DCIT 15 (1)(2), MUMBAI V. DUTYFREE DISTRIBUTION SERVICES PVT.LTD., MUMBAI

ITA 352/MUM/2019

• Counselvise Citation: [2020] 110 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 9781 (ITAT-MUMBAI)
• Duration Of Justice: 1 year(s) 5 month(s) 8 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 06-07-2020
• Appeal Filed By: Department
• Order Result: Dismissed
• Bench Allotted: D
• Assessment Year: 2014-2015
• Appeal Filed On: 28-01-2019
• Result in Favour of: Assessee
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: JYOTI LAKSHMI NAYAKLD
• Assessee Lawyers: BHUSHAN SAKPAL LD
• Section: 10AA; 27

Judgement Text

ITA NO.352/MUM/2019 M/S. DUTY FREE DISTRIBUTION SERVICES PVT. LTD. ASSESSMENT YEAR :2014-15 1 IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL D BENCH, MUMBAI , , BEFORE HONBLE SHRI AMARJIT SINGH, JM AND HONBLE SHRI MANOJ KUMAR AGGARWAL, AM ./ I.T.A. NO.352/MUM/2019 ( / ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2014-15) D CIT - 15(1)(2) MUMBAI. / VS. M/S. DUTYFREE DISTRIBUTION SERVICES PVT.LTD D-73/1, TTC INDUSTRIAL AREA MIDC, TURBHE NAVI MUMBAI-400 705. ! ./ ./PAN/GIR NO. AACCD-6134-D ( !# /APPELLANT ) : ( $%!# / RESPONDENT ) ASSESSEE BY : SHRI BHUSHAN SAKPAL- LD. AR REVENUE BY : MS. JYOTILAKSHMI NAYAK - LD.DR / DATE OF HEARING : 12/02/2020 / DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT : 06/07/2020 / O R D E R MANOJ KUMAR AGGARWAL (ACCOUNTANT MEMBER) 1. AFORESAID APPEAL BY REVENUE FOR ASSESSMENT YEAR [IN SHORT REFERRED TO AS AY] 2014-15 CONTEST THE ORDER OF LD. COMMIS SIONER OF INCOME- TAX (APPEALS)-24, MUMBAI, [IN SHORT REFERRED TO AS CIT(A)], APPEAL NO.CIT(A)-24/A.CIT-15(1)(2)/IT-206/2017-18 DATED 22/10/2018 ON FOLLOWING GROUNDS OF APPEAL:- 1. ON THE FACTS AND IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CA SE AND IN LAW, THE LD. CIT(A) WAS CORRECT IN ALLOWING THE DEDUCTION U/S.10AA IN R ESPECT OF PROFITS OF SEZ UNIT BY ITA NO.352/MUM/2019 M/S. DUTY FREE DISTRIBUTION SERVICES PVT. LTD. ASSESSMENT YEAR :2014-15 2 VIRTUE OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZO NE, 2005, CONSIDERING THAT THE ACTIVITY OF IMPORTING GOODS AND ITS EXPORT AMOUNTED TO PROVIDING OF 'SERVICES' AS PER THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 10AA OF THE ACT AS THE WO RD 'SERVICE' MUST BE TAKEN FROM THE SEZ ACT, 2005, IGNORING THAT THE DEFINITION OF SERVICES COULD NOT BE IMPORTED FROM SEZ ACT.' 2. ON THE FACTS AND IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE AND IN LAW, LD.CIT(A) ERRED IN ASSUMING THAT THE DEFINITION OF 'SERVICES' FROM SEZ RULES TO INCLUDE TRADING WHICH HAS BEEN GIVEN IN A DIFFERENT CONTEXT WITHOUT CONFI NING THE PROVISIONS OF THE INCOME TAX ACT WHICH IS A SELF CONTAINED CODE AND PARTICUL ARLY IN VIEW OF SECTION 27 OF THE SEZ ACT WHICH