IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL RAJKOT BENCH, RAJKOT BEFORE SHRI WASEEM AHMED, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER & SMT. MADHUMITA ROY, JUDICIAL MEMBER ./ I.T.A. NO. 139/RJT/2019 ( / ASSESSMENT YEAR : 2010-11 ) DECENT METAL PRODUCTS E-14/A, GIDC PHASE II, DARED, JAMNAGAR / VS. INCOME TAX OFFICER WARD 1(3), JAMNAGAR ./ ./ PAN/GIR NO. : AAEFD3844P ( / APPELLANT ) .. ( / RESPONDENT ) / APPELLANT BY : SHRI CHETAN AG ARWAL, A.R. / RESPONDENT BY : SHRI SUHAS MISTRY, SR. D.R. / DATE OF HEARING 27/02/2020 !'# / DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT 01/06/2020 $% /O R D E R PER BENCH: THE CAPTIONED APPEAL HAS BEEN FILED AT THE INSTANCE OF THE ASSESSEE AGAINST THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSIONER OF I NCOME TAX (APPEALS), JAMNAGAR (CIT(A) IN SHORT) DATED 28/05/2 019 RELEVANT TO ASSESSMENT YEAR (AY) 2010-11. 2. THE ONLY ISSUE RAISED BY THE ASSESSEE IS THAT TH E LEARNED CIT (A) ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE PENALTY IMPOSED BY THE AO UNDER SECT ION 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT FOR RS. 95,441/- ONLY. ITA NO. 139/RJT/19 [DECENT METAL PRODUCTS VS. ITO] A.Y. 2010-11 - 2 - 3. THE FACTS IN BRIEF ARE THAT THE ASSESSEE IN THE PRESENT CASE IS A PARTNERSHIP FIRM AND ITS ASSESSMENT WAS FRAMED UNDE R SECTION 143(3) R.W.S. 147 OF THE ACT AFTER MAKING THE ADDITION OF RS. 3,0 8,865/-ONLY TO THE TOTAL INCOME OF THE ASSESSEE VIDE ORDER DATED 18-12-2017 ON ACCOUNT OF UNACCOUNTED SALE. THE AO IN THE ASSESSMENT ORDER IN ITIATED THE PENALTY PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT BY I SSUING A SHOW CAUSE NOTICE UNDER SECTION 274 OF THE ACT. THE AO FINALLY LEVIED THE PENALTY FOR CONCEALMENT OF THE PARTICULARS OF INCOME AT RS. 95,441/- BEING 100% OF THE AMOUNT OF TAX SOUGHT TO BE EVADED. 4. AGGRIEVED ASSESSEE PREFERRED AN APPEAL TO THE LE ARNED CIT (A) WHO CONFIRMED THE ORDER OF THE AO BY OBSERVING AS UNDER : 5. THE PENALTY ORDER U/S. 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT OF THE AO AS WELL AS WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF AR OF THE APPELLANT HAVE BEEN CONSIDE RED. THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL OF THE APPELLANT ARE REPRODUCED IN INITIAL PARAGRAPH OF TH IS APPEAL ORDER. WITH REGARD TO TWO GROUNDS OF APPEAL OF THE APPELLANT AS REPRODUCED IN INITIAL PARAGRAPH OF THIS APPEAL ORDER, IT IS MENTIONED THAT THE AO DURING THE COURS E OF ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS ON PERUSAL OF RECORDS AND INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM CE NTRAL EXCISE DEPARTMENT FROM JAMNAGAR AS PER ITS LETTER DATED 08/07/2015 FOUND T HAT THE APPELLANT HAD MADE UNACCOUNTED SALES OF RS. 3,08,86,570/- DURING THE Y EAR UNDER CONSIDERATION. IN VIEW OF THIS, THE AO REOPENED THE ASSESSMENT OF THE APPELLA NT FOR THE YEAR UNDER CONSIDERATION AND COMPLETED THE ASSESSMENT FOR SUCH YEAR BY MAKIN G ADDITION OF RS, 3,26,520/- ON THE BASIS OF ESTIMATION OF 1% PROFIT; OF UNACCOUNTE D SATES OF RS. 3,08,86,570/-. THE AO ALSO INITIATED PENALTY PROCEEDINGS U/S. 271(L)(C) O N THIS ADDITION OF RS. 3,26,520/-. SUBSEQUENTLY THE AO LEVIED THE PENALTY OF RS, 95,44 1/- U/S. 