U.P. State Agro Industrial Corpn. Limited, Lucknow V. DCIT, Lucknow

ITA 53/LKW/2011

• Counselvise Citation: 5323714 RSA 2011
• Duration Of Justice: 2 month(s) 20 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 18-04-2011
• Appeal Filed By: Assessee
• Bench Allotted: A
• Next Hearing Date: 08-04-2011
• Assessment Year: 2006-2007
• Appeal Filed On: 28-01-2011
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Assessee Lawyers: K R RASTOGI
• Keywords: Question of law; Condonation of delay
• Section: 43B; 260A

Judgement Text

IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL: LUCKNOW BENCH A, LUCKNOW (BEFORE HONBLE SHRI H. L. KARWA AND HONBLE SH. N. K.SAINI) ITA NO.53/LKW/2011 ASSESSMENT YEAR:2006-07 U.P. STATE AGRO INDUSTRIES CORPN. LIMITED 22, BABA SAHEB BHIMRAO AMBEDKAR MARG LUCKNOW V. DY. CIT RANGE II, LUCKNOW (APPELLANT) (RESPONDENT) PNR: AAACU2653G APPELLANT BY: SHRI. K. R. RASTOGI, ADVOCATE RESPONDENT BY: SHRI PRAVEEN KUMAR, D.R. O R D E R PER H. L. KARWA: THIS APPEAL FILED BY THE ASSESSEE IS DIRECTED AGAI NST THE ORDER OF THE CIT(A)-I, LUCKNOW DATED 3.12.2009 RELATING TO ASSES SMENT YEAR 2006-07. THE ONLY EFFECTIVE GROUND RAISED BY THE ASSESSEE RE ADS AS UNDER:- 1. THE LD. CIT(A)-I, LUCKNOW ERRED ON FACTS AND IN LAW IN NOT ACCEPTING THAT EMPLOYEES CONTRIBUTION RS.1,41,98, 948/- PAID BEFORE FILING OF RETURN, THE SAME IS ALLOWABLE UNDE R SECTION 43B OF I.T. ACT. 2. IT IS OBSERVED THAT THIS APPEAL HAS BEEN FILED BY T HE ASSESSEE LATE BY 355 DAYS. THE ASSESSEE HAS ALSO FILED AN APPLIC ATION FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY ALONG WITH AFFIDAVIT OF SHRI H. P. VERMA, FIN ANCE CONTROLLER, U.P. STATE AGRO INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION LIMITED, 22, BABA SAHEB AMBEDKAR MARG, LUCKNOW. THE APPLICATION FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY READS AS UNDER:- APPLICATION FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY IN THE APPEAL OF :-2-: U.P. AGRO INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION LIMITED. 22-BABA SA HEB BHIMRAO AMBEDKAR MARG. LUCKNOW. ASSESSMENT YEAR 2006- 07. WITH DUE RESPECT, IT IS PRAYED THAT THE LD. COMMISS IONER OF INCOME TAX (APPEALS)-I, LUCKNOW PASSED THE FIRST APPEAL OR DER FOR A. Y. 2006-07 ON 03.12.2009 WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY THE APP ELLANT CORPORATION ON 09.12.2009. THE CORPORATION IS A ST ATE GOVERNMENT UNDERTAKING. THE HON'BLE I.T.A.T. 'B' BENCH, LUCKNO W IN I.T.A. NO. 18/LUCKNOW/2009 FOR A. Y. 2005-06 VIDE ORDER DATED 18.06.2009 DISMISSED THE APPEAL OF THE APPELLANT COMPANY, AS T HE APPEAL WAS FILED WITHOUT GETTING PERMISSION FROM THE COMMITTEE OF DISPUTES. THE COPY OF ORDER IS ENCLOSED ALONG WITH AFFIDAVIT. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, WITH RESPECT TO ORDER OF C.I. T. (A) FOR A. Y. 2006-07, APPELLANT COMPANY COULD NOT FILE APPEAL BE FORE HON'BLE I.T.A.T. WITHIN TIME. THE APPELLANT COMPANY REFERR ED THE MATTER TO HIGHER AUTHORITIES FOR GETTING PERMISSION FROM COMM ITTEE OF DISPUTES WITH RESPECT TO A. Y. 2006-07 BECAUSE HON'BLE I.T.A .T. IN I.T.A. NO. 18/L/2009 IN THE APPELLANT CASE IN A. Y. 2005-06 HA S ALREADY DISMISSED THE APPEAL. (COPY OF THE SAME IS ENCLOSED .) IN THE MEAN TIME COUNSEL OF THE APPELLANT COMPANY S HRI K. R. RASTOGI, FCA, LATER ON GIVEN ADVISED US THAT HON'BL E I.T.A.T. LUCKNOW BENCH IS NOW TAKING THE VIEW THAT FOR STATE GOVERNM ENT UNDERTAKING, PERMISSION FROM COMMITTEE OF DISPUTES IS NOT NECESS ARY. HE ALSO SUBMITTED THAT THIS VIEW HAS BEEN TAKEN BY HON'BLE I.T.A.T. LUCKNOW BENCH, IN THE APPEAL OF U.P. STATE MINERAL DEVELOPM ENT CORPORATION LIMITED, WHERE AS PER M.A. FILED IN THIS RESPECT, H AS BEEN ALLOWED BY HON'BLE I.T.A.T. VIDE ORDER M.A. NO. 64/L/2009 DATE D 18.06.2010. :-3-: IN VIEW OF THE SAID ADVISE THE MANAGEMENT OF THE AP PELLANT COMPANY DECIDED TO FILE APPEAL BEFORE HON'BLE I.T.A.T. LUCK NOW WITHOUT GETTING PERMISSION FROM COMMITTEE OF DISPUTES. THUS, THE DE LAY OF 350 DAYS IN FILING THE APPEAL WAS UNINTENTIONAL AND BEYOND C ONTROL. PRAYER IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, IT IS MOST RESPECTFULLY PRAYE D TO KINDLY CONDONE THE DELAY IN FILING THE SAID APPEAL AS THE SAME WAS UNINTENTIONAL AND DUE TO NOT UNDERSTANDING THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT. THANKING YOU, YOURS FAITHFULLY SD/- (H.P. VERMA) FINANCIAL CONTROLLER U.P. STATE AGRO INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION LTD. 3. WE HAVE HEARD THE RIVAL SUBMISSIONS. WE FIND THAT THE DELAY HAS OCCURRED DUE TO THE REASON THAT THE ASSESSEE WAS UN DER THE BONA-FIDE BELIEF THAT FOR FILING THE APPEAL BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL AGAI NST THE ORDER OF THE LD. CIT(A), THE ASSESSEE WAS REQUIRED TO OBTAIN PERMISS ION FROM THE COMMITTEE ON DISPUTES. THE SAID BELIEF OF THE ASSESSEE IS SU PPORTED BY THE FACT THAT THE ITAT B BENCH LUCKNOW IN ASSESSEES OWN CASE I N ITA NO.206/LUC/2009; CO NO.18/LUC/2009 AND ITA NO.203/L UC/2009 FOR ASSESSMENT YEAR 2005-06 VIDE ORDER DATED 18.6.2009 DISMISSED THE APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE-COMPANY, AS THE APPEAL WAS FILED WI THOUT GETTING PERMISSION FROM THE COMMITTEE ON DISPUTES. THUS, I T IS CLEAR THAT DUE TO ABOVE REASON, THE ASSESSEE COULD NOT FILE THE APPEA L BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL AGAINST THE ORDER OF THE LD. CIT(A)-I, LUCKNOW DATE D 3.12.2009 WHICH WAS :-4-: RECEIVED BY THE ASSESSEE ON 9.12.2009. IN OUR CONS IDERED VIEW, THE REASON GIVEN BY THE ASSESSEE FOR DELAY IN FILING THE APPEA L SEEMS TO BE SATISFACTORY. IT IS SETTLED LAW THAT LENGTH OF DEL AY IS NOT TO MATTER IN THE CONTEXT OF CONDONATION OF DELAY. EVEN OTHERWISE AL SO, IT IS WELL SETTLED LAW THAT THE JURISDICTION TO CONDONE THE DELAY SHOULD B E EXERCISED LIBERALLY. THE MATTER RELATING