Sri. T. Srisailam Yadav, Hyderabad V. Income Tax Officer, Ward-11(4), Hyderabad

ITA 1694/HYD/2012

• Counselvise Citation: [2013] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 69736 (ITAT-HYDERABAD)
• Duration Of Justice: 8 month(s) 24 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 14-08-2013
• Appeal Filed By: Assessee
• Order Result: Allowed
• Bench Allotted: B
• Assessment Year: 2004-2005
• Appeal Filed On: 20-11-2012
• Result in Favour of: Assessee
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: RAJEEV BENJWAL
• Assessee Lawyers: K A SAI PRASAD
• Keywords: Opportunity of being heard; Principle of natural justice; Right to appeal; Condonation of delay

Judgement Text

IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL HYDERABAD BENCH B, HYDERABAD BEFORE SHRI CHANDRA POOJARI, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND SHRI SAKTIJIT DEY, JUDICIAL MEMBER ITA NOS. 1694, 1695, 1696 & 1697/HYD/2012 ASSESSMENT YEARS:2004-05, 2005-06, 2006-07 & 2007-0 8 SRI T. SRISAILAM YADAV, APPELLANT HYDERABAD. (PAN ACSPT2063Q) VS. INCOME-TAX OFFICER, RESPONDENT WARD 11(4), HYDERABAD. APPELLANT BY : SHRI K.A. SAI PRASAD RESPONDENT BY : SHRI RAJEEV BENJWAL DATE OF HEARING : 07/08/2013 DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT : 1 4/08/2013 ORDER PER SAKTIJIT DEY, J.M.: THE ASSESSEE HAS FILED THESE APPEALS BEING AGGRIEV ED OF THE ORDER PASSED BY THE CIT(A) IN DISMISSING THE AS SESSEES APPEALS IN-LIMINE U/S 249(4) OF THE ACT FOR NON-PAY MENT OF ADMITTED TAX. 2. THE ASSESSEE IS AN INDIVIDUAL. ASSESSMENTS IN CA SE OF THE ASSESSEE WERE COMPLETED FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEARS 20 04-05 TO 2007-08 DETERMINING INCOME AT A MUCH HIGHER FIGURE THAN WHAT WAS RETURNED BY THE ASSESSEE ON ACCOUNT OF VARIOUS ADDITIONS BEING MADE. THE ASSESSEE BEING AGGRIEVED OF THE ASS ESSMENT ORDER PREFERRED APPEAL BEFORE THE CIT(A). ITA NOS. 1694 TO 1697/HYD/2012 SRI T. SRISAILAM YADAV 2 3. IN COURSE OF HEARING OF THE APPEALS, IT WAS NOTI CED BY THE CIT(A) THAT THE ASSESSEE HAD NOT PAID ADMITTED TAX FOR THE AFORESAID ASSESSMENT YEARS WHICH IS A CONDITION PRE CEDENT FOR ADMISSION OF THE APPEAL. IT WAS FURTHER NOTICED BY THE CIT(A) THAT IN FORM NO. 35 AGAINST THE COLUMN PROVIDED FOR MENT IONING WHETHER THE TAX DUE ON THE INCOME RETURNED HAD BEEN PAID IN FULL, THE ASSESSEE HAS MENTIONED YES, WHICH IS TOTALLY WRONG AND MISLEADING. THOUGH THE ASSESSEE FILED PETITION BEFO RE THE CIT(A) BEING SUPPORTED BY AN AFFIDAVIT STATING THEREIN THA T THE ADMITTED TAX HAS BEEN PAID IN FULL IN THE MEANTIME AND DETAI LS OF PAYMENT OF SUCH TAX WAS ALSO FURNISHED, THE CIT(A) REJECTED THE ASSESSEES PRAYER FOR CONDONATION OF DEEMED DELAY AND ADMISSIO N OF THE APPEALS FOR HEARING ON MERITS BY HOLDING THAT NO DI SCRETION IS LEFT WITH CIT(A) TO ADMIT THE APPEALS IN VIEW OF THE MAN DATORY PROVISIONS CONTAINED U/S 249(4) OF THE ACT. ACCORD INGLY, THE CIT(A) DISMISSED ALL APPEALS OF THE ASSESSEE IN-LIM INE WITHOUT CONDONING THE DELAY WHILE THE CIT(A) PLACED RELIANC E ON CERTAIN DECISIONS OF THE DIFFERENT HIGH COURTS AND DIFFEREN T BENCHES OF THE TRIBUNAL. 