IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL RAJKOT BENCH, RAJKOT (BEFORE SHRI WASEEM AHMED, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER & SHRI MADHUMITA ROY, JUDICIAL MEMBER) ITA. NO: 291/RJT/2018 (ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2014-15) SHRI PRANAVKUMAR RAJNIKANTBHAI KANKHARA SHRI RAM 57 DIGVIJAY PLOT, JAMNAGAR V/S INCOME TAX OFFICER, WARD- 1(1), JAMNAGAR (APPELLANT) (RESPONDENT) PAN: ANWPK8505B APPELLANT BY : SHRI KALPESH DOSHI, AR RESPONDENT BY : SMT. NAMITA KHURANA, DR. ( )/ ORDER DATE OF HEARING : 26 -02-202 0 DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT : 01-06-2020 PER BENCH, 1. THIS APPEAL FILED BY THE ASSESSEE IS DIRECTED AGAIN ST THE ORDER OF THE LD. CIT(A), JAMNAGAR DATED 04.06.2018 PERTAINING TO A.Y. 2014-1 5. ITA NOS. 291 /RJT/2018 . A.Y. 2014-1 5 2 2. THE ASSESSEE HAS RAISED THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS OF AP PEAL: 1. THAT, THE LEARNED CIT(A) HAS WRONGLY CONFIRM ED PENALTY U/S 271(1)(C) OF I.T. ACT, 1961 OF RS. 63,460- ON ACCOUNT OF CONCEALMENT OF IN COME. 2. THAT, THE LEARNED CIT(A) HAS WRONGLY CONFIRM ED PENALTY U/S 271(1)(C) OF I.T. ACT, 1961 WHERE THERE IS NO CLEAR FINDING IN THE NOTICE U/S 274 OF THE I.T. ACT AND THE NOTICE IS HAVING GLARING DEFECTS AND THEREFORE THE ORDER PASS ED BY THE AO IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND AGAINST THE PRINCIPLES OF AW. 3. THAT, THE LEARNED CIT(A) HAS FAILED TO APPRE CIATE THE FACTS AND EVIDENCES SUBMITTED BY THE ASSESSEE AND WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE SAME HA S IMPOSED THE PENALTY U/S 271(1)(C) OF THE I.T. ACT. 4. THAT, THE FINDINGS OF THE CIT (A) ARE NOT JU STIFIED AND ARE BAD-IN-LAW. THE APPELLANT CRAVES TO ADD, ALTER, AMEND OR DELETE ANY OF THE ABOVE GROUNDS OF APPEAL. 3. THE ONLY EFFECTIVE ISSUE RAISED BY THE ASSESSEE IS THAT THE LEARNED CIT (A) ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE PENALTY IMPOSED BY THE AO UNDER S ECTION 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT FOR RS. 63,460/- ONLY. 4. THE FACTS IN BRIEF ARE THAT THE ASSESSEE IN THE PRE SENT CASE IS AN INDIVIDUAL AND DRAWING HIS INCOME UNDER THE HEAD SALARY AND OTHER SOURCES. THE ASSESSEE IN THE YEAR UNDER CONSIDERATION HAS MADE DEPOSITS IN C ASH AMOUNTING TO RS. 51,85,699/- WHICH WAS NOT DISCLOSED IN THE INCOME T AX RETURN. ON QUESTION BY THE AO ASSESSEE SUBMITTED THAT THE IMPUGNED DEPOSIT S REPRESENTS THE BUSINESS RECEIPTS. AS PER THE ASSESSEE, HE WAS ENGAGED IN TH E BUSINESS ACTIVITY OF TRADING FOR ALL TYPES OF BRAS PART ITEM, STOVE PARTS, HARDW ARE ITEMS. THE ASSESSEE ALSO CLAIMED THAT HE HAS NOT MAINTAINED ANY BOOKS OF ACC OUNTS FOR SUCH BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS. ACCORDINGLY HE OFFERED THE INCOME OF RS. 4,14,856/- BEING 8% OF RS. 51,85,699/- UNDER SECTION 44 AD OF THE