Appeal Details
Counselvise Citation
[2024] 100 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 2263 (ITAT-MUMBAI)
Assessee PAN
Bench
Appeal Number
CRN Number
Duration Of Justice
7 month(s) 17 day(s)
Appellant
Respondent
Appeal Type
Income Tax Appeal
Pronouncement Date
20-05-2024
Appeal Filed By
Assessee
Order Result
PartlyAllowed
Bench Allotted
D
Next Hearing Date
13-05-2024
Assessment Year
2010-2011
Appeal Filed On
03-10-2023
Judgement Text
IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL “D” BENCH, MUMBAI BEFORE SHRI PRASHANT MAHARISHI, AM AND SHRI SUNIL KUMAR SINGH, JM ITA No. 3555/Mum/2023 (Assess me nt Year: 2010-11) ITA No. 3556/Mum/2023 (Assess me nt Year: 2009-10) Dines h So mat mal Dhokar, Bldg No.1, Roo m No.6, 1 st Fl oor, Vai bha v C Wing, Dedarka r Co mpound, Tar deo R oad, Mumbai-400 034 Vs. Inc o me Ta x Offic er Ward 19( 1) (1) Mu mbai-400 (Appellant) (Respondent) PAN No. AAAPD8605N Assessee by : Ms. Ridhisha Jain, AR Revenue by : S mt. Mahita Nair, DR Date of hearing: 14. 05.2024 Date of pronouncement : 21. 05.2024 O R D E R PER PRASHANT MAHARISHI, AM: 01. ITA No. 3556/Mum/2023 is filed by the assessee for A.Y. 2009-10 against the appellate order passed by the National Faceless Appeal Centre, Delhi [the learned CIT (A)] dated 5 th September, 2023, wherein the appeal filed by the assessee against the penalty order passed on 16 th February, 2022, under Section 271(1)(c) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act), was dismissed and therefore, assessee is in appeal. 02. Assessee has raised following grounds of appeal :- Page | 2 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 “1. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the notice dated 18 th March, 2015, issued to the appellant without indicating that there was concealment of particulars of income or furnishing of incorrect particulars of such income will vitiate the penalty notice and subsequent proceedings and hence the same is invalid and illegal. 2. Without prejudice, on the facts and in law, the Hon'ble CIT (A) erred in confirming the penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act without appreciating the fact that penalty cannot be levied when income is determined on estimate basis.” 03. The brief facts of the case shows that assessee is an individual who filed his return of income on 15 th September, 2009, at the total income of ₹530,780/-. The original assessment was made under Section 143(3) of the Act on 28 th November, 2011, at total income of ₹625,180/-. Subsequently, based on the information received from the Director General of Income Tax, Investigation, Mumbai assessee was found to have obtained accommodation entries of bogus purchase bills amounting to ₹92,47,095/-. On hearing, reassessment order under Section 143(3) read with section 147 of the Act was passed on 19 th march, 2015, determining the total income of the assessee at ₹17,81,070/- by making addition of 12.5% of alleged bogus purchases. Reassessment order was challenged before the learned CIT (A) unsuccessfully and consequently, before the ITAT. As per the order of the ITAT dated 25 th October, 2021, in ITA No.2947/Mum/2019, the profit was estimated at 5%. Page | 3 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 04. Meanwhile as along with the reassessment order penalty proceedings was initiated and at the time of passing of penalty order the order of the learned CIT (A) confirming the addition at the rate of 12.5% of the bogus purchases was available. Penalty order under Section 271 of the Act was passed by Income Tax Officer, Ward 19(1)(4), Bombay on 29 th March, 2019, levying penalty of ₹357,170/- for furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income. 05. This penalty order was challenged before the learned Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), who dismissed the appeal of the assessee, confirming the levy of penalty. Therefore, the assessee has filed his appeal. 06. Similarly, in ITA No. 3555/Mum/2023, is also filed by the assessee for A.Y. 2010-11, wherein the assessee was found, who have obtained similar bogus bills purchases of ₹82,28,687/- and therefore, the return of income filed by the assessee on 10 th September, 2010, of ₹6,25,478/- was reopened by issue of notice under Section 148 of the Act and subsequently, reassessment order was passed wherein 12.5% of bogus purchases amounting to ₹10,28,586/- was added and total income of the assessee was reassessed at ₹16,54,060/- by an assessment order dated 31 st December, 2015. In the reassessment order the learned Assessing Officer has initiated the penalty proceedings, under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act for furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income leading to concealment of income chargeable to tax. Subsequently, the assessee challenged the assessment order before the learned CIT (A) without any success. Order of learned CIT (A) was challenged before the co-ordinate bench who passed an order on 25 th January, 2021, restricting the addition to the extent of 5% of gross profit. Meanwhile as the Page | 4 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 penalty proceedings were initiated, penalty order under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act was passed levying penalty of ₹76,280/- for concealment of income. The order was challenged before the learned CIT (A), wherein the penalty was confirmed. Therefore, the assessee is in appeal before us. 07. In both the appeals simple issue involve is that when the addition is confirmed on estimated basis on bogus purchases the penalty levied by the learned Assessing Officer and confirmed by the learned CIT (A) is sustainable or not. 08. As the facts and circumstances leading to the addition in both these appeals are similar, the learned Authorized Representative Ms. Ridhisha Jain, submitted a detailed written submission contesting the first ground of appeal stating that both the penalty orders are not sustainable in law for the reason that in the notice under Section 274 read with section 271 of the Act issued for A.Y. 2009-10 placed at page no. 11 of the Paper Book at 19 th March, 2015, and penalty notice issued under Section 274 read with section 271(1)(c) of the Act for A.Y. 2010-11 issued on 31 st December, 2015, placed at page no.11 of the Paper Book does not strike off any one of the twin charges against the assessee and therefore, such penalty notices are bad in law and therefore, the penalty orders passed by the lower authorities are not sustainable. She relied upon the full Bench decision of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in case of Mohamad Farah Mohd. Farhan A. Shaikh v. ACIT (2021) 434 ITR 1 (FB) (Bom) (HC). She referred to question no.1 at page no.56 and submitted that the issue is decided in favour of the assessee. Page | 5 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 09. She also submitted that when the addition was made on the basis of the estimation of income, the penalty cannot be levied under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act. She also referred to the decisions of the co- ordinate Benches in this case such as m/s ETCO profiles pvt. Ltd. Versus assistant commissioner of income tax cc-35, Mumbai I.T.A. No. 5351/Mum/2012 and MUM gems V ACIT ITA No 1063 /Mum/2023. 010. The learned Departmental Representative referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in case of Veena Estate Pvt. Ltd. and submitted that the defect in the notice cannot prejudice the assessee. 011. We have carefully considered the rival contentions and perused the orders of the lower authorities. Facts clearly shows that issue of non striking of any of twin charges were not raised before ld AO or CIT (A) for both the years. It is argued before us for the first time. It is also a fact that assessee was fully aware why penalty proceedings are initiated. It is also not shown before us that what prejudiced is caused to the assessee by not striking off one of the twin charges in a notice issued u/s 274 RWs 271 (1) (c) of the Act. Thus, It is apparent that notwithstanding the defective notice, the assessee was fully aware of the reason as to why the Assessing Officer sought to impose penalty. Thus, significant features of the case in hand are that penalty proceedings were initiated during the assessment proceedings. The Assessing Officer had although issued a notice without a tick mark, it appears that both the limbs under section 271(1)(c) namely "concealment of particulars of income" and "furnishing inaccurate particulars of such income" were attracted in the facts of the case. Further At no point of time, the assessee had a Page | 6 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 grievance in regard to the section 271(1) (c) notice being in any manner vague, ambiguous and not being understood by the assessee in regard to the limbs under section 271(1)(c) being attracted. The corollary to this, was that neither before the Assessing Officer, nor before the appellate authority, the assessee raised such a plea, that the notice proposing to impose penalty on the assessee, was in any manner defective. Moreover, assessee had wholeheartedly participated at the hearing before the Assessing Officer and The notice was in fact, responded by the assessee on both the counts as falling under section 271(1)(c) of the IT Act. 012. Of course, In the present case, the notices under Section 274 read with section 271(1)(c) of the Act placed in the paper book clearly shows that the learned Assessing Officer has not struck off any of the alternative twin charges. Therefore, it was contended that the issue is squarely covered in favour of the assessee by the decision of the Full Bench of Hon'ble Bombay High Court in [2021] 125 taxmann.com 253 (Bombay)/[2021] 280 Taxman 334 (Bombay) wherein in answer to question no.1, it held as under:- “Answers: Question No. 1: If the assessment order clearly records satisfaction for imposing penalty on one or the other, or both grounds mentioned in Section 271(1)(c), does a mere defect in the notice—not striking off the irrelevant matter—vitiate the penalty proceedings? 181. It does. The primary burden lies on the Revenue. In the assessment proceedings, it forms an opinion, prima facie or otherwise, to launch penalty proceedings against the assessee. But that translates into action only through the statutory notice under section 271(1)(c), read with section 274 of IT Act. True, the assessment proceedings form the basis for the penalty proceedings, but they are not composite proceedings to draw strength from each other. Nor can each cure the other's defect. Page | 7 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 A penalty proceeding is a corollary; nevertheless, it must stand on its own. These proceedings culminate under a different statutory scheme that remains distinct from the assessment proceedings. Therefore, the assessee must be informed of the grounds of the penalty proceedings only through statutory notice. An omnibus notice suffers from the vice of vagueness. 