4. WE HAVE HEARD THE CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES ON THIS ISSUE AND PERUSED THE MATERIALS ON RECORD. WE HAVE ALSO CAREFULLY APPLIED OUR MIND TO THE DECISIONS PLACED BEFORE US. IT IS NOT DISPUTED THAT THE ASSESSEE AT THE TIME OF FILING OF THE APPEAL HAD NOT PAID THE ADMITTED TAX THE DETAILS OF WHICH ARE AS UNDER: A.Y. ADMITTED I NCOME (RS.) TAX PAYABLE ON ADMITTED INCOME (RS.) 2004 - 05 4,79,900 1,02,591 2005 - 06 5,43,500 87,124 2006 - 07 12,35,100 4,06,840 2007 - 08 9,52,930 2,23,220 5. HOWEVER, BEFORE THE DISPOSAL OF THE APPEAL, THE ASSESSEE IN FACT HAD PAID ALL THE ADMITTED TAXES FOR THE AFO RESAID YEARS AND ITA NOS. 1694 TO 1697/HYD/2012 SRI T. SRISAILAM YADAV 3 FILED A PETITION BEING SUPPORTED BY AN AFFIDAVIT FU RNISHING THE DETAILS OF PAYMENT OF ADMITTED TAX AND SEEKING COND ONATION OF THE DEEMED DELAY AND PRAYING FOR HEARING OF THE APP EALS ON MERIT. THE DETAILS OF PAYMENT OF ADMITTED TAX FURN ISHED BY THE ASSESSEE IS ALSO MENTIONED AT PARA 3.2 OF THE ORDER PASSED BY THE CIT(A), WHICH ARE AS UNDER: AY ADMITTED INCOME (RS.) TAX PAYABLE (RS.) T AX PAID (RS.) DATE OF PAYMENT 2004 - 05 4,79,900 1,02,591 1,02,5091 06/08/2012 2005 - 06 5,43,500 87,124 87,124 06/08/2012 2006 - 07 12,35,100 4,06,840 4,00,000 30/12/2011 2007 - 08 9,52,930 2,23,229 2,23,220 06/08/2012 6. THEREFORE, IT IS A FACT ON RECORD THAT DURING TH E PENDENCY OF APPEAL, THE ASSESSEE HAS DISCHARGED THE ADMITTED TA X LIABILITY. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE CIT(A), IN OUR VIEW, WAS NOT JUS TIFIED IN NOT CONDONING THE DELAY AND ADMITTING THE APPEALS FOR HEARING ON MERIT. WHEN THE ASSESSEE HAS PAID THE ADMITTED TAX BEFORE DISPOSAL OF APPEALS, ASSESSEES APPEALS DESERVED TO BE HEARD ON MERIT AS THERE CANN OT BE ANY PREJUDICE TO THE DEPARTMENT IF THE APPEALS ARE HEARD ON MERIT . ON CAREFUL EXAMINATION OF VARIOUS DECISIONS OF HIGH COURTS AS WELL AS DIFFERENT BENCHES OF ITAT, ON THIS ISSUE WE FIND THAT THE VIE W EXPRESSED IN THESE DECISIONS ARE OVERWHELMINGLY IN FAVOUR OF THE ASSES SEE. THE HONBLE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT IN CASE OF CIT VS. K. SATISH K UMAR SINGH, [2012] 19 TAXMANN.COM 154(KAR) WHILE CONSIDERING IDENTICAL IS SUE HELD AS FOLLOWS: THEREFORE, FROM SUB-SECTION (4) OF SECTION 249, IT IS CLEAR WHEN THE RETURN HAS BEEN FILED BY THE ASSESSEE, UNL ESS THE ASSESSEE PAYS THE ADMITTED TAX DUE ON THE INCOME RE TURNED BY HIM, NO APPEAL SHALL BE ENTERTAINED AND ADMITTED. T HEREFORE, IF ADMITTED TAX IS NOT PAID WHICH FALLS UNDER CLAUSE ( A) OF SUB- SECTION (4) OF SECTION 249, THE COMMISSIONER (APPEA LS) IS NOT VESTED WITH ANY POWER TO WAIVE PAYMENT OF SUCH ADMI TTED TAX AND ENTERTAIN THE APPEAL. THE ORDER OF DISMISSING T HE APPEAL IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES IS AUTOMATIC. THEREFORE, THE APP EAL DISMISSED UNDER CLAUSE (A) OF SUB-SECTION (4) OF SE CTION 249 FOR NON-PAYMENT OF ADMITTED TAX DUE ON THE INCOME RETUR NED BY THE ASSESSEE CANNOT BE FOUND FAULT WITH. HOWEVER, I F AFTER SUCH DISMISSAL, IF THE ASSESSEE PAYS THE ADMITTED TAX AN D REQUESTS ITA NOS. 1694 TO 1697/HYD/2012 SRI T. SRISAILAM YADAV 4 THE APPELLATE AUTHORITY TO RECALL THE ORDER DISMISS ING THE APPEAL IN LIMINE AND TO CONSIDER THE APPEAL ON MERITS UNDE R THE AFORESAID PROVISION OR UNDER ANY OTHER PROVISION OF THE ACT, THERE IS NO PROHIBITION OR LEGAL IMPEDIMENT FOR THE APPELLATE AUTHORITY TO RECALL ITS EARLIER ORDER AND ENTERTAIN THE APPEAL AND DECIDE THE SAME ON MERITS. 