CLEARLY STIPULATES THAT 'THE PROVISIO NS OF INCOME TAX ACT 1961, AS IN FORCE FOR THE TIME BEING, SHALL APPLY TO, OR IN REL ATION TO, THE DEVELOPER OR ENTREPRENEUR FOR CARRYING ON THE SECOND SCHEDULE' A ND IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT THE NECESSARY MODIFICATIONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN INCORPORA TED IN THE INCOME TAX ACT?' 3. THE APPELLANT PRAYS THAT THE ORDER OF THE CIT (A), MUMBAI ON THE ABOVE GROUNDS BE SET-ASIDE AND THAT OF THE ASSESSING OFFI CER BE RESTORED.' 2. THE LD. AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE FOR ASSESSEE ( AR), AT THE OUTSET, SUBMITTED THAT LD. CIT(A) HAS MERELY FOLLOW ED THE ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL RENDERED IN ASSESSEES OWN CASE FOR EARLIE R ASSESSMENT YEARS AND THEREFORE, THERE BEING NO CHANGE IN FACTS AND C IRCUMSTANCES, THE APPEAL IS LIABLE TO BE DISMISSED. THE LD. DR COULD NOT CONTROVERT THE AFORESAID FACT. 3. FACTS ON RECORD WOULD REVEAL THAT ASSESSEE BEING RESIDENT CORPORATE ASSESSEE STATED TO BE ENGAGED IN IMPORT & EXPORT, WAS ASSESSED FOR YEAR UNDER CONSIDERATION U/S.143(3) R. W.S. 144C(4) OF THE ACT ON 06/01/2017 WHEREIN DEDUCTION U/S. 10AA FOR R S.181.44 LACS, AS CLAIMED BY THE ASSESSEE, WAS DENIED IN VIEW OF THE CONCLUSION THAT THE ASSESSEE WAS NOT ENGAGED IN MANUFACTURING OR PRODUC TION OF ARTICLES OR GOODS. THE DEFINITION OF SERVICE AS PROVIDED IN CLA USE 2(Z) OF SEZ ACT, IN THE OPINION OF LD. AO, COULD NOT BE IMPORTED TO SEC TION 10AA OF THE ACT AND THEREFORE, THE DEDUCTION AS CLAIMED BY THE ASSE SSEE WOULD NOT BE ALLOWABLE. ITA NO.352/MUM/2019 M/S. DUTY FREE DISTRIBUTION SERVICES PVT. LTD. ASSESSMENT YEAR :2014-15 3 4. UPON FURTHER APPEAL, LD. CIT(A) ALLOWED THE CLAI M OF THE ASSESSEE BY OBSERVING AS UNDER: - 2.4. I HAVE GIVEN MY CAREFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE R IVAL SUBMISSIONS, PERUSED THE MATERIAL ON RECORD AND DULY CONSIDERED THE FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE AS ALSO THE APPLICABLE LEGAL POSITION. 2.4.1. THE ONLY EFFECTIVE GROUND IS AGAINST THE ACT ION OF THE LD. AO IN NOT ALLOWING DEDUCTION CLAIMED BY THE APPELLANT U/S. 10AA OF THE ACT. A SIMILAR ISSUE WAS ALSO ADJUDICATED IN THE APPELLANTS OWN CASE VIDE ITAT O RDER IN ITA NO.2753/MUM/2015 DATED 13/07/2016 FOR A.Y. 2011-12 AND ITA NOS. 6198 /M/2016 & 6199/M/2016 FOR A.Y. 2012-13 & 2009-10 AND CIT(A) ORDER APPEAL NO.5 5/IT-76/2017-18 DATED 02/02/2018 FOR A.Y. 2013-14 AND THERE BEING NO CHAN GE IN THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE PRESENT APPEAL, RESPECTFULLY F OLLOWING THE SAME, THE GROUND RAISED IS ALLOWED IN FAVOUR OF THE APPELLANT. AS EVIDENT LD. CIT(A) HAS MERELY FOLLOWED THE ORDER S OF TRIBUNAL PASSED IN ASSESSEE S OWN CASE FOR AYS 2009-10, 2011-12 AN D 