IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL DELHI BENCH : D , NEW DELHI BEFORE SH. BHAVNESH SAINI , JUDICIAL M EMBER AND SH. O.P. KANT , ACCOUNTANT MEMBER ITA NO .6258 /DE L/ 2015 ASSESSMENT YEAR: 2008 - 09 M/S ROOTS EDUCATION PVT. LTD., 44, KALU SARAI, NEAR SARAVPRIYA VIHAR, NEW DELHI VS. ITO, WARD 15(4), NEW DELHI PAN : AACCR5600C ( APPELLANT ) (RESPONDENT) APPELLANT BY SMT. PREMLATA BANSAL, SR. ADV. RESPONDENT BY SH. AMIT JAIN, SR.DR DATE OF HEARING 12.02.2018 DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT 16.03.2018 ORDER PER O.P. KANT , A. M. : THIS APPEAL BY THE ASSESSEE IS DIRECTED AGAINST ORDER DATED 21/01/2013 PASSED BY THE LD. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME - TAX (APPEALS) - XVIII, NEW DELHI [IN SHORT THE LD. CIT(A) ] FOR ASSESSMENT YEAR 2008 - 09 RAISING FOLLOWING GROUNDS : 1. THAT THE LD. CIT(A) HAS ERRED IN ALLOWING ONLY 1 /5TH OF THE TOTAL EXPENDITURE INCURRED BY THE ASSESSEE UNDER THE HEAD BRAND BUILDING & ADVERTISEMENT IGNORING THE DOCUMENTS FILED BY THE ASSESSEE. 2. THAT THE LD. ASSESSING OFFICER HAS ERRED IN LAW AND ON FACTS IN DISALLOWING 4/5TH OF THE EXPENSES CLAIMED BY THE ASSESSEE 2 UNDER THE HEAD BRAND BUILDING & ADVERTISEMENT U/S 40(A)(IA) OF THE INCOME TAX ACT. 3. THAT THE LD. CIT(A) HAS ERRED IN NOT APPRE CIATING THE LAW THAT THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 40(A)(IA) WERE NOT AT ALL ATTRACTED IN THE PRESENT CASE AS THE ASSESSEE HAD DEDUCTED TDS ON THE ENTIRE EXPENDITURE AND HAD DULY PAID IN THE GOVT, ACCOUNT. 4. THAT THE LD. CIT(A) HAS ERRED IN LAW AND ON FACTS IN APPLYING THE JUDGEMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF GOETZE (INDIA) LTD. VS CIT (2006) 284 ITR 323 (SC) AS THE SAME WAS NOT WARRANTED IN THE FACTS OF PRESENT CASE; ASSESSEE HAD CLAIMED THE EXPENDITURE IN THE RETURN ITSELF AND THEREFORE, THERE WAS NO NEED TO MAKE THE CLAIM DURING THE COURSE OF ASSESSMENT OR BY WAY OF FILING A REVISED RETURN. 5. THAT THE FINDING RECORDED BY THE LD. CIT(A) ARE CONTRARY TO LAW AND FACTS ON RECORD AND THEREFORE, THE ORDER PASSED BY HER IS LIABLE TO BE SET ASIDE QUA THI S GROUND. 6. THAT THE LD. CIT(A) HAS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE ADDITION OF RS.7,50,000/ - MADE BY THE AO HOLDING THAT ASSESSEE HAD NOT OFFERED ANY CREDITABLE EXPLANATION ABOUT THE AMOUNTS CREDITED IN HIS BOOKS. 7. THAT THE LD. CIT(A) HAS ERRED IN HOLDING TH AT THE ASSESSEE HAD FAILED TO DISCHARGE THE PRIMARY ONUS OF PROVING THE IDENTITY OF THE CREDITORS / SHARE APPLICANTS, CAPACITY TO MAKE THE PAYMENT AND TO PROVE THE GENUINENESS OF THE TRANSACTION, IGNORING THE FACT THAT THE ASSESSEE HAD PRODUCED THE CONFIRM ATIONS ACCOMPANIED WITH THEIR PAN CARDS AND IDENTITY PROOFS OF THE SHAREHOLDERS AND CREDITORS. EVEN THE DETAILS OF DIRECTORS, THEIR PAN AND ASSESSMENT PARTICULARS WERE FILED BY THE ASSESSEE. HENCE THE ORDER PASSED BY THE CIT(A) IS CONTRARY TO THE FACTS ON RECORD. 