Rajalakshmi Vettrivel, New Delhi V. ACIT, CHENNAI

ITA 1109/CHNY/2017

• Counselvise Citation: [2017] 127 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 6224 (ITAT-CHENNAI)
• Duration Of Justice: 3 month(s) 28 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 31-08-2017
• Appeal Filed By: Assessee
• Order Result: Dismissed
• Bench Allotted: B
• Assessment Year: 2005-2006
• Appeal Filed On: 03-05-2017
• Result in Favour of: Revenue
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: B SAGADEVAN JICIT D R
• Assessee Lawyers: N DEVANATHAN
• Keywords: Unexplained investment; Gift; Principle of natural justice; Peak credit; Reasonable cause; Condonation of delay
• Section: 273B; 142(1)

Judgement Text

, B/ SMC , IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL B/SMC BENCH, CHENNAI . , BEFORE SHRI CHANDRA POOJARI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER I.T.A.NOS.1106,1107,1108,1109,1110 & 1111 /MDS./2017 ( ASSESSMENT YEARS :2002-03, 2003-04,2004-05,2005-06, 2006-07 & 2007-08) SMT.RAJALAKSHMI VETT RIVEL , B-272,GROUND FLOOR, B-BLOCK REAR FLAT, GREATER KAILASH PART-I, NEW DELHI-110 048. VS. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, CENTRAL CIRCLE-III(4), CHENNAI. PAN ACGPV 1471 Q ( / APPELLANT ) ( / RESPONDENT ) / APPELLANT BY : MR.N.DEVANATHAN, ADVOCATE / RESPONDENT BY : MR.B.SAGADEVAN, JICIT, D.R ! ' / DATE OF HEARING : 12.07.2017 #$%& ! ' /DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT : 31.08.2017 / O R D E R PER CHANDRA POOJARI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER: ALL THESE SIX APPEALS ARE FILED BY THE ASSESSEE ARE DIRECTED AGAINST THE COMMON ORDER OF THE LEARNED COMMISSIONE R OF INCOME TAX(A)-19, CHENNAI, DATED 19.12.2015, WHICH WAS PAS SED CONSEQUENT TO ORDER OF A.O PASSED U/S. 153C R.W.S. 144 OF THE ACT ITA NOS.1106 TO 1111/MDS/2017 2 FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEARS 2002-03, 2003-04,2004-05,2 005-06, 2006- 07, 2007-08. SINCE ISSUES INVOLVED IN ALL THESE AS SESSEES APPEALS ARE COMMON IN NATURE, THESE APPEALS ARE CLUBBED TOG ETHER, HEARD TOGETHER, DISPOSED OFF BY THIS COMMON ORDER FOR THE SAKE OF CONVENIENCE. 2. THE ASSESSEE RAISED THE FOLLOWING COMMON GROUND S IN THESE SIX APPEALS AS FOLLOWS:- 1. THE ORDER OF THE LEARNED CIT (A) IS (A) CONTRARY TO LAW, FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, (B) OPPOSED TO PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE AND LE GITIMATE EXPECTATION EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND THERE EXISTS NO SATISFACTION FOR EMPLOYING 153C (C) FAIR PROCEDURE IN REGARD TO ASST AND NON FURNIS HING OF MATERIALS IN REGARD TO ADDITIONS AND AGAINST DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND ABSENCE OF INCRIMINATORY MATERIALS. 2. THE LEARNED CIT (A) FUNDAMENTALLY FAILED TO APP RECIATE THAT THE AC LACKS JURISDICTION SINCE THE CONDITIONS FOR INVOKIN G SECTION 144 IS NOT SATISFIED AND HENCE THE WHOLE ASSESSMENT IS NULLITY IN LAW. 3. THE LEARNED CIT(A) FUNDAMENTALLY FAILED TO APPR ECIATE THAT THE INGREDIENTS TO INVOKE SECTION 144 ARE SINGULARLY AB SENT SINCE THE APPELLANT HAS REPLIED TO THE NOTICE ISSUED BY THE L EARNED AC AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE THE ASSESSING OFFICER HAD NOT ISSUED MATE RIAL NOTICE STATING THE BASIS OF HIS ADDITIONS SOUGHT TO BE MADE AND JU STIFICATION FOR MAKING ADDITIONS AND THE MATERIALS HE SOUGHT TO BASE HIS R EASONS AND MISERABLY FAILED TO DISCHARGE ONUS. 4. THE ORDER OF THE AO IS FULL OF CLAIRVOYANCE OF REASONING COUPLED WITH SUSPICION, SURMISES AND CONJECTURES AND SUCH ASSESS MENT IS AB-INITIO VOID AND NULLITY ( SEE 37 ITR 26 ITR 736 & 775 SC 3 7 ITR 151 AND 37 ITR 288 SC) 5. THE LEARNED CIT (A) ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE ADDI TIONS WITHOUT MAKING ANY SORT OF ENQUIRY, HUMAN PROBABILITY AND DISCRETION I N REGARD TO ITA NOS.1106 TO 1111/MDS/2017 3 INTRODUCTION OF CAPITAL, UNSECURED IOANS,IOW DRAWIN GS, ALLEGED INVESTMENTS WITHOUT ANY BASIS 6. THE LEARNED CIT ERRED IN ABDICATING HIS DUTY TO ACT JUDICIOUSLY AND JUDICIALLY, WHEN PARTICULARS WERE AVAILABLE. 