IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL PUNE BENCH B , PUNE BEFORE: SHRI R.S. PADVEKAR, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SHRI R.K. PANDA, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER ITA NO. 2450 /PN/20 1 2 ASSESSMENT YEAR : 200 9 - 10 SHRI KULDEEP DEEPAK PAWAR, 184, VY ANKATPURA PETH, SATARA VS. INCOME TAX OFFICER, WARD - 2, SATARA (APPELLANT) (RESPONDENT) PAN NO. ALPPPP9906N APPELLANT BY: SHRI S.N. DOSHI RESPONDENT BY: SHRI S.P. WALIMBE DATE OF HEARING : 0 4 - 02 - 2014 DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT : 21 - 0 2 - 2014 ORDER P ER R.S. PADVEKAR , JM : - THIS APPEAL IS FILED BY THE ASSESSEE CHALLENGING THE IMPUGNED ORDER OF THE LD. CIT(A) - III, PUNE DATED 23 - 11 - 2012 FOR THE A.Y. 200 9 - 10. THE ASSESSEE HAS TAKEN THE FOLLOWING GROUND IN THE APPEAL: ON THE FACTS AND IN THE CIRCUMS TANCES OF THE CASE THE L D. CIT(A) HAS ERRED IN NOT RESPECTFULLY FOLLOWING THE DECISION OF THE SPECIAL BENCH OF VISHAKHAPATNAM TRIBUNAL IN THE CASE OF M/S. MERILYN SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT 136 ITD 23 AND HE HAS FURTHER ERRED IN RELYING ON OTHER DECISIONS IN CLUDING THE DECISION OF KERALA HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF RAJA & CO. 335 ITR 381, THE FACTS OF ALL THESE DECISIONS ARE DISTINGUISHABLE. 2. THE BRIEFLY STATED FACTS ARE AS UNDER. THE ASSESSEE IS ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS OF CIVIL CONSTRUCTION, UNDER HIS P ROPRIETARY CONCERN NAMELY, QUALITY CONSTRUCTION. ON VERIFICATION OF THE TDS DETAILS CALLED FOR DURING THE ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS, IT WAS OBSERVED BY THE ASSESSING 2 ITA NO. 2450/PN/2012, SHRI KULDEEP DEEPAK PAWAR, SATARA OFFICER THAT THE ASSESSEE HAD DEDUCTED TAX AT SOURCE AMOUNTING TO RS.69,894/ - FROM VARIOUS P AYMENTS/EXPENSES MADE BY HIM AGGREGATING TO RS.33,92,830/ - DURING THE PERIOD RELEVANT TO THE ASSESSMENT YEAR UNDER CONSIDERATION. HOWEVER, THE TAX SO DEDUCTED WAS FOUND TO BE DEPOSITED INTO GOVT. A/C . ONLY ON 03 - 02 - 2010. ACCORDING TO THE ASSESSING OFFICER, THE ASSESSEE OUGHT TO HAVE DEPOSITED SUCH TAX DEDUCTED ON OR BEFORE THE DATE OF FILING OF RETURN FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR UNDER CONSIDERATION TO BE ABLE TO CLAIM FOR DEDUCTION OF THE RELEVANT EXPENDITURE/PAYMENT, IN THE LIGHT OF THE PROVISIONS OF SEC.40(A) (IA) OF THE I.T. ACT. NO TING THAT THE DUE DATE FOR FILING OF THE RETURN OF INCOME FOR A.Y. 2009 - 10 UNDER CONSIDERATION AS PRESCRIBED IN SEC. 139(1) WAS 30 - 09 - 2009 WHILE THE TAX DEDUCTED BY THE ASSESSEE WAS DEPOSITED ONLY ON 03 - 02 - 2010 , THE ASSESSING OFFICE R HELD THAT THE CORRESPONDING EXPENSES CLAIMED BY THE ASSESSEE AS BUSINESS EXPENDITURE COULD NOT BE ALLOWED AS DEDUCTION. ACCORDINGLY, THE DEDUCTION CLAIMED FOR RS.33,92,830/ - WAS DISALLOWED BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER FO R CONTRAVENTION OF THE PROVISIONS OF S EC.40(A)(IA) OF THE I.T. ACT, WHILE COMPU TING THE TOTAL INCOME OF THE ASSESSEE. 