Improvement Trust, Jagadhari V. DCIT, Yamunanagar

ITA 1222/CHANDI/2009

• Counselvise Citation: [2010] 136 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 5088 (ITAT-CHANDIGARH)
• Duration Of Justice: 4 month(s) 7 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 30-04-2010
• Appeal Filed By: Assessee
• Order Result: Dismissed
• Bench Allotted: A
• Assessment Year: 2006-2007
• Appeal Filed On: 23-12-2009
• Result in Favour of: Revenue
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: N K SAINI
• Keywords: Business income; Depreciation

Judgement Text

IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL CHANDIGARH BENCHES (A) BEFORE SHRI G.S.PANNU, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND MS.SUSHMA CHOWLA, JUDICIAL MEMBER ITA 1222/CHD/2009 ASSESSMENT YEAR : 2006-07 IMPROVEMENT TRUST, V D.C.I.T., JAGADHRI. YAMUNA NAGAR. PAN : AAALI 0084J (APPELLANT) (RESPONDENT) APPELLANT BY : SHRI AJAY JAIN RESPONDENT BY: SHRI N.K.SAINI ORDER PER G.S.PANNU, AM THIS APPEAL BY THE ASSESSEE IS DIRECTED AGAINST TH E ORDER OF THE CIT(APPEALS) DATED 26.11.2008 FOR THE ASSESS MENT YEAR 2006-07, WHEREIN THE FOLLOWING TWO GROUNDS OF APPEA L HAVE BEEN RAISED : I) THAT THE LEARNED AUTHORITIES BELOW GROSSLY ERRED IN LAW AS WELL AS ON FACTS IN NOT ALLOWING THE STATUS OF LOCAL AUTHORITY TO THE APPELLANT AND CONVENIENTLY DENIED EXEMPTION AS AVAILABLE TO THE APPELLANT UNDER SECTION 10(20) OF THE INCOME TAX ACT IN RESPECT OF THE INCOME DERIVED FROM RENDERING SERVICE WHOLLY UNSUSTAINABLE GROUNDS. II) THAT THE LEARNED AUTHORITIES BELOW FURTHER ERRE D IN TREATING THE INCOME FROM SHOPS ETC. DECLARED UNDER THE PROPER HEAD AS INCOME FROM BUSINESS AND PROFESSION AS INCOME FROM PROPERTY AND DISALLOWED THE CLAIM OF DEPRECIATION OF RS.3380238/-. THE ACTION OF THE LEARNED AUTHORITIES BELOW IS UNJUST, ILLEGAL AND DESERVES T O BE QUASHED. 2 2. THE APPELLANT BEFORE US IS CONSTITUTED BY THE GO VERNMENT OF HARYANA AS AN IMPROVEMENT TRUST U/S 3 OF THE PU NJAB TOWN IMPROVEMENT TRUST ACT, 1922. THE MAIN FUNCTIONS OF THE ASSESSEE ARE DEVELOPMENT OF ANY LOCALITY WITHIN THE MUNICIPAL LIMITS CONTAINED IN ITS LOCAL AREA, TO PREPARE A DE VELOPMENT SCHEME UNDER CHAPTER IV OF PUNJAB TOWN IMPROVEMENT TRUST ACT, 1922 ETC. THE ASSESSEE FILED A RETURN OF INCOME DEC LARING A LOSS OF RS.6,83,633/-. IN THE PROFIT & LOSS ACCOUNT FIL ED ALONGWITH THE RETURN OF INCOME, ASSESSEE DECLARED INCOME FROM REN TAL INCOME, BANK INTEREST, INTEREST ON SALE OF LAND, INTERNAL R ENT, INCOME ON ACCOUNT OF TRANSFER FEE/LAND FEES ETC. THE ASSESSE E ALSO CLAIMED DEPRECIATION OF RS.33,80,238/- AND FOR THE SAID REA SON, THE RETURN OF INCOME COMPRISED OF LOSS OF RS.6,83,633/-. AS P ER THE ASSESSING OFFICER, THE ASSESSEE'S ENTIRE INCOME FOR THE YEAR UNDER CONSIDERATION WAS PRIMARILY EARNED ON ACCOUNT OF RENT FROM PROPERTIES AND BY WAY OF INTEREST AND PLAN/TRANSFER FEES