ACIT- CIRCLE-20(3), MUMBAI V. VASTUPAL LAHERCHAND JAIN, MUMBAI

ITA 6133/MUM/2018

• Counselvise Citation: [2020] 111 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 1255 (ITAT-MUMBAI)
• Duration Of Justice: 1 year(s) 7 month(s) 1 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 27-05-2020
• Appeal Filed By: Department
• Order Result: Allowed
• Bench Allotted: F
• Assessment Year: 2010-2011
• Appeal Filed On: 26-10-2018
• Result in Favour of: Revenue
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: SANATHA MULLAMUDI
• Assessee Lawyers: A N SHAH
• Keywords: Bogus purchase
• Section: 143(3); 32; 147; 148; 2

Judgement Text

IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TR IBUNAL MUMBAI I BENCH, MUMBAI [BEFORE SHRI PRAMOD KUMAR, HONBLE VICE PRESIDENT & MS. MADHUMITA ROY, HONBLE JUDICIAL MEMBER] I.T.A. NO. 6133/MUM/2018 ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2010-11 ASST. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, CIRCLE-20(3), MUM BAI.................APPELLANT 6 TH FLOOR, PIRAMAL CHAMBERS, LALBAUG, MUMBAI 400 012. VS. SHRI VASTUPAL LAHERCHAND JAIN......... ........RESPONDENT 41, 1 ST FLOOR, MEHTA CHAMBERS, 4 TH LANE, KAMATHIPURA, MUMBAI 400 012. [PAN: AAEPJ 5465 G] APPEARANCES BY: SHRI SANATHA MULLAMUDI, D/R, APPEARED ON BEHALF OF THE REVENUE SHRI A.N. SHAH, AR APPEARED ON BEHALF OF THE ASSESS EE. DATE OF CONCLUDING THE HEARING : JANUARY 06, 2020 DATE OF PRONOUNCING THE ORDER : MAY 27 , 2020 ORDER PER MS. MADHUMITA ROY, JM THE INSTANT APPEAL FILED BY THE REVENUE IS DIRECTED AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 19.07.2018 PASSED BY THE LD. CIT(A) 3 2 MUMBAI U/S 143(3) READ WITH SECTION 147 OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961 (HEREIN AFTER REFERRED TO AS THE ACT) ARISING OUT OF THE ORDER DATED 26.02.2016 PASSED BY THE ACIT, CIRCLE 20(3), MUMBAI FOR A.Y. 2010-11 . 2. THE ASSESSEE AN INDIVIDUAL ENGAGED IN THE BUSINE SS OF CIVIL CONTRACTOR FILED ITS ORIGINAL RETURN OF INCOME ON 3 0.09.2010 DECLARING TOTAL INCOME OF RS. 65,65,886/-. UNDER SCRUTINY, TH E ASSESSMENT U/S 143(3) WAS FINALISED ON 21.03.2013 DETERMINING TAXA BLE INCOME OF RS. 91,10,260/-. SUBSEQUENTLY UPON RECEIVING INFORMATIO N THAT THE ASSESSEE, DURING THE YEAR UNDER CONSIDERATION INDULGED IN THE ACCEPTANCE OF BOGUS ENTRIES IN RESPECT OF PURCHASE TO THE TUNE OF RS. 1 ,57,03,048/-, UPON INVOKING PROVISION OF SECTION 147 OF THE ACT, NOTIC E U/S 148 OF THE ACT WAS SERVED UPON THE ASSESSEE INFORMING THE ASSESSEE, TH E REASONS TO BELIEVE THAT THE INCOME CHARGEABLE TO TAX HAS ESCAPED ASSES SMENT FOR THE A.Y. 2010-11. IN RESPONSE THERETO 06.01.2016 OBJECTED TO SUCH THE ASSES SEE SUBMITTED THE LEDGER COP REASONS FOR REOPENING INCLUDING THE COPIES OF BILLS. WHICH WERE MADE BY THE ACCOUNT PAYEE CHEQUES WERE ALSO NOTICE OF THE ASSESSING OFFICER. 19.02.2016 THE DETAILS OF THE PARTIES FROM WHICH PURCHASES WERE MADE WERE ALSO PROVIDED TO THE LD. AO SAID ASSESSMENT WAS FINALISED UPON MAKING DISALLOWA NCE OF RS. 7,22,128/- I.E. 12.5% OF THE TOT THE PURCHASES MADE FROM TOTAL INCOME OF THE ASSESSEE WHICH WAS, IN TURN, RE DUCE BY ADOPTING 5% OF THE CIT(A) . HENCE THE INSTANT APPEAL BEFORE US BY THE REVENUE . 3. AT THE TIME OF HEAR THAT THE PURCHASERS CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN MADE FROM THE REMAINED UNVERIFIED. HE ULTIMATELY LD. AO. THE LEARNED C OUNSEL US THAT IN RESPONSE TO THE NOTICE U/S 148 OF THE AC T, THE LEDGER COPIES OF THE PARTIES; COPIES OF BILLS; THE DETAILS OF PAYMEN T W BEFORE THE ASSESSING OFFICER. FURTHER THAT THE PART IES FROM WHOM PURCHASES WERE MADE WHICH DISALLOWANCE AT 25% IN THE ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS U /S 143(3) OF THE ACT. SUCH DISALLOWANCE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RE 12.5% ON THE PURCHASES IN RESPECT OF FOUR PARTIES EXCEPT M TRADING COMPANY THEREFORE, ULTIM 2 THERETO , THE ASSESSEE BY AND UNDER A LETTER DATED SUCH REOPENING OF THE ASSESSMENT. SUBSEQUENTLY, SEE SUBMITTED THE LEDGER COP IES OF THE PARTIES MENTION INCLUDING THE COPIES OF BILLS. T HE DETAILS OF PAYMENT MADE BY THE ACCOUNT PAYEE CHEQUES WERE ALSO BROUGHT TO THE THE ASSESSING OFFICER. FURTHER THAT BY A SUBSEQUENT REPLY DATED 19.02.2016 THE DETAILS OF THE PARTIES FROM WHICH THE ALLEGED BOGUS WERE ALSO PROVIDED TO THE LD. AO . HOWEVER, T SAID ASSESSMENT WAS FINALISED UPON MAKING DISALLOWA NCE OF RS. I.E. 12.5% OF THE TOT AL AMOUNT OF RS. 57,77,025/- IN RESPECT TO PURCHASES MADE FROM M/S. PRINCE TRADING COMPANY AND ADDED TO THE TOTAL INCOME OF THE ASSESSEE WHICH WAS, IN TURN, RE DUCE D TO RS. 2 BY ADOPTING 5% OF THE SUCH PURCHASES OF RS. 57,77,025/- . HENCE THE INSTANT APPEAL BEFORE US BY THE REVENUE . AT THE TIME OF HEAR ING OF THE MATTER THE LD. DR SUBMITTED BEFORE US THAT THE PURCHASERS CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN MADE FROM THE REMAINED UNVERIFIED. HE ULTIMATELY RELIED UPO N THE ORDER PASSED BY THE OUNSEL APPEARING FOR THE ASSESSEE SUBMITTED BEFORE US THAT IN RESPONSE TO THE NOTICE U/S 148 OF THE AC T, THE LEDGER COPIES OF THE PARTIES; COPIES OF BILLS; THE DETAILS OF PAYMEN T W ERE DULY BEFORE THE ASSESSING OFFICER. FURTHER THAT THE PART IES FROM WHOM WHICH WERE ALLEGED TO BE BOGUS WAS CONSIDERED FOR DISALLOWANCE AT 25% IN THE ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS U /S 143(3) OF THE ACT. SUCH DISALLOWANCE WAS SUBSEQUENTLY RE STRICTED BY THE LD. CIT(A) TO PURCHASES IN RESPECT OF FOUR PARTIES EXCEPT M TRADING COMPANY THEREFORE, ULTIM ATELY THE L D. AO DISALLOWED 12. I.T.A. NO. 6133/MUM/2018 ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2010-11 SHRI VASTUPAL LAHERCHAND JAIN , THE ASSESSEE BY AND UNDER A LETTER DATED REOPENING OF THE ASSESSMENT. SUBSEQUENTLY, OF THE PARTIES MENTION ED IN THE HE DETAILS OF PAYMENT BROUGHT TO THE REPLY DATED THE ALLEGED BOGUS HOWEVER, T HE SAID ASSESSMENT WAS FINALISED UPON MAKING DISALLOWA NCE OF RS. IN RESPECT TO AND ADDED TO THE TO RS. 2 ,88,850/- BY THE LD. MATTER THE LD. DR SUBMITTED BEFORE US THAT THE PURCHASERS CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN MADE FROM THE PARTIES N THE ORDER PASSED BY THE FOR THE ASSESSEE SUBMITTED BEFORE US THAT IN RESPONSE TO THE NOTICE U/S 148 OF THE AC T, THE LEDGER COPIES OF ERE DULY SUBMITTED BEFORE THE ASSESSING OFFICER. FURTHER THAT THE PART IES FROM WHOM ALLEGED TO BE BOGUS WAS CONSIDERED FOR DISALLOWANCE AT 25% IN THE ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS U /S 143(3) OF THE STRICTED BY THE LD. CIT(A) TO PURCHASES IN RESPECT OF FOUR PARTIES EXCEPT M /S. PRINCE D. AO DISALLOWED 12. 