Telicherry Minority Welfare Trust, Thalassery V. Commissioner of Income Tax, Kannur

ITA 137/COCH/2009

• Counselvise Citation: [2011] 134 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 4573 (ITAT-COCHIN)
• Duration Of Justice: 2 year(s) 1 month(s) 13 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 29-04-2011
• Appeal Filed By: Assessee
• Bench Allotted: DB
• Next Hearing Date: 11-01-2011
• Assessment Year: misc
• Appeal Filed On: 16-03-2009
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: T J VINCENT
• Assessee Lawyers: C R HARISH CAAR
• Keywords: Charitable institution; Competent authority
• Section: 12A

Judgement Text

IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLAT E TRIBUNAL COCHIN BEN CH, COCHIN BEFORE S/SHRI N.VIJAYAKUMARAN, JM AND SANJAY AR ORA, AM I.T.A. NO. 137/COCH/2009 TELLICHERRY MINORITY WELFARE TRUST, 19/600 MARIYAMA ROAD, PILACKOOL, THALASERRY. [PAN: AAFFT 2236C] VS. THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, KANNUR. (ASSESSEE-APPELLANT) (REVENUE- RESPONDENT) ASSESSEE BY SHRI C.R.HARISH, CA-AR REVENUE BY SHRI T.J.VINCENT, DR. O R D E R PER SANJAY ARORA, AM: THIS IS AN APPEAL BY THE ASSESSEE ARISING OUT OF T HE ORDER BY THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, KANNUR (CIT FOR SHORT) U/S. 12AA(1)(B )(II) OF THE INCOME-TAX ACT, 1961 ('THE ACT' HEREINAFTER) DATED 15.1.2009. 2. THE BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE ARE THAT THE APPELLA NT IS A TRUST, CONSTITUTED VIDE TRUST DEED DATED 30.5.2003 AS A CHARITABLE AND RELIGIOUS TRUST, ONLY FOR CHARITABLE AND RELIGIOUS PURPOSES. IT APPLIED FOR REGISTRATION U/S. 12A OF T HE ACT ON 21.7.2008. ON EXAMINATION OF ITS CASE FOR THE PURPOSE, IT WAS OBSERVED BY THE LD . CIT, THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY UNDER THE ACT, THAT CLAUSE 11(Z) OF THE TRUST DEED READ AS:- TO ENGAGE INTO ANY OTHER ACTIVITIES WHICH THE TRUS T DEEMS BENEFICIAL TO THE MINORITIES AND OTHER BACKWARD CLASSES. HE WAS, THEREFORE, OF THE VIEW THAT THE APPLICANT-T RUST IS ESTABLISHED FOR THE BENEFIT OF A PARTICULAR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY OR CASTE AND, THUS, HIT BY SECTION 13(1)(B) OF THE ACT. EXPLANATION (2) BELOW SUB-SECTION (7) OF S. 13, WHICH PROVIDES AN EXCEPTION TO S. 13(1)(B) FOR SCHEDULE CASTES, BACKWARD CLASSES, SCHEDULED TR IBE OR WOMEN AND CHILDREN, WOULD NOT ITA NO.137 /COCH/2009 2 BE APPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE AS THE WORD MINO RITY CANNOT BE CATEGORIZED AS EITHER SCHEDULE CASTE OR BACKWARD COMMUNITY; VIZ. JAINS AN D CHRISTIANS ARE A MINORITY COMMUNITY, BUT ARE NEITHER BACKWARD NOR A SCHEDULE CASTE. HE, ACCORDINGLY, REJECTED THE ASSESSEES APPLICATION FOR GRANT OF REGISTRATION WI THOUT EXAMINING THE OTHER ISSUES THAT MAY ARISE, INCLUDING CONSIDERATION OF THE REASONS F OR CONDONING THE DELAY IN MAKING THE APPLICATION. AGGRIEVED, THE APPLICANT IS IN APPEAL . 