3. THE ASSESSEE CARRIED THE ISSUE BEFORE THE LD. CIT(A) AND LD. CIT(A) DISMISSED THE APPEAL FILED BY THE ASSESSEE. NOW , THE ASSESSEE IS IN APPEAL BEFORE US. 4. WE HAVE HEARD THE PARTIES. WE FIND THAT THE DECISION OF THE HON'BLE SPECIAL BENCH OF ITAT, VISHAKHAPATNAM IN THE CASE OF MERILYN SHIPPING AND TRANSPORTS 136 ITD 23 (SB) (VISAKHA) HAS BEEN CONSIDERED BY THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT OF KOLKATA IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. CRESCENT EXPORT SYNDICATE (2013) 33 TAXMANN.COM 250 (KOLKATA) . THE DECISION IN THE CASE OF CRESCENT EXPORT SYNDICATE (SUPRA) HAS BEEN CONSIDERED AND FOLLOWED BY THE ITAT, PUNE IN THE CASE OF ACIT, CIRCEL - 2, KOLHAPUR VS. SHRI BHARAT DHANPAL PATIL BEING ITA NO. 600/ PN/2012 AND CO NO. 3 ITA NO. 2450/PN/2012, SHRI KULDEEP DEEPAK PAWAR, SATARA 18/PN/2013 ORDER DATED 30 - 07 - 2013. THE OPERATIVE PART OF THE DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL IS AS UNDER: 3. THE PAYMENTS OF THE BILLS MADE BY THE ASSESSEE AND TDS DEPOSITED ARE AS UNDER: SL. NO. DATE OF BILL NAME OF CONTRACTOR AMOUNT TDS AMO UNT PAYMENT OF TDS CONTRACTORS 1 26/02/2007 NARAYAN RATHOD 102041/ - 2041/ - 30/05/2007 2 09/01/2007 MOTIRAM CHAVAN 102041/ - 2041/ - 30/05/2007 3 17/10/2006 MALTI DESHPANDE 153443/ - 3443/ - 30/05/2007 4 02/12/2006 JAI GANESH MATAL SUPPLY 153443/ - 3443/ - 3 0/05/2007 5 15/06/2006 VIJAY MUSALE 255739/ - 5739/ - 30/05/2007 6 06/09/2006 MUSALE 153443/ - 3443/ - 30/05/2007 7 21/07/2006 ADITYA LOGISTIC PVT. LTD. 613773/ - 13773/ - 30/05/2007 8 29/11/2006 - DO - 386428/ - 8671/ - 30/05/2007 SUB - CONTRACTORS 1 25/01/2007 D.N. NARVEKAR 2022695/ - 22695/ - 30/05/2007 TOTAL 39,43,046/ - 65,290/ - 3.1. ADMITTEDLY, ALL THE PAYMENTS ARE MADE ON ONE DATE I.E. 30 - 05 - 2007 THAT IS ALMOST AFTER TWO MONTHS FROM THE END OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR I.E. 31 - 03 - 2007, THE DATE OF THE BILLS AR E PRIOR TO MARCH 2007. NOW THE ISSUE STANDS COVERED AGAINST THE ASSESSEE BY THE FOLLOWING TWO DECISIONS (I) CIT VS. SIKANDARKHAN N TUNVAR (2013) 33 TAXMANN.COM 133 (GUJARAT) AND (II) CIT, KOLKATA VS. CRESCENT EXPORT SYNDICATE (2013) 33 TAXMANN.COM 250 (KO LKATA). IN THE CASE OF CRESCENT EXPORT SYNDICATE (SUPRA) THE DECISION OF THE HON'BLE SPECIAL BENCH OF THE ITAT IN THE CASE OF MERILYN SHIPPING AND TRANSPORTS 136 ITD 23 (SB) (VISAKHA) HAS COME FOR THE JUDICIAL SCRUTINY IN WHICH IT