Kerala Urban & Rural Dev, Calicut V. ACIT, Calicut

ITA 417/COCH/2011

• Counselvise Citation: [2012] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 64854 (ITAT-COCHIN)
• Duration Of Justice: 1 year(s) 4 month(s) 19 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 12-10-2012
• Appeal Filed By: Assessee
• Order Result: Dismissed
• Bench Allotted: DB
• Next Hearing Date: 18-09-2012
• Assessment Year: 2006-2007
• Appeal Filed On: 23-05-2011
• Result in Favour of: Revenue
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: SREENIVASU KOLLIPAKA
• Assessee Lawyers: C B M WARRIER
• Keywords: Principle of natural justice
• Section: 43B; 263

Judgement Text

1 ITA NO.417/COCH/2011 IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL COCHIN BENCH, COCHIN BEFORE SHRI N.R.S. GANESAN (JM) AND SHRI B.R. BASKARA N(AM) I.T.A NO. 417/COCH/2011 (ASSESSMENT YEAR 2006-07) M/S KERALA URBAN & RURAL DEVELOPMENT VS A.C.I.T., C IR.1(1) FINANCE CORPORATION LTD CALICUT CHAKORATH KULAM, WEST HILL CALICUT PAN : AAACK9783H (APPELLANT) (RESPONDENT) APPELLANT BY : SHRI CBM WARRIER RESPONDENT BY : SHRI SREENIVASU KOLLIPAKA DATE OF HEARING : 18-09-2012 DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT : 12-10-2012 O R D E R PER N.R.S. GANESAN (JM) THIS APPEAL OF THE TAXPAYER IS DIRECTED AGAINST TH E ORDER OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMISSIONER PASSED U/S 263 OF THE I NCOME-TAX ACT, 1961. 2. SHRI CBM WARRIER, THE LD.REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE TAXPAYER SUBMITTED THAT THE ASSESSING OFFICER, AFTER CALLING FOR ALL THE DE TAILS WITH REGARD TO INTEREST PAYMENT TO HUDCO MADE ADDITION ONLY IN RESPECT OF R ENTAL INCOME AS DISCUSSED IN THE ASSESSMENT ORDER AT PARAGRAPH 2. IN RESPECT OF ALL OTHER ISSUES, THE ASSESSING OFFICER SATISFIED WITH THE CLAIM OF THE T AXPAYER AND ACCEPTED THE SAME. 2 ITA NO.417/COCH/2011 HOWEVER, THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMISSIONER FOUND THAT INTEREST PAYMENT TO HUDCO WAS NOT CONSIDERED BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER. THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMISSIONER FURTHER FOUND THAT WHEN THE INTEREST W AS PAID IT HAS TO BE ALLOWED U/S 43B OF THE ACT. THE COMMISSIONER ALSO FOUND TH AT THE TAXPAYER HAS PAID RS.3.20 CRORES ON 28-07-2006 AND RS.21 LAKHS ON 27-08-2 006 TO HUDCO. THE LD.REPRESENTATIVE SUBMITTED THAT WHEN THESE PAYMENT S WERE MADE, THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMISSIONER SHOULD HAVE DIRECTED TH E ASSESSING AUTHORITY TO ALLOW THE CLAIM ON PAYMENT BASIS. HOWEVER, NO SUCH DIRECTION WAS ISSUED BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMISSIONER. ACCORDING TO THE LD.R EPRESENTATIVE, SINCE THE ISSUE WAS EXAMINED BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER EXERCISING OF POWERS U/S 263 IS NOT JUSTIFIED. ON A QUERY FROM THE BENCH WITH REGARD T O THE FACT THAT THE EXAMINATION OF THE