National Dairy Development Board, Anand V. The Income tax Officer, TDS, Anand

ITA 3914/AHD/2007

• Counselvise Citation: [2010] 136 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 8686 (ITAT-AHMEDABAD)
• Duration Of Justice: 2 year(s) 5 month(s) 4 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 26-03-2010
• Appeal Filed By: Assessee
• Order Result: Allowed
• Bench Allotted: B
• Next Hearing Date: 25-03-2010
• Assessment Year: 2000-2001
• Appeal Filed On: 22-10-2007
• Result in Favour of: Assessee
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: P ORAM
• Assessee Lawyers: YOGESH SHAHAR
• Keywords: Notional interest; Reassessment proceedings
• Section: 201(1); 147; 148; 144

Judgement Text

IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AHMEDABAD BENCH 'B' [BEFORE SH. D T GARASIA,JM &SH. A N PAHUJA,AM] ITA NOS.3914 AND 3915/AHD/2007 (ASSESSMENT YEARS:-2000-01 AND 2001-02) NATIONAL DAIRY DEVELOPMENT BOARD, NDDB CAMPUS, ANAND [PAN: AABCN 2029 C] [TAN:BRDN00717D] V/S THE INCOME-TAX OFFICER, TDS,ANAND [APPELLANT] [RESPONDENT] ASSESSEE BY :- SHRI YOGESH SHAH,AR REVENUE BY:- SHRI P ORAM, DR O R D E R A N PAHUJA: THESE TWO APPEALS BY THE ASSESSEE AGAINST A COMMO N ORDER DATED 13-07-2007 PASSED OF THE LD. CIT(APPEAL S)-IV, BARODA, RAISE FOLLOWING SIMILAR GROUNDS IN THE AYS 2000-0 1 AND 2001-02. 1. THE LEARNED CIT(A) ERRED IN CONFIRMING ACTION OF LEARNED A.O PASSING THE ORDER U/S. 201 AFTER MORE THAN SIX YEARS. IT IS SUBMITTED THAT THE ORDER OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN PASSED WITHIN REASONABLE PERIOD AND FAILING WHICH ORDER PASSED IS TIME BARRED AND HENCE BAD IN LAW AND VOID AB INITIO. IT IS SUBMITTED THAT IN THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, TH E ORDER PASSED BY THE INCOME TAX OFFICER REQUIRES TO BE QUA SHED. IT BE SO DONE. 2. THE LEARNED CIT(A) HAS ERRED IN NOT QUASHING OR DER U/S. 201 R.W.S. 192 OF THE ACT. IT IS SUBMITTED THAT IN THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, THERE IS NO DEFAULT U/S. 192 OF THE ACT AND PROVISIONS OF SECTION 201 ARE NOT APPLICABL E. IT IS SUBMITTED THAT THE ORDER PASSED BY THE LEARNED INCO ME TAX OFFICER IS BAD IN LAW AND REQUIRES TO BE QUASHED. 3. THE CIT(A) HAS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PROVISIONS OF RULE 3(E) ARE APPLICABLE. IT IS SUBMITTED THAT IN THE FACTS A ND CIRCUMSTANCES, THE INCOME TAX OFFICER OUGHT TO HAVE CONSIDERED THAT THE FACILITY IS NOT PROVIDED BY THE EMPLOYER AND THEREFORE CANNOT BE TREATED AS PERQUISITE. IT IS SU BMITTED THAT IT BE SO HELD NOW. ITA NOS.3914 AND 3915/AHD/2007 2 4. THE LEARNED CIT(A) ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CONCESS IONAL EDUCATION FACILITIES ARE COVERED BY RULE 3(E) OF T HE INCOME TAX RULES, 1962. UNDER RULE 3(E) ONLY FREE EDUCATIO NAL FACILITIES ARE TREATED AS PERQUISITES AND THEREFORE CONCESSIONAL EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES OUGHT NOT TO HAVE BEEN CONSI DERED AS PERQUISITES. IT IS SUBMITTED THAT IT BE SO HELD NOW . 