GUPTA & MAHINDRA TRACTORS, Jaipur V. ITO (TDS), Kota

ITA 397/JPR/2017

• Counselvise Citation: [2018] 119 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 5146 (ITAT-JAIPUR)
• Duration Of Justice: 1 year(s) 5 month(s) 7 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 24-10-2018
• Appeal Filed By: Assessee
• Order Result: Partly Allowed
• Bench Allotted: SMC
• Assessment Year: 2009-2010
• Appeal Filed On: 17-05-2017
• Result in Favour of: Partly Allowed
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: J C KULHARI JCIT DHK
• Assessee Lawyers: DEVANG GARGIEYA S
• Keywords: Period of limitation; Retrospective amendment; Question of law; Competent authority; Time period of passing order
• Section: 201(1); 147

Judgement Text

VK;DJ VIHYH; VF/KDJ.K] T;IQJ U;K;IHB] T;IQJ IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, JAIPUR BENCHE S, JAIPUR JH FOT; IKY JKWO] U;KF;D LNL; ,OA JH FOE FLAG ;K NO ] YS[KK LNL; DS LE{K BEFORE: SHRI VIJAY PAL RAO, JM AND SHRI VIKRAM SING H YADAV, AM VK;DJ VIHY LA-@ ITA NO. 397/JP/2017 FU/KZKJ.K O'K Z@ ASSESSMENT YEAR : 2009-10. M/S. GUPTA & MAHINDRA TRACTORS, SATYAMN TOWER, VILLAGE GINDORE JHALRAPATAN, JHALAWAR. CUKE VS. THE INCOME TAX OFFICER (TDS), KOTA. LFKK;H YS[KK LA-@THVKBZVKJ LA-@ PAN /TAN NO. JDHG 03359 G VIHYKFKHZ@ APPELLANT IZR;FKHZ@ RESPONDENT FU/KZKFJRH DH VKSJ LS@ ASSESSEE BY : SHRI MAHENDRA GARGIEYA AND SHRI DEVANG GARGIEYA (ADVOCATES) JKTLO DH VKSJ LS@ REVENUE BY : SHRI J.C. KULHARI (JCIT) LQUOKBZ DH RKJH[K@ DATE OF HEARING : 22.10.2018. ?KKS'K .KK DH RKJH[K@ DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT : 24/10/2018. VKNS'K@ ORDER PER VIJAY PAL RAO, JM : THIS APPEAL BY THE ASSESSEE IS DIRECTED AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 1 ST MARCH, 2017 OF LD. CIT (A), ALWAR FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEA R 2008-09. THE ASSESSEE HAS RAISED THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS :- 1. THE IMPUGNED ORDER PASSED U/S 201(1)/201(1A) O F THE ACT IS BAD IN LAW AND ON FACTS OF THE CASE, FOR WANT OF JURISDICT ION AND VARIOUS OTHER REASONS AND HENCE, THE SAME KINDLY BE DELETED. 2. THAT THE IMPUGNED ORDER PASSED U/S 201(1)/201(1A ) OF THE ACT DATED 27.03.2014, IS BARRED BY LIMITATION AND HENCE, THE SAME KINDLY BE QUASHED. 3. RS. 59,603/-: THE LD. ITO (TDS), KOTA ERRED IN L AW AS WELL AS ON THE FACTS OF THE CASE IN RAISING DEMAND OF THE ALLEGED NON DEDUCTION OF TDS U/S 201(1) OF THE ACT AND THE LD. CIT (A) ALSO ERRED IN CONFIRMING 2 ITA NO. 397/JP/2017 M/S. GUPTA & MAHINDRA TRACTORS, JHALAWAR. THE SAME, WHICH IS COMPLETELY CONTRARY TO THE PROVI SIONS OF LAW AND FACTS HENCE, KINDLY BE QUASHED AND DELETED IN FULL. 4. RS. 41,914/-: THE LD. ITO (TDS), KOTA ERRED IN L AW AS WELL AS ON THE FACTS OF THE CASE IN RAISING DEMAND OF THE ALLEGED NON DEDUCTION OF TDS U/S 201(1) OF THE ACT AND THE LD. CIT (A) ALSO ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE SAME, WHICH IS COMPLETELY CONTRARY TO THE PROVI SIONS OF LAW AND FACTS HENCE, KINDLY BE QUASHED AND DELETED IN FULL. 5. THE LD. ITO (TDS), KOTA, JAIPUR ALSO ERRED IN LA W AS WELL AS ON THE FACTS OF THE CASE IN INITIATING AND REFERRING PENALTY PRO CEEDINGS U/S 271C OF THE ACT ON ACCOUNT OF THE ALLEGED NON DEDUCTION OF TDS IN RESPECT OF THE SUBJECTED RECEIPTS REFERRED TO IN THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 27.03.2014. THE APPELLANT NOT BEING LIABLE TO TDS A ND NOT BEING COVERED BY THE PROVISIONS OF SEC. 194J OF THE ACT, THE VERY INITIATION AND REFERENCE OF THE PENALTY PROCEEDINGS IS VOID AB INTIO, LACKING JURISDICTION AND HENCE, SUCH ACTION, INITIATION AND REFERENCE KINDLY BE QUASHED HERE ITSELF. 6. THE APPELLANT PRAYS YOUR HONOUR INDULGENCES TO A DD, AMEND OR ALTER OF OR ANY OF THE GROUNDS OF THE APPEAL ON OR BEFORE TH E DATE OF HEARING. 