7. THE COORDINATE BENCH OF THIS TRIBUNAL IN CASE OF SHRI T. KISHAN VS. ACIT IN IT(SS)A NOS. 23 & 25/HYD/2011 VIDE ORDE R DATED 18/05/2012, HELD AS UNDER: 19. WE HAVE DULY CONSIDERED THE RIVAL CONTENTIONS. FROM THE PERUSAL OF RECORD AND ON CONSIDERATION OF RESPECTIVE ARGUME NTS, FOLLOWING POINTS HAVE EMERGED OUT FOR OUR ADJUDICATION: (1) WHETHER THE TRIBUNAL HAS POWERS UNDER SECTION 254(1) TO GIVE A FINDING THAT, AN APPEAL FILED IN VIOLATION OF SECTI ON 249(4) WOULD BE TERMED AS DEFECTIVE ONE AND THE MOMENT THE DEFECT I S CURED BY MAKING PAYMENT OF AGREED TAX, THE APPEAL CAN BE DECIDED ON MERIT SUBJECT TO LIMITATION PROVIDED IN SECTION 249(2) AND ITS CONDO NATION THEREOF AS PER SECTION 249(3). (2) WHETHER NON-AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR MAKING P AYMENT OF AGREED TAXES WITH THE ASSESSEE COULD BE CONSIDERED AS A RE ASONABLE CAUSE FOR FILING DEFECTIVE APPEALS IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 24 9(4) OF THE ACT. (3) WHETHER SUFFICIENT REASON EXISTS FOR CURING TH IS DEFECT AFTER EXPIRY OF LIMITATION PROVIDED IN SECTION 249(2) OF THE ACT . 20. IT IS UNDISPUTED PROPOSITION OF LAW THAT APPEAL IS A CONTINUATION OF THE ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS AND RIGHT OF APPEAL IS NOT AN INHERENT RIGHT BUT IT IS A STATUTORY RIGHT. IT IS OPEN TO THE LEGISLAT URE TO GIVE OR NOT TO GIVE A RIGHT OF APPEAL AGAINST DECISIONS MADE BY AUTHORITI ES. THE RIGHT OF APPEAL WHEREVER CONFERRED BY STATUTE HAS TO BE EXER CISED STRICTLY IN CONFORMITY WITH THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS, WHICH CRE ATE IT. IF THE STATUTE PUT ANY RESTRICTIONS THEN, SUCH RIGHT WOULD BE AVAI LABLE ALONG WITH SUCH RESTRICTIONS. IT IS ALSO NOT DISPUTED BEFORE US THA T ASSESSEE HAD MADE THE PAYMENT OF AGREED TAX DURING THE PENDENCY OF TH ESE APPEALS. BEFORE EMBARKING UPON THE JURISDICTION OF THE TRIBUNAL WHE THER THESE APPEALS CAN BE RESTORED BACK TO THE CIT(A) OR NOT, IT IS SA LUTARY TO TAKE NOTE OF SUB-SECTIONS (3) AND (4) OF SECTION 249 AND SUB-SEC TION (1) OF SECTION 254 BECAUSE THESE PROVISIONS HAVE DIRECT BEARING ON THE CONTROVERSY : SECTION 249(3) : 'THE CIT(A) MAY ADMIT AN APPEAL AF TER THE EXPIRATION OF THE SAID PERIOD IF HE IS SATISFIED THAT THE APPELLA NT HAD SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR NOT PRESENTING IT WITHIN THAT PERIOD.' ITA NOS. 1694 TO 1697/HYD/2012 SRI T. SRISAILAM YADAV 5 SECTION 249(4) : 'NO APPEAL UNDER THIS CHAPTER SHAL L BE ADMITTED UNLESS AT THE TIME OF FILING OF THE APPEAL,-- (A) WHERE A RETURN HAS BEEN FILED BY THE ASSESSEE, THE ASSESSEE HAS PAID THE TAX DUE ON THE INCOME RETURNED BY HIM; OR (B) WHERE NO RETURN HAS BEEN FILED BY THE ASSESSEE , THE ASSESSEE HAS PAID AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO THE AMOUNT OF ADVANCE TAX W HICH WAS PAYABLE BY HIM : PROVIDED THAT, IN A CASE FILLING UNDER CLAUSE (B) A ND ON AN APPLICATION MADE BY THE APPELLANT IN THIS BEHALF, THE CIT(A) MA Y, FOR ANY GOOD AND SUFFICIENT REASON TO BE RECORDED IN WRITING, EXEMPT HIM FROM THE OPERATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THAT CLAUSE.' SECTION 254(1) : 'THE TRIBUNAL MAY, AFTER GIVING BO TH THE PARTIES TO THE APPEAL AN OPPORTUNITY OF BEING HEARD, PASS SUCH ORD ERS THEREON AS IT THINKS FIT.' 21. FOR CONSIDERING THE POWERS OF TRIBUNAL CONTEMPL ATED IN SUB- SECTION (1) OF SECTION 254, IT WOULD BE IMPERATIVE FOR US TO REFER THE JUDGMENT OF THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT RENDERED IN T HE CASE OF HUKUMCHAND MILLS LTD. V. CIT (1967) 63 ITR 232 (SC) WHEREIN THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT HAD CONSIDERED THE AMBIT AND SCOPE OF THE EXPRESSION 'PASS SUCH ORDERS THEREIN AS IT THINKS F IT', USED IN SECTION 33(4) OF IT ACT, 1922, WHICH IS ANALOGOUS TO 254(1) IN INCOME-TAX ACT, 1961. AT PAGE 237, THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT MADE F OLLOWING OBSERVATION : 'THE WORD 'THERE OF, OF COURSE, RESTRICTS THE JURI SDICTION OF THE TRIBUNAL TO THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF THE APPEAL. T HE WORDS 'PASS SUCH ORDERS AS THE TRIBUNAL THINKS FIT' INCLU DE ALL THE POWERS (EXCEPT POSSIBLY THE POWER OF ENHANCEMENT) W HICH ARE CONFERRED UPON THE AAC BY SECTION 31 OF THE ACT . CONSEQUENTLY, THE TRIBUNAL HAS AUTHORITY UNDER THIS SECTION TO DIRECT THE AAC OR THE ITO TO HOLD A FURTHER ENQU IRY AND DISPOSE OF THE CASE ON THE BASIS OF SUCH ENQUIRY.' 22. THEN AGAIN THIS EXPRESSION CAME FOR CONSIDERATI ON BEFORE THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT V. ASSAM T RAVELS SHIPPING SERVICE. (199 ITR 1) (SC). IN THIS CASE, ASSESSEE F ILED THE RETURN LATE FOR ASST. YRS. 1963-64 AND 1964 65. THUS, VIOLATED SECT ION 271(1)(A)(2) OF THE ACT. THE LEARNED AO LEVIED THE PENALTY. HOWEVER , WHILE CALCULATING THE PENALTY, HE WORKED OUT THE AMOUNT AT A VERY LOW ER FIGURE. HE LEVIED THE PENALTY AT RS. 6,494 AND RS. 70,118 FOR ASST. Y RS. 1963-64 AND 1964-65 RESPECTIVELY AS AGAINST THE AMOUNT OF RS. 6 5,700 AND RS. 93,564. THE ASSESSEE CHALLENGED THIS LEVY OF PENALT Y BEFORE THE CIT(A). THE LEARNED CIT(A) QUASHED THE PENALTY ON THE GROUN D THAT THE AO LEVIED THE PENALTY CONTRARY TO THE PROVISIONS OF SE CTION 271(1). THE ITA NOS. 1694 TO 1697/HYD/2012 SRI T. SRISAILAM YADAV 6 MATTER FURTHER TRAVELLED TO THE TRIBUNAL. THE TRIBU NAL HAS ALSO DISMISSED THE APPEAL OF THE DEPARTMENT BY CONFIRMIN G THE ORDER OF THE CIT(A) ON THE GROUND THAT TRIBUNAL HAS NO POWER TO ENHANCE THE PENALTY. IN SUCH A SITUATION, IT CAN DO NOTHING EXC EPT AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF THE CIT(A). ULTIMATELY, THE MATTER WENT UP BEFOR E THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT. THE HON'BLE. SUPREME COURT HAS OBSERVED AS U NDER WHILE ELABORATING THE SCOPE OF EXPRESSION 'PASS SUCH ORDE RS THEREON AS IT THINKS FIT.' : 'THE EXPRESSION 'AS IT THINKS FIT' IS, WIDE ENOUGH TO INCLUDING THE POWER OF REMAND TO THE AUTHORITY COMPETENT TO MAKE THE REQUISITE ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW IN SUCH A CASE EVEN TH OUGH THE TRIBUNAL ITSELF COULD NOT HAVE MADE THE ORDER ENHANCING THE AMOUNT OF PENALTY. THE POWER OF THE AAC UNDER SECTION 251(1)(B) INCLUD ES THE POWER EVEN TO ENHANCE THE PENALTY SUBJECT TO THE REQUIREM ENT OF SUB-SECTION (2) OF SECTION 251 OF A REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY OF S HOWING CAUSE AGAINST SUCH ENHANCEMENT BEING GIVEN TO THE APPELLA NT ASSESSED. THIS COULD HAVE BEEN DONE IN THE ASSESSEE'S APPEAL ITSEL F FILED IN THE PRESENT CASE. THE POWER OF THE TRIBUNAL TO MAKE AN ORDER OF REMAND IN SUCH A SITUATION IS WELL-SETTLED IN HUKUMCHAND MILLS LTD. V. CIT (1967) 63 ITR 232 (SC).' 