7. THE LEARNED CIT (A) ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE ADDI TION MADE U/S 234A.,234B& 234C OF THE INCOME TAX ACT 3. THERE WAS A DELAY OF 744 DAYS IN FILING ALL THE SE SIX APPEALS BEFORE THIS TRIBUNAL. THE LD.A.R DREW MY ATTENTION TO THE CONDONATION PETITION/AFFIDAVIT FILED BY THE ASSESSEE, WHICH REA DS AS UNDER:- AFFIDAVIT APPELLANT: RAJALAKSHMI VETTRIVEL I STATE THAT THE DELAY IN FILING THE APPEAL IS NEIT HER WILFUL NOR DELIBERATE BUT DUE TO DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS INITIATED BY HIS SPOUSE AND THE PETITIONER WAS UNDER SEVERE MENTAL PAIN AND AGONY. THE PETITIONER WAS BUSY WITH THE SAID COURT PROCEEDINGS AND HENCE THE DELAY. THE APPELLANT RELIES ON THE FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES DE DUCED FROM THE CASE LAW JUSTIFICATION FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY. TH E RELEVANT PRINCIPLES, FROM SELECTED CASES, ARE SUMMARISED AS FOLLOWS: THE APPELLANT SUBMIT AND INVITE ATTENTION TO ARTICL E 39A OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA MANDATES THAT JUSTICE SHOULD NOT BE DENIED ON ACCOUNT OF DISABILITY OF THE PETITIONER. I ALSO INV ITE THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE GOVERNMENT AS ADUMBRATED IN ITS CIRCULAR BY WAY OF INSTRUCTIONS WHICH IS REPRODUCED BELOW: (EXTRACT FROM THE JUDGM ENT REPORTED IN 130 ITR 442) ITA NOS.1106 TO 1111/MDS/2017 4 IN THEIR LETTER TO THE CBDT [PART OF EX. E (COLLECT IVELY) TO THE PETITION] THE STATEMENTS MADE ON BEHALF OF THE BOARD AND THE ASSURANCES GIVEN BY THE GOVERNMENT TO THE PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMM ITTEE IN 1967-68, HAVE BEEN SET OUT. THE COMMITTEE HAD INQUI RED WHETHER BY REASON OF CONSIDERATIONS OF TIME BAR REFUNDS WER E DENIED IN CASES OF OVER-ASSESSMENTS. THE FINANCE SECRETARY HA D THEN STATED: SUCH INSTRUCTIONS ARE ALREADY THERE. REGARDING REVI SION PETITIONS, WE ADVISED THE COMMISSIONERS OF INCOME-TAX TO CONDONE THE DELAY EVEN THOUGH THE PETITIONS ARE FILED BEYOND THE PERMISSIB LE LIMIT OF TWO YEARS. WE CONDONE DELAY IN HUNDREDS OF CASES. WE HAVE INST RUCTED THAT IT SHOULD BE CONDONED FREELY. THE COMMITTEE IN ITS RE PORT HAS ALSO REFERRED TO A NOTE FURNISHED BY THE FINANCE MINISTRY, IN WHI CH IT IS STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT IS ANXIOUS TO DISCHARGE ITS MORAL OBLIGA TION, WAIVING LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS . IN THE NOTE, IT HAS BEEN FURTHER STA TED THAT: UNDER THE ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS THE COMMISSI ONERS ARE REQUIRED TO REFER TO THE GOVERNMENT CASES OF OVER-ASSESSMENTS O CCURRING DUE TO MISTAKES OF LAW OR FACT RELATING TO THE COMPUTATION OF TOTAL INCOME OR TAX THEREON WHICH CANNOT NORMALLY BE RECTIFIED DUE TO T HE OPERATION OF THE LAW OF LIMITATION. IN ALL SUITABLE CASES THE GOVERNMENT DOES WAIVE THE LIMITATION AND REFUNDS ARE INVARIABLY ALLOWED . SIMILARLY THE APEX COURT IN THE CASE OF COMMISSIONE R LAND ACQUISITION MS KATIJI 167 ITR 471SC AS UNDER:- THE LEGISLATURE HAS CONFERRED THE POWER TO CONDONE DELAY BY ENACTING SECTION 51 OF THE LIMITATION ACT OF 1963 IN ORDER T O ENABLE THE COURTS TO DO ITA NOS.1106 TO 1111/MDS/2017 5 SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE TO PARTIES BY DISPOSING OF MATT ERS ON DE MERITS . THE EXPRESSION SUFFICIENT CAUSE EMPLOYED BY THE LEGIS LATURE IS ADEQUATELY ELASTIC TO ENABLE THE COURTS TO APPLY THE LAW IN A MEANINGFUL MANNER WHICH SUBSERVES THE ENDS OF JUSTICE THAT BEING THE LIFE-P URPOSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE INSTITUTION OF COURTS. IT IS COMMON KNOWLEDG E THAT THIS COURT HAS BEEN MAKING A JUSTIFIABLY LIBERAL APPROACH IN MATTE RS INSTITUTED IN THIS COURT. BUT THE MESSAGE DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE PERC OLATED DOWN TO ALL THE OTHER COURTS IN THE HIERARCHY. AND SUCH A LIBERAL APPROACH IS ADOPTED ON PRINCIPLE AS IT IS REALIZED THAT: 1. ORDINARILY, A LITIGANT DOES NOT STAND TO BENEFIT BY LODGING AN APPEAL LATE. 2. REFUSING TO CONDONE DELAY CAN RESULT IN A MERITO RIOUS MATTER BEING THROWN OUT AT THE VERY THRESHOLD AND CAUSE OF JUSTI CE BEING DEFEATED. AS AGAINST THIS, WHEN DELAY IS CONDONED, THE HIGHEST T HAT CAN HAPPEN IS THAT A CAUSE WOULD BE DECIDED ON MERITS AFTER HEARING TH E PARTIES. ----- 1. ANY APPEAL OR ANY APPLICATION, OTHER THAN AN APPLICATION UNDER ANY OF THE PROVISIO NS OF ORDER XXI OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908, MAY BE ADMITTED AFTE R THE PRESCRIBED PERIOD IF THE APPELLANT OR THE APPLICANT SATISFIES THE COURT THAT HE HAD SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR NOT PREFERRING THE APPEAL OR M AKING THE APPLICATION WITHIN SUCH PERIOD. PAGE NO: 0473 3. EVERY DAYS DELAY MUST BE EXPLAINED DOES NOT M EAN THAT A PEDANTIC APPROACH SHOULD BE MADE. WHY NOT EVERY HOURS DELAY , EVERY SECONDS DELAY? THE DOCTRINE MUST BE APPLIED IN A RATIONAL, COMMON SENSE AND PRAGMATIC MANNER. ITA NOS.1106 TO 1111/MDS/2017 6 4. WHEN SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE AND TECHNICAL CONSIDERA TIONS ARE PITTED AGAINST EACH OTHER, THE CAUSE OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTIC E DESERVES TO BE PREFERRED, FOR THE OTHER SIDE CANNOT CLAIM TO HAVE VESTED RIGHT IN INJUSTICE BEING DONE BECAUSE OF A NON-DELIBERATE DELAY. 5. THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION THAT DELAY IS OCCASIONED DELIBERATELY, OR ON ACCOUNT OF CULPABLE NEGLIGENCE, OR ON ACCOUNT OF MA LA FIDES. A LITIGANT DOES NOT STAND TO BENEFIT BY RESORTING TO DELAY. IN FACT, HE RUNS A SERIOUS RISK. 6. IT MUST BE GRASPED THAT THE JUDICIARY IS RESPECT ED NOT ON ACCOUNT OF ITS POWER TO LEGALIZE INJUSTICE ON TECHNICAL GROUNDS BU T BECAUSE IT IS CAPABLE OF REMOVING INJUSTICE AND IS EXPECTED TO DO SO. MAKING A JUSTICE-ORIENTED APPROACH FROM THIS PERSPE CTIVE, THERE WAS SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR CONDONING THE DELAY IN THE INS TITUTION OF THE APPEAL. THE FACT THAT IT WAS THE STATE WHICH WAS SEEKIN G CONDONATION AND NOT A PRIVATE PARTY WAS ALTOGETHER IRRELEVANT. THE DOCTRI NE OF EQUALITY BEFORE LAW DEMANDS THAT ALL LITIGANTS, INCLUDING THE STATE AS A LITIGANT, ARE ACCORDED THE SAME TREATMENT AND THE LAW IS ADMINISTERED IN A N EVEN-HANDED MANNER. THERE IS NO WARRANT FOR ACCORDING A STEP-MO THERLY TREATMENT WHEN THE STATE IS THE APPLICANT PRAYING FOR CONDO NATION OF DELAY. IN FACT, EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT ON ACCOUNT OF AN IMPERSONAL M ACHINERY (NO ONE IN CHARGE OF THE MATTER IS DIRECTLY HIT OR HURT BY THE JUDGMENT SOUGHT TO BE SUBJECTED TO APPEAL) AND THE INHERITED BUREAUCRATIC METHODOLOGY IMBUED WITH THE NOTE-MAKING, FILE-PUSHING, AND PASSING-ON- THE-BUCK ETHOS, DELAY ON ITS PART IS LESS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND THOUGH MORE DIFFICULT TO APPROVE. ITA NOS.1106 TO 1111/MDS/2017 7 IN ANY EVENT, THE STATE WHICH REPRESENTS THE COLLEC TIVE CAUSE OF THE COMMUNITY, DOES NOT DESERVE A LITIGANT NON GRATA ST ATUS. THE COURTS, THEREFORE, HAVE TO BE INFORMED OF THE SPIRIT AND PH ILOSOPHY OF THE PROVISION IN THE COURSE OF THE INTERPRETATION OF THE EXPRESSI ON SUFFICIENT CAUSE . SO ALSO THE SAME APPROACH HAS TO BE EVIDENCED IN ITS A PPLICATION TO MATTERS AT HAND WITH THE END IN VIEW TO DO EVEN-HANDED JUST ICE ON MERITS IN PREFERENCE TO THE APPROACH WHICH SCUTTLES A DECISIO N ON MERITS. IN THE LIGHT OF THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES THE LEG ISLATURE HAS CONFERRED THE POWER TO CONDONE DELAY BY ENACTING SECTION 51 O F THE LIMITATION ACT OF 1963 IN ORDER TO ENABLE THE COURTS TO DO SUBSTANTIA L JUSTICE TO PARTIES BY DISPOSING OF MATTERS ON DE MERITS . THE EXPRESSION SUFFICIENT CAUSE EMPLOYED BY THE LEGISLATURE IS ADEQUATELY ELASTIC T O ENABLE THE COURTS TO APPLY THE LAW IN A MEANINGFUL MANNER WHICH SUB SERV ES THE ENDS OF JUSTICE THAT BEING THE LIFE-PURPOSE OF THE EXISTENC E OF THE INSTITUTION OF COURTS. IT IS COMMON KNOWLEDGE THAT THIS COURT HAS BEEN MAKING A JUSTIFIABLY LIBERAL APPROACH IN MATTERS INSTITUTED IN THIS COURT. BUT THE MESSAGE DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE PERCOLATED DOWN TO ALL THE OTHER COURTS IN THE HIERARCHY. AND SUCH A LIBERAL APPROACH IS ADOPTED ON PRINCIPLE AS IT IS REALIZED THAT: 1. ORDINARILY, A LITIGANT DOES NOT STAND TO BENEFIT BY LODGING AN APPEAL LATE. ITA NOS.1106 TO 1111/MDS/2017 8 2. REFUSING TO CONDONE DELAY CAN RESULT IN A MERITO RIOUS MATTER BEING THROWN OUT AT THE VERY THRESHOLD AND CAUSE OF JUSTICE BEING DEFEATED. AS AGAINST THIS, WHEN DELAY IS CONDONED, THE HIGHEST THAT CAN HAPPEN IS THAT A CAUSE WOULD BE DECIDED ON MERI TS AFTER HEARING THE PARTIES. 