ITA NO 559 OF 2019 D PEDDA REDDAIAH KADAPA . PA GE 1 OF 11 IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL H YDERABAD B SMC B ENCH, HYDERABAD BEFORE SMT. P. MADHAVI DEVI, JUDICIAL MEMBER ITA NO. 559 / HYD/201 9 A SSESSMENT YEAR: 2010 - 11 SHRI D. PE DDA REDDAIAH PROP:SRI LAKSHMI VENKATESWARA WINES, KADAPA DISTT . PAN: AGIPD1836F VS. INCOME TAX O FFICER WARD - 1 PRODDATUR ( APPELLANT) (RESPONDENT) A S S ES SEE BY: SRI K.C. DEVDAS REVENUE BY : S MT. M. NARMADA, DR DATE OF HEARING: 12 / 0 3 /20 20 DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT: 30 / 0 4 /20 20 O R D E R THIS IS ASS ESSEE S APPEAL FOR THE A. Y 2010 - 11 FILED AGAINST THE ORDER OF THE CIT ( A ) - KURNOOL, DATED 4.3.2015. 2. AT THE OUTSET IT IS SEEN THAT THERE IS A DELAY OF 1422 DAYS IN FILING OF THIS APP EAL BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL. THE ASSESSEE HAS FILED AN APP LICATION FOR COND ONATION OF DELAY STATING AS UNDER: 1. I, D. PEDA REDDAIAH, S/O D.SUBBARAYUDU, AGED ABOUT 47 YEARS, PROP. OF SRI LAKSHMI VENKATESWARA WINES, HOUSED AT 11/231, BADVEL ROAD, MYDUKUR VILLAGE, KADAPA DISTRICT, ANDHRA PRADESH, DO SOLEMNLY AFFIRM AND STATE AS UN DER: 2. I AM AN ILLITERATE AND NOT WELL CONVERSANT WITH THE STATUTORY PROVISIONS AND I CARRIED ON BUSINESS IN WINES FOR TWO YEARS AT MYDKUR VILLAGE. I DON'T HAVE ANY FORMAL EDUCATION. 3. I HAVE CARRIED ON WINES BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF SRI LAKSHMI VENKATESWARA WINES FOR ABOUT TWO YEARS. FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 2010 - 11, AN ORDER WAS PASSED BY THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX (APPEALS), ITA NO 559 OF 2019 D PEDDA REDDAIAH KADAPA . PA GE 2 OF 11 KURNOOL ON 04/03/2015. IT WAS SERVED ON 28/03/2015. AS I WAS NOT WELL CONVERSANT WITH THE FACTS OF THE CASE AN D ON THE BASIS OF THE ORDER PASSED BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER, I RELIED ON SOME PROFESSIONAL, WHO DID NOT APPEAR BEFORE THE ASSESSING OFFICER OR BEFORE THE COMMISSIONER O F INCOME TAX (APPEALS), KURNOOL. 4. THE ORDER PASSED BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER WAS U/S 143(3) R.W.S 144 OF THE LT. ACT, 1961. THUS, IT WAS AN ORDER PASSED WITHOUT MY REPRESENTATION AS ADVOCATES IN THIS AREA WHO ARE SUPPOSED TO APPEAR ON MY BEHALF AND T O WHOM I HAD GIVEN THE POWER OF ATTORNEY DID NOT APPEAR BEFORE THE REVENUE AUTHORITIES AND THE MATTER ENDED WITH AN ORDER BEING PASSED EX - PARTE BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER ON 25/03/2013. 5. ON FURTHER APPEAL TO THE LD CIT (A), KURNOOL, MY AUTHORISED REP RESENTATIVE DID NOT APPEAR AND THE CIT (A) DISPOSE OF THE APPEAL ON THE GROUND THERE WERE NO CO MPLIANCES AND THAT THERE BEING NO RESPONSE AND MERELY RELYING ON THE REASONS OF THE AO, DISMISSED THE APPEAL. THERE WAS NO ADJUDICATION ON MERITS. 