TO CONDONATION OF DELAY SHOULD BE JUDGED BROADLY AND NOT IN A PEDANTIC MANNER. IN THE CASE OF COLLECTOR OF LAND ACQUISITION V. MST. KATIJI [1987] 167 ITR 471 (SC), THE HONBLE SU PREME COURT OF INDIA HELD THAT ORDINARILY, A LITIGANT DOES NOT STAND TO BENEFIT BY LODGING AN APPEAL LATE. THE HONBLE SUPREME COURT FURTHER RUL ED THAT WHEN SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE AND TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS ARE PITTED AGA INST EACH OTHER, THE CAUSE OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE DESERVES TO BE PREFERRED, FO R THE OTHER SIDE CANNOT CLAIM TO HAVE VESTED RIGHT IN INJUSTICE BEING DONE BECAUSE OF A NON- DELIBERATE DELAY. IT HAS ALSO BEEN HELD BY THE HON BLE SUPREME COURT THAT THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION THAT DELAY IS OCCASIONED DE LIBERATELY, OR ON ACCOUNT OF CULPABLE NEGLIGENCE, OR ON ACCOUNT OF MALA FIDES . A LITIGANT DOES NOT STAND TO BENEFIT BY RESORTING TO DELAY. IN FACT, H E RUNS A SERIOUS RISK. THUS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE ENTIRE FACTS AND CIRC UMSTANCES OF THE PRESENT CASE AS WELL AS THE SETTLED LEGAL POSITION, WE ARE SATISFIED THAT THE ASSESSEE WAS PREVENTED BY A SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR FILING THE APPEAL WELL WITHIN TIME. WE, THEREFORE, CONDONE THE DELAY AND ADMIT THE APPE AL FOR HEARING. 4. BRIEFLY STATED, THE FACTS OF THE CASE ARE THAT THE ASSESSEE IS ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS OF PROVIDING CHEMICAL FERTI LIZERS TO THE FARMERS. :-5-: WHILE FRAMING THE ASSESSMENT, THE AO DISALLOWED RS. 1,41,98,948/- OBSERVING AS UNDER:- 4.2. AN AMOUNT IDENTICAL TO ABOVE MENTIONED EMPLOY ERS CONTRIBUTION IS ALSO CONTRIBUTED BY THE EMPLOYEES O N EACH ACCOUNT. THE ASSESSEE COULD NOT FURNISH DETAILS EM PLOYEES CONTRIBUTION AND PAYMENT THEREOF WITHIN TIME LIMIT PRESCRIBED U/S 36(1)(VA). HENCE SIMILAR AMOUNT OF RS.1,41,98, 948/- IS TREATED AS INCOME U/S 2(24)(X) AND ADDED TO THE INC OME. 5. ON APPEAL, THE LD. CIT(A) CONFIRMED THE ADDITION ST ATING THAT I AM NOT IN AGREEMENT WITH THE CLAIM OF THE LD. AR THAT DEDUCTION IN RESPECT OF EMPLOYEES CONTRIBUTIONS MAY BE ALLOWED EVEN IF IT IS PAID BEFORE THE FILING OF RETURN OF INCOME. 6. NOW THE ASSESSEE IS IN APPEAL BEFORE THIS TRIBUNAL AGAINST THE ORDER OF THE LD. CIT(A). 7. WE HAVE HEARD THE RIVAL SUBMISSIONS AND PERUSED THE MATERIALS AVAILABLE ON RECORD. AFTER HEARING THE PARTIES, WE FIND THAT THE ISSUE IS SQUARELY COVERED IN FAVOUR OF THE ASSESSEE AND AGAINST THE R EVENUE BY THE DECISION OF THE HONBLE DELHI HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. P. M. ELECTRONICS LTD. (2009)177 TAXMAN 1 (DELHI). 