CANTT BOARD, AJMER V. INCOME TAX OFFICER (TDS), AJMER, AJMER

ITA 660/JPR/2017

• Counselvise Citation: [2017] 127 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 2051 (ITAT-JAIPUR)
• Duration Of Justice: 1 month(s)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 18-09-2017
• Appeal Filed By: Assessee
• Order Result: Allowed
• Bench Allotted: SMC
• Assessment Year: misc
• Appeal Filed On: 17-08-2017
• Result in Favour of: Assessee
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: AJAY MALLIK CIT DHK
• Keywords: Right to appeal; Condonation of delay

Judgement Text

VK;DJ VIHYH; VF/KDJ.K] T;IQJ U;K;IHB] T;IQJ IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, JAIPUR BENCHES (SMC), JAIPUR JH HKKXPAN] YS[KK LNL; ] DS LE{K BEFORE: SHRI BHAGCHAND, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER VK;DJ VIHY LA- @ ITA NOS. 660 TO 664/JP/2017 FU/KZKJ.K O'K Z @ ASSESSMENT YEARS : 2014-15 AND 2015-16 CANTT BOARD, NASIRABAD, AJMER-305601 CUKE VS. INCOME TAX OFFICER TDS, AJMER. TAN NO.: JDHC 02278 D VIHYKFKHZ@ APPELLANT IZR;FKHZ@ RESPONDENT FU/KZKFJRH DH VKSJ L S@ ASSESSEE BY : WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS. JKTLO DH VKSJ LS @ REVENUE BY : SHRI AJAY MALLIK (ADDL.CIT) LQUOKBZ DH RKJH[K @ DATE OF HEARING : 18/09/2017 MN?KKS'K .KK DH RKJH[K @ DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT : 18/09/2017 VKNS'K@ ORDER PER: BHAGCHAND, A.M. THESE ARE THE APPEALS FILED BY THE ASSESSEE EMANATE S FROM THE SEPARATE ORDERS OF THE LD. CIT(A) AJMER DATED 11/05/ 2017 PERTAINING TO THE ASSESSMENT YEARS 2014-15 AND 2015-16. 2. SINCE, COMMON ISSUES ARE INVOLVED IN ALL THE APP EALS, THEREFORE, ALL THE APPEALS ARE BEING HEARD TOGETHER AND FOR THE SA KE OF CONVENIENCE AND BREVITY, COMMON ORDER IS BEING PASSED. ITA 660 TO 664/JP/2017_ CANTT BOARD VS ITO (TDS) 2 3. IN ALL THESE APPEALS, THE ISSUE INVOLVED IS NOT ADMITTING THE APPEALS FILED BY THE ASSESSEE FOR THE REASON THAT NOTICE OF DEMAND WAS SENT TO THE ASSESSEE ON 19/06/2014 IN ITA NO. 660/JP/2017, ON 2 3/06/2014 IN ITA NO. 661 & 662/JP/2017, ON 12/02/1015 IN ITA NO. 663/JP/ 2017 ON E.MAIL NO. [e-mail] AND ON 02/09/2015 IN ITA NO. 664/JP/2017 ON E.MAIL NO. [e-mail] . THE LD CIT(A) HAS HELD THAT AS PER SECTION 249(2) OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961 (IN S HORT THE ACT), THE APPEAL HAS TO BE PRESENTED WITHIN 30 DAYS FROM THE D ATE OF SERVICE OF NOTICE OF DEMAND. THE APPELLANT HAS NOT FILED THE AP PEALS WITHIN THE SPECIFIED PERIOD AND THERE WAS AN INORDINATE DELAY I N FILING THE APPEAL. THE ASSESSEE CLAIMS THAT IT HAS NEVER RECEIVED THE NOTI CE BUT THE LD. CIT(A) HELD THAT NO DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE WAS SUBMITTED TO SUBSTA NTIATE THIS ARGUMENT AND HE DID NOT ACCEPT THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE ASSESS EE IN THIS REGARD AND THE APPEALS WERE DISMISSED AS NOT ADMITTED. IN THE WR ITTEN SUBMISSIONS FILED BY THE ASSESSEE, IT WAS SUBMITTED THAT AS PER SCHEME OF CENTRALIZED PROCESSING OF STATEMENT OF TDS SCHEME 2013, CLAUSE 1 0 DEFINED THE SERVICE OF NOTICE OR COMMUNICATION, WHICH IS AS UNDE R:- (1) THE SERVICE OF A NOTICE OR ORDER OR INTIMATION OR ANY OTHER COMMUNICATION BY THE CELL MAY BE MADE BY DELIVERING OR TRANSMITTING A COPY THEREOF TO THE DEDUCTOR, ITA 660 TO 664/JP/2017_ CANTT BOARD VS ITO (TDS) 3 (A) BY ELECTRONIC MAIL; OR (B) BY PLACING SUCH COPY IN THE REGISTERED ELECTRO NIC ACCOUNT OF THE DEDUCTOR ON THE PORTAL OF THE CELL; OR (C) BY ANY MODE MENTIONED IN SUB-SECTION (1) OF SE CTION 282 OF THE ACT. (2) THE DATE OF POSTING OF ANY COMMUNICATION UNDER SUB- PARAGRAPH (1) IN THE ELECTRONIC MAIL OR ELECTRONIC ACCOUNT OF THE DEDUCTOR IN THE PORTAL OF THE CELL SHALL BE DEEMED TO BE THE DA TE OF SERVICE OF SUCH COMMUNICATION. (3) THE INTIMATION, ORDERS AND NOTICES SHALL BE COM PUTER GENERATED AND NEED NOT CARRY PHYSICAL SIGNATURE OF THE PERSON ISSUING IT. SECTION 282(2) SPECIFIES THE SERVICE OF NOTICE GEN ERALLY- THE BOARD MAY MAKE RULE (SEE RULE 127) PROVIDING FOR THE ADDR ESSES (INCLUDING THE ADDRESS FOR ELECTRONIC MAIL OR MESSAGE) TO WHICH THE COMMUNICATION REFERRED TO IN SUB-SECTION (1) MAY BE DELIVERED OR TRANSMITTED TO THE PERSON THEREIN. [HERE ELECTRONIC MAIL, MESSAGE MEANS AND A S ASSIGNED TO THEM IN EXPLANATION TO SECTION 66A OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT, 2000 (21 OF 2000). HERE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT RULE 127 SERVICE OF NOT ICE SUMMONS, REQUISITION, ORDER AND COMMUNICATION HAS SINCE BEE N INSERTED BY INCOME TAX (EIGHTEEN AMENDMENT) RULES 2015 W.E.F. 