8. THAT THE LD. CIT(A) HAS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ASSESSEE HAD FAILED TO PRODUCE LEGALLY ACCEPTABLE EVIDENCE WHEN THE EVIDENCE FILED BY THE ASSESSEE WERE DULY ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE E.G. ASSESSMENT RECORD, COPY OF BANK STATEMENT, PAN CARD ETC. 3 9 . THAT THE LD. CIT(A) HAS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE JUDGEMENT OF SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT VS LOVELY EXPORTS (216 CTR 195) WHICH IS SQUARELY APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE. 10. THAT THE ORDER PASSED BY THE LD. CIT(A) IS PERVERSE AS IT IS CONTRARY TO THE LAW AND FACTS ON RECORD HENCE LIABLE TO BE SET ASIDE. 11. THAT THE LD. CIT(A) HAS NOT APPRECIATED THE FACT THAT NO SUFFICIENT OPPORTUNITY HAS GIVEN BY THE AO TO THE ASSESSEE TO ADDUCE THE EVIDENCE AND THEREFORE, PRINCIPLES OF NAT URAL JUSTICE HAS VIOLATED WHICH ONLY IS A SUFFICIENT GROUND TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED BY THE AO AND THE LD. CIT(A). 12. THAT THE APPELLANT SEEKS LEAVE TO ADD, AMEND, ALTER, ABANDON OR SUBSTITUTE ANY OF THE ABOVE GROUNDS DURING THE HEARING OF THE APPEA L. 2. T HIS APPEAL HAS BEEN FILED WITH DELAY OF 940 DAYS FROM THE LIM ITATION PROVIDED IN SECTION 253(3) O F THE INCOME - TAX ACT, 1961 (IN SHORT THE ACT ). THUS , THE ASSESSEE ALSO FILED AN APPLICATION FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY IN FILING THE APPEAL. THE RELEVANT PART OF THE APPLICATION OF THE ASSESSEE IS REPRODUCED AS UNDER: 2. THAT THE IMPUGNED ORDER WAS RECEIVED BY THE APPLICANT ON 15.02.2013 AND THEREFORE, THE LIMITATION FOR FILING APPEAL EXPIRED ON 16.04.2013. HOWEVER, THE PRESENT APPEAL IS BEING FILED ON L(,.11.2015 AND THUS THERE IS A DELAY OF 940 DAYS IN FILING THE PRESENT APPEAL. 3. THAT THE ORDER PASSED BY CIT(A) WAS RECEIVED BY THE DIRECTOR SHRI PAWAN KAUSHIK. SINCE THERE WAS A DISPUTE AMONGST THE DIRECTORS, HE DID NOT BRING THE SAID ORDER INTO THE NOTICE OF OTHER DIRECTORS. ULTIMATELY, SHRI PAWAN KAUSHIK RESIGNED FROM THE MANAGEMENT W.E.F. 08.10.2014, THE COPY OF FORM DIR - 12 FILED WITH ROC IS ENCLOSED HEREWITH AS ANNEXURE - A?' 4 4. THAT IT WAS ONLY WHEN THE AO PASSED THE ORDER U/S 271(1)(C) ON 25.03.2014 THAT THE DIRECTORS CAME TO KNOW REGARDING THE ORDER PASSED BY CIT( A) IN QUANTUM APPEAL. 5. THAT THE PRESENT DIRECTORS WERE NOT CONVERSANT WITH THE TAXATION LAWS. SINCE THE RETURN WAS FILED DECLARING LOSS OF RS.37,49,011/ - AND THE ASSESSED LOSS WAS ?10,21,693/ - , THERE WAS NO TAX LIABILITY. EVEN THE CIT(A) ALLOWED PART R ELIEF AND THEREFORE, LOSS DETERMINED BY THE AO WAS INCREASED TO RS.12,91,157/ - FROM RS.10,21,693/ - . HENCE NO APPEAL WAS FILED BY THE APPLICANT TO ITAT. 6. THAT, HOWEVER, WHEN THE APPEAL AGAINST PENALTY ORDER WAS FIXED FOR HEARING, THE MATTER WAS DISCUSSE D WITH THE COUNSEL AND AT THAT POINT OF TIME, DIRECTORS CAME TO KNOW THAT THEY HAD A GOOD CASE PARTICULARLY WHEN THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 40(A)(IA) WERE NOT AT ALL ATTRACTED IN THE PRESENT CASE AND THEREFORE, THE CO. DECIDED TO FILE THE APPEAL BEFORE ITAT . 