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT ON THE GROUND THAT THE APPELLANT HAD CONCEALED THE PARTICU LARS OF INCOME BY WAY OF NOT DISCLOSING THE CORRECT INCOME. IN MY OPINION, THE A O HAS CORRECTLY LEVIED THE PENALTY OF RS 95,441/- U/S, 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT IN VIEW OF TH E FACT THAT AS PER INFORMATION RECEIVED BY THE AO FROM CENTRAL EXCISE DEPARTMENT, JAMNAGAR THERE WAS UNACCOUNTED SALES OF RS, 3,08,86,570/-. IT MAY BE THE CASE THAT THE AO HAS MADE ADDITION AT THE RATE OF 1% OF THE TOTAL SALES, BUT THE FACTS REMAIN THAT THE SALES TO THE EXTENT OF RS. 3,08,86,570/- WERE NOT ACCOUNTED FOR BY THE APPELLA NT IN ITS BOOKS OF ACCOUNT. THUS IT CAN BE SAID THAT THE PROFIT WHICH WAS REQUIRED TO B E DISCLOSED BY THE APPELLANT IN ITS BOOKS OF ACCOUNT ON THE BASIS OF SALES OF RS. 3,08, 86,570/- WAS NOT DISCLOSED AND IT WAS ONLY WHEN THE CASE OF THE APPELLANT WAS REOPENE D U/S. 148 FOR THE YEAR UNDER CONSIDERATION THAT THE APPELLANT CAME FORWARD AND A DMITTED SUCH SALES OF RS. 3,08,86,570/-. THUS IT CAN NOT BE SAID THAT THE APP ELLANT HAD MADE SUO-MOTO DISCLOSURE OF THE PROFIT ON THE SALES OF RS. 3,08,86,570/-. CO NSIDERING THESE FACTS, IT IS HELD THAT THE AO HAS CORRECTLY FEVIED THE PENALTY OF RS. 95,4 41/- U/S. 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT AND THEREFORE, THE SAME IS CONFIRMED. 5. BEING AGGRIEVED BY THE ORDER OF THE LEARNED CIT (A), THE ASSESSEE IS IN APPEAL BEFORE US. ITA NO. 139/RJT/19 [DECENT METAL PRODUCTS VS. ITO] A.Y. 2010-11 - 3 - 6. THE LEARNED AR BEFORE US FILED A PAPER BOOK RUNN ING FROM PAGES 1 TO 20 AND CLAIMED THAT THE ASSESSEE HAS NOT CONCEALED PAR TICULARS OF INCOME DELIBERATELY AND THEREFORE THERE CANNOT BE ANY PENA LTY UNDER SECTION 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT. AS SUCH THE ADDITION MADE UNDER THE EXC ISE ACT, WAS ACCEPTED TO AVOID THE DISPUTE AND TO BUY THE PEACE OF MIND. 7. ON THE OTHER HAND THE LEARNER DR VEHEMENTLY SUPP ORTED THE ORDER OF THE AUTHORITIES BELOW. 8. WE HAVE HEARD THE RIVAL CONTENTIONS OF BOTH THE PARTIES AND PERUSED THE MATERIALS AVAILABLE ON RECORD. FROM THE PRECEDING D ISCUSSION, THE CONTROVERSY BEFORE US ARISES SO AS TO ADJUDICATE WHETHER THE AS SESSEE HAS CONCEALED THE PARTICULARS OF INCOME WITH RESPECT TO SUCH BUSINESS TURNOVER NOT DISCLOSED IN THE INCOME TAX RETURN. THE TERM CONCEALMENT OF PART ICULAR OF INCOME HAS NOT BEEN DEFINED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 271(1) (C) OR ELSEWHERE IN THE ACT THE ACT. HOWEVER, THE MEANING OF THE TERM CONCEALED /INACCURATE