5% OF THE PURCHASE OF RS. 57, 77 COMPANY I.E. THE QUANTUM OF PROFIT ELEMENT INVOLVED ON ACCOUNT OF INFLATION OF PURCHASES. BEFORE THE FIRST APPELLATE AUTHORITY, THE ASSESSEE SUBMITTED THAT THE FIGURES AMOUNTING TO RS. 7,22, 128/ POINTED OUT BY THE LEARNED AR THAT THE SAME HAS TO EXCLUDED WHILE ARRIVING AT THE QUANTUM OF ALLEGED PURCHASES OF RS. 57 FROM THAT THERE WAS ACTUAL EVIDENT FROM THE INVOICES OF THE PARTIES AS ALSO SU BMITTED BY THE LEARNED AR. THE LEARNED AR FURTHER ARGUED THAT THE DETAILS OF PURCHASES INCLUDING THE COPIES OF LEDGER OF PARTIES, THE COPIES OF INVOICES CONTAIN ADDRESS, THE TIN (SALES TAX STATEMENTS SHOWING PAYMENTS THEIR RESPECTIVE ACCOUNTS WERE DULY SUBMITTED BY TH E ASSESSEE. IT IS A FACT THAT THE PARTIES HAD PARTIALLY DI SOMEONES MISDEED OR NON THE ASSESSEE CANNOT BE PENALISED OTHERWISE . HE, THEREFORE, RELIES UPON THE ORDERS PASSED BY T HE FIRST APPELLATE AUTHORITY WHEREBY AND WHERE RESTRICTED TO 5% OF THE ALLEGED BOGUS PURCHASES. 4. WE HAVE HEARD THE MATERIALS AVAILABLE ON RECORD. IT APPEARS THAT THE ASSESSEE P URCHASED FROM THESE FIVE PARTIES WHICH HAS ACTUALLY BEEN UTI LISED IN THE CONTRACTS UNDERTAKEN BY HIM AND IT BMC (BOMBAY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION) ONLY UPON VERIFICATION OF THE ACTUAL EXECUTION OF W ORK, THE SAID GOVT. AUTHORITY HAS MADE CONTRACT PAYMENTS TO THE ASSESSEE. IN THAT VIEW OF THE MATTER, THE ASSESSEE CLAIMED THOSE PURCHASES 3 77 ,025/- MADE FROM THE SAID M/S. PRINCE TRADING QUANTUM OF PROFIT ELEMENT INVOLVED ON ACCOUNT OF INFLATION OF PURCHASES. BEFORE THE FIRST APPELLATE AUTHORITY, THE ASSESSEE SUBMITTED THAT THE FIGURES SPECIFIED BY THE REVENUE ARE INCLUSIVE OF VAT 128/ -; DETAILS WHEREOF WERE DULY ENCL OSED. IT WAS POINTED OUT BY THE LEARNED AR THAT THE SAME HAS TO EXCLUDED WHILE ARRIVING AT THE QUANTUM OF ALLEGED PURCHASES OF RS. 57 ,77, 025/ WAS ACTUAL DELIVERY OF GOODS BY THE SUPPLIERS WHICH ARE EVIDENT FROM THE INVOICES OF THE PARTIES AS ALSO SU BMITTED BY THE LEARNED AR. THE LEARNED AR FURTHER ARGUED THAT THE DETAILS OF PURCHASES LEDGER OF PARTIES, THE COPIES OF INVOICES CONTAIN ADDRESS, THE TIN (SALES TAX ) NOS. ETC. FROM SPECIFIED SUPPLIERS, THE BANK SHOWING PAYMENTS BY ACCOUNT PAYEE CHEQUES AND CREDITED TO THEIR RESPECTIVE ACCOUNTS WERE DULY SUBMITTED BY TH E ASSESSEE. IT IS A FACT THAT THE PARTIES HAD PARTIALLY DI SCHARGED THEIR LIABILITY TO VAT BUT FOR MISDEED OR NON -MEETING THE NORMS OF SALES TAX DEPARTMENT, THE ASSESSEE CANNOT BE PENALISED PARTICULARLY WHEN THE EVIDENCES SHOW . HE, THEREFORE, RELIES UPON THE ORDERS PASSED BY T HE FIRST AUTHORITY WHEREBY AND WHERE UNDER THE DISALLOWANCE HAS BEEN RESTRICTED TO 5% OF THE ALLEGED BOGUS PURCHASES. WE HAVE HEARD THE RESPECTIVE PARTIES AND ALSO PERUSED THE RELEVANT AVAILABLE ON RECORD. IT APPEARS THAT THE ASSESSEE P URCHASED FROM THESE FIVE PARTIES WHICH HAS ACTUALLY BEEN UTI LISED IN THE CONTRACTS IT HAS FURTHER RECEIVED CONTRACTS PAYMENTS FROM (BOMBAY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION) . IT IS A CASE OF THE ASSESSEE THAT ONLY UPON VERIFICATION OF THE ACTUAL EXECUTION OF W ORK, THE SAID GOVT. CONTRACT PAYMENTS TO THE ASSESSEE. IN THAT VIEW OF THE MATTER, THE ASSESSEE CLAIMED THOSE PURCHASES ARE GENUINE AS IN THE I.T.A. NO. 6133/MUM/2018 ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2010-11 SHRI VASTUPAL LAHERCHAND JAIN M/S. PRINCE TRADING QUANTUM OF PROFIT ELEMENT INVOLVED ON ACCOUNT OF INFLATION OF PURCHASES. BEFORE THE FIRST APPELLATE AUTHORITY, THE ASSESSEE BY THE REVENUE ARE INCLUSIVE OF VAT OSED. IT WAS POINTED OUT BY THE LEARNED AR THAT THE SAME HAS TO EXCLUDED WHILE 025/ -. APART DELIVERY OF GOODS BY THE SUPPLIERS WHICH ARE EVIDENT FROM THE INVOICES OF THE PARTIES AS ALSO SU BMITTED BY THE LEARNED AR. THE LEARNED AR FURTHER ARGUED THAT THE DETAILS OF PURCHASES LEDGER OF PARTIES, THE COPIES OF INVOICES CONTAIN ING ETC. FROM SPECIFIED SUPPLIERS, THE BANK BY ACCOUNT PAYEE CHEQUES AND CREDITED TO THEIR RESPECTIVE ACCOUNTS WERE DULY SUBMITTED BY TH E ASSESSEE. IT IS A FACT SCHARGED THEIR LIABILITY TO VAT BUT FOR SALES TAX DEPARTMENT, PARTICULARLY WHEN THE EVIDENCES SHOW . HE, THEREFORE, RELIES UPON THE ORDERS PASSED BY T HE FIRST UNDER THE DISALLOWANCE HAS BEEN PARTIES AND ALSO PERUSED THE RELEVANT AVAILABLE ON RECORD. IT APPEARS THAT THE ASSESSEE P URCHASED FROM THESE FIVE PARTIES WHICH HAS ACTUALLY BEEN UTI LISED IN THE CONTRACTS HAS FURTHER RECEIVED CONTRACTS PAYMENTS FROM THE ASSESSEE THAT ONLY UPON VERIFICATION OF THE ACTUAL EXECUTION OF W ORK, THE SAID GOVT. CONTRACT PAYMENTS TO THE ASSESSEE. IN THAT VIEW OF THE GENUINE AS IN THE ABSENCE OF PURCHASES, NO C THE OTHER HAND, SUCH PLEA OF THE ASSESSEE HAS NOT B EEN ACCEPTED BY THE LEARNED ASSESSING OFFICER FOR SEVERAL REASONS. THE ASSESSEE DID NOT PRODUCE THE PURCHASER RE VENUE, NEITHER ANY EVIDENCE SUCH TRANSACTIONS. WE HAVE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED THE ORDER PASSED BY TH E LD. AO WHEREFROM IT APPEARS THAT SALES CANNOT BE MADE WITHOUT PURCHA DOUBTED EVEN THOUGH THEY WERE NOT MADE FROM THE SAM E PARTIE DEBITED IN THE BOOKS. THUS T PURCHASE MADE BY THE ASSESSEE ON THE OTHER HAND, T MADE SINCE THROUGH BANKING TRANSACTIONS BY CHEQUES THOSE ARE GENUINE WAS NEITHER ACCEPTED BY THE LD. CIT(A) IN