ACT. ACC ORDINGLY THE ASSESSMENT WAS FRAMED UNDER SECTION 143(3) OF THE ACT, AFTER MAKIN G THE ADDITION OF RS. 4,14,856/- TO THE TOTAL INCOME OF THE ASSESSEE VIDE ORDER DATED 28THSEPTEMBER 2016. THE AO IN THE ASSESSMENT ORDER INITIATED THE PENALTY PROCEEDINGS UNDER ITA NOS. 291 /RJT/2018 . A.Y. 2014-1 5 3 SECTION 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT, BY ISSUING A SHOW CAU SE NOTICE UNDER SECTION 274 OF THE ACT. 5. THE ASSESSEE IN RESPONSE TO SUCH NOTICE SUBMITTED T HAT THE INCOME WAS OFFERED TO TAX TO BUY THE PEACE OF MIND. SIMILARLY, THE ASS ESSEE ADMITTED THE INCOME AND PAID THE TAX DATED 27 JULY 2016 BEFORE THE RECEIPT OF THE ASSESSMENT ORDER DATED 30 SEPTEMBER 2016. ACCORDINGLY THE ASSESSEE CLAIMED THAT HE HAS NOT FURNISHED ANY INACCURATE PARTICULARS OF INCOME OR CONCEALED T HE PARTICULAR OF INCOME DELIBERATELY. HOWEVER THE AO DISREGARDED THE CONTEN TION OF THE ASSESSEE BY OBSERVING THAT THE ASSESSEE HAS CONCEALED THE PARTI CULARS OF INCOME. ACCORDINGLY HE LEVIED THE PENALTY OF RS. 63,455/- BEING 100% OF THE AMOUNT OF TAX SOUGHT TO BE EVADED. 6. AGGRIEVED ASSESSEE PREFERRED AN APPEAL TO THE LEARN ED CIT (A) WHO CONFIRMED THE ORDER OF THE AO BY OBSERVING AS UNDER: THE APPELLANT DURING THE COURSE OF ASSESSMENT PROC EEDINGS STATED BEFORE THE AO THAT SOURCE OF CASH DEPOSITS WAS OUT OF BUSINESS ACTIVI TIES CARRIED OUT DURING THE YEAR UNDER ASSESSMENT. HOWEVER, SUCH BUSINESS ACTIVITIES WAS N OT DISCLOSED BY THE APPELLANT IN THE RETURN OF INCOME. THE APPELLANT WAS ALSO NOT MAINTAINING THE BOOKS OF ACCOUNT. THUS THE ADDITIONAL INCOME OF RS, 4,14,856 /- AS DISCLOSED BY THE APPELLANT U/S. 44AD WAS ASSESSED BY THE AO AS INCOME FROM BUSINESS AND PROFESSION. THE APPELLANT HAD FILED THE RETURN OF INCOME IN FORM ITR-1. THIS FORM IS APPLICABLE TO THE INDIVIDUAL HAVING INCOME FROM SALARY AND INTEREST. THOUGH THE APPELLANT WAS HAVING BUSINESS INCOME, BUT HE HAD USED WRONG TYPE OF FORM FOR FILI NG RETURN OF INCOME. THIS FACT SHOWS THAT THE BUSINESS ACTIVITIES OF THE APPELLANT WERE NOT SHOWN IN THE RETURN OF INCOME BY WAY OF FILING CORRECT FORM. THIS IS MORE PARTICULAR LY IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE BUSINESS TURNOVER OF THE APPELLANT WAS 51,85,699/-. THE APPE LLANT WAS WELL AWARE OF HIS BUSINESS ACTIVITIES AND ALSO ABOUT THE PROFIT EARNED OUT OF THE SAME. HOWEVER, NON DISCLOSER OF THIS BUSINESS ACTIVITIES AND ALSO THE PROFIT EARN A S A RESULT OF THE SAME SHOW THAT THE APPELLANT HAD CONCEALED THE PARTICULARS OF INCOME A ND HE CAME FORWARD ONLY DURING THE COURSE OF ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS WHEN THE INQUIRY R EGARDING CASH DEPOSIT WAS CONDUCTED BY THE AO. THUS EVEN IF THE PROFIT I S DISCLOSED BY THE APPELLANT ON ESTIMATION BASIS U/S. 44AD OF THE ACT, THEN ALSO PR OVISIONS OF SECTION 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT ARE APPLICABLE TO HIS CASE AS THERE WAS NO TRUE AND CORRECT DISCLOSER OF THE INCOME EARNED OUT OF BUSINESS ACTIVITIES IN THE RETURN OF INCOME. THUS THE EXPLANATION ONE BELOW SUB SECTION 1 OF SECTION 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT IS AP PLICABLE TO THE CASE OF THE APPELLANT. IN VIEW OF THESE FACTS, IT IS HELD THAT THE A.O. HAS C ORRECTLY LEVIED THE PENALTY U/S. 