HAS BEEN DISCUSSED BY THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF RELIANCE PETROPRODUCTS (P) LTD REPORTED IN 189 TAXMAN 322 WHEREIN IT WAS HELD THAT THE TERM INACCURATE SIGNIFIES DELIBERATE ACT OR OMISSION ON THE PART OF THE ASSESSEE. AS SUCH, THE DETAILS/INFORMATIONS CONTAIN ED IN THE RETURN OF INCOME /FINANCIAL STATEMENTS /AUDIT REPORT WHICH ARE NOT C ORRECT ACCORDING TO TRUTH, AND WERE FURNISHED BY THE ASSESSEE WITH THE DISHONEST I NTENT SHALL BE TREATED AS INACCURATE PARTICULARS. IN HOLDING SO, WE FIND SUP PORT AND GUIDANCE FROM THE JUDGEMENT OF HONBLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF RELIANCE PETROPRODUCTS (P) LTD (SUPRA). WE ARE NOT CONCERNED IN THE PRESENT CASE WITH THE M ENSREA. HOWEVER, WE HAVE TO ONLY SEE AS TO WHETHER IN THIS CASE, AS A MATTER OF FACT , THE ASSESSEE HAS GIVEN INACCURATE PARTICULARS. IN WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, THE WORD 'INA CCURATE' HAS BEEN DEFINED AS : 'NOT ACCURATE, NOT EXACT OR CORRECT; NOT ACCORDING TO TRUTH; ERRONEOUS; AS AN INACCURATE STATEMENT, COPY OR TRANSCRIPT.' WE HAVE ALREADY SEEN THE MEANING OF THE WORD 'PARTI CULARS' IN THE EARLIER PART OF THIS JUDGMENT. READING THE WORDS IN CONJUNCTION, THEY MU ST MEAN THE DETAILS SUPPLIED IN THE RETURN, WHICH ARE NOT ACCURATE, NOT EXACT OR CORREC T, NOT ACCORDING TO TRUTH OR ERRONEOUS. ITA NO. 139/RJT/19 [DECENT METAL PRODUCTS VS. ITO] A.Y. 2010-11 - 4 - WE MUST HASTEN TO ADD HERE THAT IN THIS CASE, THERE IS NO FINDING THAT ANY DETAILS SUPPLIED BY THE ASSESSEE IN ITS RETURN WERE FOUND TO BE INCO RRECT OR ERRONEOUS OR FALSE NOW, IF WE ANALYSES THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE I N THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE STATED DISCUSSION, WE FIND THAT THERE WAS NO INFORM ATION AVAILABLE WITH THE REVENUE FOR THE UNACCOUNTED SALE MADE BY THE ASSESS EE. THUS IT IS TRANSPIRED THAT THERE WAS NO DELIBERATE ACT, ON THE PART OF TH E ASSESSEE NOT TO DISCLOSE THE BUSINESS RECEIPTS IN THE INCOME TAX RETURN. THE REVENUE HAS ALSO NOT BROUGHT ANY MATERIAL SUGGE STING THAT THE ASSESSEE DELIBERATELY FURNISHED THE INACCURATE PARTICULARS O F INCOME. IN OUR CONSIDERED VIEW ANY ADDITION/DISALLOWANCES M ADE DURING THE QUANTUM PROCEEDINGS DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY JUSTIFY THE LEVY OF THE PENALTY UNDER SECTION 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT. BESIDES THE ELEMENT OF INCOME ADDED IN THE QUANTUM PROCEEDINGS, THERE MUST BE SOME MATERIAL/CIRCUMSTAN TIAL EVIDENCES LEADING TO THE REASONABLE CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS CONSCIOUS CONCEALMENT OR THE ACT OF FURNISHING OF INACCURATE PARTICULARS ON THE PART OF THE ASSESSEE. ACCORDINGLY, WE ARE NOT CONVINCED WITH THE FINDING OF THE AUTHORITI ES BELOW. HENCE WE SET ASIDE THE ORDER OF THE LEARNED CIT (A) AND DIRECT THE AO TO DELETE THE PENALTY LEVIED BY HIM