WAS HELD THAT THE DISALL OWANCE U/S. 40(A)(IA) APPLIES ONLY TO AMOUNTS PAYABLE AS ON 31 ST MARCH OF THE PREVIOUS YEAR ON WHICH THE TDS HAS NOT BEEN DEDUCTED AND NO DISALLOWANCE TO BE MADE IN RESPECT OF SUMS PAID DURING THE PREVIOUS YEAR WITHOUT DEDUCTING TDS. THE HON'BLE HIGH COUR T REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE 4 ITA NO. 2450/PN/2012, SHRI KULDEEP DEEPAK PAWAR, SATARA SPECIAL BENCH IN THE CASE OF MERILYN SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT (SUPRA). THE OPERATIVE PART OF THE JUDGMENT IS AS UNDER: IN VIEW OF ABOVE DISCUSSION, WE ANSWER THE QUESTION AS UNDER: - THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 40(A)(IA) OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961, ARE APPLICABLE NOT ONLY TO THE AMOUNT WHICH IS SHOWN AS PAYABLE ON THE DATE OF BALANCE - SHEET, BUT IT IS APPLICABLE TO SUCH EXPENDITURE, WHICH BECOME PAYABLE AT ANY TIME DURING THE RELEVANT PREVIOUS YEAR AND WAS ACTUALLY PAID WITHIN TH E PREVIOUS YEAR. IN THE RESULT THE QUESTION IS DECIDED IN FAVOUR OF REVENUE AND AGAINST THE ASSESSEE.' BEFORE DEALING WITH THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL APPEARING FOR THE ASSESSEES IN BOTH THE APPEALS WE HAVE TO EXAMINE THE CORRECTNESS OF THE MAJO RITY VIEWS IN THE CASE OF MERILYN SHIPPING. WE ALREADY HAVE QUOTED EXTENSIVELY BOTH THE MAJORITY AND THE MINORITY VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THE AFORESAID CASE. THE MAIN THRUST OF THE MAJORITY VIEW IS BASED ON THE FACT 'THAT THE LEGISLATURE HAS REPLACED THE EXPRES SION 'AMOUNTS CREDITED OR PAID' WITH THE EXPRESSION 'PAYABLE' IN THE FINAL ENACTMENT. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PRE - AMENDMENT AND POST AMENDMENT LAW IS PERMISSIBLE FOR THE PURPOSE OF ASCERTAINING THE MISCHIEF SOUGHT TO BE REMEDIED OR THE OBJECT SOUGHT TO BE A CHIEVED BY AN AMENDMENT. THIS IS PRECISELY WHAT WAS DONE BY THE APEX COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. KELVINATOR REPORTED IN 2010(2) SCC 723. BUT THE SAME COMPARISON BETWEEN THE DRAFT AND THE ENACTED LAW IS NOT PERMISSIBLE. NOR CAN THE DRAFT OR THE BILL BE USE D FOR THE PURPOSE OF REGULATING THE MEANING AND PURPORT OF THE ENACTED LAW. IT IS THE FINALLY ENACTED LAW WHICH IS THE WILL OF THE LEGISLATURE. THE LEARNED TRIBUNAL FELL INTO AN ERROR IN NOT REALIZING THIS ASPECT OF THE MATTER. THE LEARNED TRIBUNAL HELD 'T HAT WHERE LANGUAGE IS CLEAR THE INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE IS TO BE GATHERED FROM THE LANGUAGE USED'. HAVING HELD SO, IT WAS NOT OPEN TO SEEK TO INTERPRET THE SECTION ON THE BASIS OF ANY COMPARISON BETWEEN THE DRAFT AND 5 ITA NO. 2450/PN/2012, SHRI KULDEEP DEEPAK PAWAR, SATARA THE SECTION ACTUALLY ENACTED