23. ON PLAIN READING OF SUB-SECTION (3) OF SECTION 249 SHALL REVEAL THAT IF THE ASSESSEE SHOWED SUFFICIENT REASONS FOR LATE FILING OF HIS APPEALS, THEN SUCH DELAY CAN BE CONDONED AND CONTRO VERSY WOULD BE SILENCED ON MERIT. SIMILARLY, FOR SAKE OF EXPLANATI ON, IF AN ASSESSEE DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT FUNDS FOR COMPLYING THE REQUIRE MENT OF SECTION 249(4) AND HAS NOT FILED THE APPEAL WITHIN THE TIME PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 249(2), SUBSEQUENT TO EXPIRY OF LIMITATION, HE MADE COMPLIANCE OF SECTION 249(4) AND FILED THE APPEAL WITH A PRAYE R OF CONDONATION OF DELAY THEN IT WOULD BE IN DISCRETION OF THE FIRST A PPELLATE AUTHORITY TO SEE WHETHER SUFFICIENT REASONS FOR LATE FILING OF APPEA L EXIST OR NOT. IF THE LEARNED CIT(A) ARRIVED AT A CONCLUSION THAT SUFFICI ENT REASONS EXIST THEN AGAIN THE CONTROVERSY WOULD BE DECIDED ON MERIT. TH US, ON CONJOINT READING OF SUB-SECTIONS (3) AND (4), IT IS INFERRED THAT DEFECT ARISES DUE TO NON-COMPLIANCE OF SECTION 249(4) IS A CURABLE ON E AND IN A GIVEN CASE IF THE TRIBUNAL IS SATISFIED THAT THERE EXIST SUFFI CIENT REASONS FOR CURING SUCH DEFECTS AFTER EXPIRY OF LIMITATION, IT WOULD B E IN THE REALM OF TRIBUNAL'S DISCRETION TO RESTORE SUCH MATTERS TO TH E FILE OF THE CIT(A) FOR DECIDING THE CONTROVERSY ON MERIT BECAUSE SUB-SECTI ON (1) OF SECTION 254 PROVIDES WIDE POWERS TO THE TRIBUNAL FOR PASSING SU CH ORDERS THEREON AS IT THINKS FIT IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE. 24. THERE IS NO DISPUTE THAT THE ASSESSEE HAS DISCH ARGED THE HUGE TAX LIABILITY ON 17.2.2011 VIDE CHALLAN NO. 788, IN DIAN BANK, HIMAYATNAGAR BRANCH, HYDERABAD, BSR CODE 0260025 WH ICH IS EVIDENT FROM THE DOCUMENT FILED BY THE ASSESSEE. TH US, IT WOULD BE TOTALLY UNFAIR FOR NOT PROVIDING AN OPPORTUNITY TO HIM FOR DISPUTING THE ADDITIONS MADE BY THE AO ON MERIT. THE HON'BLE FULL BENCH OF DELHI ITA NOS. 1694 TO 1697/HYD/2012 SRI T. SRISAILAM YADAV 7 HIGH COURT IN J.T. (INDIA) EXPORTS AND ANR. V. UNIO N OF INDIA AND ANR. (2003) 262 ITR 269 (DEL)(FB), WHILE ELABORATING THE PRINCIPLE OF NATURAL JUSTICE ALONG WITH THE LEGAL JUSTICE, HAS OBSERVED AS UNDER : 'NATURAL JUSTICE IS ANOTHER NAME FOR COMMONSENSE JU STICE. RULES OF NATURAL JUSTICE ARE NOT CODIFIED CANONS. BUT THEY A RE PRINCIPLES INGRAINED INTO THE CONSCIENCE OF MAN. NATURAL JUSTI CE IS THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN A COMMONSENSE LIBERAL WAY. JUSTICE IS BASED SUBSTANTIALLY ON NATURAL IDEALS AND HUMAN VAL UES. THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IS TO BE FREED FROM THE N ARROW AND RESTRICTED CONSIDERATIONS WHICH ARE USUALLY ASSOCIATED WITH A FORMULATED LAW INVOLVING LINGUISTIC TECHNICALITIES AND GRAMMATICAL NICETIES. IT IS THE SUBSTANCE OF JUSTICE WHICH HAS TO DETERMINE ITS FOR