UNDER SECTION 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT. 9. BEFORE WE PART WITH THE ISSUE/APPEAL AS DISCUSSE D ABOVE, IT IS PERTINENT TO NOTE THAT THE CLAUSE (C) OF RULE 34 OF THE APPEL LATE TRIBUNAL RULES 1963 REQUIRES THE BENCH TO MAKE ENDEAVOUR TO PRONOUNCE T HE ORDER WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING. HOWEVER THE PER IOD OF 60 DAYS CAN BE EXTENDED UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES BUT THE SA ME SHOULD NOT ORDINARILY BE FURTHER EXTENDED BEYOND ANOTHER 30 DAYS. IN SIMP LE WORDS THE TOTAL TIME AVAILABLE TO THE BENCH IS OF 90 DAYS UPON THE CONCL USION OF THE HEARING. HOWEVER, DURING THE PREVAILING CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THE ENTIRE WORLD IS FACING THE UNPRECEDENTED CHALLENGE OF COVID 2019 OUTBREAK, RESULTING THE LOCKDOWN IN THE COUNTRY, THE ORDERS THOUGH SUBSTANTIALLY PREPAR ED BUT COULD NOT BE PRONOUNCED FOR THE UNAVOIDABLE REASONS WITHIN THE M AXIMUM PERIOD OF 90 DAYS. ITA NO. 139/RJT/19 [DECENT METAL PRODUCTS VS. ITO] A.Y. 2010-11 - 5 - IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES WE FIND THAT THE HONBLE MUMB AI TRIBUNAL IN THE CASE OF JSW LIMITED VS DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX IN ITA NO. 6103/MUM/2018 VIDE ORDER DATED 14-5-2020 EXTENDED THE TIME FOR PRONOUNCING THE ORDER WITHIN 90 DAYS OF TIME BY OBS ERVING AS UNDER: 9. LET US IN THIS LIGHT REVERT TO THE PREVAILING SI TUATION IN THE COUNTRY. ON 24TH MARCH, 2020, HONBLE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA TOOK THE BOLD STEP OF IMPOSING A NATIONWIDE LOCKDOWN, FOR 21 DAYS, TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF COV ID 19 EPIDEMIC, AND THIS LOCKDOWN WAS EXTENDED FROM TIME TO TIME. AS A MATTER OF FACT , EVEN BEFORE THIS FORMAL NATIONWIDE LOCKDOWN, THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AT MUMBAI WAS SEVERELY RESTRICTED ON ACCOUNT OF LOCKDOWN BY T HE MAHARASHTRA GOVERNMENT, AND ON ACCOUNT OF STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF HEALTH ADVISORI ES WITH A VIEW OF CHECKING SPREAD OF COVID 19. THE EPIDEMIC SITUATION IN MUMBAI BEING GR AVE, THERE WAS NOT MUCH OF A RELAXATION IN SUBSEQUENT LOCKDOWNS ALSO. IN ANY CAS E, THERE WAS UNPRECEDENTED DISRUPTION OF JUDICIAL WOK ALL OVER THE COUNTRY. AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT HAS BEEN SUCH AN UNPRECEDENTED SITUATION, CAUSING DISRUPTION IN THE FUNCTIONING OF JUDICIAL MACHINERY, THAT HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, IN AN UNPRECED ENTED ORDER IN THE HISTORY OF INDIA AND VIDE ORDER DATED 6.5.2020 READ WITH ORDER DATED 23.3.2020, EXTENDED THE LIMITATION TO EXCLUDE NOT ONLY THIS LOCKDOWN PERIOD BUT ALSO A FEW MORE DAYS PRIOR TO, AND AFTER, THE LOCKDOWN BY OBSERVING THAT IN CASE THE LIMITATION HAS EXPIRED AFTER 15.03.2020 THEN THE PERIOD FROM 15.03.2020 TILL THE DATE ON WHICH THE LOCKDOWN IS LIFTED IN