7. THAT, ACCORDINGLY, THE COUNSEL ADVISED TO FILE THE APPEAL WITH AN APPLICATION FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY AS THERE WAS A DELAY - DAYS FOR FILING THE APPEAL. 8. THAT THE APPELLANT / APPLICANT MOST HUMBLY SUBMITS THAT THE DELAY IS BONAFIDE AND NOT INTENTIONAL. THE APPLICANT WAS NOT NEGLIGENT; INITIALLY ONE OF THE DIRECTOR DID NOT COOPERATE AND SUPPRESSED THE RECEIPT OF ORDER PASSED BY CIT(A) AND THEREAFTER, DUE TO IGNORANCE OF LAW, IT WAS UNDER THE BONAFIDE IMPRESSION THAT AS THERE WAS NO T AX LIABILITY, NO APPEAL WAS TO BE FILED. IT WAS ONLY WHEN THE PENALTY APPEAL CAME FOR HEARING AND OPINION WAS SOUGHT FROM THE COUNSEL THAT THE DECISION WAS TAKEN TO FILE THE PRESENT APPEAL. THUS THERE IS A SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR NOT FILING THE APPEAL WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME. EVEN OTHERWISE, THE COMPANY CANNOT BE MADE SUFFER DUE TO IGNORANCE OF LAW. 3. SUPPORTING THE APPLICATION, THE LD. COUNSEL OF THE ASSESSEE SUBMITTED THAT THERE WAS A SUFFICIENT AND REASONABLE CAUSE FOR 5 DELAY IN FILING THE APPEAL AND T H US THE DELAY MIGHT BE CONDONED. IN SUPPORT OF THE CONTENTION, SHE RELIED ON FOLLOWING DECISIONS: 1. ESHA BHATTACHARJEE VS. MANAGING COMMITTEE OF RAGHUNATHPUR NAFAR ACADEMY AND ORS. (2013) 12 SCC 649 . 2. COLLECTOR, LAND ACQUISITION, ANANTNAG AND ANR. VS. MST. KATIJI AND ORS. (1987) 2 SCC 107 . 3. MUKESH JESANGBHAI PATEL VS. INCOME TAX OFFICER (GUJ) (TAX APPEALS NOS. 372 TO 374 OF 2011 DECIDED ON 16.08.2012) . 4. RAMNATH GARG VS. BSES YAMUNA POWER LTD. AND ORS. (RSA NO.164/2014) . 4. O N THE CONTRARY, THE LD. SENIOR DEPARTMENTAL REPRESENTATIVE ( SR. DR) SUBMITTED THAT THE ASSESSEE HAS NOT FILED ANY SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR DELAY IN FILING THE APPEAL. ACCORDING TO HIM, THE CLAIM THAT DE LAY IN FILING APPEAL WAS DUE TO A DISPUTE AMONGST THE DIRECTOR S, IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCES. HE SUBMITTED THAT THE DIRECTOR SH. PAWAN KAUSHIK RESIGNED FROM THE COMPANY AFTER MORE THAN 18 MONTHS FROM THE DUE DATE OF FILING THE APPEAL. HE ALSO SUBMITTED THE ASSESSEE ITSELF HAS ADMITTED IN PARA 5 OF THE APPLICATION THAT APPEAL WAS NOT FILED BEFORE THE T RIBUNAL IN VIEW OF NO TAX LIABILITY AND , THUS , THE CLAIM THAT APPEAL WAS NOT FILED IN VIEW OF DISPUTE AMONGST THE DIRECTOR S, IS TOTALLY BASELESS. ACCORDINGLY , HE SUBMITTED THAT THE CASE LAWS RELIED UPON BY THE LD. COU NSEL ARE NOT APPLICABLE OVER THE FACTS OF THE INSTANT CASE IN VIEW OF NO SUFFICIENT AND REASONABLE CAUSE FOR DELAY IN FILING THE APPEAL. 