, , IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AMRITSAR BENCH AMRITSAR BEFORE SHRI L.P. SAHU, AM & SHRI RAVISH SOOD, JM . .. . / ITA NO.285/ASR/2016 ( / ASSESSMENT YEAR :2011-2012) SH. RAJAN BHARDWAJ, 182-C, BASANT AVENUE, AMRITSAR VS. PR. CIT-II, AMRITSAR ./ PANNO. : AEBPB 0629 K ( / APPELLANT ) .. ( / RESPONDENT ) ! ' '' ' /ASSESSEE BY : SHRI ASHWANI KALIA, CA ' '' ' /REVENUE BY : SHRI M.P.SINGH, CIT-DR ' ' / DATE OF HEARING : 06/02/2020 ' ' / DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT : 30/06/2020 / O R D E R PER L.P.SAHU, AM : THE ASSESSEE HAS FILED THIS APPEAL AGAINST THE ORDER OF PR.CIT-II, AMRITSAR, DATED 31.03.2016 PASSED U/S.263 OF THE ACT FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 2011-2012 ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS O F APPEAL :- 1. THAT ORDER U/S.263 PASSED BY THE LD. PR. COMMIS SIONER OF INCOME TAX-II, AMRITSAR IS BEYOND JURISDICTION AND HENCE P ERVERSE IN LAW AND VOID ABINITIO. 2. THAT THE LD. PR. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX-II, AMRITSAR HAS ERRED IN RECORDING HIS FINDING THAT OFFICE NOTE RECORDED BY ITO WARD 5(3), AMRITSAR WHILE FRAMING THE ASSESSMENT IS INCO RRECT. 3. THAT THE LD. PR. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX-2, A MRITSAR HAS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ORDER U/S.143(3) DATED 7.3.2014 IS ERRONEOUS AND PREJUDICE TO THE INTEREST OF THE REVENUE. 4. THAT THE ORDER IS BAD IN LAW AND ON FACTS. 5. THAT THE APPELLANT CRAVES LEAVE TO ADD OR AMEND THE GROUND OF APPEAL BEFORE THE APPEAL IS HEARD AND DISPOSED OFF. 2. THE ASSESSEE HAS ALSO FILED REVISED GROUNDS OF APPE AL VIDE APPLICATION DATED 01.05.2017, WHICH READS AS UNDER :- ITA NO.285/ASR/2016 2 1 THAT THE PROCEEDINGS INVOKED U/S 263 BY I D. PR. CIT-II, AMRITSAR ARE BEYOND JURISDICTION AND HENCE THE ORDER PASSED IS PERVERSE IN LAW AND VOID ABINITIO. 2 THAT THE ORDER U/S 263 BY THE ID. PR. CIT -II, AMRITSAR WAS PASSED UNDER PRESSURE OF THE AUDIT WING AND WITHOUT INDEPE NDENT APPLICATION OF MIND WHICH IS EVIDENT FROM THE LETTE R OF THE ITO HQ CIT (AUDIT) AND THE PETITION OF ASSESSING OFFICE R TO THE PR.CIT- II FOR PASSING ORDER U/S 263 WHEREAS HE HAD STOUTLY DEFENDED THE ASSESSMENT ORDER PASSED BY HIS PREDECESSOR BEFORE C IT (AUDIT). HENCE THE ORDER U/S 263 IS NOT SUSTAINABLE IN LAW. 3 THAT THE ID. PR. CIT-II, AMRITSAR HAS ERR ED IN LAW AND ON FACTS IN PASSING ORDER U/S 263 SINCE THE SAME IS WITHOUT APP RECIATING THE FACT THAT THE ORDER OF THE AO IS NEITHER ERRONEOUS NOR PREJUDICIAL TO THE INTEREST OF THE REVENUE SINCE THE ASSESSMENT ORDER WAS PASSED BY THE AO ONLY AFTER MAKING DETAILED INDEPTH ENQUIRIES AS IS EVIDENT FROM DETAILED QUERIES RAISED DURING THE ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS AND OFFICE NOTE APPENDED TO THE ASSESSM ENT ORDER. 4 THAT THE ID. PR. CIT-II, AMRITSAR HAS ERR ED IN LAW AND ON FACTS IN HOLDING THAT THE OFFICE NOTE APPENDED TO THE ASSESS MENT ORDER BY THE AO, GIVING DETAILED REASONS FOR ACCEPTING TH E CONTENTION OF THE APPELLANT, IS INCORRECT. 