5. THE LEARNED CIT(A) ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE EXP ENDITURE INCURRED BY THE EMPLOYER TO PROVIDE ANY FACILITY IS NOT RELEVANT. IT IS SUBMITTED THAT SINCE NO EXPENDITURE HAS BEEN INCURRED BY THE APPELLANT, THE VALUE OF PERQUISITE, IF ANY, OUG HT TO HAVE BEEN DETERMINED AT NIL. IT BE SO HELD NOW. 6. THE LEARNED CIT(A) ERRED IN CONSIDERING ACTIVITY FEES, REFRESHMENT CHARGES AND SPORTS FEES WHILE CALCULATI NG THE DIFFERENTIAL FEES. IT IS SUBMITTED THAT WHILE VALUI NG BENEFIT ARISING OUT OF CONCESSIONAL EDUCATIONAL FACILITY, F EES FOR ONLY EDUCATIONAL ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AND ANY OTHER FEES RECOVERED FROM STUDENTS SHOULD BE IGNORED. IT IS SU BMITTED THAT IT BE SO HELD NOW. 7. THE LEARNED CIT(A) ERRED IN CONSIDERING NOTIONAL INTEREST ON DIFFERENTIAL SECURITY DEPOSITS WHILE CALCULATING TH E DIFFERENTIAL FEES. IT IS SUBMITTED THAT WHILE VALUING BENEFIT AR ISING OUT OF CONCESSIONAL EDUCATIONAL FACILITY, FEES FOR ONLY ED UCATIONAL ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AND NOTIONAL INTE REST COSTS SHOULD BE IGNORED. IT IS SUBMITTED THAT IT BE SO HE LD NOW. 8. THE LEARNED CIT(A) HAS ERRED IN RELYING ON ITAT DECISION IN CASE OF IRMA V/S. I.T.O FACTS OF WHICH ARE TOTAL LY DIFFERENT. IT BE SO HELD NOW. 9. THE LEARNED CIT(A) ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING EXEMPT ION U/S. 10(16) OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961 IN RESPECT OF TH E PERQUISITE PROVIDED TO THE EMPLOYEES. IN THE FACTS AND CIRCUMS TANCES, THE CONCESSION WAS GRANTED TO MEET THE COST OF EDUCATIO N AND THEREFORE IT OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN TREATED AS 'SCHOLAR SHIP' AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED FROM TOTAL INCOME. IT IS SUBMITTED THAT IT BE SO HELD NOW. 10. THE LEARNED CIT(A) FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT TH E APPELLANT HAS DEDUCTED TAX U/S. 192 ON BONAFIDE ESTIMATE OF T HE SALARY OF THE EMPLOYEES AND THEREFORE, IF AT ALL ANY SHORTFAL L ON ACCOUNT OF DIFFERENT INTERPRETATION THEN TAX SHOULD NOT BE RECOVERED FROM THE APPELLANT. IT BE SO HELD NOW. ITA NOS.3914 AND 3915/AHD/2007 3 11.THE LEARNED CIT(A) ERRED IN CONFIRMING LEVY OF I NTEREST U/S. 201 (1 A) OF THE ACT. IT IS SUBMITTED THAT IN THE F ACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, INTEREST U/S. 201 (1A) I S NOT CHARGEABLE. IT IS SUBMITTED THAT IT BE SO HELD NOW. YOUR APPELLANT PRAYS FOR LEAVE TO ADD, ALTER AND/OR TO AMEND ANY OF THE GROUNDS BEFORE FINAL HEARING OF THE APPE AL. SINCE THE ISSUES INVOLVED WERE SIMILAR , THESE APPE ALS WERE HEARD TOGETHER FOR THE SAKE OF CONVENIENCE AND ARE BEING DISPOSED OF THROUGH THIS COMMON ORDER. 2 ADVERTING FIRST TO GROUND NO.1 IN THE APPEAL, FAC TS ,IN BRIEF, AS PER RELEVANT ORDERS ARE THAT ON VERIFICATION OF RE CORDS OF INDIAN INSTITUTE FOR RURAL MANAGEMENT & GUJRAT CO-OP. MILK MARKETING FEDERATION LTD., IT WAS FOUND BY THE ITO-TDS [AO IN SHORT] THAT M/S ANANDALAYA EDUCATION SOCIETY [AES] WAS PROVIDING CO NCESSIONAL EDUCATION TO THE CHILDREN OF THE EMPLOYEES OF THE A SSESSEE I.E NDDB. IT CAME TO THE NOTICE OF THE AO THAT THE AES HAD PASSED A RESOLUTION THAT THE WARDS OF THE EMPLOYEES OF THE N DDB WOULD GET CONCESSIONAL TREATMENT IN THE SCHOOL IN RESPECT OF FEES. IN RESPONSE TO A SHOW CAUSE NOTICE AS TO WHY THE SAID BENEFIT OF CONCESSION IN FEES SHOULD NOT BE TREATED AS A PERQUISITE, THE LD. AR ON BEHALF OF THE ASSESSEE STATED THAT :- I. THE EDUCATION FACILITY IS NOT PROVIDED BY THE E MPLOYER TO THE EMPLOYEE AND THEREFORE, IS NOT WITHIN PURVIEW O F 'PERQUISITE'. II. NDDB HAS NOT INCURRED ANY EXPENDITURE TO PROVID E SUCH FACILITY AND THEREFORE, VALUE OF BENEFIT, IF ANY, I S TO BE TAKEN AT 'NIL'. III. ALL EMPLOYEES ARE TREATED AT PAR AND THEREFORE , IT CANNOT BE TREATED AS CONCESSION BEEN GRANTED TO EMPLOYEES. IV. CONCESSIONAL EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES ARE NOT TRE ATED AS PERQUISITES UPTO A.Y.2001-02. ITA NOS.3914 AND 3915/AHD/2007 4 V. ONLY TUITION FEES AND LIBRARY FEES ARE REQUIRED TO BE CONSIDERED FOR WORKING OUT THE DIFFERENTIAL FEES. VI. INTEREST ON SECURITY DEPOSIT CANNOT BE CONSIDER ED TO VALUE BENEFIT VII. EVEN IF OTHER FEES ARE CONSIDERED FOR A.Y.20 02-03, THE VALUE OF BENEFIT IS LESS THAN RS.1000/- AND THEREFO RE, VALUE OF PERQUISITE IS NIL. VIII. THE AMOUNT EVEN IF TREATED AS PERQUISITE, IS LIABLE TO BE EXCLUDED FROM TOTAL INCOME BY VIRTUE OF SECTION 10( 16). ACCORDINGLY, IT WAS SUBMITTED THAT THE ASSESSE E SHOULD NOT BE TREATED AS 'ASSESSEE IN DEFAULT' U/S. 201(1) &. 201(1A) OF THE INCOME-TAX ACT,1961[HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS THE ACT]. 