182. More particularly, a penal provision, even with civil consequences, must be construed strictly. And ambiguity, if any, must be resolved in the affected assessee's favour. 183. Therefore, we answer the first question to the effect that Goa Dourado Promotions and other cases have adopted an approach more in consonance with the statutory scheme. That means we must hold that Kaushalya does not lay down the correct proposition of law." 013. Coming to the decision of the Hon'ble High Court in case of Veena Estate Pvt. Ltd. [2024] 158 taxmann.com 341 (Bombay)/[2024] 461 ITR 483 (Bom) , Hon'ble High Court held that where the assessee never having raised any objection from very inception on account of defect in notice, the assessee was prevented from raising such grounds, without showing prejudice caused to him. Honourable Jurisdictional high court after considering various decision of Honourable Supreme court and full bench decision in case Modhd. Farhan Seikh (supra) held as under :- " 41. It is a settled principle of law that any breach of the principles of natural justice cannot be addressed by a straight jacket formula. Any complaint of breach of principles of natural justice would be required to be considered in the facts of the case. When the facts of the case would demonstrate it, to be an undisputed position, that no real prejudice was caused to a party aggrieved by an order, being alleged to be breach of the principles of natural justice, the Court would certainly not interfere. Such complaint and/or a genuine grievance of the breach of principles of natural justice accompanied with the prejudice it would cause, is required to be made with utmost promptness. Any delay in making such complaint or raising a grievance would give rise to a position that such grievance is either not genuine or is belated and/or a Page | 8 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 technical plea being agitated. In Natwar Singh (supra), the Supreme Court while observing on the test of real prejudice, observed that there is no such thing as "technical infringement of natural justice", as what is necessarily to be seen is that there must have been caused some real prejudice to the complainant. It was observed that the requirements of natural justice must depend inter alia as involved in the facts and circumstances of the case and the nature of the inquiry, etc. The relevant observations of the Supreme Court are required to be noted which read thus:- "26. Even in the application of the doctrine of fair play there must be real flexibility. There must also have been caused some real prejudice to the complainant; there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject matter to be dealt with and so forth. Can the Courts supplement the statutory procedures with requirements over and above those specified? In order to ensure a fair hearing, Courts can insist and require additional steps as long a such steps would not frustrate the apparent purpose of the legislation." (emphasis supplied) 42. In the present case, applying such principles of natural justice, the assessee at no point of time, had discharged the basic burden of prejudice being caused to it. In State Bank of Patiala (supra), the Court observed that the respondent in such case, neither before the enquiry officer nor before the trial Court, or the appellate Court, had protested that he was denied of an adequate opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses effectively or to defend himself properly on account of non-supply of the statements of witnesses. In such circumstances, the Court observed that it was possible to say that there has been a substantial compliance of the enquiry procedure. The Court also observed that the question would be whether each and every violation of rules or regulations governing the enquiry automatically vitiated the enquiry and the punishment awarded or whether the test of substantial compliance can be invoked in cases of such violation and whether the issue has to be examined from the point of view of prejudice. Answering such issue, the Court observed that Page | 9 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 the test in such cases should be one of prejudice. The Court also observed that there may be some procedural provisions, as also there may be provisions, which are fundamental in nature, in which case the theory of substantial compliance may not be applicable as discussed in paragraph 11 of the said decision. In the context of prejudice, the Court, referring to the decision in Jankinath Sarangi v. State of Orissa [1969] 3 SCC 392, and in the case of K. L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India [1984] 1 SCC 43, as also in the case of Managing Director, ECIL v. B Karunkar [1994] 4 SCC 727, held that principles of natural justice cannot be reduced to any hard and fast formulae. The relevant observations in that regard are required to be noted which read thus:- "28. The decisions cited above make one thing clear, viz., principles of natural justice cannot be to reduced to any hard and fast formulae. As said in Russell c. Duke of Norfolk [1949 (1) All.E.R.109] way back in 1949, these principle cannot be put in a straight-jacket. Their applicability depends upon the context and the facts and circumstances of each case. [See Mahender Singh Gill v. Chief Election commissioner (1978 (2) S.C.R.272)]. The objective is to ensure a fair hearing, a fair deal, to the person whose rights are going to be affected. [See A.K.Roy v. Union of India 1982 (1) S.C.C.271) and Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union (1981 (1) S.C.C.664)]. As pointed out by this Court in A.K.Kraipak L Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (1969 (2) S.C.C.262), the dividing line between quasi- judicial function and administrative function [affecting the rights of a party] has become quite thin and almost indistinguishable a fact also emphasized by House of Lords in C.C.C.U. v. Civil Service Union [supra] where the principles of natural justice and a fair hearing were treated as synonymous. Whichever the Cases it is from the standpoint of fair hearing - applying the test of prejudice, as it may be called - that any and every complaint of violation of the rule of audi alteram partem should be examined. Indeed, there may be situations where observance of the requirement of prior notice/no hearing may defeat the very proceeding - which may result in grave prejudice to Page | 10 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 public interest. It is for this reason that the rule of post- decisional hearing as a sufficient compliance with natural justice was evolved in some of the cases, e.g., Liberty Oil Mills v. Union of India (1984 (3) S.C.C.465). There may also be cases where the public interest or the interests of the security of State or other similar considerations may make it inadvisable to observe the rule of audi alteram partem altogether [as in the case of situations contemplated by clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to Article 311(2)] or to disclose the material on which a particular action is being taken. There may indeed be any number of varying situations which it is not possible for anyone to foresee. In our respectful opinion, the principles emerging from the decided cases can be stated in the following terms in relation to the disciplinary orders and enquiries: a distinction ought to be made between violation of the principle of natural justice, audi alteram partem, as such and violation of a facet of the said principle. In other words, distinction is between "no notice"/"no hearing" and "no adequate hearing" or to put it in different words, "no opportunity" and "no adequate opportunity". To illustrate - take a case where the person is dismissed from service without hearing him altogether [as in Ridge v. Baldwin]. It would be a case falling under the first category and the order of dismissal would be invalid or void, if one chooses to use that expression [Calvin v.Carr]. But where the person is dismissed from service, say, without supplying him a copy of the enquiry officer's report [Managing Director, E.C.I.L. v.B.Karunkar] or without affording him a due opportunity of cross-examining a witness [K.L.Tripathi] it would be a case falling in the latter category - violation of a facet of the said rule of natural justice - in which case, the validity of the order has to be tested on the touch-stone of prejudice, i.e., whether, all in all, the person concerned did nor did not have a fair hearing. It would not be correct - in the light of The above decisions to say that for any and every violation of a facet of natural justice or of a rule incorporating such facet, the order passed is altogether void and ought to be set aside without further enquiry. Page | 11 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 In our opinion, the approach and test adopted in B.Karunkar should govern all cases where the complaint is not that there was no hearing [no notice, no opportunity and no hearing] but one of not affording a proper hearing [i.e., adequate or a full hearing] or of violation of a procedural rule or requirement governing the enquiry; the complaint should be examined on the touch-stone of prejudice as aforesaid. 29. The matter can be looked at from the angle of justice or of natural justice also. The object of the principles of natural justice - which are now understood as synonymous with the obligation to provide a fair hearing - is to ensure that justice is done, that there is no failure of justice and that every person whose rights are going to be affected by the proposed action gets a fair hearing. The said objective can be tested with reference to sub-clause (iii) concerned herein. It says that copies of statements of witnesses should be furnished to the delinquent officer "not later than three days before the commencement of the examination of the witnesses by the Inquiring Authority". Now take a case - not the one before us where the copies of statements are supplied only two days before the commencement of examination of witnesses instead of three days. The delinquent officer does not object; he does not say that two days are not sufficient for him to prepare himself for cross- examining the witnesesses. The eqnuiry is concluded and he is punished. Is the entire enquiry and the punishment awarded to be set aside on the only ground that instead of three days before, the statements were supplied only two days before the commencement of the examination of witnesses? It is suggested by the Appellate Court that sub-clause (iii) is mandatory since it uses the expression "shall". Merely because, word "shall" is used, it is not possible to agree that it is mandatory. We shall, however, assume it to be so for the purpose of this discussion. But then even a mandatory requirement can be waived by the person concerned if such mandatory provision is his interest and not in public interest, ......." (Emphasis Supplied) Page | 12 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 43. Alok Kumar (supra), the Court considered the doctrine of de facto prejudice and considered a contention as urged on behalf of the appellant therein, that the prejudice is a sine qua non for vitiation of any disciplinary order. In such context, the Court observed as under:- "83. Earlier, in some of the cases, this Court had taken the view that breach of principle of natural justice was in itself a prejudice and no other `de facto' prejudice needs to be proved. In regard to statutory rules, the prominent view was that the violation of mandatory statutory rules would tantamount to prejudice but where the Rule is merely dictatory the element of de facto prejudice needs to be pleaded and shown. With the development of law, rigidity in these Rules is somewhat relaxed. The instance of de facto prejudice has been accepted as an essential feature where there is violation of non-mandatory rules or violation of natural justice as it is understood in its common parlance. Taking an instance, in a departmental inquiry where the Department relies upon a large number of documents majority of which are furnished and an opportunity is granted to the delinquent officer to defend himself except that some copies of formal documents had not been furnished to the delinquent. In that event the onus is upon the employee to show that non-furnishing of these formal documents have resulted in de facto prejudice and he has been put to a disadvantage as a result thereof. 