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT ON THE AMOUNT OF RS. 4,14.856/- AND THE SAME IS HEREBY CONFIRMED. THUS, THE GROUND OF APPEAL OF THE APPELLANT IS DISMISSED. ITA NOS. 291 /RJT/2018 . A.Y. 2014-1 5 4 7. BEING AGGRIEVED BY THE ORDER OF THE LEARNED CIT (A) , THE ASSESSEE IS IN APPEAL BEFORE US. 8. THE LEARNED AR BEFORE US FILED A PAPER BOOK RUNNING FROM PAGES 1 TO 5 AND SUBMITTED THAT THE ASSESSEE HAS PAID THE TAXES DURI NG THE ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS AND BEFORE PASSING THE ASSESSMENT ORDER BY THE AO. ACCORDINGLY HE CLAIMED THAT THE ASSESSEE HAS NOT CONCEALED PARTICU LARS OF INCOME DELIBERATELY AND THEREFORE THERE CANNOT BE ANY PENALTY UNDER SEC TION 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT. 9. ON THE OTHER HAND THE LEARNER DR VEHEMENTLY SUPPORT ED THE ORDER OF THE AUTHORITIES BELOW. 10. WE HAVE HEARD THE RIVAL CONTENTIONS OF BOTH THE PAR TIES AND PERUSED THE MATERIALS AVAILABLE ON RECORD. THE CONTROVERSY BEFO RE US ARISES SO AS TO ADJUDICATE WHETHER THE ASSESSEE HAS CONCEALED THE P ARTICULARS OF INCOME WITH RESPECT TO SUCH BUSINESS RECEIPTS NOT DISCLOSED IN THE INCOME TAX RETURN. THE TERM CONCEALMENT OF PARTICULAR OF INCOME HAS NOT BE EN DEFINED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 271(1)(C) OR ELSEWHERE IN THE ACT THE ACT. HOWEVER, THE MEANING OF THE TERM CONCEALED /INACCURATE HAS BEEN DISCUSSED BY THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF RELIANCE PETROPRODUCTS (P) LTD REPORTED IN 189 TAXMAN 322 WHEREIN IT WAS HELD THAT THE TERM INACC URATE SIGNIFIES DELIBERATE ACT OR OMISSION ON THE PART OF THE ASSESSEE. AS SUCH, T HE DETAILS/INFORMATIONS CONTAINED IN THE RETURN OF INCOME /FINANCIAL STATEM ENTS /AUDIT REPORT WHICH ARE NOT CORRECT ACCORDING TO TRUTH, AND WERE FURNISHED BY THE ASSESSEE WITH THE DISHONEST INTENT SHALL BE TREATED AS INACCURATE PAR TICULARS. IN HOLDING SO, WE FIND SUPPORT AND GUIDANCE FROM THE JUDGEMENT OF HONBLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF RELIANCE PETROPRODUCTS (P) LTD (SUPRA). WE ARE NOT CONCERNED IN THE PRESENT CASE WITH THE M ENSREA. HOWEVER, WE HAVE TO ONLY SEE AS TO WHETHER IN THIS CASE, AS A MATTER OF FACT , THE ASSESSEE HAS GIVEN INACCURATE PARTICULARS. IN WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY, THE WORD 'INA CCURATE' HAS BEEN DEFINED AS : ITA NOS. 291 /RJT/2018 . A.Y. 2014-1 5 5 'NOT ACCURATE, NOT EXACT OR CORRECT; NOT ACCORDING