3. BEFORE US, LIKE CONTENTIONS STOOD RAISED BY EITH ER SIDE. THE LD. CIT HAD MISCONSTRUED THE WORD MINORITIES TO MEAN A RELIGI OUS MINORITY OR WITH REFERENCE TO A RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY, WHICH WOULD, EVEN OTHERWISE, I NCLUDE PEOPLE OF DIFFERENT COMMUNITIES, VIZ. MUSLIMS, CHRISTIANS, SIKHS BESIDE S ZOROASTRIANS (PARSIS), ETC. SECONDLY, EVEN SO, S. 13 ONLY PROVIDES FOR SATISFAC TION OF CONDITIONS SUBJECT TO WHICH SS. 11 AND 12 WILL HAVE APPLICATION AND, AS SUCH, HAS N O BEARING ON THE REGISTRATION U/S. 12A OF THE ACT. THE LD. DR, ON THE OTHER HAND, DREW OU R ATTENTION TO CLAUSE 11 (Y) OF THE TRUST DEED, WHICH AUTHORISES THE TRUST TO RAISE THE FUNDS BY COLLECTING AND DISTRIBUTING ZAKATH FOR FULFILLING THE AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE TRUST . ZAKATH, IT WAS SUBMITTED BY HIM, IS A RELIGIOUS DONATION; AS PER THE TENETS OF ISLAM, A D UTY IS CAST ON A MUSLIM TO CONTRIBUTE 2.5% OF HIS WEALTH OVER `NISAB, WHICH IS A SUM DEF INED IN TERMS OF A SPECIFIED QUANTITY OF GOLD (AS OF AUGUST 7, 2010, NISAB IS ESTIMATED A T $2,975/-). IT IS CLEAR, THEREFORE, THAT THE APPELLANT-TRUST IS FOR THE BENEFIT OF A PARTICU LAR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY AND, ACCORDINGLY, STOOD RIGHTLY DENIED REGISTRATION BY THE REGISTERIN G AUTHORITY. 4. WE HAVE HEARD THE PARTIES, AND PERUSED THE MATER IAL ON RECORD. 4.1 THE ISSUE AT HAND CONCERNING THE APPLICATION OR OTHERWISE OF SECTION 13(1)(B), THE PROVISION, TO THE EXTENT RELEVANT, IS REPRODUCED AS UNDER:- SECTION 11 NOT TO APPLY IN CERTAIN CASES . 13(1) NOTHING CONTAINED IN SECTION 11 (OR SECTION 1 2) SHALL OPERATE SO AS TO EXCLUDE FROM THE TOTAL INCOME OF THE PREVIOUS YEAR OF THE PERSO N IN RECEIPT THEREOF- A) ANY PART OF THE INCOME FROM THE PROPERTY HELD UNDER A TRUST FOR PRIVATE RELIGIOUS PURPOSES WHICH DOES NOT ENURE FOR THE BE NEFIT OF THE PUBLIC; ITA NO.137 /COCH/2009 3 B) IN CASE OF A TRUST FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSE S OR A CHARITABLE INSTITUTION CREATED OR ESTABLISHED AFTER THE COMMENCEMENT OF THIS ACT, ANY INCOME THEREOF IF THE TRUST OR INSTITUTION IS CREATED OR ESTABLISHED F OR THE BENEFIT OF ANY PARTICULAR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY OR CASTE; C) IN THE CASE OF A TRUST FOR CHARITABLE OR RELIGIOUS PURPOSES, OR A CHARITABLE OR RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION, ANY INCOME THEREOF- (I) IF SUCH TRUST OR INSTITUTION HAS BEEN CREATED OR ESTABLISHED AFTER THE COMMENCEMENT OF THIS ACT AND UNDER THE TERMS OF TH E TRUST OR THE RULES GOVERNING THE INSTITUTION, ANY PART OF SUCH INCOME ENURES, OR (II) IF ANY PART OF SUCH INCOME OR ANY PRO PERTY OF THE TRUST OR THE INSTITUTION (WHENEVER CREATED OR ESTABLISHED) IS DURING THE PR EVIOUS YEAR USED OR APPLIED, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY FOR THE BENEFIT O F ANY PERSON REFERRED TO IN SUB-SECTION (3): D) EXPLANATION 2 - A TRUST OR INSTITUTION CREATED OR ESTABLISHED FO R THE BENEFIT OF SCHEDULED CASTES, BACKWARD CLASSES, SCHEDULED TRIBES OR WOMEN AND CHILDREN SHALL NOT BE DEEMED TO BE A TRUST OR INSTITUTION CREATED OR ESTABLISHED FOR THE BENEFIT OF A RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY OR CASTE WITHIN THE MEANING OF CLAUSE (B) OF SUB-SE CTION (1). 