PUNJAB STATE WAREHOUSING CORPORATION, HOSHIARPUR V. INCOME TAX OFFICER, TDS -1, JALANDHARF

ITA 496/ASR/2017

• Counselvise Citation: [2019] 117 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 9174 (ITAT-AMRITSAR)
• Duration Of Justice: 1 year(s) 8 month(s) 2 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 26-03-2019
• Appeal Filed By: Assessee
• Order Result: Allowed
• Bench Allotted: DB
• Next Hearing Date: 07-03-2019
• Assessment Year: 2014-2015
• Appeal Filed On: 24-07-2017
• Result in Favour of: Assessee
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: ABHA RANI SINGH LD
• Keywords: Period of limitation; Time period of passing order; Condonation of delay; TDS
• Section: 194C; 250; 154

Judgement Text

IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLA TE TRIBUNAL AMRITSAR BENCH, AMRITSAR BEFORE SH. SANJAY ARORA, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AN D SH. N.K.CHOUDHRY, JUDICIAL MEMBER ITA NOS.494, 495 & 496(ASR)/2017 ASSESSMENT YEARS:2012-13, 2013 -14 & 2014-15 PUNJAB STATE WAREHOUSING CORPORATION, HOSHIARPUR. [PAN:JLDP0 2255B] VS. INCOME TAX OFFICER, TDS-1, JALANDHAR. (APPELLANT) (RESPONDENT) APPELLANT BY: WRITTEN SUBMISSION RESPONDENT BY: MS. ABHA RANI SINGH (LD. CIT-DR ) DATE OF HEARING: 07.03.2019 DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT: 26.03.201 9 ORDER PER N.K.CHOUDHRY, JM: THESE APPEALS HAVE BEEN PREFERRED BY THE ASSESSEE AGAINST THE COMPOSITE ORDER DATED 28.04.2017 HEREIN PASSED BY THE L D. CIT(A)-1, JALANDHAR FOR THE RELEVANT ASST. YEARS UNDER CONSIDERAT ION, WHEREBY THE LD. CIT(A) DISMISSED THE APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE ON THE REASON OF DELAY OF 725 DAYS IN FILING THE APPEALS. 2. THE BRIEF FACTS RELEVANT FOR ADJUDICATION OF THE A PPEALS ARE THAT IN THESE CASE, THE ASSESSMENT ORDERS HAVE BEEN PASSED U/S 201(1)/ 201(1A) R. W. S. 194C OF THE I.T. ACT, 1961 (HEREINAFTER CALLED AS THE ACT) ON DATED 25.03.2014. AS THE ASSESSEE IS A GOVT. ORGANIZATION THERE FORE SOUGHT PERMISSION FOR ENGAGING OF A LAWYER FROM HEAD OFFICE OF THE ASSESSEE AT CHANDIGARH AND THEREAFTER IN CONSULTATION WITH THE COU NSEL, IT WAS OPINED BY LAWYER THAT THE LIMITATION PERIOD FOR FILING THE AP PEAL U/S 249 OF THE ACT, ITA NOS.494 TO 496/ASR/2017 (A.YS. 2 012-13 TO 2014-15) PUNJAB ST ATE WAREHOUSING CORPORATION VS. ITO 2 BEFORE THE LD. CIT(A) IS EXPIRED ON 30.04.2014 THERE FORE THE ALTERNATIVE REMEDY WOULD BE TO FILE THE REVISION PETITION AND UL TIMATELY ALTERNATIVE REMEDY WAS RECOMMENDED TO THE ASSESSEE. IN PURSUANCE TO T HE RECOMMENDATION OF ITS COUNSEL, THE ASSESSEE FILED THE REVI SION PETITIONS U/S 264 OF THE ACT BEFORE THE LD. CIT(A) ON 18.07.2014 WHICH HAVE BEEN REJECTED BY THE CIT VIDE ORDER DATED 22.03.2016 . LA TER IT WAS REALIZED THAT APPROPRIATE COURSE WAS TO FILE STATUTORY APPEALS U/ 249 OF THE ACT THEREFORE THE RESPECTIVE APPEALS HAVE BEEN PREFERRED BEFORE THE LD. CIT(A) WHO VIDE COMPOSITE ORDER DATED 28.04.2017 DISMISSED THE APPEAL ON THE GROUNDS OF IN-ORDINATE DELAY OF 725 DAYS IN FILING THE APPEAL. FOR READY REFERENCE AND FOR BREVITY THE RELEVANT PART OF ORDER IS REPRODUCED HEREIN BELOW. 