IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL DELHI BENCH B, NEW DELHI BEFORE SRI C.M.GARG, JM AND SRI O.P. KANT, AM ITA NO. 506/DEL./2014 : A SSTT. YEAR : 2002-03 DCIT CIRCLE-49(1), NEW DELHI VS CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES 139, SHOPPING COMPLEX, ZAMRUDPUR KAILASH COLONY EXTN., NEW DELHI (APPELLANT) (RESPONDENT) PAN NO. AACFC6156D ASSESSEE BY : DR. RAM SAM EYH, ADV. REVENUE BY : MS. RAKHI VIM AL, SR. DR DATE OF HEARING : 07.01.2016 DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT : 10.02.2016 ORDER PER C.M.GARG, J.M. THIS APPEAL BY THE REVENUE HAS BEEN DIRECTED AGAINS T THE ORDER OF THE CIT(A) XXX, NEW DELHI DATED 25.11.2013 PAS SED IN APPEAL NO. 0281/2011-12 FOR AY 2002-03. 2. THE GROUND RAISED BY THE APPELLANT READ AS UNDER :- 1. ON THE FACTS AND IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE C ASE AS WELL AS IN LAW, THE LD. CIT(APPEALS) HAS ERRED IN H OLDING THAT THE ORDER PASSED BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER FOR AY 2002- 03 IS BARRED BY LIMITATION. 2. ON THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE AS W ELL AS IN LAW, THE LD. CIT(APPEALS) HAS ERRED IN IGNORING THE PROVISO TO SECTION 201(3) OF THE IT ACT, WHEREIN IT IS ITA NO. 506/DEL/2014 CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES 2 CLEARLY PROVIDED THAT THE ORDER FOR A FINANCIAL YEA R COMMENCING ON OR BEFORE THE 1 ST DAY OF APRIL, 2007 MAY BE PASSED AT ANY TIME ON OR BEFORE THE 31 ST DAY OF MARCH, 2011. 3. THE CANCELLATION OF THE ORDER BY THE CIT(A) PAS SED U/S 201(1)/201(1A) IS BAD IN LAW THEREFORE THE HONBLE ITAT BE REQUESTED TO SET ASIDE THE SAME AND RESTORE BACK TH E ORDER OF THE A.O. 3. WE HAVE HEARD ARGUMENT OF BOTH THE SIDES AND CAR EFULLY PERUSED THE MATERIAL PLACED ON RECORD BEFORE US, TH E LD. DR STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE ACTION OF THE AO SUBMITTED THAT AS PE R AMENDMENT TO PROVISION OF SECTION 201 OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 196 1 (FOR SHORT THE ACT) BY THE FINANCE ACT- 2009 W.E.F. 1.4.2010, ORDE R U/S 201 FOR A FINANCIAL YEAR COMMENCING ON OR BEFORE 01.04.2007 M AY BE PASSED AT ANY TIME ON OR BEFORE THE 31 ST DAY OF MARCH, 2011. IT WAS ALSO CONTENDED THAT IN VIEW OF SPECIFIC PROVISIONS BROUG HT TO THE ACT BY THE LEGISLATURE THE STAND OF THE ASSESSEE IS NTO AC CEPTABLE. THE LD. DR VEHEMENTLY CONTENDED THAT THE CIT(A) WAS INCORRE CT IN GRANTING RELIEF TO THE ASSESSEE IN VIEW OF THE SPECIFIC PROV ISIONS BROUGHT IN BY THE LEGISLATURE. 4. THE LD. AR, REPLYING TO THE ABOVE SUBMISSIONS, SUPPORTED THE FIRST APPELLATE ORDER AND CONTENDED T HAT THE ISSUE IS SQUARELY COVERED IN FORM OF THE ASSESSEE BY THE ORD ER OF THE ITAT, NEW DELHI B BENCH IN ASSESSEES OWN CASE I.E. ITA NO. 2742 TO 2744/DEL/2011 FOR AY 2003-04 TO 2005-06. HE DRAWN O UR ATTENTION TO THE RELEVANT PARAS OF THE TRIBUNAL ORDER (SUPRA) AND CONTENDED THAT THE FY 2001-02 (RELEVANT TO AY 2002-03) WAS EN DED ON ITA NO. 506/DEL/2014 CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES 3 31.3.2002 NOTICE FOR INITIATION OF RELEVANT PROCEED INGS HAS ISSUED ON 15.11.2010 THE ASSESSEE FILED ITS REPLY ON 23.11.20 10 AND THE ORDER WAS PASSED ON 30.3.2011 WHICH IS CLEARLY BARRED BY LIMITATION. THE LD. AR TOOK US THROUGH RELEVANT PARAS OF THE TRIBUN AL ORDER AND SUBMITTED THAT IN THE ORDER PASSED BY CIT(A) ON 27. 04.2010 U/S 201(1)/201(1A) OF THE AY FOR AY 2002-03 TO 2004-05 WAS HELD AS BARRED BY LIMITATION IN THE SIMILAR SET OF FACTS AN D CIRCUMSTANCES THEN NO OTHER SUSTAINABLE VIEW IS POSSIBLE AND THE ISSUE IN THE PRESENT CASE HAVING SIMILAR SET OF FACTS AND CIRCUM STANCE IS SQUARELY COVERED BY THE TRIBUNAL ORDER (SUPRA). 5. ON CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF ABOVE RIVAL SUBMI SSIONS, AT THE OUTSET, WE NOTE THAT THE TRIBUNAL DECIDED THE S IMILAR CONTROVERSY FOR AY 2003-04 TO 2005-06 WITH FOLLOWING OBSERVATIO NS UPHOLDING THE FIRST APPELLATE ORDER. 