6 5. WE HAVE HEARD THE RIVAL SUBMISSION AND PERUSED THE RELEVANT MATERIAL ON RECORD. IN THE CASE OF ESHA BHATTACHARJEE ( SUPRA) , THE HON BLE SUPREME COURT AFTER TAKING INTO ACCOUNT VARIOUS DECISIONS INCLUDING THE DECISION OF THE HON BLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF COLLECTOR, LAND ACQUISITION, ANANTNAG, AND ANR. VS MST KATIJI AND ORS (1987) 2 SCC 107 , LAID DOWN CERTAIN PRINC IPLES ON THE ISSUE OF CONDONING THE DELAY IN FILING A PETITION BEFORE THE COURTS. THE RELEVANT PARAGRAPHS OF THE DECISION ARE REPRODUCED AS UNDER: 15. FROM THE AFORESAID AUTHORITIES THE PRINCIPLES THAT CAN BROADLY BE CULLED OUT ARE: I) THERE SHOULD BE A L IBERAL, PRAGMATIC, JUSTICE - ORIENTED, NON - PEDANTIC APPROACH WHILE DEALING WITH AN APPLICATION FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY, FOR THE COURTS ARE NOT SUPPOSED TO LEGALISE INJUSTICE BUT ARE OBLIGED TO REMOVE INJUSTICE. II) THE TERMS SUFFICIENT CAUSE SHOULD BE UN DERSTOOD IN THEIR PROPER SPIRIT, PHILOSOPHY AND PURPOSE REGARD BEING HAD TO THE FACT THAT THESE TERMS ARE BASICALLY ELASTIC AND ARE TO BE APPLIED IN PROPER PERSPECTIVE TO THE OBTAINING FACT - SITUATION. III) SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE BEING PARAMOUNT AND PIVOTAL T HE TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN UNDUE AND UNCALLED FOR EMPHASIS. IV) NO PRESUMPTION CAN BE ATTACHED TO DELIBERATE CAUSATION OF DELAY BUT, GROSS NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE COUNSEL OR LITIGANT IS TO BE TAKEN NOTE OF. V) LACK OF BONA FIDES IMPUTABLE TO A PARTY SEEKING CONDONATION OF DELAY IS A SIGNIFICANT AND RELEVANT FACT. VI) IT IS TO BE KEPT IN MIND THAT ADHERENCE TO STRICT PROOF SHOULD NOT AFFECT PUBLIC JUSTICE AND CAUSE PUBLIC MISCHIEF BECAUSE THE COURTS ARE REQUIRED TO BE VIGILANT SO T HAT IN THE ULTIMATE EVENTUATE THERE IS NO REAL FAILURE OF JUSTICE. VII) THE CONCEPT OF LIBERAL APPROACH HAS TO ENCAPSULE THE CONCEPTION OF REASONABLENESS AND IT CANNOT BE ALLOWED A TOTALLY UNFETTERED FREE PLAY. 7 VIII) THERE IS A DISTINCTION BETWEEN INORDINA TE DELAY AND A DELAY OF SHORT DURATION OR FEW DAYS, FOR TO THE FORMER DOCTRINE OF PREJUDICE IS ATTRACTED WHEREAS TO THE LATTER IT MAY NOT BE ATTRACTED. THAT APART, THE FIRST ONE WARRANTS STRICT APPROACH WHEREAS THE SECOND CALLS FOR A LIBERAL DELINEATION. IX) THE CONDUCT, BEHAVIOUR AND ATTITUDE OF A PARTY RELATING TO ITS INACTION OR NEGLIGENCE ARE RELEVANT FACTORS TO BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION. IT IS SO AS THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE IS THAT THE COURTS ARE REQUIRED TO WEIGH THE SCALE OF BALANCE OF JUSTICE IN RESPECT OF BOTH PARTIES AND THE SAID PRINCIPLE CANNOT BE GIVEN A TOTAL GO BY IN THE NAME OF LIBERAL APPROACH. X) IF THE EXPLANATION OFFERED