8. IN THE CASE OF P.M. ELECTRONICS (SUPRA) ON EXAMINATI ON OF THE DETAILS SUBMITTED BY THE ASSESSEE WITH RESPECT TO PROVIDENT FUND PAYMENT MADE BOTH ON ACCOUNT OF EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEES SHARE REVEALED THAT PAYMENTS IN A :-6-: SUM OF RS.17,94,042 WERE MADE AS PER PROVISIONS OF SECTION 36(1)(VA) READ WITH SEE. 2(24)(X) AND SEC. 43B OF THE INCOME-TAX A CT, 1961. CONSEQUENTLY, THE A.O. DISALLOWED DEDUCTION AND ADDED THE SUM OF RS.17,94,042/- TOWAR DS EPF CONTRIBUTION. ON APPEAL, THE CIT(A) ALLOWED PARTIAL RELIEF TO THE ASSESSEE. IN SECOND APPEAL, THE TRIBUNAL ALLOWED THE APPEAL OF T HE ASSESSEE. THE REVENUE PREFERRED AN APPEAL U/S 260A OF THE ACT BEFORE THE HON'BLE DELHI HIGH COURT AND THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT CONFIRMED THE ORDER OF THE T RIBUNAL OBSERVING AS UNDER : '7. HAVING HEARD THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE REVEN UE, AS WELL AS THE ASSESSEE, WE ARE OF THE VIEW THAT THE VIEW TAKEN BY THE TRIBUNAL DESERVES TO BE SUSTAINED AS IT IS NO LONGER RES INTEGRA IN VIEW OF THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT V. VINAY CEMENT LT D. [S.L. A. NO. 1934 OF 2007, DATED 7-3-2007] WHICH HAS BEEN FOLLOWED BY A DIVISION BENCH OF THIS COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT V. DHARMENDRA SHARMA [2008 ] 297 ITR 320. 8. DESPITE THE AFORESAID JUDGMENTS, THE LEARNED CO UNSEL FOR THE TRIBUNAL HAS CONTENDED THAT IN VIEW OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE D IVISION BENCH OF THE MADRAS HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT V. SYNERGY FIN ANCIAL EXCHANGE LID. [2007] 288 ITR 366' AND THAT OF THE DIVISION BENCH OF THE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT V. PAMWI TISSUES LTD.[IT A PPEAL NO. 1034 OF 2004, DATED 4-2-2008] THE ISSUE REQUIRES CONSIDERATION. A CCORDING TO US, IN VIEW OF THE DISMISSAL OF THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IN THE CASE OF VINAY CEMENT LTD.(SUPRA) BY THE SUPREME COURT BY A SPEAKING ORDE R, THE SUBMISSION OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE REVENUE HAS TO BE REJECTED AT THE VERY THRESHOLD. THE REASON FOR THE SAME IS AS FOLLOWS:- :-7-: 9. THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT V. GEO RGE WILLIAMSON (ASSAM) LTD. (2006) 284 ITR 619 DEALT WITH THE VERY SAME ISSUE. IN THE SAID JUDGMENT THE DIVISION BENCH OF THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT NOTED A CONTRARY VIEW TAKEN BY THE KERALA HIGH COURT THE CASE OF CIT V. SOUTH INDIA CORPN. LTD. [2000 ] 242 ITR 114. AFTER NOTING THE SAID JUDGMENT THE FACT THAT THE AMENDMENTS HAD BEEN MADE TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 43B OF THE ACT BY VIRTUE OF F INANCE ACT, 2003 WITH EFFECT FROM 1-4-2004 IT AGREED WITH THE SUBMISSION OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE ASSESSEE THAT BY VIRTUE OF THE OMIS SION OF THE SECOND PROVISO AND THE OMISSION OF CLAUSES (A), (C), (D), (E) AND (F) WITHOUT ANY SAVING CLAUSE WOULD MEAN THAT THE PROVISIONS WE RE NEVER IN EXISTENCE. FOR THIS PURPOSE, IN THE SAID CASE THE A SSESSEE HAD PLACED RELIANCE ON THE