, , IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL RAJKOT BENCH, RAJKOT BEFORE SHRI WASEEM AHMED, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND MS. MADHUMITA ROY, JUDICIAL MEMBER ./ ITA NO. 224/RJT/2018 / ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2013-14 SONU ENTERPRISE SHOP NO. 6, VISHAL COMPLEX, MOTI KHAVDI, JAMNAGAR VS THE INCOME TAX OFFICER, WARD-3(2), JAMNAGAR PAN NO. AAX FS2 737 D / (APPELLANT) / (RESPONDENT) ASSESSEE BY : WRITTEN SUBMISSION REVENUE BY : MRS. NAMITA KHURANA, SR. DR / DATE OF HEARING : 26/02/2020 /DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT : 29/06/2020 PER MADHUMITA ROY JUDICIAL MEMBER: THE ASSESSEE HAS COME UP IN APPEAL AGAINST THE ORDE R DATED 23.11.2016 PASSED BY THE CIT(A), JAMNAGAR WHEREBY A ND WHEREUNDER PENALTY TO THE TUNE OF RS. 24,770/- UNDER SECTION 2 71(1)(C) OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961(HEREINAFTER REFERRED AS TO THE ACT) ON ACCOUNT OF CONCEALMENT OF INTEREST INCOME OF RS. 80,164/- ON I NCOME TAX REFUND HAS BEEN CONFIRMED. 2. THERE IS AN APPLICATION OF CONDONATION OF DELAY OF 49 DAYS FILED BY THE ASSESSEE. A PLEA TAKEN BY THE ASSESSEE IS THIS THAT THE OFFICE OF THE ASSESSEE IS LOCATED 35 KILOMETRES AWAY FROM JAMNAGA R CITY. THE ASSESSEE COULD COLLECT THE ORDER IMPUGNED ONLY ON 05.02.2018 FROM THE OFFICE OF THE CIT(A) SINCE HE WAS BEING IN HIS SITE WORK AT MOTI KHAVDI, INDUSTRIAL BELT. ITA NO. 224/RJT/2018 AY 2013-14 - 2 - APART FROM THAT DURING THAT PERIOD THE ASSESSEE FEL L SICK AND COULD NOT CO- ORDINATE WITH THE CONSULTANT FOR PREFERRING THE APP EAL BEFORE US WHICH SEEMS TO BE GENUINE AND PRACTICAL AND HENCE DELAY I S CONDONED. 3. THE BRIEF FACT LEADING TO THE CASE ID THIS THAT THE ASSESSEE A PARTNERSHIP FIRM, FILED ITS RETURN OF INCOME FOR A. Y. 2013-14 DECLARING TOTAL INCOME OF RS. 12,59,657/-. SUCH ASSESSMENT WAS COM PLETED ON 04.03.2016. SUBSEQUENTLY ON VERIFICATION OF ITS DATA, IT WAS NO TICED THAT THE ASSESSEE RECEIVED INTEREST U/S. 244A OF THE ACT AMOUNTING TO RS. 80,164/- WHICH HAS NOT BEEN OFFERED BY THE ASSESSEE FOR TAXATION. HEN CE, THE SAID WAS ADDED TO THE TOTAL INCOME OF THE ASSESSEE AND PENALTY PROCEE DING UNDER SECTION 271(1)(C) R.W.S. 274 OF THE ACT INITIATED SEPARATEL Y FOR CONCEALMENT OF INCOME BY FURNISHING INACCURATE PARTICULARS OF INCO ME. ON 29.09.2016, THE PENALTY PROCEEDING WAS CULMINATED INTO AN ORDER IMP OSING PENALTY OF RS. 24,770/- UNDER SECTION 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT FOR CON CEALMENT OF INCOME. 4. HEARD THE PARTIES, PERUSED THE RELEVANT MATERIAL S AVAILABLE ON RECORD. 