1. ANY APPEAL OR ANY APPLICATION, OTHER THAN AN AP PLICATION UNDER ANY OF THE PROVISIONS OF ORDER XXI OF THE CODE OF C IVIL PROCEDURE, 1908, MAY BE ADMITTED AFTER THE PRESCRIBED PERIOD I F THE APPELLANT OR THE APPLICANT SATISFIES THE COURT THAT HE HAD SU FFICIENT CAUSE FOR NOT PREFERRING THE APPEAL OR MAKING THE APPLICATION WITHIN SUCH PERIOD. PAGE NO: 0473 3. EVERY DAYS DELAY MUST BE EXPLAINED DOES NOT M EAN THAT A PEDANTIC APPROACH SHOULD BE MADE. WHY NOT EVERY HOU RS DELAY, EVERY SECONDS DELAY? THE DOCTRINE MUST BE APPLIED IN A RATIONAL, COMMON SENSE AND PRAGMATIC MANNER. 4. WHEN SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE AND TECHNICAL CONSIDERA TIONS ARE PITTED AGAINST EACH OTHER, THE CAUSE OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTIC E DESERVES TO BE PREFERRED, FOR THE OTHER SIDE CANNOT CLAIM TO HAVE VESTED RIGHT IN INJUSTICE BEING DONE BECAUSE OF A NON-DELIBERATE DE LAY. 5. THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION THAT DELAY IS OCCASIONED DELIBERATELY, OR ON ACCOUNT OF CULPABLE NEGLIGENCE, OR ON ACCOUNT OF MALA FIDES. A LITIGANT DOES NOT STAND TO BENEFIT BY RESORTING TO DELAY. IN FACT, HE RUNS A SERIOUS RISK. 6. IT MUST BE GRASPED THAT THE JUDICIARY IS RESPECT ED NOT ON ACCOUNT OF ITS POWER TO LEGALIZE INJUSTICE ON TECHNICAL GRO UNDS BUT BECAUSE IT IS CAPABLE OF REMOVING INJUSTICE AND IS EXPECTED TO DO SO. MAKING A JUSTICE-ORIENTED APPROACH FROM THIS PERSPE CTIVE, THERE WAS SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR CONDONING THE DELAY IN THE INS TITUTION OF THE APPEAL. THE FACT THAT IT WAS THE STATE WHICH WA S SEEKING ITA NOS.1106 TO 1111/MDS/2017 9 CONDONATION AND NOT A PRIVATE PARTY WAS ALTOGETHER IRRELEVANT. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUALITY BEFORE LAW DEMANDS THAT ALL LI TIGANTS, INCLUDING THE STATE AS A LITIGANT, ARE ACCORDED THE SAME TREA TMENT AND THE LAW IS ADMINISTERED IN AN EVEN-HANDED MANNER. THERE IS NO WARRANT FOR ACCORDING A STEP-MOTHERLY TREATMENT WHEN THE S TATE IS THE APPLICANT PRAYING FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY. IN FACT , EXPERIENCE SHOWS THAT ON ACCOUNT OF AN IMPERSONAL MACHINERY (N O ONE IN CHARGE OF THE MATTER IS DIRECTLY HIT OR HURT BY THE JUDGMENT SOUGHT TO BE SUBJECTED TO APPEAL) AND THE INHERITED BUREAUCRA TIC METHODOLOGY IMBUED WITH THE NOTE-MAKING, FILE-PUSHING, AND PASS ING-ON-THE- BUCK ETHOS, DELAY ON ITS PART IS LESS DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND THOUGH MORE DIFFICULT TO APPROVE. IN ANY EVENT, THE STATE WHICH REPRESENTS THE COLLECTIVE CAUSE OF THE COMMUNITY, DOES NOT DES ERVE A LITIGANT NON GRATA STATUS. THE COURTS, THEREFORE, HAVE TO BE INFORMED OF THE SPIRIT AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE PROVISION IN THE COURS E OF THE INTERPRETATION OF THE EXPRESSION SUFFICIENT CAUSE . SO ALSO THE SAME APPROACH HAS TO BE EVIDENCED IN ITS APPLICATIO N TO MATTERS AT HAND WITH THE END IN VIEW TO DO EVEN-HANDED JUSTICE ON MERITS IN PREFERENCE TO THE APPROACH WHICH SCUTTLES A DECISIO N ON MERITS MEANING OF SUFFICIENT CAUSE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX V. DATA SOFTWARE RESEARC H CO. P. LTD. 288 ITR 289 ( MAD) THE PRINCIPLE OF REASONABLENESS HAS BECOME ONE OF T HE MOST IMPORTANT AND ACTIVE PROPOSITION IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW. I T IS OFTEN USED IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM WITH NICK NAMES, SUCH AS WEDNESBURYS PRINCIPLE, WEDNESBURYS REASONABLENESS, WEDNESBURYS UNREASONA BLENESS, WEDNESBURYS GROUNDS, WEDNESBURYS CASE, WEDNESBURY S SENSE A ITA NOS.1106 TO 1111/MDS/2017 10 CURRENT LEGAL JARGON. THUS, WEDNESBURYS PRINCIPLE IS NOW A COMMON AND CONVENIENT LABEL INDICATING SPECIAL STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS OR SPECIAL STANDARD OF UNREASONABLENESS, WHICH HAS NOW BECOME A CRITERION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION. T HE TEST IS FUNDAMENTALLY BASED ON RATIONALITY! IRRATIONALITY. VIRTUALLY, THE RATIONALITY IN THE POSITIVE SENSE OR IRRATIONALITY IN THE NEGATIVE SENSE ARE TE STED IN THE LIGHT OF INTELLIGIBLE REASONS. BUT THE QUESTION THEN IS WHET HER SUCH INTELLIGIBLE REASONS MEASURE UP TO THE LEGAL STANDARD OF REASONA BLENESS. OF COURSE, IF SUCH REASONS ARE FRIVOLOUS OR FICTITIOUS, THEY A RE LIABLE TO BE REJECTED AS UNREASONABLE OR IRRATIONAL. IN OTHER WORDS, THE REL EVANCY OF THE REASONS SHALL BE THE BED-ROCK OF THE CONSIDERATION. ONCE TH E RELEVANCY OF THE REASON IS SATISFIED, SUCH REASON SHALL STAND THE TE ST OF REASONABLENESS. ALTERNATIVELY, IF THE REASONS DO NOT STAND THE TEST OF RELEVANCY, AS THE SAME IS FRIVOLOUS, FICTITIOUS