ETC. ACCORDING TO THE ASSESSING OFFICER, RENTAL INCOME F ROM PROPERTIES WAS LIABLE TO BE ASSESSED UNDER THE HEAD INCOME FR OM HOUSE PROPERTY AND THE BALANCE OF THE INCOMES DECLARED W ERE TO BE ASSESSED UNDER THE HEAD INCOME FROM OTHER SOURCES . THE ASSESSEE, HOWEVER REFLECTED ITS ENTIRE INCOME UNDER THE HEAD INCOME FROM BUSINESS OR PROFESSION. ON BEING CO NFRONTED DURING THE COURSE OF ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS, THE AS SESSEE SUPPORTED RETURN OF INCOME FILED. ALTERNATIVELY, T HE ASSESSEE ALSO SUBMITTED THAT ITS INCOME IS EXEMPT BY VIRTUE OF SE CTION 10(20) OF THE ACT BECAUSE ASSESSEE WAS A LOCAL AUTHORITY. 3. THE ABOVE SUBMISSIONS OF THE ASSESSEE DID NOT FI ND FAVOUR WITH THE ASSESSING OFFICER. AS PER THE ASSESSING O FFICER, THE ASSESSEE DID NOT FALL WITHIN THE MEANING OF EXPRESS ION LOCAL 3 AUTHORITY AS DEFINED IN THE EXPLANATION TO SECTION 10(20) OF THE ACT AND THEREFORE, IT WAS NOT ENTITLED FOR EXEMPTIO N PROVIDED IN SECTION 10(20) OF THE ACT. FURTHER, THE RENTAL INC OME OF THE ASSESSEE WAS HELD ASSESSABLE UNDER THE HEAD INCOME FROM HOUSE PROPERTY AND THE BALANCE OF THE INCOMES NAME LY BANK INTEREST, INTEREST ON SALE OF LAND ETC. WERE ASSESS ED UNDER THE HEAD 'INCOME FROM OTHER SOURCES'. WHILE COMPUTING INCOME UNDER THE HEAD OTHER SOURCES, THE ASSESSING OFFICER ALL OWED EXPENSES DEBITED IN THE PROFIT & LOSS ACCOUNT EXCEPT THE CLA IM OF DEPRECIATION. IN THIS MANNER, THE TOTAL INCOME WAS DETERMINED AT RS.25,69,720/-. AGAINST SUCH ASSESSMENT, ASSESSEE C ARRIED THE MATTER IN APPEAL BEFORE THE CIT(APPEALS). 4. BEFORE THE CIT(APPEALS), ASSESSEE CLAIMED EXEMPT ION U/S 10(20) ON THE PLEA THAT IT WAS A LOCAL AUTHORITY. SECONDLY, THE ASSESSEE CONTENDED THAT THE RENTAL INCOME WAS ASSES SABLE AS BUSINESS INCOME AND NOT AS FROM HOUSE PROPERTY AND THEREBY IT CLAIMED THAT IT WAS ENTITLED TO THE DEPRECIATION ALLOWANCES. BOTH THE ABOVE CONTENTIONS HAVE BEEN NEGATED BY THE CIT(APPEALS) AND THE APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE WAS DIS MISSED. NOT BEING SATISFIED WITH THE ORDER OF THE CIT(APPEALS), THE ASSESSEE IS IN FURTHER APPEAL BEFORE US. 5. THE FIRST GROUND RAISED BY THE ASSESSEE PERTAINS TO ITS CLAIM FOR EXEMPTION U/S 10(20) OF THE ACT ON THE PL EA THAT IT QUALIFIES TO BE A LOCAL AUTHORITY WITHIN THE MEANIN G OF THE EXPLANATION TO SECTION 10(20) OF THE ACT. 6. IN THIS REGARD, ATTENTION OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL WAS INVITED TO THE DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL IN THE CASE OF AMBA LA IMPROVEMENT TRUST IN ITA NO. 621/CHD/2007 DATED 25.03.2009 WHER EIN 4 SIMILARLY PLACED ASSESSEE HAS NOT BEEN FOUND TO BE ELIGIBLE FOR EXEMPTION U/S 10(20) OF THE ACT. ON BEING CONFRONT ED, LEARNED COUNSEL SOUGHT TIME TO REPLY AND ON THE NEXT DATE O F HEARING, CONCEDED THE POSITION. 