IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL RAJKOT BENCH , RAJKOT BEFORE SHRI PRAMOD KUMAR, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND SHRI RAJPAL YADAV , JUDICIAL MEMBER ./ ITA NO . 75 TO 79 / RJT / 20 1 7 / ASS TT. YEAR : 20 08 - 09 TO 2012 - 13 M/S.ICON FORGING P.LTD. C/O. KALPESH S. DOSHI & CO. CHARTERED ACCOUNTNTS 411, COSMO COMPLEX MAHILA COLLEGE CIRCLE RAJKOT 360 001. VS ITO, WARD - 2 (1) (4) RAJKOT. / (APPELLANT) / (RESPONDENT) ASSESSEE BY : SHRI KALPESH DOSHI, AR REVENUE BY : SHRI ARVIND SONTAKKE, DR / DATE OF HEARING : 3 1 / 1 0 /201 7 / DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT: 31 / 1 0 /201 7 / O R D E R PER PRAMOD KUMAR , ACCOUNTANT MEMBER : PRESENT FIVE APPEALS ARE DIRECTED AT THE INSTANCE OF THE ASSESSEE AGAINST COMMON ORDER OF THE LD.CIT(A) DATED 24.1.2017 PASSED FOR THE ASSTT.YEARS 2008 - 09 TO 2012 - 13. 2. SOLE GRIEVANCE OF THE ASSESSEE IS THAT ITS APPEALS FOR THESE ASSESSMENT YEARS HAVE BEEN DISMISSED BY THE LD.CIT(A) ON THE GROUND THAT APPEALS ARE TIME BARRED BY 116 DAYS. 3. WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE LD.REPRESENTATIVES, WE HAVE GONE THROUGH THE RECORD CAREFULLY. WE FIND THAT THE ASSESSMENT ORDERS WERE PASSED ON 30.3.2015 UNDER SECTION 144 R.W.S 147 BY THE ITO, WARD - 2(1)(4), RAJKOT. DISSATISFIED WITH THE ASSESSMENT ORDERS, T HE ASSESSEE CARRIED THE MATTER IN APPEAL HOWEVER, THE APPEALS FILED BY THE ASSESSEE W ERE TIME BARRED BY 116 DAYS. THE ASSESSEE HAS FILED APPLICATION FOR ITA NO . 75 TO 79 /RJT/2017 2 CONDONATION OF DELAY WHICH HAS BEEN REPRODUCED BY THE LD.CIT ( A). THE LD.CIT(A) DID NO T CONCUR WITH TH E EXPLANATION GIVEN BY THE ASSESSEE AND DISMISSED THE APPEALS BEING TIME BARRED. 4. ON DUE CONSIDERATION OF THE FACTS, WE FIND THAT THE ASSESSEE HAS GIVEN THE FOL LOWING EXPLANATION FOR CONDONATION OF THE DELAY. , 'TO, THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME - TAX, APPEA L S - 2, RAJKOT REF.: M/S. ICON FORGING PVT LTD., RAJKOT SUB.: - CONDONATION OF DE/AY IN FILING OF APPEAL FOR A. Y. 2008 - 09 TO 2012 - 13 RESPECTED SIR, WITH REFERENCE TO ABOVE MATTER, ON BEHALF OF OUR CLIENT, WE HAVE TO STATE AS UNDER: 1. THE ASSESSMENT ORDER FOR ALL THE ABOVE MENTIONED ASSESSMENT YEAR HAS BEEN PASSED ON 30/03/2015. 2. AS PER THE DEPARTMENT RECORDS, THE APPELLANT WAS SERVED THE ORDER ON 30/04/2015. 3. THE APPEAL IS REQUIRED TO BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE RECEIPT O F THE ORDER I.E . ON 29/05/2015 4. THE APPELLANT HAS FILED THE APPEAL BEFORE ID. CIT (A) ON 22/09/2015, THEREFORE THERE IS DELAY OF 116 DAYS. 5. THE DELAY HAS BEEN CAUSED IN FILING APPEAL AS THE COMPANY AND DIRECTORS AND FAMILY MEMBERS OF THE DIRECTORS WERE INTO SERIOUS FINANCIAL CRISIS. 6. THE APPELLANT COMPANY AND FAMILY MEMBERS OF THE DIRECTORS OF THE COMPANY HAD AVAILED LOANS FROM VARIOUS BANKS AND OTHER PRIVATE FINANCE COMPANY. 7.THE APPELLANT WAS IN A GREAT FINANCIAL CRISIS AND HAD INCURRED HUGE LOSSES DURING THE YEAR UNDER CONSIDERATION. ITA NO . 75 TO 79 /RJT/2017 3 8. THE APPELLANT WAS NOT ONLY FACING FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES BUT WAS ALSO FACING FINANCIAL ISSUES WITH PRIVATE PARTIES AND OTHER CREDITORS. 