6. LATER SOM ETIME IN THE FIRST WEEK OF APRIL, 2019, I APPROACHED MR. BHASKARA REDDY, ADVOCATE, WHO INFORMED ME THAT AN APPEAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN FILED LONG BACK AND THEREFORE, PRESENTLY THE APPEAL IS BEING FILED TO THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL WITH A PRAYER FOR CON DONATION OF DELAY. 7. THE ORDER OF THE CIT (A) WAS PASSED ON 04/03/2015. THE ORDER WAS SERVED ON 28/03/2015. WHEN I CONSULTED MR. BHASKARA REDDY, ADVOCATE, I WAS INFORMED THAT AN APPEAL TO THE ITAT IS TO BE FILED WITH A PRAYER FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY. T HE APPEAL IS BEING PRESENTLY FILED ON 18/04/2019 WITH A DELAY OF 1422 DAYS. 8. THE DEPONENT B EING AN ILLITERATE AND UNEDUCATED PLEADS FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY IN FILING THE APPEAL. 9. THERE WAS NO INTENTION TO DEFAULT AND THE ENTIRE DELAY OCCUR RED ON ACCOUNT OF MY ILLITERACY AND NOT NUANCES OF LAW AND THEREFORE, THE APPELLANT PRAYS TO CONDONE T HE DELAY OF 1422 DAYS AND PROPER ADJUDICATION OF THE MATTER ON MERITS AS THE INCOME FROM WINES I AM INFORMED HAS BEEN ESTIMATED FAR BEYOND THE NORMAL RANG E. 10. IF THE DELAY IS CONDONED, A MERITORIOUS CASE WOULD BE HEARD ON MERITS BY HEARING BOTH THE DEP ONENT AND THE DEPARTMENT AND ON THE CONTRARY, IF THE DELAY IS NOT CONDONED, A MERITORIOUS CASE WOULD BE THROWN OUT ON THE THRESHOLD VIOLATING THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY. ITA NO 559 OF 2019 D PEDDA REDDAIAH KADAPA . PA GE 3 OF 11 SOLEMNLY AFFIRMED ON THE 10TH DAY OF APRIL, 2019 . 3. IN AD DI TION TO THE AVER MENTS I N TH E PETITION , THE LEARNED COU NSEL FOR THE ASSESSEE HAS FURTHER SUBMITTED THAT THE ASSESSEE HAS A STRONG CASE ON MERITS AND THEREFORE, THE DELAY SHOULD BE CONDONE D AND THE ASSESSEE S CASE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED ON MERITS . IN SU PPORT O F HIS CONTENTION THAT WHERE THERE IS A STRONG CASE ON MERITS, THE DELAY SHOULD BE CONDONED , HE PLACED RELIANCE UPON THE FOL LOWING DECISIONS: I) THE HON'BLE A.P. HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF SURYA GENERAL TRADERS VS. COMMER CIAL TAX OFFICER & OTHERS (1997) (3) ALT 110, 31.03.1997. II) THE HON'BLE A.P. HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF M/S. MADHUPAL ESTATES (P) LTD VS. ITO IN IT T A NO.294 OF 2016 DATED 8.8.2016 III) THE HON'BLE MAD RAS HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF M/S . HOSANNA MINISTRIES IN T.C. APPEAL NO.3 O F 2017 IV) THE HO N'BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. KF BIOPLANTS (P) LTD (2015) 59 TAXMANN.COM 449 (BOMBAY). 