4. ON APPEAL, THE LD. CIT (APPEALS) CONCLUDED THAT THE ORDER PASSED ON 27TH APRIL, 2010 UNDER SECTION 201(1) / 201(1A) OF THE A CT FOR THE FYS 2002-03, 2003- 04 AND 2004-05 WAS BARRED BY LIMITATION. THE FINDIN GS OF THE LD. CIT (APPEALS) READ AS UNDER :- 4. I HAVE CONSIDERED THE ARGUMENTS OF LD. AR AND PERUSED THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 27.04.2010 PASSED ULS 201(1)/201(1A) FO R THE AFORESAID YEARS. I HAVE ALSO PERUSED THE LEGAL PROVISIONS AND CASE LAW S AS RELIED UPON BY THE LD. AR. I FIND THAT THE APPELLANT IS A LIAISON OFFICE S ITUATED IN NEW DELHI OF A U.S. BASED NGO ESTABLISHED IN 1943 HAVING ITS OPERATION IN INDIA FOR MANY YEARS AS AN APPROVED AGENCY UNDER THE INDO-US BILATERAL AGRE EMENT. I FURTHER FIND THAT THE LD. AR INSTEAD OF EXPLAINING THE MERITS OF THE CASE, HE HAS EMPHASIZED THE LIMITATION MATTER. THE LD. AR RELIED ON THE DECISIO N OF THE HON'BLE DELHI HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT VS NHK JAPAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION 172 (TAXMAN) 230 WHICH WAS DECIDED FOLLOWING THE PRINCI PLE LAID DOWN BY HON 'BLE APEX COURT IN THE CASE OF STATE OF PUNJAB V. BHATIN DA DISTT. CO-OPERATIVE MILLS ITA NO. 506/DEL/2014 CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES 4 (P) LTD. (2007) 11 SCC 633 FIXING THE LIMITATION PE RIOD OF 4 YEARS, WHEREVER NO SPECIFIC LIMITATION IS PROVIDED. ACCORDING TO AR, I N APPELLANT'S CASE, THE PROCEEDINGS FOR FINANCIAL YEAR 2002-03 TO 2004-05 R ELEVANT TO ASSESSMENT YEAR 2003-04 TO 2005-06 WERE BARRED BY LIMITATION BECAUS E OF THE FACT THE PROCEEDING IN THIS CASE WAS INITIATED ON 16.11.2009, WHICH WAS BEYOND THE PERIOD OF 4 YEARS FROM THE END OF FINANCIAL YEAR. HENCE, THE A.O WAS NOT JUSTIFIED TO TREAT THE ASSESSEE IN DEFAULT AND LEVIED THE TAXES ULS 201(1) AND CHARGED THE INTEREST ULS 201 (1A) IN THESE YEARS. 4.1 0N GOING THROUGH THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 27.04 .2010, L FIND THAT THE A.O HAS ADMITTED THE LD. AR ARGUMENT RELATING TO LIMITA TION MATTER. 'DESPITE, HE LEVIED THE TAXES ULS 201 (1) AND CHARGED THE INTERE ST U/S 201 (1A) WITH THE OBSERVATION, 'THE DEPARTMENT HAS NOT ACCEPTED THE DECISION OF HO N 'BLE HIGH COURT OF DELHI IN THE CASE OF CIT VS NHK JAPAN BROADCASTING CORPOR ATION AND FILED A SLP BEFORE THE HON 'BLE APEX COURT. THE DECISION OF THE HON 'BLE APEX COURT IN RESPECT OF SLP THAT CASE IS STILL PENDING. ' IN THI S REGARD, THE LD. AR BROUGHT TO MY NOTICE THAT THERE WERE TWO DECISIONS IN THE CASE OF AFORESAID NHK JAPAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION BY THE HON 'BLE DELHI HIGH COURT, I.E. FIRST, ON THE ISSUE OF TAXES AND INTEREST U/S 201(1)/201(1A) WHIC H WAS REPORTED IN 172 TAXMAN 230 AND SECONDLY, AGAINST THE CITIZEN INDIVI DUAL INHABITANT TAX ACT, WHICH WAS A JAPANESE LAW, WHICH WAS REPORTED IN (20 07)210CTR(DEL)349. THE SLP WAS FILED AGAINST THE SECOND DECISION WHICH HAS BEEN DECIDED BY THE HON'BLE APEX COURT AS REPORTED IN (2009) 225 CTR SC 258. THE COPY OF ALL THESE THREE JUDGMENTS HAVE BEEN PLACED IN THE PAPER BOOK. ON PERUSAL OF THESE JUDGMENTS, I FIND THAT THE HON'BLE DELHI HIGH COURT JUDGMENT GIVEN IN AFORESAID NHK JAPAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION AS REPORTED IN 1 72 (TAXMAN) 230 ON THE ISSUE OF LEVY OF TAX AND CHARGING OF INTEREST U/S 2 01(1)/201(1A) HAS BECOME FINAL AS NO SLP WAS FILED AGAINST IT. 4.2 FURTHER, ON GOING THROUGH THE IMPUGNED ORDER DA TED 27.04:2010; I FIND THAT THE A.O HAS RELIED ON THE NEWLY INSERTED 'PROVISO' TO SECTION 201(3) BY THE FINANCE ACT, 2009 W.E.F. 01.04.2010. ACCORDING TO T HE A.O, IN THE LIGHT OF NEWLY INSERTED 'PROVISO' TO SECTION 201(3) OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961, THE ORDER COULD BE PASSED ON OR BEFORE 31.03.2011 IN THIS CASE. IN THIS REGARD, THE LD. AR RELYING ON THE EXPLANATORY CIRCULAR FOR FINANCE (NO 2) ACT, 2009 FOR WHICH THE COPY HAS BEEN PLACED AS ANNEXURE 7 OF PAPER BOOK, A RGUED THAT IN THE LIGHT OF PARA 50.2 OF EXPLANATORY NOTE, THE ORDER ON OR BEFO RE 31.03.2011 COULD BE PASSED ONLY IN THOSE CASES WHERE THE PROCEEDINGS WE RE PENDING ON OR BEFORE 01.04.2007. ITA NO. 506/DEL/2014 CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES 5 SINCE IN APPELLANT CASE, THE PROCEEDING WAS INITIAT ED ON 16.11.2009, I.E. LATER THAN THE DATE 01.04.2007 AS MENTIONED IN THE 'PROVI SO', THE PROCEEDING FOR THESE YEARS WERE NOT PENDING ON 01.04.2007. ON PERUSAL OF IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 27.04.2010, I FIND THAT THE A.O HAS HIMSELF MENTION ED IN THE ORDER, 'THE ASSESSEE WAS FURTHER ASKED TO FILE DETAILS OF SALARY PAID IN INDIA AND OUTSIDE INDIA TO ALL THE 25 EXPATRIATE