2. AT THE TIME OF HEARING, THE LD. A/R OF THE ASSES SEE HAS STATED AT BAR THAT GROUND NO. 1 IS GENERAL IN NATURE AND DOES NOT REQU IRE ANY ARGUMENT OR ADJUDICATION. ACCORDINGLY GROUND NO. 1 OF THE ASSES SEES APPEAL IS DISMISSED BEING NOT PRESSED. GROUND NO. 2 IS REGARDING VALIDITY OF ORDER PASSED UNDER SECTION 201(1)/201(1A) OF THE IT ACT BEING BARRED BY LIMITA TION. 3. THIS GROUND HAS BEEN RAISED BY THE ASSESSEE FIRS T TIME BEFORE THIS TRIBUNAL AND, THEREFORE, THE ASSESSEE HAS FILED AN APPLICATI ON FOR ADMISSION OF THE GROUND NO. 2 BEING AN ADDITIONAL GROUND. THE LD. A/R OF THE A SSESSEE HAS SUBMITTED THAT THE ISSUE RAISED BY THE ASSESSEE IN GROUND NO. 2 IS PUR ELY LEGAL IN NATURE AND THE 3 ITA NO. 397/JP/2017 M/S. GUPTA & MAHINDRA TRACTORS, JHALAWAR. ADJUDICATION OF THE SAME DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY FRESH INVESTIGATION OF FACTS BUT THE FACTS ALREADY AVAILABLE ON RECORD ARE SUFFICIENT FO R DECIDING THE LEGAL ISSUE RAISED BY THE ASSESSEE. IN SUPPORT OF HIS CONTENTION HE HAS RELIED UPON THE DECISION OF HONBLE SUPREME COURT IN CASE OF NTPC VS. CIT, 229 ITR 383 (SC). 4. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE LD. D/R HAS OBJECTED TO T HE ADMISSION OF ADDITIONAL GROUND AND SUBMITTED THAT THE ASSESSEE DID NOT RAIS E THIS ISSUE BEFORE THE AUTHORITIES BELOW AND, THEREFORE, IN THE ABSENCE OF THE REASONS AS TO WHY THE ASSESSEE HAS NOT RAISED THIS ISSUE BEFORE THE AUTHO RITIES BELOW, THE ADDITIONAL GROUND RAISED BY THE ASSESSEE CANNOT BE ADMITTED AT THIS STAGE. 5. WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE RIVAL SUBMISSIONS AS WELL AS THE RELEVANT MATERIAL ON RECORD. THERE IS NO DISPUTE THAT THE ADDITIONAL GR OUND RAISED BY THE ASSESSEE INVOLVES A PURE QUESTION OF LAW. THE LIMITATION FOR PASSING THE ORDER UNDER SECTION 201(1)/201(1A) OF THE IT ACT IS PURELY LEGAL ISSUE AND ONCE THE ORDER PASSED BY THE AO ON 27.03.2014 AS WELL AS THE ASSESSMENT YEAR IS NOT IN DISPUTE THEN FOR ADJUDICATION OF THE SAID LEGAL ISSUE NO FRESH INVES TIGATION OF FACTS OR MATERIAL IS REQUIRED BUT THE GROUND CAN BE ADJUDICATED ON THE B ASIS OF THE FACTS ALREADY AVAILABLE ON RECORD. HENCE, ONCE THE LEGAL PLEA RA ISED BY THE ASSESSEE DOES NOT INVOLVE OR REQUIRE ANY FINDING OF FACT OR INVESTIGA TION OF FACTS, THEN THERE IS NO BAR FOR RAISING SUCH PLEA AT THIS STAGE. ACCORDINGLY, IN V IEW OF THE DECISION OF HONBLE SUPREME COURT IN CASE OF NTPC VS. CIT (SUPRA), WE A DMIT THE ADDITIONAL GROUND RAISED BY THE ASSESSEE. 6. ON MERITS OF THE GROUND NO. 2, THE LD. A/R OF TH E ASSESSEE HAS SUBMITTED THAT THE AO HAS PASSED THE IMPUGNED ORDER UNDER SECTION 201(1)/201(1A) ON 27.03.204 4 ITA NO. 397/JP/2017 M/S. GUPTA & MAHINDRA TRACTORS, JHALAWAR. WHICH IS AFTER 4 YEARS FROM THE END OF THE FINANCIA L YEAR UNDER CONSIDERATION, THEREFORE, THE ORDER PASSED BY THE AO IS BARRED BY LIMITATION WHICH CANNOT BE MORE THAN 2 YEARS OR AT THE MAXIMUM 4 YEARS FROM THE END OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR. THE LD. A/R HAS FURTHER CONTENDED THAT AT THE RELEVANT POIN T OF TIME, THERE WAS NO LIMITATION PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 201(1) OF THE ACT AND THEREA FTER THE LIMITATION WAS PROVIDED BY THE AMENDMENT IN THE PROVISIONS BY FINANCE ACT, 2009 WITH EFFECT FROM 01.04.2010 OF 2 YEARS FROM THE END OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR IN CASE WHERE THE ASSESSEE HAS FILED THE TDS STATEMENTS. THE LIMITATION FOR P ASSING THE ORDER UNDER SECTION 201(1) IS 4 YEARS IN CASE WHERE THE ASSESSEE HAS NO T FILED THE TDS STATEMENTS. THUS THE LD. A/R HAS SUBMITTED THAT EVEN IF THE AME NDED PROVISIONS OF THE ACT ARE CONSIDERED, THE ORDER PASSED BY THE AO ON 27.03.201 4 IS BEYOND 4 YEARS FROM THE END OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR UNDER CONSIDERATION. IN SUPPORT OF HIS CONTENTION, HE HAS RELIED UPON THE DECISION OF COORDINATE BENCH OF THE TRIBUNAL IN CASE OF ITO VS. EID MOHAMMED NIZAMUDDIN IN ITA NO. 316/JP/2018 AND 248/ JP/2018 DATED 29.08.2018. HENCE, THE LD. A/R HAS SUBMITTED THAT THE ORDER PAS SED BY THE AO IS ILLEGAL BEING BARRED BY LIMITATION. 7. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE LD. D/R HAS SUBMITTED THA T WHEN NO LIMITATION WAS PROVIDED IN THE STATUTE FOR INITIATION OF ACTION OR PASSING THE ORDER UNDER SECTION 201(1) AND THE ASSESSEE HAS DEFAULTED IN NOT DEDUCT ING TAX AT SOURCE, THEN THERE IS NO BAR ON THE JURISDICTION AND POWER OF THE AO TO P ASS THE ORDER HOLDING THE ASSESSEE AS ASSESSEE IN DEFAULT. HE HAS RELIED UPO N THE ORDERS OF THE AUTHORITIES BELOW. 