AND EXTRANEOUS, THEN SUCH REASONS DO NOT STAND THE TEST OF REASONABLENESS AND THEREFORE, ARE HELD TO BE UNREASONABLE. WHILE TESTING THE REASONABLENESS , THE COURT SHOULD NOT USURP THE ROLE OF THE AUTHORITIES AND IT SHOULD RES IST THE TEMPTATION TO DRAW THE BOUNDS TOO TIGHTLY ACCORDING TO ITS OWN OPINION AND THEREFORE, MUST AIM TO APPLY THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD FOR TESTING THE REASONABLENESS WITH THE MEASURE OF RELEVANCY AND THIS IS THE ESSENCE OF WEDNESBURYS REASONABLENESSLWEDNESBURYS UNREASONABLENESS. THE F OLLOWING ARE SOME OF THE REFERENCES, WHERE THE WORDS REASONABLE AND REASONABLE CAUSE HAVE BEEN EXPLAINED BY COURTS IN INDIA. ITA NOS.1106 TO 1111/MDS/2017 11 IN AZADIBACHAOANDOLAN V. UNION OF INDIA [2001] 252 ITR 471 (DELHI), IT IS EXPLAINED THAT REASONABLE CAUSE CAN BE REASONABLY SAID TO BE A CAUSE WHICH PREVENTS A MAN OF AVERAGE INTELLIGENCE AND ORDINARY PRUDENCE, ACTING UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMST ANCES, WITHOUT NEGLIGENCE OR INACTION OR WANT OF BONA FIDES. IN WOODWARD GOVERNOR INDIA P. LTD. V. CIT [2002] 25 3 ITR 745 (DELHI); [2001] 118 TAXMAN 433, IT IS HELD THAT RE ASONABLE CAUSE AS APPLIED TO HUMAN ACTION IS THAT WHICH WOULD CON STRAIN A PERSON OF AVERAGE INTELLIGENCE AND ORDINARY PRUDENCE. IT C AN BE DESCRIBED AS A PROBABLE CAUSE. IT MEANS AN HONEST BELIEF FOUN DED UPON REASONABLE GROUNDS, OF THE EXISTENCE OF A STATE OF CIRCUMSTANCES, WHICH, ASSUMING THEM TO BE TRUE, WOULD REASONABLY L EAD ANY ORDINARILY PRUDENT AND CAUTIOUS MAN, PLACED IN THE POSITION OF THE PERSON CONCERNED, TO COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT TH E SAME WAS THE RIGHT THING TO DO. SIMILARLY, IN KALAKRITHI V. ITO [2002] 253 ITR 754 (MAD), THIS COURT HAD AN OCCASION TO CONSIDER THE WORDS REASONABLE C AUSE CONTAINED IN SECTION 273B OF THE ACT, WHICH READS A S FOLLOWS (HEADNOTE): THE WORDS REASONABLE CAUSE IN SECTION 273B OF TH E INCOME-TAX ACT, 1961, MUST NECESSARILY HAVE A RELATION TO THE FAILU RE ON THE PART OF THE ASSESSEE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENT OF THE LAW WHICH HE HAD FAILED TO COMPLY WITH. IN THE CASE OF DELAY IN COMPLIANCE, TH E CAUSE SHOWN MUST BE FOR THE WHOLE OF THE PERIOD OF THE DELAY AND NOT MERELY FOR A PART THEREOF. IF THE CAUSE SHOWN IS SUCH AS TO EXPLAIN T HE DELAY AS A WHOLE AND CONSTITUTE A GOOD REASON FOR THE NON-COMPLIANCE, NO PENALTY WOULD BE LEVIABLE. HOWEVER, IN CASES WHERE THE CAUSE SHOWN I S SUCH AS TO EXPLAIN A PART OF THE DELAY, OR THE CAUSE SHOWN IS ONLY TO MITIGATE THE GRAVITY OF ITA NOS.1106 TO 1111/MDS/2017 12 THE NON-COMPLIANCE, SUCH A CAUSE CANNOT BE EXTRAPOL ATED AND TREATED AS BEING GOOD CAUSE FOR THE WHOLE OF THE PERIOD OF THE DELAY IN ITS ENTIRETY. THE APEX COURT IN COLLECTOR V. P. MANGAMMA [2003] 4 SCC 488, WHILE INTERPRETING THE WORD REASONABLE HAS OBSERV ED AS FOLLOWS (HEADNOTE): IT WOULD BE HARD TO GIVE AN EXACT DEFINITION OF TH E WORD REASONABLE. REASON VARIES IN ITS CONCLUSIONS ACCORDING TO THE I DIOSYNCRASY OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE TIMES AND CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH HE THINKS. THE REASONING WHICH BUILT UP THE OLD SCHOLASTIC LOGIC S TANDS NOW LIKE THE JINGLING OF A CHILDS TOY. BUT MANKIND MUST BE SATI SFIED WITH THE REASONABLENESS WITHIN REACH ; AND IN CASES NOT COVE RED BY AUTHORITY, THE DECISION OF THE JUDGE USUALLY DETERMINES WHAT IS R EASONABLE IN EACH PARTICULAR CASE; BUT FREQUENTLY REASONABLENESS, BE LONGS TO THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW, AND THEREFORE, TO BE DECIDED BY THE COU RTS. AN ATTEMPT TO GIVE A SPECIFIC MEANING TO THE WORD REASONABLE IS TRYI NG TO COUNT WHAT IS NOT A NUMBER AND MEASURE WHAT IS NOT SPACE. IT MEANS PRIM A FACIE IN LAW REASONABLE IN REGARD TO THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES OF WHIC H THE ACTOR, CALLED UPON TO ACT REASONABLY, KNOWS OR OUGHT TO KNOW. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE A PRIORI TO STATE WHAT IS REASONABLE AS SUCH IN ALL CASES. Y OU MUST HAVE THE PARTICULAR FACTS OF EACH CASE ESTABLISHED BEFORE YO U CAN ASCERTAIN WHAT IS REASONABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. RAJA JAGDAMBIKAPRATAPNARAIN SINGH V. CENTRAL BOARD OF DIRECT TAXES 100 ITR 698 SC AT THE FIRST FLUSH IT MAY SEEM THAT THE ASSESSEES AGRICULTURAL INCOME HAVING BEEN TAXED ILLEGALLY, A REFUND WAS OBLIGATOR Y AND THE FANATICAL INSISTENCE ON THE LEGAL POUND OF FLESH BASED ON L IMITATION AND FINALITY WAS NOT TO BE EXPECTED FROM A PARTY LIKE THE STATE. INDEED, ONE MIGHT GO TO THE EXTENT OF QUOTING THE CYNICAL WORDS OF THE A NCIENT LEGAL WIT: LAW AND EQUITY ARE TWO THINGS WHICH GOD HATH JOINED, BU T WHICH MAN HAS PUT ITA NOS.1106 TO 1111/MDS/2017 13 AS UNDER . WE HAVE TO EXAMINE THE MERITS OF THE CA SE IN THE LIGHT OF THE FACTS MERELY BECAUSE AN ORDER HAS BEEN PASSED BY THE OFFI CER AND HAS NOT BEEN APPEALED AGAINST, IT DOES NOT BECOME LEGAL AND FINAL IF OTHERWISE IT IS VOID ; FOR INSTANCE, IF THERE IS A FLAGRANT VIOLATI ON OF NATURAL JUSTICE ANY LEGAL SYSTEM, ESPECIALLY ONE EVOLVING IN A DEVE LOPING COUNTRY, MAY PERMIT JUDGES TO PLAY A CREATIVE ROLE AND INNOVATE TO ENSURE JUSTICE IT IS HUMBLY SUBMITTED THAT TWO STARK FACTS GENERAT E SOME CONSIDERATIONS OF CONSCIENCE IN FAVOUR OF THE ASSESSEE. THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF MIS DEHRI LIGHT RA ILWAY COMPANY LTD REPORTED IN 1992 2 SCC 598 TELLINGLY OB SERVED AS UNDER:- THE REAL TEST IS NOT PHYSICAL RUNNING OF TIME WHE RE THE CIRCUMSTANCES. THE CONDUCT EXITS, THE ILLEGALITY WHICH IS MANIFEST CANNOT BE SUSTAINED ON THE GROUND OF LACHES. IT IS HUMBLY SUBMITTED THAT ON THE FACTS OF THE CAS E THERE EXISTS MANIFEST ILLEGALITY WHEN THE TAX IS SOUGHT TO BE COLLECTED C ONTRARY TO CONSTITUTION MANDATE OF ARICLE 265 WHICH CLEARLY MANDATES THAT N O TAX SHALL BE COLLECTED WITHOUT THE AUTHORITY OF LAW SINCE THE IS SUE IS ONCE FOR AND ALL SETTLED BY VDIS CERTIFICATE ISSUED BY THE GOVT. THE DEPARTMENT OUGHT TO HAVE SUOMOTO IN THE INTERES T OF THE REVENUE SHOULD HAVE CANCELLED THE DEMAND IN THE LIGHT OF TH E ACCEPTANCE OF VDIS AND THE ORDER OF THE ITAT WHICH WAS NOT APPEALED BY THE REVENUE.CBDT CIRCULARSBINDING NATUREIMPLICATIONS OF CIRCULAR N O. 14(XL-35) OF 1955IT IS INCUMBENT ON ITOS TO FOLLOW THE ABOVE SA ID CIRCULAR AND DRAW THE ATTENTION OF THE ASSESSEE CONCERNED TO ALL THE RELIEFS AND REFUNDS TO WHICH THE ASSESSEE SEEMS TO BE ENTITLED ON THE FACT S OF THE CASE EVEN ITA NOS.1106 TO 1111/MDS/2017 14 THOUGH THE ASSESSEE MIGHT HAVE OMITTED TO CLAIM REF UND OR RELIEF. RELIANCE PLACED 9NNAVNITLAL C. JAVERI VS. K.K. SEN , AAC(1 965) 56 ITR 198 (SC) : TC 69R.265 APPLIED THE FOLLOWING CIRCULAR OF THE CENTRAL BOARD OF REVE NUE ISSUED IN JUNE, 1955. THE CIRCULAR IS REPRODUCED AT PAGE 532 OF VOL UME I OF CHATURVEDI AND PITHISARIAS INCOME- TAX LAW, SECOND EDN., AND THE CIRCULAR IS AS FOLLOWS: OFFICERS OF THE DEPARTMENT MUST NOT TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IGNORANCE OF AN ASSESSEE AS TO HIS RIGHTS, IT IS ONE OF THEIR DUTIE S TO ASSIST A TAXPAYER IN EVERY REASONABLE WAY, PARTICULARLY IN THE MATTER OF CLAIMING AND SECURING RELIEFS AND IN THIS REGARD THE OFFICERS SHOULD TAKE THE INITIATIVE IN GUIDING A TAXPAYER WHERE PROCEEDINGS OR OTHER PARTICULARS BEF ORE THEM INDICATE THAT SOME REFUND OR RELIEF IS DUE TO HIM. THIS ATTITUDE WOULD, IN THE LONG RUN, BENEFIT THE DEPARTMENT, FOR IT WOULD INSPIRE CONFID ENCE IN HIM THAT HE MAY BE SURE OF GETTING A SQUARE DEAL FROM THE DEPARTMEN T. ALTHOUGH, THEREFORE, THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR CLAIMING REFUNDS AND RELIEFS RESTS WITH THE ASSESSEES ON WHOM IT IS IMPOSED BY LAW, OFFICERS SH OULD (A) DRAW THEIR ATTENTION TO ANY REFUNDS OR RELIEFS TO WHICH THEY APPEAR TO BE CLEARLY ENTITLED BUT WHICH THEY HAVE OMITTED TO CLAIM FOR SOME REASON OR OTHER; (B) FREELY ADVISE THEM WHEN APPROACHED BY THEM AS T O THEIR RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES AND AS TO THE PROCEDURE TO BE ADOPTED F OR CLAIMING REFUNDS AND RELIEFS. (CIRCULAR NO. 14 (XL-35) OF 1955 DT. 11-4 -1955) IN CONNECTION WITH THE EFFECT OF SUCH CIRCULAR, MR. SHAH RELIED UPON THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN NAVNITLAL C. JAVER I VS. K.K. SEN, MC (1965) 56 ITR 198 (SC): TC 41R.238. THERE THE MAJOR ITY OF THE LEARNED JUDGES HEARING THE APPEAL HELD THAT CIRCULAR ISSUED BY THE CENTRAL BOARD ITA NOS.1106 TO 1111/MDS/2017 15 OF REVENUE, OF THE KIND OF CIRCULAR MENTIONED THERE IN, WOULD BE BINDING ON ALL OFFICERS AND PERSONS EMPLOYED IN THE EXECUTION OF THE IT ACT. THE SECOND MANIFEST ILLEGALITY IS THAT THE ASSUMPTI ON OF PENALTY PROCEEDINGS IS ILLEGAL SINE