2012-13. SIMILAR VIEW WAS TAKEN BY LD. CIT(A) FOR AY 2013-14. NOTHIN G HAS BEEN BROUGHT ON RECORD TO DEMONSTRATE ANY CHANGE IN FACTS AND CI RCUMSTANCES. IN FACT, THE REVENUE WAS UNDER APPEAL AGAINST THE APPELLATE ORDER FOR 2013-14 BEFORE THIS TRIBUNAL VIDE ITA NO. 2855/MUM/2018 ORD ER DATED 02/12/2019, WHEREIN THE VIEW TAKEN BY TRIBUNAL IN E ARLIER YEARS WAS FOLLOWED AND REVENUES GROUNDS WERE DISMISSED. THER EFORE, RESPECTFULLY FOLLOWING THE CONSISTENT VIEW OF TRIBUNAL, WE DISMI SS THE APPEAL. REASONS FOR DELAY IN PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDER 5.1 BEFORE PARTING, WE WOULD LIKE TO ENUMERATE THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH HAVE LED TO DELAY IN PRONOUNCEMENT OF THIS OR DER. THE HEARING OF THE MATTER WAS CONCLUDED ON 12/02/2020 AND IN TERMS OF RULE 34(5) OF INCOME TAX (APPELLATE TRIBUNAL) RULES, 1963, THE MA TTER WAS REQUIRED TO BE PRONOUNCED WITHIN A TOTAL PERIOD OF 90 DAYS. AS PER SUB-CLAUSE (C) OF RULE 34(5), EVERY ENDEAVOR WAS TO BE MADE TO PRONOU NCE THE ORDER WITHIN 60 DAYS AFTER CONCLUSION OF HEARING. HOWEVER , WHERE IT IS NOT ITA NO.352/MUM/2019 M/S. DUTY FREE DISTRIBUTION SERVICES PVT. LTD. ASSESSMENT YEAR :2014-15 4 PRACTICABLE TO DO SO ON THE GROUND OF EXCEPTIONAL A ND EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES, THE BENCH COULD FIX A FUTURE DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE ORDER WHICH SHALL NOT ORDINARILY BE A DAY BEYOND A FURTHER PERIOD OF 30 DAYS. THUS, A PERIOD OF 60 DAYS HAS BEEN PROVIDED U NDER THE EXTANT RULE FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE ORDER. THIS PERIOD COULD B E EXTENDED BY THE BENCH ON THE GROUND OF EXCEPTIONAL AND EXTRAORDINAR Y CIRCUMSTANCES. HOWEVER, THE EXTENDED PERIOD SHALL NOT ORDINARILY EXCEED A PERIOD OF 30 DAYS. 5.2 ALTHOUGH THE ORDER WAS WELL DRAFTED BEFORE THE EXPIRY OF 90 DAYS, HOWEVER, UNFORTUNATELY, ON 24/03/2020, A NATIONWIDE LOCKDOWN WAS IMPOSED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA IN VIEW OF ADVER SE CIRCUMSTANCES CREATED BY PANDEMIC COVID-19 IN THE COUNTRY. THE LO CKDOWN WAS EXTENDED FROM TIME TO TIME WHICH CRIPPLED THE FUNCT IONING OF MOST OF THE GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS INCLUDING INCOME TAX APPELLA TE TRIBUNAL (ITAT). THE SITUATION LED TO UNPRECEDENTED DISRUPTI ON OF JUDICIAL WORK ALL OVER THE COUNTRY AND THE ORDER COULD NOT BE PRONOUN CED DESPITE LAPSE OF CONSIDERABLE PERIOD OF TIME. THE SITUATION CREATED BY PANDEMIC COVID-19 COULD BE TERMED AS UNPRECEDENTED AND BEYOND THE CON TROL OF ANY HUMAN BEING. THE SITUATION, THUS CREATED BY THIS PANDEMIC , COULD NEVER BE TERMED AS ORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES AND WOULD WARRANT EXCLUSION OF LOCKDOWN PERIOD FOR THE PURPOSE OF AFORESAID RULE G OVERNING THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE ORDER. ACCORDINGLY, THE ORDER IS BEING PRONOUNCED NOW AFTER THE RE-OPENING OF THE OFFICES. 