05. I HAVE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED THE ASSESSMENT O RDER U/S 201(1)/ 201(1A) R.W.S 194C OF THE INCOME TAX ACT AND WRITTE N SUBMISSIONS OF THE ASSESSEE ON RECORDS. HAVING CONSIDERED THE SAME , I HOLD AS UNDER: 06. GROUND NO. 1 - 6 RELATE TO THE DEMAND OF RS. 5,69,801/- RS.4,92,682/-, RS.6,16,202/- RAISED BY THE ITO (TDS ) -1, JALANDHAR U/S 201(1). 07. THE SAID ORDER WAS PASSED BY THE ITO (TDS) - I, JALANDHAR ON 25.03.2014. THE ASSESSEE HAS FILED APPEAL ON 25.04. 2016 WITH A DELAY OF 725 DAYS. THE ASSESSEES PLEA FOR THE DELAY IS T HAT IT HAD INITIALLY AFTER THE ORDER OF THE ITO (TDS) - I, JALANDHAR REA LIZED THAT THE APPEAL WITH CIT (APPEALS) HAD NOT BEEN FILED IN TIME. THER EFORE THE ASSESSEE DECIDED TO PURSUE THE MATTER WITH AN APPLICATION FO R REVISION U/S 264 OF THE I.T. ACT. HAVING FAILED AT THAT ATTEMPT IN TERM S OF AN ADVERSE ORDER PASSED BY CIT (TDS), CHANDIGARH ON 22.03.2016, THE ASSESSEE THEN SOUGHT APPROACH THE HON. ITAT. 08. THE ASSESSEE WAS HOWEVER INFORMED BY HIS COUN SEL THAT AN APPEAL AGAII ORDER U/S 264 DOES NOT LIE WITH THE HO N. ITAT. 09. THEREFORE THE ASSESSEE HAS NOW FILED AN APPE AL WITH THE CIT (A) JALANDHAR. ITA NOS.494 TO 496/ASR/2017 (A.YS. 2 012-13 TO 2014-15) PUNJAB ST ATE WAREHOUSING CORPORATION VS. ITO 3 10. IT IS QUITE CLEAR THAT THE ASSESSEE HAS BEEN FOLLOWING VARIOUS AVENUES FOR GETTING RELIEF BY FIRST GOING F OR A REVISION U/S 264, WHEN IT COULD NOT COMPLY WITH THE TIMELINES FO R FILING APPEAL U/S 250. WHEN THAT REMEDY FAILED THE ASSESSEE TRIED TO GO TO THE ITAT. WHEN EVEN THAT AVENUE WAS NOT AVAILABLE, THE ASSESSEE HAS FILED AN APPEAL WITH THE O/O THE CIT (A) WITH AN UN-ACCEP TABLE DELAY OF 725 DAYS. 11. I FIND THIS FORUM SHOPPING ENTERED INTO BY TH E ASSESSEE HIGHLY IRREGULAR. T HON. ITAT, AMRITSAR IN ITS ORDE R DATED 22.04.2014 IN ITA NO. 396, 3' 398(ASR.)/ 2010 HAS C LEARLY HELD THAT AN APPEAL ON THE ORDER UNDER 264 CANNOT WITH T HE CIT (A). SECONDLY, DELAY OF 725 DAYS IS INORDINATE AND CANNO T BE ALLOV FOR FILING OF APPEAL. 12. I THEREFORE HAVE NO HESITATION IN DISMISSING THE ASSESSEES APPEAL ON GROUNDS OF INORDINATE DELAY IN FILING THE SAME. 13. IN RESULT APPEAL IS DISMISSED. 3. ON AGGRIEVED, THE ASSESSEE FILED THE INSTANT APPEALS CHAL LENGING THE COMPOSITE ORDER PASSED BY THE LD. CIT (A) AND IN SUPPOR T OF ITS CASE, PREFERRED TO FILE WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS, WHEREAS THE LD. CIT-DR ARGUED THE MATTER AT LENGTH. 