EMPLOYEES FOR THE PERIOD RELEVANT TO FINANCIAL YEARS 2001- 2002 TO 2007-2008 VIDE ORDER SHEET ENTRY DATED 16.1 1.2009 'THUS, IT IS ESTABLISHED THAT IN THE APPELLANT'S CASE THE PROCEE DINGS U/S 201(1)/201(1A) WAS NOT PENDING AS ON 0L.04.2007. HENCE, THE 'PROVISO' TO SECTION 201(3) IN WHICH THE LIMITATION IS GIVEN UPTO 31.03.2011 IS NOT APPLICAB LE IN THIS CASE. 4.3 I FURTHER FIND THAT HON'BLE DELHI HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. HUTCHISON ESSAR TELECOM LTD. (2010) 323 ITR 230 (DE L) HAS HELD THE PROCEEDINGS U/S 201 (1)/201(1A) FOR A.Y 2002-03 AS BARRED BY LIMITATION BECAUSE IN THAT CASE PROCEEDINGS WAS INITIATED BEYO ND THE PERIOD OF FOUR YEARS FROM THE END OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR. I FURTHER FIND THAT HON'BLE DELHI HIGH COURT HAS DECIDED THE AFORESAID CASE VIDE ORDER DATED 15. 04.2010 I.E. AFTER INSERTION OF NEW PROVISION OF SECTION 201(3) BY THE FINANCE ACT, 2009 W.E.F. 01.04.2010. SINCE THE HON'BLE DELHI COURT HAS DECIDED THE SAID CASE OF HUTCHISON ESSAR TELECOM LTD. ON 15.04.2010, I.E. AFTER THE DATE OF APPLICATION (0L.04.2010) OF NEWLY INSERTED PROVISION OF SECTION 201 (3) BY HOLD ING PERIOD OF LIMITATION FOR 4 YEARS, FROM THE END OF FINANCIAL YEAR, THE DATE OF LIMITATION ON OR BEFORE 31.03.2011 IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THOSE CASE WHERE TH E PROCEEDING ON OR BEFORE 01.04.2007 WAS NOT PENDING. IN THE LIGHT OF FACTS A ND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, LEGAL PROVISION AND CASE LAWS DECIDED BY HON'BLE JU RISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT AND ALSO BY THE APEX COURT, I HOLD THAT THE PROCEEDING S INITIATED ON 16.11.2009 AND ORDER PASSED ON 27.04.2010 UNDER SECTION 201(1) / 2 01(1A) IN APPELLANTS CASE FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 2002-03 TO 2004-05 RELEVANT TO A. Y 2003-04 TO 2005 -06 RESPECTIVELY WERE BARRED BY LIMITATION. HENCE, THE TAXES LEVIED AND INTEREST CHARGED U/S 201 (1)/201 (1A) VIDE ORDER DATED 27.04 .2010 FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR 2002-03 TO 2004-05 RELEVANT TO A.Y 2003-04 TO 2005- 06 ARE CANCELLED. ' 5. THE REVENUE IS NOW IN APPEAL BEFORE US AGAINST T HE AFORESAID FINDINGS OF THE LD. CIT (APPEALS). THE LD. DR WHILE CARRYING US THR OUGH THE IMPUGNED ORDERS INVITED OUR ATTENTION TO THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF SECTION 201(3) , INTRODUCED BY THE FINANCE ACT, 2009 WITH EFFECT FROM 1.4.2010 AND CONTENDED THAT IN TERMS OF PROVISO TO SECTION 201(3)OF THE ACT, ORDER FOR A FI NANCIAL YEAR COMMENCING ON OR BEFORE 1.4.2007 CAN BE PASSED AT ANY TIME ON OR BEF ORE 31ST DAY OF MARCH, 2011. SINCE PROCEEDINGS IN THIS CASE WERE INITIATED ON 16 /11/2009 IN CONSEQUENT OF SEARCH U/S 132 OF THE ACT, APPARENTLY THE ORDER PAS SED BY THE AO WAS WITHIN THE ITA NO. 506/DEL/2014 CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES 6 LIMITATION AND THUS, THE LD. CIT (APPEALS) WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN QUASHING THE SAID ORDER ON THE GROUND THAT THE SAME WAS BARRED BY LIM ITATION. 6. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE LD. AR ON BEHALF OF THE A SSESSEE SUPPORTED THE FINDINGS OF THE LD. CIT (APPEALS) WHILE CONTENDING THAT NO P ROCEEDINGS WERE PENDING BEFORE THE AO AS ON 1.4.2007 NOR THE AMENDED PROVI SIONS , APPLICABLE WITH EFFECT FROM 1.4.2010,HAD COME IN TO FORCE ON THE DA TE OF INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS . TO A QUERY BY THE BENCH, THE LD. AR ADMITTED THAT THE SAID PROVISO WAS NOT CONSIDERED BY THE HONBLE DELHI HIGH COURT IN THEIR DECISION IN CIT VS. HUTCHISON ESSAR TELECOM LTD. [2010] 323 ITR 230 (DE L.), WHICH WAS DECIDED ON 15TH APRIL, 2010 I.E. AFTER THE INSERTION OF AMENDE D PROVISIONS U/S201(1)(3) OF THE ACT, EVEN THOUGH THE LD. CIT (APPEALS) CONCLUDE D THAT THE HONBLE DELHI HIGH COURT HAVING DECIDED A SIMILAR ISSUE IN THEIR ORDER DATED 15TH APRIL, 2010, WERE AWARE OF THE SAID AMENDED PROVISIONS. TO A FUR THER QUERY BY THE BENCH,NEITHER THE LD. AR ON BEHALF OF THE ASSESSEE NOR THE LD. DR REPLIED AS TO WHETHER THEPROVISO TO THE AMENDED PROVISIONS OF SEC . 