5.3 FACED WITH SIMILAR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES, THE CO-ORDINATE BENCH OF THIS TRIBUNAL COMPRISING-OFF OF HONBLE PRESIDEN T AND HONBLE VICE ITA NO.352/MUM/2019 M/S. DUTY FREE DISTRIBUTION SERVICES PVT. LTD. ASSESSMENT YEAR :2014-15 5 PRESIDENT, IN ITS RECENT DECISION TITLED AS DCIT V/S JSW LIMITED (ITA NOS. 6264 & 6103/MUM/2018) ORDER DATED 14/05/2020 HELD AS UNDER: - 7. HOWEVER, BEFORE WE PART WITH THE MATTER, WE MUST DEAL WITH ONE PROCEDURAL ISSUE AS WELL. WHILE HEARING OF THESE APPEALS WAS C ONCLUDED ON 7TH JANUARY 2020, THIS ORDER THEREON IS BEING PRONOUNCED TODAY ON 14T H DAY OF MAY, 2020, MUCH AFTER THE EXPIRY OF 90 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF CONCLUSION O F HEARING. WE ARE ALSO ALIVE TO THE FACT THAT RULE 34(5) OF THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TR IBUNAL RULES 1963, WHICH DEALS WITH PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS, PROVIDES AS FOLLOWS: (5) THE PRONOUNCEMENT MAY BE IN ANY OF THE FOLLOWIN G MANNERS: (A) THE BENCH MAY PRONOUNCE THE ORDER IMMEDIATELY U PON THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING. (B) IN CASE WHERE THE ORDER IS NOT PRONOUNCED IMMED IATELY ON THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING, THE BENCH SHALL GIVE A DATE FOR PRONOUNCEM ENT. (C) IN A CASE WHERE NO DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT IS GIV EN BY THE BENCH, EVERY ENDEAVOUR SHALL BE MADE BY THE BENCH TO PRONOUNCE T HE ORDER WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM THE DATE ON WHICH THE HEARING OF THE CASE WAS CONCL UDED BUT, WHERE IT IS NOT PRACTICABLE SO TO DO ON THE GROUND OF EXCEPTIONAL A ND EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, THE BENCH SHALL FIX A FUTURE DAY FOR P RONOUNCEMENT OF THE ORDER, AND SUCH DATE SHALL NOT ORDINARILY (EMPHASIS SUPPLIED B Y US NOW) BE A DAY BEYOND A FURTHER PERIOD OF 30 DAYS AND DUE NOTICE OF THE DAY SO FIXED SHALL BE GIVEN ON THE NOTICE BOARD. 8. QUITE CLEARLY, ORDINARILY THE ORDER ON AN APPE AL SHOULD BE PRONOUNCED BY THE BENCH WITHIN NO MORE THAN 90 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF CONCLUDING THE HEARING. IT IS, HOWEVER, IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT THE EXPRESSION ORD INARILY HAS BEEN USED IN THE SAID RULE ITSELF. THIS RULE WAS INSERTED AS A RESULT OF DIRECTIONS OF HONBLE JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF SHIVSAGAR VEG RESTAURANT VS ACIT [(2009) 317 ITR 4 33 (BOM)] WHEREIN THEIR LORDSHIPS HAD, INTER ALIA, DIRECTED THAT WE, THEREFORE, DIRECT THE PRESIDENT OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL TO FRAME AN D LAY DOWN THE