4. HAVING HEARD THE LD. CIT(DR) AND PERUSED THE WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS OF THE ASSESSEE AND THE RELEVANT MATERIAL AVAILABLE ON RECO RD. THE QUESTION ARISES AS IF THE ASSESSEE HAS PREFERRED OR CHOSEN A WRONG R EMEDY AND/OR ALTERNATIVE FORUM WHICH CAUSED DELAY IN PURSUING THE AP PROPRIATE REMEDY, THEN THE TIME SPENT IN THAT REMEDY CAN BE CONDONABLE O R NOT. AS IN THE INSTANT CASE ON THE ADVICE OF ITS COUNSEL, THE ASSESSEE INSTEAD OF FILING STATUTORY APPROPRIATE APPEALS WITH CONDONATION OF DELA Y BEFORE THE LD. CIT U/S 249 OF THE ACT, PREFERRED THE REVISION PETITIONS U /S 264 OF THE ACT BEFORE THE LD. CIT(A) WHEREIN CONSIDERABLE TIME HAS ELAPSED AND THEREAFTER THE ASSESSEE PREFERRED THE APPROPRIATE APPEALS U/S 249 OF THE ACT WITH ITA NOS.494 TO 496/ASR/2017 (A.YS. 2 012-13 TO 2014-15) PUNJAB ST ATE WAREHOUSING CORPORATION VS. ITO 4 CONDONATION OF DELAY ON THE GROUND THAT EARLIER PETI TIONS U/S 264 WERE FILED ON THE ADVICE OF THE LAWYER. 4.1 LET US TO REPRODUCE SEC.14 OF THE LIMITATION ACT, 1963 FOR BREVITY AND READY REFERENCE. SECTION 14 IN THE LIMITATION ACT, 1963 14 EXCLUSION OF TIME OF PROCEEDING BONA FIDE IN CO URT WITHOUT JURISDICTION. (1) IN COMPUTING THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION FOR ANY SUI T THE TIME DURING WHICH THE PLAINTIFF HAS BEEN PROSECUTING WITH DUE DILIGENCE A NOTHER CIVIL PROCEEDING, WHETHER IN A COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OR OF APPEAL O R REVISION, AGAINST THE DEFENDANT SHALL BE EXCLUDED, WHERE THE PROCEEDING RELATES TO THE SAME MATTER IN ISSUE AND IS PROSECUTED IN GOOD FAITH IN A COURT WHICH, FROM DEF ECT OF JURISDICTION OR OTHER CAUSE OF A LIKE NATURE, IS UNABLE TO ENTERTAIN IT. (2) IN COMPUTING THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION FOR ANY APP LICATION, THE TIME DURING WHICH THE APPLICANT HAS BEEN PROSECUTING WITH DUE D ILIGENCE ANOTHER CIVIL PROCEEDING, WHETHER IN A COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OR OF APPEAL OR REVISION, AGAINST THE SAME PARTY FOR THE SAME RELIEF SHALL BE EXCLUDE D, WHERE SUCH PROCEEDING IS PROSECUTED IN GOOD FAITH IN A COURT WHICH, FROM DEF ECT OF JURISDICTION OR OTHER CAUSE OF A LIKE NATURE, IS UNABLE TO ENTERTAIN IT. (3) NOTWITHSTANDING ANYTHING CONTAINED IN RULE 2 OF O RDER XXIII OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908 (5 OF 1908), THE PROVISIONS O F SUB-SECTION (1) SHALL APPLY IN RELATION TO A FRESH SUIT INSTITUTED ON PERMISSION G RANTED BY THE COURT UNDER RULE 1 OF THAT ORDER WHERE SUCH PERMISSION IS GRANTED ON T HE GROUND THAT THE FIRST SUIT MUST FAIL BY REASON OF A DEFECT IN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OR OTHER CAUSE OF A LIKE NATURE. EXPLANATION. FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS SECTION, (A) IN EXCLUDING THE TIME DURING WHICH A FORMER CIVIL PROCEEDING WAS PENDING, THE DAY ON WHICH THAT PROCEEDING WAS INSTITUTED AND THE DAY ON WHICH IT ENDED SHALL BOTH BE COUNTED; (B) A PLAINTIFF OR AN APPLICANT RESISTING AN APPEAL SH ALL BE DEEMED TO BE PROSECUTING A PROCEEDING; (C) MISJOINDER OF PARTIES OR OF CAUSES OF ACTION SHAL L BE DEEMED TO BE A CAUSE OF A LIKE NATURE WITH DEFECT OF JURISDICTION. SECTION 49 OF THE LIMITATION ACT PRESCRIBES THAT IN COMP UTING THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION FOR ANY SUI, THE TIME DURING WH ICH THE PLAINTIFF HAS BEEN