THE JURISDICTIONAL AREA WHERE THE DISPUTE LIES OR WHERE THE CAUSE OF ACTION ARISES SHALL BE EXTENDED FOR A PERIOD OF 15 DAYS AFTER THE LIFTING OF LOCKDOWN . HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT, IN AN ORDER DATED 15T H APRIL 2020, HAS, BESIDES EXTENDING THE VALIDITY OF ALL INTERIM ORDERS, HAS ALSO OBSERVED THAT, IT IS ALSO CLARIFIED THAT WHILE CALCULATING TIME FOR DISP OSAL OF MATTERS MADE TIME- BOUND BY THIS COURT, THE PERIOD FOR WHICH THE ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 CONTINUES TO OPERATE SHALL BE ADDED AND TIME SHALL STAND EXTENDED ACCORDINGLY , AND ALSO OBSERVED THAT ARRANGEMENT CONTINUED BY AN ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 TILL 30TH APRIL 2020 SHALL CONTINUE FURTHER TILL 15TH JUNE 2020 . IT HAS BEEN AN UNPRECEDENTED SITUATION NOT ONLY IN INDIA BUT ALL OVER THE WORLD. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA HAS, VIDE NOTIFICATION DATED 19 TH FEBRUARY 2020, TAKEN THE STAND THAT, THE CORONAVIRUS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A CASE OF NATURAL CALAMITY AND FMC (I.E. FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSE) MAYBE INVOKED, WHEREVER CONSIDERED APPROPRI ATE, FOLLOWING THE DUE PROCEDURE. THE TERM FORCE MAJEURE HAS BEEN DEFINED IN BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, AS AN EVENT OR EFFECT THAT CAN BE NEITHER ANTICIPATED NOR CONTROLLED WHEN SUCH IS THE POSITION, AND IT IS OFFICIALLY SO NOTIFIED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE COVID-19 EPIDEMIC HAS BEEN NOTIFIED AS A DISAST ER UNDER THE NATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT ACT, 2005, AND ALSO IN THE LIGHT OF THE DISCUSSIONS ABOVE, THE PERIOD DURING WHICH LOCKDOWN WAS IN FORCE CAN BE ANYTHING BUT AN ORDINARY PERIOD. 10. IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE DISCUSSIONS, WE ARE O F THE CONSIDERED VIEW THAT RATHER THAN TAKING A PEDANTIC VIEW OF THE RULE REQUIRING PRONOU NCEMENT OF ORDERS WITHIN 90 DAYS, DISREGARDING THE IMPORTANT FACT THAT THE ENTIRE COU NTRY WAS IN LOCKDOWN, WE SHOULD COMPUTE THE PERIOD OF 90 DAYS BY EXCLUDING AT LEAST THE PERIOD DURING WHICH THE LOCKDOWN WAS IN FORCE. WE MUST FACTOR GROUND REALIT IES IN MIND WHILE INTERPRETING THE TIME LIMIT FOR THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE ORDER. LAW IS NOT BROODING OMNIPOTENCE IN THE SKY. IT IS A PRAGMATIC TOOL OF THE SOCIAL ORDER. TH E TENETS OF LAW BEING ENACTED ON THE BASIS OF PRAGMATISM, AND THAT IS HOW THE LAW IS REQ UIRED TO INTERPRETED. THE INTERPRETATION SO ASSIGNED BY US IS NOT ONLY IN CON SONANCE WITH THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF RULE 34(5) BUT IS ALSO A PRAGMATIC APPROACH AT A TI ME WHEN A DISASTER, NOTIFIED UNDER THE DISASTER MANAGEMENT ACT 2005, IS CAUSING UNPREC EDENTED DISRUPTION IN THE FUNCTIONING OF OUR JUSTICE DELIVERY SYSTEM. UNDOUBT EDLY, IN THE CASE OF OTTERS