02/12/201 5 THAN A.O. BEFORE ANY LEGAL BINDING CAN ENFORCE PROCESSING NOTE ELECT RONICALLY AND THUS RATHER THERE WAS NO SERVICE/NO VALID SERVICE OF NOTICE/COMM UNICATION PRIOR TO 02/12/2015) AND THUS IT IS REQUESTED TO DELETE THE DEMAND. ITA 660 TO 664/JP/2017_ CANTT BOARD VS ITO (TDS) 4 4. AFTER HEARING BOTH THE SIDES ON THIS ISSUE, I AM OF THE VIEW THAT THE LD. CIT(A) WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN DISMISSING THE APPEAL S FOR THE REASON THAT THE ASSESSEE DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR NOT PRES ENTING THEN APPEALS WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME U/S 249(2) OF THE ACT. TH E HON'BLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF COLLECTOR LAND & ACQUISITION V S. MST KATIJI & OTHERS (1987) 167 ITR 471 (SC) HELD AS UNDER: THE LEGISLATURE HAS CONFERRED POWER TO CONDONE DE LAY BY ENACTING SECTION 5 OF THE LIMITATION ACT, 1963, IN ORDER TO ENABLE THE COURTS TO DO SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE TO PARTIES BY DISPOSING OF MATT ERS ON MERITS. THE EXPRESSION ' SUFFICIENT CAUSE ' IN SECTION 5 IS ADEQUATELY ELAST IC TO ENABLE THE COURTS TO APPLY THE LAW IN A MEANINGFUL MANNER WHICH SUBSERVES THE ENDS OF JUSTICE--THAT BEING THE LIFE-PURPOSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE INSTITUTIO N OF COURTS. A JUSTIFIABLY LIBERAL APPROACH HAS TO BE ADOPTED ON PRINCIPLE. 'EVERY DAY'S DELAY MUST BE EXPLAINED' DOES NOT IMPL Y A PEDANTIC APPROACH. THE DOCTRINE MUST BE APPLIED IN A RATIONAL, COMMON SENSE AND PRAGMATIC MANNER. THE DOCTRINE OF EQUALITY BEFORE LAW DEMANDS THAT AL L LITIGANTS, INCLUDING THE STATE AS A LITIGANT, ARE ACCORDED THE SAME TREA TMENT AND THE LAW IS ADMINISTERED IN AN EVENHANDED MANNER. THERE IS NO W ARRANT FOR ACCORDING A STEP- MOTHERLY TREATMENT WHEN THE STATE IS THE APPLICANT PRAYING FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY. 'WHEN SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE AND TECHNICAL CONSIDERATI ONS ARE PITTED AGAINST EACH OTHER, THE CAUSE OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE DESERV ES TO BE PREFERRED, FOR THE OTHER SIDE CANNOT CLAIM TO HAVE A VESTED RIGHT IN INJUSTI CE BEING DONE BECAUSE OF A NON- DELIBERATE DELAY.' THE FEE FOR DEFAULT IN FURNISHING STATEMENT U/S 234E OF THE ACT CAN BE LEVIED FOR A PERSON WHO VIOLATES THE PROVISIONS OF S ECTION 200(3) OF THE ACT. THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 200(3) OF THE ACT IS AS UN DER:- (3) ANY PERSON DEDUCTING ANY SUM ON OR AFTER THE 1S T DAY OF APRIL, 2005 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOREGOING PROVISIONS OF THIS CH APTER OR, AS THE CASE MAY BE, ANY PERSON BEING AN EMPLOYER REFERRED TO IN SUB-SECTION (1A) ITA 660 TO 664/JP/2017_ CANTT BOARD VS ITO (TDS) 5 OF SECTION 192 SHALL, AFTER PAYING THE TAX DEDUCTED TO THE CREDIT OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME, PREP ARE SUCH STATEMENTS FOR SUCH PERIOD AS MAY BE PRESCRIBED AND DELIVER OR CAUSE TO BE DELIVERED TO THE PRESCRIBED INCOME-TAX AUTHORITY 6 OR THE PERSON AUTHORISED BY SUCH AUTHORITY SUCH STATEMENT IN SUCH FORM 7 AND VERIFIED IN SUCH MANNER AND SETTING FORTH SUCH PARTICULARS AND WITHIN SUCH TIME AS MAY BE PRESCRIBED: IT IS ALSO LEVIED FOR VIOLATION OF SECTION 206C (3) OF THE ACT, WHICH IS AS UNDER:- (3) ANY PERSON COLLECTING ANY AMOUNT UNDER SUB-SEC TION (1) OR SUB-SECTION (1C) 29 [ *** ] SHALL PAY WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED 30 TIME THE AMOUNT SO COLLECTED TO THE CREDIT OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OR AS THE BOARD DI RECTS : PROVIDED THAT THE PERSON COLLECTING TAX ON OR AFTER THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 2005 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOREGOING PROVISIONS OF THIS SE CTION SHALL, AFTER PAYING THE TAX COLLECTED TO THE CREDIT OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT W ITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME, PREPARE SUCH STATEMENTS FOR SUCH PERIOD AS MAY BE P RESCRIBED AND DELIVER OR CAUSE TO BE DELIVERED TO THE PRESCRIBED INCOME-TAX AUTHOR ITY 31 , OR THE PERSON AUTHORISED BY SUCH AUTHORITY, SUCH STATEMENT IN SUCH FORM AND VERIFIED IN SUCH MANNER AND SETTING FORTH SUCH PARTICULARS AND WITHIN SUCH TIME AS MAY BE PRESCRIBED. 