PAYMENT OF INTEREST IS NOT REFLECTED IN THE ASSESSMENT ORDER, THE LD.REPRESENTATIVE SUBMITTED THAT THE TAXPAYER HAS N O CONTROL OVER THE ASSESSING OFFICER AND CANNOT DIRECT HIM HOW TO DRAFT THE ASSE SSMENT ORDER. THE TAXPAYER COULD ONLY SUBMIT ALL THE MATERIALS AND EXPLANATION S THAT WERE CALLED FOR BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER. THEREFORE, MERELY BECAUSE THE A SSESSING AUTHORITY HAS NOT DISCUSSED ANYTHING WITH REGARD TO THE PAYMENT OF IN TEREST THE TAXPAYER CANNOT BE PENALIZED. WE HEARD SHRI SRINIVASU KOLLIPAKA, THE LD .DR ALSO. 3. WE HAVE CAREFULLY GONE THROUGH THE ORDER OF THE LOWER AUTHORITIES. AS RIGHTLY SUBMITTED BY THE LD.REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE TAXPAYER THE ASSESSING OFFICER HAS DISALLOWED ONLY RENTAL INCOME AS DISCUSSED AT P ARAGRAPH 2 OF THE ASSESSMENT ORDER. THERE IS NO DISCUSSION WITH REGARD TO THE I NTEREST PAYMENT TO HUDCO OR ANY OTHER ISSUE. THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMISSIONER, IN EXERCISE OF HIS POWERS U/S 263 OF THE INCOME-TAX ACT FOUND THAT THE ASSESSING A UTHORITY HAS NOT CONDUCTED ANY PROPER ENQUIRY; THEREFORE, THE ASSESSMENT ORDER IS ERRONEOUS AND PREJUDICIAL TO THE INTEREST OF THE REVENUE. ACCORDINGLY HE DIR ECTED THE ASSESSING OFFICER TO 3 ITA NO.417/COCH/2011 REDO THE ASSESSMENT AFTER PROVIDING ADEQUATE OPPORT UNITY TO THE TAXPAYER. THE MAIN CONTENTION OF THE LD.REPRESENTATIVE FOR THE TA XPAYER BEFORE THIS TRIBUNAL IS THAT THE ASSESSING OFFICER HAS CALLED FOR ALL THE D ETAILS AND THE TAXPAYER HAS ALSO SUBMITTED ALL THE MATERIALS. THEREFORE, THE TAXPAY ER CANNOT BE PENALIZED MERELY BECAUSE THE ASSESSING OFFICER HAS NOT DISCUSSED ANY THING IN THE ASSESSMENT ORDER. 4. ADMITTEDLY THE ASSESSMENT ORDER IS A QUASI JUDIC IAL ORDER. A QUASI JUDICIAL ORDER SHALL CONTAIN THE REASONS FOR ITS CONCLUSION IN THE ORDER ITSELF. A QUASI JUDICIAL ORDER SHALL REFLECT THE APPLICATION OF MIN D BY THE CONCERNED OFFICER. THE REASONS AND APPLICATION OF MIND SHALL BE REFLECTED IN THE ASSESSMENT ORDER ITSELF. THE REASON FOR THE CONCLUSION REACHED IN THE ASSESS MENT ORDER CANNOT BE SUBSTITUTED EITHER BY FILING AFFIDAVIT OR BY FILING DOCUMENTS IN THE APPELLATE PROCEEDINGS. 5. THE ASSESSMENT ORDER IS SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVI EW ON APPEALS. THEREFORE, THE REVISIONAL AS WELL AS APPELLATE AUTHORITIES SHO ULD KNOW THE REASON FOR THE CONCLUSION REACHED BY THE ASSESSING AUTHORITY IN TH E ASSESSMENT ORDER. IF THE ASSESSING OFFICER DOES NOT RECORD THE REASONS FOR T HEIR CONCLUSION, THE APPELLATE / REVISIONAL AUTHORITY MAY NOT BE IN A POSITION TO AP PRECIATE THE ASSESSMENT ORDER WHILE EXERCISING THEIR REVISIONAL / APPELLATE JURIS DICTION AND THE VERY PURPOSE OF PROVIDING APPEAL / REVISION UNDER THE STATUTORY PRO VISION WOULD BE DEFEATED. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, THE ASSESSING AUTHORITY IS BOUND TO RECORD HIS REASONS IN THE ASSESSMENT ORDER WHILE ALLOWING OR DISALLOWING A CL AIM OF THE TAXPAYER. THE APPLICATION OF MIND SHALL ALSO BE REFLECTED IN THE ASSESSMENT ORDER ITSELF. 6. WE FIND THAT THE APEX COURT HAD AN OCCASION TO C ONSIDER AN IDENTICAL ISSUE IN TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION VS COMMISSIONER OF INCO ME-TAX (2008) 306 ITR 52 4 ITA NO.417/COCH/2011 (SC). THE APEX COURT, SPEAKING THROUGH HONBLE MR. JUTICE DR ARIJIT PASAYAT HAS OBSERVED AS FOLLOWS AT PAGE 53 OF THE ITR: WE ARE NOT INCLINED TO INTERFERE WITH THE IMPUGNE D ORDER OF THE HIGH COURT. THE HIGH COURT HAS HELD THAT THE A SSESSING OFFICER HAD DISPOSED OF THE PROCEEDINGS STATING THE PENALTY PROCEEDINGS INITIATED IN THIS CASE UNDER SECTION 271C READ WITH SECTION 274 OF THE INCOME-TAX ACT, 1961 ARE HEREBY DROPPED. ACCORD INGLY TO THE HIGH COURT, THERE WAS NO BASIS INDICATED FOR DROPPI NG THE PROCEEDINGS. THE TRIBUNAL REFERRED TO CERTAIN ASPE CTS AND HELD THAT THE INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 263 OF THE INCOME-TAX ACT, 1961 (IN SHORT, THE I.T. ACT) WAS IMPERMISSI BLE WHEN CONSIDERED IN THE BACKGROUND OF THE MATERIALS PURPOR TEDLY PLACED BY THE ASSESSEE BEFORE THE ASSESSING OFFICER. WHAT THE HIGH COURT HAS DONE IS TO REQUIRE THE ASSESSING OFFICER TO PAS S A REASONED ORDER. THE HIGH COURT WAS OF THE VIEW THAT THE TRI BUNAL COULD NOT HAVE SUBSTITUTED ITS OWN REASONINGS WHICH WERE REQU IRED TO BE RECORDED BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER. ACCORDING TO TH E ASSESSEE, ALL RELEVANT ASPECTS WERE PLACED FOR CONSIDERATION AND IF THE OFFICER DID NOT RECORD REASONS, THE ASSESSEE CANNOT BE FAULTED. WE DO NOT THINK IT NECESSARY TO INTERFERE AT THIS STAGE. IT GOES WITHOUT SAYING THAT WHEN THE MATTER BE TAKEN UP BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER ON REMAND, IT SHALL BE HIS DUTY T O TAKE INTO ACCOUNT ALL THE RELEVANT ASPECTS INCLUDING THE MATE RIALS, IF ANY, ALREADY PLACED BY THE ASSESSEE, AND PASS A REASONED ORDER. 7. WE ALSO FIND THAT THE PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COUR T HAD AN OCCASION TO EXAMINE THIS ISSUE IN COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX VS SUNIL KUMAR GOEL (2005) 274 ITR 53 (P&H). THE PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT AFTE R CONSIDERING THE JUDGMENT OF THE APEX COURT IN MUKHERJEE (S.N.) VS UOI (1990) AIR 1990 SC 1984 HAS OBSERVED AS FOLLOWS: IN S.N. MUKHERJEE V. UNION OF INDIA, AIR 1990 SC 1 984, A CONSTITUTION BENCH OF THE SUPREME COURT DISCUSSED T HE 5 ITA NO.417/COCH/2011 DEVELOPMENT OF LAW ON THIS SUBJECT IN INDIA, AUSTRA LIA, CANADA, ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND AFTER MAKING REFERENCE TO A LARGE NUMBER OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS, THEIR LORDSHIPS CULLED OUT THE FOLLOWING PROPOSITIONS (PAGE 1995): THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT REFERRED TO ABOVE IND ICATE THAT WITH REGARD TO THE