5 THAT THE ORDER IS BAD IN LAW AND ON FACT S. 6 THAT THE APPELLANT CRAVES LEAVE TO ADD OR AMEND THE GROUND OF APPEAL BEFORE THE APPEAL IS HEARD AND DISPOSED OFF. 3. BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE ARE THAT THE ASSESSEE IS AN INDIVIDUAL AND DERIVES INCOME FROM SALARY, WORKING REMUNERATION AND INTEREST ON CAPITAL FROM PARTNERSHIP FIRM. THE ASSESSEE FILED HI S RETURN ON 15.12.2011 DECLARING HIS TOTAL INCOME OF RS.7,61,950 /-, WHICH WAS PROCESSED U/S.143(1) OF THE ACT AND SELECTED FOR SCRU TINY UNDER CASS. THEREAFTER THE AO FRAMED THE ASSESSMENT AND ASSESSED THE TOTAL INCOME OF THE ASSESSEE AT RS.7,61,950/- CREATING AN ADDITIONAL DEMAND OF RS.NIL. 4. SUBSEQUENTLY, THE PR. CIT-II, AMRITSAR, INVOKING POWERS U/S.263 OF THE ACT HAS QUASHED THE ORDER PASSED BY THE AO U/S .143(3) OF THE ACT ITA NO.285/ASR/2016 3 HOLDING THE SAME IS ERRONEOUS AND PREJUDICIAL TO THE INTEREST OF REVENUE. 5. AGAINST THE ABOVE ORDER OF PR.CIT, THE ASSESSEE I S IN APPEAL BEFORE THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL. 6. LD.AR BEFORE US SUBMITTED THAT THE AO HAS RIGHTLY OBSERVED THAT THERE IS NO DEMAND AGAINST THE ASSESSEE AS THE ASSES SED INCOME AND RETURNED INCOME ARE SAME. THEREFORE, THE PR.CIT HAS ERRED IN QUASHING THE ASSESSMENT ORDER AND DIRECTED THE AO TO DO FRESH AS SESSMENT HOLDING THE SAME AS ERRONEOUS AND PREJUDICIAL TO THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE. ACCORDINGLY, LD. AR SUBMITTED THAT THE ORDER PASSED B Y THE PR.CIT DESERVES TO BE DISMISSED. 7. ON THE OTHER HAND, LD. DR RELIED ON THE ORDER OF P R. CIT. HE FURTHER SUBMITTED THAT THE AO HAD NOT DONE ANY ENQUIR Y IN THIS REGARD, THEREFORE, THE ORDER OF THE AO IS ERRONEOUS AND PREJU DICIAL TO THE INTEREST OF THE REVENUE. 8. AFTER CONSIDERING THE SUBMISSIONS OF BOTH THE PAR TIES AND PERUSING THE ENTIRE MATERIAL AVAILABLE ON RECORD, WE ARE OF THE VIEW THAT THE PR.CIT HAS RIGHTLY DIRECTED THE AO TO FRAME THE ASSESSMENT AFRESH AS HE FOUND THAT THE OFFICE NOTE RECORDED BY T HE THEN ITO WARD- 5(3), AMRITSAR IS FACTUALLY INCORRECT. THE PR. CIT ALSO FOUND THAT THE AMOUNT OF RS.29,69,855/- BELONGED STATEDLY TO THE HUF WAS DEPOSITED NOT IN THE ACCOUNT OF THE HUF BUT INTO THE ACCOUNT OF THE INDIVIDUAL. ITA NO.285/ASR/2016 4 DURING THE COURSE OF HEARING THE LD. AR WAS ALSO UNA BLE TO SUBSTANTIATE THAT THIS ISSUE WAS EXAMINED BY THE AO AND THERE IS A NY CONCLUSIVE FINDINGS BY THE AO AS PER LAW. FROM THE ORDER OF PR . CIT, IT IS CLEAR THAT THIS ISSUE WAS NOT EXAMINED BY THE AO. IT WAS EXPECT ED FROM THE AO THAT HE HAS ASSESSED THE TAXABLE INCOME AS PER LAW. FIRSTLY, THE ASSESSING OFFICER IS INVESTIGATING OFFICER THEREAFT ER HE IS AN ADJUDICATING OFFICER. IF THE AO FAILED TO CARRY OUT ADEQUATE ENQUI RY ABOUT THE ALLEGED TRANSACTIONS IN THE NAME OF THE ASSESSEE, WHICH ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE, THEREFORE, THE PR. CIT HAS RIGHTLY INVOKED THE PROVI SIONS OF SECTION 263 OF THE I.T.ACT TO REOPEN THE COMPLETED ASSESSMENT. 