PROSECUTING WITH DUE DILIGENCE ANOTHER CIVIL PROCEEDING , WHETHER IN COURT OF ITA NOS.494 TO 496/ASR/2017 (A.YS. 2 012-13 TO 2014-15) PUNJAB ST ATE WAREHOUSING CORPORATION VS. ITO 5 FIRST INSTANCE OR OF APPEAL OR REVISION, AGAINST THE DE FENDANT SHALL BE EXCLUDED, WHERE, PROCEEDINGS RELATES TO THE SAME MATTER IN ISSUE AND IS PROSECUTED IN GOOD FAITH IN A COURT WHICH, FROM DEFECT OR JURISDICTION OR OTHER CAUSE OF A LIKE NATURE IS UNABLE TO ENTERTAIN IT THERE FORE FROM SEC.14 IT IS CLEAR IF ANY PERSONS IN GOOD FAITH WITH DUE DILIGENCE H AS BEEN PROSECUTING ANOTHER PROCEEDING WHICH RELATES TO THE SAME MATTER IN ISSUE, WHICH THE OTHER COURT WAS UNABLE TO ENTERTAIN IT, THEN THE PER IOD FOR PROSECUTING THE FORMER PROCEEDING SHOULD BE EXCLUDED. 4.2 IN THE INSTANT CASE, THE ASSESSEE HAS PREFERRED THE ALTE RNATIVE REMEDY OF REVISION U/S 264 WHEREAS THE ISSUES INVOLVED COULD HA VE BEEN RAISED IN FIRST APPEAL AS OBSERVED BY THE LD. CIT IN ITS ORDER D ATED 22.03.2016 U/S 264 OF THE ACT. THOUGHT IT IS NOT THE CASE OF THE ASSESSEE THAT THE LD. CIT (A) WAS NOT COMPETENT TO ENTERTAIN THE REVISION PETITIONS U /S 264 OF THE ACT, HOWEVER TRUE SPIRIT OF SECTION 14 OF THE LIMITATION AC T WHICH PRESCRIBES EXCLUSION OF TIME IN PROSECUTING THE CLAIM IN GOOD FAIT H, IN A COURT WHICH, FROM DEFECT OR JURISDICTION OR OTHER CAUSE OF A LIKE NAT URE IS UNABLE TO ENTERTAIN, DISCERNABLE AND CAN BE APPLIED IN THE INSTA NT CASE. 4.3 THE LD. CIT DR THOUGH VEHEMENTLY ARGUED THAT THE L D. CIT IN ITS ORDER U/S 264 HAS ALREADY DEALT WITH THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE ASSESSEE HOWEVER THE ASSESSEE ON FAILURE TO GET ANY RELIEF PREFERRED THE INSTANT APPEALS, WHICH AMOUNTS TO ABUSE OF PROCESS OF LAW AND IN ANY CASE ARE NOT ENTERTAINABLE, THE LD. DR, HOWEVER FAILED TO BRING ON RECORD ANY DE CISION IN SUPPORT OF ITS CONTENTION. 4.4 THE HONBLE MADRAS HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. D. LAKSHMI- NARAYANPATHI [2001] 250 ITR 0187 DEALT WITH THE IDE NTICAL ISSUE AND HELD ITA NOS.494 TO 496/ASR/2017 (A.YS. 2 012-13 TO 2014-15) PUNJAB ST ATE WAREHOUSING CORPORATION VS. ITO 6 THAT INVOKING THE REVISIONAL JURISDICTION COULD NOT CO NSTITUTE A BAR TO FILING OF AN APPEAL. FOR READY REFERENCE AND BREVITY THE CONCLU DING PART OF THE JUDGMENT IS REPRODUCED HEREIN BELOW. 2. THE ARGUMENT ADVANCED BEFORE US IS THAT BY INFERENTIAL REASONING WE SHOULD HOLD THAT IF THERE IS A LIMITATION ON EXE RCISE OF REVISIONAL POWER A SIMILAR LIMITATION SHOULD BE READ INTO THE EXERCISE OF THE APPELLATE POWER. IT DOES NOT REQUIRE ANY AUTHORITY TO HOLDING THAT IT I S NOT THE PROVINCE OF THE COURT TO REWRITE THE LAW ON THE GROUND THAT THE PRO VISION SHOULD HAVE BEEN WORDED IN THE DIFFERENT MANNER IN ORDER TO MAKE IT SEEMINGLY CONSISTENT WITH SOME OTHER PROVISION. MOREOVER, IT IS WHOLLY U NNECESSARY FOR PARLIAMENT TO IMPOSE THE SAME KIND OF RESTRICTION F OR INVOKING DIFFERENT KINDS OF JURISDICTION. IT IS OPEN TO THE LAW-MAKER TO PROVIDE MORE THAN ONE REMEDY TO THE