4. THE LEARNED COU NSEL FOR THE ASSESSEE SUBMITTED THAT IN VIEW OF THE ABOV E DECISIONS , THE DELAY OF 1422 DAYS SHOULD BE CONDO NED AND THE MATTER SHOULD BE R EMITTED TO THE FILE OF THE AO FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE ISSUE ON MERITS SINCE THE ASSESSMENT WAS ALSO CO MPLETED EX - PARTE THE ASSES SEE U/S 144 OF THE ACT. 5. THE LEARNED DR , ON THE OTHER HAND, STRONGLY OPPOSED THE CON DONATION OF DELAY STATING T HAT THE RE WAS A LSO A DELAY OF 292 DAYS IN FILING OF APPEAL BEFORE THE CIT (A) WHICH WAS NOT CONDONED BY THE CIT (A) . THEREFORE ACCORDING TO HIM , IT IS EVIDENT THAT TH E ITA NO 559 OF 2019 D PEDDA REDDAIAH KADAPA . PA GE 4 OF 11 ASSESSEE HAS NOT BEEN VIGI LANT IN PROTECTING HIS INTEREST AND HAS NOT FILED AN APPEAL WITH BONA FIDE REASONS. HE THEREFORE, SUBMITTED THAT THE ORDERS OF THE AO AND THE CIT (A) SHOULD BE CON FIRMED. 6. HAVING REGARD TO THE RIVAL CONTENTIONS AND THE MATERIAL ON RECORD, I FIND THAT THE ASSESSMENT WAS COM PLETED U/S 143(3) R .W.S. 144 OF THE ACT , BECA USE N ONE APPEARED FOR THE ASSESSEE BEFORE THE AO INSPITE OF SEVERAL NOTICES ISSUED TO HIM U/S 143(2) AND 142(1) ON 12.01.2012, 6.02.2012, 4.5.2012, 31.07.2012, 21.8.2012, 10.09.2012, 22.10 .2012. T HE ASSESSEE S REPRESENTATI VE HAD APPEARED ONLY ON 29.09.2012 BUT DID NOT FURNISH ANY INFORMATION C ALLED FOR BY THE AO AND IT WAS IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES , THAT THE AO COMPLETED THE ASSESSMENT U/S 143(3) R. W.S. 144 BY ESTIMATING THE INCOME FRO M WINE BUSINESS AND ALSO BY DISALL OWING SUND RY CREDITORS TO THE EXTENT OF RS.24,9 0,000/ - AS THE ASSESSEE FAILED TO PROVE THE GE NUINENESS OF THE CR E DITORS , BY ESTIMATING THE INTEREST ON SUNDRY DEBTORS TO THE EXTEN T OF RS.3,59,200/ - @18% AND M AKING AN ADDITION OF RS.64,656/ - ; AND ALSO BRINGING TO T AX THE INTEREST INCOME OF RS. 21,476/ - R ECEIVED FROM BANK . I FIND THAT THOUGH THE ASSESSEE FILED AN APPEAL BEFORE THE CIT (A) WITH A DELAY OF 292 DAYS, HE DID NOT FILE ANY APPLICATION FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY AND THEREFORE, THE CIT (A) HAS NOT ADMITTED TH E APPEAL. EVEN THOUGH THE NOTICES WERE IS SUED BY ITA NO 559 OF 2019 D PEDDA REDDAIAH KADAPA . PA GE 5 OF 11 THE CIT (A) TO THE ASSESSEE ON 30.01.2015, 20.2.2015 AND 30.03.2015, THERE WAS NO RESPONSE BY THE ASSESSEE TO THE SAID NOTICES . IT WAS IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES , THAT THE CIT (A) DID NOT ADMIT THE APPEAL AND ALS O CONFIRMED T HE ASSESSMENT ORDER ON MERI TS AS WELL. THE ASSESSEE HAS NO W FILED AN APPEAL BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL WITH A DELAY OF 1422 DAYS STATING THAT HE WAS NOT ADVISED PROPERLY BY THE AUTHORISED REPRESENTATIVE AND THAT H E WAS NOT AWARE OF THE STEPS TO BE TAKEN AGAINST THE ASSE SSMENT OR DER. THE CO NDUCT OF THE ASS