matter only in the interest of justice, even as explained ITA Nos. 108 & 109/Jab/2018 (AYs. 2013-14 & 2014-15) Dy. CIT v. Jila Sahkari Kendriya Bank Maryadit 12 | P a g e by the Apex Court in CIT v. Walchand & Co. (P.) Ltd. [1967] 65 ITR 381 (SC), while dealing with the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, that it is to deal with and determine questions which arise out of the subject-matter of the appeal in the light of the evidence, and consistently with the justice of the case. This is as the Auditors’ report is an expert opinion, based on the assessee’s own accounts, of which this Tribunal is therefore to have due regard and, besides, has not been rebutted or countered at any stage, including before us. Reference here may also be made to rules 11 & 27 of the Income Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963. Our decision in this regard is also guided by the consideration that perhaps the CBS has been by now fully implemented by the Bank, so that the assessee may be in a position to arrive at a proper classification of NPA accounts (as at the relevant year-end). We may also clarify that the reversal of provision for bad and doubtful debts (as at the year-end), which is liable to be reversed on the opening day of the following year, is only insofar as it is based on the average balance of advances by the rural branches of the bank. This is as otherwise the bank would be provisioning in respect of assets obtaining no longer, i.e., being not on it’s books inasmuch as the same stand since recovered. The provision could continue ad infinitum, surpassing, in time, the total value of the outstanding debt. The same is to be therefore restricted to the incremental advances, i.e., where the provision as outstanding at a year-end is, as a matter of accounting procedure/method, not followed by its reversal on the first day of the year following, at the end of which the same would be revisited and provided on the basis of risk assessment at the relevant time/at the per cent prescribed. The provision to the extent it relates to the percentage of income is based only on the income of each year and, thus, is to continue to obtain in the assessee’s accounts, increasing each year to the extent of the specified percentage of the income of each following year. The provision account, comprising both components, is only to be adjusted against actual write off of the bad debts. The reversal of provision as at the beginning of the following year is though to be ITA Nos. 108 & 109/Jab/2018 (AYs. 2013-14 & 2014-15) Dy. CIT v. Jila Sahkari Kendriya Bank Maryadit 13 | P a g e made for the full amount of the corresponding provision made at the close of the immediately preceding year, as outstanding. This is as this only would ensure that the provision is, as at the end of each year, capped at the prescribed percentage of the advances by the rural branches of the bank, other than of course the outstanding part thereof made on the basis of income, which is not liable for reversal. Any excess of the actual write off of bad debts u/s. 36(1)(vii), if any, in excess of the amount available under provision account, is to be debited to the P&L A/c for the relevant year. We decide accordingly. 10. In the result, the Revenue’s appeal 108/Jab/2018 (for AY 2013-14) is allowed, and 109/Jab/2018 (for AY 2014-15) is allowed for statistical purposes. Order pronounced in the Open court on June 17, 2022 sd/- sd/- (Manomohan Das) (Sanjay Arora) Judicial Member Accountant Member Dated: 17/06/2022 Copy of the Order forwarded to: 1. The Appellant: Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle - 1(1) Jabalpur (M.P.) 2. The Respondent: Jila Sahkari Kendriya Bank Maryadit, Sahakari Sadan, Wright Town, Jabalpur (M.P.) 3. The Principal CIT – 1, Jabalpur (M.P) 4. CIT (Appeals)-1 Jabalpur (M.P) 5. The CIT-DR, ITAT, Jabalpur (M.P) 6. Guard File