85. The Doctrine of de facto prejudice has been applied both in English as well as in Indian Law. To frustrate the departmental inquiries on a hyper technical approach have not found favour with the Courts in the recent times. In the case of S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [1980 (4) SCC 379], a three Judge Bench of this Court while following the principle in Ridge v. Baldwin stated that if upon admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion was possible, then in such a case that principle of natural justice was in its self prejudice would not apply. Thus, every case would have to be examined on its own merits and keeping in view the statutory rules applying to such departmental proceedings. The Court in S.L. Kapoor (supra) held as under: Page | 13 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 "18. In Ridge v. Baldwin [1964 AC 40, 68 : 1963 2 All ER 66, 73] One of the arguments was that even if the appellant have been heard by the Watch Committee nothing that he could have said could have made any difference. The House of Lords observed at (p. 68): "It may be convenient at this point to deal with an argument that, even if as a general rule a watch committee must hear a constable in its own defence before dismissing him this case was so clear that nothing that the appellant could have said could have made any difference. It is at least very doubtful whether that could be accepted as an excuse. But, even if it could, the watch committee would, in my view, fail on the facts. It may well be that no reasonably body of men could have reinstated the appellant. But at between the other two courses open to the watch committee the case is not so clear. Certainly, on the facts, as we know them the watch committee could reasonably have decided to forfeit the appellant's pension rights, but I could not hold that they would have acted wrongly or wholly unreasonably if they have in the exercise of their discretion decided to take a more lenient course." 86. Expanding this principle further, this Court in the case of K.L. Tripathi v. State Bank of India [(1984) 1 SCC 43] held as under: ".... It is not possible to lay down rigid rules as to when the principles of natural justice are to apply, nor as to their scope and extent. There must also have been some real prejudice to the complainant; there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice. The requirements of natural justice must depend on the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter to be dealt with, and so forth." 87. In the case of ECIL v. B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727], this Court noticed the existing law and said that the theory of reasonable opportunity and the principles of natural justice have been evolved to uphold the rule of law and to assist the individual to vindicate his just rights. They are neither incantations to be invoked nor rites to be performed on all and sundry occasions. Whether, in fact, prejudice has been caused to the employee or not on account of denial of report to Page | 14 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 him, has to be considered on the facts and circumstances of each case. The Court has clarified even the stage to which the departmental proceedings ought to be reverted in the event the order of punishment is set aside for these reasons. 89. The well established canons controlling the field of bias in service jurisprudence can reasonably extended to the element of prejudice as well in such matters. Prejudice de facto should not be based on a mere apprehension or even on a reasonable suspicion. It is important that the element of prejudice should exist as a matter of fact or there should be such definite inference of likelihood of prejudice flowing from such default, which relates statutory violations. It will not be permissible to set aside the departmental inquiries in any of these classes merely on the basis of apprehended prejudice." (emphasis supplied) 44. It is well settled that in judging the validity of an adjudicatory order, when the complaint is of non compliance of the principles of natural justice or in cases where the attack is not on the ground of bias, a distinction is required to be drawn between cases of no notice or no hearing, and cases of no fair hearing or no adequate hearing. If the defect is of the former category, it will automatically make the order invalid but if the defect is of a latter category, it will have to be further examined whether the defect has resulted in prejudice and failure of justice and it is only when such a conclusion is reached that the order may be declared invalid. (See. Municipal Corporation v. Inderjit Singh AIR 2009 SC 195; P.D. Agrawal v. State Bank Of India AIR 2006 SC 2064; Haryana Financial Corporation v. Kailash Chandra Ahuja [2008] 9 SCC 33; Union of India v. Mustafa & Najibai Trading Co. 1998 taxmann.com 667 (SC)/AIR 1998 SC 2526. Some of these decisions can be discussed. 45. In the above context the Supreme Court in Inderjit Singh (supra) observed thus:- 17. In Alighar Muslim University itself, the Court noticed the decision of the Court in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan wherein it was held that non- compliance with the principles of natural justice by itself causes prejudice. No doubt, the development of law in the field would have also to be kept in mind. Page | 15 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 The said decision, however, was rendered in the facts of the said case as it was a case of overstay of leave by an employee. It was found that no prejudice had been caused to the petitioner therein. Mr. Patwalia places strong reliance upon para 21 of the said decision which reads as under: (Alighar Muslim University case, SCC p. 539, para 21) "21. As pointed recently in M. C. Mehta v. Union of India there can be certain situations in which an order passed in violation of natural justice need not be set aside under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. For example where no prejudice is caused to the person concerned, interference under Article 226 is not necessary. Similarly, if the quashing of the order which is in breach of natural justice is likely to result in revival of another order which is in itself illegal as in Gadde Venkateshwara Rao v. Govt. of A.P. it is not necessary to quash the order merely because of violation of principles of natural justice...... " 46. In Mustafa & Najibai Trading Co. (supra) the Supreme Court in the context of section 124 of the Customs Act which provides for issuance of a show cause notice, before confiscation of goods observed that in making a complaint of breach of audi alteram partem, the test of prejudice is required to be made out by the owner whose goods are to be confiscated. In such context, the Court observed thus: "35. Section 124 of the Act, which incorporates the rule of audi alteram partem, one of the two basic tenets of the principles of natural justice, does not have the effect of making any alteration in the nature of these penalties. There may be situations where the goods are found to be smuggled goods and are seized but the identity of the owner of the goods is not known. Can it be said that since notice cannot be issued to the owner of the goods under section 124 of the Act, the goods which are found to be smuggled goods cannot be confiscated under section 111 of the Act? In our view, this question must be answered in the negative because confiscation of goods under section 111 of the Act is a penalty in rem which attaches to the goods which are the subject matter of Page | 16 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 the proceedings for confiscation and if it is found that the goods are liable to be confiscated under section 111 of the Act, they can be confiscated without ascertaining their real owner. Moreover, in so far as the rule of audi alteram partem is concerned, the position is well settled that an order passed in disregard of the said principle would not be invalidated if it can be shown that as a result of denial of the opportunity contemplated by the said rule the person seeking to challenge the order has not suffered any prejudice. Since section 124 of the Act incorporates the said principle of natural justice, failure to give the notice to the owner of goods would not, by itself, invalidate an order of confiscation. What has to be seen is whether the owner of the goods has suffered prejudice on account of the failure on the part of the officer passing the order for confiscation of goods. The owner of goods ordered to be confiscated cannot be said to have suffered any prejudice in a case where notice has been given to the person responsible for the alleged contravention on which the order for confiscation of goods is founded and who alone is in a position to offer an requirement regarding issuing of notice to the owner of the goods under section 124 cannot therefore, be construed as a mandatory requirement so as to have the effect of invalidating an order. An order of confiscation would not be rendered invalid if there is substantial compliance with the requirements of section 124 in the sense hat before passing an order of confiscation a notice has been given either to the owner of the goods or a person who is responsible for the contravention on which the order for confiscation of goods is founded and who alone is in a position to offer an explanation "39. Decision of this Court in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [(1980) 