M/s. Nosegay Public School Management Committee, SRIGANGANAGAR V. CIT, BIKANER

ITA 127/JODH/2012

• Counselvise Citation: [2012] 119 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 7999 (ITAT-JODHPUR)
• Duration Of Justice: 9 month(s) 14 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 19-12-2012
• Appeal Filed By: Assessee
• Order Result: Allowed
• Bench Allotted: DB
• Next Hearing Date: 27-11-2012
• Assessment Year: misc
• Appeal Filed On: 05-03-2012
• Result in Favour of: Assessee
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: G R KOKANI
• Assessee Lawyers: SURESH OHJA
• Keywords: Charitable institution; Reasonable cause; Condonation of delay; Ignorance of law
• Section: 12A; 12AA; 2

Judgement Text

1 IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL JODHPUR BENCH, JODHPUR BEFORE SHRI HARI OM MARATHA, JUDICIAL MEMBERAND SHRI N.K.SAINI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER ITA NOS. 127 & 128 /JU/2012 (U/S 12A) M/S NOSEGAY PUBLIC SCHOOL VS. THE CIT. MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE, BIKANER SRIGANGANAGAR PAN NO. AAATN8221E (APPELLANT) (RESPONDENT) APPELLANT BY : SHRI SURESH OHJA RESPONDENT BY : SHRI G.R.KOKANI DATE OF HEARING : 27.11.2012 DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT : 19.12.2012 ORDER PER HARI OM MARATHA, J.M. BOTH THE APPEALS BY THE ASSESSEE COMMITTEE (TRUST) IS DIRECTED AGAINST THE ORDER PASSED BY LD CIT (ADMINISTRATION), BIKANE R DATED 14.6.2007 PASSED U/S 12A(A) OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961 [HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS 'THE ACT' IN SHORT]. BY THIS COMMON ORDER, WE WILL DISPOSE O FF BOTH THE APPEALS WHICH ARE INTER-RELATED. 2. BRIEFLY STATED, THE FACTS OF THE CASE ARE THAT T HE APPELLANT HAD FILED APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF A CHARITABLE TRUST / INSTITUTION U/S 12A(A) OF 2 THE ACT IN FORM NO.10A. AS PER HIS APPLICATION IN COLUMN NO.4, DATE OF CREATION OF THE INSTITUTION HAS BEEN MENTIONED AS 9 .11.1985. THE ASSESSEE RECEIVED A NOTICE OF HEARING IN THIS CASE IN WHICH IT IS STATED THAT SINCE YOU HAVE APPLIED FOR REGISTRATION U/S 12A(A) ON 30.3.20 06, AFTER EXPIRY OF ONE YEAR FROM THE DATE OF REGISTRATION UNDER THE RAJAST HAN SOCIETY REGISTRATION ACT (RSRA), 1958 (ON 9.11.1986), THEREFORE, YOU ARE DIRECTED TO ATTEND THIS OFFICE ON 22.8.2006 AT 11.00 AM AND EXPLAIN THE REA SONS FOR THE DELAY. THE ASSESSEE FILED CONDONATION PETITION ON 2.4.2007 STA TING THEREIN THAT DUE TO LACK OF AWARENESS OF THE LAW, WE COULD NOT APPLY FO R REGISTRATION OF THE SOCIETY IN TIME AND WHEN IT CAME TO OUR NOTICE, WE IMMEDIATELY APPLIED FOR THE SAME. THROUGH THIS LETTER, IT WAS PRAYED THAT T HE DELAY IN FILING THE APPLICATION MAY BE CONDONED. IT WAS ALSO SUGGESTED IN THE ALTERNATIVE THAT IN CASE THE DELAY IS NOT CONDONED, REGISTRATION MAY BE GRANTED FROM 1.4.2005 IN VIEW OF CLAUSE (II) OF PROVISO TO SECTION 12A(A) OF THE ACT. THE COMMISSIONER HAD INQUIRED INTO THE NATURE AND OBJEC TS OF THIS COMMITTEE / INSTITUTION AND HAD FOUND THAT ITS OBJECTIVES ARE U NDISPUTEDLY CHARITABLE IN NATURE AND, THEREFORE, IT DESERVES REGISTRATION U/S 12A(A) OF THE ACT. LATER ON, ON 14.6.2007, THE LD CIT REGISTERED THE ASSESS EE U/S 12A(A) W.E.F 1.4.2005. 3. BUT DESPITE FACT THAT CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATIO N UNDER THE ACT WAS GRANTED , THE APPELLANT IS AGGRIEVED ON TWO GROUNDS:- (I) THAT THE ORDER PASSED BY THE COMMISSIONER BI KANER ON 14.6.2007 IS NOT AS PER LAW AND AS SUCH IT IS ILLEGAL BECAUSE AS PER LAW THE COMMISSIONER IS BOUND TO PASS ORDER ACCEPTING OR R EJECTING 3 APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION U/S 12A WITHIN SIX MON THS FROM THE DATE OF APPLICATION FILED IN HIS OFFICE; AND (II) THE ASSESSEE HAS MENTIONED THE DATE OF REGIS TRATION OF THE SOCIETY AS 9.11.1985, THE REGISTRATION DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN GRANTED W.E.F 9.11.1985, AS THE COMMISSIONER HAS NOT CONSIDERED T HE CONDONATION PETITION AT ALL. IT WAS ARGUED THAT WITHOUT GIVING REASONS FOR REJECTION OF CONDONATION APPLICATION AND WITHOUT MENTIONING A NYTHING IN THIS REGARD, THE CIT CANNOT REJECT THE APPLICATION. THE DEEMED REJECTION OF APPLICATION WILL ALSO NOT ARISE. 