201(3) OF THE ACT COULD ENLARGE THE PERIOD FORPASSING ANY ORDER UNDER SECTI ON 201 OF THE ACT BEYOND THE PERIOD 4 YEARS FROM THE END OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR I N WHICH PAYMENT IS MADE OR CREDIT IS GIVEN AS STIPULATED IN SECTION 201(3) OF THE ACT. 7. WE HAVE HEARD BOTH THE PARTIES AND GONE THROUGH THE FACTS OF THE CASE AS ALSO THE AFORESAID DECISIONS REFERRED TO BY THE LD. CIT (APPEALS). INDISPUTABLY, THE ASSESSEE ,IN THE INSTANT CASE, DID NOT DEDUCT T AX AT SOURCE AT THE TIME OF PAYMENT OR CREDIT OF SALARY TO THE AFORESAID EXPTAR IATES NOR PAID TDS TO THE CREDIT OF GOVERNMENT BEFORE THE SEARCH ON 11.9.2007 . THE IMPUGNED ORDERS DO NOT REVEAL ANY FINDING AS TO WHETHER OR NOT ANY STA TEMENT REFERRED TO IN SEC. 200 OF THE ACT WAS FILED BY THE ASSESSEE NOR EVEN THE D ATE(S) OF PAYMENT OF SALARY OR TDS OR DATE OF CREDIT FOR SUCH TDS TO THE GOVERNMEN T ACCOUNT ARE EVIDENT .HOWEVER, THE ASSESSEE STATED BEFORE THE LD. CIT(A THAT NO SUCH STATEMENT WAS FILED WHILE ADHOC PAYMENT OF `97,28,267/- TOWARDS T DS WAS MADE ON 24.8.2010 AND THAT SALARY WAS CREDITED TO THE ACCOUNTS OF EXP ATRIATES IN USA. APPARENTLY, A PORTION OF TDS LIABILITY IN RESPECT OF SOME OF TH E EMPLOYEES APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN DEPOSITED AFTER THE ORDER OF THE AO. AS IS APP ARENT FROM THE FINDINGS IN THE IMPUGNED ORDER, THE LD. CIT(A) HAS MERELY DECIDED T HE APPEAL ON LIMITATION WITHOUT GOING IN TO MERITS OF THE CASE NOR THE ASSE SSEE SEEMS TO HAVE EXPLAINED THE ISSUES ON MERITS BEFORE THE LD. CIT(A). THE ISS UE BEFORE US IS AS TO WHETHER THE AO WAS COMPETENT TO INITIATE PROCEEDINGS U/S 20 1(1)/201(1A) OF THE ACT IN THE YEAR 2009 FOR THESE THREE FINANCIAL YEARS 2002- 03 TO 2004-05. WHILE REFERRING TO PROVISO IN THE NEWLY INSERTED PROVISIO NS OF SECTION 201(3) INTRODUCED BY FINANCE ACT, 2009 WITH EFFECT FROM 1. 4.2010, THE AO CONCLUDED THAT HE WAS COMPETENT TO PASS SUCH ORDERS FOR THE A FORESAID FINANCIAL YEARS AT ANY TIME ON OR BEFORE 31.3.2011 WHILE THE LD.CIT(A) ,FOLLOWING THE DECISIONS OF ITA NO. 506/DEL/2014 CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES 7 THE HONBLE JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT IN NHK JAPAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (SUPRA) & . HUTCHISON ESSAR TELECOM LTD.(SUPRA) HEL D THAT THE ORDER DATED 27.4.2010 PASSED BY THE AO WAS BARRED BY LIMITATION .INDISPUTABLY, IN NONE OF THESE DECISIONS, THE AMENDED PROVISIONS OF SEC. 201 (3) WERE CONSIDERED. MOREOVER, THE LD. CIT(A) OBSERVED THAT NO SLP WAS F ILED IN NHK JAPAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (SUPRA) AND THEREFORE, THE RATIO OF THIS DECISION HAS BECOME FINAL WHILE IN THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL, THE AO MENTIONED THAT ON SLP FILED BY THE REVENUE, THE HONBLE APEX COURT HAVE DISPOSE D OF THE SLP WHILE LEAVING THE QUESTION OF LIMITATION OPEN. INTER ALIA, THE LD . CIT(A) CONCLUDED THAT SINCE IN THE INSTANT CASE THE PROCEEDINGS U/S 201(1)/201(1A) WERE NOT PENDING AS ON L.04.2007, THE 'PROVISO' TO SECTION 201(3) WAS NOT APPLICABLE. HERE , WE MAY REFER TO THE AMENDED PROVISIONS OF SECTION 201(3) I NTRODUCED BY FINANCE ACT, 2009 WITH EFFECT FROM 1.4.2010,WHICH READ AS UNDER :- 201 (3) NO ORDER SHALL BE MADE UNDER SUB-SECTION (1) DEEMING A PERSON TO BE AN ASSESSEE IN DEFAULT FOR FAILURE TO DEDUCT THE WHOLE OR ANY PART OF THE TAX FROM A PERSON RESIDENT IN INDIA, AT ANY TIME AFTER THE EXPIRY OF (I) TWO YEARS FROM THE END OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR IN WHICH THE STATEMENT IS FILED IN A CASE WHERE THE STATEMENT REFERRED TO IN SECTION 2 00 HAS BEEN FILED; (II) FOUR YEARS FROM THE END OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR IN WHICH PAYMENT IS MADE OR CREDIT IS GIVEN, IN ANY OTHER CASE; PROVIDED THAT SUCH ORDER FOR A FINANCIAL YEAR COMME NCING ON OR BEFORE THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 2007 MAY BE PASSED AT ANY TIME ON OR BEFORE THE 31ST DAY OF MARCH, 2011. 7.1 THE RELEVANT EXTRACTS FROM THE EXPLANATORY NOTE S TO THE AFORESAID NEWLY INSERTED PROVISIONS, WHICH HAVE BEEN REFERRED TO BY THE LD. CIT(A) IN PARA OF HIS ORDER, READ AS UNDER: 50. PROVIDING TIME LIMITS FOR PASSING OF ORDERS U/ S 201(1) HOLDING A PERSON TO BE AN ASSESSEE IN DEFAULT 50.1 CURRENTLY, THE INCOME TAX ACT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR ANY LIMITATION OF TIME FOR PASSING AN ORDER U/S 201(1) HOLDING A PERSON TO BE AN ASSESSEE IN DEFAULT. IN THE ABSENCE OF SUCH A TIME LIMIT, DISPUTES ARISE WH EN THESE PROCEEDINGS ARE TAKEN UP OR COMPLETED AFTER SUBSTANTIAL TIME HAS EL APSED. IN ORDER TO BRING CERTAINTY ON THIS ISSUE, SPECIFIC TIME LIMITS IS PR OVIDED IN THE ACT WITHIN WHICH ORDER U/S 201(1) WILL BE PASSED. 