9. FURTHER IN THE REVISED GROUNDS OF APPEAL THE ASSES SEE HAS CHALLENGED ONLY ONE ISSUE FOR INVOKING THE REVISONAR Y PROCEEDINGS BY THE PR. CIT U/S.263 OF THE I.T.ACT WITHOUT APPLICAT ION OF MIND BY THE PR. CIT. IT IS CLEAR FROM THE ORDER OF THE PR. CIT AT P AGE 2 THAT THE PR. CIT BEFORE INVOKING THE REVISIONARY POWER U/S.263 OF TH E ACT HAS ASKED FOR THE REPORT OF THE AO AND RECEIPT OF THE REPORT FROM THE AO THE SAME HAS BEEN CONFRONTED TO THE COUNSEL OF THE ASSESSEE. THE OBSERVATIONS OF THE PR. CIT AT PAGE 2 (FIRST PARA) READ AS UNDER :- THIS OFFICE ASKED FOR THE REPORT OF THE AO AND THE RANGE HEAD ON ONE HAND AND FIXED THE CASE FOR HEARING OF THE ASSESSEE ON THE OTHER HAND AS PER ORDER SHEET ENTERIES. SH ASHWANI KALIA, C.A AND COUNSEL OF THE ASSESSEE ATTENDED THE PROCEEDING FROM TIME TO TIME. THE REPORT OF THE A.O RECEIVED THROUGH THE JOINT COMMISSIONER OF INCO ME TAX, RANGE -5, AMRITSAR WAS CONFRONTED TO THE COUNSEL OF THE ASSES SEE AND ALSO VISA VERSA. ITA NO.285/ASR/2016 5 FROM THE ABOVE, IT IS CLEAR THAT THE LD. PR. CIT HAS ENQUIRED BEFORE INVOKING THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 263 OF THE I.T.A CT. ACCORDINGLY, THE REVISED GROUNDS OF APPEAL RAISED BY THE ASSESSEE HAVE NO MERIT AND THE SAME ARE DISMISSED. WE, THEREFORE, OF THE OPINION THA T THE PR. CIT HAS TAKEN A RIGHT VIEW IN QUASHING THE ASSESSMENT FRAME D BY THE AO AND DIRECTING THE AO TO MAKE FRESH ASSESSMENT. ACCORDINGL Y, WE UPHOLD THE FINDINGS RECORDED BY THE PR. CIT AND DISMISS THE APPE AL OF THE ASSESSEE. 10. NOW, A PROCEDURAL ISSUE COMES BEFORE US THAT TH OUGH THE HEARING OF THE CAPTIONED APPEAL WAS CONCLUDED ON 06.02.2020, HOWEVER, THIS ORDER IS BEING PRONOUNCED MUCH AFTER THE EXPIRY OF 9 0 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF CONCLUSION OF HEARING. WE FIND THAT RULE 34( 5) OF THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL RULES, 1962, WHICH ENVISAGES THE PROCEDURE FOR PRONOUNCEMENT ORDERS, PROVIDES AS FOLLOWS: 34(5) THE PRONOUNCEMENT MAY BE IN ANY OF THE FOLLOW ING MANNERS: - (A) THE BENCH MAY PRONOUNCE THE ORDER IMMEDIATELY U PON THE CONCLUSION OF HEARING. (B) IN CASE WHERE THE ORDER IS NOT PRONOUNCED IMME DIATELY ON THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING, THE BENCH SHALL GIVE A D ATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT. (C) IN A CASE WHERE NO DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT IS GIV EN BY THE BENCH, EVERY ENDEAVOUR SHALL BE MADE BY THE BENCH TO PRONO UNCE THE ORDER WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM THE DATE ON WHICH THE HEARING O F THE CASE WAS CONCLUDED BUT, WHERE IT IS NOT PRACTICABLE SO TO DO ON THE GROUND OF EXCEPTIONAL AND EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, THE BENCH SHALL FIX A FUTURE DAY FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE ORD ER, AND SUCH DATE SHALL NOT ORDINARILY BE A DAY BEYOND A FURTHER PERI OD OF 30 DAYS AND DUE NOTICE OF THE DAY SO