32 THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 200(3) OF THE ACT PUT AN O BLIGATION ON A PERSON WHO HAS DEDUCTED A SUM ON OR AFTER 1 ST DAY OF APRIL, 2005 TO PREPARE STATEMENTS AS PRESCRIBED AND DELIVER OR CAUSE TO BE DELIVERED TO THE PRESCRIBED INCOME TAX AUTHORITY OR THE PERSON AUTHO RIZED BY SUCH AUTHORITY A STATEMENT IN SUCH FORM AND VERIFIED IN SUCH MANNE R AND SETTING FORTH SUCH PARTICULARS AND WITHIN SUCH TIME AS MAY BE PRES CRIBED. RULE 31A OF THE INCOME TAX RULES, 1962 (IN SHORT THE RULES) PROV IDED FOR QUARTERLY STATEMENT OF DEDUCTION OF TAX AS PER SUB-SECTION (3 ) OF SECTION 200 OF THE ACT WHEREIN EVERY PERSON BEING A PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR DEDUCTION OF TAX UNDER CHAPTER XVIIB SHALL, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PR OVISIONS OF SUB-SECTION ITA 660 TO 664/JP/2017_ CANTT BOARD VS ITO (TDS) 6 (3) OF SECTION 200, DELIVER OR CAUSE TO DELIVER OR CAUSE TO BE DELIVERED TO THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF INCOME TAX SYSTEMS OR THE PE RSON AUTHORIZED BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF SYSTEMS QUARTERLY STATEMENT S IN FORM NO. 24Q AND 26Q AS THE CASE MAY BE ON OR BEFORE 15 TH OF JULY, 15 TH OF OCTOBER AND 15 TH OF JANUARY IN RESPECT OF FIRST THREE QUARTERS OF TH E FINANCIAL YEAR AND 15 TH JUNE FOR THE LAST QUARTER OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR. THE PROVISIONS OF LEVY OF FEES U/S 234E OF THE ACT FOR FAILURE IN FURNISHING THE S TATEMENTS HAS BEEN INSERTED BY THE FINANCE ACT, 2012 W.E.F. 01/7/2012. FOR FAILURE TO FILE STATEMENT WITHIN TIME PRESCRIBED IN SUB-SECTION (3) OF SECTION 200 OF THE ACT OF RS. 200 EVERY DAY DURING WHICH FAILURE CONTIN UED BUT NOT EXCEEDING THE TAX DEDUCTIBLE WAS THE AMOUNT OF FEE TO BE LEVI ED. THE PROVISIONS FOR PROCESSING OF STATEMENT OF TAX DEDUCTIBLE AT SOURCE WERE INTRODUCED BY THE FINANCE ACT NO. 2 2009 W.E.F. 01/10/2010 WHEREIN TH E FEE FOR FAILURE TO FURNISH THE STATEMENT U/S 234E WAS MADE APPEALABLE B Y SUBSTITUTING CLAUSE (C) TO (F) OF SECTION 200A BY THE FINANCE AC T 2015 W.E.F. 01/6/2015. IT WAS STATED IN THE WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS THAT THE FEE FOR LATE FILING THE STATEMENT U/S 234E CAN BE LEVIED ONLY ON THE ISSUE OF INTIMATION U/S 200A W.E.F. 01/6/2015 ONLY. THE HONBLE BOMBAY HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF RASHMIKANT KUNDALIA VS. UNION OF INDIA (2015) 229 T AXMAN 596 (BOM) WHILE EXAMINING THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF SECTI ON 234E HAS UPHELD THE VALIDITY AND ALSO HELD AS UNDER: ITA 660 TO 664/JP/2017_ CANTT BOARD VS ITO (TDS) 7 9. WE HAVE HEARD THE LEARNED COUNSEL, AND PERUSED T HE PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE PETITION. SECTION 200 OF THE ACT DEALS WITH THE DUTY OF A PERSON DEDUCTING TAX. IT READS THUS : '200. DUTY OF PERSON DEDUCTING TAX.- (1) ANY PERSON DEDUCTING ANY SUM IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOREGOING PROVISIONS OF THIS CHAPTER SHALL PAY WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME, THE SUM SO DEDUCTED TO THE CREDIT OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OR AS THE BOARD DIRECTS. (2) ANY PERSON BEING AN EMPLOYER, REFERRED TO IN SU B-SECTION (1A) OF SECTION 192 SHALL PAY, WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME, THE TAX TO THE CREDIT OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OR AS THE BOARD DIRECTS. (3) ANY PERSON DEDUCTING ANY SUM ON OR AFTER THE 1S T DAY OF APRIL, 2005 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOREGOING PROVISIONS OF THIS CHAPTER OR, AS THE CASE MAY BE, ANY PERSON BEING AN EMPLOYER REFERRED TO IN SUB-SECTION (1A) OF SECTION 192 SHALL, AFTER PAYING THE TAX DEDUCTED TO THE CREDIT OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME, PREP ARE SUCH STATEMENTS FOR SUCH PERIOD AS MAY BE PRESCRIBED AND DELIVER OR CAUSE TO BE DELIVERED TO THE PRESCRIBED INCOME TAX AUTHORITY OR THE PERSO N AUTHORISED BY SUCH AUTHORITY SUCH STATEMENT IN SUCH FORM AND VERIFIED IN SUCH MANNER AND SETTING FORTH SUCH PARTICULARS AND WITHIN SUCH TIME AS MAY BE PRESCRIBED. *[PROVIDED THAT THE PERSON MAY ALSO DELIVER TO THE PRESCRIBED AUTHORITY A CORRECTION STATEMENT FOR RECTIFICATION OF ANY MISTA KE OR TO ADD, DELETE OR UPDATE THE INFORMATION FURNISHED IN THE STATEMENT D ELIVERED UNDER THIS SUB-SECTION IN SUCH FORM AND VERIFIED IN SUCH MANNE R AS MAY BE SPECIFIED BY THE AUTHORITY.]' 