2.1. THE AO, HOWEVER, DID NOT AGREE WITH THE CONTEN TIONS OF THE ASSESSEE ON THE GROUND THAT 'PERQUISITE' WITHIN THE MEANING OF PROVISIONS OF SEC. 17(2)(III)(C) OF THE ACT INCLUD ES THE VALUE OF ANY BENEFIT PROVIDED FREE OF COST OR AT CONFESSIONAL RA TE BY AN EMPLOYER TO AN EMPLOYEE AS ALSO ANY SUM PAID BY THE EMPLOYER IN RESPECT OF ANY OBLIGATION WHICH, BUT FOR SUCH PAYMENT, WOULD H AVE BEEN PAYABLE BY THE ASSESSEE. ACCORDINGLY, THE AO WHILE DISTINGUISHING THE DECISIONS IN THE CASE OF STEEL EXECUTIVES ASSOC IATION VS. RASHTRIYA ISPAT NIGAM LTD.,241 ITR 20(AP) AND RAYMO ND WOOLEN MILLS LTD. VS. ITO,57 ITD 563 AND REFERRING TO DECI SIONS IN THE CASE OF GRINDLAYS BANK LTD. VS. CIT,193 ITR 457(CAL.) AN D BRITISH AIRWAYS VS. CIT,193 ITR 439(CAL.), CONCLUDED THAT THERE WA S NO TIME LIMIT FOR INITIATING ACTION U/S 201(1A) OF THE ACT AND TH AT NOTICE PERIOD DID NOT CROSS THE TIME LIMITATION GIVEN IN SEC. 149 OF THE ACT. THEREFORE, THE AO TREATED THE ASSESSEE IN DEFAULT FOR NON-DEDU CTION OF TAX AT SOURCE FROM THE PAYMENTS MADE TOWARDS EDUCATIONAL E XPENSES OF THE CHILDREN OF ITS EMPLOYEES AND WORKED OUT PERQU ISITE OF RS. 810/- TO BE INCLUDED IN THE SALARY OF EACH OF THE EMPLO YEE AND DETERMINED TAX U/S 201 OF RS. 5,71,454/- AND INTERE ST U/S 201(1A) ITA NOS.3914 AND 3915/AHD/2007 5 RS.4,50,019/- IN THE AY 2000-01 . LIKEWISE IN THE A Y 2001-02, TAX U/S 201 WAS WORKED OUT AT RS.5,47,57/- AND INTEREST U/S 201(1A)- S.3,32,579/-. 3. ON APPEAL, THE ASSESSEE ARGUED THAT THE IMPUGNE D ORDERS U/S.201 / 201(LA) OF THE ACT WERE PASSED AFT ER A GAP OF MORE THAN 2 TO 6 YEARS AND THEREFORE, WERE TIME BARRED. HOWEVER, THE LD. CIT(A) RELYING ON THE DECISION IN THE CASE OF IRMA VS. ITO IN ITA NOS.1814 & 1815/AHD/2006 REJECTED THE CONTENTIONS O N BEHALF OF THE ASSESSEE AND HELD THAT THESE ORDERS WERE NOT TIME B ARRED 4. THE ASSESSEE IS NOW IN APPEAL BEFORE US AGA INST THE AFORESAID FINDINGS OF THE LD. CIT(A). AT THE OUTSET, THE LD. AR ON BEHALF OF THE ASSESSEE WHILE RELYING UPON THE DECISION OF THE I TAT IN THE CASE OF MAHINDRA AND MAHINDRA LTD. VS. DEPUTY CIT (2009) 31 3 ITR AT 263 (MUMBAI) CONTENDED THAT PROCEEDINGS HAVING BEEN IN ITIATED AFTER MORE THAN FOUR YEARS FROM THE END OF THE AFORESAID TWO ASSESSMENT YEARS, WERE BARRED BY LIMITATION. ON THE OTHER HAND , THE LD. DR DID NOT DISPUTE THESE CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE ASSE SSEE. 5. WE HAVE HEARD BOTH THE PARTIES AND GONE THROUGH THE FACTS OF THE CASE AS ALSO THE DECISIONS RELIED UPON. WE F IND THAT HON'BLE SUPREME COURT IN CASE OF STATE OF GUJARAT V. PATEL RAGHAV NATH AIR 1969 SC 1297 AND IN CASE OF S.B. GURBAKSH SINGH V. UOI ,AIR 1976 SC 1115 HAVE HELD THAT THE PROCEEDINGS SHOULD BE INITIATED WITHIN A R EASONABLE TIME, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF THE TIME-LIMIT FOR INITIATION OF ANY PRO CEEDINGS IN THE STATUTE. WHILE ADJUDICATING A SIMILAR ISSUE, THE ITAT, MUMBAI BENC H AFTER