9. HOWEVER, THE APPELLANT BANK ACCOUNT WAS TERMED AS NON - PERFORRNINQ ASSET AND THE ACCOUNTS WERE SEIZED AND ALL ASSETS INCLUDING FACTORY BUILDING WAS ACQUIRED BY THE BANK. 10. THE DEBT RECOVERY TRIBUNAL HAD PASSED AN ORDER AGAINST THE APPELLANT ON 30/03/2015. THE COPY OF ORDER IS ENCLOSED ON PAGE NO. 1 - 3 11. THE APPELLANT HAD TO COMPLY WITH THE ORDER AND MAKE THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR MAKING VARIOUS PAYMENTS FOR THE OUTSTANDIN G DEBTS TO VARIOUS PARTIES. 12. IT IS ALSO FURTHER STATED THAT DUE TO PRIVATE FINANCING BY THE SON OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE COMPANY, THE FAMILY MEMBERS HAD TO ABSCOND THE PLACE AND HAD THREAT OF LIFE, THE FAMILY HAD TO ALSO TAKE HELP OF POLICE DEPARTMENT T HE COPY OF RELEVANT COMMUNICATION IS ENCLOSED ON PAGE NO. 8 13. IT IS ALSO STATED THAT THE APPELLANT WAS NOT ABLE TO CARRY OUT THE BUSINESS ACTIVITIES AND HAS INCURRED HUGE LOSSES AND COULD NOT REPAY DEBTS TO BANK. 14. THE BANK HAD ALSO TAKEN THE POSSE SSION OF THE FACTORY AND OTHER ASSETS LIKE FREEHOLD LANDS OF THE APPELLANT THE COPY OF THE ORDER ISSUED BY THE BANK FOR TAKING THE POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY OF THE APPELLANT IS ENCLOSED AT PAGE NO. 4 - 7 15. THE APPELLANT WAS NOT SERVED THE ORDER AND OTHE R COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE DEPARTMENT AS THE FACTORY BUILDING HAD BEEN TAKEN INTO POSSESSION OF THE BANK AND THE WHOLE PREMISES WAS UNDER STRONG SECURITY. THUS NO PERSON WAS ALLOWED TO ENTER THE PREMISES NOR THE PEOPLE PRESENT THERE HAD THE AUTHORITY TO COL LECT THE COMMUNICATIONS SENT TO THE APPELLANT . 16. IT IS ALSO STATED THAT TILL DATE, THE DIRECTOR AND HIS FAMILY MEMBERS ARE HIDING DUE TO THREAT OF LIFE AS THEY ARE NOT ABLE TO REPAY THE OUTSTANDING DEBTS. 17. THE DIRECTOR AND HIS FAMILY MEMBERS ARE CONSTANTLY FACING THREATS AND HAVE TO SHIFT FROM ONE PLACE TO OTHER PLACE EVERY 3 TO 4 MONTHS. ITA NO . 75 TO 79 /RJT/2017 4 18. THUS THE DIRECTOR AND HIS FAMILY MEMBERS ARE WERE IN CONSTANT PRESSURE AND NOT IN A MENTAL STATE THAT THEY CAN UNDERTAKE THE ACTIVITIES FOR FILLING OF APPEAL AND LOOK AFTER THE LEGAL ISSUES. 19. IT IS ALSO STATED THAT AT PRESENT, ALL THE BUSINESS ACTIVITIES ARE COMPLETELY CLOSED DOWN AND THERE IS NO SOURCE OF EARNING FOR THE FAMILY. 20. DUE TO ALL THE ABOVE MEN TIONED REASONS, THE DIRECTOR OF THE COMPANY WAS IN UNDER TREMENDOUS MENTAL PRESSURE AND BUSY WITH MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR FUNDS AND THE SECURITY OF HIS FAMILY MEMBERS. 21. THEREFORE, THERE WAS A GENUINE AND REASONABLE CAUSE FOR THE DELAY CAUSED BY THE APPELLANT FOR FILLING THE APPEAL AND THE PROCEDURE FOR FILING OF APPEAL COULD NOT BE COMPLETED WITHIN PRESCRIBED TIME LIMIT 22. WE KINDLY REQUEST YOUR HONOUR TO CONDONE T HE DELAY OF 116 DAYS IN FILLING THE APPEAL AS THERE IS REASONABLE CAUSE. 23. WE WOULD ALSO LIKE TO STATE THAT THE DELAY SHOULD BE CONDONE BY NOT GOING INTO TECHNICALITY BUT BY TO ENSURING THAT SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IS DONE BY GIVING AN OPPORTUNITY OF BEING HEARD TO BOTH PARTIES. 