GUIDELINES IN THE SIMILAR LINES AS ARE LAID DOWN BY THE APEX COUR T IN THE CASE OF ANIL RAI (SUPRA) AND TO ISSUE APPROPRIATE ADMINISTRATIVE DIR ECTIONS TO ALL THE BENCHES OF THE TRIBUNAL IN THAT BEHALF. WE HOPE AND TRUST THAT SUITABLE GUIDELINES SHALL B E FRAMED AND ISSUED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL WITHIN SHORTEST REASONABLE TIME AND FOLLOWED STRICTLY BY ALL THE BE NCHES OF THE TRIBUNAL. IN THE MEANWHILE (EMPHASIS, BY UNDERLINING, SUPPLIED BY US NOW), ALL THE REVISIONAL AND APPELLATE AUTHORITIES UNDER THE INCOME-TAX ACT ARE DIRECTED TO DECIDE MATTERS HEARD BY THEM WITHIN A PERIOD OF THREE MONTHS FROM THE DATE CASE IS CLOSED FOR JUDGMENT . IN THE RULED SO FRAMED, AS A RESULT OF THESE DIR ECTIONS, THE EXPRESSION ORDINARILY HAS BEEN INSERTED IN THE REQUIREMENT T O PRONOUNCE THE ORDER WITHIN A PERIOD OF 90 DAYS. THE QUESTION THEN ARISES WHETHER THE PASSING OF THIS ORDER, BEYOND NINETY DAYS, WAS NECESSITATED BY ANY EXTRAO RDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES. 9. LET US IN THIS LIGHT REVERT TO THE PREVAILING SI TUATION IN THE COUNTRY. ON 24TH MARCH, 2020, HONBLE PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA TOOK T HE BOLD STEP OF IMPOSING A NATIONWIDE LOCKDOWN, FOR 21 DAYS, TO PREVENT THE SP READ OF COVID 19 EPIDEMIC, AND THIS LOCKDOWN WAS EXTENDED FROM TIME TO TIME. AS A MATTER OF FACT, EVEN BEFORE THIS FORMAL NATIONWIDE LOCKDOWN, THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AT MUMBAI WAS SEVERELY RESTRICTED ON ACCOUNT OF LOCKDO WN BY THE MAHARASHTRA ITA NO.352/MUM/2019 M/S. DUTY FREE DISTRIBUTION SERVICES PVT. LTD. ASSESSMENT YEAR :2014-15 6 GOVERNMENT, AND ON ACCOUNT OF STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF HEALTH ADVISORIES WITH A VIEW OF CHECKING SPREAD OF COVID 19. THE EPIDEMIC SITUAT ION IN MUMBAI BEING GRAVE, THERE WAS NOT MUCH OF A RELAXATION IN SUBSEQUENT LO CKDOWNS ALSO. IN ANY CASE, THERE WAS UNPRECEDENTED DISRUPTION OF JUDICIAL WOK ALL OV ER THE COUNTRY. AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT HAS BEEN SUCH AN UNPRECEDENTED SITUATION, CAUSING DISRUPTION IN THE FUNCTIONING OF JUDICIAL MACHINERY, THAT HONBLE SUP REME COURT OF INDIA, IN AN UNPRECEDENTED ORDER IN THE HISTORY OF INDIA AND VID E ORDER DATED 6.5.2020 READ WITH ORDER DATED 23.3.2020, EXTENDED THE LIMITATION TO E XCLUDE NOT ONLY THIS LOCKDOWN PERIOD BUT ALSO A FEW MORE DAYS PRIOR TO, AND AFTER , THE LOCKDOWN BY OBSERVING THAT IN CASE THE LIMITATION HAS EXPIRED AFTER 15.03.202 0 THEN THE PERIOD FROM 15.03.2020 TILL THE DATE ON WHICH THE LOCKDOWN IS L IFTED IN THE JURISDICTIONAL AREA WHERE THE DISPUTE LIES OR WHERE THE CAUSE OF A CTION ARISES SHALL BE EXTENDED FOR A PERIOD OF 15 DAYS AFTER THE LIFTING OF LOCKDOWN. HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT, IN