4.2 THE ISSUES, AS APPARENT FROM THE FOREGOING , THAT ARISE FOR OUR CONSIDERATION, ARE:- I) WHETHER THE PROVISION OF SECTION 13(1)(B) IS APPLIC ABLE TO THE ASSESSEE?; AND II) WHETHER, EVEN IF SO, WOULD THE SAME HAVE THE EFFECT OF DENIAL OF REGISTRATION U/S. 12A? 4.3 AT THE VERY OUTSET, HOWEVER, WE MAY CLARIFY THA T EVEN IF BOTH THE QUESTIONS ARE ANSWERED IN FAVOUR OF THE APPELLANT-TRUST, THE MATT ER SHALL HAVE TO BE REMANDED BACK TO THE FILE OF THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY FOR EXAMINATION OF THE ASSESSEES APPLICATION ON MERITS, OF COURSE IN A TIME BOUND MANNER. THIS IS FOR THE REASON THAT, AS AFORE-NOTED, THERE IS NO FINDING BY THE LD. CIT IN RESPECT OF TH E SATISFACTION OR OTHERWISE OF THE CONDITIONS OF S. 12A(B). THE SAME IS NECESSARY FOR EITHER THE GRANT OR THE REJECTION OF REGISTRATION UNDER THE ACT, WHICH CANNOT BE PRESUME D, BUT ONLY FOLLOW DEFINITE FINDINGS OF FACT BY HIM. IN FACT, IT IS NOT EVEN CLEAR FROM THE MATERIAL ON RECORD WHETHER THE TRUST STANDS REGISTERED, WHICH ONLY WOULD ACCORD IT THE S TATUS OF A PUBLIC CHARITABLE AND RELIGIOUS TRUST; ALSO WE FIND THE REVENUE TO HAVE R AISED CERTAIN ISSUES ON PERUSAL OF THE ASSESSEES APPLICATION VIDE LETTER DATED 3.10.2008, AND WHICH HAS ALSO BEEN RESPONDED TO ITA NO.137 /COCH/2009 4 BY THE APPELLANT (VIDE LETTER DATED 1.11.2008), TO WHICH THOUGH THERE IS NO REFERENCE IN THE IMPUGNED ORDER. 4.4 COMING TO THE QUESTIONS AFORE-RAISED, WE SHA LL TAKE UP THE SECOND QUESTION FIRST. THIS IS FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT IF THE APPLICATI ON OF S. 13(1)(B), GRANTING SO, HAS NO BEARING ON THE REGISTRATION U/S. 12A, AS CONTENDED, THE SAME WOULD BECOME IRRELEVANT FOR OUR PURPOSE. TOWARD THIS, WE FIND THAT THE WORDS MINORITIES AND BACKWARD CLASSES DO NOT APPEAR ONLY IN CLAUSE 11(Z) OF THE DEED, BUT RU NS THROUGH THE TRUST DEED. THE PREAMBLE TO THE DEED ITSELF ACCORDS PRIMACY TO THIS ; IT READING AS:- ---------AND WHEREAS THE TRUSTEES ARE DESIROUS OF CREATING A CHARITABLE AND RELIGIOUS TRUST, WHOLLY FOR CHARITABLE AND RELIGIOUS PURPOSES , OF THE SAID MONEYS AND THROUGH ASSISTANCE, FINANCIAL AND/OR OTHERWISE FROM INDIVID UALS FROM INDIA AND ABROAD, INSTITUTIONS, QUASI GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS MAINLY TO PROVIDE SHELTERS FOR THE HOMELESS POOR AND TO IMPROVE THE STANDARDS OF LIFE AND EDUCA TION OF THE MINORITIES AND BACKWARD CLASSES IN TELLICHERRY MUNICIPALITY AND ITS SUBURBS . CLAUSE (9) OF THE DEED SPECIFIES THE BENEFICIARIES OF THE TRUST, AND READS AS: BENEFICIARIES : THE BENEFICIARIES OF THIS TRUST ARE THE FINANCIAL LY POOR MINORITIES AND OTHER BACKWARD CLASSES IN TELLICHERRY MUNICIPALITY