FIXED SHALL BE GIVEN ON TH E NOTICE BOARD. AS SUCH, ORDINARILY, THE ORDER ON AN APPEAL SHOULD BE PRONOUNCED BY THE BENCH WITHIN NO MORE THAN 90 DAYS FROM THE DATE O F CONCLUDING THE HEARING. IT IS, HOWEVER, IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THE EXPRESSION ITA NO.285/ASR/2016 6 ORDINARILY HAS BEEN USED IN THE SAID RULE ITSELF. THIS RULE WAS INSERTED AS A RESULT OF DIRECTIONS OF HONBLE HIGH COURT IN T HE CASE OF SHIVSAGAR VEG RESTAURANT VS ACIT (2009) 319 ITR 433 (BOM), WH EREIN, IT WAS, INTER ALIA , OBSERVED AS UNDER: WE, THEREFORE, DIRECT THE PRESIDENT OF THE APPELLA TE TRIBUNAL TO FRAME AND LAY DOWN THE GUIDELINES IN THE SIMILAR LINES AS ARE LAID DOWN BY THE APEX COURT IN THE CASE OF ANIL RAI (SUPRA) AND TO I SSUE APPROPRIATE ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTIONS TO ALL THE BENCHES OF THE TRIBUNAL IN THAT BEHALF. WE HOPE AND TRUST THAT SUITABLE GUIDELINES SHALL BE FRAMED AND ISSUED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL W ITHIN SHORTEST REASONABLE TIME AND FOLLOWED STRICTLY BY ALL THE BE NCHES OF THE TRIBUNAL. IN THE MEANWHILE (EMPHASIS, BY UNDERLINING, SUPPLIE D BY US NOW),ALL THE REVISIONAL AND APPELLATE AUTHORITIES UNDER THE INCO ME-TAX ACT ARE DIRECTED TO DECIDE MATTERS HEARD BY THEM WITHIN A P ERIOD OF THREE MONTHS FROM THE DATE CASE IS CLOSED FOR JUDGMENT. IN THE RULES SO FRAMED, AS A RESULT OF THESE DIRECTI ONS, THE EXPRESSION ORDINARILY HAS BEEN INSERTED IN THE REQUIREMENT T O PRONOUNCE THE ORDER WITHIN A PERIOD OF 90DAYS. THE QUESTION THEN AR ISES WHETHER THE PASSING OF THIS ORDER, BEYOND NINETY DAYS, WAS NECESS ITATED BY ANY EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES. 11. WE ALSO FIND THAT THE AFORESAID ISSUE HAS BEEN A NSWERED BY A COORDINATE BENCH OF THE TRIBUNAL VIZ; ITAT, MUMBAI F BENCH IN DCIT, CENTRAL CIRCLE-3(2), MUMBAI VS JSW LIMITED & ORS (I TA NO.6264/MUM/18 DATED 14.5.2020, WHEREIN, IT WAS OBSE RVED AS UNDER: 9. LET US IN THIS LIGHT REVERT TO THE PREVAILING SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY. ON 24TH MARCH,2020, HONBLE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA TOOK THE BOLD STEP OF IMPOSING A NATIONWIDE LOCKDOWN, FOR 21 DAYS, TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF COVID 19 EPIDEMIC, AND THIS LOCKDOWN WAS EXTENDE D FROM TIME TO TIME. AS A MATTER OF FACT, EVEN BEFORE THIS FORMAL NATIONWIDE LOCKDOWN, THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNA L AT MUMBAI WAS SEVERELY RESTRICTED ON ACCOUNT OF LOCKDOWN BY THE M AHARASHTRA GOVERNMENT, AND ON ACCOUNT OF STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF HEALTH ADVISORIES ITA NO.285/ASR/2016 7 WITH A VIEW OF CHECKING SPREAD OF COVID 19. THE EPI DEMIC SITUATION IN MUMBAI BEING GRAVE, THERE WAS NOT MUCH OF A RELAXAT ION IN SUBSEQUENT LOCKDOWNS ALSO. IN ANY CASE, THERE WAS UNPRECEDENTE D DISRUPTION OF JUDICIAL WOK ALL OVER THE COUNTRY. AS A MATTER OF F ACT, IT HAS BEEN SUCH AN UNPRECEDENTED SITUATION, CAUSING DISRUPTION IN THE