AGGRIEVED PARTY AND SO LONG AS SUCH R EMEDIES ARE AVAILABLE, THE AGGRIEVED PARTIES CAN CERTAINLY INVOKE THEM. 3. THE TRIBUNAL HAS RIGHTLY HELD THAT THE ASSESSEE, NOTWITHSTANDING HIS UNSUCCESSFUL EFFORT AT HAVING THE ORDER REVISED , COULD STILL FILE AN APPEAL AS INVOKING THE REVISIONAL JURISDICTION COULD NOT C ONSTITUTE A BAR TO THE FILING OF AN APPEAL. IT IS FOR THE LEGISLATURE TO IMPOSE S UCH A BAR IF IT CONSIDERS IT NECESSARY TO DO SO. 4. WE, THEREFORE, FIND NO ERROR IN THE ORDE R OF THE TRIBUNAL. WE ANSWER THE QUESTION AS TO 'WHETHER, ON THE FACTS AND IN TH E CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, THE TRIBUNAL WAS RIGHT IN HOLDING' THAT THE A AC WAS JUSTIFIED IN ENTERTAINING THE ASSESSEE'S APPEAL AGAINST THE ASSE SSMENT EVEN THOUGH THE CIT HAD PASSED AN ORDER UNDER S. 264 AGAINST TH E ASSESSEE AND HOLDING THAT THE' PROVISIONS OF S. 154 WERE APPLICA BLE AND A REVISION WAS NOT BARRED BY LIMITATION' IN FAVOUR OF THE ASSESSEE AND AGAINST THE REVENUE. NO COSTS. 4.5 THE CO-ORDINATE BENCH IN THE CASE OF GOPAL SINGH VS. INCOME TAX OFFICER, DASUYA (ITA NO.347 & 348/ASR/ 006 DECIDED ON 0 7.08.2007 ALSO DEALT WITH THE IDENTICAL ISSUE AND CONDONED THE DELAY O F 557 DAYS WHICH OCCURRED IN PROSECUTING THE REVISION PETITION U/S 264 OF THE ACT. HENCE, CONSIDERING THE PECULIAR FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES AS THE LEAR NED COUNSEL HAD SUGGESTED THE ALTERNATIVE REMEDY IN GOOD FAITH TO THE ASSESSEE. THE SAID OPINION SEEMS TO BE BASED ON THE LAWYER'S WISDOM AND THE REFORE ON THE BASIS OF OPINION, INSTEAD OF FILING AN APPEAL U/S 249 O F THE ACT WITH APPLICATION FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY, THE ASSESSE FILED T HE REVISION PETITIONS ITA NOS.494 TO 496/ASR/2017 (A.YS. 2 012-13 TO 2014-15) PUNJAB ST ATE WAREHOUSING CORPORATION VS. ITO 7 U/S 264 OF THE ACT, WHICH INDISPUTABLY WERE WITHIN TIME HOWEVER RESULTED INTO IN-ORDINATE DELAY BUT THE DELAY CANNOT BE CONSTR UED AS UN-BONAFIDE OR INTENTIONAL BUT BECAUSE ON THE BASIS OF THE OPINION SOU GHT ON GOOD FAITH. AS IT IS WELL SETTLED LAW BY THE APEX COURT THAT AMOUNT O F DELAY IS NOT MATERIAL BUT THE CAUSE FOR CAUSING THE DELAY IS PARAMOUNT CONSIDER ATION FOR ENTERTAINING THE RESPECTIVE PETITIONS WHILE CONDONING THE DELAY. 4.6 FOR ENTERTAINMENT OF PETITION AFTER LIMITATION PER IOD, THE LAW IS WELL SETTLED BY THE HIGHER COURTS THAT WHILE DEALING WITH THE APPLICATION FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY, THE COURT IS TO SEE THE CONDUCT OF THE PARTY AND PLAUSIBLE REASONING FOR NON FILING OF THE STATUTORY A PPEAL WITHIN TIME. THE PRIMARY FUNCTION OF A COURT IS TO ADJUDICATE THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND TO ADVANCE SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE. THE APEX COURT IN TH E CASE OF STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. VS. KAMESHWAR PRASAD SINGH & ANR.