10. ON A PERUSAL OF SECTION 200, IT IS CLEAR THAT S UB-SECTION (3) THEREOF, AND WITH WHICH WE ARE CONCERNED, INTER ALIA STIPULA TES THAT ANY PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR DEDUCTING ANY SUM BY WAY OF TAX, ON OR AFTER 1ST APRIL, 2005 IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOREGOING PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER XVII OR, AS THE CASE MAY BE, ANY PERSON BEING AN EMPLOYER REFER RED TO IN SUB- SECTION (1A) OF SECTION 192 SHALL, AFTER PAYING THE TAX SO DEDUCTED TO THE CREDIT OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WITHIN THE PRESCRI BED TIME, PREPARE SUCH STATEMENTS FOR SUCH PERIOD AS MAY BE PRESCRIBE D AND DELIVER OR CAUSE TO BE DELIVERED TO THE PRESCRIBED INCOME TAX AUTHORITY OR THE PERSON AUTHORISED BY SUCH AUTHORITY, SUCH STATEMENT S, IN SUCH FORM AND VERIFIED IN SUCH MANNER AND SETTING FORTH SUCH PART ICULARS AND WITHIN SUCH TIME AS MAY BE PRESCRIBED. THE PROVISO (WHICH WAS I NSERTED W.E.F. 01-10- 2014) FURTHER STIPULATES THAT A PERSON MAY ALSO DEL IVER TO THE PRESCRIBED AUTHORITY A CORRECTION STATEMENT FOR RECTIFICATION OF ANY MISTAKE OR TO ADD, DELETE OR UPDATE THE INFORMATION FURNISHED IN THE STATEMENT. SIMILARLY, THE PROVISO TO SUB-SECTION (3) OF SECTIO N 206C AND WHICH DEAL WITH PROFITS AND GAINS FROM THE BUSINESS OF TRADING IN ALCOHOLIC LIQUOR, FOREST PRODUCE, SCRAP ETC. ALSO PROVIDE FOR SIMILAR PROVISIONS AS SET OUT IN SECTION 200(3). THOUGH IN THE PRESENT CASE WE ARE N OT CONCERNED WITH SECTION 206C, WE ARE REFERRING TO IT IN PASSING ONL Y BECAUSE THE PROVISO TO SUB-SECTION (3) OF SECTION 206C FINDS MENTIONS IN S ECTION 234E, THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF WHICH IS CHALLENGED BEFO RE US. ITA 660 TO 664/JP/2017_ CANTT BOARD VS ITO (TDS) 8 11. SECTION 234E, THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF WH ICH IS CHALLENGED BEFORE US, WAS BROUGHT INTO THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961 WITH EFFECT FROM 1ST JULY 2012. THE SAID SECTION READS AS UNDER : 'G LEVY OF FEE IN CERTAIN CASES 234E. FEE FOR DEFAULT IN FURNISHING STATEMENTS.-(1) WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE ACT, WHERE A PERSON FAILS TO DELIVER OR CAUSE TO BE DELIVERED A STATEMENT WITHIN THE TIME PRESCRIBED IN SUB-SECTION (3) OF SECTION 200 OR THE PROVISO TO SUB-SECTION (3) OF SE CTION 206C, HE SHALL BE LIABLE TO PAY, BY WAY OF FEE, A SUM OF TWO HUNDRED RUPEES FOR EVERY DAY DURING WHICH THE FAILURE CONTINUES. (2) THE AMOUNT OF FEE REFERRED TO IN SUB-SECTION (1 ) SHALL NOT EXCEED THE AMOUNT OF TAX DEDUCTIBLE OR COLLECTIBLE, AS THE CAS E MAY BE. (3) THE AMOUNT OF FEE REFERRED TO IN SUB-SECTION (1 ) SHALL BE PAID BEFORE DELIVERING OR CAUSING TO BE DELIVERED A STATEMENT I N ACCORDANCE WITH SUB- SECTION (3) OF SECTION 200 OR THE PROVISO TO SUB-SE CTION (3) OF SECTION 206C. (4) THE PROVISIONS OF THIS SECTION SHALL APPLY TO A STATEMENT REFERRED TO IN SUB-SECTION (3) OF SECTION 200 OR THE PROVISO TO SU B-SECTION (3) OF SECTION 206C WHICH IS TO BE DELIVERED OR CAUSED TO BE DELIVERED FOR TAX DEDUCTED AT SOURCE OR TAX COLLECTED AT SOURCE, AS T HE CASE MAY BE, ON OR AFTER THE 1ST DAY OF JULY, 2012.' 12. ON A PERUSAL OF SUB-SECTION (1) OF SECTION 234E , IT IS CLEAR THAT A FEE IS SOUGHT TO BE LEVIED INTER ALIA ON A PERSON WHO F AILS TO DELIVER OR CAUSE TO BE DELIVERED THE TDS RETURN/STATEMENTS WITHIN TH E PRESCRIBED TIME IN SUB-SECTION (3) OF SECTION 200. THE FEE PRESCRIBED IS RS.200/- FOR EVERY DAY DURING WHICH THE FAILURE CONTINUES. SUB-SECTION (2) FURTHER STIPULATES THAT THE AMOUNT OF FEE REFERRED TO IN SUB-SECTION ( 1) SHALL NOT EXCEED THE AMOUNT OF TAX DEDUCTIBLE OR COLLECTIBLE AS THE CASE MAY BE. 13. IT IS NOT IN DISPUTE THAT AS PER THE EXISTING P ROVISIONS, A PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR DEDUCTION OF TAX (THE DEDUCTOR) IS REQUIRED TO FURNISH PERIODICAL QUARTERLY STATEMENTS CONTAINING THE DETA ILS OF DEDUCTION OF TAX MADE DURING THE QUARTER, BY THE PRESCRIBED DUE DATE . UNDOUBTEDLY, DELAY IN FURNISHING OF TDS RETURN/STATEMENTS HAS A CASCAD ING EFFECT. UNDER THE INCOME TAX ACT, THERE IS AN OBLIGATION ON THE INCOM E TAX DEPARTMENT TO PROCESS THE INCOME TAX RETURNS WITHIN THE SPECIFIED PERIOD FROM THE DATE OF FILING. THE DEPARTMENT CANNOT ACCURATELY PROCESS THE RETURN ON WHOSE BEHALF TAX HAS BEEN DEDUCTED (THE DEDUCTEE) UNTIL I NFORMATION OF SUCH DEDUCTIONS IS FURNISHED BY THE DEDUCTOR WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME. THE TIMELY PROCESSING OF RETURNS IS THE BEDROCK OF AN E FFICIENT TAX ADMINISTRATION SYSTEM. IF THE INCOME TAX RETURNS, E SPECIALLY HAVING REFUND CLAIMS, ARE NOT PROCESSED IN A TIMELY MANNER , THEN (I) A DELAY OCCURS IN THE GRANTING OF CREDIT OF TDS TO THE PERS ON ON WHOSE BEHALF TAX IS DEDUCTED (THE DEDUCTEE) AND CONSEQUENTLY LEADS T O DELAY IN ISSUING REFUNDS TO THE DEDUCTEE, OR RAISING OF INFRUCTUOUS DEMANDS AGAINST THE DEDUCTEE; (II) THE CONFIDENCE OF A GENERAL TAXPAYER ON THE TAX ADMINISTRATION IS ERODED; (III) THE LATE PAYMENT OF REFUND AFFECTS THE ITA 660 TO 664/JP/2017_ CANTT BOARD VS ITO (TDS) 9 GOVERNMENT FINANCIALLY AS THE GOVERNMENT HAS TO PAY INTEREST FOR DELAY IN GRANTING THE REFUNDS; AND (IV) THE DELAY IN RECE IPT OF REFUNDS RESULTS INTO A CASH FLOW CRUNCH, ESPECIALLY FOR BUSINESS EN TITIES. 