ESSEE IS THEREFORE, DOES NOT APPEA R TO BE O F A VIGILANT ASSESSEE . LET US THEREFORE CONSIDER THE DECISIONS RELIED UPON BY THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE ASSESSEE AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES THEREIN IN WHICH WERE CONSIDERED BY THE HON'BLE COURTS FOR C ONDON ING THE DELAY AND WHETHER THEY WOULD APPLY TO THE CASE BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL . 6 . 1 IN THE CASE OF SURYA GENERAL TRADES (CITED SUPRA), THERE WAS A DELAY OF ONE YEAR, FIVE MONTHS AND NINE DAYS IN FILING OF THE APPEAL AND THE REASON GIVEN THEREIN FOR THE DELAY WAS THAT T H E ASSESSEE E RRON E OU SLY ADVISED THAT NO APPEAL NEED TO BE F ILED FOR THE RELEVANT A.Y AS THE DEMAND AGAINST HIM FOR THE EARLIER A.Y S WERE PENDING BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL AND WHATEVER ORDER WOULD BE PASSED FOR THAT YEAR WOULD AUTOMATICALLY APPLY F OR THE SUBSEQUENT YEAR AND IT WAS ONLY WHEN HE MET HIS COUNSEL THAT HE WAS ITA NO 559 OF 2019 D PEDDA REDDAIAH KADAPA . PA GE 6 OF 11 EXP LAINED THAT THE APPEAL HAS TO BE FILED IN RESPECT OF EACH YEAR. IT WAS IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT HAS HELD THAT WHERE A PERSON HAS A GOOD CASE ON MERIT S , THE STATE SHOULD NOT TAKE TECHNICAL PLEA OF LIMITATION SO AS TO DEPRIVE HI M O F HIS JUST D UES. 6.2 . IN THE CASE OF MADHUPAL ESTATES (P) LTD (CITED SUPRA) ALSO THERE WAS A SHORT DEL AY OF ONLY 53 DAYS IN FILING OF THE APPEAL BEFORE THE HON 'BLE HIGH COURT AND THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT HA D CONDONED THE DELAY. 6. 3 I N THE CASE OF M/S. HOSANNA MIN ISTRIES (CITED SUPRA) ALSO , THERE WAS A DELAY OF 1902 DAYS IN PREFERRING THE APPEAL AND THE REASONS FOR THE DELAY WAS THAT THE ASSESS EE WAS NOT AWARE THAT AN APPEAL COU LD BE FILED TO THE TRIBUNAL AGAINST THE ORDER OF THE REJECTION OF REGISTRATION BY THE CIT (A ) U/S 12AA OF THE ACT AND IT IS ONLY AFTER OBTAINING THE PROFESSIONAL ADVISE THAT THE APPEAL WAS FILED. 6.4 THE HON'BLE MAD RAS HIGH COURT AT PARA 21 TO 27 OF ITS ORDER HAS H E LD AS UNDER: 21. NOW, WE COME TO THE MAIN REASON I.E., THE REASON OF DELAY SHO WN FOR THE REJECTION OF THE APPEAL THROUGH THE IMPUGNED ORDER. NO DOUBT, THE DELAY OF 1902 DAYS IS A HUG E AND ENORMOUS DELAY. BUT, WHEN WE LOOK AT THE REASONS GIVEN B Y THE ASSESSEE FOR SUCH A DELAY, IT SHOWS THAT IT IS NOT ITA NO 559 OF 2019 D PEDDA REDDAIAH KADAPA . PA GE 7 OF 11 ATTRIBUTABLE TO ANY LAME EXCUSES ON MEDICAL GROUNDS OR OTHERWISE. BUT, IT IS ONLY THE REASON OF EITHER NON ADVISE ON THE PART OF THE PROF ESSIONAL, WHO HAS BEEN ENGAGED BY THE ASSESSEE OR THE IGNORANC E OF LAW BY THE ASSESSEE ITSELF. ASSESSEE KNEW WELL THAT IF A PLEA OF IGNORANCE OF LAW IS TAKEN, THAT WOULD BE, ON THE FACE OF IT, REJECTED BY THE COURT/TRIBUNAL, NEVERTHELESS, SUCH A PLEA ALONE HAD BEEN TAKEN BY THE ASSESSEE AND THAT ITSELF WOULD SHOW THE INHERENT GENUINENESS ATTACHED WITH THE REASON CITED BY THE ASSESSEE FOR SUCH HUGE DELAY. 