IS CONCOCTED OR THE GROUNDS URGED IN THE APPLICATION ARE FANCIFUL, THE COURTS SHOULD BE VIGILANT NOT TO EXPOSE THE OTHER SIDE UNNECESSARILY TO FACE SUCH A LITIGATION. XI) IT IS TO BE BORNE IN MIND THAT NO ONE GETS AWAY WITH FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION OR INTERPOLATION BY TAKING RECOURSE TO THE TECHNICALITIES OF LAW OF LIMITATION. XII) THE ENTIRE GAMUT OF FACTS ARE TO BE C AREFULLY SCRUTINIZED AND THE APPROACH SHOULD BE BASED ON THE PARADIGM OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION WHICH IS FOUNDED ON OBJECTIVE REASONING AND NOT ON INDIVIDUAL PERCEPTION. XIII) THE STATE OR A PUBLIC BODY OR AN ENTITY REPRESENTING A COLLECTIVE CAUSE SHOULD BE G IVEN SOME ACCEPTABLE LATITUDE. 16. TO THE AFORESAID PRINCIPLES WE MAY ADD SOME MORE GUIDELINES TAKING NOTE OF THE PRESENT DAY SCENARIO. THEY ARE: - A) AN APPLICATION FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY SHOULD BE DRAFTED WITH CAREFUL CONCERN AND NOT IN A HALF HAZARD M ANNER HARBOURING THE NOTION THAT THE COURTS ARE REQUIRED TO CONDONE DELAY ON THE BEDROCK OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT ADJUDICATION OF A LIS ON MERITS IS SEMINAL TO JUSTICE DISPENSATION SYSTEM. B) AN APPLICATION FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY SHOULD NOT BE DEALT WITH IN A ROUTINE MANNER ON THE BASE OF INDIVIDUAL PHILOSOPHY WHICH IS BASICALLY SUBJECTIVE. C) THOUGH NO PRECISE FORMULA CAN BE LAID DOWN REGARD BEING HAD TO THE CONCEPT OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION, YET A CONSCIOUS EFFORT FOR ACHIEVING CONSISTENCY AND COLLEGIALITY OF THE ADJUDICATORY SYSTEM SHOULD BE MADE AS THAT IS THE ULTIMATE INSTITUTIONAL MOTTO. 8 D) THE INCREASING TENDENCY TO PERCEIVE DELAY AS A NON - SERIOUS MATTER AND, HENCE, LACKADAISICAL PROPENSITY CAN BE EXHIBITED IN A NON - CHALLANT MANNER REQUIRES TO BE CURBED, OF COURSE, WITHIN LEGAL PARAMETERS. 6. FURTHER , WE ALSO NOTE THAT IN THE CASE OF VEDABAI ALIAS VAIJAYANATABAI BABURAO PATIL VS. SHANTARAM BABURAO PATIL & ORS. R EPORTED IN 253 ITR 798 , HON BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA HAS OBSERVED THAT IN CASE OF INORDINATE DELAY, THE CONSIDERATION OF PREJUDICE TO THE OTHER SIDE WILL BE A RELEVANT FACTOR SO THE CASE CALLS FOR A MORE CAUTIOUS APPROACH . 7 . WE FIND THAT THERE IS DELAY OF 940 DAYS IN FILING THE APPEAL. THE ACT HAS PROVIDED A PERIOD OF 60 DAY S FOR FIL ING APPEAL BEFORE THE T RIBUNAL FROM THE RECEIPT OF THE ORDER OF THE LD. CIT(A). THUS, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT DELAY IN FILING APPEAL IS INORDINATE DELAY. IN THE FACTS OF THE CASE BEFORE US , WE HAVE TO EXAMINE , WHETHER THERE WAS SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR DELAY I N FILING THE APPEAL , WHETHER THERE WAS GROSS NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE APPLICANT IN FILING APPEAL, CONDUCT AND BEHAVIOUR OF THE APPLICANT RELATING TO ITS INACTION OR NEGLIGENCE, THE EXPLANATION OFFERED BY THE ASSESSEE FOR DELAY IN FILING THE APPEAL ETC . 