JUDGMENT OF A CONSTITUTION BENCH OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF KOLHAPUR CANESUGAR WORKS LTD. V UNIO N OF INDIA [2000] 2 SCC 536 AND RAYALA CORPN. (P) LID. V. DIRECTOR OF ENFORCEMENT [1969] 2 SCC 412 AND GENERAL FINANCE CO. V. ASSN. C IT [2002] 257 ITR 338 (SC). THE SAID SUBMISSIONS FOUND FAVOUR WITH TH E DIVISION BENCH OF THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT AND RELYING ON EARLIER DECIS IONS OF ITS OWN COURT IN CIT V. ASSAM TRIBUNE [2002] 253 ITR 932 AND CIT V. BHARAT BAMBOO & TIMBER SUPPLIERS [1996] 219 ITR 212 (GAU.) THE DIVISION BENCH DISMISSED THE APPEAL OF THE REVENUE. IT TRANS PIRES THAT THE AFORESAID MATTER WAS TAKEN UP IN APPEAL ALONGWITH OTHER MATTERS INCLUDING VINAY CEMENT LTD. 'S CASE (SUPRA). THE ORDER IN VINAY CEMENT LTD.S CASE (SUPRA) WAS PASSED BY THE SUPREME COURT ON 7-3-2007 WHEREIN IT OBSERVED AS FOLLOWS:- 'DELAY CONDONED. IN THE PRESENT CASE WE ARE CONCERNED WITH THE LAW A S IT STOOD :-8-: PRIOR TO THE AMENDMENT OF SECTION 43B. IN THE CIRCU MSTANCES, THE ASSESSEE WAS ENTITLED TO CLAIM THE BENEFIT IN SECTI ON 43B FOR THAT PERIOD PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT HE HAS CONTRIBUTED TO PROVIDENT FUND BEFORE FILING OF THE RETURN. SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IS DISMISSED. ' 10. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, IT IS QUITE EVIDENT THAT THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION WAS DISMISSED BY A SPEAKING ORDER AND WHIL E DOING SO THE SUPREME COURT HAD NOTICED THE FACT THAT THE MATTER IN APPEAL BEFORE IT PERTAIN TO A PERIOD PRIOR TO THE AMENDMENT BROUGHT ABOUT IN SECTION 43B OF THE ACT. THE AFORESAID POSITION AS REGARDS T HE STATE OF THE LAW FOR A PERIOD PRIOR TO THE AMENDMENT TO SECTION 43B HAS BEEN NOTICED BY A DIVISION BENCH OF THIS COURT IN DHARMENDRA SHARMA 'S CASE (SUPRA). APPLYING THE RATIO OF THE DECISION OF THE SUPREME C OURT IN VINAY CEMENT LTD.'S CASE (SUPRA) A DIVISION BENCH OF THIS COURT DISMISSED THE APPEALS OF THE REVENUE. IN THE PASSING WE MAY ALSO NOTE THAT A DIVISION BENCH OF THE MADRAS HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT V . NEXUS COMPUTER (P.) LTD. BY A JUDGMENT DATED 18-8-2008 PASSED IN T AX-CASE (A) NO. 1192 OF 2008 DISCUSSED THE IMPACT OF BOTH THE DISMI SSAL OF THE SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IN THE CASE OF GEORGE WILLIAMSON (AS SAM) LTD. 'S CASE (SUPRA) AND VINAY CEMENT LTD. 'S CASE (SUPRA) AS WE LL AS A CONTRARY VIEW OF THE DIVISION BENCH OF ITS OWN COURT IN SYNE RGY FINANCIAL EXCHANGES CASE (SUPRA). THE DIVISION BENCH OF THE M ADRAS HIGH COURT HAS EXPLAINED THE EFFECT OF THE DISMISSAL OF A SPEC IAL LEAVE PETITION BY A SPEAKING ORDER BY RELYING UPON TH6 JUDGMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF KUNHAYAMMED V. STATE OF KERALA [2000] 1 19 STC 505 AT PAGE 526 IN PARAGRAPH 40 AND NOTED THE FOLLOWING OB SERVATIONS: 