M. 25. THE EXPRESSION, 'NATURAL JUSTICE AND LEGAL JUST ICE' DO NOT PRESENT A WATER-TIGHT CLASSIFICATION. IT IS THE SUBSTANCE OF JUSTICE WHICH IS TO BE SECURED BY BOTH, AND WHENEVER LEGAL JUSTICE FAILS T O ACHIEVE THIS SOLEMN PURPOSE, NATURAL JUSTICE IS CALLED IN AID OF LEGAL JUSTICE. NATURAL JUSTICE RELIEVES LEGAL JUSTICE FROM UNNECESSARY TECHNICALLY , GRAMMATICAL PEDANTRY OR LOGICAL PREVARICATION. IT SUPPLIES THE OMISSIONS OF A FORMULATED LAW. 26. THE ADHERENCE TO PRINCIPLE OF NATURAL JUSTICE A S RECOGNIZED BY ALL CIVILIZED STATES IS OF SUPREME IMPORTANCE WHEN A QU ASI-JUDICIAL BODY EMBARKS ON DETERMINING DISPUTES BETWEEN THE PARTIES .' 27. FROM THE JUDGMENT OF HON'BLE DELHI HIGH COURT, IT IS CLEAR THAT WHENEVER LEGAL JUSTICE FAILS TO ACHIEVE THE SOLEMN PURPOSE OF SECURING JUSTICE THEN NATURAL JUSTICE IS CALLED IN AID OF LE GAL JUSTICE. FROM THE DETAILS SUBMITTED BY THE ASSESSEE IN THE PAPER BOOK AS EXTRACTED BY US, IT REVEALS THAT ASSESSES KEPT ON MAKING THE PAYMENT OF TAX ALONG WITH INTEREST IN INSTALMENTS. HAD THE ASSESSEE WAS HAVIN G SUFFICIENT FUND WITH HIM, THEN NO PRUDENT BUSINESSMAN WOULD ALLOW T O SWELL THE LIABILITY OF INTEREST IN SUCH A WAY. FOR EXAMPLE, T HE TOTAL TAX REQUIRED TO BE PAID BY THE ASSESSEE IN ASST. YR. 1991-92 ON THE AGREED RETURN ALONG WITH INTEREST WAS RS. 17,30,273. AGAINST IT, BY THE END OF DECEMBER, 1997, ASSESSEE HAS PAID RS. 26,09,843. THUS, IT CLE ARLY INDICATES THAT ASSESSEE WAS NOT HAVING SUFFICIENT FUNDS AT THE REL EVANT TIME FOR COMPLIANCE OF SECTION 249(4) WHICH RENDERED THE APP EALS OF THE ASSESSEE AS DEFECTIVE ONE. IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTI CE, WE ARE OF THE OPINION THAT THESE APPEALS DESERVE TO BE ALLOWED BY SETTING ASIDE THE IMPUGNED ORDER OF THE CIT(A) AND RESTORING THE SAME BEFORE THE LEARNED FIRST APPELLATE AUTHORITY FOR ADJUDICATION ON MERIT . FOR OUR ABOVE VIEW, WE ARE SUPPORTED BY THE DECISION OF HON'BLE ORISSA HIGH COURT GIVEN IN THE CASE OF CIT V. KALIPADA GHOSE (1987) 167 ITR 17 3 (ORI). THOUGH THE ISSUE BEFORE THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT WAS ON A LITTLE DIFFERENT FOOTING, BUT AN INFERENCE CAN BE DRAWN FROM THE JUDGMENT THAT IN SUCH CASES THE RIGHT COURSE WOULD BE RESTORING THE APPEAL BEFORE T HE CIT(A). BEFORE THE HON'BLE ORISSA HIGH COURT, THE ISSUE RELATES TO ASS T. YRS. 1974-75 AND ITA NOS. 1694 TO 1697/HYD/2012 SRI T. SRISAILAM YADAV 8 1975-76. THE LEARNED AO DETERMINED THE INCOME OF AS SESSEE AT RS. 17,500 AND RS. 30,000. AGAINST THIS ORDER, THE APPE ALS WERE FILED BEFORE THE FIRST APPELLATE AUTHORITY ON 29TH OCT., 1975. BY THEN SECTION 249 HAS BEEN AMENDED BY INCORPORATING SUB-SECTION ( 4) W.E.F. 1ST OCT., 1975. THE LEARNED FIRST APPELLATE AUTHORITY DISMISS ED THE APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE IN LIMINE ON THE GROUND THAT ASSESSEE FAIL ED TO PAY THE AGREED TAX AT THE TIME OF FILING OF THE APPEAL. DURING THE PENDENCY OF APPEAL BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL, THE ASSESSEE PAID AGREED TAX O N 15TH JUNE, 1976, THE TRIBUNAL SET ASIDE THE ORDER OF THE LEARNED CIT (A) AND RESTORED THE MATTER BACK TO THE FILE OF FIRST APPELLATE AUTHORIT Y. THE REVENUE HAS CHALLENGED THE ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL ON THE GROUND THAT DECISION GIVEN BY THE FIRST APPELLATE AUTHORITY WAS NOT ONE UNDER SECTION 250 OF THE ACT AND, THEREFORE, NO APPEAL WOULD LIE TO THE TRIBUNAL AND THE TRIBUNAL HAS NO JURISDICTION UNDER SECTION 253 FOR SETTING ASIDE THE ORDER OF FIRST APPELLATE AUTHORITY AND DIRECTING THE FIRST APPELLA TE AUTHORITY TO DECIDE THE ISSUE AFRESH ON MERIT. THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT R EJECTED THE CONTENTION OF THE REVENUE AND UPHELD THE ORDER OF T HE TRIBUNAL. WHILE DOING SO, THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT AT P. 176 OBSERVED AS UNDER : 'ON THE AFORESAID ANALYSIS, IT HAS TO BE HELD THAT THE ORDER OF THE AAC DISMISSING THE APPEALS FOR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SECT ION 249(4) OF THE ACT CAME WITHIN THE AMBIT OF SECTION 250 OF THE ACT AND WAS APPEALABLE BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL UNDER SECTION 253 OF THE ACT. THE TRIBUNAL, THEREFORE, COMMITTED NO ILLEGALITY IN ENT ERTAINING THE APPEALS AND IN CONDONING THE DELAY ON BEING SATISFIED, ON T HE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIEN T CAUSE FOR THE ASSESSEE'S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 249(4) OF THE ACT AND IN REMITTING THE CASES TO THE FIRST APPELLATE FORUM FO R DISPOSAL ON MERITS. ACCORDINGLY, THE QUESTION REFERRED IS ANSWERED IN T HE AFFIRMATIVE.' 28. THUS, WE ARE FORTIFIED FOR OUR VIEW BY THE ABOV E DECISION OF THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT. 29. THE NEXT ISSUE FOR OUR ADJUDICATION IS WHETHER SUFFICIENT REASONS EXIST FOR CURING DEFECT AFTER EXPIRY OF LIMITATION PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 249(2) OF THE ACT. SINCE, WE HAVE HELD IN THE UPPER PART OF THE ORDER THAT APPEAL FILED IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 249(4) WOULD B E TERMED AS A DEFECTIVE ONE AND THE MOMENT DEFECT IS CURED THEN T HOSE CAN BE DISPOSED OF ON MERIT SUBJECT TO LIMITATION. THE COU RTS AND THE QUASI- JUDICIAL BODIES ARE EMPOWERED TO CONDONE THE DELAY IF A LITIGANT SATISFIES THE COURT THAT THERE WERE SUFFICIENT REAS ONS FOR AVAILING THE REMEDY AFTER EXPIRY OF LIMITATION. SUCH REASONING S HOULD BE TO THE SATISFACTION OF THE COURT. THE EXPRESSION 'SUFFICIE NT CAUSE OR REASON', AS PROVIDED IN SUB-SECTION (3) OF SECTION 249 OF THE A CT, IS USED IN IDENTICAL POSITION IN A NUMBER OF STATUTES AND THE HON'BLE SU PREME COURT AS WELL AS THE HON'BLE HIGH COURTS HAVE TIME AND AGAIN HELD THAT EXPRESSION 'SUFFICIENT CAUSE' FOR CONDONATION OF A DELAY SHOUL D RECEIVE A LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION SO AS TO ADVANCE SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE W HEN NO NEGLIGENCE OR INACTION OR WANT OF BONA FIDE IS IMPUTABLE TO A PAR TY BECAUSE THE ITA NOS. 1694 TO 1697/HYD/2012 SRI T. SRISAILAM YADAV 9 JUDICIARY IS EXPECTED NOT ON ACCOUNT OF ITS POWER T O LEGALIZE INJUSTICE ON TECHNICAL GROUNDS BUT BECAUSE IT IS CAPABLE OF REMO VING INJUSTICE AND IS EXPECTED TO DO SO. A LITIGANT DOES NOT STAND TO BEN EFIT BY RESORTING THE DELAY OR BREACHING ANY PROVISION OF A STATUTE. THE HON'BLE, SUPREME COURT IN COLLECTOR, LAND ACQUISITION V. MST. KATIJI AND