AND IT S SUBURBS. SIMILARLY, THE SAID WORDS APPEAR IN SUB-CLA USES (C), (J), (M), (N), (U) AND (Z) OF CLAUSE 11, WHICH IS TITLED: `OBJECTS OF THE TRUST. NO DO UBT, THERE ARE OTHER OBJECT CLAUSES WHICH DO NOT BEAR REFERENCE TO THESE WORDS, BUT THAT IS INCONSEQUENTIAL IN VIEW OF CLAUSE (9) OF THE TRUST DEED, IDENTIFYING THE BENEF ICIARY TARGET GROUP. FURTHER, IT IS TRUE THAT SEC. 13 ONLY SPECIFIES THE CONDITIONS SUBJECT TO WH ICH SS. 11 AND 12, WHICH OPERATE TO EXCLUDE THE INCOME FROM THE PROPERTY HELD UNDER TRU ST FROM THE TOTAL INCOME OF THE PERSON IN RECEIPT THEREOF, WOULD BE APPLICABLE. SO, HOWEVE R, WE HAVE ALREADY FOUND THAT THE BENEFICIARIES ARE SPECIFIED, SO THAT THE INCOME OF THE TRUST COULD BE APPLIED ONLY FOR THEIR BENEFIT. THE SAME IS INTEGRAL TO, AND FORMS A PART OF THE OBJECTS AND ACTIVITIES OF, THE TRUST. NOW, WHEN THE ENTIRE INCOME OF THE TRUST IS TO BE E XCLUDED FROM THE PURVIEW OF S. 11, SO AS TO BE TAXABLE (I.E., ASSUMING APPLICATION OF S. 13(1)(B)), WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF GRANTING REGISTRATION U/S. 12A TO SUCH A TRUST? THE SAME, I .E., CLAUSE (9), READ IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE PREAMBLE, AS WELL AS THE OBJECT CLAUSES, DEFINE S THE CHARACTER OR THE STATUS OF THE TRUST. ITA NO.137 /COCH/2009 5 WE ARE, THEREFORE, OF THE VIEW THAT EVEN THOUGH S. 13 ONLY RESTRICTS THE APPLICATION OF SS. 11 AND 12, THE SAME IMPINGING ON THE DENOMINATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE TRUST, AS WELL AS THE FACT THAT S. 13(1)(B) EXTENDS TO THE ENTIRE INCOME OF THE TRUST (IRRESPECTIVE OF THE EXTENT OF APPLICATION FOR THE BENEFIT OF A PARTICULAR RELIGIO US COMMUNITY OR CASTE), THE SAME (S. 13(1)(B)), WHERE APPLICABLE, COULD VALIDLY LEAD TO DENIAL OF REGISTRATION U/S. 12A OF THE ACT. 4.5 WE MAY NOW ADDRESS THE FIRST QUESTION AFORE-MEN TIONED. IN THIS REGARD, WE FIND THAT S. 13(1)(B) DEALS WITH THE TRUSTS FOR CHARITAB LE PURPOSES OR CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS, I.E., IT HAS NO APPLICATION IN THE CASE OF A RELIGIOUS TR UST. THIS IS FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT A RELIGIOUS TRUST OR INSTITUTION WOULD NECESSARILY BE WITH REFERENCE TO A PARTICULAR RELIGION. THE CASE OF A COMPOSITE TRUST, I.E., FOR CHARITABLE AND RELIGIOUS PURPOSES, CAME UP BEFORE THE HONBLE GUJARAT HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. BARKATE SAIFIYAH SOCIETY (1995) 213 ITR 492 (GUJ.). IT, FINDING THE TRUST TO BE A COMPO SITE ONE, UPHELD THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIBUNAL THAT S. 13(1)(B) SHALL HAVE NO APPLICATION IN THAT CASE, I.E., WHERE THE TRUST IS CONSTITUTED FOR CHARITABLE AND RELIGIOUS PURPOSES; S.13(1)(B) BEING INAPPLICABLE IN THE CASE OF A RELIGIOUS TRUST/INSTITUTION SET UP FOR RELIGIO US PURPOSES. 