'IF THE ORDER REFUSING LEAVE TO APPEAL IS A SPEAKING ORDER, IE., :-9-: GIVES REASONS FOR REFUSING THE GRANT OF LEAVE, THEN THE ORDER HAS TWO IMPLICATIONS. FIRSTLY, THE STATEMENT OF LAW CON TAINED IN THE ORDER IS A DECLARATION OF LAW BY THE SUPREME COURT WITHIN THE MEANING OF ARTICLE 141 OF THE CONSTITUTION. SECONDL Y, OTHER THAN THE DECLARATION OF LAW, WHATEVER IS STATED IN THE O RDER ARE THE FINDINGS RECORDED BY THE SUPREME COURT WHICH WOULD BIND THE PARTIES THERETO AND ALSO THE COURT, TRIBUNAL OR AUT HORITY IN ANY PROCEEDINGS SUBSEQUENT THERETO BY WAY OF JUDICIAL D ISCIPLINE, THE SUPREME COURT BEING THE APEX COURT OF THE COUNTRY. BUT, THIS DOES NOT AMOUNT TO SAYING THAT THE ORDER OF THE COU RT, TRIBUNAL OR AUTHORITY BELOW HAS STOOD MERGED IN THE ORDER OF TH E SUPREME COURT REJECTING SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION OR THAT THE ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT IS THE ONLY ORDER BINDING AS RES JUDI CATA IN SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS BETWEEN THE PARTIES.' 11. UPON NOTING THE OBSERVATIONS OF THE SUPREME COU RT IN KUNHAYAMMED'S CASE (SUPRA) THE DIVISION BENCH OF TH E MADRAS HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF NEXUS COMPUTER (P.) LTD. (SUPR A) CAME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE VIEW TAKEN BY THE SUPREME COURT IN VINAY CEMENT LTD.'S CASE (SUPRA) WOULD BIND THE HIGH COURT AS IT WAS NON-DECLARED BY THE SUPREME COURT UNDER ARTICLE 141 OF THE CONSTITU TION. 12. WE ARE IN RESPECTFUL AGREEMENT WITH THE REASON ING OF THE MADRAS HIGH COURT IN NEXUS COMPUTER (P.) LTD.'S CASE (SUPR A). JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE REQUIRES US TO FOLLOW THE VIEW OF THE SU PREME COURT IN VINAY CEMENT LTD. 'S CASE (SUPRA) AS ALSO THE VIEW OF THE DIVISION BENCH OF THIS COURT IN DHARMENDRA SHARMA'S CASE (SUPRA). 13. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE RESPECTFULLY DISAGR EE WITH THE :-10-: APPROACH ADOPTED BY A DIVISION BENCH OF THE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN PAMWI TISSUES LTD. 'S CASE (SUPRA). 14. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES INDICATED ABOVE, WE ARE OF THE OPINION THAT NO SUBSTANTIAL QUESTION OF LAW ARISES FOR OUR CONSIDERATION IN THE PRESENT APPEAL. THE APPEAL IS, THUS, DISMISSED. 9. RESPECTFULLY FOLLOWING THE JUDGMENT OF THE HONBLE DELHI HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. P.M. ELECTRONICS LTD. (SUPRA), WE ALLOW THE APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE. 10. IN THE RESULT, THE APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE IS ALLOWE D. ORDER WAS PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON 18.4.201 1. SD/- SD/- [N. K. SAINI] [H. L. KARWA] ACCOUNTANT MEMBER VICE PRESIDENT DATED: 18.4.2011 JJ:0804 COPY FORWARDED TO: 1. THE APPELLANT 2. THE RESPONDENT 3. THE CIT(A) 4. THE CIT 5. THE DR ASSISTANT REGISTRAR