FUNCTIONING OF JUDICIAL MACHINERY, THAT HONBLE SUPREME COURT OF I NDIA, IN AN UNPRECEDENTED ORDER IN THE HISTORY OF INDIA AND VID E ORDER DATED 6.5.2020 READ WITH ORDER DATED 23.3.2020, EXTENDED THE LIMITATION TO EXCLUDE NOT ONLY THIS LOCKDOWN PERIOD BUT ALSO AFEW MORE DAYS PRIOR TO, AND AFTER, THE LOCKDOWN BY OBSERVING THAT IN CASE THE LIMITATION HAS EXPIRED AFTER 15.03.2020 THEN THE PERIOD FROM 15.03 .2020 TILL THE DATE ON WHICH THE LOCKDOWN IS LIFTED IN THE JURISDICTION AL AREA WHERE THE DISPUTE LIES OR WHERE THE CAUSE OF ACTION ARISES SH ALL BE EXTENDED FOR A PERIOD OF 15 DAYS AFTER THE LIFTING OF LOCKDOWN. H ONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT, IN AN ORDER DATED 15TH APRIL 2020, HAS, BESI DES EXTENDING THE VALIDITY OF ALL INTERIM ORDERS, HAS ALSO OBSERVED T HAT, IT IS ALSO CLARIFIED THAT WHILE CALCULATING TIME FOR DISPOSAL OF MATTERS MADE TIME-BOUND BY THIS COURT, THE PERIOD FOR WHICH THE ORDER DATED 26 TH MARCH 2020 CONTINUES TO OPERATE SHALL BE ADDED AND TIME SHALL STAND EXTENDED ACCORDINGLY, AND ALSO OBSERVED THAT ARRANGEMENT C ONTINUED BY AN ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 TILL 30TH APRIL 2020 SH ALL CONTINUE FURTHER TILL 15TH JUNE2020. IT HAS BEEN AN UNPRECEDENTED S ITUATION NOT ONLY IN INDIA BUT ALL OVER THE WORLD. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA H AS, VIDE NOTIFICATION DATED 19TH FEBRUARY 2020, TAKEN THE STAND THAT, THE CORONAVIRUS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A CASE OF NATURAL CALAMITY AN D FMC (I.E. FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSE) MAYBE INVOKED, WHEREVER CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE, FOLLOWING THE DUE PROCEDURE.... THE TERM FORCE MA JEURE HAS BEEN DEFINED IN BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, AS AN EVENT OR EFFECT THAT CAN BE NEITHER ANTICIPATED NOR CONTROLLED WHEN SUCH IS TH E POSITION, AND IT IS OFFICIALLY SO NOTIFIED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA A ND THE COVID-19 EPIDEMIC HAS BEEN NOTIFIED AS A DISASTER UNDER THE NATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT ACT, 2005, AND ALSO IN THE LIGHT OF THE DISCUSSIONS ABOVE, THE PERIOD DURING WHICH LOCKDOWN WAS IN FORCE CAN B E ANYTHING BUT AN ORDINARY PERIOD. 10. IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE DISCUSSIONS, WE ARE O F THE CONSIDERED VIEW THAT RATHER THAN TAKING A PEDANTIC VIEW OF THE RULE REQUIRING PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS WITHIN 90 DAYS, DISREGARDIN G THE IMPORTANT FACT THAT THE ENTIRE COUNTRY WAS IN LOCKDOWN, WE SH OULD COMPUTE THE PERIOD OF 90 DAYS BY EXCLUDING AT LEAST THE PERIOD DURING WHICH THE LOCKDOWN WAS IN FORCE. WE MUST FACTOR GROUND REALIT IES IN MIND WHILE INTERPRETING THE TIME LIMIT FOR THE PRONOUNCEMENT O F THE ORDER. LAW IS NOT BROODING OMNIPOTENCE IN THE SKY. IT IS A PRAGMA TIC TOOL OF THE SOCIAL ORDER. THE TENETS OF LAW BEING ENACTED ON THE BASIS OF PRAGMATISM, AND THAT IS HOW THE LAW IS REQUIRED TO INTERPRETED. THE