THE FUNDAMENTAL GROUND OF SATISFACTION TO INITIATE THE PROCEEDINGS IS SINGULARLY ABSENCE IN V IEW OF PROTECTIVE ASST. MADE IN THE APPELLANTS CASE. THE THIRD MANIFEST ILLEGALITY IS THAT THE IMPUGNED DEMAND IS CONTRARY TO VDIS SCHEME AND ALSO OFFENDING THE PRINCIPLES OF L EGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF THE CITIZEN THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD HONOUR ITS PROMISES MADE IN PURSUANCE OF VDIS DECLARATION ON WAIVER OF ENTIRE P ENALTY CONSEQUENT TO ACCEPTANCE OF VDJS DECLARATION. LENGTH OF DELAY IS NOT A MATTER OF CONCERN THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF N. BALAKRISHNAN RE PORTED IN 1987 (1) SCC PAGE 123 OBSERVED AS FOLLOWS; (COPY PARA 13. OF THE JUDGMENT) THE SAME VIEW WAS ALSO EXPRESSED IN SRINIVASA CHARI TIES BY THE MADRAS HIGH COURT. HENCE IT IS SETTLED LAW THAT AUT HORITIES CAN, IF AT ALL, CAN ONLY IMPOSE COST, AND CANNOT DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL. TO CONCLUDE, IT IS APT TO QUOTE OBSERVATIONS OF THE JUSTICE V.R. KRISHNA LYER SUPREME COURT AS FOLLOWS: OXYGENATE HUMANE JUSTICE ON HUMAN LAW THE LD.A.R PLEADED THAT ALL THESE APPEALS OF THE AS SESSEE WERE FILED LATE BY 744 DAYS TO BE CONDONED AND TO BE ADMITTED FOR ADJUDICATION ON MERIT. ITA NOS.1106 TO 1111/MDS/2017 16 4. ON THE OTHER HAND, LD.D.R STRONGLY OPPOSED THE CONDONATION OF DELAY ON THE REASON THAT THIS IS AN INORDINATE DELA Y OF 744 DAYS IN FILING THESE APPEALS. 5. THE BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE, WHICH ARE COMMON T O ALL ASSESSMENT YEARS UNDER APPEAL, ARE THAT THERE WAS A SEARCH IN THE PREMISES OF THE APPELLANTS HUSBAND SHRI PANDIT VET RIVEL, AT NO.B-7, ASWATHI APARTMECNS, NO.16, II CRESCENT PARK ROAD, G ANDHI NAGAR, ADYAR, CHENNAI - 20. THE ASSESSEES HUSBAND WAS AN INDIVIDUAL CARRYING ON PROFESSION AS ASTROLOGER HAVING INCOME FROM BUSINESS/PROFESSION. NOTICES U/S. 153C OF THE ACT W AS ISSUED. IN RESPONSE, THE ASSESSEE FILED COPIES OF RETURNS OF INCOME ORIGINALLY FILED. NOTICE U/S. 142(1) ALONG WITH QUESTIONNAIRE WAS ISSUED ON 30.09.2009 FOR FILING OF CERTAIN DETAILS AND EXPLAN ATION REGARDING SOME IRREGULARITIES. AS THE APPELLANT COULD NOT BE CONTACTED, THE SAME WAS HANDED OVER TO THE AR. SINCE THE EFFORTS T O CONTACT THE APPELLANT PROVED FUTILE, A FINAL SHOW CAUSE NOTICE DATED 12.11.2009 WAS ISSUED AND THE SAME WAS SERVED ON THE APPELLANT THROUGH AR. ITA NOS.1106 TO 1111/MDS/2017 17 THERE WAS NO COMPLIANCE ON THE PART OF THE ASSESSEE IN THE WAY OF SUBMISSION OF ANY DOCUMENTS OR EXPLANATIONS OF THE ISSUES RAISED. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, ASSESSMENT WAS COMPLETED U /S. 153C R.W.S. 144 AS UNDER: A.Y DATE OF ORDER ASSESSED INCOME ADDITION/DISALLOWANCE ON ACCOUNT OF 2002-03 14.12.2009 RS.6,83,425 FRESH CAPITAL INTRODUCED OF RS.62,150, UNSECURED LOANS FROM PANDIAN OF RS.1,00,000, LOW DRAWINGS OF RS.2,25,000, UNACCOUNTED INVESTMENTS OF RS.2,11,975. 2003-04 14.12.2009 RS.4,92,500/- GIFT FROM PARENTS OF RS.25,000, UNSECURED LOANS FROM PANDIAN OF RS.1,00,000, LOW DRAWINGS OF RS. 2,30,000. 2004-05 14.12.2009 RS.3,71,600/- LOW DRAWINGS OF RS.2,25,000 2005-06 14.12.2009 RS.3,73,300/- LOW DRAWINGS OF RS.2,25,000 2006-07 14.12.2009 RS.8,85,014/- UNSECURED LOANS OF RS.55,000, OTHER LOANS OF RS.1,50,000, PEAK CASH CREDIT OF RS.2,96,694, LOW DRAWINGS OF RS.70,000. 2007-08 14.12.2009 RS.8,29,045/- PEAK CREDIT OF RS.1,00,000 AGGRIEVED BY THE ORDER OF LD. ASSESSING OFFICER, TH E ASSESSEE CARRIED THE APPEAL BEFORE THE LD.CIT(A). ON APPEAL, LD.CIT (A) CONFIRMED THE ORDER OF LD. ASSESSING OFFICER. AGAINST THE ORDER O F LD.CIT(A), NOW THE ASSESSEE IS IN APPEAL BEFORE US. ITA NOS.1106 TO 1111/MDS/2017 18 6. I HAVE CONSIDERED THE RIVAL SUBMISSIONS AND PER USED THE ORDERS OF THE LOWER AUTHORITIES IMPUGNED IN THESE APPEALS. AS FAR AS THE DELAY IN FILING THESE APPEALS BY 744 DAYS AGAINST T HE COMMON APPELLATE ORDER OF THE CIT(A), VIZ. ITA NO. 76 TO 8 1/09-10 DATED 19.02.2015 IS CONCERNED, ONE HAS TO ADMIT THAT THE DELAY INVOLVED IS INORDINATE AND NOT MARGINAL. 