22. IN THIS REGARD, WE WOULD EMPHASISE THAT NO DOUBT, THE DELAY THAT TOO A LONG DELAY HAS TO BE EXPLAINE D WITH PROPER REASONS. BUT, IT DOES NOT MEAN THAT EVERY DAY'S DELAY MUST BE EXPLAINED. THE COURT MUST TAKE A PRAGMATIC VIEW IN APPRECIATING THE REASONS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE DELAY CAUSED TO THE PARTY TO APPROACH THE COURT OF LAW. NO PEDANTIC VIEW OR APPROACH TO BE ADOPTED BY THE COURT IN CONSIDERING THE REASONS GIVEN B Y THE PARTIES FOR DELAY IN APPROACHING THE COURT. 23. IN THIS REGARD, WE WOULD LIKE TO QUO TE A DECISION OF THE HON'BLE APEX COURT, IN THE MATTER OF COLLECTOR, LAND ACQUISITION - VS - M.S.T.KATIJI AND OTHERS REPORTED IN I.T.R.VOL.167(1987) PAGE 471. IN THE SA ID JUDGMENT, THEIR LORDSHIPS HAVE GIVEN CERTAIN PRINCIPLES BASED ON WHICH, THE ISSUE WITH REGARD TO THE DELAY CAN BE APPROACHED AND THE SAID PORTION OF THE ORDER OF THE JUDGMENT CITED SUPRA IS R EPRODUCED HEREUNDER: AND SUCH A LIBERAL APPROACH IS ADOPTED O N PRINCIPLE AS IT IS REALIZED THAT: 1.ORDINARILY, A LITIGANT DOES NOT STAND TO BENEFIT BY LODGING AN APPEAL LATE. 2.REFUSING TO CONDONE DELAY CAN RESULT IN A MERITORIOUS MATTER BEING THROWN OUT AT THE VERY THRESHOLD AND CAUSE OF JUSTICE BEING DEFEATED. AS AGAINST THIS WHEN DELAY IS CONDONED, THE HIGHEST THAT CAN HAPPEN IS THAT A CAUSE WOULD BE DECIDED ON MERITS AFTER HEARING THE PARTIES. 3.EVERY DAY'S DELAY MUST BE EXPLAINED DOES NOT MEAN THAT A PEDANTIC APPROACH SHOULD BE MADE. WHY NOT EVERY HOUR'S DELAY, EVERY SECOND'S DELAY? THE DOCTRINE MUST BE APPLIED IN A RATIONAL, COMMON SENSE AND PRAGMA TIC MANNER. 4.WHEN SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE AND TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS ARE PITTED AGAINST EACH OTHER, THE C AUSE OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE DESERVES TO BE PREFERRED, FOR THE OTHER SIDE CANNOT CLAIM TO HAVE VESTED RIGHT IN INJUSTICE BEING DONE BECAUSE OF A NON - DELI BERATE DELAY. 5.THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION THAT DELAY IS OCCASIONED DELIBERATELY, OR ON ACCOUNT OF CULPABLE NEGLIGENCE, OR ON ACCOUNT OF MALA FIDES. A LITIGANT DOES NOT STAND TO BENEFIT BY RESORTING TO DELAY. IN FACT, HE RUNS A SERIOUS RISK. 6.IT MUST BE GRAS PED THAT THE JUDICIARY IS RESPECTED NOT ON ACCOUNT OF ITS POWER TO LEGALIZE INJUSTICE ON TECHNICAL GROUN DS BUT BECAUSE IT IS CAPABLE OF REMOVING INJUSTICE AND IS EXPE CTED TO DO SO. ITA NO 559 OF 2019 D PEDDA REDDAIAH KADAPA . PA GE 8 OF 11 24. THAT APART, IN A SIMILAR SITUATION IN A RELATED APPEAL