4. IN THIS MANNER, THE APPELLANT HAS PLEADED ONE THAT THE ORDER IN QUESTION IS NOT AT ALL A VALID ORDER IN THE EYES OF LAW BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN PASSED BEYOND THE PERMITTED TIME AND TWO DEEMED REG ISTRATION WOULD BE FROM THE DATE OF ITS REGISTRATION, WHEN ORDER WAS N OT PASSED WITHIN SIX MONTHS OF THE RECEIPT OF APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATI ON BY THE COMMISSIONER. 5. BEFORE US, LENGTHY ARGUMENTS WERE ADVANCED BY LD AR WHICH WAS CONTROVERTED BY LD. CIT DR WHO SUPPORTED THE APPE LLATE ORDER. BECAUSE THE ISSUE BEFORE US IS ADMIXTURE OF FACTS AND LAW , WE WOULD LIKE TO EXTRACT THE ENTIRE SUBMISSIONS WHICH WAS MADE BY THE ASSESS EE BEFORE CIT, IN VERBATIM, AS UNDER:- TO THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BIKANER. 4 REG. NOSEGAY PUBLIC SCHOOL MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE, SRIGANGANAGAR. ASSESSMENT YEAR: SUB : FOR GRANT OF 12 A OF I .T. ACT 1961 DEAR SIR, I WANT TO DRAW YOUR KIND ATTENTION TOWARDS THE FACT THAT AN APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION WAS SUBMITTED BY THE S OCIETY ON DATED 30.3.2006. IN THIS CONNECTION IT IS STATED THAT IN THE APPLICATION THE DATE OF CREATION OF THE SOCIETY WAS MENTIONED AS 9. 11.1985. IN THIS CONNECTION, IT IS STATED THAT AFTER APPLICA TION OF REGISTRATION WHAT I HAVE BEEN ABLE TO UNDERSTAND TH AT ONE REPORT FROM THE ASSESSING OFFICER/ JOINT COMMISSIONER WAS CALLED FOR. THE ORDER SHEET DATED 8.8.2006 IS CRYSTAL CLEAR, FO R YOUR READY REFERENCE THE CONTENTS THEREOF ARE BEING REPRODUCED HEREWITH: THE PREDECESSOR OF YOUR GOOD SELF ISSUED ONE NOTICE DATED 9.8.2006 IN RESPECT OF THE FACT THAT THE REGISTRATI ON APPLICATION WAS SUBMITTED AFTER EXPIRY OF ONE YEAR FROM THE DATE OF REGISTRATION. THE ASSESSEE SUBMITTED REPLIES VIDE LETTER DATED 2. 4.2007 STATING FULL FACTS AND THE REASONS MENTIONED THEREIN WERE ON ACC OUNT OF LACK OF AWARENESS, OF THE LAW. THE RELEVANT PARAGRAPH IS BE ING REPRODUCED HEREUNDER: B UT DUE TO LACK OF AWARENESS OF THE LAW WE COULD NOT APPLY FOR THE REGISTRATION OF THE SOCIETY IN TIME AND WHE N IT CAME TO OUR NOTICE, WE APPLIED FOR THE REGISTRATION. FROM THE PERUSAL OF THE ABOVE YOU WILL OBSERVE THAT YOUR PREDECESSOR WAS REQUESTED SO AS TO CONDONE THE DELA Y AND TO GRANT REGISTRATION RETROSPECTIVELY. NOW, I WANT TO DRAW YOUR KIND ATTENTION TOWARDS THE PROVISION OF SECTION 12AA OF THE INCOME-TAX ACT. THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS ARE BEING REPRODUCED HEREUNDER: (2) EVERY ORDER GRANTING OR REFUSING REGISTRATION U NDER CLAUSE (B) OF SUB SECTION (1) SHALL BE PASSED BEFOR E THE EXPIRY OF SIX MONTH FROM THE END OF THE MONTH IN WH ICH THE APPLICATION WAS RECEIVED UNDER CLAUSE(A) [OR CL AUSE (AA) OF SUB SECTION(L)} OF SECTION 12A] IN THIS RESPECT FROM THE PERUSAL OF ABOVE YOU WILL OBSERVE THAT ORDER HAS TO BE PASSED WITHIN SIX MONTH FROM THE DATE OF SUBMISSION OF THE APPLICATION. IN CASE OF THE ASSESSEE AN APPLICATION WAS SUBMITTED ON 30.03.2006. THE SIX MONTH EXPIRED ON 30.09.2006. IN THE MEANWHILE NO ORDER FOR REFUSAL WAS PASSED BY THE CO MMISSIONER OF 5 INCOME-TAX, BIKANER. THE WORD SHALL HAS BEEN USED. THEREFORE IN CASE OF THE ASSESSEE THE REGISTRATION SHALL BE DEEM ED TO HAVE BEEN GRANTED IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE PROVISIONS. IT IS. THEREFORE, HUMBLY PRAYED THAT NECESSARY ORDE R FOR THE PERIOD PRIOR TO 1.4.2005 MAY KINDLY BE PASSED SO THAT THE ASSESSEE MAY BE ABLE TO TAKE LEGAL BENEFIT AS PROVIDED IN THE ACT. HOPE YOU WILL CONSIDER THE REQUEST AND PASS THE ORDER FOR GRANTIN G REGISTRATION FROM THE DATE OF APPLICATION. I ALSO WANT TO DRAW YOUR KIND ATTENTION THAT THE DE PARTMENT HIMSELF HAS ACCEPTED THAT THE SOCIETY IS A CHARITABLE INSTI TUTION. THE REPORT OF THE LOWER AUTHORITIES IS SELF EXPLANATORY IN THIS R EGARD. WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ABOVE IT IS STATED THAT IF THE PREDECESSOR OF YOUR GOOD SELF WAS OF THE OPINION THAT REGISTRATION CANN OT BE GRANTED RETROSPECTIVELY IN THAT CASE SPEAKING ORDER SHOULD HAVE BEEN PASSED. THERE IS NO ORDER AT ALL IN RESPECT OF REFU SAL OF REGISTRATION UNDER SECTION 12AA /12A OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961. FURTHER WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO ABOVE IT WILL BE WORTH MENTIONING HERE THAT ONLY ON ACCOUNT OF DELAY ADVERSE VIEW SHOULD N OT BE DRAWN. THERE IS A DIRECT JUDGMENT OF HON'BLE SUPREME COURT REPORTED IN 167 ITR 471 IN CASE OF COLLECTOR, LAND ACQUISITION VS. MST. KATIJI AND OTHERS. THE RELEVANT PARAS OF IS BEING REPRODUCED H ERE UNDER: 1. ORDINARILY, A LITIGANT DOES NOT STAND TO BENEFIT BY LODGING AN APPEAL LATE. 2. REFUSING TO CONDONE DELAY CAN RESULT IN A MERITORIOUS MATTER BEING THROWN OUT AT THE VERY THRESHOLD AND CAUSE OF JUSTICE BEING DEFEATED. AS A GAINST THIS, WHEN DELAY IS CONDONED, THE HIGHEST THAT CAN HAPPEN IS THAT A CAUSE WOULD BE DECIDED ON MERITS A FTER HEARING THE PARTIES. 