NOR W AS IT OPEN TO SPECULATE AS TO THE EFFECT OF THE SO - CALLED REPRESENTATIONS MADE BY THE PROFESSIONAL BODIES. THE LEARNED TRIBUNAL HELD THAT 'SECTION 40(A)(IA) OF THE ACT CREATES A LEGAL FICTION BY VIRTUE OF WHICH EVEN THE GENUINE AND ADMISSIBLE EXPENSES CLAI MED BY AN ASSESSEE UNDER THE HEAD 'INCOME FROM BUSINESS AND PROFESSION' IF THE ASSESSEE DOES NOT DEDUCT TDS ON SUCH EXPENSES ARE DISALLOWED'. HAVING HELD SO WAS IT OPEN TO THE TRIBUNAL TO SEEK TO JUSTIFY THAT 'THIS FICTION CANNOT BE EXTENDED ANY FURTHER AN D, THEREFORE, CANNOT BE INVOKED BY ASSESSING OFFICER TO DISALLOW THE GENUINE AND REASONABLE EXPENDITURE ON THE AMOUNTS OF EXPENDITURE ALREADY PAID'? DOES THIS NOT AMOUNT TO DELIBERATELY READING SOMETHING IN THE LAW WHICH IS NOT THERE? WE, AS SUCH, HAVE NO DOUBT IN OUR MIND THAT THE LEARNED TRIBUNAL REALIZED THE MEANING AND PURPORT OF SECTION 40(A)(IA) CORRECTLY WHEN IT HELD THAT IN CASE OF OMISSION TO DEDUCT TAX EVEN THE GENUINE AND ADMISSIBLE EXPENSES ARE TO BE DISALLOWED. BUT THEY SOUGHT TO REMOVE THE RIG OUR OF THE LAW BY HOLDING THAT THE DISALLOWANCE SHALL BE RESTRICTED TO THE MONEY WHICH IS YET TO BE PAID. WHAT THE TRIBUNAL BY MAJORITY DID WAS TO SUPPLY THE CASUS OMISSUS WHICH WAS NOT PERMISSIBLE AND COULD ONLY HAVE BEEN DONE BY THE SUPREME COURT IN AN A PPROPRIATE CASE. REFERENCE IN THIS REGARD MAY BE MADE TO THE JUDGMENT IN THE CASE OF BHUWALKA STEEL INDUSTRIES VS. BOMBAY IRON & STEEL LABOUR BOARD REPORTED IN 2010 (2) SCC 273. 'UNPROTECTED WORKER' WAS FINALLY DEFINED IN SECTION 2 (II) OF THE MATHADI ACT AS FOLLOWS: - UNPROTECTED WORKER' MEANS A MANUAL WORKER WHO IS ENGAGED OR TO BE ENGAGED IN ANY SCHEDULED EMPLOYMENT.' THE CONTENTION RAISED WITH REFERENCE TO WHAT WAS THERE IN THE BILL WAS REJECTED BY THE SUPREME COURT BY HOLDING AS FOLLOWS: - 'IT MUST, AT THIS JUNCTURE, BE NOTED THAT IN SPITE OF SECTION 2(11), WHICH INCLUDED THE WORDS 'BUT FOR THE 6 ITA NO. 2450/PN/2012, SHRI KULDEEP DEEPAK PAWAR, SATARA PROVISIONS OF THIS ACT IS NOT ADEQUATELY PROTECTED BY LEGISLATION FOR WELFARE AND BENEFITS OF THE LABOUR FORCE IN THE STATE', THESE PRECISE WORDS WERE REMOVED BY THE LEGISLATURE AND THE DEFINITION WAS MADE LIMITED AS IT HAS BEEN FINALLY LEGISLATED UPON. IT IS TO BE NOTED THAT WHEN THE BILL CAME TO BE PASSED AND RECEIVED THE ASSENT OF THE VICE - PRESIDENT ON 05 - 06 - 1969 AND WAS FIRST PUBLISHED IN THE MAHARASHTRA GOVE RNMENT GAZETTE EXTRAORDINARY, PART IV ON 13 - 06 - 1969, THE AFOREMENTIONED WORDS WERE OMITTED. THEREFORE, THIS WOULD BE A CLEAR POINTER TO THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT THAT THE LEGISLATURE BEING CONSCIOUS OF THE FACT AND BEING ARMED WITH ALL THE COMMITTEE REPORTS A ND ALSO BEING ARMED WITH THE