50.2 IT HAS BEEN PROVIDED THAT AN ORDER U/S 201(1) FOR F AILURE TO DEDUCT THE WHOLE OR ANYPART OF THE TAX AS REQUIRED UNDER THIS ACT, IF THE DEDUCTEE IS A RESIDENT TAXPAYER, SHALL BE PASSED WITHIN TWO YEARS FROM THE END OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR IN WHICH THE STATEMENT OF TAX DEDUCTION AT SOU RCE IS FILED BY THE DEDUCTOR. WHERE NO SUCH STATEMENT IS FILED, SUCH ORDER CAN B E PASSED UP TILL FOUR YEARS ITA NO. 506/DEL/2014 CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES 8 FROM THE END OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR IN WHICH THE PAY MENT IS MADE OR CREDIT IS GIVEN. TO PROVIDE SUFFICIENT TIME FOR PENDING CASES , IT IS PROVIDED THAT SUCH PROCEEDINGS FOR A FINANCIAL YEAR BEGINNING FROM 1ST APRIL, 2007 AND EARLIER YEARS CANBE COMPLETED BY THE 31ST MARCH, 2011. 50.3 HOWEVER, NO TIME-LIMITS HAVE BEEN PRESCRIBED FOR OR DER UNDER SUB-SECTION (1) OF SECTION 201 WHERE:- (A) THE DEDUCTOR HAS DEDUCTED BUT NOT DEPOSITED THE TAX DEDUCTED AT SOURCE, AS THIS WOULD BE A CASE OF DEFALCATION OF GOVERNMENT D UES, (B) THE EMPLOYER HAS FAILED TO PAY THE TAX WHOLLY O R PARTLY, UNDER SUB-SECTION (1A) OF SECTION 192, AS THE EMPLOYEE WOULD NOT HAVE PAID TAX ON SUCH PERQUISITES, (C) THE DEDUCTEE IS A NON-RESIDENT AS IT MAY NOT BE ADMINISTRATIVELY POSSIBLE TO RECOVER THE TAX FROM THE NON-RESIDENT. 50.4 APPLICABILITY - THIS AMENDMENT HAS BEEN MADE APPLICABLE WITH EFFE CT FROM 1 ST APRIL, 2010 AND WILL ACCORDINGLY APPLY IN RELATION TO ASSESSMENT YEAR 2011- 12 AND SUBSEQUENT ASSESSMENT YEARS. 7.2 BEFORE PROCEEDING FURTHER, WE MAY HAVE A LOOK A T THE DECISION IN NHK JAPAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (SUPRA) ,WHERE IN WHILE RE LYING UPON THE DECISION OF THE HONBLE APEX COURT IN BHATINDA DISTRICT CO-OP. MILK PRODUCERS UNION LTD. [2007] 9 RC 637; 11 SCC 363. HONBLE JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT HELD AS UNDER: 14. WE ARE UNABLE TO AGREE WITH LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE REVENUE INASMUCH AS THE DECISION RELIED UPON BY HIM DEALS WITH REASONA BLE TIME FOR COMPLETING THE ASSESSMENT OR FOR COMPLETING THE TASK ON HAND. 15. IN BHARAT STEEL TUBES LTD.S CASE (SUPRA) THE QUEST ION THAT AROSE BEFORE THE COURT (AND WHICH HAS BEEN STATED ON PAGE 130 OF THE REPORT) IS WHETHER AN ORDER OF ASSESSMENT UNDER SECTION 11(3) OF THE PUNJ AB GENERAL SALES TAX ACT, 1948 OR SECTION 28(3) OF THE HARYANA GENERAL SALES TAX ACT, 1973 COULD NOW BE COMPLETED OR IT WOULD BE BARRED BY LIMITATION. IN T HAT CASE, THE ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS HAD BEEN UNDULY DELAYED AND THE SUPREM E COURT CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT FOR COMPLETING THE ASSESSMENT PROCE EDINGS THERE IS NO PERIOD OF LIMITATION PRESCRIBED AND THAT WOULD DEPEND UPON TH E FACTS OF EACH CASE. CONSIDERING THE FACTS OF THE CASE, THE SUPREME COUR T GAVE A DIRECTION TO THE ASSESSING AUTHORITY TO COMPLETE ALL THE PENDING ASS ESSMENTS WITHIN A PERIOD OF FOUR MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF DELIVERY OF THE JUDGME NT. 16. INSOFAR AS BHATINDA DISTRICT CO-OP. MILL (P.) UNION LTD.S CASE (SUPRA) IS CONCERNED, THE QUESTION THAT AROSE BEFORE THE SUPRE ME COURT WAS REGARDING INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS BY EXERCISE OF JURISDICTI ON BY THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY. THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT EXERCISE OF JURISDICTIO N MUST BE WITHIN A ITA NO. 506/DEL/2014 CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES 9 REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME AND CONSIDERING THE PROVI SIONS OF THE PUNJAB GENERAL SALES TAX ACT, 1948, IT WAS HELD THAT A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME FOR INITIATING PROCEEDINGS WOULD BE FIVE YEARS. 