ORS. (1987) 167 1TR 471 (SC) HAS OBSERVED THAT WHEN SUBSTANTIAL JUS TICE AND TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS ARE PITTED AGAINST EACH OTHER, THE C AUSE OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE DESERVES TO BE PREFERRED, FOR THE OTHER SID E CANNOT CLAIM TO HAVE A VESTED RIGHT IN INJUSTICE BEING DONE BECAUSE OF A NON-DELIBERATE DELAY. THUS, CONSIDERING THE HARDSHIP OF THE ASSESSEE, WE ARE OF THE OPINION THAT THERE EXIST SUFFICIENT REASONS FOR NOT FILING A VALID EFFECTIVE APPEAL BEFORE THE CIT(A). IT IS APTLY SAID THAT FACTS SHOU LD BE VIEWED IN A NATURAL PERSPECTIVE HAVING REGARD TO THE COMPULSION OF CIRCUMSTANCES OF A CASE WHERE IT IS POSSIBLE TO DRAW INFERENCES, FRO M THE FACTS AND WHERE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY DISHONEST OR IMPROPER M OTIVE ON THE PART OF THE ASSESSEE IT WOULD BE JUST AND EQUITABLE TO DRAW SUCH INFERENCE IN SUCH A -MANNER THAT WOULD LEAD TO EQUITY AND JUSTIC E. TOO HYPER TECHNICAL OR LEGALIZED APPROACH SHOULD BE AVOIDED I N LOOKING AT A PROVISION WHICH MUST BE EQUITABLY INTERPRETED AND J USTLY ADMINISTERED. HENCE, TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE OVERALL FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE WE ARE OF THE OPINION THAT THESE APPEALS D ESERVE TO BE ALLOWED AND, ACCORDINGLY, ALLOWED. WE SET ASIDE THE ORDER O F THE LEARNED CIT(A) AND RESTORE THE MATTERS BEFORE HIM FOR DECIDING THE CONTROVERSY ON MERIT. 8. SAME VIEW HAS ALSO BEEN EXPRESSED IN FOLLOWING DECISIONS: 1. ENDEAVOUR INDUSTRIES LTD. VS. DCIT, [2011] 43 SO T 322 (HYD.) 2. ITO VS. ANKUSH FINSTOCK LTD., [2012] 136 ITD 168 (AHD.) 3. SMT. BANU BEGUM VS. DCIT, [2012] 22 TAXMANN.COM 235 (HYD.) 9. CONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT OF THE RATIO LAID DOWN I N THE AFORESAID DECISIONS, THE ASSESSEES CASE STANDS EVE N ON A BETTER FOOTING AS THE ASSESSEE HAS PAID THE ADMITTED TAX E VEN BEFORE THE DISPOSAL OF THE APPEALS BY THE CIT(A). IN THE AFORE SAID VIEW OF THE MATTER, RESPECTFULLY FOLLOWING THE DECISION OF THE HONBLE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT IN CASE OF K. SATISH KUMAR SIN GH (SUPRA) AND THE DECISIONS OF THE COORDINATE BENCHES OF THE TRIBUNAL AS REFERRED TO HEREINABOVE, THE ASSESSEE HAVING PAID T HE ADMITTED TAX LIABILITY AND FILED A PETITION BEFORE THE CIT(A ) SEEKING ITA NOS. 1694 TO 1697/HYD/2012 SRI T. SRISAILAM YADAV 10 CONDONATION OF DELAY, WE DIRECT THE CIT(A) TO CONDO NE THE DEEMED DELAY AS THE ASSESSEE HAS ALREADY PAID THE A DMITTED TAX AND ADMIT THE ASSESSEES APPEALS FOR HEARING ON MER IT. ACCORDINGLY, THE APPEALS OF THE ASSESSEE ARE ALLOWE D FOR STATISTICAL PURPOSES. 10. IN THE RESULT, APPEALS OF THE ASSESSEE ARE ALLO WED FOR STATISTICAL PURPOSES. PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON 14/08/2013. SD/- SD/- (CHANDRA POOJARI) (SAKTIJIT DEY) ACCOUNTANT MEMBER JUDICIAL MEMB ER HYDERABAD, DATED: 14 TH AUGUST, 2013. KV COPY TO:- 1) SRI T. SRISAILAM YADAV, C/O. CH. PARTHASARATHY & CO., 1-1- 298/2B/3, 1 ST FLOOR, SOWBHAGYA AVENUE, ST. NO. 1, ASHOKNAGAR, HYDERABAD 500 020. 2) ITO, WARD 11(4), HYDERABAD. 3) CIT(A)-VI, HYDERABAD. 4) CIT-V, HYDERABAD. 5) THE DEPARTMENTAL REPRESENTATIVE, I.T.A.T ., HYDERABAD.