8 . THE ONLY REASON WHICH HAS BEEN SUBMITTED BY THE ASSESSEE FOR DELAY IN FILING APPEAL IS DISPUTE AMONGST THE DIRECTORS. IT IS CLAIMED BY THE ASSESSEE THAT ORDER PASSED BY THE LD. CIT(A) WAS RECEIVED BY THE DIRECTOR , SH. PAWAN KAUSHIK AND DUE TO A DISPU TE, HE DID NOT BRING THE SAID ORDER INTO THE NOTICE OF THE OTHER DIRECTORS. WE FIND THAT ASSESSEE HAS NOT FURNISHED ANY EVIDENCE BEFORE US TO SUPPORT ITS CL AIM THAT THE ORDER OF THE LD. CIT(A) WAS 9 RECEIVED BY S H . PAWAN KAUSHIK AND EXISTENCE OF DISPUTE AMON GST THE DIRECTORS. 9 . THE ASSESSEE HAS STATED THAT SH. PAWAN KAUSHIK RESIGNED FROM THE MANAGEMENT W.E.F. 08/10/2014. BUT THE DUE DATE OF FILING THE APPEAL WAS ON 16/04/2013 AND NO REASONS HAVE BEEN SPECIFIED FOR FILING THE APPEAL BEFORE RESIGNATION OF SRI PAWAN KAUSHIK. 10 . SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE ASSESSEE IS CLAIMING THAT THE APPEAL WAS NOT FILED BECAUSE THE ASSESSED LOSS WAS RS. 10,21,693 / - AND THERE WAS NO TAX LIABILITY AND EVEN THE LD. CIT(A) ALLOWED PART RELIEF TO THE ASSESSEE. IN VIEW OF THIS FACTUAL ADMISSION , IT IS CLEAR THAT APPEAL WAS NOT FILED AGAINST THE ORDER OF THE LD. CIT(A) IN VIEW OF NO TAX L IABILITY, AND ONLY SUBSEQUENTLY , WHEN PENALTY PROCEEDINGS WERE INITIATED THEN ONLY THE ASSESSEE THOUGHT IT TO FILE THE APPEAL. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES , THE CONTENTION OF THE ASSESSEE THAT THE APPEAL WAS NOT FILED DUE TO DISPUTE AMONGST THE DIRECTOR IS NOT CORRECT. 11 . THUS, WE DO NOT FIND SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR DELAY IN FILING THE APPEAL. THERE WAS A WELL THOUGHT DECISION BY THE MANAGEMENT FOR NOT TO FILE THE APPEAL IN VIEW OF NO TAX LIABILITY AND THE ASSESSEE REVIEWED ITS DECISION OF NOT FILING THE APPEAL ONLY AFTER ISSUE OF PENALTY PROCEEDI NGS. IN OUR VIEW, THE INACTION OR NEGLIGENCE IN FILING THE APPEAL CANNOT BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE ALLEGED DISPUTE AMONGST THE DIRECTORS OR CANNOT BE CAMOUFLAGED UNDER THE UMBRELLA OF IGNORANCE OF LAW. 10 12. THUS , IN OUR OPINION , IT IS NOT A FIT CASE FOR CONDON ING THE DELAY IN FILING OF THE APPEAL. THE APPEAL FILED BEING BEYOND THE LIMITATION PERIOD, IT IS NOT ADMITTED AND DISMISSED IN LIMINE. 13. IN THE RESULT, THE APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE IS NOT ADMITTED AND DISMISSED AS SUCH. THE DECISION IS PRONOUN CED IN THE OPEN COURT ON 1 6 T H MARCH . , 201 8 . S D / - S D / - ( BHAVNESH SAINI ) ( O.P. KANT ) JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMBER DATED: 1 6 T H MARCH , 201 8 . RK / - (D.T.D) COPY FORWARDED TO: 1 . APPELLANT 2 . RESPONDENT 3 . CIT 4 . CIT(A) 5 . DR ASST. REGISTRAR, ITAT, NEW DELHI