TO TRUTH; ERRONEOUS; AS AN INACCURATE STATEMENT, COPY OR TRANSCRIPT.' WE HAVE ALREADY SEEN THE MEANING OF THE WORD 'PARTI CULARS' IN THE EARLIER PART OF THIS JUDGMENT. READING THE WORDS IN CONJUNCTION, THEY MU ST MEAN THE DETAILS SUPPLIED IN THE RETURN, WHICH ARE NOT ACCURATE, NOT EXACT OR CORREC T, NOT ACCORDING TO TRUTH OR ERRONEOUS. WE MUST HASTEN TO ADD HERE THAT IN THIS CASE, THERE IS NO FINDING THAT ANY DETAILS SUPPLIED BY THE ASSESSEE IN ITS RETURN WERE FOUND T O BE INCORRECT OR ERRONEOUS OR FALSE 11. NOW, IF WE ANALYSES THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE I N THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE STATED DISCUSSION, WE FIND THAT THE ASSESSEE HAS DISCLOSED THE BUSINESS INCOME DURING THE ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS WHICH WAS NOT DOUBTED BY THE AUTHORITIES BELOW. MOREOVER THE BUSINESS INCOME WAS CHARGED TO TAX ON PRESUMPTION BASIS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 44 AD OF THE ACT. THUS IT IS TRANSPIRED THAT THERE WAS NO DELIBERATE ACT ON THE PART OF THE ASSESSEE NOT TO D ISCLOSE THE BUSINESS RECEIPTS IN HIS INCOME TAX RETURN. IN HOLDING SO WE DRAW SUPPOR T AND GUIDANCE FROM THE JUDGMENT OF HONBLE GUJARAT HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF ITO VS. BOMBAY WALA READYMADE STORES REPORTED IN 55 TAXMANN.COM 258 WHE REIN IT WAS HELD AS UNDER: 6. THE PENALTIES WERE UPHELD AS IT WAS ONLY ESTIMA TED VALUE ON WHICH ESTIMATES OF INCOME TAX WAS MADE AND THE BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS WERE REJECTED. THERE WAS NO SCOPE TO LEVY THE PENALTY UNDER SECTION 271(1)(C), THE APPEL LANT HAD BEEN ASSESSED BY THE INCOME TAX. THE TRIBUNAL HAS VERY RIGHTLY CONSIDERE D THAT BOTH THE ADDITIONS ARE ON A ESTIMATED BASIS. THEREFORE, JUST BECAUSE ESTIMATES ARE MADE, PENALTY CANNOT BE LEVIED UNDER SECTION 271(C). 12. THE REVENUE HAS ALSO NOT BROUGHT ANY MATERIAL SUGGE STING THAT THE ASSESSEE DELIBERATELY FURNISHED THE INACCURATE PARTICULARS O F INCOME. 13. IN OUR CONSIDERED VIEW ANY ADDITION/DISALLOWANCES M ADE DURING THE QUANTUM PROCEEDINGS DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY JUSTIFY THE LEVY OF THE PENALTY UNDER SECTION 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT. BESIDES THE ELEMENT OF INCOME ADDED THE QUANTUM ITA NOS. 291 /RJT/2018 . A.Y. 2014-1 5 6 PROCEEDINGS, THERE MUST BE SOME MATERIAL/CIRCUMSTAN TIAL EVIDENCES LEADING TO THE REASONABLE CONCLUSION THAT THERE WAS CONSCIOUS CONCEALMENT OR THE ACT OF FURNISHING OF INACCURATE PARTICULARS ON THE PART OF THE ASSESSEE. ACCORDINGLY, WE ARE NOT CONVINCED WITH THE FINDING OF THE AUTHORITI ES BELOW. HENCE WE SET ASIDE THE ORDER OF THE LEARNED CIT (A) AND DIRECT THE AO TO DELETE THE PENALTY LEVIED BY HIM UNDER SECTION 271(1)(C) OF THE ACT. THUS THE AP PEAL OF THE ASSESSEE IS ALLOWED. 