INTERPRETATION SO ASSIGNED BY US IS NOT ONLY INCONSONANCE WITH THE LE TTER AND SPIRIT OF RULE 34(5) BUT IS ALSO A PRAGMATIC APPROACH AT A TIME WH EN A DISASTER, NOTIFIED UNDER THE DISASTER MANAGEMENT ACT 2005, IS CAUSING UNPRECEDENTED DISRUPTION IN THE FUNCTIONING OF OUR JUSTICE DELIVERY SYSTEM. UNDOUBTEDLY, IN THE CASE OF OTTERS CLUB VS DIT [(2017) 392 ITR 244 (BOM)], HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT DID NOT APPRO VE AN ORDER BEING ITA NO.285/ASR/2016 8 PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL BEYOND A PERIOD OF 90 DAYS, BUT THEN IN THE PRESENT SITUATION HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT ITSELF HAS, VIDE JUDGMENT DATED 15TH APRIL2020, HELD THAT DIRECTED WHILE CAL CULATING THE TIME FOR DISPOSAL OF MATTERS MADE TIME-BOUND BY THIS COURT, THE PERIOD FOR WHICH THE ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 CONTINUES TO OPERAT E SHALL BE ADDED AND TIME SHALL STAND EXTENDED ACCORDINGLY. THE EXT RAORDINARY STEPS TAKEN SUO MOTU BY HONBLE JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT AND HONBLE SUPREME COURT ALSO INDICATE THAT THIS PERIOD OF LOC KDOWN CANNOT BE TREATED AS AN ORDINARY PERIOD DURING WHICH THE NORM AL TIME LIMITS ARE TO REMAIN IN FORCE. IN OUR CONSIDERED VIEW, EVEN WI THOUT THE WORDS ORDINARILY, IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL POSITION, THE PERIOD DURING WHICH LOCKOUT WAS IN FORCE IS TO EXCL UDED FOR THE PURPOSE OF TIME LIMITS SET OUT IN RULE 34(5) OF THE APPELLA TE TRIBUNAL RULES, 1963. VIEWED THUS, THE EXCEPTION, TO 90-DAY TIME-LIMIT FO R PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS, INHERENT IN RULE 34(5)(C), WITH RESPECT TO THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS WITHIN NINETY DAYS, CLEARLY COMES INTO PLAY IN THE PRESENT CASE. 12. RESPECTFULLY FOLLOWING THE ABOVE JUDICIAL DECISI ON OF HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT AND THE TRIBUNAL, WE ARE OF THE CO NSIDERED VIEW THAT THE PERIOD DURING WHICH THE LOCKDOWN WAS IN FORC E SHALL STAND EXCLUDED FOR THE PURPOSE OF WORKING OUT THE TIME LIMI T FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS, AS ENVISAGED IN RULE 34(5) O F THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL RULES, 1963. 13. IN THE RESULT, APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE IS DISMISS ED. ORDER PRONOUNCED IN PURSUANCE WITH RULE 34(4) OF I TAT RULES, 1963 BY PUTTING THE COPY OF THE SAME ON NOTICE BOAR D ON 30/06 /2020 AT AMRITSAR. SD/ - (RAVISH SOOD) SD/ - (L.P.SAHU) / JUDICIAL MEMBER / ACCOUNTANT MEMBER / AMRITSAR; , DATED 30/06/2020 PRAKASH KUMAR MISHRA, SR.P.S. ITA NO.285/ASR/2016 9 ' '' ' - - - - .- .- .- .- / COPY OF THE ORDER FORWARDED TO : / BY ORDER, ( SENIOR PRIVATE SECRETARY ) ITAT AMRITSAR BENCH, AMRITSAR 1. / THE APPELLANT- SH. RAJAN BHARDWAJ, 182-C, BASANT AVENUE, AMRITSAR 2. / THE RESPONDENT- PR. CIT-II, AMRITSAR 3. / ( ) / THE CIT(A), 4. / / CIT 5. - , , /DR, ITAT, AMRITSAR 6. / GUARD FILE. - //TRUE COPY//