4.6 IN THIS REGARD, WE MAY FIRSTLY DRAW ATTENTION T O THE DECISION BY THE APEX COURT IN THE CASE OF STATE OF KERALA V. M.P. SHANTI VERMA JAIN (1998) 231 ITR 787 (SC). SUCH A PLEA, I.E., AS TO MIXED OBJECTS, WAS ALSO RAISED IN THAT CASE, AND FOUND NOT ACCEPTABLE. IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THIS WOULD ALSO FOLLOW FROM THE F ACT THAT THE DISQUALIFICATION U/S. 13(1)(B) IS ONLY QUA CHARITABLE ACTIVITIES, SO THAT INDEPENDENT OF WHET HER THE TRUST IS ALSO ESTABLISHED FOR RELIGIOUS PURPOSES, INASMUCH ITS CH ARITABLE OBJECTS INURE FOR THE BENEFIT OF A PARTICULAR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY OR CASTE, THE PROV ISION WOULD BE ATTRACTED. WE HAVE ALSO EXAMINED THE SAID CASE [ BARKATE SAIFIYAH SOCIETY (SUPRA)], THOUGH NOT CITED BEFORE US, IN DETAIL, AND FIND IT TO BE DISTINGUISHABLE. THE OBJE CT CLAUSE IN THE SAID CASE READ AS UNDER:- I) TO HELP THE POOR AND NEEDY. II) MEDICAL RELIEF. III) PROVISION OF EDUCATION. IV) TO CARRY OUT RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES. ITA NO.137 /COCH/2009 6 THAT IS, ONE OF THE FOUR OBJECTS WAS RELIGIOUS IN NATURE, WHILE THE OTHER THREE, CHARITABLE, SO THAT IT COULD NOT POSSIBLY BE SAID O N ITS BASIS THAT THE CHARITABLE ACTIVITIES INURE FOR ANY PARTICULAR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY OR CAS TE, SO AS TO BE HIT BY S. 13(1)(B). IN THE PRESENT CASE, ON THE OTHER HAND, WE FIND THAT ALL T HE SUB-CLAUSES OF CLAUSE 11, WHICH STATES THE VARIOUS AIMS AND OBJECTS OF THE TRUST, ARE CHAR ITABLE OBJECTS, I.E., AS WOULD FALL WITHIN THE MEANING AND SCOPE OF S. 2(15) OF THE ACT. THE B ENEFICIARIES ARE DEFINED, BOTH UNDER THE PREAMBLE AS WELL AS PER CLAUSE (9) OF THE TRUST DEED. IN VIEW OF THE DENOMINATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE TRUST, SO DEFINED, IT COULD NOT, T HEREFORE, BE SAID THAT S. 13(1)(B) WOULD NOT APPLY ON ACCOUNT OF IT BEING A `COMPOSITE TRUST. A PUBLIC TRUST, IT MAY BE CLARIFIED, IS ONE WHICH INURES FOR THE BENEFIT OF ANY RECOGNISABLE AN D IDENTIFIABLE CROSS-SECTION OF THE PUBLIC, AND IT WOULD NOT MATTER WHETHER THE CROSS-S ECTION IS ONE IDENTIFIED BY A BOND OF RELIGION, COMMUNITY OR CASTE, I.E., SUCH A TRUST WO ULD STILL QUALIFY TO BE A PUBLIC CHARITABLE TRUST. HOWEVER, THE ACT PROVIDES AN EXCEPTION BY D ENYING EXEMPTION, AS A MATTER OF PUBLIC POLICY, TO COMMUNAL OR SECTARIAN TRUSTS, LAY ING THE CRITERION OF `FOR THE BENEFIT OF A PARTICULAR RELIGION OR CASTE, EVIDENTLY WITH A VIE W TO DISCOURAGE SECTARIANISM. IN OTHER WORDS, A TRUST TO WHICH S. 13(1)(B) APPLIES, IS NO LESS A PUBLIC CHARITABLE TRUST, THOUGH DISQUALIFIED FOR THE EXEMPTION STATUS OF ITS INCOME UNDER THE ACT ON ACCOUNT OF IT INURING FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC DRAWN ON THE LINES OF RELIGIOUS IDENTITY OR AFFINITY, OR CASTE. 