CONSIDERING THE VARIOUS DECISIONS IN CASE OF RAYMOND WOOLLEN MILLS LTD. V. ITO [1996] 57 ITD 536 (BOM.), SAHARA AIRLINES LTD. V. DY. CIT [2002] 83 ITD 11 (DELHI), MITSUBISHI CORPN. V. DY. CIT [2003] 85 ITD 414 (DELHI) AND ORD ER DATED 8-6-2005 IN WOCKHARDT LIFE SCIENCES LTD. IN ITA NO. 3625 (MUM.) OF 2002 FOR THE AY 1999- 2000, QUASHED THE ORDERS ,BEING BARRED BY LIMITATI ON, THE NOTICES HAVING BEEN ITA NOS.3914 AND 3915/AHD/2007 6 ISSUED BEYOND THE PERIOD OF FOUR YEARS IN THE CASE OF CENTURY TEXTILES AND INDUSTRIES LTD. VS DCIT,13 SOT 507. AS POINTED OU T BY THE LD. AR ON BEHALF OF THE ASSESSEE, THE TRIBUNAL IN THEIR LATEST DECISION IN MAHINDRA AND MAHINDRA LTD.(SUPRA) WHILE ADJUDICATING A SIMILAR ISSUE HELD THAT THOUGH S. 201 (1) OF THE ACT DOES NOT IMPOSE ANY TIME LIMIT FOR THE INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS OR THE PASSING OF AN ORDER, A REASONABLE TIME LIMIT WOULD HAVE TO BE READ IN AS OTHERWISE THE AUTHORITIES WOULD HAVE AN INDEFINITE PERIOD TO TAKE ACTION AND THE SWORD OF UNCERTAINTY WOULD HANG FOREVER OVER AN ASSESSEE ;) A REASONABLE PERIOD WOULD HAVE TO BE DETERMINED BEA RING IN MIND THE FACT THAT AN ORDER U/S 201 IS TO BE TREATED AKIN TO AN ASSESSMEN T ORDER AND THAT IT IS DEPENDENT ON THE OUTCOME OF THE ASSESSMENT OF THE P AYEE. ACCORDINGLY, THE MAXIMUM TIME LIMIT FOR INITIATING AND COMPLETING PR OCEEDINGS U/S 201 (1) HAS TO BE ON PAR WITH THE TIME LIMIT FOR INITIATING AND COMPLETING REASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS U/S 147 OF THE ACT. FOLLOWING THE TIME LIMITS IMPOSED BY S. 149, THE BENCH HELD THAT S. 201 PRO CEEDINGS SHOULD BE INITIATED WITHIN SIX YEARS FROM THE END OF THE RELEVANT ASSESSMENT YEAR IF THE INCOME BY VIRTUE OF SUMS PAID WITHOUT DEDUCTION OF TAX AT SOU RCE BY THE PAYER CHARGEABLE TO TAX IN THE HANDS OF THE PAYEE IS EQUAL TO OR MORE T HAN ONE LAKH RUPEES. IF SUCH AMOUNT IS LESS THAN RS. 1 LAKH THEN THE PROCEEDINGS MUST BE INITIATED WITHIN FOUR YEARS FROM THE END OF THE RELEVANT ASSESSMENT YEAR. BY TH E SAME LOGIC THE PROCEEDINGS U/S 201 (1) MUST BE COMPLETED BY PASSIN G AN ORDER WITHIN ONE YEAR FROM THE END OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR IN WHICH PROCEED INGS U/S 201(1) WERE INITIATED. THESE TIME LIMITS APPLY TO S. 201 (1A) AS WELL. AS REGARDS DECISION OF THE HONBLE DELHI HIGH COURT IN CIT VS. NHK,JAPAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 305 ITR 137,HOLDING THAT THE PERIOD OF FOUR YEARS WAS A RE ASONABLE PERIOD, THE BENCH OBSERVED THAT SAME IS NOT BINDING AS IT WAS OF A NO N-JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT AND ALSO BECAUSE THERE WAS NO UNANIMITY ON THE SUBJECT AMONGST THE COURTS. IN THE WORDS OF THE BENCH, IT WAS HELD IN MAHINDRA AND M AHINDRA LTD.