14. BEFORE WE PART WITH THE ISSUE/APPEAL AS DISCUSSED A BOVE, IT IS PERTINENT TO NOTE THAT THE CLAUSE (C) OF RULE 34 OF THE APPELLATE TRI BUNAL RULES 1963 REQUIRES THE BENCH TO MAKE ENDEAVOUR TO PRONOUNCE THE ORDER WITH IN 60 DAYS FROM THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING. HOWEVER THE PERIOD OF 60 DAYS CAN BE EXTENDED UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES BUT THE SAME SHOULD NOT O RDINARILY BE FURTHER EXTENDED BEYOND ANOTHER 30 DAYS. IN SIMPLE WORDS TH E TOTAL TIME AVAILABLE TO THE BENCH IS OF 90 DAYS UPON THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING. HOWEVER, DURING THE PREVAILING CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE THE ENTIRE WORLD IS FACING THE UNPRECEDENTED CHALLENGE OF COVID 2019 OUTBREAK, RESULTING THE LOCKDOWN IN THE COUNTRY, THE ORDERS THOUGH SUBSTANTIALLY PREPAR ED BUT COULD NOT BE PRONOUNCED FOR THE UNAVOIDABLE REASONS WITHIN THE M AXIMUM PERIOD OF 90 DAYS. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES WE FIND THAT THE HONBLE MUMB AI TRIBUNAL IN THE CASE OF JSW LIMITED VS DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX IN ITA NO. 6103/MUM/2018 VIDE ORDER DATED 14-5-2020 EXTENDED THE TIME FOR PRONOUNCING THE ORDER WITHIN 90 DAYS OF TIME BY OBS ERVING AS UNDER: 9. LET US IN THIS LIGHT REVERT TO THE PREVAILING SI TUATION IN THE COUNTRY. ON 24TH MARCH, 2020, HONBLE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA TOOK THE BOLD STEP OF IMPOSING A NATIONWIDE LOCKDOWN, FOR 21 DAYS, TO PREVENT THE SPREAD OF COV ID 19 EPIDEMIC, AND THIS LOCKDOWN WAS EXTENDED FROM TIME TO TIME. AS A MATTER OF FACT , EVEN BEFORE THIS FORMAL NATIONWIDE LOCKDOWN, THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INCOME TAX APPELLA TE TRIBUNAL AT MUMBAI WAS SEVERELY RESTRICTED ON ACCOUNT OF LOCKDOWN BY THE MAHARASHTR A GOVERNMENT, AND ON ACCOUNT OF STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF HEALTH ADVISORIES WITH A VIEW OF CHECKING SPREAD OF COVID 19. THE EPIDEMIC SITUATION IN MUMBAI BEING GRAVE, THERE WAS NOT MUCH OF A RELAXATION IN SUBSEQUENT LOCKDOWNS ALSO. IN ANY CASE, THERE WAS U NPRECEDENTED DISRUPTION OF JUDICIAL WOK ALL OVER THE COUNTRY. AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT H AS BEEN SUCH AN UNPRECEDENTED SITUATION, CAUSING DISRUPTION IN THE FUNCTIONING OF JUDICIAL MACHINERY, THAT HONBLE ITA NOS. 291 /RJT/2018 . A.Y. 2014-1 5 7 SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, IN AN UNPRECEDENTED ORDER I N THE HISTORY OF INDIA AND VIDE ORDER DATED 6.5.2020 READ WITH ORDER DATED 23.3.2020, EXT ENDED THE LIMITATION TO EXCLUDE NOT ONLY THIS LOCKDOWN PERIOD BUT ALSO A FEW MORE DAYS PRIOR TO, AND AFTER, THE LOCKDOWN BY OBSERVING THAT IN CASE THE LIMITATION HAS EXPIRED AFTER 15.03.2020 THEN THE PERIOD FROM 15.03.2020 TILL THE DATE ON WHICH THE L OCKDOWN IS LIFTED IN THE