4.7 THE QUESTION THAT WOULD FOLLOW NEXT IS WHETHER THE `SPECIFIED BENEFICIARIES FALL TO BE COVERED U/S. 13(1)(B) OF THE ACT. IN THIS REGAR D, THE ASSESSEE STATES THAT THE LD. CIT HAS MISCONSTRUED THE WORD MINORITIES, STATED IN ITS P REAMBLE, AS WELL AS IN THE `BENEFICIARIES AND THE `OBJECT CLAUSE OF THE TRUS T DEED. THE WORD MINORITY DOES NOT BY ITSELF SIGNIFY A RELIGIOUS MINORITY, SO AS TO REFER TO A PARTICULAR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY OR CASTE. TRUE, THE WORD `MINORITY OR `MINORITIES WO ULD NOT NECESSARILY MEAN A RELIGIOUS MINORITY, TO WHICH RELIGIOUS IDENTITY ONLY, THE PRO SCRIPTION UNDER THE ACT EXTENDS. HOWEVER, IN THAT CASE, IT IS FOR THE ASSESSEE-APPLI CANT TO SPECIFY AS TO WHICH SPECIFIC MINORITY OR MINORITIES THE SAID WORD `MINORITIES I N ITS TRUST DEED REFERS TO, OR ELSE, IT WOULD BECOME AN UNCERTAIN AND VAGUE TERM, NOT CONVE YING THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH THE TRUST IS SET-UP AS WELL AS THE TARGET GROUP IT IS I NTENDED TO SERVE. APART FROM BEING A ITA NO.137 /COCH/2009 7 PRIMARY FACT, BASIC TO ITS CHARACTER, THE QUESTION IS: HOW WOULD THE TRUST FUNCTION OR OPERATE IF ITS BENEFICIARY OR THE TARGET GROUP IS N OT IDENTIFIED OR IDENTIFIABLE ? FURTHER, NO DOUBT, THE WORD `MINORITY WOULD NOT SIGNIFY A RELI GIOUS MINORITY ALONE, BUT THEN THE DISQUALIFICATION U/S. 13(1)(B) EXTENDS TO `CASTE A S WELL. THERE MAY BE A NUMBER OF CASTES WHICH ARE IN MINORITY AMONGST THE RESIDENTS OF THE AREA COMPRISED IN THE TELLICHERRY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION AND ITS SUBURBS, I.E., THE TE RRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE ASSESSEE- TRUST. FURTHER, THE WORD `PARTICULAR RELIGIOUS COMM UNITY OR CASTE IN S. 13(1)(B) HAS BE READ IN A BROAD MANNER AS WOULD BE APPARENT FROM TH E CATEGORIES EXCLUDED FROM THE OPERATION OF THE SECTION PER EXPLANATION 2 THERETO. WE HAVE ALSO GONE THROUGH ARTICLES 25 TO 30 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, WHICH DEAL WITH PROTECTION OF MINORITY RIGHTS. THE WORD ` MINORITY, AS CONCEIVED THEREIN, EXTENDS TO ANY RELIGIOUS, LINGUISTIC OR CULTURAL MI NORITY. THERE IS NO REFERENCE TO CONSERVATION OR PROMOTION OF ANY LANGUAGE OR PARTIC ULAR CULTURE IN THE OBJECT CLAUSES OF THE TRUST DEED. AS SUCH, THERE IS NO BASIS TO CONTE ND THAT THE TRUST INURES FOR ALL MINORITIES, HOWSOEVER CONSTRUED. CONSIDERING SO, EVERY PERSON W OULD BE IN MINORITY IN SOME RESPECT OR OTHER, AND THE WORD WOULD LOOSE ALL ITS SIGNIFIC ANCE. E.G. TAMIL-SPEAKING PEOPLE WOULD BE IN MINORITY IN TELLICHERRY, A TOWN IN KERALA. WOULD THAT MEAN THAT THE TRUST IS ESTABLISHED FOR THE BENEFIT OF TAMIL-SPEAKING, OR O THER LINGUISTIC MINORITIES RESIDENT THEREOF ? AND, PARTICULARLY IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY REFERENC E TO TAMIL LANGUAGE, OR ANY LANGUAGE FOR THAT MATTER, OR LANGUAGES ITSELF, IN T HE TRUST DEED. THIS IS ONLY INTENDED TO SERVE AS AN EXAMPLE, WHICH COULD BE MULTIPLIED. A D OCUMENT HAS TO BE READ AS A WHOLE, AND PURPOSIVELY. EVEN THE NATIONAL MINORITIES COMMI SSION, CONSTITUTED AS AN AUTONOMOUS BODY TO OVERSEE MINORITY INTERESTS, HAS DEFINED FIVE RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS, VIZ. MUSLIMS, SIKHS, CHRISTIANS, BUDDHISTS AND