Anand Engineering Products Pvt. Ltd., Trichy V. DDIT, CPC, Bengaluru

ITA 1375/CHNY/2024

• Counselvise Citation: [2024] 100 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 0419 (ITAT-CHENNAI)
• Duration Of Justice: 2 month(s) 30 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 06-08-2024
• Appeal Filed By: Assessee
• Order Result: PartlyAllowed
• Bench Allotted: B
• Next Hearing Date: 30-07-2024
• Assessment Year: misc
• Appeal Filed On: 07-05-2024
• Result in Favour of: Assessee
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: GOUTHAMI MANIVASAGAM
• Keywords: Principle of natural justice; Condonation of delay
• Section: 143(1); 139(1)

Judgement Text

आयकर अपीलीय अिधकरण ‘बी’’’ Ɋायपीठ चेɄई मŐ। IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL ‘B’ BENCH, CHENNAI माननीय ŵी मनु कु मार िगįर, Ɋाियक सद˟ एवं माननीय ŵी अिमताभ शुƑा . लेखा सद˟ के समƗ। BEFORE HON’BLE SHRI MANU KUMAR GIRI, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND HON’BLE SHRI AMITABH SHUKLA, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER आयकरअपील सं./ ITA No.1375/Chny/2024 (िनधाŊरणवषŊ / Assessment Year: 2015-2016) Anand Engineering Products Pvt Limited, D-56, Developed Plots Estate, Thuvakudi, Trichy 620 015. [PAN: AAFCA 1512R] Vs. The Assessing Officer, Corporate Ward 1(1) Chennai. (अपीलाथȸ/Appellant) (Ĥ×यथȸ/Respondent) अपीलाथȸ कȧ ओर से/ Appellant by : Shri A.S. Ramakrishnan, C.A., Ĥ×यथȸ कȧ ओर से /Respondent by : Ms. Gouthami Manivasagam, IRS, JCIT. स ु नवाई कȧ तारȣख/Date of Hearing : 31.07.2024 घोषणा कȧ तारȣख /Date of Pronouncement : 07.08.2024 आदेश / O R D E R MANU KUMAR GIRI (Judicial Member) This appeal filed by the assessee is directed against the order of the Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax, Appeal Addl/JCIT(A)-1 JAIPUR [‘CIT(A)’ in short] dated 24.04.2024 for Assessment Year 2015-16. 2. The following grounds appeal are raised:- ‘’1. The order of the authorities below in so far as they are against the appellant are opposed to law, equity, weight of evidence, probabilities, in violation of the principles of natural justice and facts and circumstances of the case. 2 ITA No.1375/Chny/2024. 2. The Learned CIT(A) is not justified in refusing to condone the delay in filing the appeal especially without issuance of any notice for hearing of the appeal and rejecting the reasons explained for the delay in filing on slender and unsustainable grounds without appreciating that the cause of substantive Justice must be preferred over technical considerations under the facts and in the circumstances of the appellant's case. 3. The claim of the appellant is for giving the legitimate tax credit claimed and omitted to be given by CPC u/s. 115JAA and not for adjusting any taxable Income assessed. 4. As the assessment proceedings are not adversarial in nature, a pragmatic view needs to be taken rather than taking a technical view.. 5. The Appellant craves leave to add, amend, alter, vary and/or withdraw any or all the above grounds of appeal’’. 3. Brief facts of the case are that the Assessee is a Private Limited Company into the business of fabrication of heavy Irons and Steels having its works at Trichy. The return of the appellant was filed u/s. 139(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (in short ‘’the Act’’) on 28.09.2015 admitting an income of Rs.3,46,99,100/- and the return was accepted and processed u/s. 143(1)(a) of the Act on 03.08.2016. On the Gross tax liability of Rs.1,12,58, 124/- the appellant had claimed a tax credit u/s. 115JAA of the Act of Rs.19,13,057/- which was not allowed and consequent to that a demand of Rs.23,58,130/- has been raised. The appellant had made several representations against this disallowance of MAT credit and was not considered. Being aggrieved by the intimation order u/s 143(1) of the I.T. Act, 1961 dated 03.08.2016 of the AO CPC, the assessee filed an appeal before the ld. CIT(A). The ld. CIT(A) on perusal of Form-35 found that the intimation u/s 143(1) of the Act was passed on 03.08.2016, while the appeal was filed on 10.04.2024, which is beyond the statutory time limit provided for filing of the appeal. As per section 249(2)(c) of the Act, the appeal shall be presented within 30 days of the following date on which the intimation of the order sought to be appealed against is served. However, the appellant filed appeal beyond the time limit with delay of more than 7 3 ITA No.1375/Chny/2024. years. It is also found that the appellant had made several representations for setting right the anomaly of not giving credit to the MAT credit of AY 2014-15, but not heard by the Assessing officer/CPC. Even after the demand was raised several representations and grievances were raised by appellant, not addressed by the jurisdictional AO/CPC. As the time allowed for rectification lapsed, the appellant had filed appeal before ld.CIT(A) as an ultimate resort to set right this error caused while processing the return. As it is apparent error on the processing by CPC, the demand raised is not sustainable under law. The delay in preferring this appeal, may be condoned and natural justice be rendered in admitting this appeal. However, the ld. CIT(A) held that there is no "sufficient cause" in terms of section 249(3) of the Act, for not presenting the appeal within the prescribed period. It is well-settled law that an appellant is not entitled to the condonation as a matter of right. For an appellant to succeed, the existence of sufficient cause is sine qua non and a condition precedent. It is manifestly evident that this ingredient is woefully lacking in this belated appeal filed by the appellant. Thus, the delay in filing the appeal by the appellant, is not considered as sufficient cause and delay is therefore, not condoned. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed without any discussion on merits or on any other aspect. Considering the facts, ld.CIT(A) held that the appeal filed is not in conformity with the provisions of Section 249(2) of the Act, and there is no sufficient cause for condonation of the delay in filing of the appeal, the present appeal is dismissed as not maintainable. Aggrieved, assessee filed an appeal before us. 4 ITA No.1375/Chny/2024. 