4 SCC 379] whereupon Mr Rao placed strong reliance to contend that non- observance of principle of natural justice itself causes prejudice or the same should not be read "as it causes difficulty of prejudice", cannot be said to be applicable in the instant case. The principles of natural justice, as noticed hereinbefore, have Page | 17 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 undergone a sea change. In view of the decisions of this Court in State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma [(1996) 3 SCC 364 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 717] and Rajendra Singh v. State of M.P. [(1996) 5 SCC 460] the principle of law is that some real prejudice must have been caused to the complainant. The Court has shifted from its earlier concept that even a small violation shall result in the order being rendered a nullity. To the principle/doctrine of audi alteram partem, a clear distinction has been laid down between the cases where there was no hearing at all and the cases where there was mere technical infringement of the principle. The Court applies the principles of natural justice having regard to the fact situation obtaining in each case. It is not applied in a vacuum without reference to the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. It is no unruly horse. It cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. (See Viveka Nand Sethi v. Chairman, J&K Bank Ltd. [(2005) 5 SCC 337 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 689] and State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi [(2006) 1 SCC 667 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 190 : JT (2006) 1 SC 19] . See also Mohd. Sartaj v. State of U.P. [(2006) 2 SCC 315 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 295 : (2006) 1 Scale 265] ) 48. In Kailash Chandra Ahuja (supra), in the context of prejudice, the Supreme Court taking a review of principles of law under the Indian jurisprudence as also under the English Law, reiterated the principles that the recent trend, however, is of the test of prejudice. The following observations of the Court are required to be noted:- "31. At the same time, however, effect of violation of the rule of audi alteram partem has to be considered. Even if hearing is not afforded to the person who is sought to be affected or penalised, can it not be argued that "notice would have served no purpose" or "hearing could not have made difference" or "the person could not have offered any defence whatsoever". In this connection, it is interesting to note that under the English law, it was held few years before that non-compliance with principles of natural justice would make the order null and void and no further inquiry was necessary. Page | 18 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 32. In the celebrated decision of Ridge v. Baldwin [1964 AC 40 : (1963) 2 WLR 935 : (1963) 2 All ER 66 (HL)] it was contended that an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent would have served no purpose. Negativing the contention, however, Lord Reid stated: (All ER p. 73 F- G) "It may be convenient at this point to deal with an argument that, even if as a general rule a watch committee must hear a constable in his own defence before dismissing him, this case was so clear that nothing that the appellant could have said could have made any difference. It is at least very doubtful whether that could be accepted as an excuse." (emphasis supplied) 33. Wade and Forsyth in their classic work, Administrative Law, (9th Edn.) pp. 506-09 also stated that if such argument is upheld, the Judges may be tempted to refuse relief on the ground that a fair hearing could have made no difference to the result. "But in principle it is vital that the procedure and the merits should be kept strictly apart, since otherwise the merits may be prejudiced unfairly." (emphasis supplied) 34. This Court expressed the same opinion. In Board of High School & Intermediate Education v. Chitra Srivastava [(1970) 1 SCC 121] , the Board cancelled the examination of the petitioner who had actually appeared at the examination on the ground that there was shortage in attendance at lectures. Admittedly, no notice was given to her before taking the action. On behalf of the Board it was contended that the facts were not in dispute and therefore, "no useful purpose would have been served" by giving a show-cause notice to the petitioner. This Court, however, set aside the decision of the Board, holding that the Board was acting in a quasi-judicial capacity and, therefore, it ought to have observed the principles of natural justice. 35. In S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [(1980) 4 SCC 379] , rejecting the argument that observance of natural justice would have made no difference, this Court said:(SCC p. 395, para 24) Page | 19 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 "24. ... The non-observance of natural justice is itself prejudice to any man and proof of prejudice independently of proof of denial of natural justice is unnecessary. It ill comes from a person who has denied justice that the person who has been denied justice is not prejudiced." (emphasis supplied) 36. The recent trend, however, is of "prejudice". Even in those cases where procedural requirements have not been complied with, the action has not been held ipso facto illegal, unlawful or void unless it is shown that non-observance had prejudicially affected the applicant. 37. In Malloch v. Aberdeen Corpn. [(1971) 1 WLR 1578 : (1971) 2 All ER 1278 (HL)] , Lord Reid said: (All ER p. 1283a-b) "... it was argued that to have afforded a hearing to the appellant before dismissing him would have been a useless formality because whatever he might have said could have made no difference. If that could be clearly demonstrated it might be a good answer." (emphasis supplied) Lord Guest agreed with the above statement, went further and stated: (All ER p.1291b-c) "... A great many arguments might have been put forward but if none of them had any chance of success then I can see no good reason why the respondents should have given the appellant a hearing, nor can I see that he was prejudiced in any way." (emphasis supplied) 38. In Jankinath Sarangi v. State of Orissa [(1969) 3 SCC 392] it was contended that natural justice was violated inasmuch as the petitioner was not allowed to lead evidence and the material gathered behind his back was used in determining his guilt. Dealing with the contention, the Court stated: (SCC p. 394, para 5) "5. ... We have to look to what actual prejudice has been caused to a person by the supposed denial to him of a particular right." (emphasis supplied) 39. In B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704] this Court Page | 20 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 considered several cases and held that it was only if the court/tribunal finds that the furnishing of the report "would have made a difference" to the result in the case that it should set aside the order of punishment. The law laid down in B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704] was reiterated and followed in subsequent cases also (vide State Bank of Patiala v. S.K. Sharma [(1996) 3 SCC 364 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 717] , M.C. Mehta v. Union of India [(1999) 6 SCC 237] ). 40. In Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali Khan [(2000) 7 SCC 529 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 965] the relevant rule provided automatic termination of service of an employee on unauthorised absence for certain period. M remained absent for more than five years and, hence, the post was deemed to have been vacated by him. M challenged the order being violative of natural justice as no opportunity of hearing was afforded before taking the action. Though the Court held that the rules of natural justice were violated, it refused to set aside the order on the ground that no prejudice was caused to M. Referring to several cases, considering the theory of "useless" or "empty" formality and noting "admitted or undisputed" facts, the Court held that the only conclusion which could be drawn was that had M been given a notice, it "would not have made any difference" and, hence, no prejudice had been caused to M. 41. In Ajit Kumar Nag v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [(2005) 7 SCC 764 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 1020] , speaking for a three-Judge Bench, one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) stated: (SCC pp. 785-86, para 44) "44. We are aware of the normal rule that a person must have a fair trial and a fair appeal and he cannot be asked to be satisfied with an unfair trial and a fair appeal. We are also conscious of the general principle that pre-decisional hearing is better and should always be preferred to post-decisional hearing. We are further aware that it has been stated that apart from Laws of Men, Laws of God also observe the rule of audi alteram partem. It has been stated that the first hearing in human history was given in the Garden of Eden. God did not pass sentence upon Adam and Eve before Page | 21 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 giving an opportunity to show cause as to why they had eaten the forbidden fruit. (See R. v. University of Cambridge [(1723) 1 Str 557 : 93 ER 698] .) But we are also aware that the principles of natural justice are not rigid or immutable and hence they cannot be imprisoned in a straitjacket. They must yield to and change with exigencies of situations. They must be confined within their limits and cannot be allowed to run wild. It has been stated: ' "To do a great right" after all, it is permissible sometimes "to do a little wrong".' [Per Mukharji, C.J. in Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India [(1990) 1 SCC 613] (Bhopal Gas Disaster), SCC p. 705, para 124.] While interpreting legal provisions, a court of law cannot be unmindful of the hard realities of life. In our opinion, the approach of the Court in dealing with such cases should be pragmatic rather than pedantic, realistic rather than doctrinaire, functional rather than formal and practical rather than 'precedential'." (emphasis supplied) 42. Recently, in P.D. Agrawal v. SBI [(2006) 8 SCC 776 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 43] this Court restated the principles of natural justice and indicated that they are flexible and in the recent times, they had undergone a "sea change". If there is no prejudice to the employee, an action cannot be set aside merely on the ground that no hearing was afforded before taking a decision by the authority. .. ... ... .. ... 45. In the instant case, no finding has been recorded by the High Court that prejudice had been caused to the delinquent employee, the writ petitioner. According to the High Court, such prejudice is "writ large". In our view, the above observation and conclusion is not in consonance with the decisions referred to above, including a decision of the Constitution Bench in B. Karunakar [(1993) 4 SCC 727 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 1184 : (1993) 25 ATC 704] . The view of the High Court, hence, cannot be upheld. The impugned order, therefore, deserves to be set aside and is accordingly set aside. 