5. THE CASE OF THE ASSESSEE IS THIS THAT THE ASSESS EE DURING THE YEAR UNDER CONSIDERATION THOUGH RECEIVED THE INTEREST ON INCOME TAX REFUND OF RS. 80,164/-, BY MISTAKE THE SAME WAS NOT SHOWN AS INCOME, AND NEITHER THE SAME WAS CREDITED TO THE P&L ACCOUNT. THE CASE IS THIS THAT THERE IS NO DELIBERATE INTENTION ON THE PART OF THE ASSESSEE FO R CONCEALMENT OF SUCH INCOME ACCRUED BY HIM FOR WHICH PENALTY UNDER SECTI ON 271(1)(C) CAN BE LEVIED BY THE AUTHORITIES BELOW. IN THIS REGARD, T HE ASSESSEE RELIED UPON THE JUDGMENT PASSED BY THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT IN THE MATTER OF HINDUSTAN STEEL LTD. VS. STATE OF ORISSA REPORTED I N 83 ITR 27. ITA NO. 224/RJT/2018 AY 2013-14 - 3 - 6. THE CASE OF THE REVENUE IS THIS THAT NOT DECLARI NG THE INTEREST ON REFUND IS CONCEALMENT BY THE ASSESSEE AND HENCE PEN ALTY SHOULD RIGHTLY BE LEVIED. WE ARE FURTHER PERUSED THE ORDERS PASSED BY THE AU THORITIES BELOW FROM WHICH IT APPEARS THAT THE APPELLANT SUBMITTED A REPLY ON 11.01.2018 BEFORE THE FIRST APPELLATE AUTHORITY WHEREIN HE HAS BEEN REITERATED THE PLEA THAT BY MISTAKE THE INTEREST ON INCOME TAX REF UND OF RS. 80,164 WAS NOT SHOWN. HOWEVER, THERE IS NO DELIBERATE INTENTION ON THE PART OF THE ASSESSEE FOR SUCH ACT NEITHER THERE WAS ANY DEFAULT ON THE P ART OF THE ASSESSEE TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH STATUTORY REQUIREMENT. ACCO RDING TO US, MERELY BECAUSE THERE IS A PROVISION FOR THE IMPOSITION OF PENALTY, THE OFFICER MUST NOT EXERCISE HIS JURISDICTION AND IMPOSE PENALTY IN EVERY CASE. PENALTY, IN OUR CONSIDERED OPINION, SHOULD BE IMPOSED FOR THE F AILURE TO PERFORM A STATUTORY APPLICATION, WHICH IS OF COURSE A MATTER OF DISCRETION OF THE AUTHORITY TO BE EXERCISED STRICTLY JUDICIALLY. AS WE FIND, THAT THE OMISSION ON THE PART OF THE ASSESSEE IS A BONA FIDE MISTAKE. SUCH BONA FIDE MISTAKE CANNOT BE CALLED A REASONABLE CAUSE FOR IMPOSING PE NALTY. WE ALSO GET THE INSPIRATION FROM THE JUDGMENT PASSED BY THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT AS CITED ABOVE AS RELIED UPON BY THE ASSESSEE. PENALT Y IS NOT UNIFORM AND ITS IMPOSITION DEPENDS UPON EXERCISING OF DISCRETION BY THE TAXING AUTHORITIES AND IS IMPOSED AS PART OF THE MACHINERY FOR ASSESSM ENT OF TAX LIABILITY. THE WORD MENTIONED IN THE STATUTE MAY DIRECT THAT SUCH PERSON SHALL PAY BY WAY OF PENALTY UNDER SECTION 271 DEFINITELY LEAVE CERTAIN AMOUNT OF DISCRETION IN IMPOSING PENALTY WHICH NEED TO BE IMP OSED WHEN THERE IS A MINOR BREACH OF LAW AND WHEN HAVING REGARD TO THE F ACTS, END OF JUSTICE REQUIRES THAT THE ASSESSEE SHOULD NOT BE PENALIZED. SIMILARLY, THE WORD WITHOUT REASONABLE CAUSE ARE ALSO INDICATIVE OF S OME KIND OF DISCRETION IN ITA NO. 224/RJT/2018 AY 2013-14 - 4 - THE AUTHORITY IMPOSING THE PENALTY TO FIND OUT WHET HER THERE WAS A REASONABLE CAUSE OR NOT. IF SUCH AUTHORITY IS SATI SFIED THAT THERE WAS A REASONABLE CAUSE, IT MAY IMPOSE ANY PENALTY BUT INA DVERTENT MISTAKE CANNOT CALL FOR PENALTY IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY MATER IAL TO SHOW THERE IS GROSS NEGLIGENCY OR WANT OF BONA FIDES ON THE PART OF THE ASSESSEE. IN THE INSTANT CASE, WE FIND NO SUCH GROSS NEGLIGENCY ON THE PART OF THE ASSESSEE AND THUS IN OUR CONSIDERED OPINION THE PENALTY SHOULD BE JUS TIFIED FOR AN INADVERTENT MISTAKE COMMITTED BY THE ASSESSEE. HENCE, PENALTY ORDER IS FOUND TO BE DEVOID OF ANY MERIT AND HEREBY QUASHED. 