CLUB VS DIT [(2017) 392 ITR 244 (BOM)] , HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT DID NOT APPROVE AN ORDER BEING PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL BEYOND A PERIOD OF 90 DAYS, BUT THEN IN THE PRESENT SITUATION HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT ITSELF HAS, VID E JUDGMENT DATED 15TH APRIL 2020, ITA NO. 139/RJT/19 [DECENT METAL PRODUCTS VS. ITO] A.Y. 2010-11 - 6 - HELD THAT DIRECTED WHILE CALCULATING THE TIME FOR DISPOSAL OF MATTERS MADE TIME-BOUND BY THIS COURT, THE PERIOD FOR WHICH THE ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 CONTINUES TO OPERATE SHALL BE ADDED AND TIME S HALL STAND EXTENDED ACCORDINGLY . THE EXTRAORDINARY STEPS TAKEN SUO MOTU BY HONBL E JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT AND HONBLE SUPREME COURT ALSO INDICATE THAT THIS PERIOD OF LOCKDOWN CANNOT BE TREATED AS AN ORDINARY PERIOD DURING WHICH THE NORM AL TIME LIMITS ARE TO REMAIN IN FORCE. IN OUR CONSIDERED VIEW, EVEN WITHOUT THE WOR DS ORDINARILY, IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL POSITION, THE PERIOD DU RING WHICH LOCKOUT WAS IN FORCE IS TO EXCLUDED FOR THE PURPOSE OF TIME LIMITS SET OUT IN RULE 34(5) OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL RULES, 1963. VIEWED THUS, THE EXCEPTION, TO 90-DAY TIME-LIMIT FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS, INHERENT IN RULE 34(5)(C), WITH RESPECT TO THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS WITHIN NINETY DAYS, CLEARLY COMES INTO PLAY IN THE PRESENT CASE. OF COURSE, THERE IS NO, AND THERE CANNOT BE ANY, BAR ON THE DISCRETION OF THE B ENCHES TO REFIX THE MATTERS FOR CLARIFICATIONS BECAUSE OF CONSIDERABLE TIME LAG BET WEEN THE POINT OF TIME WHEN THE HEARING IS CONCLUDED AND THE POINT OF TIME WHEN THE ORDER THEREON IS BEING FINALIZED, BUT THEN, IN OUR CONSIDERED VIEW, NO SUCH EXERCISE WAS REQUIRED TO BE CARRIED OUT ON THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. 11. TO SUM UP, THE APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE IS ALLOWE D, AND APPEAL OF THE ASSESSING OFFICER IS DISMISSED. ORDER PRONOUNCED UNDER RULE 3 4(4) OF THE INCOME TAX (APPELLATE TRIBUNAL) RULES, 1962, BY PLACING THE DETAILS ON TH E NOTICE BOARD. CONSIDERING THE ABOVE, WE EXPRESS TO PRONOUNCE THE ORDER BEYOND THE PERIOD OF 90 DAYS. ACCORDINGLY, WE PROCEED TO PRONOUNCE TH E ORDER AS ON DATE. 10. IN THE RESULT, APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE IS ALLOWE D. SD/- SD/- (MADHUMITA ROY) (WASEEM AH MED) JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AHMEDABAD: DATED 01/06/2020 TRUE COPY S. K. SINHA / COPY OF ORDER FORWARDED TO:- 1. / REVENUE 2. $ / ASSESSEE 3. ) *+ , / CONCERNED CIT 4. ,- / CIT (A) 5. 012 33*+, *+#, 56$)$ / DR, ITAT, AHMEDABAD 6. 289 : / GUARD FILE. BY ORDER DEPUTY/ASSTT.REGISTRAR ITAT, RAJKOT THIS ORDER PRONOUNCED IN OPEN COURT 01/06/2020