[1], THA T POWER TO CONDONE THE DELAY IN APPROACHING THE COURT HAS BEEN CONFERRED UPON THE COURTS TO ENABLE THEM TO DO SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE TO PARTIES BY DISPO SING THE CASES ON MERIT. 4.7 THE APEX COURT IN COLLECTOR, LAND ACQUISITION, ANANTN AG V. MST. KATIJI (1987) I LLJ 500 SC, ANALYZED THE PROVISIONS OF LAW Q UA LIMITATION ACT AND HELD THAT THE EXPRESSION 'SUFFICIENT CAUSE' EMPLOYED BY T HE LEGISLATURE IN THE LIMITATION ACT IS ADEQUATELY ELASTIC TO ENABLE THE COU RTS TO APPLY THE LAW IN A MEANINGFUL MANNER WHICH SUB-SERVES THE ENDS OF JUSTICE-THA T BEING THE LIFE PURPOSE FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE INSTITUTION OF COURTS. IT WAS FURTHER OBSERVED THAT A LIBERAL APPROACH IS ADOPTED ON PRINCIPLE AS IT I S REALISED THAT: 1. ORDINARILY A LITIGANT DOES NOT STAND TO BENEFIT BY LODGING AN APPEAL LATE. 2. REFUSING TO CONDONE DELAY CAN RESULT IN A MERITO RIOUS MATTER BEING THROWN OUT AT THE VERY THRESHOLD AND CAUSE OF JUSTICE BEING DEFEATED. AS AGAINST THIS WH EN DELAY IS CONDONED THE HIGHEST THAT CAN HAPPEN IS THAT A CAUSE WOULD BE DECIDED ON MERITS AFTER HEARING THE PARTIES. ITA NOS.494 TO 496/ASR/2017 (A.YS. 2 012-13 TO 2014-15) PUNJAB ST ATE WAREHOUSING CORPORATION VS. ITO 8 3. 'EVERY DAY'S DELAY MUST BE EXPLAINED' DOES NOT M EAN THAT A PEDANTIC APPROACH SHOULD BE MADE. WHY NO T EVERY HOUR'S DELAY, EVERY SECOND'S DELAY? THE DOCTR INE MUST BE APPLIED IN A RATIONAL COMMON SENSE PRAGMATIC MANNER. 4. WHEN SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE AND TECHNICAL CONSIDERA TIONS ARE PITTED AGAINST EACH OTHER, CAUSE OF SUBST ANTIAL JUSTICE DESERVES TO BE PREFERRED FOR THE OTHER SIDE CANNOT CLAIM TO HAVE VESTED RIGHT IN INJUSTICE BEI NG DONE BECAUSE OF A NON-DELIBERATE DELAY. 5. THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION THAT DELAY IS OCCASIONED DELIBERATELY, OR ON ACCOUNT OF CULPABLE NEGLIGENCE , OR ON ACCOUNT OF MALA FIDES. A LITIGANT DOES NOT STAND TO BENEFIT BY RESORTING TO DELAY. IN FACT HE RUNS A S ERIOUS RISK. 6. IT MUST BE GRASPED THAT JUDICIARY IS RESPECTED N OT ON ACCOUNT OF ITS POWER TO LEGALIZE INJUSTICE ON TECHNICAL GROUNDS BUT BECAUSE IT IS CAPABLE OF REMOVING INJUS TICE AND IS EXPECTED TO DO SO. XXX XXX XXX 4.8 APEX COURT IN THE CASE OF STATE OF HARYANA V. CHANDR A MANI 2002(143) ELT 249(SC) HAS HELD; '.....THE EXPRESSION 'SUFFICIENT CAUSE' SHOULD, THE REFORE, BE CONSIDERED WITH PRAGMATISM IN JUSTICE-OR IENTED PROCESS APPROACH RATHER THAN THE TECHNICAL DETENTIO N OF SUFFICIENT CASE FOR EXPLAINING EVERY DAY'S DEL AY. THE FACTORS WHICH ARE PECULIAR TO AND CHARACTERISTIC OF THE FUNCTIONING OF PRAGMATIC APPROACH INJUSTICE OR IENTED PROCESS. THE COURT SHOULD DECIDE THE MATTERS ON MER ITS UNLESS THE CASE IS HOPELESSLY WITHOUT MERIT. NO SEPARATE STANDARDS TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE LAID BY T HE STATE VIS-A-VIS PRIVATE LITIGANT COULD BE LAID T O PROVE STRICT STANDARDS OF SUFFICIENT CAUSE. THE GOVERNMEN T AT APPROPRIATE LEVEL SHOULD CONSTITUTE LEGAL CELL S TO EXAMINE THE CASES WHETHER ANY LEGAL PRINCIPLES ARE INVOLVED