(SUPRA) AS UNDER: 14.4 IF WE LOOK AT THE SCHEME OF S. 201(1) IT I S FOUND THAT A DUTY HAS BEEN CAST UPON THE PERSON RESPONSIBLE TO MAKE DEDUC TION OF TAX AT SOURCE FROM ANY PAYMENT MADE ON WHICH TAX IS DEDUCTIBLE. T HE FAILURE TO DEDUCT OR PAYMENT AFTER DEDUCTION ENABLES THE AUTHORITIES TO TREAT HIM AS ITA NOS.3914 AND 3915/AHD/2007 7 ASSESSEE IN DEFAULT. THIS DEDUCTION OF TAX AT SOURC E IS ONLY ONE MODE OF RECOVERY. THE DEDUCTEE ALWAYS REMAINS RESPONSIBLE F OR THE PAYMENT OF TAX ON THE AMOUNT WHICH IS PAID TO HIM WITH OR WITHOUT DEDUCTION OF TAX AT SOURCE. HENCE WE DO NOT FIND ANY MATCH BETWEEN THE FACTS OF THE CASE OF HINDUSTAN TIMES LTD. AND OTHERS ON SIMILAR LINES, R ELIED UPON BY THE LEARNED DEPARTMENTAL REPRESENTATIVE VIS-A-VIS THE F ACTS UNDER CONSIDERATION. ON THE CONTRARY SO MANY AUTHORITIES HAVE BEEN CITED ON BEHALF OF THE ASSESSEE, SOME OF WHICH HAVE BEEN REF ERRED TO ABOVE IN WHICH IT HAS BEEN CATEGORICALLY HELD THAT THE STATU TORY POWER SHOULD BE EXERCISED WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME EVEN IF NO TIME- LIMIT IS PRESCRIBED. THE SAME OPINION HAS BEEN EXPRESSED BY THE HON'BLE SUPR EME COURT IN THE CASE OF MOHAMAD KAVI MOHAMAD AMIN VS. FATMABAI IBRA HIM (1997) 6 SCC 71. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING DISCUSSION WE ARE OF THE CONSIDERED OPINION THAT THERE IS NO MERIT IN THE CONTENTION OF THE LEARNED DEPARTMENTAL REPRESENTATIVE THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF TIME-LIMIT SP ECIFIED UNDER S. 201, ACTION CAN BE TAKEN AT ANY POINT OF TIME. IT IS NAT URALLY, SO FOR THE REASON THAT TIME IS THE CORE OF EVERY ACTION UNDER LAW. IF THE LEGISLATURE IS SILENT IN PRESCRIBING A PARTICULAR TIME-LIMIT THEN THE ACTION CAN BE TAKEN WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME. THE LEARNED DEPARTMENTAL REPRESENT ATIVE, DURING THE COURSE OF SUBSEQUENT ARGUMENTS, WAS FAIR ENOUGH TO CONCEDE THAT THE TIME-LIMIT MAY BE SPECIFIED, BUT REQUESTED THAT IT SHOULD NOT BE KEPT RIGID AT FOUR YEARS AS HAS BEEN HELD IN THE CASE OF RAYMOND WOOLLEN MILLS LTD. VS. ITO (1997) 57 ITD 536 (BOM). NOW THE NEXT QUESTION IS THAT WHAT CAN BE THE REASONABLE PERIOD FOR ACTION UNDER S. 201(1). T HERE CANNOT BE A PARTICULAR TIME-LIMIT SAY TWO YEARS OR FIVE YEARS O R TEN YEARS, WHICH CAN BE DESCRIBED AS REASONABLE FOR ALL THE ACTIONS UNDER T HE ACT, WHEN NO TIME- LIMIT IS PRESCRIBED. THE REASONABLE TIME FOR TAKING ACTION UNDER A PARTICULAR SECTION LARGELY DEPENDS ON HOST OF FACTORS, INTER A LIA, THE NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS, THE CHARACTER OF THE ORDER ETC. IN ORD ER TO DETERMINE THE REASONABLE TIME FOR TAKING ACTION UNDER S. 201, IT IS IMPORTANT TO HAVE A LOOK AT SUCH NECESSARY FACTORS. 