ZORO ASTRIANS, AS MINORITIES IN INDIA (VIDE ITS NOTIFICATION DATED 23/10/1993). READING THE DEED HARMONIOUSLY, HOLIST ICALLY AND REASONABLY, WHICH IT MUST, WE ARE OF THE VIEW THAT THE WORD MINORITIES IN THE T RUST DEED IS WITH REFERENCE TO `RELIGIOUS MINORITIES ONLY. IN FACT, IF THAT WAS NOT SO, THE RE IS NO QUESTION OF IT BEING ACCORDED THE STATUS OF, OR CREATED AS A, RELIGIOUS TRUST, BESID ES A CHARITABLE ONE, I.E., WHOLLY FOR RELIGIOUS AND CHARITABLE PURPOSES. FURTHER, THE ASS ESSEES OWN ARGUMENT THAT PEOPLE OF DIFFERENT RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS WOULD STAND TO BE COVERED BY THE TERM `MINORITIES, I.E., ITA NO.137 /COCH/2009 8 THOSE RESIDING IN TELLICHERRY MUNICIPALITY AND ITS SUBURBS (TO WHICH THE OBJECTS OF THE TRUST EXTEND), ITSELF ABUNDANTLY CLARIFIES THAT THE IMPORT AND PURPORT OF THE SAID WORD IS WITH REFERENCE TO RELIGIOUS MINORITIES. 4.8 IN SUM, EVEN AS IT IS FOR THE TRUST DEED TO SPELL OUT IN CLEAR TERMS THE MEANING, IMPORT AND SCOPE OF THE WORDS THEREIN, PARTICULARLY HAVING A BEARING ON THE DENOMINATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE TRUST, READING THE SAME HOLISTICALLY, AS WELL AS ITS BEING CREATED AS A RELIGIOUS TRUST, LEADS TO THE UNMISTAK ABLE INFERENCE OF THE SAME REFERRING TO RELIGIOUS MINORITIES ONLY. THE SAME, ADMITTEDLY, AN SWERS THE ASSESSEES CASE IN THE NEGATIVE, AS IF THAT WERE NOT SO, IT WOULD NOT RAIS E THE PLEA OF THE WORD `MINORITIES NOT SIGNIFYING A RELIGIOUS MINORITY. EVEN OTHERWISE, TO THE EXTENT THE WORD `MINORITIES OCCURRING IN THE DEED IS LIABLE TO BE CONSTRUED AS REFERABLE TO `RELIGIOUS MINORITIES, S. 13(1)(B) WOULD STAND AUTOMATICALLY ATTRACTED. FURTH ER, NO DOUBT, THE WORDS IN S. 13(1)(B) ARE IN A SINGULAR FORM, I.E., REFER TO `ANY PARTICU LAR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY OR CASTE, WHILE THE WORD USED IN THE TRUST DEED IS `MINORITIES, SO THAT IT COULD VALIDLY BE FOR THE BENEFIT OF MORE THAN ONE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY. HOWEVER, THAT W OULD BE OF NO MOMENT, AS WHAT IS APPLICABLE FOR ONE WOULD BE APPLICABLE FOR MORE THA N ONE; THE INTENT AND PURPORT OF THE SECTION/PROHIBITIVE CLAUSE BEING TO REMOVE FROM THE PURVIEW OF EXEMPTION, TRUSTS OR INSTITUTIONS WHICH, THOUGH FOR PUBLIC CHARITABLE PU RPOSES, ARE INTENDED TO SERVE THE INTERESTS OF SOME DEFINED RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES OR CASTES, I.E., IN PREFERENCE TO OTHERS. AS SUCH, EXCLUSION OF EVEN ONE RELIGIOUS COMMUNITY WOU LD BE SUFFICIENT TO ATTRACT THE PROVISION OF S. 13(1)(B) AND, RESULTANTLY, THE ATTE NDANT DISQUALIFICATION. IT WOULD BE A TRAVESTY AND A PERVERSITY TO NOT HOLD SO, CONSIDERI NG THE LANGUAGE AND THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT CONVEYED THEREBY. OF COURSE, THERE IS A SAVI NG CLAUSE BY WAY OF EXPLANATION 2 TO THE PROVISION, SO THAT WHERE THE TARGET GROUP OR BE NEFICIARIES ARE LIMITED TO THOSE SPECIFIED THEREIN, THE SATISFACTION OF SECTION 