ITS TOTAL ITY, FINDING OF THE SALES TAX DEPARTMENT THAT THE SUPPLI ER IN THE CASE ASSESSEE ARE BOGUS. THE QUESTION OF GENUINENESS OF SUCH TRANSACTION THE ABSENCE OF VALID DOCUMENT TO THAT EFFECT PRODUC ED BY THE ASSESSEE, THEREFORE, REMAINED UN IMPUGNED THAT TIME AND AGAIN RELYING ON SEV THE MATTER OF SHRI MADHUKANT B. GANDHI VS. ITO PASS ED BY THE COORDINATE BENCH, THE LD. CIT(A) CONCLUDED DISALLOWED BUT ONLY THE PROFIT EMBEDDED TO BE TAXED. THE JUDGEMENT PASSED BY THE HON'BLE GUJARAT HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. BHOLANATH POLY FAB PVT. LTD. RE PORTED IN 355 ITR 290 (GUJ) HAS ALSO BEEN TAKEN CARE OF BY THE LD. CIT(A) WHERE THE FACTS ARE IDENTICAL. TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE ENTIRE FACTS OF 4 ABSENCE OF PURCHASES, NO C ONTRACT WORK COULD NOT HAVE BEEN EXECUTED. ON THE OTHER HAND, SUCH PLEA OF THE ASSESSEE HAS NOT B EEN ACCEPTED BY THE LEARNED ASSESSING OFFICER FOR SEVERAL REASONS. HE WAS OF THE OPINION THAT PRODUCE THE PURCHASER S SO DEMANDED BY THE VENUE, NEITHER ANY EVIDENCE S WERE SUBMITTED SHOWING GENUIN WE HAVE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED THE ORDER PASSED BY TH E LD. AO WHEREFROM IT APPEARS THAT THE LD. AO DID NOT DOUBT THE SALES MADE. WHEN CANNOT BE MADE WITHOUT PURCHA SE, THE FACT OF PURCHASE CANNOT BE DOUBTED EVEN THOUGH THEY WERE NOT MADE FROM THE SAM E PARTIE THUS T HE AO HAS RIGHTLY SOUGHT TO VERIFY THE CLAIM OF PURCHASE MADE BY THE ASSESSEE . ON THE OTHER HAND, T HE PLEA OF THE ASSESSEE THAT THE PURCHASES WERE MADE SINCE THROUGH BANKING TRANSACTIONS BY CHEQUES THOSE ARE GENUINE WAS NEITHER ACCEPTED BY THE LD. CIT(A) IN ITS TOTAL ITY, ON THE BASIS FINDING OF THE SALES TAX DEPARTMENT THAT THE SUPPLI ER IN THE CASE ASSESSEE ARE BOGUS. THE QUESTION OF GENUINENESS OF SUCH TRANSACTION THE ABSENCE OF VALID DOCUMENT TO THAT EFFECT PRODUC ED BY THE ASSESSEE, THEREFORE, REMAINED UN DECIDED. HOWEVER, WE FIND FROM THE ORDER IMPUGNED THAT TIME AND AGAIN RELYING ON SEV ERAL JUDGEMENTS INCLUDING IN THE MATTER OF SHRI MADHUKANT B. GANDHI VS. ITO PASS ED BY THE COORDINATE CONCLUDED THAT THE ENTIRE PURCHASE CANNOT BE DISALLOWED BUT ONLY THE PROFIT EMBEDDED IN THE DOUBTFUL TRANSACTION HAS JUDGEMENT PASSED BY THE HON'BLE GUJARAT HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. BHOLANATH POLY FAB PVT. LTD. RE PORTED IN 355 ITR 290 (GUJ) HAS ALSO BEEN TAKEN CARE OF BY THE LD. CIT(A) WHERE THE FACTS ARE TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE ENTIRE FACTS OF THE MATTER WE FIND I.T.A. NO. 6133/MUM/2018 ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2010-11 SHRI VASTUPAL LAHERCHAND JAIN EXECUTED. ON THE OTHER HAND, SUCH PLEA OF THE ASSESSEE HAS NOT B EEN ACCEPTED BY THE HE WAS OF THE OPINION THAT SO DEMANDED BY THE SHOWING GENUIN ENESS OF WE HAVE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED THE ORDER PASSED BY TH E LD. AO THE LD. AO DID NOT DOUBT THE SALES MADE. WHEN SE, THE FACT OF PURCHASE CANNOT BE DOUBTED EVEN THOUGH THEY WERE NOT MADE FROM THE SAM E PARTIE S AS THOSE HE AO HAS RIGHTLY SOUGHT TO VERIFY THE CLAIM OF HE PLEA OF THE ASSESSEE THAT THE PURCHASES WERE MADE SINCE THROUGH BANKING TRANSACTIONS BY CHEQUES THOSE ARE GENUINE ON THE BASIS THE FINDING OF THE SALES TAX DEPARTMENT THAT THE SUPPLI ER IN THE CASE OF THE ASSESSEE ARE BOGUS. THE QUESTION OF GENUINENESS OF SUCH TRANSACTION , IN THE ABSENCE OF VALID DOCUMENT TO THAT EFFECT PRODUC ED BY THE ASSESSEE, HOWEVER, WE FIND FROM THE ORDER INCLUDING IN THE MATTER OF SHRI MADHUKANT B. GANDHI VS. ITO PASS ED BY THE COORDINATE THAT THE ENTIRE PURCHASE CANNOT BE DOUBTFUL TRANSACTION HAS JUDGEMENT PASSED BY THE HON'BLE GUJARAT HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. BHOLANATH POLY FAB PVT. LTD. RE PORTED IN 355 ITR 290 (GUJ) HAS ALSO BEEN TAKEN CARE OF BY THE LD. CIT(A) WHERE THE FACTS ARE THE MATTER WE FIND THAT THE LD. CIT(A) FURTHER OPINED THAT FROM OTHER PARTIES THOUGH THOSE ACCOUNTS OTHERWISE THE SALES MADE COULD NOT HAVE TA KEN PLACE. THE ASSESSEE TOOK BILLS ONLY FROM THE FIVE PARTIES AS A CCOMMODATION TO EXPLAIN SUCH PURCHASES. MATTER WHEN THE AP PELLANT HAS ALREADY RECORDED A IN HIS BOOKS AND THE SALES HAS NOT BEEN DOUBTED, WE FIND NO AMBIGUITY IN RESTRICTING SUCH DISALLOWANCE TO 5% LD. CIT(A) SO AS TO WARRANT INTERFERENCE. HENCE WE FIND APPEAL PREFERRED BY THE REVENUE AFFIRMATIVE I.E. IN FAVOUR OF THE ASSESSEE AND AGAINST THE REVENUE. HENCE REVENUES APPEAL IS DISMISSED. 5. IN THE RESULT, THE APPEAL OF THE 6. BEFORE PARTING WE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE CERTAIN OBSERV ATION RELATING TO THE ISSUE CROPPED UP UNDER PRESENT SCENARIO TO WHETHER WHEN THE HEARING OF THE MATTER WAS CONCL UDED ON 0 THE ORDER CAN BE PRONOUNCED TODAY I.E. ON 19.05.2020. THE ISSUE HAS ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED BY THE CO JSW LTD. (ITA NOS. 6264 & 6103/MUM/2018) PRONOUNCED ON 14.05.2020 IN THE LIGHT OF WHICH IT IS WELL WITHIN THE TIME LI MIT PERMITTED U 34(5) OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL RULES, 1963 IN VIEW OF THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS MADE THEREIN: 7. HOWEVER, BEFORE WE PART WITH THE MATTER, WE MUST DE AL WITH ONE PROCEDURAL ISSUE AS WELL. WHILE HEARING OF THESE A PPEALS WAS CONCLUDED ON 8TH JAN UARY 2020, THIS ORDER THEREON IS BEING PRONOUNCED T ODAY ON THE DAY OF 14TH MAY, 2020, MUCH AFTER THE EXPIRY OF 90 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF CONCLUSION OF HEARING. WE ARE ALSO ALIVE TO THE FACT THAT RULE 34(5) OF 5 THAT THE LD. CIT(A) FURTHER OPINED THAT ASSESSEE HAS MADE CASH PURCHASES THOUGH THOSE WERE NOT RECORDED IN THE BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS OTHERWISE THE SALES MADE COULD NOT HAVE TA KEN PLACE. THE ASSESSEE TOOK BILLS ONLY FROM THE FIVE PARTIES AS A CCOMMODATION TO EXPLAIN SUCH PURCHASES. HAVING REGARD TO THE PARTICULAR ASPECT PELLANT HAS ALREADY RECORDED A GROSS