IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL DELHI BENCH `E : NEW DELHI BEFORE SHRI A.D. JAIN, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SHRI DEEPAK R. SHAH, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER I.T.A. NO.170/DEL/2008 ASSESSMENT YEAR : 2004-05 INCOME-TAX OFFICER (E), MANAGEMENT DEVELOPMENT IN STITUTE, TRUST WARD-IV, DELHI. VS. IFCI TOWER, 14 TH FLOOR, 61, NEHRU PLACE, NEW DELHI. (APPELLANT) (RESPONDENT) APPELLANT BY : SHRI G.S. SAHOTA, SR. DR. RESPONDENT BY : SHRI VEENU AGGARWAL, CA. O R D E R PER DEEPAK R. SHAH, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER THIS APPEAL BY THE REVENUE IS DIRECTED AGAINST THE ORDER OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX (APPEALS)-XXI, NEW DELHI , DATED 5 TH OCTOBER, 2007 FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 2004-05 IN AN APPEAL A GAINST ASSESSMENT FRAMED UNDER SECTION 143(3) OF THE INCOME-TAX ACT, 1961 (THE ACT). 2. THE REVENUE HAS RAISED THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS BEF ORE US:- 1. ON THE FACTS AND IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CA SE, THE LD. CIT(A) HAS ERRED IN ALLOWING EXEMPTION U/S 11 OF TH E I.T. ACT, 1961 TO THE ASSESSEE IGNORING THE FACT THAT THE ASS ESSEE HAD 2 RENDERED PROFESSIONAL SERVICES TO THE CORPORATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR ENTERPRISES WHICH IS A COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY. 2. ON THE FACTS AND IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE C ASE, THE LD. CIT(A) HAS ERRED IN ALLOWING DISALLOWANCE OF RS.32, 595/- BEING 50% OF THE EXPENSES ON TELEPHONE INSTALLED AT THE R ESIDENCE OF THE DIRECTOR AND RS.43,560/- OUT OF THE EXPENSES IN CURRED ON FOREIGN TRAVEL OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ASSESSEE INST ITUTE. 3. ON THE FACTS AND IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CA SE, THE LD. CIT(A) HAS ERRED IN ALLOWING RELIEF OF RS.4,92,22,2 58/- ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE CAPITAL EXPENDITURE. 4. ON THE FACTS AND IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CAS E, THE LD. CIT(A) HAS ERRED IN ALLOWING SET OFF OF EARLIER YEA RS DEFICIT AGAINST THE SURPLUS OF THE ASSTT. YEAR 2004-05 WITH OUT APPRECIATING THE FACT THAT THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIO N 11, 12 & 13 DO NOT CONTAIN ANY SUCH PROVISIONS FOR SET OFF OF E ARLIER YEARS DEFICIT. 3. AS REGARDS GROUND NO.1 THE LEARNED CIT(A) OBSERV ED AS UNDER:- 3. I HAVE CONSIDERED THE FACTS OF THE CASE AND THE ARGUMENTS OF THE APPELLANT CAREFULLY. THE APPELLANT IS A REP UTED ORGANIZATION IN THE FIELD OF MANAGEMENT STUDIES AND IT HAS BEEN PROVIDING CONSULTANCY SERVICES TO VARIOUS ORGANIZAT IONS FROM ITS VERY INCEPTIONS SINCE THIS IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF I NTERACTING WITH VARIOUS