13(1)(B) NOTWI THSTANDING, ITS MANDATE WOULD NOT APPLY. HOWEVER, AS AFORE-STATED, AND AS FOUND BY THE REVEN UE, TO NO CHALLENGE BY THE ASSESSEE, THE SAME IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THE PRESENT CASE. AS RIGHTLY STATED BY THE LD. CIT, THE WORD MINORITIES WOULD INCLUDE RELIGIOUS GROUPS OR DENO MINATIONS WHICH DO NOT FALL UNDER THE EXCEPTING CLASSES OF EXPLANATION 2 . ITA NO.137 /COCH/2009 9 4.9 THE APPELLANT HAS RELIED ON TWO DECISIONS I N SUPPORT OF ITS CASE, TO WHICH, THEREFORE, IT WOULD BE INCUMBENT ON US TO ADVERT TO. IN THE CA SE OF CIT V. RED ROSE SCHOOL , 212 CTR (ALL) 394, THE SCHOOL WAS FOUND TO BE NOT IN DISAGR EEMENT OR BREACH OF ANY PUBLIC POLICY, WHILE IT HAS BEEN SO IN THE PRESENT CASE, I.E., AS EXPRESSED PER THE CLEAR STATUTORY PRESCRIPTION OF S. 13(1)(B). IN THE CASE OF RAJKOT VISHA SHRIMALI JAIN SAMAJ V. ITO , 111 ITD 238 (RAJ.)(SMC), IT STOOD CLARIFIED THAT THE SC OPE OF WORD `PUBLIC IN THE `PUBLIC CHARITABLE TRUST WOULD NOT IMPLY THE ENTIRE MANKIN D, AND IT WOULD BE SUFFICIENT IF IT IS FOR THE BENEFIT OF A CROSS-SECTION OF THE PUBLIC. THE S AME IS MATTER OF TRITE LAW [REFER, INTER ALIA, AHMEDABAD RANA CASTE ASSOCIATION V. CIT , 82 ITR 704 (SC); CIT V. BAR COUNCIL OF MAHARASHTRA (1981) 130 ITR 28 (SC)], AND IT IS NOT THE CHARACT ER OF THE INSTITUTION AS A PUBLIC CHARITABLE TRUST THAT IS IN DOUBT OR DISPUTE , BUT OF ITS ELIGIBILITY FOR EXEMPTION U/S. 11 AND, CONSEQUENTLY, REGISTRATION U/S. 12A, IN VIE W OF ITS STATUS AS ONE COVERED U/ S. 13(1)(B), EXCLUSION TO EXEMPTION WHERE-UNDER EXTEND S TO ITS ENTIRE INCOME. WHERE THE CROSS-SECTION OF THE PUBLIC TO WHICH THE BENEFIT OF THE TRUST WOULD INURE IS ONE IDENTIFIED IN TERMS OF A RELIGIOUS IDENTITY, OR A CASTE, NOTWI THSTANDING ITS PUBLIC CHARACTER, IT WOULD, AS ALSO AFORE-STATED, NOT BE ENTITLED TO THE RELIEF OR BENEFIT UNDER THE ACT. THE SAID CASES, THEREFORE, HAVE NO BEARING OR APPLICATION IN THE FA CTS OF THE PRESENT CASE. 5. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, WE ARE OF THE CON SIDERED VIEW THAT THE REGISTRATION STANDS RIGHTLY DENIED BY THE LD. CIT IN THE INSTANT CASE, AND HIS ORDER IS ACCORDINGLY UPHELD. THE QUESTION OF REMISSION FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE COMP ETENT AUTHORITY OF THE OTHER FACTUAL ASPECTS OF THE CASE, AND CONSEQUENT ISSUE OF FINDIN GS THEREON (REFER PARA 4.3 OF THIS ORDER), DOES NOT ARISE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. WE DECIDE A CCORDINGLY. 6. IN THE RESULT, THE ASSESSEES APPEAL IS DISMISSED. SD/- SD/- (N.VIJAYAKUMARAN) (SANJAY ARORA) JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMBER PLACE: ERNAKULAM DATED: 29TH APRIL, 2011 GJ ITA NO.137 /COCH/2009 10 COPY TO: 1. TELLICHERRY MINORITY WELFARE TRUST, 19/600 MARIY AMA ROAD, PILACKOOL, THALASERRY, 2. THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX, KANNUR. 3. D.R., I.T.A.T., COCHIN BENCH, COCHIN. 4. GUARD FILE. BY ORDER (ASSISTAN T REGISTRAR)