46. Since the High Court has not considered the second question, namely, whether failure to supply the report of the inquiry officer had or had not Page | 22 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 resulted in prejudice to the delinquent employee, ends of justice would be met with if we remit the matter to the High Court to decide the said question." (emphasis supplied) 49. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Madhyamam Broadcasting Limited v. Union of India 2023 (3) BCR 685 the law in regard to the compliance of principles of natural justice and the test of prejudice which is required to be met by a party, complaining of the breach of principle of natural justice have been reiterated. In paragraph 42 of the said decision, the Court has observed that the party alleging violation of the principles of natural justice is required to prove that the administrative action has violated the principles of natural justice and such non-compliance of the requirement of natural justice has prejudiced a party. It was observed that the Courts, while assessing prejudice, need to determine if compliance of the principles of natural justice, could have benefited the party in securing a just outcome. The Court further observed that non-compliance of every facet and component of natural justice does not render the procedure unreasonable and the claimant must prove that the effect of non-compliance of a component of natural justice is so grave that the core of the right to a fair trial is infringed while making an argument from a component-facet perspective. 50. Such principles of law are enunciated, recognised and followed in cases which may directly affect the livelihood of a person, who would face a termination from service. In our case, we are concerned with a penalty under the IT Act which is a civil penalty in regard to which the above principles which are salutary would apply with full force as they concern statutory adjudication. 51. Thus, the principles of law as laid down by the Supreme Court are clear, that mere breach of principles of natural justice is not in itself a prejudice and in fact it is de facto prejudice which is required to be proved. Applying such principles to the facts of the present case, it is clear that the notice issued to the assessee by the Assessing Officer under section 271(1)(c) itself not being disputed by the assessee, to be in any manner in breach of the principles of natural justice, much less on the ground that it does not clarify as to which limb of the provisions was attracted, no fault could be found in the Assessing Officer proceeding to pass an order on such notice. In our opinion, accepting such a plea as urged on Page | 23 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 behalf of the assessee would amount to accepting a place of technical infringement of natural justice, as even remotely it was not the case of the assessee before any of the forums below that the notice in question was defective. This even assuming and as seen from the aforesaid decisions, that the law is well settled in a series of decisions, that even a mandatory provision can be waived. Thus, to accept such belated plea of a defective notice, would not be a permissible course of action for the Court, considering the well settled principles of law, as laid down by the Supreme Court as noted above. 52. We may also observe that arguments are advanced by both the sides on the view taken by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Mohd. Farhan A. Shaik (supra). We discuss the judgment of the Full Bench. In such case, the Full Bench was considering a precedential cleavage in view of the two decisions of this Court namely in Smt. Kaushalya (supra) and in case of Goa Coastal Resorts and Recreation (P.) Ltd. (supra). The order passed by the Division Bench referring the issue to the Full Bench is required to be noted which reads thus:- "Heard Mr. S. R. Rivankar, learned Senior Advocate with Mr. Rama Rivankar for the Appellant in both these Appeals and Ms. Amira Razaq, learned Standing Counsel for the Respondent-Income Tax Department in both these Appeals. 2. The issue involved in both these Appeals is, whether mere failure to tick mark the applicable grounds in the printed form in which the notice is issued under section 271 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (IT Act), vitiates the entire penalty proceedings ? 3. The following decisions rendered by the Division Benches of this Court, relied upon by Mr. Rivankar, the learned Senior Advocate for the Appellant, supports the view that it does :- (1) The Commissioner of Income-Tax-11 vs. Shri Samson Perinchery1; (2) The Principal Commissioner of Income-Tax (Central) Bengaluru vs. Goa Coastal Resorts and Recreation Pvt. Ltd.2; (3) The Principal Commissioner of Income-Tax, Panaji vs. New Era Sova Mine and Page | 24 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 (4) The Principal Commissioner of Income-Tax, Panaji vs. Goa Dourado Promotions Pvt. Ltd.4 . 4. However, Ms. Razaq, the learned Standing Counsel for the Respondents-Income Tax Department relied upon a prior decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Commissioner of Income-tax vs. Smt. Kaushalya, in which, the Division Bench has held that mere failure to tick mark the applicable ground or to cancel the inapplicable ground in the notice under section 271 of the IT Act, does not vitiate the penalty proceedings, where the satisfaction for initiation of penalty proceedings is correctly recorded and reflected in the assessment order made by the Assessing Officer (AO) and duly communicated to the Assessee. 5. On perusal of both the sets of decisions, we find that there is a conflict between the view taken by us in Goa Dourado Promotions (supra) and Kaushalya (supra). In Goa Dourado Promotions (supra), the substantial question of law as to whether the ITAT erred in holding the penalty proceedings fatal for mere failure of the AO to tick the relevant box in the show cause notice, was answered against the Appellant-Revenue and in favour of the Respondent-Assessee relying upon the Samson Perinchery (supra) and New Era Sova Mine (supra). As noticed above, the Division Bench in Kaushalya (supra) has held that such failure to strike off the relevant portion of the printed notice or to tick mark the applicable portion in the printed notice, is not fatal, particularly where no prejudice has been demonstrated by the Assessee. Thus, there appears to be a conflict between the two sets of decisions of the Coordinate Benches. In particular, there appears to be a conflict between the view in Goa Dourado Promotions (supra) and Kaushalya (supra). 6. Though the said decisions relied upon by Mr. Rivankar were rendered subsequent to the decision of the Division Bench in Kaushalya (supra), it appears that the decision in Kaushalya (supra) was not brought to the notice of the subsequent Division Benches. 7. Though attempts were made by the learned Counsel for the parties to distinguish the two sets of decisions based upon the fact situations in the present matters, the conflict, according to us, will still persist. Since such Page | 25 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 issues recur, we feel that these Appeals can be more advantageously heard by a Bench of more than two Judges, so that, this conflict between the two sets of decisions, is resolved by authoritative pronouncement of the Full Bench. 8. Besides, we find that in the first set of decisions, relied upon by Mr. Rivankar while the entire emphasis is upon the proper form of the notice and inference of non- application of mind and failure to observe natural justice, there is no discussion on the aspect of 'prejudice' which a party is expected to demonstrate in a case where the complaint is of 'inadequate notice', as opposed to a case of 'no notice'. 9. In State Bank of Patiala and others vs. S.K. Sharma, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that it would not be correct to say that for any and every violation of a facet of natural justice or of a rule incorporating such facet, the order passed is altogether void and ought to be set aside without further inquiry. The approach and test adopted in Managing Director, ECIL vs. B. Karunakar7 should govern all cases where the complaint is not that there was no hearing (no notice, no opportunity and no hearing), but one of not affording a proper hearing (i.e. adequate or full hearing) or of violation of a procedural rule or requirement governing the enquiry; the complaint should be examined on the touchstone of prejudice. The test is: 'all things taken together whether the delinquent officer/employee had or did not have a fair hearing'. 10. The aforesaid is relevant because, Ms Razaq has pointed out that in the present matters the assessment order under section 143(3) of the IT Act or the order under section 153C of the IT Act had recorded satisfaction for initiation of penalty proceedings on the relevant grounds and there was no ambiguity as such involved. She pointed out that at no stage until the additional question of law was framed in these matters, the Assessee had even pleaded or demonstrated any prejudice. She pointed out that in fact, the Assessee having understood clearly that the penalty proceedings were initiated on the grounds reflected in the assessment order under section 143(3) or the order made under section 153C of the IT Act, had submitted their necessary Page | 26 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 responses in the matter. One of the Assessees had also urged 'lenient treatment'. All these aspects have not been considered in the first set of decisions relied upon by Mr. Rivankar. There is, however, reference to these aspects in Kaushalya (supra), relied upon by Ms Razaq. 11. According to us, the issue which arises can be more advantageously decided by the Full Bench, now that we notice the conflict between the decisions relied upon Mr. Rivankar and the decision in Kaushalya (supra), not to mention the absence of discussion on the aspect of 'prejudice' in the decision relied upon by Mr. Rivankar. 12. Chapter I, Rule 8 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960 provides that if it shall appear to any Judge, either on the application of a party or otherwise, that an appeal or matter can be more advantageously heard by a Bench of two or more Judges, he may report to that effect to the Chief Justice who shall make such order thereon as he shall think fit. 13. According to us, the following question can be more advantageously considered by a Bench of more than two Judges, taking into consideration the conflicting decisions as aforesaid, as well as absence of any discussion on the aspect of 'prejudice' in the set of decisions relied up by Mr. Rivonkar :- When in the assessment order or the order made under sections 143(3) and 153C of the IT Act, the Assessing Officer has clearly recorded satisfaction for imposition of penalty on one or the other, or both grounds mentioned in section 271(1)(c), whether a mere defect in the notice of not striking out the relevant words, would vitiate the penalty proceedings ? 