4. WHEN SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE AND TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS ARE PITTED AGAINST EACH OTHER, THE C AUSE OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE DESERVES TO BE PREFERRED, FO R THE OTHER SIDE CANNOT CLAIM TO HAVE VESTED RIGHT IN INJ USTICE BEING DONE BECAUSE OF A NON-DELIBERATE DELAY. 5. THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION THAT DELAY IS OCCASIONED DELIBERATELY, OR ON ACCOUNT OF CULPABLE NEGLIGENCE, OR ON ACCOUNT OF MALA FIDES. A LITIGANT DOES NOT STAND TO BENEFIT BY RESORTING TO DELAY. IN FACT, HE RUNS SERIOUS RIS K. 6. IT MUST BE GRASPED THAT THE JUDICIARY IS RESPECT ED NOT ON ACCOUNT OF ITSPOWER TO LEGALIZE INJUSTICE ON TECHNI CAL GROUNDS BUT BECAUSE IT IS CAPABLE OF REMOVING INJUS TICE AND IS EXPECTED TO DO SO. 6 THE JUDGMENT OF SUPREME COURT IS VERY CLEAR REGARDI NG THE SUBJECT. AS FAR AS THE IGNORANCE OF LAW IS CONCERN I WANT TO DRAW YOUR KIND ATTENTION TOWARDS THE ORDER OF 1TA1 JODHPUR BENCH, JODHPUR REPORTED IN 30 TW 158 THE RELEVANT PORTION IS BEING REPRODUCED AS UNDER: IN THIS CASE THE HONB 'LE SUPREME COURT HAS HELD TH AT COURT SHOULD ADOPT RATIONAL, COMMON SENSE AND PRAGMATIC APPROACH. AND RELIANCE CAN ALSO HE PLACED ON THE JUDGMENT OF APEX COURT IN THE CASE OF MOTILAL PADAMPATH SUGAR MILL COMPANY LIMITED VS. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS REPORTED IN (1997 ) 118 1TR 326. IN THIS CASE IT WAS HELD THAT 'THERE I S NO PRESUMPTION THAT EVERY PERSON KNOWS THE LAW. IT IS OFTEN SAID THAT EVERY ONE IS PRESUMED-TO KNOW THE LAW, BU T THAT IS NOT CORRECT STATEMENT. THERE IS NO SUCH MAX IM KNOWN TO THE LAW.' FROM THE PERUSAL OF THE ABOVE YOU WILL OBSERVE THAT THERE WAS REASONABLE CAUSE MADE KNOWN TO THE CIT BIKANER REGA RDING DELAY. THOUGH THE MATTER BECAME BARRED BY LIMITATION BY TH AT TIME BUT THE REASON WAS SUBMITTED TO THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME- TAX, BIKANER. IN ABOVE MENTIONED FACT AND CIRCUMSTANCES YOU WILL OBSERVE THAT THE ORDER PASSED BY YOUR PREDECESSOR IS A CYCLOSTYLED O RDER IN WHICH THE PERIOD SEEMS TO HAVE BEER, TYPED UNDER SOME WRONG I MPRESSION. I WANT TO ALSO DRAW YOUR KIND ATTENTION THAT THE MA TTER IN RESPECT OF THE PERIOD PRIOR TO 01.04.2005 REMAINED UNDISPOSED OFF IN THE ORDER. IN THE OTHER WORD THERE IS NO ORDER FOR THE PERIOD PRIOR TO 01.4.2005. IT IS, THEREFORE, PRAYED THAT ORDER MAY KINDLY BE PASSED, IN VIEW OF SECTION 12AA OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961, IN CASE OF DISPOS AL OFF APPLICATION AFTER EXPIRY OF SIX MONTH. IT IS THEREFORE PRAYED THAT NECESSARY ORDER FOR THE PERIOD PRIOR TO 01.04.2005 MAY KINDLY BE PASSED FOR GRANTING REGIST RATION UNDER SECTION 12A AND 12AA OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961. IT IS ALSO PRAYED THAT A CHANGE OF PERSONAL HEARING MAY KINGLY BE ALLOWED SOT THAT THE ASSESSEE MAY BE ABLE TO COME F ORWARD WITH SUITABLE SUBMISSION AND PUT HIS SUBMISSION. HOPE YOU WILL CONSIDER THE REQUEST. YOURS FAITHFULLY, SD/- FOR NOSEGAY PUBLIC SCHOOL ; MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE DATED 11.1.2012 7 6. IT WAS FOUND THAT THE APPEAL FILED BEFORE THE TR IBUNAL IS TIME BARRED. THIS APPEAL WAS RECEIVED IN THIS OFFICE ON 5.3.2012 . THIS APPEAL IS DIRECTED AGAINST THE ORDER OF LD. CIT DATED 14.6.2007. THE DELAY IN FILING THIS APPEAL IS 1660 DAYS. A CONDONATION PETITION HAS BEEN FILED WHICH IS DULY SUPPORTED BY AN ATTESTED AFFIDAVIT. THE AVERMENTS TAKEN IN T HIS AFFIDAVIT OF THE MANAGING TRUSTEE ARE BEING REPRODUCED VERBATIM, TO UNDERSTAND THE REASONS FOR THIS DELAY. AFFIDAVIT I PAPINDER SINGH SUDAN S/O SH. HAKAM SINGH SUDAN, A GE 60 YEARS, RESIDENT OF CHAK 7-E CHHOTI, SRI GANGANAGAR DECLARE ON OATH AS UNDER: THAT I AM MANAGING TRUSTEE OF NOSEGAY PUBLIC SCHOOL , SRIGANGANAGAR AND CONVERSANT WITH THE AFFAIRS OF TH E TRUST AND ALSO