5 ITA NO. 397/JP/2017 M/S. GUPTA & MAHINDRA TRACTORS, JHALAWAR. 8. WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE RIVAL SUBMISSIONS AS WELL AS THE RELEVANT MATERIAL ON RECORD. THERE IS NO DISPUTE THAT THE IMPUGNED ORDE R PASSED BY THE AO UNDER SECTION 201(1)/201(1A) IS DATED 27.03.2014 WHICH IS BEYOND THE PERIOD OF 4 YEARS FROM THE END OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR UNDER CONSIDERAT ION WHICH IS 2008-09. AT THE OUTSET, WE NOTE THAT THE COORDINATE BENCH OF THE TR IBUNAL IN THE CASE OF ITO VS. EID MOHAMMAD NIZAMUDDIN (SUPRA) HAS CONSIDERED THE ISSU E OF LIMITATION FOR PASSING THE ORDER WHERE THE STATUTE DOES NOT PROVIDE ANY LI MITATION FOR SUCH ORDER IN PARA 6 AS UNDER :- 6. WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE RIVAL SUBMISSIONS AS WEL L AS THE RELEVANT MATERIAL ON RECORD. THERE IS NO DISPUTE TH AT SECTION 206C OR ANY OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE INCOME TAX ACT DO NOT P ROVIDE ANY LIMITATION FOR PASSING THE ORDER BY THE ASSESSING O FFICER U/S 206C(6)/206C(7) OF THE ACT HOLDING THE ASSESSEE IN DEFAULT DUE TO FAILURE TO COLLECT TAX AT SOURCE. HOWEVER, NON-PROV IDING THE LIMITATION IN THE STATUTE WOULD NOT CONFER THE JURISDICTION/POWER S TO THE ASSESSING OFFICER TO PASS ORDER U/S 206C AT ANY POINT OF TIME DISREGARDING THE AMOUNT OF TIME LAPSE FROM SUCH DEFAULT OF COLLECTIO N OF TAX AT SOURCE. IF THE CONTENTION OF THE REVENUE IS ACCEPTED THAT THE ASSESSING OFFICER IS FREE TO INITIATE THE ACTION AND PASS THE ORDER U/S 206C AT ANY TIME DEPENDING UPON THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, IT WO ULD AMOUNT TO GIVE AN UNFETTERED POWERS TO THE ASSESSING OFFICER TO TAKE ACTION AT ANY POINT TILL AN INDEFINITE PERIOD. THEREFORE, SUC H INTERPRETATION OR INFERENCE WOULD DEFY OR DEFEAT THE VERY PURPOSE AND SCHEME OF THE STATUTE AND FURTHER THE CONCEPT OF FINALITY OF MATT ERS. HENCE, IN SUCH A SITUATION, A REASONABLE TIME PERIOD IS ALLOWED TO T HE TAXING AUTHORITY FOR A PARTICULAR ACTION OR AN ORDER TO BE PASSED OT HERWISE IT WOULD LEAD TO UNREGULATED POWERS AND AUTHORITIES TO THE TAXING AUTHORITY. THE LAW 6 ITA NO. 397/JP/2017 M/S. GUPTA & MAHINDRA TRACTORS, JHALAWAR. IS TO BE FOLLOWED BY THE AUTHORITIES CONCERNED AS W ELL AS THE PERSONS GOVERNED BY THE SAID LAW AND THEREFORE, IN ABSENCE OF THE LIMITATION ON THE POWERS OF THE TAXING AUTHORITY, IT WOULD ALLOW THE MISUSE OF SUCH POWERS AND PROVISIONS OF THE ACT. IT IS PERTINENT T O NOTE THAT WHEN A LIMITATION IS NOT PROVIDED IN STATUTE FOR A SPECIFI C PURPOSE THEN THE LIMITATION PROVIDED FOR THE PURPOSE OF COMPLETING T HE ASSESSMENT WOULD BE A PROPER GUIDANCE FOR TAKING THE REASONABL E TIME PERIOD WITHIN WHICH AN ORDER HAS TO BE PASSED BY THE TAXIN G AUTHORITY. AN IDENTICAL SITUATION WAS PREVAILING IN RESPECT OF TH E ORDER PASSED U/S 201(1)(201(1A) OF THE ACT PRIOR TO THE AMENDMENT VI DE FINANCE ACT, 2009 W.E.F. 01/4/2010 WHEREBY SUBSECTION (3) WAS IN SERTED TO SECTION 201 OF THE ACT AND LIMITATION HAS BEEN PROVIDED FOR PASSING THE ORDER U/S 201(1) AND 201(1A) OF THE ACT. WHEN THIS ISSUE OF LIMITATION FOR PASSING THE ORDER U/S 201(1)/201(1A) OF THE ACT CAM E BEFORE THE COURTS, IT WAS HELD THAT THE ASSESSING OFFICER CANN OT BE GIVEN UNFETTERED POWERS WHICH CAN BE EXERCISES EVEN BEYON D A REASONABLE TIME BECAUSE OF NON-PROVIDING THE LIMITATION IN THE STATUTE. HENCE, THE COURTS HAVE TAKEN A CONSISTENT VIEW THAT REASONABLE TIME PERIOD FOR PASSING THE ORDER U/S 201(1)/201(1A) OF THE ACT WOU LD BE FOUR YEARS. THE HONBLE DELHI HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. NHK JAPAN BROADCASTING (SUPRA) HAS CONSIDERED AND DECIDED THI S ISSUE IN PARA 18 TO 25 AS UNDER: 18. INSOFAR AS THE INCOME-TAX ACT IS CONCERNED, OUR A TTENTION HAS BEEN DRAWN TO SECTION 153(1)(A) THEREOF WHICH PRESC RIBES THE TIME- LIMIT FOR COMPLETING THE ASSESSMENT, WHICH IS TWO Y EARS FROM THE END OF THE ASSESSMENT YEAR IN WHICH THE INCOME WAS FIRS T ASSESSABLE. IT IS WELL-KNOWN THAT THE ASSESSMENT YEAR FOLLOWS THE PRE VIOUS YEAR AND, THEREFORE, THE TIME-LIMIT WOULD BE THREE YEARS FROM THE END OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR. THIS SEEMS TO BE A REASONABLE PERIO D AS ACCEPTED UNDER SECTION 153 OF THE ACT, THOUGH FOR COMPLETION OF AS SESSMENT PROCEEDINGS. THE PROVISIONS OF RE-ASSESSMENT ARE UN DER SECTIONS 147 AND 148 OF THE ACT AND THEY ARE ON A COMPLETELY DIF FERENT FOOTING AND, THEREFORE, DO NOT MERIT CONSIDERATION FOR THE PURPO SES OF THIS CASE. 7 ITA NO. 397/JP/2017 M/S. GUPTA & MAHINDRA TRACTORS, JHALAWAR. 