INDUSTRIES TO UNDERSTAND THE MANAGEMENT PRO BLEMS AND TO GIVE ITS SOLUTIONS. I AGREE WITH THE APPELLANT T HAT SUCH ACTIVITY SHARPEN THE FACULTYS VISION ON MATTERS OF ACADEMIC NATURE AND HELPS THEM IN DELIVERY OF CONCEPTS/THEORY DURING MA NAGEMENT TEACHING. THE CONSULTANCY ASSIGNMENTS ARE GIVEN BY THE SPONSORS TO THE CONCERNED FACULTY MEMBERS BASED UPO N THEIR KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERTISE IN THE FIELD. 33% OF THE F EES IS RECOVERED BY THE INSTITUTE TOWARDS COST OF USE OF F ACULTY TIME, INFRASTRUCTURAL FACILITIES ETC. THIS CONSULTANCY W ORK IS A BASE FOR FACULTY MEMBERS TO PUBLISH THE RESEARCH PAPERS AND TO CARRY OUT FURTHER RESEARCH WHICH THEY THEN DELIVER TO STUDENT S WHILE TAKING A COURSE AS A CASE STUDY. OUT OF TOTAL REVE NUE OF RS.1633,75 LAKHS THE CONSULTANCY INCOME RS.81.40 LA KHS IS 3 ONLY WHICH IS ABOUT 4.98% OF THE TOTAL INSTITUTES RECEIPTS WHICH IS ONLY INCIDENTAL AND INEXTRICABLY LINKED TO THE I NSTITUTES EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES. THIS INCOME HAS ALSO BEEN SPENT WHOLLY AND EXCLUSIVELY FOR MEETING OF THE OBJECT OF THE IN STITUTE. THIS IS NOT THE CASE OF THE ADIT THAT ANY PART OF THIS I NCOME HAS BEEN SPENT FOR ANYTHING OTHER THAN THE OBJECT OF TH E ASSESSEE. I HAVE ALSO GONE THROUGH THE VARIOUS JUDGEMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN CITED BY THE APPELLANT. IN THE CASE OF ACIT V S. SURAT ART SILK CLOTH MRFS. ASSOCIATION (121 ITR 1)(SC) (SUPRA ), IT HAS BEEN HELD THAT IF THE PROFITS MUST NECESSARILY FEED A CHARITABLE PURPOSE UNDER THE TERMS OF THE TRUST, THE MERE FACT THAT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE TRUST YIELD PROFIT WILL NOT ALTER THE CHARITABLE CHARACTER OF THE TRUST. SIMILARLY, IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. THANTI TRUST (247 ITR 785), IT HAS BEEN HELD THAT A BUSIN ESS WHOSE INCOME IS UTILIZED BY THE TRUST OR THE INSTITUTION FOR THE PURPOSE OF ACHIEVING THE OBJECTIVES OF THE TRUST OR THE INS TITUTION IS, SURELY, A BUSINESS WHICH IS INCIDENTAL TO THE ATTAI NMENT OF THE OBJECTIVE OF THE TRUST. THIS ISSUE WAS ALSO CONSI DERED BY MY PREDECESSORS IN A.Y. 97-98, 98-99, 2001-02 AND 2003 -04 IN THE APPELLANTS CASE IN APPEAL NOS. 82/2000-01, 136/01- 02, 31/04- 05 AND 209/06-07 RESPECTIVELY AND ALSO BY ITAT, DEL HI VIDE THEIR ORDER DATED 10 TH AUGUST, 2007 FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 2001-02. IT HAS BEEN CLEARLY HELD THAT THIS ACTIVI TY IS INCIDENTAL ACTIVITY FOR THE OBJECTIVE OF THE TRUST AND THE PRO FIT HAS BEEN DEPLOYED ONLY FOR THE OBJECTIVE OF THE TRUST. THER EFORE, ON THIS ISSUE BENEFIT OF SECTION 11 & 12 CANNOT BE DENIED T O THE APPELLANT. CONSIDERING THE APPELLATE ORDERS OF THE PREVIOUS YEARS IN THIS CASE AND ALSO CONSIDERING THE SUBMISS IONS OF THE APPELLANT AND ALSO THE ORDER OF ITAT, DELHI FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 2001-02 AND ALSO THE VARIOUS CASE LAWS AS MENT IONED BY THE APPELLANT, I AGREE WITH THE APPELLANT THAT THE BENEFIT OF SECTION 11 & 12 CANNOT BE DENIED TO THE APPELLANT A S THE PROFITS OF CONSULTANCY SERVICES WHICH IS ONLY ABOUT 5% OF T HE TOTAL RECEIPTS HAS ALSO BEEN DEPLOYED FOR THE OBJECTIVE O F THE TRUST/SOCIETY. AS FAR AS THE TELEPHONE AND THE VEHICLE EXPENDITURE ARE CONCERNED SHRI DEVI SINGH WAS THE DIRECTOR OF THE I NSTITUTE. EARLIER HE WAS ONE OF THE FACULTY MEMBERS AND CONSI DERING HIS EXPERIENCE AND THE BIO-DATA HE WAS APPOINTED AS A D IRECTOR OF 4 THIS INSTITUTE. BY VIRTUE OF HIS BEING DIRECTOR HE BECAME THE MEMBER OF THE BOARD. THE AO IS OF THE VIEW THAT TH E PAYMENT OF RS.23,963/- FOR THE TELEPHONE PROVIDED AT THE RE SIDENCE OF THE DIRECTOR IS A VIOLATION OF SECTION 13 (1)(C) OF THE IT ACT. NOWHERE, IT IS BROUGHT ON RECORD THAT THE TELEPHONE IS BEING USED FOR PERSONAL USE. HE IS THE DIRECTOR OF THE I NSTITUTE AND HE IS REQUIRED TO MAKE CALLS FOR HIS OFFICIAL PURPOSES FROM HIS RESIDENCE ALSO. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE ON RECORD THA T HE HAS MISUTILIZED THIS FACILITY OR HAS TAKEN UNDUE BENEFI T OR HAS TAKEN UNDUE BENEFIT FOR HIS PERSONAL PURPOSES. SIMILARLY REGARDING THE VEHICLE AS A DIRECTOR HE IS REQUIRED TO MEET VA RIOUS PERSONS AND TO HAVE INTERFACE WITH THE INDUSTRY. IT HAS BE EN MENTIONED THAT THERE WAS ONLY ONE AIRCONDITIONED VEHICLE IN T HE WHOLE INSTITUTE WHICH WAS ALSO REQUIRED BY OTHER FACULTY MEMBERS AND SENIOR OFFICERS. THIS CAR HAS BEEN JOINTLY UTILIZE D BY OTHER SENIOR PERSONS. TOWARDS THE PERSONAL PURPOSES OF T HE DIRECTOR A RECOVERY OF RS.250/- P.M. HAS BEEN MADE. THE AO HA S NOT BROUGHT ANYTHING ON RECORD THAT THE VEHICLE HAS BEE N MISUTILIZED BY THE DIRECTOR TO HIS PERSONAL USE OR HIS PERSONAL UTILIZATION WAS MUCH MORE. HE HAS SIMPLY DISALLOWED EXPENSES O N CAR @ 50% ON AD HOC BASIS WITHOUT ANY EVIDENCE. LOOKING TO THE TOTAL EXPENDITURE INCURRED. FURTHER, I DO NOT FIND ANY M ISUSE OR MISAPPROPRIATION OF THE VEHICLE FOR PERSONAL PURPOS ES BY THE DIRECTOR AND AO ONLY BY ESTIMATE HAS DISALLOWED 50% FOR THE PERSONAL USE OF THE DIRECTOR. THEREFORE, THIS GROU ND IS ALSO NOT JUSTIFIED FOR REJECTING THE BENEFIT OF SECTION 11 & 12 TO THE APPELLANT THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF SECTION 13 OF TH E USE OF VEHICLE/TELEPHONE EXPENSES. FURTHER AO IS ALSO NOT JUSTIFIED IN DISALLOWING RS.32,595/- ON ACCOUNT OF TELEPHONE AND VEHICLE EXPENSES PROVIDED TO THE DIRECTOR FOR PERSONAL USE. I HAVE EXAMINED THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANT AN D FACTS OF THE CASE AND I FIND THAT THE PROF. DEVI SINGH HAS V ISITED USA AND CANADA FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INSTITUTE AND ON THE BASIS OF THE DOCUMENTS PLACED ON RECORDS , THE FOREIGN TOUR WAS DULY INTIMATED