6.1 IT IS SETTLED POSITION OF LAW THAT IT IS ONLY MARGINAL DELAYS THAT CAN BE CONDONED, AND NOT INORDINATE DELAYS RUNNING INTO SEVERAL YEARS. WE MAY AT THIS JUNCTURE, REFER TO THE THIRD MEMBER DECISION OF TRIBUNAL (CHENNAI) IN THE CASE OF JT. CIT V/S. TRAC TORS & FARMS LTD. ( 104 ITD 149)-TM, WHEREIN DRAWING OUT A DISTINCTION BETWEEN NORMAL DELAY AND INORDINATE DELAY, IT HAS BEEN OBSERVED, V IDE HEAD-NOTE ON PAGE 150 OF THE REPORTS (104 ITD) AS FOLLOWS- 'A DISTINCTION MUST BE MADE BETWEEN A CASE WHERE TH E DELAY IS INORDINATE AND A CASE WHERE THE DELAY IS OF A FEW D AYS. WHEREAS IN THE FORMER CASE, THE CONSIDERATION OF PREJUDICE TO THE OTHER SIDE WILL BE A RELEVANT FACTOR, SO THE CASE CALLS FOR MORE CAUTIOU S APPROACH, IN THE LATTER CASE, NO SUCH CONSIDERATION MAY ARISE AND SUCH A CA SE DESERVES A LIBERAL APPROACH. NO HARD AND FAST RULE CAN BE LAID DOWN IN THIS REGARD. THE COURT HAS TO EXERCISE THE DISCRETION ON THE FAC TS OF EACH CASE, ITA NOS.1106 TO 1111/MDS/2017 19 KEEPING IN MIND THAT IN CONSIDERING THE EXPRESSION SUFFICIENT CAUSE, THE PRINCIPLE OF ADVANCING SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IS OF PR IME IMPORTANCE.' 7. THAT BEING SO, THE CASE-LAW RELIED BEFORE US BY THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE ASSESSEE HAS NO APPLICATION TO THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE. FURTHER I MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THERE IS NO HARD AND FAST RULE WHICH CAN BE LAID DOWN IN THE MATTER OF CONDON ATION OF DELAY AND COURTS SHOULD ADOPT A PRAGMATIC APPROACH AND DISCRE TION ON THE FACTS OF EACH CASE KEEPING IN MIND THAT IN CONSIDERING TH E EXPRESSION SUFFICIENT CAUSE THE PRINCIPLES OF ADVANCING SUBS TANTIAL JUSTICE IS OF PRIME IMPORTANCE AND THE EXPRESSION SUFFICIENT CAU SE SHOULD RECEIVE A LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION. A LIBERAL VIEW OUGHT TO BE TAKEN IN TERMS OF DELAY OF FEW DAYS. HOWEVER, WHEN THERE IS INORDINAT E DELAY, ONE SHOULD BE VERY CAUTIOUS WHILE CONDONING THE DELAY. THE DELAY OF 744CANNOT BE CONDONED SIMPLY BECAUSE THE ASSESSEES CASE IS HARD AND CALLS FOR SYMPATHY OR MERELY OUT OF BENEVOLENCE TO THE PARTY SEEKING RELIEF. IN GRANTING THE INDULGENCE AND COND ONING THE DELAY, IT MUST BE PROVED BEYOND THE SHADOW OF DOUBT THAT THE ASSESSEE WAS DILIGENT AND WAS NOT GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE WHATSOEVE R. THE SUFFICIENT ITA NOS.1106 TO 1111/MDS/2017 20 CAUSE WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF THE LIMITATION PR OVISION MUST BE A CAUSE WHICH IS BEYOND THE CONTROL OF THE PARTY INVO KING THE AID OF THE PROVISIONS. THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF RAMLAL V. REWA COALFIELDS LTD., AIR 1962 SC 361 HAS HELD THAT THE CAUSE FOR THE DELAY IN FILING THE APPEAL WHICH BY DUE CARE AND AT TENTION COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED CANNOT BE A SUFFICIENT CAUSE WITHIN TH E MEANING OF THE LIMITATION PROVISION. WHERE NO NEGLIGENCE, NOR INAC TION, OR WANT OF BONA FIDES CAN BE IMPUTED TO THE ASSESSEE A LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE PROVISIONS HAS TO BE MADE IN ORDER TO ADVANCE S UBSTANTIAL JUSTICE. SEEKERS OF JUSTICE MUST COME WITH CLEAN HANDS. IN T HE PRESENT CASE, THE REASONS ADVANCED BY THE ASSESSEE DO NOT SHOW AN Y GOOD AND SUFFICIENT REASON TO CONDONE THE DELAYS. THE DELAYS ARE NOT PROPERLY EXPLAINED BY THE ASSESSEE. THERE IS NO REASON FOR C ONDONING SUCH DELAY IN THIS CASE. THE DELAY IS NOTHING BUT NEGLIG ENCE AND INACTION OF THE ASSESSEE WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN VERY WELL AVOIDE D BY THE EXERCISE OF DUE CARE AND ATTENTION. THOUGH THE ASS ESSEE HAS SAID THAT THE DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS INITIATED BY HER SPOUS E WERE THE REASON FOR DELAY IN FILING THESE APPEALS, THERE IS NO IOTA OF EVIDENCE OF SUCH PROCEEDINGS BEFORE ANY COURT. HENCE, THERE EXISTS N O SUFFICIENT OR ITA NOS.1106 TO 1111/MDS/2017 21 GOOD REASON FOR CONDONING INORDINATE DELAYS OF MORE THAN 744 DAYS IN FILING APPEAL BEFORE US. ACCORDINGLY, THESE APPE ALS ARE DISMISSED AS BARRED BY LIMITATION. 8. I ACCORDINGLY DECLINE TO CONDONE THE DELAY OF 7 44 DAYS, AND DISMISS THESE SIX APPEALS OF THE ASSESSEE AS BARRED BY LIMITATION. 9 IN THE RESULT, ALL THE SIX APPEALS OF THE ASSES SEE ARE DISMISSED. ORDER PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON 31 ST AUGUST , 2017. SD/- ( ) ( CHANDRA POOJARI ) /ACCOUNTANT MEMBER CHENNAI, DATED THE 31 ST AUGUST, 2017 . K S SUNDARAM. ' ( )!*+ ,+%! / COPY TO: 1 . / APPELLANT 3. ' ' -! () / CIT(A) 5. +0 1 )!)23 / DR 2. / RESPONDENT 4. ' ' -! / CIT 6. 1 45 6 / GF