PROFIT IN HIS BOOKS AND THE SALES HAS NOT BEEN DOUBTED, WE FIND NO AMBIGUITY IN RESTRICTING SUCH DISALLOWANCE TO 5% OF THE ALLEGED BOGUS PURCHASES BY THE LD. CIT(A) SO AS TO WARRANT INTERFERENCE. HENCE WE FIND NO MERIT IN THE APPEAL PREFERRED BY THE REVENUE . T HE ORDER IS, THEREFORE, PASSED IN THE IN FAVOUR OF THE ASSESSEE AND AGAINST THE REVENUE. HENCE REVENUES APPEAL IS DISMISSED. IN THE RESULT, THE APPEAL OF THE REVENUE IS DISMISSED. BEFORE PARTING WE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE CERTAIN OBSERV ATION RELATING TO THE ISSUE CROPPED UP UNDER PRESENT SCENARIO OF COVID- 19 PANDEMIC TO WHETHER WHEN THE HEARING OF THE MATTER WAS CONCL UDED ON 0 PRONOUNCED TODAY I.E. ON 19.05.2020. THE ISSUE HAS ALREADY BEEN DISCUSSED BY THE CO - ORDINATE BENCH IN THE CASE OF DCIT VS. JSW LTD. (ITA NOS. 6264 & 6103/MUM/2018) PRONOUNCED ON 14.05.2020 IN THE LIGHT OF WHICH IT IS WELL WITHIN THE TIME LI MIT PERMITTED U 34(5) OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL RULES, 1963 IN VIEW OF THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS MADE THEREIN: HOWEVER, BEFORE WE PART WITH THE MATTER, WE MUST DE AL WITH ONE PROCEDURAL ISSUE AS WELL. WHILE HEARING OF THESE A PPEALS WAS CONCLUDED UARY 2020, THIS ORDER THEREON IS BEING PRONOUNCED T ODAY ON THE DAY OF 14TH MAY, 2020, MUCH AFTER THE EXPIRY OF 90 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF CONCLUSION OF HEARING. WE ARE ALSO ALIVE TO THE FACT THAT RULE 34(5) OF I.T.A. NO. 6133/MUM/2018 ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2010-11 SHRI VASTUPAL LAHERCHAND JAIN ASSESSEE HAS MADE CASH PURCHASES WERE NOT RECORDED IN THE BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS OTHERWISE THE SALES MADE COULD NOT HAVE TA KEN PLACE. THE ASSESSEE TOOK BILLS ONLY FROM THE FIVE PARTIES AS A CCOMMODATION TO HAVING REGARD TO THE PARTICULAR ASPECT OF THE GROSS PROFIT OF 3.56% IN HIS BOOKS AND THE SALES HAS NOT BEEN DOUBTED, WE FIND NO AMBIGUITY IN OF THE ALLEGED BOGUS PURCHASES BY THE NO MERIT IN THE HE ORDER IS, THEREFORE, PASSED IN THE IN FAVOUR OF THE ASSESSEE AND AGAINST THE REVENUE. HENCE BEFORE PARTING WE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE CERTAIN OBSERV ATION RELATING 19 PANDEMIC AS TO WHETHER WHEN THE HEARING OF THE MATTER WAS CONCL UDED ON 0 6.01.2020 PRONOUNCED TODAY I.E. ON 19.05.2020. THE ISSUE HAS ORDINATE BENCH IN THE CASE OF DCIT VS. JSW LTD. (ITA NOS. 6264 & 6103/MUM/2018) PRONOUNCED ON 14.05.2020 IN THE LIGHT OF WHICH IT IS WELL WITHIN THE TIME LI MIT PERMITTED U NDER RULE 34(5) OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL RULES, 1963 IN VIEW OF THE FOLLOWING HOWEVER, BEFORE WE PART WITH THE MATTER, WE MUST DE AL WITH ONE PROCEDURAL ISSUE AS WELL. WHILE HEARING OF THESE A PPEALS WAS CONCLUDED UARY 2020, THIS ORDER THEREON IS BEING PRONOUNCED T ODAY ON THE DAY OF 14TH MAY, 2020, MUCH AFTER THE EXPIRY OF 90 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF CONCLUSION OF HEARING. WE ARE ALSO ALIVE TO THE FACT THAT RULE 34(5) OF THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL RULES 1963, WH PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS, PROVIDES AS FOLLOWS: (5) THE PRONOUNCEMENT MAY BE IN ANY OF THE FOLLOWIN G MANNERS : (A) THE BENCH MAY PRONOUNCE THE ORDER IMMEDIATELY UPON THE CONCLUSION OF THE HEARING. (B) IN CASE WHERE TH THE HEARING, THE BENCH SHALL GIVE A DATE FOR PRONOU NCEMENT. (C) IN A CASE WHERE NO DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT IS GI VEN BY THE BENCH, EVERY ENDEAVOUR SHALL BE MADE BY THE BENCH TO PRONOUNCE T HE ORDER WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM THE DATE ON WHICH THE HEARING OF THE CASE WAS CONCL UDED BUT, WHERE IT IS NOT PRACTICABLE SO TO DO ON THE GROUND OF EXCEPTIONAL AND EXTRAORDINAR Y CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, THE BENCH SHALL FIX A FUTURE DAY FOR PRON OUNCEMENT OF THE ORDER, AND SUCH DATE SHALL NOT ORDINARILY (EMPHASIS SUPPLIED BY US NOW) BE A DAY BEYOND A FURTHER PERIOD OF 30 DAYS A ND DUE NOTICE OF THE DAY SO FIXED SHALL BE GIVEN ON THE NOTICE BOARD. 8. QUITE CLEARLY, ORDINARILY THE ORDER ON AN APPEAL SHOULD BE PRONOUNCED BY THE BENCH WITHIN NO MORE THAN 90 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF CONCLUDING THE HEARING. IT IS, HOWEVER, IMPORTANT T O EXPRESSION ORDINARILY HAS BEEN USED IN THE SAID R ULE ITSELF. THIS RULE WAS INSERTED AS A RESULT OF DIRECTIONS OF HONBLE JURIS DICTIONAL HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF SHIVSAGAR VEG RESTAURANT VS ACIT [(200 9) 317 ITR 433 (BOM)] WHEREIN THEIR L THEREFORE, DIRECT THE PRESIDENT OF THE APPELLATE TR IBUNAL TO FRAME AND LAY DOWN THE GUIDELINES IN THE SIMILAR LINES AS ARE LAI D DOWN BY THE APEX COURT IN THE CASE OF ANIL RAI (SUPRA) AND TO ISSUE APPROPRIATE ADM INISTRATIVE DIRECTIONS TO ALL THE BENCHES OF THE TR IBUNAL IN THAT BEHALF. WE HOPE AND TRUST THAT SUITABLE GUIDELINES SHALL BE FRAMED AND ISSUED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL WITHIN SHOR TEST REASONABLE TIME AND FOLLOWED STRICTLY BY ALL THE BEN MEANWHILE(EMPHASIS, BY UNDERLINING, SUPPLIED BY US NOW), ALL THE REVISIONAL AND APPELLATE AUTHORITIES UNDER THE INCO ME 6 THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL RULES 1963, WH ICH DEALS WITH PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS, PROVIDES AS FOLLOWS: (5) THE PRONOUNCEMENT MAY BE IN ANY OF THE FOLLOWIN G MANNERS : (A) THE BENCH MAY PRONOUNCE THE ORDER IMMEDIATELY UPON THE CONCLUSION OF (B) IN CASE WHERE TH E ORDER IS NOT PRONOUNCED IMMEDIATELY ON THE CONCLU SION OF THE HEARING, THE BENCH SHALL GIVE A DATE FOR PRONOU NCEMENT. (C) IN A CASE WHERE NO DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT IS GI VEN BY THE BENCH, EVERY ENDEAVOUR SHALL BE MADE BY THE BENCH TO PRONOUNCE T HE ORDER WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM THE DATE ON WHICH THE HEARING OF THE CASE WAS CONCL UDED