7. IN VIEW OF THE AFORESAID PRECEDENT, THE RELEVANT PORTION OF WHICH IS REPRODUCED HEREIN AFTER, THE CLAIM OF THE ASSESSEE FOR EXEMPTION U/S 10(20) IS HEREBY DENIED. 14. WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE RIVAL SUBMISSIONS CAREF ULLY. WE HAVE ALSO CAREFULLY PERUSED THE PROVISIONS OF SECTI ON 10(20) EXTRACTED ABOVE, AS APPLICABLE FOR THE ASSESSMENT Y EAR UNDER CONSIDERATION. THE BRIEF CONTROVERSY IS AS TO WHET HER OR NOT THE ASSESSEE QUALIFIES TO BE A LOCAL AUTHORITY WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 10(20) OF THE ACT. HAVING REGARD TO THE LE GAL POSITION, WE DO NOT FIND ANY MERIT IN THE CLAIM OF THE ASSESSEE THAT IT CONSTITUTES A LOCAL AUTHORITY WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 1 0(20) OF THE ACT. EVIDENTLY, AFTER INSERTION OF EXPLANATION TO SECTIO N 10(20) W.E.F. 1.4.2003, IT CAN NOT BE SAID THAT THE EXPRESSION L OCAL AUTHORITY HAS NOT BEEN DEFINED UNDER THE ACT. THEREFORE, TO TAKE RECOURSE TO THE PROVISIONS OF GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, 1897 IN ORDER TO UNDERSTAND THE MEANING OF THE EXPRESSION LOCAL AUTHORITY AND THE REBY DISREGARDING THE MEANING ASSIGNED TO IT UNDER THE ACT IS A WRONG APPROACH. THE ENTIRE CASE OF THE ASSESSEE IS BUILT ON THE MEA NING OF LOCAL AUTHORITY AS DESCRIBED IN THE GENERAL CLAUSES ACT 1897. THIS IS PRECISELY WHAT HAS BEEN NEGATED BY THE SUPREME COUR T WHILE CONSIDERING THE MEANING OF THE EXPRESSION LOCAL AU THORITY IN TERMS OF THE ACT IN THE CASE OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARK ET COMMITTEE, NARELA VS. CIT & ANOTHER, 305 ITR 1 (S.C). IN THIS CONNECTION, THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS OF THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT ARE WORTHY OF NOTICE :- ONE MORE ASPECT NEEDS TO BE MENTIONED. IN THE CASE OF R.C. JAIN, THE TEST OF LIKE NATURE WAS ADOPTED AS THE WORDS OTHER AUTHORITY CAME AFTER THE WORDS MUNIC IPAL COMMITTEE, DISTRICT BOARD, BODY OF PORT COMMISSIONERS. THEREFORE, THE WORDS OTHER AUTHORI TY IN SECTION 3(31) TOOK COLOUR FROM THE EARLIER WORDS , NAMELY, MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE, DISTRICT BOARD OR BOD Y OF PORT COMMISSIONERS. THIS IS HOW THE FUNCTIONAL TES T IS EVOLVED IN THE CASE OF R.C. JAIN. HOWEVER, AS STATE D, EARLIER PARLIAMENT IN ITS LEGISLATIVE WISDOM HAS OM ITTED THE WORDS OTHER AUTHORITY FROM THE SAID EXPLANATI ON TO SECTION 10(20) OF THE 1961 ACT. THE SAID EXPLANATIO N TO SECTION 10(20) PROVIDES A DEFINITION TO THE WORDS LOCAL AUTHORITY. IT IS AN EXHAUSTIVE DEFINITION. IT IS N OT AN INCLUSIVE DEFINITION. THE WORDS OTHER AUTHORITY D O NOT FIND PLACE IN THE SAID EXPLANATION. EVEN, ACCORDING TO THE APPELLANT(S), AMC(S) IS NEITHER A MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE NOR A DISTRICT BOARD NOR A MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE NOR A PANCHAYAT. THEREFORE, IN OUR VIEW, THE 5 FUNCTIONAL TEST AND THE TEST OF INCORPORATION