COMPETENT TO SWEAR THIS AFFIDAVIT. THAT NOSEGAY PUBLIC SCHOOL MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE IS A SOCIETY CREATED VIDE MEMORANDUM OF ASSOCIATION AND WAS GOT REGISTERED VIDE REGISTRATION CERTIFICATE DATED 09.11.1985, THAT AN APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 12 A OF THE INCOM E-TAX ACT WAS SUBMITTED VIDE APPLICATION DATED 30.03.2006 BEFORE THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX BIKANER. THAT THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BIKANER ALLOWE D THE REGISTRATION TO THE SOCIETY NOSEGAY PUBLIC SCHOOL MANAGEMENT COM MITTEE WITH EFFECT FROM 01.04.2005. THAI THE SOCIETY APPLIED FOR REGISTRATION SINCE ITS BEGINNING I.E. FROM DATE OF CREATION. THAT THE SOCIETY NOW SUBMITTED AN APPEAL BEFORE THE INCOME-TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL JODHPUR BENCH, JODHPUR AGAINST T HE ORDER OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, BIKANER DATED 14.06.200 7. THE APPEAL IS BARRED BY LIMITATION. THAT THE APPEAL IN QUESTION IS DELAYED SUBSTA NTIALLY ON ACCOUNT OF IGNORANCE OF LAW AND AS PER THE ADVICE OF THE T AX CONSULTANT OF THE SOCIETY AT THAT TIME. THAT NOW THE PRESENT CONSULTANTS OF THE SOCIETY ADV ISED THAT AN APPEAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED. IT HAS ALSO BEEN MADE K NOWN THAT NO ORDER CAN 8 BE PASSED ON AN APPLICATION U/S. 12 A OF THE INCOME -TAX ACT AFTER PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF APPLICATION. THAT SINCE THE MEMBERS OF SOCIETY WERE NOT AWARE AB OUT THE INCOME- TAX ACT AND CONSEQUENCES THEREOF BUT THE CONSULTANT ADVISED THAT IT MAKES NO DIFFERENCE IF THE REGISTRATION TO THE SOCIETY HA S BEEN GRANTED WITH EFFECT FROM 1.4.2005 IN PLACE OF DATED 09.11.1985 WHEREAS THE SOCIETY WAS CREATED AND RUNNING FOR FULFILLMENT OF AIMS AND OBJECTS THE REOF AFTER CREATION. THAT THE APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 12 A OF THE INCO ME-TAX ACT SUBMITTED BY THE SOCIETY WAS DECIDED BY THE COMMISS IONER OF INCOME-TAX, BIKANER VIDE ORDER DATED 14.06.2007 I.E. AFTER EXPI RY OF 6 MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF SUBMITTING OF THE APPLICATION. THAT AN APPLICATION IN RESPECT OF CONDONATION OF DE LAY WAS ALSO SUBMITTED BEFORE THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX BIK ANER VIDE APPLICATION DATED 2.4.2007 PREPARED BY THE THEN CONSULTANT. WHAT HAS BEEN STATED ABOVE IS TRUE TO THE BEST OF M Y KNOWLEDGE AND NOTHING HAS BEEN CONCEALED. GOD MAY HELP ME. DEPONENT SD/- (PAPINDER SINGH SUDAN) 7. WITH THE SUPPORT OF THIS AFFIDAVIT AND APPLICATI ON FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY IT HAS BEEN PRAYED THAT IN THE INTEREST OF SUBSTANT IAL JUSTICE, THIS DELAY MAY KINDLY BE CONDONED. THIS REQUEST WAS REPELLED BY LD . CIT DR STATING THAT THIS DELAY IS INORDINATE, THEREFORE, IT SHOULD NOT BE CO NDONED. AFTER CONSIDERING RIVAL STANDS, WE HAVE FOUND THAT THE REASON FOR THIS DELAY IS STATED TO BE DUE TO WRONG ADVICE AND IGNORANCE OF LAW OF THE PERSONS WHO ARE MANAGING THIS INSTITUTION. WE HAVE GONE THROUGH THE DECISIONS REL IED UPON BY THE LD. AR IN RESPECT OF CONDONATION OF THIS DELAY. WE HAVE NOTI CED THAT THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT, AS BACK AS IN THE YEAR 1987, HAD AN OCCASION TO DECIDE SUCH AN ISSUE IN THE CASE OF COLLECTOR, LAND ACQUISITION VS. MST. KA TIJI AND OTHER [(1987) 167 ITR 471 (SC)]. THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT HAS TITL ED THEIR DECISION OVERWHELMINGLY IN THE FAVOUR OF THE SUBSTANTIAL JUS TICE WHEN IT IS PITTED AGAINST THE PEDANTIC REASONS. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE HON'BLE APE X COURT REITERATED THEIR 9 VIEW WHILE DECIDING THE CASE OF VEDABAI ALIAS VIJAY ANATABAI BABURAO PATIL VS SHANTARAM BABURAO PATIL AND OTHERS [(2002)253 ITR 7 98 (SC) IN WHICH THEIR LORDSHIP HAVE HELD AS UNDER:- IN EXERCISING DISCRETION UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE LI MITATION ACT, 1963, TO CONDONE DELAY FOR SUFFICIENT CAUSE IN NOT PREFERRIN G AN APPEAL OR OTHER APPLICATION WITHIN THE PERIOD PRESCRIBED, COURTS SH OULD ADOPT A PRAGMATIC APPROACH. A DISTINCTION MUST BE MADE BETWEEN A CASE WHERE THE DELAY IS INORDINATE AND A CASE WHERE THE DELAY IS OF A FEW D AYS. WHEREAS IN THE FORMER CONSIDERATION OF PREJUDICE TO THE OTHER SIDE WILL BE A RELEVANT FACTOR AND CALLS FOR A