7. IN THE RESULT, APPEAL FILED BY THE ASSESSEE IS A LLOWED. 8. BEFORE PARTING WE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE CERTAIN OBS ERVATION RELATING TO THE ISSUE CROPPED UP UNDER PRESENT SCENARIO OF COVI D-19 PANDEMIC AS TO WHETHER WHEN THE HEARING OF THE MATTER WAS CONCLUDE D ON 26.02.2020 THE ORDER CAN BE PRONOUNCED TODAY I.E. ON 29.06.2020. THE ISSUE HAS ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED BY THE CO-ORDINATE BENCH IN THE CASE OF DCIT VS. JSW LTD. (ITA NOS. 6264 & 6103/MUM/2018) PRONOUNCED ON 14.05 .2020 IN THE LIGHT OF WHICH IT IS WELL WITHIN THE TIME LIMIT PERMITTED UNDER RULE 34(5) OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL RULES, 1963 IN VIEW OF THE FOLLO WING OBSERVATIONS MADE THEREIN: 7. HOWEVER, BEFORE WE PART WITH THE MATTER, WE MUS T DEAL WITH ONE PROCEDURAL ISSUE AS WELL. WHILE HEARING OF THESE A PPEALS WAS CONCLUDED ON 8TH JANUARY 2020, THIS ORDER THEREON IS BEING PRONO UNCED TODAY ON THE DAY OF 14TH MAY, 2020, MUCH AFTER THE EXPIRY OF 90 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF CONCLUSION OF HEARING. WE ARE ALSO ALIVE TO THE FAC T THAT RULE 34(5) OF THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL RULES 1963, WHICH DEA LS WITH PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS, PROVIDES AS FOLLOWS: ITA NO. 224/RJT/2018 AY 2013-14 - 5 - (5) THE PRONOUNCEMENT MAY BE IN ANY OF THE FOLLOWIN G MANNERS : (A) THE BENCH MAY PRONOUNCE THE ORDER IM MEDIATELY UPON THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING. (B) IN CASE WHERE THE ORDER IS NOT PRONO UNCED IMMEDIATELY ON THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING, THE BENCH SHALL GIVE A DATE FOR PRONOUNCEM ENT. (C) IN A CASE WHERE NO DATE OF PRONOUNCE MENT IS GIVEN BY THE BENCH, EVERY ENDEAVOUR SHALL BE MADE BY THE BENCH TO PRONOUNCE THE ORDER W ITHIN 60 DAYS FROM THE DATE ON WHICH THE HEARING OF THE CASE WAS CONCLUDED BUT, WHERE IT IS NOT PRACTICABLE SO TO DO ON THE GROUND OF EXCEPTIONAL AND EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, THE BENCH SHALL FIX A FUTURE DAY FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE ORDER, AND SUCH DATE SHALL NOT ORDINARILY (EMPHASIS SUPPLIED BY US NOW) BE A DAY BEYOND A FURTHER PERIOD OF 30 DAYS AN D DUE NOTICE OF THE DAY SO FIXED SHALL BE GIVEN ON THE NOTICE BOARD. 8. QUITE CLEARLY, ORDINARILY THE ORDER ON AN APPE AL SHOULD BE PRONOUNCED BY THE BENCH WITHIN NO MORE THAN 90 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF CONCLUDING THE HEARING. IT IS, HOWEVER, IMPORTANT T O NOTE THAT THE EXPRESSION ORDINARILY HAS BEEN USED IN THE SAID R ULE ITSELF. THIS RULE WAS INSERTED AS A RESULT OF DIRECTIONS OF HONBLE JURIS DICTIONAL HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF SHIVSAGAR VEG RESTAURANT VS ACIT [(2009) 3 17 ITR 433 (BOM)] WHEREIN THEIR LORDSHIPS HAD, INTER ALIA, DIRECTED T HAT WE, THEREFORE, DIRECT THE PRESIDENT OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL TO FRAME AN D LAY DOWN THE GUIDELINES IN THE SIMILAR LINES AS ARE LAID DOWN BY THE APEX COURT IN THE CASE OF ANIL RAI (SUPRA) AND TO ISSUE APPROPRIATE A DMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIONS TO ALL THE BENCHES OF THE TRIBUNAL IN THAT BEHALF. WE HOPE AND TRUST THAT SUITABLE GUIDELINES SHALL BE FRAMED AND ISSUED BY T HE PRESIDENT OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL WITHIN SHORTEST REASONABLE TIME AND FOLLOWED STRICTLY BY ALL THE BENCHES OF THE TRIBUNAL. IN THE MEANWHILE(E MPHASIS, BY UNDERLINING, SUPPLIED BY US NOW), ALL THE REVISIONA L AND APPELLATE AUTHORITIES UNDER THE INCOME-TAX ACT ARE DIRECTED T O DECIDE MATTERS HEARD BY THEM WITHIN A PERIOD OF THREE MONTHS FROM THE DA TE CASE IS CLOSED FOR JUDGMENT. IN THE RULED SO FRAMED, AS A RESULT OF THESE DIRECTIONS, THE EXPRESSION ORDINARILY HAS BEEN INSERTED IN THE RE QUIREMENT TO PRONOUNCE ITA NO. 224/RJT/2018 AY 2013-14 - 6 - THE ORDER WITHIN A PERIOD OF 90 DAYS. THE QUESTION THEN ARISES WHETHER THE PASSING OF THIS ORDER, BEYOND NINETY DAYS, WAS NECE SSITATED BY ANY EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES. 9. LET US IN THIS LIGHT REVERT TO THE PREVAILING SI TUATION IN THE COUNTRY. ON 24TH MARCH, 2020, HONBLE PRIME MINISTER OF INDI A TOOK THE BOLD STEP OF IMPOSING A NATIONWIDE LOCKDOWN, FOR 21 DAYS, TO PRE VENT SPREAD OF COVID 19 EPIDEMIC, AND THIS LOCKDOWN WAS EXTENDED FROM TI ME TO TIME. AS A MATTER OF FACT, EVEN BEFORE THIS FORMAL NATIONWIDE LOCKDOWN, THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AT MUMBAI WAS SEVERELY RESTRICTED ON ACCOUNT OF LOCKDOWN BY THE MAHARASHTR A GOVERNMENT, AND ON ACCOUNT OF STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF HEALTH ADVISORIES WITH A VIEW OF CHECKING SPREAD OF COVID 19. THE EPIDEMIC SITUATION IN MUMBA I BEING GRAVE, THERE WAS NOT MUCH OF A RELAXATION IN SUBSEQUENT LOCKDOWN S ALSO. IN ANY CASE, THERE WAS UNPRECEDENTED DISRUPTION OF JUDICIAL WOK ALL OVER THE COUNTRY. AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT HAS BEEN SUCH AN UNPRECEDEN TED SITUATION, CAUSING DISRUPTION IN THE FUNCTIONING OF JUDICIAL MACHINERY , THAT HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, IN AN UNPRECEDENTED ORDER IN THE HI STORY OF INDIA AND VIDE ORDER DATED 6.5.2020 READ WITH ORDER DATED 23.3.202 0, EXTENDED THE LIMITATION TO EXCLUDE NOT ONLY THIS LOCKDOWN PERIOD BUT ALSO A FEW MORE DAYS PRIOR TO, AND AFTER, THE LOCKDOWN BY OBSERVING THAT IN CASE THE LIMITATION HAS EXPIRED AFTER 15.03.2020 THEN THE PE RIOD FROM 15.03.2020 TILL THE DATE ON WHICH THE LOCKDOWN IS LIFTED IN THE JUR ISDICTIONAL AREA WHERE THE DISPUTE LIES OR WHERE THE CAUSE OF ACTION ARISES SH ALL BE EXTENDED FOR A PERIOD OF 15DAYS AFTER THE LIFTING OF LOCKDOWN. HO NBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT, IN AN ORDER DATED 15TH APRIL 2020, HAS, BESI DES EXTENDING THE VALIDITY OF ALL INTERIM ORDERS, HAS ALSO OBSERVED T HAT, IT