AS LA ID DOWN IN THE CASE OF R.C. JAIN, IS NO MORE APPLICABLE TO THE EXPLANATION TO SECTION 10(20) OF THE 1961 ACT. THEREFORE, IN OUR VIEW THE JUDGMENT OF THIS COURT I N THE CASE OF R.C. JAIN, FOLLOWED BY JUDGMENT OF VARIOUS HIGH COURTS ON THE STATUS AND CHARACTER OF AMC(S) IS NO MORE APPLICABLE TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 10(20) AFTER THE INSERTION OF THE EXPLANATION/DEFINITION CLAUSE TO THAT SUB SECTION, VIDE THE FINANCE ACT, 2002. THE QUESTION STILL REMAINS AS TO WHY PARLIAMENT HAS USED THE WORDS MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE AND DISTRICT BOARD IN ITEM (III) OF THE SAID EXPLANATION. IN OU R VIEW, PARLIAMENT HAS DEFINED LOCAL AUTHORITY TO MEAN-A PANCHAYAT AS REFERRED TO IN CLAUSE (D) OF ARTICLE 2 43 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, MUNICIPALITY AS REFERRED TO IN CLAUSE (E) OF ARTICLE 243P OF THE CONSTITUTION OF I NDIA. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO REFERENCE TO ARTICLE 243 AFTER THE WORDS MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE AND DISTRICT BOARD. I N OUR VIEW, THE MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE AND DISTRICT BOAR D IN THE SAID EXPLANATION ARE USED OUT OF ABUNDANT CAUTI ON. IN 1897 WHEN THE GENERAL CLAUSES ACT WAS ENACTED THERE EXISTED IN INDIA MUNICIPAL COMMITTEES AND DIS TRICT BOARDS. THEY CONTINUED EVEN THEREAFTER. IN SOME REMOTE PLACE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THERE EXISTS A MUN ICIPAL COMMITTEE OR A DISTRICT BOARD. THEREFORE, IN OUR VI EW, APART FROM A PANCHAYAT AND MUNICIPALITY, PARLIAMENT IN ITS WISDOM DECIDED TO GIVE EXEMPTION TO MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE AND DISTRICT BOARD. EARLIER THERE WERE DI STRICT BOARD ACTS IN VARIOUS STATES. MOST OF THE STATES HA D REPEALED THOSE ACTS. HOWEVER, IT IS QUITE POSSIBLE THAT IN SOME REMOTE PLACE A DISTRICT BOARD MAY STILL EXIST. THEREFORE, PARLIAMENT DECIDE TO GIVE EXEMPTION TO S UCH MUNICIPAL COMMITTEES AND DISTRICT BOARDS. THEREFORE , IN OUR VIEW, ADVISEDLY PARLIAMENT HAS RETAINED THE EXEMPTION FOR MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE AND DISTRICT BOAR D APART FROM PANCHAYAT AND MUNICIPALITY. OUR VIEW FIN DS SUPPORT FROM THE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN PART IX OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. ARTICLE 243N PROVIDES FOR CONTINUANCE OF EXISTING LAWS AND PANCHAYATS. IT STA TES, INTER ALIA, THAT NOTWITHSTANDING ANYTHING IN PART I X, ANY LAW RELATING TO PANCHAYATS IN A STATES IMMEDIATELY BEFORE COMMENCEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION (SEVENTY- THIRD AMENDMENT) ACT, 1992, WHICH IS INCONSISTENT W ITH THE PROVISIONS OF PART IX, SHALL CONTINUE TO BE IN FORCE UNTIL REPEALED BY A COMPETENT LEGISLATURE. SIMILARL Y, UNDER PART IX-A THERE IS ARTICLE 243ZF WHICH REFERS TO MUNICIPALITIES. THIS ARTICLE, INTER