AN ORDER DATED 15TH APRIL 2020, HAS, BESIDES EXTENDING THE VALIDITY OF ALL INTERIM ORDERS, HAS ALSO OBSERVED THAT, IT IS ALSO CLARIFIED THAT WHILE CALCULATING TIME FOR DISPOSAL OF MATTERS MADE TIME- BOUND BY THIS COURT, THE PERIOD FOR WHICH THE ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 CO NTINUES TO OPERATE SHALL BE ADDED AND TIME SHALL STAND EXTENDED ACCORDINGLY , AND ALSO OBSERVED THAT ARRANGEMENT CONTINUED BY AN ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 TILL 30TH APRIL 2020 SHALL CONTINUE FURTHER TILL 15TH JUNE 2020. IT HAS BEEN AN UNPRECEDENTED SITUATION NOT ONLY IN INDIA BUT ALL OVER THE WORLD. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA HAS, VIDE NOTIFICATION DATED 19TH FEBRUARY 2020, TAKEN THE ST AND THAT, THE CORONAVIRUS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A CASE OF NATURAL CALAMITY AND FMC (I .E. FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSE) MAYBE INVOKED, WHEREVER CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE, FOL LOWING THE DUE PROCEDURE. THE TERM FORCE MAJEURE HAS BEEN DEFINED IN BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, AS AN EVENT OR EFFECT THAT CAN BE NEITHER ANTICIPATED NOR CONTR OLLED WHEN SUCH IS THE POSITION, AND IT IS OFFICIALLY SO NOTIFIED BY THE G OVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE COVID-19 EPIDEMIC HAS BEEN NOTIFIED AS A DISASTER UNDER THE NATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT ACT, 2005, AND ALSO IN THE LIGHT OF THE DISCUSSIONS ABOVE, THE PERIOD DURING WHICH LOCKDOWN WAS IN FORCE CAN BE ANYTHING BUT AN ORDIN ARY PERIOD. 10. IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE DISCUSSIONS, WE ARE OF THE CONSIDERED VIEW THAT RATHER THAN TAKING A PEDANTIC VIEW OF THE RULE REQU IRING PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS WITHIN 90 DAYS, DISREGARDING THE IMPORTANT FACT THA T THE ENTIRE COUNTRY WAS IN LOCKDOWN, WE SHOULD COMPUTE THE PERIOD OF 90 DAYS B Y EXCLUDING AT LEAST THE PERIOD DURING WHICH THE LOCKDOWN WAS IN FORCE. WE MUST FAC TOR GROUND REALITIES IN MIND WHILE INTERPRETING THE TIME LIMIT FOR THE PRONOUNCE MENT OF THE ORDER. LAW IS NOT BROODING OMNIPOTENCE IN THE SKY. IT IS A PRAGMATIC TOOL OF THE SOCIAL ORDER. THE TENETS OF LAW BEING ENACTED ON THE BASIS OF PRAGMAT ISM, AND THAT IS HOW THE LAW IS REQUIRED TO INTERPRETED. THE INTERPRETATION SO ASSI GNED BY US IS NOT ONLY IN CONSONANCE WITH THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF RULE 34(5) BUT IS ALSO A PRAGMATIC APPROACH AT A TIME WHEN A DISASTER, NOTIFIED UNDER THE DISAS TER MANAGEMENT ACT 2005, IS CAUSING UNPRECEDENTED DISRUPTION IN THE FUNCTIONING OF OUR JUSTICE DELIVERY SYSTEM. UNDOUBTEDLY, IN THE CASE OF OTTERS CLUB VS DIT [(2017) 392 ITR 244 (BOM)], HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT DID NOT APPROVE AN ORDER BEING PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL BEYOND A PERIOD OF 90 DAYS, BUT THEN IN THE PRESENT SITUATION HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT ITSELF HAS, VIDE JUDGMENT DATED 15TH APRIL 20 20, HELD THAT DIRECTED WHILE CALCULATING THE TIME FOR DISPOSAL OF MATTERS MADE T IMEBOUND BY THIS COURT, THE PERIOD FOR WHICH THE ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 CO NTINUES TO OPERATE SHALL ITA NO.352/MUM/2019 M/S. DUTY FREE DISTRIBUTION SERVICES PVT. LTD. ASSESSMENT YEAR :2014-15 7 BE ADDED AND TIME SHALL STAND EXTENDED ACCORDINGLY . THE EXTRAORDINARY STEPS TAKEN SUO MOTU BY HONBLE JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT AND HONBLE SUPREME COURT ALSO INDICATE THAT THIS PERIOD OF LOCKDOWN CANNOT B E TREATED AS AN ORDINARY PERIOD DURING WHICH THE NORMAL TIME LIMITS ARE TO REMAIN I N FORCE. IN OUR CONSIDERED VIEW, EVEN WITHOUT THE WORDS ORDINARILY, IN THE LIGHT O F THE ABOVE ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL POSITION, THE PERIOD DURING WHICH LOCKOUT WAS IN FO RCE IS TO EXCLUDED FOR THE PURPOSE OF TIME LIMITS SET OUT IN RULE 34(5) OF THE APPELLA TE TRIBUNAL RULES, 1963. VIEWED THUS, THE EXCEPTION, TO 90-DAY TIME-LIMIT FOR PRONO UNCEMENT OF ORDERS, INHERENT IN RULE 34(5)(C), WITH RESPECT TO THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS WITHIN NINETY DAYS, CLEARLY COMES INTO PLAY IN THE PRESENT CASE. OF COURSE, THE RE IS NO, AND THERE CANNOT BE ANY, BAR ON THE DISCRETION OF THE BENCHES TO REFIX THE MATTERS FOR CLARIFICATIONS BECAUSE OF CONSIDERABLE TIME LAG BETWEEN THE POINT OF TIME WHEN THE HEARING IS CONCLUDED AND THE POINT OF TIME WHEN THE ORDER THER EON IS BEING FINALIZED, BUT THEN, IN OUR CONSIDERED VIEW, NO SUCH EXERCISE WAS REQUIR ED TO BE CARRIED OUT ON THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. DERIVING STRENGTH FROM THE RATIO OF AFORESAID DECIS ION, WE EXCLUDE THE PERIOD OF LOCKDOWN WHILE COMPUTING THE LIMITATION P ROVIDED UNDER RULE 34(5) AND PROCEED WITH PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE ORDER. CONCLUSION 6. THE APPEAL STANDS DISMISSED. THIS ORDER IS PRONOUNCED UNDER RULE 34(4) OF THE IN COME TAX (APPELLATE TRIBUNAL) RULES, 1962, BY PLACING THE DETAILS OF TH E SAME ON THE NOTICE BOARD. SD/- SD/- (AMARJIT SINGH) (M ANOJ KUMAR AGGARWAL) / JUDICIAL MEMBER / ACCOUNTANT MEMBER MUMBAI; DATED : 06/07/2020 SR.PS, JAISY VARGHESE ITA NO.352/MUM/2019 M/S. DUTY FREE DISTRIBUTION SERVICES PVT. LTD. ASSESSMENT YEAR :2014-15 8 ! / COPY OF THE ORDER FORWARDED TO : 1. !# / THE APPELLANT 2. $%!# / THE RESPONDENT 3. + ( ) / THE CIT(A) 4. + / CIT CONCERNED 5. ,-$. , . , / DR, ITAT, MUMBAI 6. -/01 / GUARD FILE / BY ORDER, / (DY./ASSTT.REGISTRAR) , / ITAT, MUMBAI.