FACTUAL DATA, DELIBERATELY AVOIDED THOSE WORDS. WHAT THE APPELLANTS ARE ASKING WAS TO READ IN THAT DEFINITION, THESE PRECISE WORDS, WHICH WERE CONSCIOUSLY AND DELIBERATELY OMITTED FROM THE DEFINITION. THAT WOULD AMOUNT TO SUPPL YING THE CASUS OMISSUS AND WE DO NOT THINK THAT IT IS POSSIBLE, PARTICULARLY, IN THIS CASE. THE LAW OF SUPPLYING THE CASUS OMISSUS BY THE COURTS IS EXTREMELY CLEAR AND SETTLED THAT THOUGH THIS COURT MAY SUPPLY THE CASUS OMISSUS, IT WOULD BE IN THE RAREST O F THE RARE CASE AND THUS SUPPLYING OF THIS CASUS OMISSUS WOULD BE EXTREMELY NECESSARY DUE TO THE INADVERTENT OMISSION ON THE PART OF THE LEGISLATURE. BUT, THAT IS CERTAINLY NOT THE CASE HERE'. WE SHALL NOW ENDEAVOUR TO SHOW THAT NO OTHER INTERPRETATION IS POSSIBLE. THE KEY WORDS USED IN SECTION 40(A)(IA), ACCORDING TO US, ARE 'ON WHICH TAX IS DEDUCTIBLE AT SOURCE UNDER CHAPTER XVII - B'. IF THE QUESTION IS 'WHICH EXPENSES ARE SOUGHT TO BE DISALLOWED?' THE ANSWER IS BOUND TO BE 'THOSE EXPENSES ON WHICH TAX IS DEDUCTIBLE AT SOURCE UNDER CHAPTER XVII - B. ONCE THIS IS REALIZED NOTHING TURNS ON THE BASIS OF THE FACT THAT THE LEGISLATURE USED THE WORD 'PAYABLE' AND NOT 'PAID OR CREDITED'. UNLESS ANY AMOUNT IS PAYABLE, IT CAN NEITHER BE PAID NOR CREDITED. IF AN AMOU NT HAS NEITHER BEEN PAID NOR CREDITED, THERE CAN BE NO OCCASION FOR CLAIMING ANY DEDUCTION. 7 ITA NO. 2450/PN/2012, SHRI KULDEEP DEEPAK PAWAR, SATARA THE LANGUAGE USED IN THE DRAFT WAS UNCLEAR AND SUSCEPTIBLE TO GIVING MORE THAN ONE MEANING. BY LOOKING AT THE DRAFT IT COULD BE SAID THAT THE LEGISLATURE WANTED TO TREAT THE PAYMENTS MADE OR CREDITED IN FAVOUR OF A CONTRACTOR OR SUB - CONTRACTOR DIFFERENTLY THAN THE PAYMENTS ON ACCOUNT OF INTEREST, COMMISSION OR BROKERAGE, FEES FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES OR FEES FOR TECHNICAL SERVICES BECAUSE THE WORDS 'AMOUNTS CREDITED OR PAID' WERE USED ONLY IN RELATION TO A CONTRACTOR OR SUB - CONTRACTOR. THIS DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT WAS NOT INTENDED. THEREFORE, THE LEGISLATURE PROVIDED THAT THE AMOUNTS, ON WHICH TAX IS DEDUCTIBLE AT SOURCE UNDER CHAPTER XVII - B PAYABLE ON ACCOUNT OF INTE REST, COMMISSION OR BROKERAGE, RENT, ROYALTY, FEES FOR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES OR FEES FOR TECHNICAL SERVICES OR TO A CONTRACTOR OR SUB - CONTRACTOR SHALL NOT BE DEDUCTED IN COMPUTING THE INCOME OF AN ASSESSEE IN CASE HE HAS NOT DEDUCED, OR AFTER DEDUCTION HAS NOT PAID WITHIN THE SPECIFIED TIME. THE LANGUAGE USED BY THE LEGISLATURE IN THE FINALLY ENACTED LAW IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS WHEREAS THE LANGUAGE USED IN THE BILL WAS AMBIGUOUS. A FEW WORDS ARE NOW NECESSARY TO DEAL WITH THE SUBMISSION