ALIA, STATES THAT NOTWITHSTANDING ANYTHING IN PART IX-A, ANY PROVISIO N OF ANY LAW RELATING TO MUNICIPALITIES IN FORCE IN A ST ATE IMMEDIATELY BEFORE THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION (SEVENTY-FOURTH AMENDMENT) ACT, 1992, WHICH IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE PROVISIONS OF PART I X-A, SHALL CONTINUE TO BE IN FORCE UNTIL AMENDED OR REPE ALED BY A COMPETENT LEGISLATURE. IN OUR VIEW, ARTICLE 24 3N AND ARTICLE 243ZF INDICATES THAT THERE COULD BE ENACTMENTS WHICH STILL RETAIN THE ENTITIES LIKE MUN ICIPAL COMMITTEES AND DISTRICT BOARDS AND IF THEY EXIST, 6 PARLIAMENT INTENDS TO GIVE EXEMPTION TO THEIR INCOM E UNDER SECTION 10(20) OF THE 1961 ACT. BEFORE CONCLUDING WE QUOTE HEREINBELOW AN IMPORTANT PRINCIPLE OF LAW ENUNCIATED BY THIS COURT IN THE CA SE OF R.C. JAIN, WHICH READS AS UNDER: IT IS NOT A SOUND RULE OF INTERPRETATION TO SEEK THE MEANING OF WORDS USED IN AN ACT, IN THE DEFINITION CLAUSE OF OTHER STATUTES. 15. CONSIDERED IN THIS LIGHT, IT IS APPARENT THAT T HE CONTROVERSY ON HAND CANNOT BE ADDRESSED IN THE LIGHT OF THE DECISI ON OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF R.C.JAIN (SUPRA) OR TH AT OF THE HON'BLE DELHI HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF AGRICULTURA L MARKETING PRODUCE COMMITTEE (SUPRA) OR OF THE HON'BLE APEX CO URT IN THE CASE OF U.P.FOREST CORPORATION (SUPRA). AS PER THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE M ARKET COMMITTEE, NARELA (SUPRA), THE VIEW CANVASSED IN TH E AFORESAID JUDGMENTS IS NO MORE APPLICABLE TO THE PROVISIONS O F SECTION 10(20) AFTER INSERTION OF EXPLANATION W.E.F.1.4.2003. THE ASSESSMENT YEAR BEFORE US IS 2004-05 AND IN VIEW OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCE MARKET C OMMITTEE (SUPRA) THE POINT CANVASSED BY THE ASSESSEE IS NO M ORE APPLICABLE. THE CASE OF THE ASSESSEE HAS TO BE EXAMINED IN THE LIGHT OF THE EXPLANATION TO SECTION 10(20) AS APPLICABLE TO THE YEAR UNDER CONSIDERATION. ON THIS ASPECT, THERE IS NO DEFENC E TO THE PLEA THAT THE ASSESSEE DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE MEANING OF EX PRESSION LOCAL AUTHORITY AS UNDERSTOOD FOR THE PURPOSES OF SECTIO N 10(20) OF THE ACT. THEREFORE, IN OUR VIEW, THE ASSESSING OFFICER MADE NO MISTAKE IN HOLDING THAT THE CASE OF THE ASSESSEE IS NOT COV ERED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 10(20) OF THE ACT. HENCE, ON THIS GROUND, THE ASSESSEE HAS TO FAIL. 8. FOLLOWING THE AFORESAID PRECEDENT, WHICH IS ON I DENTICAL FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES, THE PLEA OF THE ASSESSEE F OR BEING TREATED AS A LOCAL AUTHORITY IS TURNED DOWN AND C ONSEQUENTLY THE CLAIM FOR EXEMPTION U/S 10(20) OF THE ACT ALSO DESERVES TO BE DENIED. WE HOLD SO. ACCORDINGLY, GROUND NO. 1 OF THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED. 9. IN THE SECOND GROUND, THE DISPUTE