REQUIREMENT TO RECORD REASONS TH E APPROACH OF THIS COURT IS MORE IN LINE WITH THAT OF THE AMERICA N COURTS. AN IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION WHICH HAS WEIGHED WITH THE COURT FOR HOLDING THAT AN ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY EXERCISING QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS MUST RECORD THE REASONS FOR ITS DECISION, IS THAT SUCH A DECISION IS SUBJECT TO THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION O F THIS COURT UNDER ARTICLE 136 OF THE CONSTITUTION AS WELL AS THE SUPE RVISORY JURISDICTION OF THE HIGH COURTS UNDER ARTICLE 227 OF THE CONSTIT UTION AND THAT THE REASONS, IF RECORDED, WOULD ENABLE THIS COURT OR TH E HIGH COURTS TO EFFECTIVELY EXERCISE THE APPELLATE OR SUPERVISORY P OWER. BUT THIS IS NOT THE SOLE CONSIDERATION. THE OTHER CONSIDERATIO NS WHICH HAVE ALSO WEIGHED WITH THE COURT IN TAKING THIS VIEW ARE THAT THE REQUIREMENT OF RECORDING REASONS WOULD (I) GUARANTE E CONSIDERATION BY THE AUTHORITY; (II) INTRODUCE CLARITY IN THE DEC ISIONS; AND (III) MINIMIZE CHANCES OF ARBITRARINESS IN DECISION MAKING . IN THIS REGARD A DISTINCTION HAS BEEN DRAWN BETWEEN ORDINARY COURT S OF LAW AND TRIBUNALS AND AUTHORITIES EXERCISING JUDICIAL FUNCT IONS ON THE GROUND THAT A JUDGE IS TRAINED TO LOOK AT THINGS OBJECTIVEL Y UNINFLUENCED BY CONSIDERATIONS OF POLICY OR EXPEDIENCY WHEREAS AN E XECUTIVE OFFICER GENERALLY LOOKS AT THINGS FROM THE STAND POINT OF PO LICY AND EXPEDIENCY. REASONS, WHEN RECORDED BY AN ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHOR ITY IN AN ORDER PASSED BY IT WHILE EXERCISING QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS, WOULD NO DOUBT FACILITATE THE EXERCISE OF ITS JURISDICTIO N BY THE APPELLATE OR SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY. BUT THE OTHER CONSIDERATION S, REFERRED TO ABOVE, WHICH HAVE ALSO WEIGHED WITH THIS COURT IN H OLDING THAT AN ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY MUST RECORD REASONS FOR IT S DECISION, ARE OF NO LESS SIGNIFICANCE. THESE CONSIDERATIONS SHOW TH AT THE RECORDED OF REASONS BY AN ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY SERVICES A SALUTARY PURPOSE, NAMELY, IT EXCLUDES CHANCES OF ARBITRARINE SS AND ENSURES A DEGREE OF FAIRNESS IN THE PROCESS OF DECISION-MAKING. THE SAID PURPOSE WOULD APPLY EQUALLY TO ALL DECISIONS AND IT S APPLICATION CANNOT BE CONFINED TO DECISIONS WHICH ARE SUBJECT T O APPEAL, 6 ITA NO.417/COCH/2011 REVISION OR JUDICIAL REVIEW. IN OUR OPINION, THERE FORE, THE REQUIREMENT THAT REASONS BE RECORDED SHOULD GOVERN THE DECISIONS OF AN ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY EXERCISING QUASI-JUD ICIAL FUNCTIONS IRRESPECTIVE OF THE FACT WHETHER THE DECISION IS SU BJECT TO APPEAL, REVISION OR JUDICIAL REVIEW. IT MAY, HOWEVER, BE A DDED THAT IT IS NOT REQUIRED THAT THE REASONS SHOULD BE AS ELABORATE AS IN THE DECISION OF A COURT OF LAW. THE EXTENT