14. WE FIND THAT THE LEGISLATURE TOOK NOTE OF THE F ACT THAT A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF DEDUCTORS WERE NOT FURNISHING THEIR TDS R ETURN/STATEMENTS WITHIN THE PRESCRIBED TIME FRAME WHICH WAS ABSOLUTE LY ESSENTIAL. THIS LED TO AN ADDITIONAL WORK BURDEN UPON THE DEPARTMENT DU E TO THE FAULT OF THE DEDUCTOR BY NOT FURNISHING THE INFORMATION IN TIME AND WHICH HE WAS STATUTORILY BOUND TO FURNISH. IT IS IN THIS LIGHT, AND TO COMPENSATE FOR THE ADDITIONAL WORK BURDEN FORCED UPON THE DEPARTMENT, THAT A FEE WAS SOUGHT TO BE LEVIED UNDER SECTION 234E OF THE ACT. LOOKING AT THIS FROM THIS PERSPECTIVE, WE ARE CLEARLY OF THE VIEW THAT S ECTION 234E OF THE ACT IS NOT PUNITIVE IN NATURE BUT A FEE WHICH IS A FIXED C HARGE FOR THE EXTRA SERVICE WHICH THE DEPARTMENT HAS TO PROVIDE DUE TO THE LATE FILING OF THE TDS STATEMENTS. 15. AS STATED EARLIER, DUE TO LATE SUBMISSION OF TD S STATEMENTS MEANS THE DEPARTMENT IS BURDENED WITH EXTRA WORK WHICH IS OTHERWISE NOT REQUIRED IF THE TDS STATEMENTS WERE FURNISHED WITHI N THE PRESCRIBED TIME. THIS FEE IS FOR THE PAYMENT OF THE ADDITIONAL BURDE N FORCED UPON THE DEPARTMENT. A PERSON DEDUCTING THE TAX (THE DEDUCTO R), IS ALLOWED TO FILE HIS TDS STATEMENT BEYOND THE PRESCRIBED TIME PROVID ED HE PAYS THE FEE AS PRESCRIBED UNDER SECTION 234E OF THE ACT. IN OTH ER WORDS, THE LATE FILING OF THE TDS RETURN/STATEMENTS IS REGULARISED UPON PAYMENT OF THE FEE AS SET OUT IN SECTION 234E. THIS IS NOTHING BUT A PRIVILEGE AND A SPECIAL SERVICE TO THE DEDUCTOR ALLOWING HIM TO FIL E THE TDS RETURN/STATEMENTS BEYOND THE TIME PRESCRIBED BY THE ACT AND/OR THE RULES. WE THEREFORE CANNOT AGREE WITH THE ARGUMENT OF THE PETITIONERS THAT THE FEE THAT IS SOUGHT TO BE COLLECTED UNDER S ECTION 234E OF THE ACT IS REALLY NOTHING BUT A COLLECTION IN THE GUISE OF A T AX. 16. WE ARE SUPPORTED IN OUR VIEW BY A JUDGMENT OF A DIVISION BENCH OF THE CALCUTTA HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF HOWRAH TAX P AYERS' ASSOCIATION V. GOVERNMENT OF WEST BENGAL [2011] 5 CHN 430. BEFORE THE CALCUTTA HIGH COURT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF IMPOSITION OF A 'LATE FEE' UNDER SECTION 32(2) OF THE WEST BENGAL VALUE ADDED TAX AC T, 2003 CAME UP FOR CONSIDERATION. AFTER ANALYSING THE PROVISIONS OF TH E BENGAL VALUE ADDED TAX ACT, THE CALCUTTA HIGH COURT HELD AS UNDER: '10. IN CASE OF LEVYING TAX THERE IS NO QUID PRO QU O BETWEEN THE TAX PAYER AND THE STATE. BUT ELEMENT OF QUID PRO QUO IS A MUST IN CASE OF IMPOSING FEE. BY VIRTUE OF IMPUGNED AMENDMENT, A DE ALER IS ENTITLED TO GET SERVICE INDIRECTLY FROM THE AUTHORITY UPON PAYM ENT OF LATE FEE. HIS IRREGULAR FILING OF RETURN IS REGULARISED UPON PAYM ENT OF LATE FEE WITHOUT BEING SUFFERED FROM PENAL CONSEQUENCES WHICH CAN NO T BE CATEGORISED AS NOTHING BUT SPECIAL SERVICE. THUS, THERE EXISTS QUI D PRO QUO IN IMPOSING LATE FEE. 11. IN THIS CONTEXT IT IS PERTINENT TO MENTION HERE THAT THOUGH A FEE MUST BE CO-RELATED TO THE SERVICES RENDERED, SUCH RELATI ONSHIP NEED NOT BE MATHEMATICAL ONE EVEN CASUAL CO-RELATIONSHIP IN ALL THAT IS NECESSARY. THE VIEW OF THE APEX COURT IN (2005) 2 SCC 345 (REFERRE D TO BY THE LEARNED ITA 660 TO 664/JP/2017_ CANTT BOARD VS ITO (TDS) 10 TRIBUNAL AT PAGE 14 OF THE IMPUGNED JUDGMENT) REMOV ED ALL THE DOUBTS ON THIS ISSUE.' (EMPHASIS SUPPLIED) 17. IT WOULD ALSO BE APPOSITE TO REFER TO THE OBSER VATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE SONA CHANDI OAL COMMITTEE V. STAT E OF MAHARASHTRA [2005] 2 SCC 345 AND WHICH JUDGMENT HAS BEEN REFERR ED TO BY THE CALCUTTA HIGH COURT. THE SUPREME COURT, IN PARAGRAP H 22 STATED THUS: '22. A THREE-JUDGE BENCH OF THIS COURT IN B.S.E. BR OKERS' FORUM V. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE BOARD OF INDIA [(2001) 3 SC C 482] AFTER CONSIDERING A LARGE NUMBER OF AUTHORITIES, HAS HELD THAT MUCH ICE HAS MELTED IN THE HIMALAYAS AFTER THE RENDERING OF THE EARLIER JUDGMENTS AS THERE WAS A SEA CHANGE IN THE JUDICIAL THINKING AS TO THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A TAX AND A FEE SINCE THEN. PLACING RELIANC E ON THE FOLLOWING JUDGMENTS OF THIS COURT IN THE LAST 20 YEARS, NAMEL Y, SREENIVASA GENERAL TRADERS V. STATE OF A.P. [(1983) 4 SCC 353], CITY C ORPN. OF CALICUT V. THACHAMBALATH SADASIVAN [(1985) 2 SCC 112 : 1985 SC C (TAX) 211], SIRSILK LTD. V. TEXTILES COMMITTEE [1989 SUPP (1) S CC 168 : 1989 SCC (TAX) 219], COMMR. & SECY. TO GOVT., COMMERCIAL TAX ES & RELIGIOUS ENDOWMENTS DEPTT. V. SREE MURUGAN FINANCING CORPN. [(1992) 3 SCC 488], SECY. TO GOVT. OF MADRAS V. P.R. SRIRAMULU [( 1996) 1 SCC 345], VAM ORGANIC CHEMICALS LTD. V. STATE OF U.P. [(1997) 2 SCC 715], RESEARCH FOUNDATION FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & ECOLO GY V. MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE [(1999) 1 SCC 655] AND SECUNDERABAD HYD ERABAD HOTEL OWNERS' ASSN. V. HYDERABAD MUNICIPAL CORPN. [(1999) 2 SCC 274] IT WAS HELD THAT THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF QUID PRO QUO I N A FEE HAS UNDERGONE CONSIDERABLE TRANSFORMATION. SO FAR AS THE REGULATO RY FEE IS CONCERNED, THE SERVICE TO BE RENDERED IS NOT A CONDITION PRECE DENT AND THE SAME DOES NOT LOSE THE CHARACTER OF A FEE PROVIDED THE F EE SO CHARGED IS NOT EXCESSIVE. IT WAS NOT NECESSARY THAT SERVICE TO BE RENDERED BY THE COLLECTING AUTHORITY SHOULD BE CONFINED TO THE CONT RIBUTORIES ALONE. THE LEVY DOES NOT CEASE TO BE A FEE MERELY BECAUSE THER E IS AN ELEMENT OF COMPULSION OR COERCIVENESS PRESENT IN IT, NOR IS IT A POSTULATE OF A FEE THAT IT MUST HAVE A DIRECT RELATION TO THE ACTUAL SERVIC E RENDERED BY THE AUTHORITY TO EACH INDIVIDUAL WHO OBTAINS THE BENEFI T OF THE SERVICE. QUID PRO QUO IN THE STRICT SENSE WAS NOT ALWAYS A SINE Q UA NON FOR A FEE. ALL THAT IS NECESSARY IS THAT THERE SHOULD BE A REASONA BLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LEVY OF FEE AND THE SERVICES RENDERED. IT WAS OBSERVED THAT IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH THAT THOSE WHO PA Y THE FEE MUST RECEIVE DIRECT OR SPECIAL BENEFIT OR ADVANTAGE OF THE SERVI CES RENDERED FOR WHICH THE FEE WAS BEING PAID. IT WAS HELD THAT IF ONE WHO IS LIABLE TO PAY, RECEIVES GENERAL BENEFIT FROM THE AUTHORITY LEVYING THE FEE, THE ELEMENT OF SERVICE REQUIRED FOR COLLECTING THE FEE IS SATIS FIED.' (EMPHASIS SUPPLIED) 18. WE ARE THEREFORE CLEARLY OF THE VIEW THAT THE F EE SOUGHT TO BE LEVIED UNDER SECTION 234E OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961 IS N OT IN THE GUISE OF A TAX THAT IS SOUGHT TO BE LEVIED ON THE DEDUCTOR. WE ALSO DO NOT FIND THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 234E AS BEING ONEROUS ON THE GROUND THAT THE SECTION DOES NOT EMPOWER THE ASSESSING OFFICER TO C ONDONE THE DELAY IN LATE FILING OF THE TDS RETURN/STATEMENTS, OR THAT N O APPEAL IS PROVIDED FOR FROM AN ARBITRARY ORDER PASSED UNDER SECTION 234E. IT MUST BE NOTED THAT A RIGHT OF APPEAL IS NOT A MATTER OF RIGHT BUT IS A CREATURE OF THE STATUTE, ITA 660 TO 664/JP/2017_ CANTT BOARD VS ITO (TDS) 11 AND IF THE LEGISLATURE DEEMS IT FIT NOT TO PROVIDE A REMEDY OF APPEAL, SO BE IT. EVEN IN SUCH A SCENARIO IT IS NOT AS IF THE AGGRIEVED PARTY IS LEFT REMEDILESS. SUCH AGGRIEVED PERSON CAN ALWAYS APPROA CH THIS COURT IN ITS EXTRAORDINARY EQUITABLE JURISDICTION UNDER ARTICLE 226/227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, AS THE CASE MAY BE. WE THERE FORE CANNOT AGREE WITH THE ARGUMENT OF THE PETITIONERS THAT SIMPLY BE CAUSE NO REMEDY OF APPEAL IS PROVIDED FOR, THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 2 34E ARE ONEROUS. SIMILARLY, ON THE SAME PARITY OF REASONING, WE FIND THE ARGUMENT REGARDING CONDONATION OF DELAY ALSO TO BE WHOLLY WI THOUT ANY MERIT. 19. IT IS NOW WELL SETTLED THAT EVEN THOUGH THIS CO URT EXERCISING JURISDICTION UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA HAS THE POWER TO DECLARE A STATUTE (OR ANY PROVISION THEREOF) AS UNC ONSTITUTIONAL, IT SHOULD EXERCISE GREAT RESTRAINT BEFORE EXERCISING SUCH A P OWER. REALLY SPEAKING, THERE IS ONLY ONE GROUND FOR DECLARING AN ACT OF TH E LEGISLATURE AS INVALID, AND THAT IS IF IT CLEARLY VIOLATES SOME PROVISION O F THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA IN SO EVIDENT A MANNER SO AS TO LEAVE NO MANNER OF DOUBT. BEFORE DECLARING A STATUTE TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL, THE COU RT MUST BE ABSOLUTELY SURE THAT THERE CAN BE NO MANNER OF DOUBT THAT IT V IOLATES THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA. IF TWO VIEWS ARE POSS IBLE, ONE MAKING THE STATUTE CONSTITUTIONAL AND THE OTHER MAKING IT UNCO NSTITUTIONAL, THE FORMER VIEW MUST ALWAYS BE PREFERRED. THE COURT MUST THERE FORE MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF A S TATUTE, EVEN IF IT REQUIRES GIVING THE STATUTORY PROVISION A STRAINED MEANING, OR A NARROWER OR WIDER MEANING, THAN