19. EVEN THOUGH THE PERIOD OF THREE YEARS WOULD BE A REASONABLE PERIOD AS PRESCRIBED BY SECTION 153 OF THE ACT FOR COMPLETION OF PROCEEDINGS, WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THE INCOME-TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL HAS, IN A SERIES OF DECISIONS, SOME OF WHI CH HAVE BEEN MENTIONED IN THE ORDER WHICH IS UNDER CHALLENGE BEF ORE US, TAKEN THE VIEW THAT FOUR YEARS WOULD BE A REASONABLE PERIOD O F TIME FOR INITIATING ACTION, IN A CASE WHERE NO LIMITATION IS PRESCRIBED. 20. THE RATIONALE FOR THIS SEEMS TO BE QUITE CLEAR - IF THERE IS A TIME-LIMIT FOR COMPLETING THE ASSESSMENT THEN THE T IME-LIMIT FOR INITIATING THE PROCEEDINGS MUST BE THE SAME IF NOT LESS. NEVERTHELESS, THE TRIBUNAL HAS GIVEN A GREATER PERIOD FOR COMMENC EMENT OR INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS. 21. WE ARE NOT INCLINED TO DISTURB THE TIME-LIMIT OF FOUR YEARS PRESCRIBED BY THE TRIBUNAL AND ARE OF THE VIEW THAT IN TERMS OF THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN BHATINDA DISTRICT CO-OP. MIL (P.) UNION LTD.S CASE (SUPRA) ACTION MUST BE INITIATED BY THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY UNDER THE INCOME-TAX ACT WHERE NO LIMITAT ION IS PRESCRIBED AS IN SECTION 201 OF THE ACT WITHIN THAT PERIOD OF FOUR YEARS. 22. LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE REVENUE SUBMITTED THAT TH E DEPARTMENT CAME TO KNOW THAT THE ASSESSEE WAS AN AS SESSEE IN DEFAULT ONLY IN NOVEMBER, 1998 WHEN A SURVEY WAS CO NDUCTED AND IT CAME TO BE KNOWN ONLY THEN THAT WHEN THE ASSESSEE H AD NOT DEDUCTED TAX AT SOURCE ON THE GLOBAL SALARY. WE ARE OF THE O PINION THAT THE DATE OF KNOWLEDGE IS NOT RELEVANT FOR THE PURPOSES OF EX ERCISING JURISDICTION INSOFAR AS THE PROVISIONS OF THE INCOME-TAX ACT ARE CONCERNED. IF IT WERE SO, THE LIMITATION PERIOD, AS FOR EXAMPLE PRES CRIBED UNDER SECTION 147/148 OF THE ACT WOULD BECOME MEANINGLESS IF THE CONCEPT OF KNOWLEDGE IS IMPORTED INTO THE SCHEME OF THE ACT. 23. THE SECOND PART OF THE ARGUMENT OF LEARNED COUNSE L FOR THE REVENUE IN THIS REGARD WAS THAT THE QUESTION OF LIM ITATION DID NOT AT ALL ARISE BECAUSE THE ASSESSEE HAD ITSELF ADMITTED ITS LIABILITY AND IT VOLUNTARILY PAID THE TAX AND INTEREST ON THAT AMOUN T. AGAIN, WE ARE NOT IN AGREEMENT WITH LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE REVEN UE IN THIS REGARD. 24. IT APPEARS THAT THE ASSESSEE PAID THE TAX VOLUNTA RILY AS WELL AS INTEREST THEREON BUT THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE LIABILIT Y BY THE ASSESSEE WOULD NOT BY ITSELF EXTEND THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION NOR WOULD IT EXTEND THE REASONABLE TIME THAT IS POSTULATED BY THE SCHEM E OF THE INCOME- TAX ACT. THE ASSESSEE CANNOT BE PUT, IN A SENSE, IN A WORSE POSITION MERELY BECAUSE IT HAS ADMITTED ITS LIABILITY. IF TH E ASSESSEE HAD DENIED ITS LIABILITY THE QUESTION THAT WOULD HAVE ARISEN W OULD BE WHETHER THE REVENUE COULD HAVE INITIATED PROCEEDINGS AFTER A LA PSE OF FOUR YEARS. THE ANSWER TO THAT WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO BE IN TH E NEGATIVE IN VIEW OF THE REASON THAT WE HAVE ALREADY INDICATED ABOVE. THE FACT THAT THE 8 ITA NO. 397/JP/2017 M/S. GUPTA & MAHINDRA TRACTORS, JHALAWAR. ASSESSEE AGREED TO PAY THE TAX VOLUNTARILY CANNOT P UT THE ASSESSEE IN A SITUATION WORSE THAN IF IT HAD CONTESTED ITS LIABIL ITY. 25. WE MAY ALSO NOTE THAT UNDER SECTION 191 OF THE AC T, THE PRIMARY LIABILITY TO PAY TAX IS ON THE PERSON WHOSE INCOME IT IS THAT IS THE DEDUCTEE. OF COURSE, A DUTY IS CAST UPON THE DE DUCTOR, THAT IS THE PERSON WHO IS MAKING THE PAYMENT TO THE DEDUCTEE, T O DEDUCT TAX AT SOURCE BUT IF HE FAILS TO DO SO, IT DOES NOT WASH A WAY THE