MORE CAUTIOUS APPROACH, IN THE LATT ER CASE NO SUCH CONSIDERATION MAY ARISE AND SUCH A CASE DESERVES A LIBERAL APPROACH. NO HARD AND FAST RULE CAN BE LAID DOWN IN THIS REGARD. THE COURT HAS TO EXERCISE ITS DISCRETION ON THE FACTS OF EACH CASE KEEPING IN MIND THAT IN CONSTRUING THE EXPRESSION SUFFICIENT CAUSE THE PRINCIPLE OF ADVANCING SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IS OF PRIME IMPORTANCE. THE EXPRESSION SUF FICIENT CAUSE SHOULD RECEIVE A LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION. 8. SIMILARLY, HON'BLE ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT HAS VERY SUCCINCTLY DEALT WITH THIS ISSUE THREADBARE WHILE DECIDING THE CASE OF CI T & ANOTHERS VS. RAM KISHAN GUPTA [(2007) 295 ITR 578 (ALL.). IT HAS BEEN HELD IN THIS CASE AS UNDER:- IN VIEW OF THE AFORESAID DISCUSSIONS, WE ARE OF TH E VIEW THAT THE SUFFICIENT CAUSE HAD BEEN BROUGHT ON RECORD TO CONDONE THE DELAY OF FIVE DAYS. IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT AND ORDER DATE D JULY 26, 1999, IS SET ASIDE. THE DELAY IN FILING THE APPEAL BEFORE THE TR IBUNAL IS CONDONED AND THE TRIBUNAL IS DIRECTED TO DECIDE THE APPEAL ON THE ME RITS IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW. SINCE THE APPEAL WAS FILED IN THE YEAR 1992, IT WOU LD BE APPROPRIATE THAT THE TRIBUNAL EXPEDITES THE HEARING OF THE APPEAL AND D ECIDE THE SAME WITHIN A PERIOD OF THREE MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF PRODUCTION OF CER TIFIED COPY OF THIS ORDER. THE APPEAL STANDS ALLOWED AS ABOVE, HOWEVER IN THE FACTS OF THE CASE, THERE SHALL BE NO ORDER AS TO COSTS. 10. THE HON'BLE APEX COURT HAS LAID DOWN A FIRM LAW VID E WHICH IGNORANCE OF LAW HAS BEEN TREATED AS A SUFFICIENT CAUSE AND R EASONABLE EXCUSE FOR ANY DEFAULT COMMITTED UNDER THE LAW WHEN THE CAUSE OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTIC E IS UNDER CONSIDERATION. THE HON'BLE APEX COURT WHILE DEALING WITH THE CASE OF MOTILAL PADAMPAT SUGAR MILLS CO LTD VS. STATE OF UTTAR PRAD ESH & OTHERS REPORTED IN [(1997) 118 ITR PAGE 326 (SC)], HAS HELD THUS:- 10 ON THE BASIS OF AN ANNOUNCEMENT IN A NEWSPAPER THA T THE STATE OF U.P. HAD DECIDED TO GRANT EXEMPTION FROM SALES TAX FOR A PER IOD OF THREE YEARS TO ALL NEW INDUSTRIAL UNITS IN THE STATE, THE APPELLANT WROTE A LETTER IN OCTOBER, L968, TO THE DIRECTOR OF INDUSTRIES OF ITS INTENTION TO SET UP A N INDUSTRIAL UNIT FOR THE MANUFACTURE OF VANASPATI, IN REPLY TO WHICH THE DIR ECTOR CONFIRMED THAT THERE WILL BE NO SALES TAX ON THE FINISHED PRODUCT OF THE APPE LLANT'S VANASPATI FACTORY FROM THE DATE IT GETS POWER CONNECTION FOR COMMENCING PR ODUCTION. THEREUPON THE APPELLANT APPROACHED FINANCIERS FOR FINANCING THE P ROJECT AND INITIATED NEGOTIATIONS WITH MANUFACTURERS FOR THE PURCHASE OF MACHINERY FOR THE FACTORY. IN DECEMBER, 1968, THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO GOVERNMEN T AND ADVISER TO THE GOVERNOR REITERATED THE ASSURANCE THAT THE APPELLAN T WOULD BE ENTITLED TO THE TAX HOLIDAY. ON THE APPELLANT'S REQUEST FOR CONFIRMATIO N, THE CHIEF SECRETARY IN A REPLY DATED DECEMBER 22, 1968, CONFIRMED THAT 'THE STATE GOVERNMENT WILL BE WILLING TO CONSIDER YOUR REQUEST FOR GRANT OF EXEMP TION FROM U.P. SALES TAX FOR A PERIOD OF THREE YEARS FROM THE DATE OF PRODUCTION', AND THE APPELLANT TO APPLY FORMALLY TO THE SECRETARY IN THE INDUSTRIES DEPARTM ENT AND IN THE MEANTIME TO 'GO AHEAD WITH THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR SETTING UP OF T HE FACTORY'. SINCE THE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS WERE NOT SATISFIED WITH THAT REPLY, THE APPELLANT APPROACHED THE CHIEF SECRETARY AGAIN AND THE LATTER WROTE A LE TTER DATED JANUARY 23, 1969, TO THE EFFECT THAT THE APPELLANT 'WILL BE ENTITLED TO EXEMPTION FROM U.P. SALES TAX FOR A PERIOD OF THREE YEARS FROM THE DATE OF GOING INTO PRODUCTION', THE EXEMPTION BEING APPLICABLE TO VANASPATI SOLD IN THE STATE, AN D IN VIEW OF THIS ASSURANCE THE APPELLANT WENT AHEAD WITH THE SETTING UP OF THE VAN ASPATI FACTORY. THEREAFTER, THE STATE GOVERNMENT TOOK A POLICY DECISION IN JANUARY, 1970, THAT NEW VANASPATI UNITS WILL BE GIVEN ONLY A GRADED PARTIAL CONCESSIO N DURING THE FIRST THREE YEARS OF PRODUCTION AND ONCE AGAIN THE STATE GOVERNMENT REVI SED ITS POLICY IN AUGUST, 1970, RESCINDING EVEN THE PARTIAL EXEMPTION. IN THE MEANTIME, THE APPELLANT HAD