FOR DECISION BY THE COURTS OR WHETHER CASE S REQUIRE ADJUSTMENT AND SHOULD AUTHORIZE THE OFFICER S TO TAKE A DECISION TO GIVE APPROPRIATE PERMISSION FOR SETTLEMENT. IN THE EVENT OF DECISION TO FILE THE AP PEAL NEEDED PROMPT ACTION SHOULD BE PURSUED BY THE OFFICER RESPONSIBLE TO FILE THE APPEAL AND HE SHOULD BE MAD E PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR LAPSES, IF ANY. EQUALL Y, THE STATE CANNOT BE PUT ON THE SAME FOOTING AS AN INDIV IDUAL. THE INDIVIDUAL WOULD ALWAYS BE QUICK IN TAKI NG THE DECISION WHETHER HE WOULD PURSUE THE REMEDY BY WAY OF AN APPEAL OR APPLICATION SINCE HE IS A PERSON LE GALLY INJURED WHILE STATE IS AN IMPERSONAL MACHINERY WORK ING THROUGH ITS OFFICERS OR SERVANTS.' 4.9 THE APEX COURT IN NAND KISHORE V. STATE OF PUNJAB ( 1995) 6 SCC 614, UNDER THE PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE CONDONED THE D ELAY OF ABOUT 31 YEARS, IN APPROACHING THE APEX COURT. 4.10 SIMILARLY, THE APEX COURT IN N. BALAKRISHNAN VS. M. KRISHNAMURTHY 2008(228) ELT 162(SC), THE APEX COURT, WHILE CONDONI NG THE DELAY OF 883 DAYS IN FILING AN APPLICATION FOR SETTING ASIDE THE EX PARTE DECREE HELD AS UNDER: ITA NOS.494 TO 496/ASR/2017 (A.YS. 2 012-13 TO 2014-15) PUNJAB ST ATE WAREHOUSING CORPORATION VS. ITO 9 'THAT THE PURPOSE OF LIMITATION ACT WAS NOT TO DESTROY THE RIGHTS. IT IS FOUNDED ON PUBLIC POLICY FIXING A LIFE SPAN FOR THE LEGAL REMEDY FOR THE GENERAL WELF ARE. THE PRIMARY FUNCTION OF A COURT IS TO ADJUDICA TE DISPUTES BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND TO ADVANCE SUBSTANTIAL JUST ICE. THE TIME LIMIT FIXED FOR APPROACHING THE COURT IN DIFFERENT SITUATIONS IS NOT BECAUSE ON THE EXPIRY O F SUCH TIME A BAD CAUSE WOULD TRANSFORM INTO A GOOD CAUSE. THE OBJECT OF PROVIDING LEGAL REMEDY IS TO REPAIR T HE DAMAGE CAUSED BY REASON OF LEGAL INJURY. IF THE EXPLANATION GIVEN DOES NOT SMACK MALA FIDES OR IS N OT SHOWN TO HAVE BEEN PUT FORTH AS A PART OF A DILA TORY STRATEGY, THE COURT MUST SHOW UTMOST CONSIDERATION TO THE SUITOR.' IT IS AXIOMATIC THAT CONDONATION OF DELAY IS A MATT ER OF DISCRETION OF THE COURT. SECTION 5 OF THE LIMITATION ACT DOES NOT SAY THAT SUCH DISCRETION CA N BE EXERCISED ONLY IF THE DELAY IS WITHIN A CERTAI N LIMIT. LENGTH OF DELAY IS NO MATTER, ACCEPTABILITY OF THE EXPLANATION IS THE ONLY CRITERION. SOMETIMES DELAY OF THE SHORTEST RANGE MAY BE UNCONTAINABLE DUE TO A WANT O F ACCEPTABLE EXPLANATION WHEREAS IN CERTAIN OTHER C ASES, DELAY OF A VERY LONG RANGE CAN BE CONDONED AS THE E XPLANATION THEREOF IS SATISFACTORY. ONCE THE COURT ACCEPTS THE EXPLANATION AS SUFFICIENT, IT IS THE RE SULT OF POSITIVE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION AND NORMALL Y THE SUPERIOR COURT SHOULD NOT DISTURB SUCH FINDING, MUC H LESS IN REVISIONAL JURISDICTION, UNLESS THE EXERC ISE OF DISCRETION WAS ON WHOLLY UNTENABLE GROUNDS OR ARBIT RARY OR PERVERSE. BUT IT IS A DIFFERENT MATTER WHEN THE FIRST COURT REFUSES TO CONDONE THE DELAY. IN SUCH CASES, THE SUPERIOR COURT