IS ALSO CLARIFIED THAT WHILE CALCULATING TIME FOR DISPOSAL OF MATTERS MADE TIME-BOUND BY THIS ITA NO. 224/RJT/2018 AY 2013-14 - 7 - COURT, THE PERIOD FOR WHICH THE ORDER DATED 26TH MA RCH 2020 CONTINUES TO OPERATE SHALL BE ADDED AND TIME SHALL STAND EXTENDE D ACCORDINGLY, AND ALSO OBSERVED THAT ARRANGEMENT CONTINUED BY AN ORD ER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 TILL 30TH APRIL 2020 SHALL CONTINUE FURTHER TI LL 15TH JUNE 2020. IT HAS BEEN AN UNPRECEDENTED SITUATION NOT ONLY IN INDIA B UT ALL OVER THE WORLD. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA HAS, VIDE NOTIFICATION DATED 19 TH FEBRUARY 2020, TAKEN THE STAND THAT, THE CORONA VIRUS SHOULD BE CONSIDE RED A CASE OF NATURAL CALAMITY AND FMC (I.E. FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSE) MAY BE INVOKED, WHEREVER CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE, FOLLOWING THE DUE PROCEDURE . THE TERM FORCE MAJEURE HAS BEEN DEFINED IN BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY , AS AN EVENT OR EFFECT THAT CAN BE NEITHER ANTICIPATED NOR CONTROLLED WHE N SUCH IS THE POSITION, AND IT IS OFFICIALLY SO NOTIFIED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE COVID-19 EPIDEMIC HAS BEEN NOTIFIED AS A DISASTER UNDER THE NATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT ACT, 2005, AND ALSO IN THE LIGHT OF THE DISCUSSIONS ABOVE, THE PERIOD DURING WHICH LOCKDOWN WAS IN FORCE CAN BE AN YTHING BUT AN ORDINARY PERIOD. 10. IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE DISCUSSIONS, WE ARE OF THE CONSIDERED VIEW THAT RATHER THAN TAKING A PEDANTIC VIEW OF THE RULE REQUIRING PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS WITHIN 90 DAYS, DISREGARDIN G THE IMPORTANT FACT THAT THE ENTIRE COUNTRY WAS IN LOCKDOWN, WE SHOULD COMPUTE THE PERIOD OF 90 DAYS BY EXCLUDING AT LEAST THE PERIOD DURING WHI CH THE LOCKDOWN WAS IN FORCE. WE MUST FACTOR GROUND REALITIES IN MIND WHIL E INTERPRETING THE TIME LIMIT FOR THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE ORDER. LAW IS NO T BROODING OMNIPOTENCE IN THE SKY. IT IS A PRAGMATIC TOOL OF T HE SOCIAL ORDER. THE TENETS OF LAW BEING ENACTED ON THE BASIS OF PRAGMATISM, AN D THAT IS HOW THE LAW IS REQUIRED TO INTERPRETED. THE INTERPRETATION SO ASSI GNED BY US IS NOT ONLY IN CONSONANCE WITH THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF RULE 34(5) BUT IS ALSO A PRAGMATIC ITA NO. 224/RJT/2018 AY 2013-14 - 8 - APPROACH AT A TIME WHEN A DISASTER, NOTIFIED UNDER THE DISASTER MANAGEMENT ACT 2005, IS CAUSING UNPRECEDENTED DISRU PTION IN THE FUNCTIONING OF OUR JUSTICE DELIVERY SYSTEM. UNDOUB TEDLY, IN THE CASE OF OTTERS CLUB VS DIT [(2017) 392 ITR 244 (BOM)], H ONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT DID NOT APPROVE AN ORDER BEING PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL BEYOND A PERIOD OF 90 DAYS, BUT THEN IN THE PRESENT SITUATIO N HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT ITSELF HAS, VIDE