WRITTEN A LETTER TO THE EFFECT THAT IT WOULD BE AVA ILING OF THE PARTIAL EXEMPTION. THE APPELLANT THEREUPON FILED A WRIT PETITION WHICH IT AMENDED AND IN THE AMENDED PETITION RAISED THE PLEA THAT THE CHIEF SECRETARY, ACTING ON BEHALF OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT, HAD GIVEN AN UNEQUIVOCAL ASSURANCE THAT THE APPELLANT WOULD BE ENTITLED TO EXEMPTION FROM PAYMENT OF SALES TAX FOR A PERIOD OF THREE YEARS FROM THE DATE OF COMMENCEMENT OF PRODUCTION, INTENDING O R KNOWING THAT IT WOULD BE ACTED UPON BY THE APPELLANT, AND THE APPELLANT, REL YING ON THAT ASSURANCE, ESTABLISHED THE FACTORY BY INVESTING A LARGE AMOUNT , AND, THEREFORE, THE STATE GOVERNMENT WAS BOUND TO HONOUR THE ASSURANCE AND EX EMPT VANASPATI MANUFACTURED AND SOLD BY THE APPELLANT FOR A PERIOD OF THREE YEARS FROM JULY 2, 1970. THE HIGH COURT REJECTED THE PLEA. ON APPEAL T O THE SUPREME COURT: HELD, REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE HIGH COURT, THA T THE FACTS NECESSARY FOR INVOKING THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL WERE C LEARLY PRESENT AND THE GOVERNMENT WAS BOUND TO CARRY OUT THE REPRESENTATIO N AND EXEMPT THE APPELLANT FROM SALES TAX IN RESPECT OF SALES OF VANASPATI EFF ECTED BY IT IN UTTAR PRADESH FOR A PERIOD OF THREE YEARS FROM THE DATE OF COMMENCEMENT OF PRODUCTION AND WAS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER SUCH SALES TAX FROM THE APPELLA NT: HELD ALSO, ON THE FACTS, THAT THE FACT THAT THE APP ELLANT WROTE A LETTER ACCEPTING THE CONCESSIONAL RATE OF SALES TAX DID NOT AMOUNT TO WA IVER. 11 IT IS ELEMENTARY THAT WAIVER IS A QUESTION OF FACT AND IT MUST BE PROPERLY PLEADED AND PROVED. NO PLEA OF WAIVER CAN BE ALLOWED TO BE RAISED UNLESS IT IS PLEADED AND THE FACTUAL FOUNDATION FOR IT IS LAID IN THE PLEADI NGS. WAIVER MEANS ABANDONMENT OF A RIGHT AND IT MAY BE EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED FROM CONDUCT, BUT ITS BASIC REQUIREMENT IS THAT IT MUST BE 'AN INTENTIONAL ACT WITH KNOWLEDGE'. THERE CAN BE NO WAIVER UNLESS THE PERSON WHO IS SAID TO HAVE WAI VED IS FULLY INFORMED AS TO HIS RIGHT AND WITH FULL KNOWLEDGE OF SUCH RIGHT, HE INT ENTIONALLY ABANDONS IT. WHERE ONE PARTY BY HIS WORDS OR CONDUCT MAKES TO AN OTHER A CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL PROMISE WHICH IS INTENDED TO CREATE LEG AL RELATIONS OR EFFECT A LEGAL RELATIONSHIP TO ARISE IN THE FUTURE, KNOWING OR INT ENDING THAT IT WOULD BE ACTED UPON BY THE OTHER PARTY TO WHOM THE PROMISE IS MADE AND IT IS IN FACT SO ACTED UPON BY THE OTHER PARTY, THE PROMISE WOULD BE BINDI NG ON THE PARTY MAKING IT AND HE WOULD NOT BE ENTITLED TO GO BACK UPON IT, IF IT WOULD BE INEQUITABLE TO ALLOW HIM TO DO SO HAVING REGARD TO THE DEALINGS WHICH HAVE T AKEN PLACE BETWEEN THE PARTIES, AND THIS WOULD BE SO IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER THERE IS ANY PRE-EXISTING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES OR NOT. IT IS NOT NECESSARY, IN ORDER TO ATTRACT THE APPLIC ABILITY OF THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL, THAT THE PROMISEE, ACTING IN R ELIANCE ON THE PROMISE, SHOULD SUFFER ANY DETRIMENT. WHAT IS NECESSARY IS ONLY THA T THE PROMISEE SHOULD HAVE ALTERED HIS POSITION: THE ALTERATION OF POSITION NE ED NOT INVOLVE ANY DETRIMENT TO THE PROMISEE. THE DETRIMENT IN SUCH A CASE IS NOT S OME PREJUDICE SUFFERED BY THE PROMISEE BY ACTING ON THE PROMISE, BUT THE PREJUDIC E WHICH WOULD BE CAUSED TO THE PROMISEE, IF THE PROMISOR WERE ALLOWED TO GO BA CK ON THE PROMISE. WHERE THE GOVERNMENT MAKES A PROMISE KNOWING OR INT ENDING THAT IT WOULD BE ACTED ON BY THE PROMISEE AND, IN FACT, THE PROMISEE , ACTING IN RELIANCE ON IT, ALTERS HIS POSITION, THE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE HELD BOUND BY THE PROMISE AND THE PROMISE WOULD BE ENFORCEABLE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT AT THE INSTANCE OF THE PROMISE, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THERE IS NO CONSIDERA TION FOR THE PROMISE AND THE PROMISE IS NOT RECORDED IN THE FORM OF A FORMAL CON TRACT AS REQUIRED BY ART. 299 OF THE CONSTITUTION. SINCE THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL IS AN EQU ITABLE DOCTRINE, IT MUST YIELD WHEN EQUITY SO REQUIRES. IF IT CAN BE SHOWN BY THE GOVERNMENT THAT HAVING REGARD TO THE FACTS AS THEY HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY TRANSPIRED, IT WOULD BE INEQUITABLE TO HOLD THE GOVERNMENT TO THE PROMISE MADE BY IT, THE COURT WOULD NOT RAISE AN EQUITY IN FAVOUR OF THE PROMISEE AND ENFORCE THE PROMISE AGAI NST THE GOVERNMENT, BECAUSE, ON THE FACTS, EQUITY WOULD NOT REQUIRE THAT THE GOV ERNMENT SHOULD BE HELD BOUND BY THE PROMISE MADE BY IT. WHEN THE GOVERNMENT IS A BLE TO SHOW THAT IN VIEW OF THE FACTS WHICH HAVE TRANSPIRED SINCE THE MAKING OF THE PROMISE, PUBLIC INTEREST WOULD BE PREJUDICED IF THE GOVERNMENT WERE REQUIRED TO CARRY OUT THE PROMISE, THE COURT WOULD HAVE TO BALANCE THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN THE GOVERNMENT CARRYING OUT A PROMISE MADE TO A CITIZEN WHICH HAS INDUCED T HE CITIZEN TO ACT UPON IT AND ALTER HIS POSITION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST LIKELY T O SUFFER IF THE PROMISE WERE REQUIRED TO BE CARRIED OUT BY THE GOVERNMENT AND DE TERMINE WHICH WAY THE EQUITY LIES. IT WOULD NOT BE ENOUGH FOR THE GOVERNMENT JUS T TO SAY THAT PUBLIC INTEREST REQUIRES THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT BE COMPELLE D TO CARRY OUT THE PROMISE OR THAT THE PUBLIC INTEREST WOULD SUFFER IF THE GOVERN MENT WERE REQUIRED TO HONOUR IT. THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT CLAIM TO BE EXEMPT FROM T HE LIABILITY TO CARRY OUT THE 12 PROMISE ON SOME INDEFINITE AND UNDISCLOSED GROUND O F NECESSITY OR EXPEDIENCY; NOR CAN THE GOVERNMENT CLAIM TO BE THE SOLE JUDGE O F ITS LIABILITY AND REPUDIATE IT ON AN EX PARTE APPRAISEMENT OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES. T HE GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE TO DISCLOSE TO THE COURT WHAT ARE THE SUBSEQUENT EVENT S ON ACCOUNT OF WHICH THE GOVERNMENT CLAIMS TO BE EXEMPT FROM THE LIABILITY A ND IT WOULD BE FOR THE COURT TO DECIDE WHETHER THOSE EVENTS ARE SUCH AS TO RENDER I T INEQUITABLE TO ENFORCE THE LIABILITY AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. MERE CLAIM OF CHA NGE OF POLICY WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT TO EXONERATE THE GOVERNMENT FROM THE LIA BILITY: THE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO SHOW WHAT PRECISELY IS THE CHANGED POLICY A ND ALSO ITS REASON AND JUSTIFICATION SO THAT THE COURT CAN JUDGE FOR ITSEL F WHICH WAY THE PUBLIC INTEREST LIES AND WHAT THE EQUITY OF THE CASE DEMANDS. IT IS ONLY IF THE COURT IS SATISFIED, ON PROPER AND ADEQUATE MATERIAL PLACED BY THE GOVERNME NT, THAT OVERRIDING PUBLIC INTEREST REQUIRES THAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT BE HELD BOUND BY THE PROMISE BUT SHOULD BE FREE TO ACT UNFETTERED BY IT, THAT TH E COURT WOULD REFUSE TO ENFORCE THE PROMISE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. THE COURT WOULD INSIST ON A HIGHLY RIGOROUS STANDARD OF PROOF IN THE DISCHARGE OF THE GOVERNMEN T'S BURDEN IN THIS REGARD. BUT EVEN WHERE THERE IS NO SUCH OVERRIDING PUBLIC I NTEREST, IT MAY STILL BE COMPETENT TO THE GOVERNMENT TO RESILE FROM THE PROM ISE ON GIVING REASONABLE NOTICE, WHICH NEED NOT BE A FORMAL NOTICE, GIVING T HE PROMISEE A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY OF RESUMING HIS POSITION PROVIDED OF CO URSE IT IS POSSIBLE FOR THE PROMISEE TO RESTORE STATUS QUO ANTE. IF, HOWEVER, T HE PROMISEE CANNOT RESUME HIS POSITION, THE PROMISE WOULD BECOME FINAL AND IRREVO CABLE. THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CANNOT BE APPLI ED IN THE TEETH OF AN OBLIGATION OR LIABILITY IMPOSED BY LAW. PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL CANNOT BE INVOKED TO COMPEL THE GOVERNMENT OR EVEN A PRIVATE PARTY TO DO AN ACT PROHIBITED BY LAW. THERE CAN ALSO BE NO PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AGAINST TH E EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER. THE LEGISLATURE CAN NEVER BE PRECLUDED FROM EXERCISING ITS LEGISLATIVE FUNCTION BY RESORT TO THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ES TOPPEL. PER CURIAM: (I) IF THE U.P. SALES TAX ACT, 1948, DI D NOT CONTAIN A PROVISION ENABLING THE GOVERNMENT TO GRANT EXEMPTION IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO ENFORCE THE REPRESENTATION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT, BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT BE COMPELLED TO ACT CONTRARY TO THE STATUTE, BUT SINCE S. 4A OF THE U.P. SALES TAX ACT, 1948, CONFERS