AND NATURE OF THE RE ASONS WOULD DEPEND ON PARTICULAR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES. WHAT IS NECESSARY IS THAT THE REASONS ARE CLEAR AND EXPLICIT SO AS TO IN DICATE THAT THE AUTHORITY HAS GIVEN DUE CONSIDERATION TO THE POINTS IN CONTROVERSY. THE NEED FOR RECORDING OF REASONS IS GREATER IN A C ASE WHERE THE ORDER IS PASSED AT THE ORIGINAL STAGE. THE APPELLA TE OR REVISIONAL AUTHORITY, IF IT AFFIRMS SUCH AN ORDER, NEED NOT GI VE SEPARATE REASONS IF THE APPELLATE OR REVISIONAL AUTHORITY AGREES WIT H THE REASONS CONTAINED IN THE ORDER UNDER CHALLENGE. IN TESTEELS LTD V. N.M. DESAI (1970) 37 FJR 7; AIR 1970 GUJ 1, A FULL BENCH OF THE GUJARAT HIGH COURT HAS MADE AN E XTREMELY LUCID ENUNCIATION OF LAW ON THE SUBJECT AND WE CAN DO NO BETTER THAN TO EXTRACT SOME OF THE OBSERVATIONS MADE IN THE DECISI ON. THE SAME ARE (HEADNOTE OF AIR 1970 (GUJ)): THE NECESSITY OF GIVING REASONS FLOWS AS A NECESS ARY COROLLARY FROM THE RULE OF LAW WHICH CONSTITUTES ON E OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL SET-UP. THE ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES HAVING A DUTY TO ACT JUDICIALLY CANNOT THEREFORE DECIDE ON CONSIDERATIONS OF POLICY OR EXPEDIENCY. THEY MU ST DECIDE THE MATTER SOLELY ON THE FACTS OF THE PARTICULAR CASE, SOLELY ON THE MATERIAL BEFORE THEM AND APART FROM ANY EXTRANEOUS CONSIDERATIONS BY APPLYING PRE-EXISTING LEGAL NORMS TO FACTUAL SITUATIONS. NOW THE NECESSITY OF GIVING REASONS IS AN IMPORTANT SAFEGUARD TO ENSURE OBSERVANCE OF THE DUTY TO ACT J UDICIALLY. IT INTRODUCES CLARITY, CHECKS THE INTRODUCTION OF EXTRA NEOUS OR IRRELEVANT CONSIDERATIONS AND EXCLUDES OR, AT ANY R ATE, MINIMIZES ARBITRARINESS IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS. ANOTHER REASON WHICH COMPELS MAKING OF SUCH AN ORDE R IS BASED ON THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW WHICH IS POSS ESSED BY THE HIGH COURT UNDER ARTICLE 226 AND THE SUPREME COURT UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION. THESE COURTS HAVE THE POWE R UNDER THE SAID 7 ITA NO.417/COCH/2011 PROVISIONS TO QUASH BY CERTIORARI A QUASI-JUDICIAL ORDER MADE BY AN ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER AND THIS POWER OF REVIEW CAN BE EFFECTIVELY EXERCISED ONLY IF THE ORDER IS A SPEAKING ORDER. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY REASONS IN SUPPORT OF THE ORDER, THE SAID COURT S CANNOT EXAMINE THE CORRECTNESS OF THE ORDER UNDER REVIEW. THE HIG H COURT AND THE SUPREME COURT WOULD BE POWERLESS TO INTERFERE SO AS TO KEEP THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE LAW . THE RESULT WOULD BE THAT THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW WOULD BE STULT IFIED AND NO REDRESS BEING AVAILABLE TO THE CITIZEN, THERE WOULD BE INSIDIOUS ENCOURAGEMENT TO ARBITRARINESS AND CAPRICE. IF THI S REQUIREMENT IS INSISTED UPON, THEN, THEY WILL BE SUBJECT TO JUDICI AL SCRUTINY AND CORRECTION. IF