14. The Full Bench, in the context of the aforesaid question can then, perhaps examine the conflict between the decisions in Goa Dourado Promotions (supra) and Kaushalya (supra). The Full Bench can as well consider the impact of non-discussion on the aspect of 'prejudice' in the decisions relied upon by Mr. Rivonkar, which includes the decision in Goa Dourado Promotions (supra), in the light of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State Bank of Patiala (supra). The Full Bench can also consider the effect of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Dilip N. Shroff vs. Joint Commissioner of Income-Tax and Page | 27 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 another on the issue of non-application of mind where the relevant portions of the printed notices are not struck off. 15. The Registry is, therefore, directed to place these matters before the Hon'ble Chief Justice in order to obtain orders in terms of Chapter I, Rule 8 of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960." 53. Having noted the referral order, the decision of the Full Bench would be required to be considered as to the view, which was taken by the Full Bench. 54. The Full Bench framed an issue as to whether the assessment order clearly recorded satisfaction for imposition of penalty on one or the other, or both limbs mentioned in section 271(1)(c) and whether a mere defect in the notice not striking off the relevant matter would vitiate the penalty proceedings. 55 to 58. The question before the Full Bench had arisen in view of the prior decision of the Division Bench in Kaushalya (supra), wherein the Division Bench of this Court was considering the challenge to an order imposing penalty. The Division Bench in Kaushalya (supra) in considering the plea that the notice issued to the assessee was defective, also considered the issue as to whether for accepting such a plea, the assessee was required to satisfy the test of any prejudice caused to the assessee, as in the absence of any prejudice, curing the defect of natural justice would not bring about any solution. In such context, the Division Bench in Kaushalya (supra) observed thus:- 56."... The assessment orders were already made and the reasons for issuing the notice under section 274 read with section 271(1)(c) were recorded by the Income-tax Officer. The assessee fully knew in detail the exact charge of the Department against him. In this background, it could not be said that ether there was non-application of mind by the Income-tax Officer or the so called ambiguous wording in the notice impaired or prejudiced the right of the assessee to reasonable opportunity of being heard. After all, section 274 or any other provision in the Act or the Rules, does not either mandate the giving of notice or its issuance in a particular form. Penalty proceedings are quasi- criminal in nature. Section 274 contains the principle of natural justice of the assessee being heard before levying penalty. Rules of natural justice cannot be imprisoned in any straight-jacket formula. For sustaining a complaint of failure of the principles of natural justice on the ground of absence of opportunity, it has to be established that prejudice is caused to the concerned person by the procedure followed. The issuance of notice is an Page | 28 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 administrative device for informing the assessee about the proposal to levy penalty in order to enable him to explain as to why it should not be done. Mere mistake in the language used or mere non-striking of the inaccurate portion cannot by itself invalidate the notice. The entire factual background would fall for consideration in the matter and no one aspect would be decisive. In this context, useful reference may be made to the following observation in the case of CIT v. Mithila Motors (P.) Ltd. [1984] 149 ITR 751. 57."... ... .. 58. No doubt, there an exist a case where vagueness and ambiguity in the notice can demonstrate non-application of mind by the authority and or ultimate prejudice to the right of opportunity of hearing contemplated under section 274. Take for example, the notice dated March 29, 1972, for the assessment year 1967-68. This show- cause notice was issued even before the assessment order was made. The assessee had no knowledge of exact charge of the Department against him. In the notice, not only there is use of the word "or" between the two groups of charges but there is use of the word "deliberately". The word "deliberately" did not exist in section 271(1)(c) when the notice was issued. It is worthwhile recalling that the said word was omitted by the Finance Act, 1964, with effect from April 1, 1964, and the Explanation was added. The notice clearly demonstrated non- application of mind on the part of the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner. The vagueness and ambiguity in the notice had also prejudiced the right of reasonable opportunity of the assessee since he did not know what exact charges he had to face. In this background, quashing of the penalty proceedings for the assessment year 1967-68 seems to be fully justified." 59. The decisions rendered in Goa Coastal Resorts and Recreation (P.) Ltd. (supra) and Goa Dourado Promotions (P.) Ltd. (supra) and some of the other decision as relied by Ms. Vissanji, did not consider the issue of prejudice, which was the subject matter of consideration in Kaushalya (supra). The Court in such cases had simplicitor considered an issue in regard to the defect in the notice to hold that once the nature of notice itself is defective, then the situation is required to be remedied and penalty order on such defective notice cannot stand. However, in all the said decisions an issue in regard to prejudice was not placed for consideration of the Court, on the touchstone of the well settled principles of prejudice which would be applicable in given circumstances and as applied in the case of Kaushalya. It is this cleavage of opinion led the Division Bench of this Court at Goa in Mohd. Farhan A. Shaik (supra) to record such dichotomy and refer the question to be considered by the Full Bench, as noted by us in the referral order (supra). 60. It is in such context, the Full Bench considered the issues in this regard namely the issues falling on the line of reasoning Page | 29 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 in Goa Coastal Resorts and Recreation (P.) Ltd. (supra), which did not consider the issue of prejudice and on the other hand, the decision rendered in Smt. Kaushalya (supra). The Full Bench framed two questions which inter alia are (i) If the assessment order clearly records satisfaction for imposing penalty on one or other, or both grounds mentioned in section 271(1)(c), will a mere defect in notice not striking off the irrelevant matter vitiated penalty proceedings; and (ii) Has Kaushalya failed to discuss the aspect of 'prejudice'? The Full Bench answered these questions inter alia observing that in so far as the view taken in Goa Coastal Resorts and Recreation (P.) Ltd. (supra) and other similar orders were concerned, the same is required to be considered to be more acceptable, as it is beneficial to the assessee. We may observe that per se the test of prejudice ought not to be applied in the manner as may be applicable in the facts of the present case, is not what has been disapproved by the Full Bench. The Full Bench cannot be read so as to construe that the test of prejudice in the given facts or a waiver as acquiescence would not be applicable, in considering any challenge to the orders imposing penalty. In other words, the Full Bench does not hold that the principles of law as laid down by the Supreme Court on prejudice are per se not applicable, when a complaint of breach of principles of natural justice is made in assailing an order imposing penalty. It also does not consider as to what can the fate of such plea if it is belatedly raised for the first time after a prolonged delay like in the present case. As to what has been observed by the Full Bench in this context can be noted which read thus:- "Answers: Question No. 1 : If the assessment order clearly records satisfaction for imposing penalty on one or the other, or both grounds mentioned in section 271(1)(c), does a mere defect in the notice—not striking off the irrelevant matter—vitiate the penalty proceedings? 181. It does. The primary burden lies on the Revenue. In the assessment proceedings, it forms an opinion, prima facie or otherwise, to launch penalty proceedings against the assessee. But that translates into action only through the statutory notice under section 271(1)(c), read with section 274 of IT Act. True, the assessment proceedings form the basis for the penalty proceedings, but they are not composite proceedings to draw strength from each other. Nor can each cure the other's defect. A penalty proceeding is a corollary; nevertheless, it must stand on its own. These proceedings culminate under a different statutory scheme that remains distinct from the assessment proceedings. Therefore, the assessee must be informed of the grounds of the penalty proceedings only through statutory notice. An omnibus notice suffers from the vice of vagueness. Page | 30 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 182. More particularly, a penal provision, even with civil consequences, must be construed strictly. And ambiguity, if any, must be resolved in the affected assessee's favour. 183. Therefore, we answer the first question to the effect that Goa Dourado Promotions and other cases have adopted an approach more in consonance with the statutory scheme. That means we must hold that Kaushalya does not lay down the correct proposition of law. Question No. 2: Has Kaushalya failed to discuss the aspect of 'prejudice'? 184. Indeed, Smt. Kaushalya case (supra) did discuss the aspect of prejudice. As we have already noted, Kaushalya noted that the assessment orders already contained the reasons why penalty should be initiated. So, the assessee, stresses Kaushalya, "fully knew in detail the exact charge of the Revenue against him". For Kaushalya, the statutory notice suffered from neither non-application of mind nor any prejudice. According to it, "the so called ambiguous wording in the notice [has not] impaired or prejudiced the right of the assessee to a reasonable opportunity of being heard". It went onto observe that for sustaining the plea of natural justice on the ground of absence of opportunity, "it has to be established that prejudice is caused to the concerned person by the procedure followed". Smt. Kaushalya case (supra) closes the discussion by observing that the notice issuing "is an administrative device for informing the assessee about the proposal to levy penalty in order to enable him to explain as to why it should not be done". 