TO THE INSTITUTE AN D THAT IS WHY THE EXPENDITURE WAS ALSO SANCTIONED AS PER THE MDI RULES. DURING THE FOREIGN VISIT AN AGREEMENT WAS ALSO SIGN ED BY MR. DEVI SINGH ON BEHALF OF THE INSTITUTE WITH SCHOOL O F PUBLIC POLICY, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY, USA. THE DIRECTOR ALSO 5 VISITED BOSTON (USA) AND MONTREAL (CANADA) FOR MEET ING WITH CAMBRIDGE COLLEGE AND MCGILL UNIVERSITY RESPECTIVEL Y. THE ASSESSING OFFICER HAS CONSIDERED A PART OF THE TOUR AS OFFICIAL AND OTHER PART AS PERSONAL BASED ON HIS ESTIMATE WI THOUT ANY BASIS OR DOCUMENTS IN SUPPORT. THEREFORE, ON THIS ISSUE ALSO AO WAS NOT JUSTIFIED TO INVOKE THE PROVISION OF SECTIO N 13(1)(C) OF THE IT ACT. BASED UPON THE ABOVE FINDINGS THE AO WAS NOT JUSTIF IED TO INVOKE THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 13(1)(C) OF THE IN COME TAX ACT, 1961. MOREOVER, THE CONSULTANCY INCOME WAS AL SO EARNED AS INCIDENTAL TO ATTAIN THE MAIN OBJECTS OF EDUCATI ONAL ACTIVITY WELL DEFINED WITHIN SECTION 2(15) OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961. ACCORDINGLY, ALL THE CONDITIONS OF SECTION 11 AND 1 2 HAD BEEN DULY FULFILLED AND THERE IS NO INFRINGEMENT OF SECT ION 13(1)(C) ON ACCOUNT OF PROVIDING THE BENEFITS TO THE DIRECTO R ON ACCOUNT TELEPHONE, VEHICLE AND FOREIGN VISIT. THE EXEMPTIO N UNDER SECTION 11 AND 12 IS ALLOWED AND RESTORED TO THE AP PELLANT. 4. WE FIND THAT THE CIT(A) WHILE HOLDING THAT THE A SSESSEE IS ELIGIBLE FOR EXEMPTION UNDER SECTION 11 & 12 OF THE ACT HAS FOLL OWED THE ORDER OF TRIBUNAL IN ITA NO.4380(DEL) OF 2004 FOR THE ASSESS MENT YEAR 2001-02, DATED 10 TH AUGUST 2007 WHEREIN THE TRIBUNAL OBSERVED AS UNDER :- WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE RIVAL SUBMISSIONS. IN OUR VIEW, THE ORDER OF THE CIT(APPEALS) ON THIS ISSUE IS JUST AND PROPER AND CALLS FOR NO INTERFERENCE. WE HAVE ALREADY NOT ICED THAT THE OBJECTS OF THE SOCIETY WAS PRINCIPALLY TO PROVIDE T RAINING FACILITIES FOR MANAGERS OF INDUSTRY CONNECTED WITH INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AND INDUSTRIAL FINANCE. SUCH ACTIVITIE S ALSO INCLUDE IMPARTING TRAINING IN MODERN MANAGEMENT AND ALLIED TECHNIQUES. THE ACTIVITY OF PROVIDING MANAGEMENT K NOW-HOW BY CHARGING A FEE REFERRED TO AS MANAGEMENT CONSULT ANCY SERVICE BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER, IN OUR VIEW, CANN OT BE SEGREGATED FROM THE PROCESS OF TEACHING AND IMPARTI NG OF EDUCATION IN MODERN MANAGEMENT AND ALLIED TECHNIQUE S. IN ANY EVENT IT CANNOT BE SAID THAT IT WAS NOT A CHARITABL E ACTIVITY WITH 6 THE MEANING OF SECTION 2(15) OF THE ACT. THE FACT THAT IN THE PROCESS OF DONG THE AFORESAID ACTIVITY INCOME IS GE NERATED IN THE HANDS OF THE ASSESSEE WILL NOT BE A GROUND OF DENY EXEMPTION UNDER SECTION 11 AND 12 OF THE ACT. EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE ACTIVITY IN