17. THERE IS A QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BHARAT ST EEL TUBES LTD.S CASE (SUPRA) AND BHATINDA DISTRICT CO-OP. MILL (P.) UNIO N OF LTD.S CASE (SUPRA ). IN THE FORMER CASE, THE QUESTION PERTAINED TO COMPLETI ON OF PROCEEDINGS, WHILE IN THE LATTER CASE IT PERTAINED TO INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS. WE ARE CONCERNED WITH IN ITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS. 18. INSOFAR AS THE INCOME-TAX ACT IS CONCERNED, OUR ATT ENTION HAS BEEN DRAWN TO SECTION 153(1)(A) THEREOF WHICH PRESCRIBES THE TIME -LIMIT FOR COMPLETING THE ASSESSMENT, WHICH IS TWO YEARS FROM THE END OF THE ASSESSMENT YEAR IN WHICH THE INCOME WAS FIRST ASSESSABLE. IT IS WELL-KNOWN THAT THE ASSESSMENT YEAR FOLLOWS THE PREVIOUS YEAR AND, THEREFORE, THE TIME-LIMIT WO ULD BE THREE YEARS FROM THE END OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR. THIS SEEMS TO BE A REASO NABLE PERIOD AS ACCEPTED UNDER SECTION 153 OF THE ACT, THOUGH FOR COMPLETION OF ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS. THE PROVISIONS OF RE-ASSESSMENT ARE UNDER SECTIONS 147 AND 148 OF THE ACT AND THEY ARE ON A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT FOOTING AND ,THE REFORE, DO NOT MERIT CONSIDERATION FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS CASE. 19. EVEN THOUGH THE PERIOD OF THREE YEARS WOULD BE A RE ASONABLE PERIOD AS PRESCRIBED BY SECTION 153 OF THE ACT FOR COMPLETION OF PROCEED INGS, WE HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT THE INCOME-TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL HAS, IN A SERIES OF DECISIONS, SOME OF WHICH HAVE BEEN MENTIONED IN THE ORDER WHICH IS UNDER CHA LLENGE BEFORE US, TAKEN THE VIEW THAT FOUR YEARS WOULD BE A REASONABLE PERIOD O F TIME FOR INITIATING ACTION, IN A CASE WHERE NO LIMITATION IS PRESCRIBED. 20. THE RATIONALE FOR THIS SEEMS TO BE QUITE CLEAR - IF THERE IS A TIME-LIMIT FOR COMPLETINGTHE ASSESSMENT THEN THE TIME-LIMIT FOR IN ITIATING THE PROCEEDINGS MUST BE THE SAME IF NOTLESS. NEVERTHELESS, THE TRIBUNAL HAS GIVEN A GREATER PERIOD FOR COMMENCEMENT ORINITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS. 21. WE ARE NOT INCLINED TO DISTURB THE TIME-LIMIT OF FO UR YEARS PRESCRIBED BY THE TRIBUNALAND ARE OF THE VIEW THAT IN TERMS OF THE DE CISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN BHATINDADISTRICT CO-OP. MIL (P.) UNION LTD.S CA SE (SUPRA) ACTION MUST BE INITIATED BY THE COMPETENT AUTHORITY UNDER THE INCO ME-TAX ACT WHERE NO LIMITATION IS PRESCRIBED AS INSECTION 201 OF THE AC T WITHIN THAT PERIOD OF FOUR YEARS. 22. LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE REVENUE SUBMITTED THAT THE DEPARTMENT CAME TO KNOW THAT THE ASSESSEE WAS AN ASSESSEE IN DEFAULT O NLY IN NOVEMBER, 1998 WHEN A SURVEY WAS CONDUCTED AND IT CAME TO BE KNOWN ONLY THEN THAT WHEN THE ASSESSEE HAD NOT DEDUCTED TAX AT SOURCE ON THE GLOB AL SALARY. WE ARE OF THE OPINION THAT THE DATE OF KNOWLEDGE IS NOT RELEVANT FOR THE PURPOSES OF EXERCISING ITA NO. 506/DEL/2014 CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES 10 JURISDICTION INSOFAR AS THE PROVISIONS OF THE INCOM E-TAX ACT ARE CONCERNED. IF IT WERE SO, THE LIMITATION PERIOD, AS FOR EXAMPLE PRES CRIBED UNDER SECTION 147/148 OF THE ACT WOULD BECOME MEANINGLESS IF THE CONCEPT OF KNOWLEDGE IS IMPORTED INTO THE SCHEME OF THE ACT. 23. THE SECOND PART OF THE ARGUMENT OF LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE REVENUE IN THIS REGARD WAS THAT THE QUESTION OF LIMITATION DID NOT AT ALL ARISE BECAUSE THE ASSESSEE HAD ITSELF ADMITTED ITS LIABILITY AND IT V OLUNTARILY PAID THE TAX AND INTEREST ON THAT AMOUNT. AGAIN, WE ARE NOT IN AGREE MENT WITH LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE REVENUE IN THIS REGARD. 24. IT APPEARS THAT THE ASSESSEE PAID THE TAX VOLUNTARI LY AS WELL AS INTEREST THEREON BUT THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE LIABILITY BY THE ASSESSEE WOULD NOT BY ITSELF EXTEND THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION NOR WOULD IT EXTEND THE REASONABLE TIME THAT IS POSTULATED BY THE SCHEME OF THE INCOME-TAX ACT. THE ASSESSEE CANNOT BE PUT, IN A SENSE, IN A WORSE POSITION MERELY BECAUSE IT HAS AD MITTED ITS LIABILITY. IF THE ASSESSEE HAD DENIED ITS LIABILITY THE QUESTION THAT WOULD HAVE ARISEN WOULD BE WHETHER THE REVENUE COULD HAVE INITIATED PROCEEDING S AFTER A LAPSE OF FOUR YEARS. THE ANSWER TO THAT WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO BE IN TH E NEGATIVE IN VIEW OF THE REASON THAT WE HAVE ALREADY INDICATED ABOVE. THE FA CT THAT THE ASSESSEE AGREED TO PAY THE TAX VOLUNTARILY CANNOT PUT THE ASSESSEE IN A SITUATION WORSE THAN IF IT HAD CONTESTED ITS LIABILITY. 