185. No doubt, there can exist a case where vagueness and ambiguity in the notice can demonstrate non-application of mind by the authority and/or ultimate prejudice to the right of opportunity of hearing contemplated under section 274. So asserts Smt. Kaushalya case (supra). ..... 189. In Sudhir Kumar Singh, the Supreme Court has encapsulated the principles of prejudice. One of the principles is that "where procedural and/or substantive provisions of law embody the principles of natural justice, their infraction per se does not lead to invalidity of the orders passed. Here again, prejudice must be caused to the litigant, "except in the case of mandatory provision of law which is conceived not only in individual interest but also in the public interest"." 61. In view of the above discussion, we are not persuaded to accept the contentions as urged by Ms. Vissanji that in the facts of the present case, merely because Ventura Textiles Ltd. (supra) and the other decisions as referred by her, would observe that in the facts of such cases, the Assessing Officer did not put the tick mark on the order issued under section 271(1)(c) of the IT Act, indicating as to which limb Page | 31 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 of the provisions was attracted, the penalty proceedings would not stand vitiated in the present case. 62. On the contrary, we find much substance in the contention as urged by Mr. Devvrat Singh that it was imperative for the assessee to make out a case of prejudice which neither at the threshold before the authorities below nor in the present proceedings, was ever canvassed. It is difficult to accept the assessee's contention of the penalty proceedings being rendered invalid for want of a defective notice in the absence of the basic and fundamental supporting facts of such case, either being urged by the assessee or if not so urged, by satisfying the Court in regard to the prejudice. In fact, there is no case on prejudice which is sought to be urged before us. Even considering the arguments as advanced by Mr. Agrawal, the learned amicus, even assuming that the provisions are fundamental in nature and mandatory, it is not the case that no notice was served on the assessee. Moreover, this is a case where notice was served on the assessee which was understood by the assessee in the perspective it was issued, that both the limbs had stood attracted; and it was accordingly contested/responded by the assessee. If this be the case, any artificial and/or superfluous introduction of a plea of natural justice or a defective notice, certainly would not be an acceptable plea. In the facts of the case, it can certainly be said that it is not a case of any real prejudice or a case of the breach of principles of natural justice, but a borrowed plea of natural justice. The decision of the Full Bench in Mohd. Farhan A. Shaik cannot be read to mean that it does not recognize the principles of law as laid down by the Supreme Court that in accepting any plea of breach of principles of natural justice, such plea would be required to be tested on the aspect of prejudice. The law as laid down by the Supreme Court is law of the land and it is binding on all Courts. In this view of the matter, it would be unfounded for the assessee in the facts of the present case to contend that the test of prejudice was not attracted. 63. Even to consider such a plea as raised by the assessee, as a plea of jurisdiction, an anomalous situation is created, in as much as the assessee in a quasi judicial adjudication without raising any grievance in regard to any defect in the notice acquiesced in the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer in responding to the notice on on all his pleas, in Page | 32 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 regard to penalty proposed to be imposed on him under section 271 (1)(c) of the Income-tax Act. Once having accepted the notice and having participated in the proceedings thereby submitting to the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer, considering the settled principles of law, the assessee cannot take a position that there is a jurisdictional defect in the Assessing Officer proceeding to adjudicate the penalty-notice, by alleging defect in the notice. Even assuming that defect in the notice has adversely affected the interest of the noticee, the manner in which the interest is adversely affected and/or the nature of the prejudice caused to him, is required to be raised/set out with utmost promptness and/or at the first available opportunity. Certainly such grievance cannot be raised after long years that is after 23 years, to be a new invention, after the Assessing Officer had decided the issue. The plea of defect in the notice, cannot be an empty plea. Such plea can be accepted only when a demonstrable prejudice, was to be set out by the assessee, which would go to the root of the adjudication. If there is nothing on prejudice being pointed out to the Court except for bald plea of defect in the notice, in our opinion, such plea as made by the assessee cannot be accepted, so as to derail and/or render nugatory, the adjudication proceeding before the Assessing Officer and further adjudication proceeding before the (CIT) and the Tribunal, where the assessee had not even imagined that a plea on the defect in the notice was required to be taken. It is an elementary rule that a litigant cannot be permitted to assume inconsistent positions and to the detriment of the opposite party. If the party has taken up a particular position not only at the early stage of the proceedings but even before the appellate forums, it is not open to a party to appropriate and reprobate and resile from such position. When a question of fact namely whether a prejudice was at all caused, was not raised before the forums below, the parties were estopped from urging it before the appellate forum. Even otherwise and considering the well settled position in law, even a legal right which may accrue to a party can be waived. Such party would be later on estopped/precluded from raising any question on a breach of a right which stood waived. 64. We are of the opinion that the Full Bench in answering the above questions, however, would not assist the assessee Page | 33 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 to contend that the settled principles of law as laid down by the Supreme Court in regard to the test of prejudice being made applicable, is inapplicable in the facts of the present case. 65. It is abundantly clear from the principles of law as laid down by the Supreme Court as noted above, that a technical plea of breach of principles of natural justice cannot be taken, unless a case of prejudice has been made out, and if no case of prejudice is made out, certainly a plea of breach of principles of natural justice would be a hollow plea or a plea in futility. This for the reason, that a person complaining of breach of principles of natural justice needs to show that curing such breach, would culminate the proceedings with a different consequence favourable to the assessee. It is only after considering such pleas, it would be a fair decision, rendering justice to the complainant. In our opinion, this would be the logical conclusion of a plea on breach of principles of natural justice and the test of prejudice which is being sought to be applied in dealing with such complaints. The Full Bench does not lay down that the test of prejudice is not attracted when it comes to any complaint of breach of principles of natural justice on issues arising under section 271(1)(c) of the IT Act. The Full Bench also does not consider as to whether at such a belated stage as in the present case, that is after 23 years of after the Assessing Officer had decided the issue, a plea of defect in the notice can be permitted to be raised. The Full Bench only questions the correctness of Kaushalya when it says that the assessment orders would provide sufficient reasons so as to substitute the defective notice. This is not the same as saying that, in the event a notice issued by the Assessing Officer within his jurisdiction having been accepted by the assessee, and/or never complained of, by applying the principles of law as laid down by the Supreme Court, the assessee can get away on technical infringement of natural justice. This would be opposed to the principles of law as laid down by the Supreme Court in Natwar Singh (supra), wherein the Supreme Court has observed that there can never be a technical plea of breach of principles of natural justice and plea would be a realistic plea which can be proved on the principle of prejudice. 66. In the decisions of the Division Bench as referred by the Full Bench, in the facts of each of these cases, it was held Page | 34 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 that the Assessing Officer failing to tick mark the limb of section 271(1)(c) of the IT Act being attracted, the penalty proceedings stood vitiated however, as observed by the Division Bench in its referral order dated 28 February, 2020 in Mohd. Farhan A. Shaik (supra) in none of these decisions, except in Kaushalya, the test of prejudice was applied. 67. We may also refer to the decision of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. Asstt. CIT [2018] 93 taxmann.com 250/403 ITR 407 in which interpreting the provisions of section 271(1)(c) read with provisions of section 274, the Court observed that in the facts of the case, the assessee's objection in regard to any defect in the notice could not be entertained in the appeal, as such an objection, can never be a question of law in the assessee's case, as it was purely a question of fact. It was observed that the assessee at no earlier point of time had raised a plea that on account of a defect in the notice, that the assessee was put to any prejudice. The Court observed that such violation will not result in nullifying the orders passed by statutory authorities. It was observed that if the case of the assessee is that the assessee was put to a prejudice and principles of natural justice were violated on account of not being able to submit an effective reply, it would be a different matter. It was observed that on facts, the Court could safely conclude that even assuming that there was defect in the notice, it had caused no prejudice to the assessee and the assessee "clearly understood" what was the purport and import of notice issued under section 274 read with section 271 of the Act. The principles of natural justice cannot be read in abstract. The relevant observations of the Court are required to be noted, which reads thus: "16. We have perused the notices and we find that the relevant columns have been marked, more particularly, when the case against the assessee is that they have concealed particulars of income and furnished inaccurate particulars of income. Therefore, the contention raised by the assessee is liable to be rejected on facts. That apart, this issue can never be a question of law in the assessee's case, as it is purely a question of fact. Apart from that, the assessee had at no earlier point of time raised a plea that on account of a defect in the notice, they were put to prejudice. Page | 35 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 All violations will not result in nullifying the orders passed by statutory authorities. If the case of the assessee is that they have been put to prejudice and principles of natural justice were violated on account of not being able to submit an effective reply, it would be a different matter. This was never the plea of the assessee either before the Assessing Officer or before the First Appellate Authority or before the Tribunal or before this Court when the Tax Case Appeals were filed and it was only after 10 years when the appeals were listed for final hearing, this issue is sought to be raised. Thus on facts, we could safely conclude that even assuming that there was defect in the notice, it had caused no prejudice to the assessee and the assessee clearly understood what was the purport and import of notice issued under section 274 read with section 271 of the Act. Therefore, principles of natural justice cannot be read in abstract and the assessee, being a limited company, having wide network in various financial services, should definitely be precluded from raising such a plea at this belated stage." 