17.10 PROVISO TO S. 143(2) STATES THAT NO NOTICE UNDER CL. (II) SHALL BE SERVED ON THE ASSESSEE AFTER EXPIRY OF 12 MONTHS FR OM THE END OF THE MONTH IN WHICH THE RETURN IS FURNISHED, THE TIME-LI MIT FOR COMPLETION OF ASSESSMENT UNDER S. 143 OR 144 HAS BEEN PRESCRIBED UNDER S. 153(1) AS TWO YEARS FROM THE END OF THE ASSESSMENT YEAR IN WH ICH THE INCOME WAS FIRST ASSESSABLE. THE TIME-LIMIT FOR NOTICE OF ASSE SSMENT OR REASSESSMENT UNDER S. 147 HAS BEEN PRESCRIBED UNDER S. 149, THIS SECTION, IN TURN, PROVIDES THAT NO NOTICE UNDER S. 147 SHALL BE ISSUE D FOR THE RELEVANT ASSESSMENT YEAR IF FOUR YEARS HAVE ELAPSED FROM THE END OF THE RELEVANT ASSESSMENT YEAR UNLESS THE CASE FALLS UNDER CL. (B) . CLAUSE (B) FURTHER STATES THAT NO NOTICE UNDER S. 147 SHALL BE ISSUED IF FOUR YEARS BUT NOT MORE THAN SIX YEARS HAVE ELAPSED FROM THE END OF THE REL EVANT ASSESSMENT YEAR UNLESS THE INCOME CHARGEABLE TO TAX WHICH HAS ESCAP ED ASSESSMENT AMOUNTS TO OR IS LIKELY TO AMOUNT TO ONE LAKH RUPEE S OR MORE FOR THAT YEAR. THE PRESENT TWO-FOLD TIME-LIMIT FOR ISSUING NOTICE UNDER S. 148 HAS CLEAR-CUT DEMARCATION OF ITS APPLICABILITY IN ONE SITUATION O R THE OTHER. WHERE THE INCOME CHARGEABLE TO TAX WHICH HAS ESCAPED ASSESSME NT, BY REASON OR ITA NOS.3914 AND 3915/AHD/2007 8 UNDERASSESSMENT OR NO ASSESSMENT, AMOUNTS TO OR IS LIKELY TO AMOUNT TO ONE LAKH RUPEES OR MORE FOR THAT YEAR THEN THE EXTE NDED PERIOD OF SIX YEARS IS AVAILABLE BUT IF THE AMOUNT OF SUCH INCOME IS LE SS THAN RS. 1 LAKH THEN THE SHORTER PERIOD OF FOUR YEARS IS PROVIDED FOR. S EC. 153(2) DEALS WITH THE TIME-LIMIT FOR THE COMPLETION OF ASSESSMENT, REASSE SSMENT OR RECOMPUTATION UNDER S. 147. IT PROVIDES THAT 'NO OR DER OF ASSESSMENT, REASSESSMENT OR RECOMPUTATION SHALL BE MADE UNDER S . 147 AFTER THE EXPIRY OF ONE YEAR FROM THE END OF THE FINANCIAL YE AR IN WHICH NOTICE UNDER S. 148 WAS SERVED', AS WE HAVE HELD ABOVE THAT THE ORDER UNDER S. 201(1) IS AKIN TO ASSESSMENT AND FURTHER THE ASSESSMENT IN CLUDES REASSESSMENT, NATURALLY THE REASONABLE TIME-LIMITS FOR INITIATION AND COMPLETION OF ACTION UNDER S. 201(1) HAVE TO BE SIMILAR TO THOSE AVAILAB LE FOR ASSESSMENT UNDER S. 147. ACCORDINGLY WE HOLD THAT PROCEEDINGS UNDER S. 201(1) CAN BE INITIATED IN THE EXTENDED PERIOD OF SIX YEARS FROM THE END OF THE RELEVANT ASSESSMENT YEAR IF THE INCOME BY VIRTUE OF SUM PAID WITHOUT DEDUCTION OF TAX AT SOURCE BY THE PAYER CHARGEABLE TO TAX IN THE HANDS OF THE PAYEE IS EQUAL TO OR MORE THAN ONE