25. WE MAY ALSO NOTE THAT UNDER SECTION 191 OF THE ACT, THE PRIMARY LIABILITY TO PAY TAX IS ON THE PERSON WHOSE INCOME IT IS THAT IS THE DEDUCTEE. OF COURSE, A DUTY IS CAST UPON THE DEDUCTOR, THAT IS THE PERSON WHO IS MAKING THE PAYMENT TO THE DEDUCTEE, TO DEDUCT TAX AT SOURCE BUT IF HE FAI LS TO DO SO, IT DOES NOT WASH AWAY THE LIABILITY OF THE DEDUCTEE. IT IS STILL THE LIABILITY OF THE DEDUCTEE TO PAY THE TAX. IN THAT SENSE, THE LIABILITY OF THE DEDUCTOR I S A VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND, THEREFORE, HE CANNOT BE PUT IN A SITUATION WHICH WO ULD PREJUDICE HIM TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT THE LIABILITY WOULD REMAIN HANGING ON H IS HEAD FOR ALL TIMES TO COME IN THE EVENT THE INCOME-TAX DEPARTMENT DECIDES NOT TO TAKE ANY ACTION TO RECOVER THE TAX EITHER BY PASSING AN ORDER UNDER SECTION 20 1 OF THE ACT OR THROUGH MAKING AN ASSESSMENT OF THE INCOME OF THE DEDUCTEE. 26. FOR THE REASONS GIVEN BY US WE ARE NOT INCLINED TO DISTURB THE ORDER PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL AND, THEREFORE, WE ANSWER THE QUEST ION IN THE AFFIRMATIVE IN FAVOUR OF THE ASSESSEE AND AGAINST THE REVENUE AND HOLD THATTHE INITIATION OF PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 201 OF THE ACT AGAINST TH E ASSESSEE IN RESPECT OF THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 1990-91WAS BARRED BY LIMITATION HAV ING BEEN INITIATED BEYOND A REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME OF FOUR YEARS. 7.3 SUBSEQUENTLY, THE HONBLE APEX COURT IN THEIR C OMMON DECISION DATED ITA NO. 506/DEL/2014 CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES 11 20.1.2010 IN CIVIL NOS.751 TO 766 OF 2010 & OTHERS, INCLUDING ON AN SLP FILED BY THE REVENUE IN NHK JAPAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, CONCLUDED AS UNDER: THE FOLLOWING SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW ARISES F OR CONSIDERATION IN THIS BATCH OF CIVIL APPEALS: 'WHETHER THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL WAS CORR ECT IN LAW IN HOLDING THAT THE ORDERS PASSED UNDER SECTIONS 201(1) AND 201(1A) OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961 ARE INVALID AND BARRED BY TIME HAVING BEEN PAS SED BEYOND A REASONABLE PERIOD.' HAVING HEARD LEARNED COUNSEL ON BOTH SIDES, WE ARE OF THE VIEW THAT, ON THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THESE CASES, THE QUESTION ON T HE POINT OF LIMITATION FORMULATED BY THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL IN THE PRESENT CASES NEED NOT BE GONE INTO FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT, AT THE REL EVANT TIME, THERE WAS A DEBATE ON THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER TDS WAS DEDUCTIBLE UN DER THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961, ON FOREIGN SALARY PAYMENT AS A COMPONENT OF T HE TOTAL SALARY PAID TO AN EXPATRIATE WORKING IN INDIA? THIS CONTROVERSY CAME TO AN END VIDE JUDGEMENT OF THIS COURT IN THE CASE OF COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TA X VS. ELI LILLY & CO. (INDIA) PVT. LTD., REPORTED IN [2009] 312 I.T.R. 225. THE Q UESTION ON LIMITATION HAS BECOME ACADEMIC IN THESE CASES BECAUSE, EVEN ASSUMI NG THAT THE DEPARTMENT IS RIGHT ON THE ISSUE OF LIMITATION STILL THE QUESTION WOULD ARISE WHETHER ON SUCH DEBATABLE POINTS, THE ASSESSEE(S) COULD BE DECLARED AS ASSESSEE(S) IN DEFAULT UNDER SECTION 192 READ WITH SECTION 201 OF THE INCO ME TAX ACT, 1961. FURTHER, WE ARE INFORMED THAT THE ASSESSEE(S) HAVE PAID THE DIFFERENTIAL TAX.THEY HAVE PAID THE INTEREST AND THEY FURTHER UNDERTAKE NOT TO CLAIM REFUND FOR THE AMOUNTS PAID. BEFORE CONCLUDING, WE MAY ALSO STATE THAT, IN ELI LILLY & CO. (INDIA) PVT. LTD. (SUPRA) VIDE PARAGRAPH 21, THIS COURT HAS CLAR IFIED THAT THE LAW LAID DOWN IN THE SAID CASE WAS ONLY APPLICABLE TO THE PROVISI ONS OF SECTION 192 OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961. LEAVING THE QUESTION OF LAW O PEN ON LIMITATION, THESE CIVIL APPEALS FILED BY THE DEPARTMENT ARE DISPOSED OF WITH NO ORDER AS TO COSTS. 