QUESTION WAS IN THE NATURE OF BUSINESS, IN VIEW OF THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 11(4A) OF THE ACT, THE ASSESS EE COULD NOT BE DENIED THE BENEFIT OF EXEMPTION UNDER SECTION 11 AND 12 OF THE ACT, IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE PROFITS HAVE BEEN UTILIZED FOR THE OBJECTS OF THE TRUST. ON THIS ISSUE, THERE IS NO DISPUTE AS CAN BE SEEN FROM THE ORDER OF ASSESSMENT. THE DECISION OF THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. THANTI TRUST (SUPRA) CLEARLY SUPPORTS THE STAND OF THE ASSESSEE IN THIS REGARD. CONSEQUENTLY, WE CONFIRM THE ORDER OF THE CIT(APPEA LS) ON THIS ISSUE. ACCORDINGLY THE LEARNED CIT(A) WAS JUSTIFIED IN HOL DING THAT THE ASSESSEE IS ELIGIBLE FOR EXEMPTION UNDER SECTION 11 AND 12 OF T HE ACT. 5. AS REGARDS GROUND NO.2 , WE FIND THAT SINCE THE EXPENSES ON TELEPHONE AT THE RESIDENCE OF THE DIRECTOR AND FOR FOREIGN TR AVEL OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ASSESSEE INSTITUTE WAS IN THE COURSE OF DEVELOPMENT S ACTIVITIES OF THE INSTITUTE, THE SAME IS TO BE CONSIDERED AS APPLICAT ION OF INCOME AND HENCE EXPENSES ARE ALLOWABLE AS SUCH. 6. AS REGARDS GROUND NO.3 WE FIND THAT THE ASSESSIN G OFFICER HAS DISALLOWED THE CAPITAL EXPENDITURE ON THE GROUND TH AT EXEMPTION UNDER SECTION 11 AND 12 WAS HELD NOT ALLOWABLE. HOWEVER, SINCE THE EXEMPTION UNDER SECTION 11 AND 12 HAS BEEN GRANTED BY THE CIT (A) WHICH HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY US, THE ASSESSEE IS ENTITLED TO TREAT THE CAPITAL EXPENDITURE AS 7 APPLICATION OF INCOME AND HENCE TO BE TAKEN INTO AC COUNT WHILE COMPUTING APPLICATION OF INCOME. THEREFORE, THIS GROUND IS T O BE DISMISSED. 7. AS REGARDS GROUND NO.4 THE LEARNED CIT(A) OBSERV ED AS UNDER:- 4.2.1 IN THE CASE OF THE ASSESSEE, THERE WAS A DE FICIT IN THE EARLIER YEARS I.E. THE EXPENSES INCURRED WERE I N EXCESS OF THE INCOME EARNED DURING THOSE YEARS. THERE IS NO DOUB T THAT THE EXPENSES WERE INCURRED ONLY FOR THE OBJECTS OF THE INSTITUTE AS PER ITS MEMORANDUM AND ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION. TH E SET OFF OF BROUGHT FORWARD DEFICIT OF EARLIER YEARS IS CONS IDERED AS APPLICATION OF FUNDS FOR CHARITABLE OR RELIGIOUS PU RPOSES. THERE ARE NO WORDS OF LIMITATION U/S 11 EXPLAINING THAT T HE INCOME SHOULD HAVE BEEN APPLIED FOR CHARITABLE OR RELIGIOU S PURPOSE ONLY IN THE YEAR IN WHICH THE INCOME HAD ARISEN. W HEN THE INCOME OF A TRUST IS USED OR PUT TO USE TO MEET THE EXPENSES INCURRED FOR SUCH PURPOSES, THE SAID APPLICATION OF THE INCOME FOR CHARITABLE OR RELIGIOUS PURPOSES TAKES PLACE IN THE YEAR IN WHICH THE INCOME IS ADJUSTED TO MEET THE EXPENSES I NCURRED FOR CHARITABLE OR RELIGIOUS PURPOSES. EVEN IF THE EXPE NSES ARE FOR CHARITABLE PURPOSES AND THE SAID EXPENSES ARE ADJUS TED AGAINST THE INCOME OF A SUBSEQUENT YEAR, THE INCOME OF THAT YEAR CAN BE SAID TO HAVE BEEN APPLIED FOR CHARITABLE AND RELIGI OUS PURPOSES AND WILL HAVE TO BE EXCLUDED FROM THE INCOME OF THE TRUST UNDER SECTION 11(1)(A) OF THE ACT. THIS ISSUE HAS BEEN D ECIDED IN FAVOUR OF THE ASSESSEE BY RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT IN T HE CASE OF CIT VS. MAHARANA OF MEWAR CHARITABLE FOUNDATION (19 87) 164 ITR 439. 