24. IN THIS REGARDS, WE MAY ALSO RELY ON THE FOLLOWING DECISIONS: VEDABHAI ALIAS VAIIAVNATABAI BABURAO PADL VS. SHANTARAM BABURAO PATH & ORS. 173 CTR 300 [SCJ [91 A CASE WHERE THE DELAY IS OF A FEW DAYS DESERVES A LIBERAL APPROACH IN CONSTRUING THE EXPRESSION ' SUFFICIENT CAUSE' , THE PRINCIPLE OF ADVANCING SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IS OF PRIME IMPORTANCE EXPRESSION SUFFICIENT CAUSE' SHOULD RECEIVE LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION '. COLLECTOR. LAND ACQUSITION VS. MSTKATII & ORS. 167 ITR 471 [SC) (10)SUFFICIENT CAUSE' FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE PURPOSE OF CONDONATION . OF DELAY SHOULD BE INTERPRETED WITH A VIEW TO DO EVEN - HANDED JUSTICE ON MERITS IN PREFERENCE TO APPROACH WHICH SCUTTLE S A DECISION ON MERITS. THE POWER TO CONDONE DELAY IS CONFERRED WITH A VIEW TO ENABLE THE COURTS TO DO UBSTANTIAL JUSTICE TO ITA NO . 75 TO 79 /RJT/2017 5 LITIGANTS BY DISPOSING OF THE CASES ON MERITS. THERE IS NO WARRANT FOR ACCORDING A STEP - MOTHERLY TREATMENT WHEN THE 'STATE' IS THE APPLICANT PRAYING FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY'. JAMNADAS B. KANSAGARA VS ITO [ITAT RAJKOT (11 - 12) WE HAVE HEARD THE RIVAL SUBMISSIONS AND PERUSED THE MATERIAL ON RECORD. IN THE PRESENT CASE, WE FIND THAT ID. CIT(A) HAS PASSED AN EXP ARTE ORDER AND DISMISSE D THE APPEAL OF THE APPELLANT WITHOUT GOING INTO THE MERITS OF THE ISSUE. IT IS A SETTLED LAW THAT ID. CIT(A) HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DISMISS THE APPEAL OF THE APPELLANT WITHOUT GOING INTO THE MERITS OF THE ISSUE BEFORE HIM. EVEN IN AN EX PARTE ORDER THE ID . CIT(A) SHOULD HAVE DECIDED THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL OF THE APPELLANT ON MERITS THEREOF. CONSIDERING THE AFORESAID FACTS, WE ARE OF THE VIEW THAT IN THE LARGER INTEREST OF JUSTICE, THE APPELLANT BE GIVEN ONE MORE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ITS CASE BEFORE ID. CI T(A). WE THEREFORE REMIT ALL THE GROUNDS RAISED IN THE PRESENT APPEAL BACK TO THE FILE OF ID. CIT(A) FOR HIM TO DECIDE THE ISSUE ON MERITS IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW. NEEDLESS TO STATE THAT ID. CIT(A) SHALL GRANT ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY OF HEARING TO BOTH THE PA RTIES. IN VIEW OF OUR DECISION TO RESTORE THE VARIOUS GROUNDS RAISED BY APPELLANT TO ID. CIT(A), WE ARE NOT ADJUDICATING ON MERITS THE GROUNDS OF THE APPEAL RAISED BY THE APPELLANT. RAKESH VERMA VIS. ITA 24641KOL12013 (ITAT KOLKATA) THE CASE OF THE APPELLANT WAS THAT HE WAS OUT OF CALCUTTA DUE TO FINANCIAL CRISES AND STAYED IN HIS NATIVE PLACE IN ITA NO. 2464/K/13 RAKESH VERMA V/S. STATE OF RAJASTHAN. BUT, HOWEVER, IN THE INTEREST OF THE JUSTICE, WE REMAND THE APPEAL TO THE FILE OF CI T - A FOR FRESH ADJUDICATION TREATING THE REASONS AS STATED IN THE WRITTEN SUBMISSION FILED IN SUPPORT OF CONDONATION OF DELAY AS REASONABLE BY AFFORDING AN OPPORTUNITY TO APPELLANT AND WE ALSO DIRECT THE APPELLANT TO PRODUCE ANY EVIDENCE, IF ANY, NECESSARY FOR THE FAIR ADJUDICATION OF THE CASE AND WE ALSO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE APPELLANT SHALL NOT SEEK ANY FURTHER ADJOURNMENTS. HINDUSTAN UNILEVER LTD. V. COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE 45 TAXMANN.COM 521 (GAUHATI HC) {15 - 167 ITA NO . 