THE ORDER PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL IS SCRUTINIZED IN THE LIGHT OF THE AFOREMENTIONED PROPOSITION OF LAW, WE DO NOT FIND ANY DIFFICULTY IN SETTING ASIDE THE SAME ON THE GROUND OF VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF NATURAL JUSTICE. THE FLOWERY LANGUAGE USE D BY THE TRIBUNAL TO JUSTIFY ITS ACCEPTANCE OF THE RESPONDENTS PLEA THAT HE DID NOT KNOW THE LAW DOES NOT WARRANT OUR AFFIRMATION. IN O UR OPINION, THE TRIBUNAL WAS DUTY BOUND TO RECORD TANGIBLE AND COGE NT REASONS FOR UPSETTING WELL REASONED ORDERS PASSED BY THE ASSESS ING OFFICER AND THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX (APPEALS). IT SHOULD HAVE DIRECTED ITS ATTENTION TO THE LANGUAGE OF SECTION 271D AND 2 71E OF THE ACT IN CONJUNCTION WITH OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE SAME FAMIL Y AND THEN DECIDED BY A REASONED ORDER WHETHER THE RESPONDENT HAD BEEN ABLE TO MAKE OUT A CASE FOR DELETING THE PENALTY. T HE ORDER PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL SHOULD HAVE CLEARLY REFLECTED THE A PPLICATION OF MIND BY THE LEARNED MEMBERS. 8. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE JUDGMENTS OF THE APEX COURT AND THE PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COURT, THE ASSESSING AUTHORITY IS BOUN D TO RECORD REASONS FOR THE CONCLUSIONS REACHED IN THE ASSESSMENT ORDER WITH RE GARD TO CLAIM OF THE TAXPAYER. THE APPLICATION OF MIND WITH REGARD TO MA TERIAL FILED BY THE TAXPAYER HAS TO BE REFLECTED IN THE ASSESSMENT ORDER ITSELF. SINCE SUCH AN EXERCISE WAS NOT DONE BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER, THIS TRIBUNAL IS OF THE CONSIDERED OPINION THAT THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMISSIONER HAS RIGHTLY EXERCISED H IS POWERS U/S 263 OF THE 8 ITA NO.417/COCH/2011 INCOME-TAX ACT. HOWEVER, WE MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE ASSESSING AUTHORITY HAS TO EXAMINE THE ISSUE INDEPENDENTLY ON THE BASIS OF THE MATERIAL FILED BY THE TAXPAYER WITHOUT BEING INFLUENCED BY ANY OF THE OBS ERVATION MADE BY THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMISSIONER OR THIS TRIBUNAL IN THI S ORDER. 9. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, WE DO NOT FIND ANY REASON TO INTERFERE WITH THE ORDER OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMISSIONER. ACCORDINGLY TH E SAME IS CONFIRMED AND THE APPEAL OF THE TAXPAYER IS DISMISSED. ORDER PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON THIS 12 TH OCTOBER, 2012. SD/- SD/- (B.R. BASKARAN) (N.R.S. GANESAN) ACCOUNTANT MEMBER JUDICIAL MEMBER COCHIN, DT : 12 TH OCTOBER, 2012 PK/- COPY TO: 1. THE APPELLANT 2. THE RESPONDENT 3. THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX 4. THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX(A) 5. THE DR (TRUE COPY) BY ORDER ASSTT. REGISTRAR, INCOME-TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, COCHIN BENCH