4.2.2 FURTHER, AN IDENTICAL VIEW HAS BEEN EXPANDED IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. MATRISEVA TRUST 2003 128 TAXMAN 261 GUJARAT HIGH COURT WHEREIN IT HAS BEEN HELD WHEN A TRUST HAD SPENT IN EXCESS OF ITS INCOME FOR THE CURRENT YEAR RESULTING IN A DEFICIT WHICH WAS CARRIED FORWARD TO THE NEXT YEAR, THEN IN CONSIDERING THE APPLICATION OF INCOME FOR THE NEXT YEAR, THE CARRIED FORWARD DEFICIT WAS FIRST TO BE SET OFF AGA INST THE INCOME OF THE SUBSEQUENT YEAR AND THIS WILL AMOUNT TO APPL ICATION OF INCOME BY THE TRUST. 8 4.2.3. AGAIN, REFERENCE IS MADE TO ANOTHER DECISIO N WHEREIN IT HAS BEEN HELD THAT ADJUSTMENT OF EXPENSE S INCURRED BY THE TRUST IN EARLIER YEARS AGAINST THE INCOME EA RNED BY THE TRUST IN THE SUBSEQUENT YEAR WILL HAVE TO BE REGARD ED AS APPLICATION OF INCOME BY THE TRUST IN THE SUBSEQUEN T YEAR. [CIT VS. INSTITUTE OF BANKING PERSONNEL SELECTION (2003) 131 TAXMAN 386 (MUMBAI)]. 4.3 I HAVE CONSIDERED THE SUBMISSIONS MADE BY THE APPELLANT AND PURSUING THE MATTER ON RECORD. THE A DJUSTMENT OF BROUGHT FORWARD DEFICIT OF EARLIER YEAR AGAINST THE SURPLUS OF SUBSEQUENT YEAR AS CLAIMED BY THE ASSESSEE APPEARS TO BE CORRECT. THIS HAS BEEN ALLOWED BY THE VARIOUS JUDI CIAL AUTHORITIES AS AN APPLICATION OF INCOME AS WELL AS BY ITAT, DELHI IN ITS OWN CASE FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 2001- 02. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE CASES AND THE DECISION OF ITAT, DELHI IN THE CASE OF THE ASSESSEE INSTITUTE FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 2 001-02, THE ASSESSING OFFICER IS DIRECTED TO ALLOW CREDIT OF BR OUGHT FORWARD DEFICIT FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 1999-2000 AND 2002- 03 AFTER DUE VERIFICATION. 8. WE FIND THAT SINCE THE LEARNED CIT(A) HAS FOLLOW ED THE ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL IN ASSESSEES OWN CASE FOR ASSESSMENT YEAR 2001-02, WHICH IN TURN IS BASED ON THE DECISION OF HONBLE HIGH COURTS AND SINCE NO CONTRARY DECISION HAS BEEN CITED, WE UPHOLD THE ORDER OF THE LEARNED CIT(A). 9. IN THE RESULT, THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED. PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON 12 TH MARCH, 2010. SD/- SD/- (A.D. JAIN) (DEEPAK R. SHAH) JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMBER DATED: 12 TH MARCH, 2010. 9 ITA NO.170/DEL/2008 COPY OF THE ORDER FORWARDED TO:- 1. APPELLANT 2. RESPONDENT 3. CIT 4. CIT(A) 5. DR BY ORDER *MG DEPUTY REGISTRAR, ITAT.