JURISDICTIONAL AREA WHERE THE DISPUTE LIES OR WHERE THE CAUSE OF ACTION ARISES SHALL BE EXTENDED FOR A PERIOD OF 15 DAYS AFTER THE LIFTING OF LOCKDOWN . HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT, IN AN ORDER DATED 15TH APRIL 202 0, HAS, BESIDES EXTENDING THE VALIDITY OF ALL INTERIM ORDERS, HAS ALSO OBSERVED T HAT, IT IS ALSO CLARIFIED THAT WHILE CALCULATING TIME FOR DISPOSAL OF MATTERS MADE TIME- BOUND BY THIS COURT, THE PERIOD FOR WHICH THE ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 CO NTINUES TO OPERATE SHALL BE ADDED AND TIME SHALL STAND EXTENDED ACCORDINGLY , AND ALSO OBSERVED THAT ARRANGEMENT CONTINUED BY AN ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 TILL 30TH APRIL 2020 SHALL CONTINUE FURTHER TILL 15TH JUNE 2020 . IT HAS BEEN AN UNPRECEDENTED SITUATION NOT ONLY IN INDIA BUT ALL OVER THE WORLD. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA HAS, VIDE NOTIFICATION DATED 19TH FEBRUARY 2020, TAKEN THE ST AND THAT, THE CORONAVIRUS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A CASE OF NATURAL CALAMITY AND FMC (I.E. FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSE) MAYBE INVOKED, WHEREVER CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE, FOLLOWING THE DUE PROCEDURE. THE TERM FORCE MAJEURE HAS BEEN DEFINED IN BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, AS AN EVENT OR EFFECT THAT CAN BE NEITHER ANTICIPATED NOR CONTROLLED WHEN SUCH IS THE POSITION, AND IT IS OFFICIALLY SO NOTIFIED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA A ND THE COVID-19 EPIDEMIC HAS BEEN NOTIFIED AS A DISASTER UNDER THE NATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT ACT, 2005, AND ALSO IN THE LIGHT OF THE DISCUSSIONS ABOVE, THE PERIOD DURING W HICH LOCKDOWN WAS IN FORCE CAN BE ANYTHING BUT AN ORDINARY PERIOD. 10. IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE DISCUSSIONS, WE ARE O F THE CONSIDERED VIEW THAT RATHER THAN TAKING A PEDANTIC VIEW OF THE RULE REQUIRING PRONOU NCEMENT OF ORDERS WITHIN 90 DAYS, DISREGARDING THE IMPORTANT FACT THAT THE ENTIRE COU NTRY WAS IN LOCKDOWN, WE SHOULD COMPUTE THE PERIOD OF 90 DAYS BY EXCLUDING AT LEAST THE PERIOD DURING WHICH THE LOCKDOWN WAS IN FORCE. WE MUST FACTOR GROUND REALIT IES IN MIND WHILE INTERPRETING THE TIME LIMIT FOR THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE ORDER. LAW IS NOT BROODING OMNIPOTENCE IN THE SKY. IT IS A PRAGMATIC TOOL OF THE SOCIAL ORDER. TH E TENETS OF LAW BEING ENACTED ON THE BASIS OF PRAGMATISM, AND THAT IS HOW THE LAW IS REQ UIRED TO INTERPRETED. THE INTERPRETATION SO ASSIGNED BY US IS NOT ONLY IN CON SONANCE WITH THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF RULE 34(5) BUT IS ALSO A PRAGMATIC APPROACH AT A TI ME WHEN A DISASTER, NOTIFIED UNDER THE DISASTER MANAGEMENT ACT 2005, IS CAUSING UNPRECEDEN TED DISRUPTION