OF MR. BAGCHI AND M S. ROYCHOWDHURI. THERE CAN BE NO DENIAL THAT THE PROVISION IN QUESTION IS HARSH. BUT THAT IS NO GROUND TO READ THE SAME IN A MANNER WHICH WAS NOT INTENDED BY THE LEGISLATURE. THIS IS OUR ANSWER TO THE SUBMISSION OF MR. BAGCHI. THE SUBMISSION OF MS. ROYCHOW DHURI THAT THE SECOND PROVISO SOUGHT TO BECOME EFFECTIVE FROM 1ST APRIL, 2013 SHOULD BE HELD TO HAVE ALREADY BECOME OPERATIVE PRIOR TO THE APPOINTED DATE CANNOT ALSO BE ACCEDED TO FOR THE SAME REASON INDICATED ABOVE. THE LAW WAS DELIBERATELY MADE HARSH TO SECURE COMPLIANCE OF THE PROVISIONS REQUIRING DEDUCTIONS OF TAX AT SOURCE. IT IS NOT THE CASE OF AN INADVERTENT ERROR. FOR THE REASONS DISCUSSED ABOVE, WE ARE OF THE OPINION THAT THE MAJORITY VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THE CASE OF MERILYN SHIPPING & TRANSPORTS ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE. THE SUBMISSIONS ADVANCED BY LEARNED ADVOCATES HAVE ALREADY BEEN DEALT WITH AND REJECTED. THE APPEAL IS, THUS, ALLOWED IN FAVOUR OF THE REVENUE. 8 ITA NO. 2450/PN/2012, SHRI KULDEEP DEEPAK PAWAR, SATARA 4. WE, THEREFORE, REVERSE OF ORDER OF THE LD. CIT(A) AND RESTORE THE ORDER OF THE ASSESSING OF FICER AND ALLOW THE GROUNDS TAKEN BY THE REVENUE. IN THE RESULT, THE REVENUES APPEAL IS ALLOWED. 5. THE LD. COUNSEL RELIED ON THE DECISION OF THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT OF ALLAHABAD IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. VECTOR SHIPPING SERVICES (P) LTD. 357 ITR 642 AND AR GUES THAT IF THERE ARE TWO VIEWS THEN THE FAVOURABLE TO THE ASSESSEE IS TO BE APPLIED. IN OUR HUMBLE OPINION , THE ARGUMENT OF THE ASSESSEE CANNOT BE ACCEPTED AS ITAT, PUNE BENCH HAS ACCEPTED AND APPLIED THE PRINCIPLES LAID DOWN BY THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT O F KOLKATA IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. CRESCENT EXPORT SYNDICATE (SUPRA) AS WELL AS IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. CIT VS. SIKANDERKHAN N. TUNWAR 357 ITR 312 (GUJ). WE, THEREFORE, FOLLOWING THE DECISION IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. CRESCENT EXPORT SYNDICATE (SUPRA) AS WELL A S CIT VS. CIT VS. SIKANDERKHAN N. TUNWAR (SUPRA) DISMISS THE GROUND TAKEN BY THE ASSESSEE. 6. IN THE RESULT, THE ASSESSEES APPEAL IS DISMISSED. PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON 21 - 0 2 - 201 4 SD/ - SD/ - ( R.K. PANDA ) ( R.S. PADVEKAR ) ACCOUNTANT MEMBER JUDICIAL MEMBER RK /PS PUNE , DATED : 21 ST FEBRUARY, 2014 COPY TO 1 ASSESSEE 2 DEPARTMENT 3 THE CIT(A) - III, PUNE 4 THE CIT - III, PUNE 5 THE DR, ITAT, B BENCH, PUNE . 6 GUARD FILE. //TRUE COPY// BY ORDER PRIVATE SECRETARY INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL PUNE