JUDGMENT DATED 15TH APRIL 20 20, HELD THAT DIRECTED WHILE CALCULATING THE TIME FOR DISPOSAL OF MATTERS MADE TIME- BOUND BY THIS COURT, THE PERIOD FOR WHICH THE ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 CONTINUES TO OPERATE SHALL BE ADDED AND TIME SHALL STAND EXTENDED ACCORDINGLY. THE EXTRAORDINARY STEPS TAKEN SUO MOT U BY HONBLE JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT AND HONBLE SUPREME COURT ALSO INDICATE THAT THIS PERIOD OF LOCKDOWN CANNOT BE TREATED AS AN ORD INARY PERIOD DURING WHICH THE NORMAL TIME LIMITS ARE TO REMAIN IN FORCE . IN OUR CONSIDERED VIEW, EVEN WITHOUT THE WORDS ORDINARILY, IN THE L IGHT OF THE ABOVE ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL POSITION, THE PERIOD DURING W HICH LOCKOUT WAS IN FORCE IS TO EXCLUDED FOR THE PURPOSE OF TIME LIMITS SET O UT IN RULE 34(5) OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL RULES, 1963. VIEWED THUS, THE EX CEPTION, TO 90-DAY TIME- LIMIT FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS, INHERENT IN RULE 34(5)(C), WITH RESPECT TO THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS WITHIN NINETY DAYS, CLE ARLY COMES INTO PLAY IN THE PRESENT CASE. OF COURSE, THERE IS NO, AND THERE CANNOT BE ANY, BAR ON THE DISCRETION OF THE BENCHES TO REFIX THE MATTERS FOR CLARIFICATIONS BECAUSE OF CONSIDERABLE TIME LAG BETWEEN THE POINT OF TIME WHE N THE HEARING IS CONCLUDED AND THE POINT OF TIME WHEN THE ORDER THER EON IS BEING FINALIZED, BUT THEN, IN OUR CONSIDERED VIEW, NO SUCH EXERCISE WAS REQUIRED TO BE CARRIED OUT ON THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. ITA NO. 224/RJT/2018 AY 2013-14 - 9 - 9. ON THE BASIS OF THE OBSERVATION MADE IN THE AFOR ESAID JUDGMENT WE EXCLUDE THE PERIOD OF LOCKDOWN WHILE COMPUTING THE LIMITATION PROVIDED UNDER RULE 34(5) OF THE INCOME TAX (APPELLATE TRIBU NAL) RULE 1963. ORDER IS, THUS, PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT. 10. IN THE RESULT, APPEAL FILED BY THE ASSESSEE IS ALLOWED. ORDER PRONOUNCED IN THE COURT ON 29 TH JUNE, 2020 AT RAJKOT. SD/- SD/- (WASEEM AHMED) ACCOUNTANT MEMBER (MADHUMITA ROY) JUDICIAL MEMBER RAJKOT; DATED, 29/06/2020 TANMAY DATTA, SR.PS TRUE COPY ! '! / COPY OF THE ORDER FORWARDED TO : 1. / THE APPELLANT 2. !' / THE RESPONDENT. 3. #$# % / CONCERNED CIT 4. % ( ) / THE CIT(A) 5. () * !++ , , / DR, ITAT, RAJKOT 6. * ,- . / GUARD FILE. # / BY ORDER, $/ % & (DY./ASSTT.REGISTRAR) ' (, / ITAT, RAJKOT 1. DATE OF DICTATION- 28/02/2020 2. DATE ON WHICH THE TYPED DRAFT IS PLACED BEFORE THE DICTATING MEMBER 28/02/2020 OTHER MEMBER 3. DATE ON WHICH THE APPROVED DRAFT COMES TO THE SR.P. S./P.S.- 29/06/2020 4. DATE ON WHICH THE FAIR ORDER IS PLACED BEFORE THE D ICTATING MEMBER FOR PRONOUNCEMENT /06/2020 5. DATE ON WHICH THE FILE GOES TO THE BENCH CLERK 29/06/2020 6. DATE ON WHICH THE FILE GOES TO THE HEAD CLERK . 7. THE DATE ON WHICH THE FILE GOES TO THE ASSISTANT RE GISTRAR FOR SIGNATURE ON THE ORDER.. 8. DATE OF DESPATCH OF THE ORDER