LIABILITY OF THE DEDUCTEE. IT IS STILL THE LIABILITY OF THE DEDUCTEE TO PAY THE TAX. IN THAT SENSE, THE LIABILITY OF THE DEDUCTOR IS A VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND, THEREFORE, HE CANNOT BE PUT IN A SITUATION WHICH WOULD PREJUDI CE HIM TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT THE LIABILITY WOULD REMAIN HANGING ON H IS HEAD FOR ALL TIMES TO COME IN THE EVENT THE INCOME-TAX DEPARTMENT DECI DES NOT TO TAKE ANY ACTION TO RECOVER THE TAX EITHER BY PASSING AN ORDER UNDER SECTION 201 OF THE ACT OR THROUGH MAKING AN ASSESSMENT OF T HE INCOME OF THE DEDUCTEE. THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT WAS OF THE VIEW THAT THE TIM E LIMIT FOR COMPLETING THE ASSESSMENT AS PER SECTION 153(1)(A) IS TWO YEARS FROM THE END OF THE ASSESSMENT YEAR IN WHICH THE INCOME WAS FIRST ASSESSABLE WHICH WAS CONSIDERED AS REASONABLE PERIO D FOR PASSING THE ORDER U/S 201(1)/201(1A) OF THE ACT. THE HON'BLE HI GH COURT HAS TURNED DOWN THE CONTENTION OF LIMITATION PROVIDED U /S 147/148 OF THE ACT AND HENCE, IT WAS OBSERVED THAT THREE YEARS WOU LD BE A REASONABLE PERIOD AS PRESCRIBED BY SECTION 153 FOR COMPLETION OF PROCEEDINGS. HOWEVER, SINCE THE TRIBUNAL IN A SERIES OF DECISION S HAD TAKEN A VIEW THAT THE PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE ORDER U/S 201(1)/2 01(1A) SHALL BE PASSED WOULD BE FOUR YEARS AND THEREFORE, THE HON'B LE HIGH COURT HAS REFRAINED FROM DISTURBING THE VIEW TAKEN BY THIS TR IBUNAL. FOLLOWING THE SAID DECISION, THE HONBLE DELHI HIGH COURT IN A SU BSEQUENT DECISION IN THE CASE OF VODAFONE ESSAR MOBILE SERVICES LTD. VS UNION OF INDIA & ORS. (SUPRA) HAS REITERATED THE VIEW TAKEN IN THE C ASE OF CIT VS NHK JAPAN BROADCASTING (SUPRA). THE HONBLE GUJARAT HIG H COURT IN THE CASE OF TATA TELESERVICES VS. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. (SUPRA) HAS HELD IN PARAS 15 AND 16 AS UNDER: 15. CONSIDERING THE LAW LAID DOWN BY THE HON'BLE SUPR EME COURT IN THE AFORESAID DECISIONS, TO THE FACTS OF THE CAS E ON HAND AND MORE 9 ITA NO. 397/JP/2017 M/S. GUPTA & MAHINDRA TRACTORS, JHALAWAR. PARTICULARLY CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT WHILE AMENDI NG SECTION 201 BY FINANCE ACT, 2014, IT HAS BEEN SPECIFICALLY MENTION ED THAT THE SAME SHALL BE APPLICABLE W.E.F. 1/10/2014 AND EVEN CONSI DERING THE FACT THAT PROCEEDINGS FOR F.Y. 2007-08 AND 2008-09 HAD BECOME TIME BARRED AND/OR FOR THE AFORESAID FINANCIAL YEARS, LIMITATIO N UNDER SECTION 201(3)(I) OF THE ACT HAD ALREADY EXPIRED ON 31/3/20 11 AND 31/3/2012, RESPECTIVELY, MUCH PRIOR TO THE AMENDMENT IN SECTIO N 201 AS AMENDED BY FINANCE ACT, 2014 AND THEREFORE, AS SUCH A RIGHT HAS BEEN ACCRUED IN FAVOUR OF THE ASSESSEE AND CONSIDERING THE FACT THA T WHEREVER LEGISLATURE WANTED TO GIVE RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT SO SPECIFICALLY PROVIDED WHILE AMENDING SECTION 201(3) (II) OF THE ACT AS WA S AMENDED BY FINANCE ACT, 2012 WITH RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT FROM 1/ 4/2010, IT IS TO BE HELD THAT SECTION 201(3), AS AMENDED BY FINANCE ACT NO.2 OF 2014 SHALL NOT BE APPLICABLE RETROSPECTIVELY AND THEREFO RE, NO ORDER UNDER SECTION 201(I) OF THE ACT CAN BE PASSED FOR WHICH L IMITATION HAD ALREADY EXPIRED PRIOR TO AMENDED SECTION 201(3) AS AMENDED BY FINANCE ACT NO.2 OF 2014. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE IMPUGNED NOTICES / SUMMONSES CANNOT BE SUSTAINED AND THE SAM E DESERVE TO BE QUASHED AND SET ASIDE AND WRIT OF PROHIBITION, AS P RAYED FOR, DESERVES TO BE GRANTED. 16. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE AND FOR THE REASONS STATED ABO VE, ALL THESE PETITIONS SUCCEED. THE IMPUGNED NOTICES / SUMMONSES ARE HELD TO BE INVALID AND THE SAME ARE HEREBY QUASHED AND SET ASI DE AND THE RESPONDENTS HEREIN ARE HEREBY RESTRAINED BY WRIT OF PROHIBITION FROM PROCEEDINGS WITH THE IMPUGNED NOTICES / SUMMONSES W HICH ARE, AS SUCH, HEREBY QUASHED AND SET ASIDE. RULE IS MADE AB SOLUTE ACCORDINGLY IN EACH OF THE PETITIONS. IN THE FACTS AND CIRCUMST ANCES OF THE CASE, THERE SHALL BE NO ORDER AS TO COSTS. THUS, THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT HAS SPECIFICALLY DEALT WITH THE ISSUE OF APPLICABILITY OF AMENDMENT BROUGHT TO THE PROVISION S OF SECTION 201 OF THE ACT AND HELD THAT THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE ASSESS MENT YEAR 2007-08 AND 2008-09 HAD BECOME TIME BARRED AS THE LIMITATIO N U/S 201(3) HAS ALREADY EXPIRED AND OTHERWISE AMENDMENT CANNOT BE A PPLICABLE RETROSPECTIVELY. THE HONBLE GUJARAT HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT (TDS) VS. ANAGRAM WELLINGTON ASSETS MANAGEMENT CO. LTD. ( SUPRA) HAS AGAIN CONSIDERED THIS ISSUE AND HELD IN PARA 7 AS UNDER: 7. IT IS TRUE THAT IT IS THE DUTY OF THE ASSESSEE TO DEDUCT TDS AND THE QUESTION IS WHETHER IT IS LIKELY TO CAUSE ANY L OSS TO THE REVENUE IF IT IS NOT DEDUCTED IN TIME. IF TDS IS NOT DEDUCTED, IT IS REQUIRED TO BE PAID IN THE FIRST INSTALLMENT OF ADVANCE TAX, WHICH IS R EQUIRED TO BE PAID WITHIN FOUR MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF FILING OF RETUR N. THEREFORE, EVEN IF 10 ITA NO. 397/JP/2017 M/S. GUPTA & MAHINDRA TRACTORS, JHALAWAR. THE CONTENTION OF MR. BHATT IS ACCEPTED, LOSS THAT MAY BE CAUSED TO THE REVENUE IS ONLY TO THE TUNE OF INTEREST OF FOUR MONTHS ON DELAYED PAYMENT OF TAX. NOT ONLY THAT WHEN THE DECLARATION ABOUT THIS IS MADE IN THE RETURN, IT COMES WITHIN THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ASSESSING OFFICER EVEN IF THE TDS IS NOT DEDUCTED. THEREFORE, WE ARE OF THE VIEW THAT THE PERIOD OF FOUR YEARS IS REASONABLE PERIOD AND WE CO NCUR WITH THE VIEW TAKEN BY THE DELHI HIGH COURT. IT IS TRUE THAT THE COURT CANNOT LEGISLATE THE ACT, HOWEVER, THE ASSESSING OFFICER ALSO CANNOT BE GIVEN UNFETTERED POWERS, WHICH HE CAN EXERCISE EVEN BEYON D THE REASONABLE PERIOD OF FOUR YEARS. THEREFORE, IN OUR VIEW, PERIO D OF FOUR YEARS IS JUST AND PROPER AND THE TRIBUNAL HAS NOT COMMITTED ANY E RROR WHILE PASSING THE IMPUGNED ORDER. THEREFORE, ALL THESE AP PEALS ARE DISMISSED. THE QUESTIONS POSED FOR OUR CONSIDERATIO N ARE ANSWERED IN FAVOUR OF THE ASSESSEE AND AGAINST THE REVENUE. THUS, FOUR YEARS TIME PERIOD WAS CONSIDERED AS REAS ONABLE PERIOD FOR PASSING THE ORDER U/S 201(1)/201(1A) OF THE ACT. WE FIND THAT THE SIMILAR VIEW HAS BEEN TAKEN BY THE HONBLE ANDHRA PRADESH H IGH COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. U.B. ELECTRONICS INSTRUMENTS LTD. ( 2015) 371 ITR 314 (AP) AS WELL AS BY THE HONBLE KERALA HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT(TDS) & ANR. VS BHARAT HOTELS LIMITED (2016) 384 ITR 77 ( KARN.). THE HONBLE KARNATAKA HIGH COURT HAS DEALT THIS ISSUE IN PARA 2 3 TO 27 AS UNDER: 23. IN THE MEMORANDUM EXPLAINING THE PROVISIONS IN THE FINANCE (II) BILL, 2009, IT WAS CLEARLY STATED THAT 'TO PROVIDE SUFFIC IENT TIME FOR PENDING CASES, IT IS PROPOSED TO PROVIDE THAT SUCH PROCEEDI NGS FOR A FINANCIAL YEAR BEGINNING FROM 1ST APRIL, 2007 AND EARLIER YEA RS CAN BE COMPLETED BY THE 31ST MARCH, 2011. AS SUCH, THE MEMORANDUM IT SELF CLARIFIED THAT THE PROVISO IS FOR PENDING CASES, AND NOT DECIDED C ASES. THE CIRCULAR DATED 3.6.2010, ISSUED BY THE CBDT, ALSO CLEARLY SP ECIFIES THAT THE SAID PROVISO WOULD BE FOR PENDING CASES AND NOT DECIDED CASES. WITH REGARD TO THE APPLICABILITY OF THE AMENDMENT MADE BY THE F INANCE ACT, 2009 WITH EFFECT FROM 1.4.2010, IT WAS ALSO CLARIFIED TO BE FROM THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 2011-12 AND SUBSEQUENT YEARS. AS SU CH, IT IS CLEAR THAT PROVISO TO SUB-SECTION (3) DID NOT LEGALIZE THE CAS ES WHERE ACTION HAD ALREADY BEEN TAKEN, BUT WAS MEANT FOR ONLY SUCH CAS ES WHICH WERE PENDING AT THE TIME OF INSERTION OF SUB-SECTION (3) TO SECTION 201 OF THE ACT. 24. THUS, FOR THE REASONS GIVEN ABOVE, WE FIND THAT THE TRIBUNAL WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING THAT THE ORDER PASSED UNDER SEC. 201 (1) AND (1A) OF THE ACT ON 28.1.2008 FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 2002-0 3, WOULD BE BARRED 11 ITA NO. 397/JP/2017 M/S. GUPTA & MAHINDRA TRACTORS, JHALAWAR. BY LIMITATION AS THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION WOULD BE FOUR YEARS FROM THE END OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR IN QUESTION. AS SUCH, WE ANSWER