BUT, WHERE IT IS NOT TO DO ON THE GROUND OF EXCEPTIONAL AND EXTRAORDINAR Y CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, THE BENCH SHALL FIX A FUTURE DAY FOR PRON OUNCEMENT OF THE ORDER, AND SUCH DATE SHALL NOT ORDINARILY (EMPHASIS SUPPLIED BY US NOW) BE A DAY BEYOND A FURTHER ND DUE NOTICE OF THE DAY SO FIXED SHALL BE GIVEN ON THE NOTICE QUITE CLEARLY, ORDINARILY THE ORDER ON AN APPEAL SHOULD BE PRONOUNCED BY THE BENCH WITHIN NO MORE THAN 90 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF CONCLUDING THE HEARING. IT IS, HOWEVER, IMPORTANT T O NOTE THAT THE EXPRESSION ORDINARILY HAS BEEN USED IN THE SAID R ULE ITSELF. THIS RULE WAS INSERTED AS A RESULT OF DIRECTIONS OF HONBLE JURIS DICTIONAL HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF SHIVSAGAR VEG RESTAURANT VS ACIT [(200 9) 317 ITR 433 (BOM)] WHEREIN THEIR L ORDSHIPS HAD, INTER ALIA, DIRECTED THAT WE, THEREFORE, DIRECT THE PRESIDENT OF THE APPELLATE TR IBUNAL TO FRAME AND LAY DOWN THE GUIDELINES IN THE SIMILAR LINES AS ARE LAI D DOWN BY THE APEX COURT IN THE CASE OF ANIL RAI (SUPRA) AND TO ISSUE APPROPRIATE INISTRATIVE DIRECTIONS TO ALL THE BENCHES OF THE TR IBUNAL IN THAT BEHALF. WE HOPE AND TRUST THAT SUITABLE GUIDELINES SHALL BE FRAMED AND ISSUED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL WITHIN SHOR TEST REASONABLE TIME AND FOLLOWED STRICTLY BY ALL THE BEN CHES OF THE TRIBUNAL. IN THE MEANWHILE(EMPHASIS, BY UNDERLINING, SUPPLIED BY US NOW), ALL THE REVISIONAL AND APPELLATE AUTHORITIES UNDER THE INCO ME - TAX ACT ARE I.T.A. NO. 6133/MUM/2018 ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2010-11 SHRI VASTUPAL LAHERCHAND JAIN ICH DEALS WITH (A) THE BENCH MAY PRONOUNCE THE ORDER IMMEDIATELY UPON THE CONCLUSION OF E ORDER IS NOT PRONOUNCED IMMEDIATELY ON THE CONCLU SION OF (C) IN A CASE WHERE NO DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT IS GI VEN BY THE BENCH, EVERY ENDEAVOUR SHALL BE MADE BY THE BENCH TO PRONOUNCE T HE ORDER WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM THE DATE ON WHICH THE HEARING OF THE CASE WAS CONCL UDED BUT, WHERE IT IS NOT TO DO ON THE GROUND OF EXCEPTIONAL AND EXTRAORDINAR Y CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, THE BENCH SHALL FIX A FUTURE DAY FOR PRON OUNCEMENT OF THE ORDER, AND SUCH DATE SHALL NOT ORDINARILY (EMPHASIS SUPPLIED BY US NOW) BE A DAY BEYOND A FURTHER ND DUE NOTICE OF THE DAY SO FIXED SHALL BE GIVEN ON THE NOTICE QUITE CLEARLY, ORDINARILY THE ORDER ON AN APPEAL SHOULD BE PRONOUNCED BY THE BENCH WITHIN NO MORE THAN 90 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF NOTE THAT THE EXPRESSION ORDINARILY HAS BEEN USED IN THE SAID R ULE ITSELF. THIS RULE WAS INSERTED AS A RESULT OF DIRECTIONS OF HONBLE JURIS DICTIONAL HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF SHIVSAGAR VEG RESTAURANT VS ACIT [(200 9) 317 ITR 433 ORDSHIPS HAD, INTER ALIA, DIRECTED THAT WE, THEREFORE, DIRECT THE PRESIDENT OF THE APPELLATE TR IBUNAL TO FRAME AND LAY DOWN THE GUIDELINES IN THE SIMILAR LINES AS ARE LAI D DOWN BY THE APEX COURT IN THE CASE OF ANIL RAI (SUPRA) AND TO ISSUE APPROPRIATE INISTRATIVE DIRECTIONS TO ALL THE BENCHES OF THE TR IBUNAL IN THAT BEHALF. WE HOPE AND TRUST THAT SUITABLE GUIDELINES SHALL BE FRAMED AND ISSUED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL WITHIN SHOR TEST REASONABLE TIME CHES OF THE TRIBUNAL. IN THE MEANWHILE(EMPHASIS, BY UNDERLINING, SUPPLIED BY US NOW), ALL THE TAX ACT ARE DIRECTED TO DECIDE MATTERS HEARD BY THEM WITHIN A P ERIOD OF THREE MONTHS FROM THE DATE CASE IS C LOSED FOR JUDGMENT. IN THE RULED SO FRAMED, AS A RESULT OF THESE DIRECTIONS, THE EXPRESSION ORDINAR ILY HAS BEEN INSERTED IN THE REQUIREMENT TO PRONOUNCE THE ORDER WITHIN A PER IOD OF 90 DAYS. THE QUESTION THEN ARISES WHETHER THE PASSING OF THIS OR DER, DAYS, WAS NECESSITATED BY ANY EXTRAORDINARY CIRCU MSTANCES. 9. LET US IN THIS LIGHT REVERT TO THE PREVAILING SITUA TION IN THE COUNTRY. ON 24TH MARCH, 2020, HONBLE PRIME MINISTER OF INDI A TOOK THE BOLD STEP OF IMPOSING A NATIONWIDE LOCKDO COVID 19 EPIDEMIC, AND THIS LOCKDOWN WAS EXTENDED F ROM TIME TO TIME. AS A MATTER OF FACT, EVEN BEFORE THIS FORMAL NATIONWID E LOCKDOWN, THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AT MUMBAI WAS SEVERELY RESTRIC TED ON ACCOUNT OF LOCKDOWN BY THE MAHARASHTRA GOVERNMENT, AND ON ACCOUNT OF STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF HEALTH ADVISORIES WITH A VIEW OF CHECKING SPREAD OF COVID 19. THE EPI DEMIC SITUATION IN MUMBAI BEING GRAVE, THERE WAS NOT MUCH OF A RELAXAT ION IN SUBSEQUENT L OCKDOWNS ALSO. IN ANY CASE, THERE WAS UNPRECEDENTED DISRUPTION OF JUDICIAL WOK ALL OVER THE COUNTRY. AS A MATTER OF F ACT, IT HAS BEEN SUCH AN UNPRECEDENTED SITUATION, CAUSING DISRUPTION IN THE FUNCTIONING OF JUDICIAL MACHINERY, THAT HONBLE SUPREME COURT O ORDER IN THE HISTORY OF INDIA AND VIDE ORDER DATED 6.5.2020 READ WITH ORDER DATED 23.3.2020, EXTENDED THE LIMITATION TO E XCLUDE NOT ONLY THIS LOCKDOWN PERIOD BUT ALSO A FEW MORE DAYS PRIOR TO, AND AFTER, THE LOCKDOWN BY OBSERVI NG THAT IN CASE THE LIMITATION HAS EXPIRED AFTER 15.03.2020 THEN THE PERIOD FROM 15.03.2020 TILL THE DATE ON WHICH THE LOCKDOWN IS LIFTED IN THE JURISDICTIONAL AREA WHERE THE DISPUTE LIES OR WHERE THE CAUSE OF ACTION ARISES SHALL BE EXTENDED FOR A PERIOD AFTER THE LIFTING OF LOCKDOWN. HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT, IN AN ORDER 7 DIRECTED TO DECIDE MATTERS HEARD BY THEM WITHIN A P ERIOD OF THREE MONTHS LOSED FOR JUDGMENT. IN THE RULED SO FRAMED, AS A RESULT OF THESE DIRECTIONS, THE EXPRESSION ORDINAR ILY HAS BEEN INSERTED IN THE REQUIREMENT TO PRONOUNCE THE ORDER WITHIN A PER IOD OF 90 DAYS. THE QUESTION THEN ARISES WHETHER THE PASSING OF THIS OR DER, BEYOND NINETY DAYS, WAS NECESSITATED BY ANY EXTRAORDINARY CIRCU MSTANCES. LET US IN THIS LIGHT REVERT TO THE PREVAILING SITUA TION IN THE COUNTRY. ON 24TH MARCH, 