IN T.C.A.NO.886 /2016 WHERE ALSO THE VERY SAME FACTS HAVE BEEN GIVEN OR ADDUCED BY THE ASSESSEE FOR THE HUGE DELAY OF 16 31 DAYS IN APPROACHING THE TRIBUNAL. AFTER HAVING CONSIDERED T HE VERY SAME REASON CITED IN THE SAID CASE AS HAS BEEN STATED HEREIN ALSO, WE HAVE TAKEN A VIEW THAT IN THE GIVEN CIRCUMSTANCES EVEN SUCH A HUGE DELAY CAN BE CONDONED. THE RELEVANT PORTION OF TH E ORDER OF US PASSED TODAY IN THE SAID APPEAL IS EXTRACTED HER EUNDER: 6.1. A PERUSAL OF THE PETITION FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY WOULD SHOW, (AS WAS CONTE NDED BEFORE US BY THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT), THAT THE CHARTERED ACCOUNTANT ENGAGED IN THE M ATTER, ONE, MR.A.JOHNSON, FCA, WAS UNAWARE OF THE FACT THAT AN APPEAL COULD BE FILED AGAINST THE ORDER OF THE CIT, POST THE AMENDMENT MADE IN SECTION 253(1)(C) OF THE ACT. 6.2. THE REASON, WE HAVE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE COUNSEL FOR THE ASSESSEE WOULD HAVE TAKEN INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE ASSESSEE IN PREPARING THE PETITION FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY, IS, BEC A U SE, THE NAME OF THE CHARTERED ACCOUNTANT IS MENTIONED IN THE PETITION. LEARNED COUNSEL COULD NO T HAVE CONJURED UP THE NAME OF THE CHARTERED ACCOUNTANT. THERE IS NOTHING ON RECORD TO SUGGEST THAT THE REVENUE REFUTED THIS AVERMENT MADE IN THE PETITI ON. 6.3. THEREFORE, THE MATTER HAS TO BE APPRECIATED FROM A DIFFERENT ANGLE, WHICH IS, CAN A LITIGANT BE PREJUDICED ON ACCOUNT OF, VIRTUALLY, IGNORANCE OF LAW DISPLAY ED, BY A PROFESSIONAL ENGAGED BY HIM, TO PROSECUTE HIS CASE BEFORE THE APPROPRIATE FORUM. 7. THE ANSWER TO THIS POSER LIES IN THE FELICITOUS OBSERVATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF : MOTILAL PADA MPAT SUGAR MILLS V. STATE OF U.P ., AIR 1979 SC 621 - WHEREIN, IT ACCEPTED THE DICTA OF MA ULE, J. AND LORD ATKIN, THAT WHILE IGNORANCE OF LAW IS NO EXCUSE, (A MAXIM OF DIFFERENT SCOPE AND APPLIC ATION), THERE IS NOT AND NEVER HAS BEEN A PRESUMPTION THAT EVE RYONE KNOWS THE LAW. (SEE OBSERVATIONS MADE IN THIS BEHALF AT PAGE 629) : ...... 6. THE C LAIM OF THE APPELLANT TO EXEMPTION COULD BE SUSTAINED ONLY ON THE DOCTRINE OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND TH IS DOCTRINE COULD NOT BE SAID TO BE SO WELL DEFINED IN ITS SCO PE AND AMBIT AND SO FREE FROM UNCERTAINTY IN ITS APPLICATION THAT WE SHOULD BE COMPELLED T O HOLD THAT THE APPELLANT MUST HAVE HAD KNOWLEDGE OF ITS RIGHT TO EXEMPTION ON THE BASIS OF PROMISSORY E STOPPEL AT THE TIME WHEN IT ADDRESSED THE LETTER DATED 25TH JU NE, 1970. IN FACT, IN THE PETITION AS ORIGINALLY FILED, THE RIGHT TO CLAIM TOTAL EXEMPTION FROM SALES TAX WAS NOT BASED ON THE PLEA OF PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL WHICH WAS INTRODUCED ONLY BY WAY OF AME NDMENT. MOREOVER, IT MUST BE REMEMBERED THAT THERE IS NO PRESU MPTION THAT EVERY PERSON KNOWS THE LAW. IT IS OFTEN SAID THAT EVERY ONE IS PRESUMED TO KNO W THE LAW, BUT THAT IS NOT A CORRECT STATEMENT: THERE IS NO SUCH MAXIM KNOWN TO THE LAW. OVER A HUNDRED AND THIRTY YEARS AGO, MAULE, J., POINTED OUT IN MARTINDALA V. FAULKNER, (1846) 2 CB 706 'THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION IN THIS COUNTRY THAT EVERY PERSON KNOWS THE LAW: IT WOULD BE CONTRARY TO COMMON SENSE AND REASON IF IT WERE SO'. SCRUTTON, ALSO ONCE SAID: 'IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO KNOW ALL THE STATUTORY LAW, AND NOT VERY POSS IBLE TO KNOW ALL THE COMMON LAW.' BUT IT ITA NO 559 OF 2019 D PEDDA REDDAIAH KADAPA . PA GE 9 OF 11 WAS LORD ATKIN WHO, AS IN SO MANY OTHER SPHERES, PUT THE POINT IN ITS PROPER CONTEXT WHEN HE SAID IN EVANS V. BARTLEM, 1937 AC 473 ' ...... THE FACT IS T HAT THERE IS NOT AND NEVER HAS BEEN A PRESUMPTION THAT EVERY O NE KNOWS THE LAW. THERE IS THE RULE THAT IGNORANCE OF THE LAW DOES NOT EXCUSE, A MAXIM OF VERY DIFFERENT SCOPE AND APPLICATION.' IT IS, THEREFORE, NOT POSSIBLE TO PRESUME, IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY MATERIAL PLACED BEFORE THE COURT, THAT THE APPELLANT HAD FULL KNOWLEDGE OF ITS RIGHT TO EXEMPTION SO AS TO WARRANT AN INFERENCE THAT THE APPELLANT WAIVE D SUCH RIGHT BY ADDRESSING THE LETTER DATED 25TH JUNE, 1970. WE ACCORDINGLY REJECT THE PLEA OF WAIVER RA ISED ON BEHALF OF THE STATE GOVERNMENT. ....... (EMPHASIS IS OURS) 25. IN VIEW OF THESE REASONS, THE ORDER IMPUGNED OF THE TRIBUNAL REJECTING THE APPE AL OF THE ASSESSEE MAINLY ON THE GROUND OF DELAY, IS LIABLE TO BE INTERFERED WITH. IN ADDITION, WE ALSO FEEL THAT THE FURTHER REASON GIVEN BY THE TRIBUNAL FOR ARRIVIN G AT SUCH A CONCLUSION THAT THE ASSESSEE WAS NOT ENGAGING IN ACTIVITIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE OBJECTS SPECIFIED IN THE TRUST DEED ALSO IS NOT SUPPORTED BY MATERIALS AS WE ARE SATISFIED THAT THE ASSESSEE HAS BEEN FUNCTIONING AFTER PROPER REGISTRATION WITH THE AUTHORITIES CONCERNED UNDER THE JUVENILE ACT AND A RECENT CERTIFICATION ISSUED DATED 1 4.12.2016 OF THE AUTHORITIES CONCERNED AS REFERRED TO ABOVE WOULD BE VALID FOR NEXT FIVE YEARS. THEREFOR E, THE GENUINENESS OR OTHERWISE OF THE FUNCTIONING OF THE ASSE SSEE CANNOT BE EASILY DOUBTED, IN VIEW OF THE CERTIFICATION ISSUED BY THE DIRECTORATE OF S OCIAL DEFENCE, GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU AS STATED SUPRA. 