THE FIRST QUESTION RAISED IN THIS APPEAL, IN FAVOUR OF THE RE SPONDENT ASSESSEE AND AGAINST THE REVENUE. QUESTION NO.2; 25. NOW, COMING TO THE SECOND QUESTION OF LAW, IT IS TR UE THAT IN VIEW OF THE FIRST QUESTION HAVING BEEN DECIDED IN FAVOUR OF THE ASSESSEE, THIS QUESTION REMAINS ONLY ACADEMIC IN NATURE. HOWEVER, SINCE THE QUESTION WOULD BE RELEVANT FOR THE OTHER ASSESSMENT YEARS (M ORE PARTICULARLY, ASSESSMENT YEAR 2004-05 AND 2005-06), THE APPEALS R EGARDING WHICH ASSESSMENT YEARS ARE ALSO CONNECTED WITH THIS APPEA L, LEARNED COUNSEL FOR BOTH THE PARTIES SUBMITTED THAT THIS QUESTION M AY ALSO BE CONSIDERED AND DECIDED IN THIS APPEAL, WHICH WOULD THEN GOVERN THE OTHER APPEALS OF THE REVENUE FILED AGAINST THE SAME ASSESSEE. 26. SRI K V ARAVIND, LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE REVENUE HA S SUBMITTED THAT SUB-SECTION (1A) OF SECTION 201 OF THE ACT PROVIDES FOR PAYMENT OF INTEREST. THE SUB-SECTION, AS IT STOOD AT THE RELEV ANT TIME, PRIOR TO 1.7.2010, READS AS UNDER: '(1A) WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE PROVISIONS OF SUB-SE CTION (1), IF ANY SUCH PERSON, PRINCIPAL OFFICER OR COMPANY AS IS REF ERRED TO IN THAT SUB- SECTION DOES NOT DEDUCT THE WHOLE OR ANY PART OF TH E TAX OR AFTER DEDUCTING FAILS TO PAY THE TAX AS REQUIRED BY OR UN DER THIS ACT, HE OR IT SHALL BE LIABLE TO PAY SIMPLE INTEREST AT 'ONE PER CENT FOR EVERY MONTH OR PART OF A MONTH ON THE AMOUNT OF SUCH TAX FROM THE DATE ON WHICH SUCH TAX WAS DEDUCTIBLE TO THE DATE ON WHICH SUCH TAX IS ACTUALLY PAID AND SUCH INTEREST SHALL BE PAID BEFORE FURNISHING THE S TATEMENT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SUB-SECTION (3) O F SECTION 200.' THE SAID SUB-SECTION CLEARLY PROVIDES THAT INTEREST WOULD BE PAYABLE FROM THE DATE ON WHICH SUCH TAX WAS DEDUCTIBLE, I.E ., THE DATE WHEN PAYMENT WAS MADE BY THE ASSESSEE TO THE RECIPIENT; TILL THE DATE ON WHICH SUCH TAX WAS ACTUALLY PAID, I.E., TAX WAS DEP OSITED BY THE RECIPIENT. 27. THE PROVISION FOR TAX DEDUCTION AT SOURCE IS ONLY A MECHANISM FOR COLLECTION OF TAX BY THE PAYER, EVEN THOUGH THE LIA BILITY TO PAY TAX IS THAT OF THE RECIPIENT. THE PROVISION FOR PAYMENT OF INTEREST UNDER SUB- SECTION (1A) OF SECTION 201 OF THE ACT IS ONLY OF C OMPENSATORY NATURE. IT CANNOT BE A MEANS TO PENALISE THE PAYER. THE PRO VISION FOR PAYMENT OF INTEREST WOULD ARISE FROM THE DATE WHEN IT OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN DEDUCTED I.E., FROM THE DATE OF PAYMENT BY THE PAYE R TO THE RECIPIENT. THE LIABILITY TO PAY INTEREST WOULD END ON THE DATE WHEN SUCH TAX HAS BEEN DEPOSITED BY THE RECIPIENT, EITHER BY WAY OF A DVANCE TAX OR ALONG WITH THE RETURN OF INCOME. INTEREST, HEREIN, BEING COMPENSATORY IN NATURE, CANNOT BE THUS CHARGED FOR THE PERIOD BEYON D THE DATE WHEN SUCH TAX HAS ALREADY BEEN DEPOSITED BY THE RECIPIEN T. IF THE REVENUE IS 12 ITA NO. 397/JP/2017 M/S. GUPTA & MAHINDRA TRACTORS, JHALAWAR. PERMITTED TO CHARGE INTEREST EVEN AFTER THE RECIPIE NT HAS DEPOSITED THE TAX, THE SAME WOULD AMOUNT TO UNDUE ENRICHMENT OF T HE REVENUE, AS EVEN AFTER RECEIVING THE TAX, IT WOULD CONTINUE TO GET INTEREST ON THE AMOUNT WHICH HAS ALREADY BEEN PAID OR DEPOSITED WIT H IT. AS SUCH, THE LIABILITY OF THE ASSESSEE HEREIN WOULD NOT BE FOR P AYMENT OF INTEREST AFTER THE PERIOD OF DEPOSIT OF TAX BY THE RECIPIENT . THUS, A CONSISTENT VIEW HAS BEEN TAKEN BY THE VARIO US HON'BLE HIGH COURTS ON THIS ISSUE THAT WHEN NO LIMITATION IS PRO VIDED IN THE STATUTE THEN A PERIOD OF FOUR YEARS IS CONSIDERED AS REASON ABLE FOR PASSING THE ORDER U/S 201(1)/201(1A) OF THE ACT. THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 206C OF THE ACT ARE ANALOGOUS AND A MEASURE FOR COMPLIANCE OF COLLECTION OF TAX AT SOURCE AS A SIMILAR MEASURE FOR COMPLIANCE O F DEDUCTION OF TAX AT SOURCE IS PROVIDED U/S 201 OF THE ACT. THE DEPAR TMENT HAS ACCEPTED THOSE DECISIONS AND CONSEQUENTLY BROUGHT AMENDMENT TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 201 AND THEREBY PROVIDED THE LIMITATION FOR PASSING THE ORDERS U/S 201(1)/201(1A) OF THE ACT WH ICH WAS INLINE WITH THE VIEW TAKEN BY THE HON'BLE HIGH COURTS ON THIS I SSUE. THOUGH, SUBSEQUENTLY