2020, HONBLE PRIME MINISTER OF INDI A TOOK THE BOLD STEP OF IMPOSING A NATIONWIDE LOCKDO WN, FOR 21 DAYS, TO PREVENT SPREAD OF COVID 19 EPIDEMIC, AND THIS LOCKDOWN WAS EXTENDED F ROM TIME TO TIME. AS A MATTER OF FACT, EVEN BEFORE THIS FORMAL NATIONWID E LOCKDOWN, THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AT MUMBAI WAS TED ON ACCOUNT OF LOCKDOWN BY THE MAHARASHTRA GOVERNMENT, AND ON ACCOUNT OF STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF HEALTH ADVISORIES WITH A VIEW OF CHECKING SPREAD OF COVID 19. THE EPI DEMIC SITUATION IN MUMBAI BEING GRAVE, THERE WAS NOT MUCH OF A RELAXAT ION IN SUBSEQUENT OCKDOWNS ALSO. IN ANY CASE, THERE WAS UNPRECEDENTED DISRUPTION OF JUDICIAL WOK ALL OVER THE COUNTRY. AS A MATTER OF F ACT, IT HAS BEEN SUCH AN UNPRECEDENTED SITUATION, CAUSING DISRUPTION IN THE FUNCTIONING OF JUDICIAL MACHINERY, THAT HONBLE SUPREME COURT O F INDIA, IN AN UNPRECEDENTED ORDER IN THE HISTORY OF INDIA AND VIDE ORDER DATED 6.5.2020 READ WITH ORDER DATED 23.3.2020, EXTENDED THE LIMITATION TO E XCLUDE NOT ONLY THIS LOCKDOWN PERIOD BUT ALSO A FEW MORE DAYS PRIOR TO, AND AFTER, THE NG THAT IN CASE THE LIMITATION HAS EXPIRED AFTER 15.03.2020 THEN THE PERIOD FROM 15.03.2020 TILL THE DATE ON WHICH THE LOCKDOWN IS LIFTED IN THE JURISDICTIONAL AREA WHERE THE DISPUTE LIES OR WHERE THE CAUSE OF ACTION ARISES SHALL BE EXTENDED FOR A PERIOD AFTER THE LIFTING OF LOCKDOWN. HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT, IN AN ORDER I.T.A. NO. 6133/MUM/2018 ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2010-11 SHRI VASTUPAL LAHERCHAND JAIN DIRECTED TO DECIDE MATTERS HEARD BY THEM WITHIN A P ERIOD OF THREE MONTHS LOSED FOR JUDGMENT. IN THE RULED SO FRAMED, AS A RESULT OF THESE DIRECTIONS, THE EXPRESSION ORDINAR ILY HAS BEEN INSERTED IN THE REQUIREMENT TO PRONOUNCE THE ORDER WITHIN A PER IOD OF 90 DAYS. THE BEYOND NINETY LET US IN THIS LIGHT REVERT TO THE PREVAILING SITUA TION IN THE COUNTRY. ON 24TH MARCH, 2020, HONBLE PRIME MINISTER OF INDI A TOOK THE BOLD STEP WN, FOR 21 DAYS, TO PREVENT SPREAD OF COVID 19 EPIDEMIC, AND THIS LOCKDOWN WAS EXTENDED F ROM TIME TO TIME. AS A MATTER OF FACT, EVEN BEFORE THIS FORMAL NATIONWID E LOCKDOWN, THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AT MUMBAI WAS TED ON ACCOUNT OF LOCKDOWN BY THE MAHARASHTRA GOVERNMENT, AND ON ACCOUNT OF STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF HEALTH ADVISORIES WITH A VIEW OF CHECKING SPREAD OF COVID 19. THE EPI DEMIC SITUATION IN MUMBAI BEING GRAVE, THERE WAS NOT MUCH OF A RELAXAT ION IN SUBSEQUENT OCKDOWNS ALSO. IN ANY CASE, THERE WAS UNPRECEDENTED DISRUPTION OF JUDICIAL WOK ALL OVER THE COUNTRY. AS A MATTER OF F ACT, IT HAS BEEN SUCH AN UNPRECEDENTED SITUATION, CAUSING DISRUPTION IN THE FUNCTIONING OF JUDICIAL F INDIA, IN AN UNPRECEDENTED ORDER IN THE HISTORY OF INDIA AND VIDE ORDER DATED 6.5.2020 READ WITH ORDER DATED 23.3.2020, EXTENDED THE LIMITATION TO E XCLUDE NOT ONLY THIS LOCKDOWN PERIOD BUT ALSO A FEW MORE DAYS PRIOR TO, AND AFTER, THE NG THAT IN CASE THE LIMITATION HAS EXPIRED AFTER 15.03.2020 THEN THE PERIOD FROM 15.03.2020 TILL THE DATE ON WHICH THE LOCKDOWN IS LIFTED IN THE JURISDICTIONAL AREA WHERE THE DISPUTE LIES OR WHERE THE CAUSE OF ACTION ARISES SHALL BE EXTENDED FOR A PERIOD OF 15DAYS AFTER THE LIFTING OF LOCKDOWN. HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT, IN AN ORDER DATED 15TH APRIL 2020, HAS, BESIDES EXTENDING THE V ALIDITY OF ALL INTERIM ORDERS, HAS ALSO OBSERVED THAT, IT IS ALSO CLARIFI ED THAT WHILE CALCULATING TIME FOR DISPOSAL OF MAT TERS MADE TIME FOR WHICH THE ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 CONTINUES TO OPERATE SHALL BE ADDED AND TIME SHALL STAND EXTENDED ACCORDINGLY, A ND ALSO OBSERVED THAT ARRANGEMENT CONTINUED BY AN ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 TILL 30 APRIL 2020 SHALL CONTINUE FURTHER TILL 15TH JUNE 20 20. IT HAS BEEN AN UNPRECEDENTED SITUATION NOT ONLY IN INDIA BUT ALL O VER THE WORLD. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA HAS, VIDE NOTIFICATION DATED 19 TH FEBRUARY 2020, TAKEN THE STAND THAT, THE CORONA VIRUS SHOUL NATURAL CALAMITY AND FMC (I.E. FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSE ) MAY BE INVOKED, WHEREVER CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE, FOLLOWING THE DUE PROCEDURE. THE TERM FORCE MAJEURE HAS BEEN DEFINED IN BLACKS LA W DICTIONARY, AS AN EVENT OR EFFECT THAT CAN BE NEITHER ANTICIPATED NOR CONTROLLED WHEN SUC H IS THE POSITION, AND IT IS OFFICIALLY SO NOTIFIED B Y THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND THE COVID- 19 EPIDEMIC HAS BEEN NOTIFIED AS A DISASTER UNDER T HE NATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT ACT, 2005, AND ALSO IN THE L DISCUSSIONS ABOVE, THE PERIOD DURING WHICH LOCKDOWN WAS IN FORCE CAN BE ANYTHING BUT AN ORDINARY PERIOD. 10. IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE DISCUSSIONS, WE ARE OF TH E CONSIDERED VIEW THAT RATHER THAN TAKING A PEDANTIC VIEW OF THE RULE REQUI PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS WITHIN 90 DAYS, DISREGARDIN G THE IMPORTANT FACT THAT THE ENTIRE COUNTRY WAS IN LOCKDOWN, WE SHOULD COMPUTE THE PERIOD OF 90 DAYS BY EXCLUDING AT LEAST THE PERIOD DURING WHICH THE LOCKDOWN WAS IN FORCE. WE MUST FACTOR GROUND REA THE TIME LIMIT FOR THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE ORDER. LAW IS NOT BROODING OMNIPOTENCE IN THE SKY. IT IS A PRAGMATIC TOOL OF T HE SOCIAL ORDER. THE TENETS OF LAW BEING ENACTED ON THE BASIS OF PRAGMAT ISM, AND THAT IS HOW 8 DATED 15TH APRIL 2020, HAS, BESIDES EXTENDING THE V ALIDITY OF ALL INTERIM ORDERS, HAS ALSO OBSERVED THAT, IT IS ALSO CLARIFI ED THAT WHILE CALCULATING TERS MADE TIME - BOUND BY THIS COURT, THE PERIOD FOR WHICH THE ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 CONTINUES TO OPERATE SHALL BE ADDED AND TIME SHALL STAND EXTENDED ACCORDINGLY, A ND ALSO OBSERVED THAT ARRANGEMENT CONTINUED BY AN ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 TILL 30 APRIL 2020 SHALL CONTINUE FURTHER TILL 15TH JUNE 20 20. IT HAS BEEN AN UNPRECEDENTED SITUATION NOT ONLY IN INDIA BUT ALL O VER THE WORLD. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA HAS, VIDE NOTIFICATION DATED 19 TH FEBRUARY 2020, TAKEN THE STAND THAT, THE CORONA VIRUS SHOUL D BE CONSIDERED A CASE OF NATURAL CALAMITY AND FMC (I.E. FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSE ) MAY BE INVOKED, WHEREVER CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE, FOLLOWING THE DUE PROCEDURE. THE TERM FORCE MAJEURE HAS BEEN DEFINED IN BLACKS LA W DICTIONARY, AS AN CAN BE NEITHER ANTICIPATED NOR CONTROLLED WHEN SUC H IS THE POSITION, AND IT IS OFFICIALLY SO NOTIFIED B Y THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA 19 EPIDEMIC HAS BEEN NOTIFIED AS A DISASTER UNDER T HE NATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT ACT, 2005, AND ALSO IN THE L DISCUSSIONS ABOVE, THE PERIOD DURING WHICH LOCKDOWN WAS IN FORCE CAN BE ANYTHING BUT AN ORDINARY PERIOD. IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE DISCUSSIONS, WE ARE OF TH E CONSIDERED VIEW THAT RATHER THAN TAKING A PEDANTIC VIEW OF THE RULE REQUI PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS WITHIN 90 DAYS, DISREGARDIN G THE IMPORTANT FACT THAT THE ENTIRE COUNTRY WAS IN LOCKDOWN, WE SHOULD COMPUTE THE PERIOD OF 90 DAYS BY EXCLUDING AT LEAST THE PERIOD DURING WHICH THE LOCKDOWN WAS IN FORCE. WE MUST FACTOR GROUND REA LITIES IN MIND WHILE INTERPRETING THE TIME LIMIT FOR THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE ORDER. LAW IS NOT BROODING OMNIPOTENCE IN THE SKY. IT IS A PRAGMATIC TOOL OF T HE SOCIAL ORDER. THE TENETS OF LAW BEING ENACTED ON THE BASIS OF PRAGMAT ISM, AND THAT IS HOW I.T.A. NO. 6133/MUM/2018 ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2010-11 SHRI VASTUPAL LAHERCHAND JAIN DATED 15TH APRIL 2020, HAS, BESIDES EXTENDING THE V ALIDITY OF ALL INTERIM ORDERS, HAS ALSO OBSERVED THAT, IT IS ALSO CLARIFI ED THAT WHILE CALCULATING BOUND BY THIS COURT, THE PERIOD FOR WHICH THE ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 CONTINUES TO OPERATE SHALL BE ADDED AND TIME SHALL STAND EXTENDED ACCORDINGLY, A ND ALSO OBSERVED THAT ARRANGEMENT CONTINUED BY AN ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 TILL 30 TH APRIL 2020 SHALL CONTINUE FURTHER TILL 15TH JUNE 20 20. IT HAS BEEN AN UNPRECEDENTED SITUATION NOT ONLY IN INDIA BUT ALL O VER THE WORLD. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA HAS, VIDE NOTIFICATION DATED 19 TH FEBRUARY 2020, D BE CONSIDERED A CASE OF NATURAL CALAMITY AND FMC (I.E. FORCE MAJEURE CLAUSE ) MAY BE INVOKED, WHEREVER CONSIDERED APPROPRIATE, FOLLOWING THE DUE PROCEDURE. THE TERM FORCE MAJEURE HAS BEEN DEFINED IN BLACKS LA W DICTIONARY, AS AN CAN BE NEITHER ANTICIPATED NOR CONTROLLED WHEN SUC H IS THE POSITION, AND IT IS OFFICIALLY SO NOTIFIED B Y THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA 19 EPIDEMIC HAS BEEN NOTIFIED AS A DISASTER UNDER T HE NATIONAL DISASTER MANAGEMENT ACT, 2005, AND ALSO IN THE L IGHT OF THE DISCUSSIONS ABOVE, THE PERIOD DURING WHICH LOCKDOWN WAS IN FORCE CAN BE IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE DISCUSSIONS, WE ARE OF TH E CONSIDERED VIEW THAT RATHER THAN TAKING A PEDANTIC VIEW OF THE RULE REQUI RING PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS WITHIN 90 DAYS, DISREGARDIN G THE IMPORTANT FACT THAT THE ENTIRE COUNTRY WAS IN LOCKDOWN, WE SHOULD COMPUTE THE PERIOD OF 90 DAYS BY EXCLUDING AT LEAST THE PERIOD DURING WHICH THE LOCKDOWN LITIES IN MIND WHILE INTERPRETING THE TIME LIMIT FOR THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE ORDER. LAW IS NOT BROODING OMNIPOTENCE IN THE SKY. IT IS A PRAGMATIC TOOL OF T HE SOCIAL ORDER. THE TENETS OF LAW BEING ENACTED ON THE BASIS OF PRAGMAT ISM, AND THAT IS HOW THE LAW IS REQUIRED TO INTERPRETED. THE INTERPRETATION SO A SSIGNED BY US IS NOT ONLY IN CONSONANCE WITH THE LETTER AND SPIRIT O F RULE 34(5) BUT IS ALSO A PRAGMATIC APPROACH AT A TIME WHEN A DISASTER, NOTIF IED UNDER THE DISASTER MANAGEMENT ACT 2005, IS CAUSING UNP FUNCTIONING OF OUR JUSTICE DELIVERY SYSTEM. OF OTTERS CLUB VS DIT [(2017) 392 ITR 244 (BOM)], HON BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT DID NOT APPROVE AN ORDER BEING PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL BEYOND A PERIOD OF 90 DAYS, BUT THEN IN THE PRESENT SITUATION HONBLE BOMBAY HI GH COURT ITSELF HAS, VIDE JUDGMENT DATED 15TH THAT DIRECTED WHILE CALCULATING THE TIME FOR DISPOSAL OF MATTERS MADE TIME- BOUND BY THIS COURT, THE PERIOD FOR WHICH THE ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 CONTINUES TO OPERATE SHALL BE ADDED AND TIME SHALL STAND EXTENDED ACCORDINGLY. THE EXTRAORDINARY STEPS TAKE N HONBLE JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT AND HONBLE SUPRE ME COURT ALSO INDICATE THAT THIS PERIOD OF LOCKDOWN CANNOT BE TRE ATED AS PERIOD DURING WHICH THE NORMAL TIME LIMITS ARE TO R EMAIN IN FORCE. IN OUR CONSIDERED VIEW, EVEN WITHOUT THE WORDS ORDINARILY , IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL POSITION, THE PERIOD DU RING WHICH LOCKOUT WAS IN FORCE IS TO EXCLUD ED FOR THE PURPOSE OF TIME LIMITS SET OUT IN RULE 3 4(5) OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL RULES, 1963. VIEWED THUS, THE EXCEPTION, TO 90 DAY TIME- LIMIT FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS, INHERENT IN RULE 34(5)(C), WITH RESPECT TO THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS WITHIN NINET COMES INTO PLAY IN THE PRESENT CASE. OF COURSE, THE RE IS NO, AND THERE CANNOT BE ANY, BAR ON THE DISCRETION OF THE BENCHES TO REFIX THE MATTERS FOR CLARIFICATIONS BECAUSE OF CONSIDERABLE TIME LAG BETWEEN THE POINT OF TIME WHEN THE HEARING I S CONCLUDED AND THE POINT OF TIME WHEN THE ORDER THEREON IS BEING