26. THEREFORE, EVEN THAT REASON GIVEN BY THE TR IBUNAL FOR ITS CONCLUSION IN THE ORDER IMPUGNED CANNOT STAND I N THE LEGAL SCRUTINY. THEREFORE IN OUR VIEW, BOTH THE REASONS CITED IN THE IMPUGNED ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL ARE LIABLE TO BE INTERFERED WITH AND ACCORDINGLY, THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT IS SET ASIDE. 27 . IN THE RESULT, WE ALLOW THE APPEAL REMITTING THE MATTER TO T HE TRIBUNAL FOR TAKING DECISION ON MERITS ON THE ISSUE RAISED BY THE ASSESSEE. THERE SHALL BE NO ORDER AS TO COSTS . 6. 5 SIMI LARLY, THE HON'BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. KF BIOPLANTS (P) LTD (SUPRA) HAS CONDONED THE DELAY OF 1845 DAYS I N FI LING OF THE APPEAL BY TH E R E VENUE ON THE GROUND THAT THE FAI LURE OF THE REVENUE TO REMOVE THE OBJE CTION WITHIN TIME WAS AN UNINTENTIONAL LAPSE AND ADMISSION OF THE APPEAL BY ITSELF WOULD NOT CAUSE ANY PREJUDICE TO THE ASSESSEE THEREIN . ITA NO 559 OF 2019 D PEDDA REDDAIAH KADAPA . PA GE 10 OF 11 6. 6 I FIND THAT NONE OF THE ABOVE DECISION S ARE EXACTLY SIMILAR TO THE CASE OF THE ASSESSEE . HOWEVER, FROM THE PRINCIPLES LA ID DOWN THEREIN, THAT O RDINARILY A LITIGANT DOES NOT BENEFIT BY THE DELAY AND BY REF USING TO CONDONE THE DELAY A MERI TORIOUS MATTER MIGHT BE THROWN OUT AT THE VERY THRESHOLD AND CAUSE OF JUSTICE BEING DEFEATED. I AM INCLINED TO CON DONE THE DELAY AND REMAND THE I S S UE TO THE FILE OF THE AO FOR A DECI SION ON MERITS AFTER GIVIN G THE ASSESSEE A FAIR OPPORTUNITY OF HEARING. THIS DELAY IS C ONDONED SUBJECT T O THE CONDITION THAT THE ASSESSEE PAY S A SUM OF RS.10,000/ - T O THE P.M S RELIEF FUND WITHIN A PERIOD OF ONE MONTH DAYS FROM THE DATE OF RECEIPT OF THIS ORDER AND SHALL FILE THE PROOF OF THE SAME BEFORE THE AO , ONLY AFTER WHICH THE AO SHALL TAKE UP THE ASSE SSMENT PROCEEDINGS. THE ASSESSEE SHALL ALSO COOP ERATE W ITH THE AO FOR AN EARL Y COMPLETION OF THE ASSESSMENT . ITA NO 559 OF 2019 D PEDDA REDDAIAH KADAPA . PA GE 11 OF 11 7. IN TH E RESULT, ASSESSEE S APPEAL IS TREATED AS ALLOWED FOR STATISTICAL PURPOSES. ORDER PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON 30 TH APRIL , 20 20 . SD/ - ( P. MADHAVI DEVI) JUDICIAL MEMBER HYDERABAD, DATED 30 TH APRIL, 2020 . VINODAN/SPS COPY TO: 1 SHRI D. PE DDA REDDAIAH C/O M/S. SEKHA R & CO. 133/4 RASHTRAPATHI R OAD, SECUNDERABAD 500003 2 ITO WARD - 1 PRO DDATUR 3 C I T (A) - KURNOOL 4 CIT - KURNOOL 5 THE DR, ITAT HYDERABAD 6 GUARD FILE BY ORDER 1. DRAFT DICTATED ON 30 TH APRIL , 2020 2. DRAFT PLACED BEFORE AUTHOR 30 TH APRIL , 2020 3 DRAFT PROPOSED & PLACED BEFORE THE SECOND MEMBER 30 TH APRIL , 2020 4 DRAFT DISCU SSED/APPR OV E D BY SE COND MEM BER 30 TH APRIL , 2020 5 APPROVED DRAFT COMES TO THE SR.P.S./PS 30 TH APRIL , 2020 6. KEPT FOR PRONOUNCEMENT ON 30 TH APRIL , 2020 7. FILE SENT TO THE BENCH CLERK 30 TH APRIL , 2020 8 DATE ON WHICH FILE GOES TO THE HEAD CLERK 9 DATE O F DISP ATC H OF O RDE R