AN AMENDMENT VIDE FINANCE ACT, 2014 WA S AGAIN BROUGHT IN THE SAID PROVISIONS OF SECTION 201 ENLARGING THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION, HOWEVER, THE SAID AMENDMENT IS NOT RETROSPECTIVE. A CCORDINGLY, THE LIABILITY OF TAX COLLECTED AT SOURCE IS ALSO A VICA RIOUS LIABILITY OF THE ASSESSEE TO ASSIST THE DEPARTMENT IN THE MEASURE TO AVOID ANY POSSIBILITY OF TAX AVOIDANCE BY THE PERSONS WITH WH OM THE SPECIFIC TRANSACTIONS HAVE BEEN ENTERED INTO BY THE ASSESSEE . THEREFORE, IN OUR CONSIDERED OPINION, THE ANALOGY AND REASONING GIVEN IN THE DECISIONS OF VARIOUS HON'BLE HIGH COURTS CITED SUPRA IN RESPECT OF THE LIMITATION FOR PASSING THE ORDER U/S 201 OF THE ACT, IS ALSO APPLI CABLE FOR CONSIDERING THE REASONABLE TIME PERIOD FOR PASSING THE ORDER U/ S 206C OF THE ACT. THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 201 AND 206C OF THE ACT A RE HAVING SAME SCHEME AND OBJECT BEING THE MEASURES AGAINST THE AV OIDANCE OF TAX BY THE OPPOSITE PARTIES WITH WHOM THE ASSESSEE HAD THE TRANSACTIONS. HENCE, APPLYING THE REASONABLE PERIOD OF LIMITATION AS FOUR YEARS WITHIN 13 ITA NO. 397/JP/2017 M/S. GUPTA & MAHINDRA TRACTORS, JHALAWAR. WHICH THE ASSESSING OFFICER COULD PASS THE ORDER U/ S 206C(6)/206C(7) OF THE ACT, WE HOLD THAT THE IMPUGNED ORDER PASSED BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER ON 30/3/2016 IS BEYOND THE SAID REASONABLE PERIOD OF LIMITATION AND CONSEQUENTLY IS INVALID BEING BARRED BY LIMITAT ION. ACCORDINGLY, WE QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER PASSED U/S 206C(6)/206C(7) OF THE ACT. THUS IT IS CLEAR THAT THE TRIBUNAL HAS CONSIDERED V ARIOUS DECISIONS ON THIS ISSUE INCLUDING THE DECISION OF HONBLE DELHI HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. NHK JAPAN BROADCASTING, 305 ITR 137 (DELHI) AS WELL AS THE DE CISION OF HONBLE GUJARAT HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF TATA TELESERVICES VS. UNION OF INDIA & ANR., 385 ITR 497 (GUJ.). THE HONBLE GUJARAT HIGH COURT FURTHER CONSIDERED T HE SAID ISSUE IN THE CASE OF CIT (TDS) VS. ANAGRAM WELLINGTON ASSETS MANAGEMENT CO. LTD., 389 ITR 654 (GUJ.). THUS THERE ARE SERIES OF DECISIONS OF HONBLE HIGH COURTS ON THIS ISSUE WHEREIN IT WAS HELD THAT WHEN NO LIMITATION PROVIDED FOR INITIATIN G THE ACTION BY THE AO AND PASSING THE ORDER UNDER THE PARTICULAR PROVISIONS OF THE AC T, THEN A REASONABLE TIME LIMIT FOR SUCH ACTION IS 4 YEARS FROM THE END OF THE RELEVANT FINANCIAL YEAR. FURTHER, AFTER THE DECISIONS OF THE HONBLE HIGH COURTS ON THIS ISSUE, THE LEGISLATURES HAVE AMENDED THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 201 OF THE ACT AND THEREB Y PROVIDED THE LIMITATION OF 2 YEARS AND 4 YEARS RESPECTIVELY IN SPECIFIC CASES FO R PASSING THE ORDER UNDER SECTION 201(1)/201(1A) OF THE ACT. HAVING REGARD TO THE BI NDING PRECEDENTS AS WELL AS AMENDED PROVISIONS OF THE ACT, THE IMPUGNED ORDER P ASSED BY THE AO IS BARRED BY LIMITATION AS IT WAS AFTER 4 YEARS FROM THE END OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR UNDER CONSIDERATION. ACCORDINGLY, WE HOLD THAT THE IMPUG NED ORDER PASSED UNDER SECTION 201(1)/201(1A) OF THE ACT IS INVALID BEING BARRED B Y LIMITATION. HENCE THE SAME IS 14 ITA NO. 397/JP/2017 M/S. GUPTA & MAHINDRA TRACTORS, JHALAWAR. QUASHED. SINCE WE HAVE QUASHED THE IMPUGNED ORDER, THEREFORE, WE DO NOT PROPOSE TO GO INTO THE OTHER GROUNDS RAISED BY THE ASSESSEE IN THIS APPEAL. 9. IN THE RESULT, APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE IS PARTLY ALLOWED. ORDER IS PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON 24/10/20 18. SD/- SD/- ( FOE FLAG ;KNO ) ( FOT; IKY JKWO (VIKRAM SINGH YADAV ) (VIJAY PAL RAO) YS[KK LNL;@ ACCOUNTANT MEMBER U;KF;D LNL;@ JUDICIAL MEMBER JAIPUR DATED:- 24/10/2018. DAS/ VKNS'K DH IZFRFYFI VXZSF'KR@ COPY OF THE ORDER FORWARDED TO: 1. THE APPELLANT- M/S. GUPTA & MAHINDRA TRACTORS, J HALAWAR. 2. THE RESPONDENT THE ITO (TDS), KOTA. 3. THE CIT(A). 4. THE CIT, 5. THE DR, ITAT, JAIPUR 6. GUARD FILE (ITA NO. 397/JP/2017) VKNS'KKUQLKJ@ BY ORDER, LGK;D IATHDKJ@ ASSISTANT. REGISTRAR 15 ITA NO. 397/JP/2017 M/S. GUPTA & MAHINDRA TRACTORS, JHALAWAR.