RELATES TO THE TREATMENT OF RENTAL INCOME FROM PROPERTIES EARNED BY THE ASSE SSEE. AS PER THE ASSESSING OFFICER, SUCH INCOME WAS LIABLE TO BE ASSESSED UNDER THE HEAD INCOME FROM HOUSE PROPERTY AND AS A 7 CONSEQUENCE THEREOF, THE DEPRECIATION CLAIMED BY TH E ASSESSEE HAS BEEN DISALLOWED. THE CIT(APPEALS) HAS HELD THA T INCOME FROM LETTING OF SHOPS IS ASSESSABLE UNDER THE HEAD HOUSE PROPERTY AND RELIED UPON THE JUDGEMENT OF HON'BLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF SHAMBHU INVESTMENT PVT.LTD. VS . CIT, 263 ITR 143 (S.C). 10. BEFORE US, LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE ASSESSEE HAS MERELY REITERATED THE SUBMISSIONS THAT SUCH INCOME IS LIAB LE TO BE TREATED AS BUSINESS INCOME OF THE ASSESSEE. IN THE COURSE OF HEARING, LEARNED COUNSEL HAS REFERRED TO THE JUDGEM ENT OF THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF COMMISSIONER O F EXCESS PROFITS TAX V SHRI LAKSHMI SILK MILLS LTD., 20 ITR 451 (S.C). THE FACTS IN THE CASE OF SHRI LAKSHMI SILK MILLS LTD. (SUPRA) ARE THAT ASSESSEE WAS ENGAGED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF SILK CLO TH AND DYEING OF SILK YARN. IT WAS UNABLE TO OPERATE ITS DYEING PLANT ON ACCOUNT OF DIFFICULTY IN OBTAINING SILK YARN AND TH EREFORE, IT TEMPORARILY LET OUT THE DYEING PLANT AND EARNED REN TAL INCOME. INCOME EARNED FROM SUCH LETTING OUT WAS TREATED AS BUSINESS INCOME BY THE ASSESSEE WHEREAS THE ASSESSING OFFICE R SOUGHT TO TAX IT AS INCOME UNDER THE HEAD HOUSE PROPERTY. T HE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT TREATED SUCH INCOME AS BUSINESS INCOM E FOR THE REASON THAT LETTING OUT SEEN AS A PART OF THE USUAL ACTIVITIES OF BUSINESS AND AS PER THE HON'BLE COURT, TEMPORARY LE TTING OUT OF PLANT DID NOT RESULT IN THE PLANT CEASING TO BE A C OMMERCIAL ASSET. IN THE PRESENT CASE, THERE IS NO MATERIAL TO SHOW T HAT THE ASSESSEE IS ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS OF LETTING OUT OF PROPERTIES. THE FACTS IN THE PRESENT CASE ARE QUITE DIFFERENT A ND THE JUDGEMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF SHRI LAKSHMI SILK MILLS (SUPRA) DOES NOT HELP THE CASE OF THE ASSESSEE. AS A RESULT 8 THEREOF, WE FIND NO ERROR IN THE APPROACH OF THE LO WER AUTHORITIES IN TREATING THE RENTAL INCOME UNDER THE HEAD INCOM E FROM HOUSE PROPERTY, AND CONSEQUENTLY, THE DEPRECIATION ON BU ILDINGS IS NOT ALLOWABLE AND THE LOWER AUTHORITIES ARE JUSTIFIED I N DENYING THE CLAIM OF DEPRECIATION ON BUILDINGS. ON THIS GROUND, THE ASSESSEE FAILS. 11. IN THE RESULT, THE APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE IS DI SMISSED. ORDER PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON 30 TH APRIL,2010. SD/- SD/- (SUSHMA CHOWLA) ( G.S.PANNU) JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMBER DATED : 30 TH APRIL, 2010. POONAM COPY TO : THE APPELLANT/THE RESPONDENT/THE CIT (A)/ THE CIT/THE DR.