WHAT APPEARS ON THE FACE OF IT. IT IS ONLY WHEN ALL EFFORTS TO DO SO FAIL SHOULD THE COURT DECLARE A STATUTE TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 20. IT IS EQUALLY WELL SETTLED THAT A STATUTE RELAT ING TO ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE VIEWED WITH GREATER LATITUDE THAN LAWS TO UCHING CIVIL RIGHTS SUCH AS FREEDOM OF SPEECH, FREEDOM OF RELIGION ETC. AS REGARDS ECONOMIC AND OTHER REGULATORY LEGISLATION IT IS IMPERATIVE T HAT THE COURT EXERCISES JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AND GRANTS GREATER LATITUDE TO T HE LEGISLATURE WHILST JUDGING THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF SUCH A STATU TE. THIS IS FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT THE COURT DOES NOT CONSISTS OF ECONOMIC AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERTS AND HAS NO EXPERTISE IN THESE MATTERS. 21. THESE WELL SETTLED PRINCIPLES HAVE BEEN VERY SU CCINCTLY SET OUT IN THE JUDGMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF GOVERN MENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH V. SMT. P. LAXMI DEVI [2008] 4 SCC 720 AND MORE PARTICULARLY, PARAGRAPHS 46, 67, 68, 78, 79 AND 80 THEREOF, WHICH READ THUS: '46. IN OUR OPINION, THERE IS ONE AND ONLY ONE GROU ND FOR DECLARING AN ACT OF THE LEGISLATURE (OR A PROVISION IN THE ACT) TO B E INVALID, AND THAT IS IF IT CLEARLY VIOLATES SOME PROVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION IN SO EVIDENT A MANNER AS TO LEAVE NO MANNER OF DOUBT. THIS VIOLATION CAN, OF COURSE, BE IN DIFFERENT WAYS E.G. IF A STATE LEGISLATURE MAKES A LAW WHICH ONLY PARLIAMENT CAN MAKE UNDER LIST I TO THE SEVENTH SCH EDULE, IN WHICH CASE IT WILL VIOLATE ARTICLE 246(1) OF THE CONSTITUTION, OR THE LAW VIOLATES SOME SPECIFIC PROVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION (OTHER THAN THE DIRECTIVE PRINCIPLES). BUT BEFORE DECLARING THE STATUTE TO BE UNCONSTITUTI ONAL, THE COURT MUST BE ABSOLUTELY SURE THAT THERE CAN BE NO MANNER OF DOUB T THAT IT VIOLATES A PROVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION. IF TWO VIEWS ARE POS SIBLE, ONE MAKING THE ITA 660 TO 664/JP/2017_ CANTT BOARD VS ITO (TDS) 12 STATUTE CONSTITUTIONAL AND THE OTHER MAKING IT UNCO NSTITUTIONAL, THE FORMER VIEW MUST ALWAYS BE PREFERRED. ALSO, THE COURT MUST MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF A STATUTE, EV EN IF THAT REQUIRES GIVING A STRAINED CONSTRUCTION OR NARROWING DOWN ITS SCOPE VIDE RT. REV. MSGR. MARK NETTO V. STATE OF KERALA [(1979) 1 SCC 23 : AI R 1979 SC 83] SCC PARA 6 : AIR PARA 6. ALSO, IT IS NONE OF THE CONCER N OF THE COURT WHETHER THE LEGISLATION IN ITS OPINION IS WISE OR UNWISE. 67. HENCE IF TWO VIEWS ARE POSSIBLE, ONE MAKING THE PROVISION IN THE STATUTE CONSTITUTIONAL, AND THE OTHER MAKING IT UNC ONSTITUTIONAL, THE FORMER SHOULD BE PREFERRED VIDE KEDAR NATH SINGH V. STATE OF BIHAR [AIR 1962 SC 955] . ALSO, IF IT IS NECESSARY TO UPHOLD T HE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATUTE TO CONSTRUE ITS GENERAL WORDS NARROWLY OR W IDELY, THE COURT SHOULD DO SO VIDE G.P. SINGH'S PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INT ERPRETATION, 9TH EDN., 2004, P. 497. THUS THE WORD 'PROPERTY' IN THE HINDU WOMEN'S RIGHT TO PROPERTY ACT, 1937 WAS CONSTRUED BY THE FEDERAL COU RT IN HINDU WOMEN'S RIGHTS TO PROPERTY ACT, 1937, IN RE [AIR 1941 FC 72 ] TO MEAN 'PROPERTY OTHER THAN AGRICULTURAL LAND', OTHERWISE THE ACT WO ULD HAVE BECOME UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 68. THE COURT MUST, THEREFORE, MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY OF A STATUTE, EVEN IF THAT REQUIRES GIVING THE STATUTORY PROVISION A STRAINED MEANING, OR NARROWER OR WIDER MEANING, THAN WHAT APPEARS ON THE FACE OF IT. IT IS ONLY WHE N ALL EFFORTS TO DO SO FAIL SHOULD THE COURT DECLARE A STATUTE TO BE UNCONSTITU TIONAL. 78. IN PARA 8 OF THE CONSTITUTION BENCH DECISION IN R.K. GARG CASE [R.K. GARG V. UNION OF INDIA, (1981) 4 SCC 675 : 1982 SCC (TAX) 30] IT WAS OBSERVED (AS QUOTED ABOVE) THAT LAWS RELATING TO EC ONOMIC ACTIVITIES SHOULD BE VIEWED WITH GREATER LATITUDE THAN LAWS TO UCHING CIVIL RIGHTS SUCH AS FREEDOM OF SPEECH, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, ETC . THUS, THE CONSTITUTION BENCH DECISION IN R.K. GARG CASE [(198 1) 4 SCC 675 : 1982 SCC (TAX) 30] IS AN AUTHORITY FOR THE PROPOSITION W HICH HAS BEEN STATED HEREIN, NAMELY, WHEN A LAW OF THE LEGISLATURE ENCRO ACHES ON THE CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OF THE PEOPLE MENTIONED IN PART III OF THE CONSTITUTION (THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS), SUCH AS FREE DOM OF SPEECH, FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT, EQUALITY BEFORE LAW, LIBERTY, FREEDOM OF RELIGION, ETC., THE COURT WILL NOT GRANT SUCH LATITUDE TO THE LEGISLATURE AS IN THE CASE OF ECONOMIC MEASURES, BUT WILL CAREFULLY SCRUTINISE WHETHER THE LEGISLATION ON THESE SUBJECTS IS VIOLATIVE OF THE RIGHTS AND LI BERTIES OF THE CITIZENS, AND ITS APPROACH MUST BE TO UPHOLD THOSE RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES, FOR WHICH IT MAY SOMETIMES EVEN HAVE TO DECLARE A STATUTE TO BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 79. SOME SCHOLARS REGARDED IT A PARADOX IN THE JUDG MENTS OF HOLMES, J. (WHO, AS WE HAVE ALREADY STATED ABOVE, WAS A DISCIP LE OF THAYER) THAT WHILE HE URGED TOLERANCE AND DEFERENCE TO LEGISLATI VE JUDGMENT IN BROAD AREAS OF LAW-MAKING CHALLENGED AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL, HE SEEMED WILLING TO REVERSE THE PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WHEN L AWS INHIBITING CIVIL LIBERTIES WERE BEFORE THE COURT. 80. HOWEVER, WE FIND NO PARADOX AT ALL. AS REGARDS ECONOMIC AND OTHER REGULATORY LEGISLATION JUDICIAL RESTRAINT MUST BE O BSERVED BY THE COURT AND GREATER LATITUDE MUST BE GIVEN TO THE LEGISLATURE W HILE ADJUDGING THE ITA 660 TO 664/JP/2017_ CANTT BOARD VS ITO (TDS) 13 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STATUTE BECAUSE THE COURT DOES NOT CONSIST OF ECONOMIC OR ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERTS. IT HAS NO EXPER TISE IN THESE MATTERS, AND IN THIS AGE OF SPECIALISATION WHEN POLICIES HAV E TO BE LAID DOWN WITH GREAT CARE AFTER CONSULTING THE SPECIALISTS IN THE FIELD, IT WILL BE WHOLLY UNWISE FOR THE COURT TO ENCROACH INTO THE DOMAIN OF THE EXECUTIVE OR LEGISLATIVE (SIC LEGISLATURE) AND TRY TO ENFORCE IT S OWN VIEWS AND PERCEPTIONS.' 22. THEREFORE EVEN LOOKING AT IT FROM THE PERSPECTI VE AS SET OUT IN THE AFORESAID JUDGMENT, WE ARE OF THE CLEAR VIEW THAT S ECTION 234E OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961 DOES NOT VIOLATE ANY PROVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND IS THEREFORE INTRA VIRES, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA . 23. IN VIEW OF THE AFORESAID DISCUSSION IN THIS JUD GMENT, WE FIND NO MERIT IN THIS WRIT PETITION AND THE SAME IS HEREBY DISMIS SED. RULE IS DISCHARGED. HOWEVER, IN THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE , WE LEAVE THE PARTIES TO BEAR THEIR OWN COSTS. THUS, THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT HAD CONSIDERED THE ISSU E AND DECIDED IN PARA 18 OF THE ORDER. FURTHER I WOULD LIKE TO MENTION THA T SECTION 246A OF THE ACT PROVIDES REGARDING THE APPEALABLE ORDER BEFORE THE CIT(A). THE OUTCOME OF PROCESSING UNDER SUB-SECTION (1) OF SECT ION 200A ARE APPEALABLE W.E.F. 01/6/2015 ONLY. PRIOR TO THAT THE LEVY OF FEES U/S 234E WAS NOT AN APPEALABLE ORDER. THUS, THE FEES FOR FAILU RE TO FURNISH THE STATEMENT AS PER SECTION 200 OF THE ACT IS LEVIED U/S 234E OF THE ACT AND THE PERIOD FROM 01/7/2012 TO 01/6/2015 IS NOT APPEA LABLE. THUS, THE FEES LEVIED FOR DEFAULT IN QUARTER 4 OF FINANCIAL YEAR 2 013-14 AND 2014-15 AND THE DEMAND WAS RAISED ON 19/06/2014, 23/06/2014 AND 12/02/2015 ARE NOT APPEALABLE. HOWEVER, THE REVENUE HAD NOT PRODUCE D ANY EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THIS FACT. AS PER THE ASSESSEES CLAIM TH E DEMAND NOTICE HAD NOT RECEIVED ON E.MAIL AS MENTIONED BY THE REVENUE. THE RELEVANT DATE OF SERVICE OF NOTICE OF DEMAND IS 02/2/2016, THEREFORE , THIS ISSUE RAISED IN ALL ITA 660 TO 664/JP/2017_ CANTT BOARD VS ITO (TDS) 14 THESE APPEALS IS RESTORED BACK TO THE FILE OF THE L D. CIT(A) TO BE DECIDED ON MERIT AND ALSO THE ISSUE IN ITA NO. 664/JP/2017 WHER E NOTICE OF DEMAND WAS SERVED ON 02/09/2015 IS RESTORED BACK TO THE FIL E OF THE LD. CIT(A) TO BE DECIDED ON MERIT. 5. IN THE RESULT, ALL THE APPEALS OF THE ASSESSEE A RE ALLOWED. ORDER PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON 18/09/2017. SD/- HKKXPAN (BHAGCHAND) YS[KK LNL;@ ACCOUNTANT MEMBER TK;IQJ TK;IQJ TK;IQJ TK;IQJ@ @@ @ JAIPUR FNUKAD@ DATED:- 18 TH SEPTEMBER, 2017 *RANJAN VKNS'K DH IZFRFYFI VXZSFKR @ COPY OF THE ORDER FORWARDED TO: 1. VIHYKFKHZ @ THE APPELLANT- CANTT BOARD, NASIRABAD, AJMER. 2. IZR;FKHZ @ THE RESPONDENT- THE ITO TDS, AJMER. 3. VK;DJ VK;QDR @ CIT 4. VK;DJ VK;QDRVIHY @ THE CIT(A) 5. FOHKKXH; IZFRFUF/K] VK;DJ VIHYH; VF/KDJ.K] T;IQJ @ DR, ITAT, JAIPUR 6. XKMZ QKBZY @ GUARD FILE (ITA NO. 660 TO 664/JP/2017) VKNS'KKUQLKJ @ BY ORDER, LGK;D IATHDKJ @ ASST. REGISTRAR