FINALIZED, BUT THEN, IN OUR CONSID ERED VIEW, NO SUCH EXERCISE WAS REQUIRED TO BE CARRIED OUT ON THE FACT S OF THIS CASE. 9 IS REQUIRED TO INTERPRETED. THE INTERPRETATION SO A SSIGNED BY US IS NOT ONLY IN CONSONANCE WITH THE LETTER AND SPIRIT O F RULE 34(5) BUT IS ALSO A PRAGMATIC APPROACH AT A TIME WHEN A DISASTER, NOTIF IED UNDER THE DISASTER MANAGEMENT ACT 2005, IS CAUSING UNP RECEDENTED DISRUPTION IN THE FUNCTIONING OF OUR JUSTICE DELIVERY SYSTEM. UNDOUBTEDLY, IN THE CASE OTTERS CLUB VS DIT [(2017) 392 ITR 244 (BOM)], HON BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT DID NOT APPROVE AN ORDER BEING PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL BEYOND A BUT THEN IN THE PRESENT SITUATION HONBLE BOMBAY HI GH COURT ITSELF HAS, VIDE JUDGMENT DATED 15TH APRIL 2020, HELD WHILE CALCULATING THE TIME FOR DISPOSAL OF MATTERS MADE BOUND BY THIS COURT, THE PERIOD FOR WHICH THE ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 CONTINUES TO OPERATE SHALL BE ADDED AND TIME SHALL STAND EXTENDED ACCORDINGLY. THE EXTRAORDINARY STEPS TAKE N SUO MOTU HONBLE JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT AND HONBLE SUPRE ME COURT ALSO INDICATE THAT THIS PERIOD OF LOCKDOWN CANNOT BE TRE ATED AS AN ORDINARY PERIOD DURING WHICH THE NORMAL TIME LIMITS ARE TO R EMAIN IN FORCE. IN OUR CONSIDERED VIEW, EVEN WITHOUT THE WORDS ORDINARILY , IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL POSITION, THE PERIOD DU RING WHICH LOCKOUT WAS ED FOR THE PURPOSE OF TIME LIMITS SET OUT IN RULE 3 4(5) OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL RULES, 1963. VIEWED THUS, THE EXCEPTION, TO 90 LIMIT FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS, INHERENT IN RULE 34(5)(C), WITH RESPECT TO THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS WITHIN NINET Y DAYS, CLEARLY COMES INTO PLAY IN THE PRESENT CASE. OF COURSE, THE RE IS NO, AND THERE CANNOT BE ANY, BAR ON THE DISCRETION OF THE BENCHES TO REFIX THE MATTERS FOR CLARIFICATIONS BECAUSE OF CONSIDERABLE TIME LAG BETWEEN THE POINT OF S CONCLUDED AND THE POINT OF TIME WHEN THE ORDER THEREON IS BEING FINALIZED, BUT THEN, IN OUR CONSID ERED VIEW, NO SUCH EXERCISE WAS REQUIRED TO BE CARRIED OUT ON THE FACT S OF THIS CASE. I.T.A. NO. 6133/MUM/2018 ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2010-11 SHRI VASTUPAL LAHERCHAND JAIN IS REQUIRED TO INTERPRETED. THE INTERPRETATION SO A SSIGNED BY US IS NOT ONLY IN CONSONANCE WITH THE LETTER AND SPIRIT O F RULE 34(5) BUT IS ALSO A PRAGMATIC APPROACH AT A TIME WHEN A DISASTER, NOTIF IED UNDER THE DISASTER RECEDENTED DISRUPTION IN THE UNDOUBTEDLY, IN THE CASE OTTERS CLUB VS DIT [(2017) 392 ITR 244 (BOM)], HON BLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT DID NOT APPROVE AN ORDER BEING PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL BEYOND A BUT THEN IN THE PRESENT SITUATION HONBLE BOMBAY HI GH APRIL 2020, HELD WHILE CALCULATING THE TIME FOR DISPOSAL OF MATTERS MADE BOUND BY THIS COURT, THE PERIOD FOR WHICH THE ORDER DATED 26TH MARCH 2020 CONTINUES TO OPERATE SHALL BE ADDED AND TIME SHALL STAND SUO MOTU BY HONBLE JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT AND HONBLE SUPRE ME COURT ALSO AN ORDINARY PERIOD DURING WHICH THE NORMAL TIME LIMITS ARE TO R EMAIN IN FORCE. IN OUR CONSIDERED VIEW, EVEN WITHOUT THE WORDS ORDINARILY , IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL POSITION, THE PERIOD DU RING WHICH LOCKOUT WAS ED FOR THE PURPOSE OF TIME LIMITS SET OUT IN RULE 3 4(5) OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL RULES, 1963. VIEWED THUS, THE EXCEPTION, TO 90 - LIMIT FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF ORDERS, INHERENT IN RULE 34(5)(C), Y DAYS, CLEARLY COMES INTO PLAY IN THE PRESENT CASE. OF COURSE, THE RE IS NO, AND THERE CANNOT BE ANY, BAR ON THE DISCRETION OF THE BENCHES TO REFIX THE MATTERS FOR CLARIFICATIONS BECAUSE OF CONSIDERABLE TIME LAG BETWEEN THE POINT OF S CONCLUDED AND THE POINT OF TIME WHEN THE ORDER THEREON IS BEING FINALIZED, BUT THEN, IN OUR CONSID ERED VIEW, NO SUCH EXERCISE WAS REQUIRED TO BE CARRIED OUT ON THE FACT S OF THIS CASE. 7. ON THE BASIS OF THE OBSERVATION MADE IN THE AFORESA ID JUDGMENT EXCLUDE THE PERIOD OF LOCKDOWN WHILE COMPUTING THE LIMITATION PROVIDED UNDER RULE 34(5) OF THE INCOME TAX (APPELLATE TRIBU NAL) RULE 1963. ORDER IS, THUS, PRONOUNCED UNDER RULE 34(4) OF THE SAID RULE BY PLACING THE DETAILS ON THE NOTICE BOARD. 8. IN THE RESULT, ASSESSEES APPEAL IS ALLOWED. ORDER PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON SD/- ( PRAMOD KUMAR VICE- PRESIDENT DATED: 27/05 /2020 TANMAY, SR. PS C OPY OF THE ORDER FORWARDED TO: 1. SHRI VASTUPAL LAHERCHAND JAIN, MUMBAI. 2. ACIT CIRCLE 20(3), MUMBAI. 3. CIT(A)- 4. CIT- 5. CIT(DR), MUMBAI BENCHES, MUMBAI 6. GUARD FILE 10 ON THE BASIS OF THE OBSERVATION MADE IN THE AFORESA ID JUDGMENT EXCLUDE THE PERIOD OF LOCKDOWN WHILE COMPUTING THE LIMITATION PROVIDED UNDER RULE 34(5) OF THE INCOME TAX (APPELLATE TRIBU NAL) RULE 1963. ORDER IS, THUS, PRONOUNCED UNDER RULE 34(4) OF THE SAID RULE BY PLACING THE DETAILS ON THE NOTICE BOARD. THE RESULT, ASSESSEES APPEAL IS ALLOWED. ORDER PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON 27.05. 2020 SD/- PRAMOD KUMAR ) (MADHUMITA ROY) PRESIDENT JUDICIAL MEMBER /2020 TRUE COPY OPY OF THE ORDER FORWARDED TO: SHRI VASTUPAL LAHERCHAND JAIN, MUMBAI. MUMBAI. MUMBAI BENCHES, MUMBAI . BY ORDER ASSISTANT REGISTRAR ITAT, MUMBAI BENCHES I.T.A. NO. 6133/MUM/2018 ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2010-11 SHRI VASTUPAL LAHERCHAND JAIN ON THE BASIS OF THE OBSERVATION MADE IN THE AFORESA ID JUDGMENT WE EXCLUDE THE PERIOD OF LOCKDOWN WHILE COMPUTING THE LIMITATION PROVIDED UNDER RULE 34(5) OF THE INCOME TAX (APPELLATE TRIBU NAL) RULE 1963. ORDER IS, THUS, PRONOUNCED UNDER RULE 34(4) OF THE SAID RULE BY PLACING 2020 . (MADHUMITA ROY) MEMBER BY ORDER ASSISTANT REGISTRAR BENCHES