IN THE FUNCTIONING OF OUR JUSTICE DELIVERY SYSTEM. UNDOUBTEDLY, IN THE CA SE OF OTTERS CLUB VS DIT [(2017) 392 ITR 244 (BOM)] , HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT DID NOT APPROVE AN ORDE R BEING PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL BEYOND A PERIOD OF 90 DAYS, BUT THEN IN THE PRESENT SITUATION HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT ITSELF HAS, VIDE JUDGMENT DATED 15TH APRIL 2020, HELD THAT DIRECTED WHILE CALCULATING THE TIME FOR DISPOSAL OF MATTERS MADE TIME-BOUND BY THIS COURT, THE PERIOD FOR WHICH THE ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 CONTINUES TO OPERATE SHALL BE ADDED AND TIME SHALL STAND EXTE NDED ACCORDINGLY . THE EXTRAORDINARY STEPS TAKEN SUO MOTU BY HONBLE JURIS DICTIONAL HIGH COURT AND HONBLE SUPREME COURT ALSO INDICATE THAT THIS PERIOD OF LOC KDOWN CANNOT BE TREATED AS AN ORDINARY PERIOD DURING WHICH THE NORMAL TIME LIMITS ARE TO REMAIN IN FORCE. IN OUR CONSIDERED VIEW, EVEN WITHOUT THE WORDS ORDINARILY , IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL POSITION, THE PERIOD DURING WHICH LOCKOUT WAS IN FORCE IS TO EXCLUDED FOR THE PURPOSE OF TIME LIMITS SET OUT IN RULE 34(5) OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL RULES, 1963. VIEWED THUS, THE EXCEPTION, TO 90-DAY TIME-LIMIT FOR PRONO UNCEMENT OF ORDERS, INHERENT IN RULE 34(5)(C), WITH RESPECT TO THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDE RS WITHIN NINETY DAYS, CLEARLY COMES INTO PLAY IN THE PRESENT CASE. OF COURSE, THERE IS NO, AND THERE CANNOT BE ANY, BAR ON THE DISCRETION OF THE BENCHES TO REFIX THE MATTERS FOR CLARIFICATIONS BECAUSE OF CONSIDERABLE ITA NOS. 291 /RJT/2018 . A.Y. 2014-1 5 8 TIME LAG BETWEEN THE POINT OF TIME WHEN THE HEARING IS CONCLUDED AND THE POINT OF TIME WHEN THE ORDER THEREON IS BEING FINALIZED, BUT THEN , IN OUR CONSIDERED VIEW, NO SUCH EXERCISE WAS REQUIRED TO BE CARRIED OUT ON THE FACT S OF THIS CASE. 11. TO SUM UP, THE APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE IS ALLOWE D, AND APPEAL OF THE ASSESSING OFFICER IS DISMISSED. ORDER PRONOUNCED UNDER RULE 34(4) OF THE INCOME TAX (APPELLATE TRIBUNAL) RULES, 1962, BY PLACING THE DETAILS ON THE NOTICE B OARD. CONSIDERING THE ABOVE, WE EXPRESS TO PRONOUNCE THE ORDER BEYOND THE PERIOD OF 90 DAYS. ACCORDINGLY, WE PROCEED TO PRONOUNCE THE O RDER AS ON DATE. 15. IN THE RESULT, THE APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE IS ALLOW ED. ORDER PRONOUNCED IN OPEN COURT ON 01-06-2020 SD/- SD/- (MADHUMITA ROY) (WASEEM AHMED) JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AHMEDABAD: DATED 01/06/2020 TRUE COPY RAJESH COPY OF THE ORDER FORWARDED TO: - 1. THE APPELLANT. 2. THE RESPONDENT. 3. THE CIT (APPEALS) 4. THE CIT CONCERNED. 5. THE DR., ITAT, AHMEDABAD. 6. GUARD FILE. BY ORDER DEPUTY/ASSTT.REGISTRAR ITAT, RAJKOT