POWER ON THE GOVERNMENT TO GRANT EXEM PTION FROM SALES TAX, THE GOVERNMENT CAN LEGITIMATELY BE HELD BOUND BY ITS PR OMISE TO EXEMPT THE APPELLANT FROM PAYMENT OF SALES TAX. IT IS TRUE THAT TAXATION IS A SOVEREIGN OR GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION, BUT NO DISTINCTION CAN BE MADE BETWEEN TH E EXERCISE OF A SOVEREIGN OR GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTION AND A TRADING OR BUSINESS ACT IVITY OF THE GOVERNMENT, SO FAR AS THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL IS CONCE RNED. (II) THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION THAT EVERY PERSON KNOW S THE LAW. IT IS OFTEN SAID THAT EVERY ONE IS PRESUMED TO KNOW THE LAW, BU T THAT IS NOT A CORRECT STATEMENT: THERE IS NO SUCH MAXIM KNOWN TO THE LAW. DECISION OF THE ALLAHABAD HIGH COURT REVERSED. 13 11. THEREFORE, TAKING THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THES E DECISIONS, PARTICULARLY WHEN APPELLANT BEFORE US IS A CHARITABLE INSTITUTIO N, AND THE COMMISSIONER AS WELL AS THE ITO HAVE FOUND THE OBJECTS OF THE APPEL LANT CHARITABLE IN NATURE NO DOUBT HAS BEEN RAISED IN THIS REGARD, WE ARE LEFT W ITH NO OPTION TO CONDONE THIS DELAY IN FILING APPEAL BEFORE TRIBUNAL. IN SUCH A INSTITUTION THE TRUSTEE OR ANY INCHARGE HAS GOT NO PERSONAL INTEREST, BUT SUCH INS TITUTIONS SERVE THE PUBLIC CAUSE OF CHARITY. ANYBODY SO CONNECTED MAY HAVE PE RFUNCTORY INTEREST AND SUCH LIKE LONG DELAYS USUALLY OCCUR. THERE ARE RAFT OF DECISIONS WHICH FAVOUR CONDONATION SUCH DELAYS, INSTEAD OF DEFEATING THE C AUSE OF CHARITY AT THE VERY THRESHOLD. THAT IS WHY THE LAW HAS PERMITTED SUCH INSTITUTION TO EXIST AND FLOURISH FOR PUBLIC CAUSE. WE ARE AWARE THAT THERE MAY BE SOME INSTITUTIONS WHICH MAY ALSO WORK AGAINST THE DICTUM OF THE LAW A ND AVAIL PERSONAL BENEFITS OF ITS TRUSTEES BUT SUCH CASES HAVE TO BE SEGREGATED. IN THE LIGH T OF THE ABOVE DECISIONS, WE ARE OF THE CONSIDERED OPINION THAT TH IS APPEAL DESERVES TO BE ADMITTED AFTER CONDONING THE DELAY . ACCORDINGLY, WE ADMIT THIS APPEAL. 12. COMING TO THE MERITS OF THE CASE, WE HAVE FOUND THAT THE COMMISSIONER UNDENIABLY HAS PASSED THE ORDER U/S 12A(A) BEYOND SIX MONTHS OF THE RECEIPT OF APPLICATION IN FORM 10A IN ITS OFFICE ON 30.3.2006. THE IMPUGNED ORDER WAS PASSED ON 14.6.2007, BEYOND SIX MONTHS AS HAS BEEN PRESCRIBED IN SECTION 12A . IN SUCH EVENTUALITIES, THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRA TION IS DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN ALLOWED. WE MAY RELY ON THE DECISION OF HON'BLE SP ECIAL BENCH OF ITAT, DELHI RENEDERED IN THE CASE BHAGWAD SWARUP SHRI SHRI DEV RAHA BABA MEMORIAL SHRI HARI PARMARTH DHAM TRUST VS. CIT REPORTED IN [(2 008) 299 ITR (AT) 161 (DELHI)(SB]. IN THE ABOVE ORDER IT HAS BEEN HELD T HAT IF THE ORDER IS PASSED BY CIT WITHIN 6 MOTHS OF RECEIPT OF APPLICATION IN FOR M 10A, U/S 12A, IT IS DEEMED 14 THAT IT STAND ALLOWED. THE ORDER PASSED BY COMMISSI ONER REFUSING REGISTRATION WAS TREATED AS A NULLITY LIABLE TO BE QUASHED. T HUS, REGISTRATION WAS DEEMED TO BE GRANTED AS APPLIED FOR BY THE ASSESSEE. IN THIS CASE ALSO, SIMILAR SITUATION HAS OCCURRED. THE ONLY DIFFERENCE IS THAT THE COMMI SSIONER HAS REGISTERED THE INSTITUTION BUT W.E.F. 1.4.2005, IGNORING THE DATE OF REGISTRATION GIVEN IN THE FORM NO. 10A. THE RATIO OF THE ABOVE TRIBUNAL ORDE R OF THE SPECIAL BENCH THE APPLICATION IS DEEMED ALLOWED AS APPLIED FOR BY THE ASSESSEE. SINCE THE ASSESSEE HAD APPLIED TO GET REGISTRATION FROM THE D ATE OF ITS INCEPTION, IT IS WRONG AND ILLEGAL TO ALLOW THE SAME W.E.F. 1.4.2005 UNDER THIS DEEMING PROVISION. THIS REGISTRATION HAS TO BE TREATED TO HAVE BEEN GRANTED W.E.F . THE DATE OF ITS INCEPTION I.E. 9.11.1985. ACCORDINGLY , WE DIRECT THE COMMISSIONER TO GRANT REGISTRATION TO THE APPELLANT W.E.F. 09.11 .1985, WHICH ALREADY DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN GRANTED. IN VIEW OF OUR ABOVE FINDING, T HE OTHER APPEAL WOULD BE OF ACADEMIC INTEREST ONLY. 12. IN THE RESULT, BOTH THE APPEAL STANDS ALLOW. (ORDER PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON 19.12.2012 ) SD/- SD/- (N.K.SAINI) (HARI OM MARATHA) JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMER DATED : 19 TH DECEMBER, 2012 RKK COPY TO: 1. THE APPELLANT 2. THE RESPONDENT 3. THE CIT 4. THE CIT(A) 5. THE DR BY ORDER ASSISTANT REGISTRAR ITAT, JODHPUR 15