68. We may observe that although there are other decisions which are cited on behalf of the parties, we do not intend to burden this judgment as the principles of law as discussed in the said judgments are well settled. However, considering the view which we have taken and more particularly the principles of prejudice to be satisfied in making a grievance on breach of principles of natural justice even in the context of a defective notice being well settled, as laid down in the decisions of the Supreme Court as noted by us above, we do not discuss these decisions to avoid prolix. 69. In the light of the above discussion, we reject the contention as urged on behalf of the assessee that the proceedings would stand covered by the decision of this Court in Ventura Textiles Ltd. (supra). To answer the question of law as initially framed, the proceedings would be required to be heard by the regular Court." 014. Further In case of Ventura Textiles Ltd. s [2020] 117 taxmann.com 182 (Bombay)/[2020] 274 Taxman 144 , Honourable High court held that :- Page | 36 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 "21. Let us now advert to the fourth question i.e. Question number D framed/proposed by the appellant. Through this question, appellant is contending that the Tribunal ought to have held that the order of penalty passed under section 271(1) (c) of the Act was bad in law in view of the fact that at the time of initiation of penalty proceedings as well as at the time of imposition of penalty, Assessing Officer was not clear as to which limb of section 271(1)(c) of the Act was attracted. At the time of hearing, learned counsel for the appellant had argued that in the show-cause notice the inapplicable portion was not struck off; thus it was not indicated in the notice whether the penalty was sought to be imposed for concealment of particulars of income or for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income, which has vitiated the impugned order of penalty. However, she fairly submits that this point was not urged before the lower authorities including the Tribunal. We have already noted and analyzed the two limbs of section 271(1)(c) of the Act and also the fact that the two limbs i.e. concealment of particulars of income and furnishing inaccurate particulars of income carry different connotations. We have also noticed that the Assessing Officer must indicate in the notice for which of the two limbs he proposes to impose the penalty and for this the notice has to be appropriately marked. If in the printed format of the notice the inapplicable portion is not struck off thus not indicating for which limb the penalty is proposed to be imposed, it would lead to an Page | 37 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 inference as to non-application of mind, thus vitiating imposition of penalty. 21.1. Therefore, the question relating to non-striking off of the inapplicable portion in the show-cause notice which is in printed format, thereby not indicating therein as under which limb of section 271(1)(c) of the Act penalty was proposed to be imposed i.e. whether for concealing the particulars of income or for furnishing inaccurate particulars of such income would go to the root of the lis. Therefore, it would be a jurisdictional issue. Being a jurisdictional issue, it can be raised before the High Court for the first time and adjudicated upon even if it was not raised before the Tribunal. 015. Above Decision was not on the issue that whether assessee has been prejudiced by the non striking of the one of twin limbs on which penalty can be levied. There is no quarrel that such is a jurisdictional issue and can be raised at any time. This Decision was also considered by the Honourable High court in case of Veena Textiles limited. [Supra] 016. Thus , In view of the above facts and binding decision of Honourable Bombay High court in case of Veena Textiles [Supra] , we hold that non striking of any limb in notice u/s 274 rws 271 (1) (c) of the Act does not come to rescue of the assessee. Hence, Ground No 1 is dismissed. 017. However in Ground no 2 assessee has also raised an issue that when the addition is sustained based on estimates penalty u/s 271 (1) c) is not sustainable. On similar facts, she relied up on coordinate bench Page | 38 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 decisions in (i) M/S ETCO PROFILES PVT. LTD. VERSUS ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CC-35, MUMBAI I.T.A. No. 5351/Mum/2012 and (ii) Mum Gems [2023] 155 taxmann.com 1. 018. In case of ETCO Profiles Private Limited [ Supra] facts were that search and seizure operations in Etco group and it was noticed that the assessee herein had made purchases worth ₹ 3.43 crores form M/s Triton Infotech Pvt Ltd. During the course of search operation, a statement was taken from the director of Shri Triton Infotech Pvt Ltd and he confessed that he did not supply materials, but gave only accommodation bills. However, since the assessee herein had shown sale of goods and since the sale could not effected without making purchases, the AO took the view that the assessee might have purchased goods from grey market in order to avoid local taxes. Therefore, the AO disallowed of 20% of purchases and made an addition of ₹ 65,21,831/-. The AO levied penalty on the above said addition and the same was also confirmed by Ld CIT (A). Coordinate bench held that "4. Having heard rival submissions, we are of the view that there is merit in the contentions of the assessee. Admittedly, the AO has disallowed 20% of purchases only on presumptions without establishing fully that the assessee has made purchases from grey market. Even, if it is assumed for a moment that the assessee might have purchased goods from grey market, it was not established that the amount of purchases was less than that recorded in the books of account. Under these set of facts, it has to be held that Page | 39 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 the impugned addition has been made only on estimated basis that too on presumptions only. Hence, by following the decision rendered by the Tribunal in the assessee’s sister concern’s case (supra), we hold that the impugned penalty is liable to deleted. Accordingly, we set aside the order of Ld CIT(A) and direct the AO to delete the penalty of ₹ 7,30,464/- levied u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act." 019. In case of MUM Gems [Supra] also assessee was aggrieved by penalty of Rs. 5,68,596/- on account of addition made by applying GP rate of alleged bogus purchases. ld. AO treated the entire purchases of Rs. 5,57,61,124/- as unexplained. In the first appeal, ld. CIT (A) had reduced the addition by restricting it to 3% of GP rate in the entire purchases amount. The ld. AO has levied penalty u/s. 271(1)(c) of Rs. 5,68,596/- on the final addition sustained at Rs. 16,72,834/-. The ld. CIT(A) without discussing the issue on merits held that even in the case of an estimate, Explanation to Section 271(1)(c) will be attracted once there is difference between the assessed income and returned income is excess of 20%. Cordinate bench held that before the ld. AO not only during the course of assessment proceedings but also during the penalty proceedings assessee had submitted the explanation that all the purchases were from the books and payments have been made through account payee cheques and ultimately addition has been sustained on purely ad-hoc estimate of gross profit rate. From the perusal of the records, it was seen that the assessee has submitted the quantitative details of purchases along with stock register entry and corresponding export sales which was also verified from the customer appraisal report. Page | 40 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 Once, the source of payment of purchases have been made through books of accounts and through account payee cheques and there is corresponding sales, then merely because some adhoc GP rate has been applied on such alleged bogus purchases to factor in suppression of alleged gross profit, no penalty can be levied. Thus, it was held that on such estimates penalty cannot be levied. 020. In the present case also ld AO made addition of 12.5 % of the Bogus purchases which was confirmed by the ld CIT (A), on appeal before ITAT it was reduced to 5 %. On this addition, whether penalty u/s 271 (1) (c) can be levied or not. Above two tribunal decision are on the identical facts where penalty has been deleted for aforesaid reasons. In these two AYs also income is estimated @ 5 % of Bogus Purchases and penalty u/s 271(1) (c) of the Act is levied on that addition. Therefore respectfully following the same , we allow ground no 2 of the appeal, reverse the orders of lower authorities and delete the penalty u/s 271 (1) (c) of the Act for both the years. 021. In the result, both the appeals are partly allowed. Order pronounced in the open court on 21.05.2024. Sd/- Sd/- (SUNIL KUMAR SINGH) (PRAS HANT MAHAR ISHI) (JUDIC IAL MEM BER) (ACC OUNTANT MEMB ER) Mumbai, Dated: 21.05.2024 Sudip Sarkar, Sr.PS/ Dragon Page | 41 ITA Nos. 3555& 3556/Mum/2023 Dinesh Somatmal Dhokar; A.Ys. 09-10 & 10-11 Copy of the Order forwarded to: 1. The Appellant 2. The Respondent 3. CIT 4. DR, ITAT, Mumbai 5. Guard file. BY ORDER, True Copy// Sr. Private Secretary/ Asst. Registrar Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Mumbai
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