WOULD BE FREE TO CONSIDER THE CA USE SHOWN FOR THE DELAY AFRESH AND IT IS OPEN TO SUCH S UPERIOR COURT TO COME TO ITS OWN FINDING EVEN UNTRA MMELLED BY THE CONCLUSION OF THE LOWER COURT.' A COURT KNOWS THAT REFUSAL TO CONDONE DELAY WOULD R ESULT FORECLOSING A SUITOR FROM PUTTING FORTH HIS CAUSE. THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION THAT DELAY IN APPROA CHING THE COURT IS ALWAYS DELIBERATE. THIS COURT HA S HELD THAT THE WORDS 'SUFFICIENT CAUSE' UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE LIMITATION ACT SHOULD RECEIVE A LIBERAL CON STRUCTION SO AS TO ADVANCE SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE VIDE SHAKUNTALA D EVI JAIN VS. KUNTAL KUMARI [AIR 1969 SC 575] AND ST ATE OF WEST BENGAL VS. THE ADMINISTRATOR, HOWRAH MUNICI PALITY [AIR 1972 SC 749]. IT MUST BE REMEMBERED THA T IN EVERY CASE OF DELAY THERE CAN BE SOME LAPSE ON T HE PART OF THE LITIGANT CONCERNED. THAT ALONE IS NO T ENOUGH TO TURN DOWN HIS PLEA AND TO SHUT THE DOOR AGAINST HIM. IF THE EXPLANATION DOES NOT SMACK OF MALA FIDE S OR IT IS NOT PUT FORTH AS PART OF A DILATORY STRATEGY THE CO URT MUST SHOW UTMOST CONSIDERATION TO THE SUITOR. B UT WHEN THERE IS REASONABLE GROUND TO THINK THAT THE DELAY WAS OCCASIONED BY THE PARTY DELIBERATELY TO GAIN TI ME THEN THE COURT SHOULD LEAN AGAINST ACCEPTANCE OF THE EXP LANATION. WHILE CONDONING DELAY THE COULD SHOULD NO T FORGET THE OPPOSITE PARTY ALTOGETHER. IT MUST BE BO RNE IN MIND THAT HE IS A LOOSER AND HE TOO WOULD HA VE INCURRED QUIET A LARGE LITIGATION EXPENSES. IT WOUL D BE A SALUTARY GUIDELINE THAT WHEN COURTS CONDONE THE DELAY DUE TO LACHES ON THE PART OF THE APPLICANT THE COUR T SHALL COMPENSATE THE OPPOSITE PARTY FOR HIS LOSS. 4.11 HENCE, ON THE AFORESAID ANALYZATION AND RESPECTFULLY FOLLOWING THE DICTUM OF THE HONBLE APEX COURT AND HONBLE HIGH COURT AND THE CO- ORDINATE BENCH, WE ARE INCLINED TO HOLD THAT DELAY OF 725 DAYS HAS BEEN OCCURRED IN PROSECUTING THE REVISION PETITIONS IN GOOD FA ITH ON THE BASIS OF ITA NOS.494 TO 496/ASR/2017 (A.YS. 2 012-13 TO 2014-15) PUNJAB ST ATE WAREHOUSING CORPORATION VS. ITO 10 ASSESSEE'S LAWYER AND THEREFORE REASONABLY BEEN EXPLAINED BY THE ASSESSEE AND HENCE , TIME SPENT IN PROSECUTING THE REVISION PET ITIONS U/S 264 OF THE ACT IS LIABLE TO BE CONDONED AND STANDS CONDONED , HOWEV ER, THE ASSESSEE SHALL HAVE TO EXPLAIN THE DELAY FROM 1 ST MAY, 2014 TO 17 TH JULY 2014 WHICH IS CAUSED FOR FILING THE APPEAL U/S 249 OF THE ACT BEFORE THE LD. CIT(A). 5. IN THE RESULT, THE APPEALS FILED BY THE ASSESSEE ARE ALL OWED FOR STATISTICAL PURPOSES. ORDER PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON 26.03.2019. SD/- SD/- (SANJAY ARORA) (N.K.CHOUDHRY) ACCOUNTANT MEMBER JUDIC IAL MEMBER DATED:26.03.2019 /PK/ PS. COPY OF THE ORDER FORWARDED TO: (1) M/S. PUNJAB STATE WAREHOUSING CORPORATION, HOSHIARP UR (2) INCOME TAX OFFICER, TDS-1, JALANDHAR. (3) THE CIT(A)-1, JALANDHAR (4) THE CIT CONCERNED (5) THE SR DR, I.T.A.T., AMRITSAR TRUE COPY BY ORDER