LAKH RUPEES. IF ON THE OT HER HAND SUCH AMOUNT IS LESS THAN RS. 1 LAKH THEN THE LOWER PERIOD OF FOUR YEARS AS PRESCRIBED UNDER S. 149(1)(A) FROM THE END OF THE RELEVANT ASS ESSMENT YEAR IS AVAILABLE FOR INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER S. 20 1(1). GOING BY THE SAME LOGIC AND TAKING ASSISTANCE FROM S. 153(2), THE COM PLETION OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER S. 201(1), THAT IS THE PASSING OF THE ORDER U NDER THIS SUB-SECTION, HAS TO BE WITHIN ONE YEAR FROM THE END OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR IN WHICH PROCEEDINGS UNDER S. 201(1) WERE INITIATED. SAME TI ME-LIMITS FOR INITIATION AND PASSING OF ORDERS WILL BE VALID FOR THE PASSING OF ORDER UNDER S. 201(1A) ALSO. WE HOLD ACCORDINGLY. 5.1 IN THE INSTANT CASE, WE FIND THAT UNDISPU TEDLY THE INCOME, WITHOUT DEDUCTION OF TAX AT SOURCE BY THE PAYER CHARGEABLE TO TAX IN THE HANDS OF THE PAYEE, IS NOT MORE THAN ONE LAKH RUPEES AND THE PRO CEEDINGS HAVE BEEN INITIATED ON 10.8.2006 I.E BEYOND FOUR YEARS FROM THE END OF RELEVANT ASSESSMENT YEARS. FOLLOWING THE VIEW TAKEN IN THE AFORESAID D ECISION IN MAHINDRA AND MAHINDRA LTD.(SUPRA) BY THE ITAT AFTER CONSIDERING THE VIEW TAKEN IN VARIOUS EARLIER DECISIONS INCLUDING RAYMOND WOOLLEN MILLS LTD.(SUPRA), SAHARA AIRLINES LTD. VS. DY. CIT (2003) 79 TTJ (DEL) 268 : (2002) 8 3 ITD 11 (DEL), ASSTT. CIT VS. PEPSI FOODS LTD. (2004) 88 TTJ (DEL) 111 : (2003) 1 29 TAXMAN 73 (DEL)(MAG) AND WOKHARDT LIFE SCIENCES LTD. VS. DY. CIT (2005) TIOL 178 ,MUMBAI AS ALSO IN CIT VS. NHK,JAPAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, 305 ITR 137(DELHI), WE ARE OF THE OPINION THAT PROCEEDINGS INITIATED U/S 201 AND 20 1(1A) OF THE ACT IN THE INSTANT CASE WERE BARRED BY LIMITATION . ACCORDINGLY, BOTH THESE ORDERS ARE QUASHED. THEREFORE, GROUND NO.1 IS ALLOWED. ITA NOS.3914 AND 3915/AHD/2007 9 6. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, WE DO NOT THI NK IT FIT TO GO INTO THE MERITS OF THE IMPUGNED ORDERS. CONSEQUENTLY, REMAINING GROUND NOS . 2 TO 11 DO NOT SURVIVE FOR ADJUDICATION AT THIS STAGE, INTER ALIA, SINCE NO SUBMISSIONS HAVE BEEN MADE BEFORE US ON THESE GROUNDS. 7. IN THE RESULT, THESE TWO APPEALS ARE A LLOWED. ORDER PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT TODAY ON 26 -03- 2010 SD/- SD/- (D T GARASIA) JUDICIAL MEMBER (A N PAHUJA) ACCOUNTANT MEMBER DATE : 26-03-2010 COPY OF THE ORDER FORWARDED TO : 1. NATIONAL DAIRY DEVELOPMENT BOARD, NDDB CAMPUS, A NAND 2. ITO, TDS, ANAND 3. CIT CONCERNED 4. CIT(A)-IV, BARODA 5. THE DR, ITAT,B BENCH, AHMEDABAD 6. GUARD FILE BY ORDER DEPUTY REGISTRAR ASSISTANT REGISTRAR ITAT, AHMEDABAD