7.31 APPARENTLY, THE HONBLE APEX COURT DID NOT ADV ERT TO THE QUESTION OF LIMITATION NOR EVEN THE LD. CIT(A) TOOK COGNIZANCE OF THE AFORESAID OBSERVATIONS OF THE HONBLE APEX COURT. 7.4 FOLLOWING THE AFORESAID DECISION, HONBLE JURIS DICTIONAL HIGH COURT IN THEIR DECISION DATED 15.4.2010 IN HUTCHISON ESSAR TELECOM LTD.(SUPRA), HELD THAT THE PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 201/201(1A) OF THE ACT, C AN BE INITIATED ONLY WITHIN THREE YEARS FROM THE END OF THE ASSESSMENT YEAR OR WITHIN FOUR YEARS FROM THE END OF THE RELEVANT FINANCIAL YEAR . 8. SINCE PROCEEDINGS IN THIS CASE HAVE BEEN INITIAT ED AFTER THE SEARCH ON 16.11.2009, AS CONCLUDED BY THE LD. CIT(A) AND THE AMENDED PROVISIONS HAD NOT COME IN TO FORCE ON THE SAID DATE , THE LAW PREVAIL ING AS ON THE DATE WAS ITA NO. 506/DEL/2014 CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES 12 PRONOUNCED IN THE AFORESAID TWO DECISIONS OF THE HO NBLE JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT. IN THE LIGHT OF VIEW TAKEN IN THE AFORESAID DECISIO NS BY THE HONBLE JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT , WE HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO UPHOLD T HE FINDINGS OF THE LD. CIT(A).THOUGH, THE HONBLE PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH CO URT IN THEIR DECISION DATED 17.07.2011 IN THE CASE OF CIT(TDS) V. M/S. H. M.T. LTD. IN ITA NO.524 OF 2009 AND HONBLE CALCUTTA HIGH COURT IN THEIR DECIS ION DATED 30.08.2011 IN THE CASE OF BHURA EXPORTS LTD. IN ITA NO. 118 OF 2011 , HAVE TAKEN A CONTRARY VIEW, WE ARE BOUND BY THE AFORESAID DECISIONS OF THE HON BLE JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT, HOLDING THAT IN ABSENCE OF ANY TIME FRAME IN THE STATUTE, REASONABLE TIME LIMIT WAS TO BE READ INTO IT,WHICH WAS 4 YEARS FROM THE END OF RELEVANT FINANCIAL YEARS. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, WE ARE NOT INCLINE D TO ACCEPT THE AFORESAID CONTENTIONS OF THE LD. DR AND CONSEQUENTLY, GROUND NOS.1 TO 3 IN THE APPEAL ARE DISMISSED. 6. THE VIEW OF ABOVE, ADMITTEDLY IMPUGNED ORDER OF THE AO PASSED ON 31.3.2011 IN PURSUANCE TO THE NOTICE DATED 15.11.20 10 AFTER CONSIDERING THE REPLY OF THE ASSESSEE DATED 23.11.2010 IS CLEARLY B ARRED BY LIMITATION. IT IS PERTAINING TO MENTION THAT SINCE PROCEEDINGS FOR AY 2002-03 HAS BEEN ALSO INITIATED AFTER SEARCH ON 16.11.2009 WHEN THE AMEN DED PROVISION DID NOT COME INTO EXISTENCE ON THE SAID DATE, AND THE LAW APPLI CABLE ON THE SAID DATE WAS PRONOUNCED BY HONBLE JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT OF DELHI IN THE CASE OF HATCHISON ESSAN TELECOM LTD. (SUPRA) AND CIT VS. NH K JAPAN (SUPRA). AS PER DICTA LAID DOWN BY HONBLE JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COUR T OF DELHI AND IN THE LIGHT OF THE SAME WE ARE INCLINED TO UPHOLD THE CONCLUSION OF THE LD. CIT(A) AS IN THESE JUDGMENTS THE HONBLE HIGH COURT EXPLICITLY HELD TH AT IN ABSENCE OF ANY TIME FRAME IN THE STATUE A REASONABLE TIME LIMIT WAS TO BE READ INTO, WHICH WAS FOUR YEAR FOR THE END OF RELEVANT FINANCIAL YEAR. IN THE PRESENT CASE, THE RELEVANT FINANCIAL YEAR 2001-02 WAS ENDED ON 31.03.2002 AND WHEN THE PROCEEDING INITIATED ON 15.11.2010 AND ORDER PASSED ON 30.03.2 011 U/S 201(1)/201(1A) FOR AY 2002-03 I.E. AFTER APPROXIMATELY 9 YEARS HAS T O BE HELD AS TIME BARRED AND ITA NO. 506/DEL/2014 CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES 13 THUS WE ARE OF THE OPINION THAT THE CONCLUSION O F THE CIT(A) DESERVES TO BE CONFIRMED AND HENCE WE UPHOLD THE SAME . ACCORDINGL Y, GROUND NO. 1 TO 3 OF THE REVENUE ARE DISMISSED. 8. IN THE RESULT, APPEAL OF THE REVENUE IS DISMISSED. ORDER PRONOUNCED IN THE COURT ON 10/02/2016. SD/- SD/- (O.P.KANT) (C.M.GA RG) ACCOUNTANT MEMBER JUDICI AL MEMBER DATED: 10/ 02/2016 *BINITA* COPY FORWARDED TO: 1. APPELLANT 2. RESPONDENT 3. CIT 4. CIT(APPEALS) 5. DR: ITAT ITA NO. 506/DEL/2014 CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES 14 DATE INITIAL 1. DRAFT DICTATED ON 09.02.2016 2. DRAFT PLACED BEFORE AUTHOR 09.02.2016 3. DRAFT PROPOSED & PLACED BEFORE THE SECOND MEMBER JM/AM 4. DRAFT DISCUSSED/APPROVED BY SECOND MEMBER. JM/AM 5. APPROVED DRAFT COMES TO THE SR.PS/PS PS/PS 6. KEPT FOR PRONOUNCEMENT ON PS 7. FILE SENT TO THE BENCH CLERK PS 8. DATE ON WHICH FILE GOES TO THE AR 9. DATE ON WHICH FILE GOES TO THE HEAD CLERK. 10. DATE OF DISPATCH OF ORDER.