4. We have perused the orders of ld.CIT(A) and ld.AO (CPC). We have also gone through the reasons given for delay in filing appeal before ld.CIT(A) in affidavit by the Managing Director of Company. The affidavit of assessee Company is under: ‘’Affidavit of Mr.K.PREMANATHAN aged 57 years, Managing Director of M/S. Anand Engineering Products Private Limited. That I the above-named deponent, am well conversant with the facts deposed to below. 1. That the Return of Income of the Assessee Company for the Assessment year 2015-16 was processed by CPC on 03.08.2016 and that there was no variance to the Gross Total income and the Gross tax liability declared in the Return of Income and the as computed u/s. 143(1). 2. That the only variance was on the MAT tax credit u/s. 115 JAA paid in assessment year 2014-15 claimed of Rs. 19,13,057/- was not given credit. 3. The Appellant is under bonafide belief that the MAT credit u/s. 115JAA is no different from the tax paid in advance and the credit for having paid the MAT should be allowed against the tax liability determined on the assessment, as per the memorandum explaining the provisions of Finance Bill 2006 (281 ITR (St) 61) and para 38.2 of CBDT circular No.14/2006 dated 28.12.2006. 4. That the demand raised by CPC was never reduced after several representations before CPC and the jurisdictional assessing officer, the Assessee company had little option excepting to prefer an appeal before CIT(A), after a gap of over 7 years (2807 days) to get the natural justice. 5. It is humbly submitted that the delay in preferring appeal was not deliberate nor out of culpable negligence, hence substantial justice to be rendered over technical considerations in condoning the delay, if any. 6. That the memo of appeal has been filed on 06.05.2024 in the Office of the Tribunal’’. 5. In the light of above affidavit, we find that the said approach of the ld.CIT(A) is neither reasonable nor pragmatic. In our view the ld.CIT(A) ought to have condoned the delay and decide the appeal on merit. 6. How the power of condonation of delay is to be exercised, has been explained by the Apex Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition v Mst. Katiji And Others- [167 ITR 471 (SC) @ Pg. 472] as under:- 5 ITA No.1375/Chny/2024. " The Legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting section 51 of the Limitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on the merits". The expression "sufficient cause” employed by the Legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of justice that being the life- purpose of the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that the court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realized that: 1. Ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this, when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 1. "Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period." 2. "Every day's delay must be explained" does not mean that pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour's delay, every second's delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational, common sense and pragmatic manner. 3. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non- deliberate delay. 4. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of malafides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs serious risk. 5. It must be grasped that the judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so." 7. Here we would also like to refer the finding of the Apex Court in the case of N. Balakrishnan V. M. Krishnamurthy, AIR 1998 SC 3222. The Apex Court held as under:- 6 ITA No.1375/Chny/2024. "11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. Law of limitation fixes a life span for such legal remedy for the redress of the legal injury so suffered. Time is precious and the wasted time would never revisit. During efflux of time newer causes would sprout up necessitating newer persons to seek legal remedy by approaching the courts. So a life span must be fixed for each remedy. Unending period for laundering the remedy may lead to unending uncertainty and consequential anarchy. Law of limitation is thus founded on public policy. It is enshrined in the maximinterest reipublicae up sit finis litium (it is for the general welfare that a period be put to litigation). Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of the parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but seek their remedy promptly. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a legislatively fixed period of time. 12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delays in approaching the court is always deliberate. This Court has held that the words 'sufficient cause' under section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakuntala Devi Jain V. Kuntal Kumari, AIR 1969 SC 575 and State of West Bengal V. the Administrator, Howah Muni-capacity, AIR 1972 SC 749." 08. We have pursued the affidavit of the Managing Director and find the reasons bonafide and also the issue raised is meritorious one requires liberal approach. The Assessee also made several representations, however not addressed and acceded by the CPC, Bengalore. Hence, we treat such reason as ‘sufficient cause’ and which cannot be termed as dilatory or frivolous. We observe that delay caused by the assessee is only attributable to the part of CPC, Bangalore which has omitted to give the legitimate tax credit claimed u/s115JAA of the Act. 09. In the light of the above discussions, considering to adopt pragmatic approach and with an intention to render substantial justice, we find that, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of appeal before the ld.CIT(A) by the assessee hence condone the delay. Therefore, without expressing anything on the merit of the case, we incline to remit the file to the ld.CIT(A) with a 7 ITA No.1375/Chny/2024. direction to decide the appeal on merit after providing reasonable opportunity of being heard to assessee. 10. In the result, appeal filed by the assessee is allowed for statistical purpose. Order pronounced in the open court on 7 th August, 2024 at Chennai. Sd/- Sd/- (अिमताभ शुƑा) (AMITABH SHUKLA) लेखा सद˟ / ACCOUNTANT MEMBER (मनु कु मार िगįर) (MANU KUMAR GIRI) Ɋाियक सद˟ / JUDICIAL MEMBER चेɄई Chennai: िदनांक Dated : 07-08-2024 KV आदेश कȧ ĤǓतͧलͪप अĒेͪषत /Copy to : 1. अपीलाथŎ/Appellant 2. ŮȑथŎ/Respondent 3. आयकरआयुƅ/CIT, Chennai/Coimbatore/Madurai/Salem. 4. िवभागीयŮितिनिध/DR 5. गाडŊफाईल/GF