75 TO 79 /RJT/2017 6 BY AND LARGE, APPROACH OF COURT SHOULD NOT BE SO TECHNICAL, BUT IT SHOULD BE ALWAYS TO ENSURE THAT SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE IS DONE BY GIVING AN OPPORTUNITY OF BEING HEARD TO BOTH PARTIES; HENCE, DELAY IN FILING APPEAL MUST BE CONDONED. KINDLY BEAR WITH US FOR INCONVENIENCES INCURRED DUE T O US.' 5. WE HAVE DULY CONSIDERED RIVAL CONTENTIONS AND GONE THROUGH THE RECORD. SUB - SECTION 3 OF SECTION 2 4 9 CONTEMPLATES THAT THE C I T ( A ) MAY ADMIT AN APPEAL , IF IT IS SA TISFIED THAT THERE WAS A SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR NOT PRESENTING IT WITHIN THAT PERIOD. THIS EXPRESSION 'SUFFICIENT CAUSE' EMPLOYED IN THE SECTION PROVIDES POWERS TO THE LD.COMMISSIONER TO CONDONE THE DELAY IN FILING THE APPEAL BEFORE THE COMMISSIONER. SIMILARLY, IT HAS BEEN USED IN SECTION 5 OF INDIAN LIMITATION ACT, 1963. WHENEVER INTERPRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF THIS EXPRESSION HAS FALLEN FOR CONSIDERATION BEFORE HON'BLE HIGH COURT AS WELL AS BEFORE THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT, THEN, HON'BLE COUR T S WERE UNANIMOUS IN THEIR CONCLUSION THAT THIS EXPRESSION IS TO BE USED LIBERALLY. WE MAY MAKE REFERENCE TO THE FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS OF THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT FROM THE DECISION IN THE CASE OF COLLECTOR LAND ACQUISITION VS. MST. KATIJI & OTHERS, 1987 AI R 1353: '1. ORDINARILY A LITIGANT DOES NOT STAND TO BENEFIT BY LODGING AN APPEAL LATE. 2. REFUSING TO CONDONE DELAY CAN RESULT IN A MERITORIOUS MATTER BEING THROWN OUT AT THE VERY THRESHOLD AND CAUSE OF JUSTICE BEING DEFEATED. AS AGAINST THIS WHEN DELAY I S CONDONED THE HIGHEST THAT CAN HAPPEN IS THAT A CAUSE WOULD BE DECIDED ON MERITS AFTER HEARING THE PARTIES. 3. 'EVERY DAY'S DELAY MUST BE EXPLAINED' DOES NOT MEAN THAT A PEDANTIC APPROACH SHOULD BE MADE. WHY NOT EVERY HOUR'S DELAY, EVERY SECOND'S DELAY? THE DOCTRINE MUST BE APPLIED IN A RATIONAL COMMON SENSE PRAGMATIC MANNER. ITA NO . 75 TO 79 /RJT/2017 7 4. WHEN SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE AND TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS ARE PITTED AGAINST EACH OTHER, CAUSE OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE DESERVES TO BE PREFERRED FOR THE OTHER SIDE CANNOT CLAIM TO HAVE VESTED RIGHT IN INJUSTICE BEING DONE BECAUSE OF A NON - DELIBERATE DELAY. 5. THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION THAT DELAY IS OCCASIONED DELIBERATELY, OR ON ACCOUNT OF CULPABLE NEGLIGENCE, OR ON ACCOUNT OF MALA FIDES. A LITIGANT DOES NOT STAND TO BENEFIT BY RESORTING TO DELAY. IN FACT HE RUNS A SERIOUS RISK. 6. IT MUST BE GRASPED THAT JUDICIARY IS RESPECTED NOT ON ACCOUNT OF ITS POWER TO LEGALIZE INJUSTICE ON TECHNICAL GROUNDS BUT BECAUSE IT IS CAPABLE OF REMOVING INJUSTICE AND IS EXPECTED TO DO SO.' 6. SIMILARLY, WE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE REFERENCE TO AUTHORITATIVE PRONOUNCEMENT OF HON'BLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF N.BALAKRISHNAN VS. M. KRISHNAMURTHY (SUPRA). IT READS AS UNDER: 'RULE OF LIMITATION ARE NOT MEANT TO DESTROY THE RIGHT OF PARTIES. THEY ARE MEANT TO SEE TH AT PARTIES DO NOT RESORT TO DILATORY TACTICS, BUT SEEK THEIR REMEDY PROMPTLY. THE OBJECT OF PROVIDING A LEGAL REMEDY IS TO REPAIR THE DAMAGE CAUSED BY REASON OF LEGAL INJURY. LAW OF LIMITATION FIXES A LIFE - SPAN FOR SUCH LEGAL REMEDY FOR THE REDRESS OF THE LEGAL INJURY SO SUFFERED. TIME IS PRECIOUS AND THE WASTED TIME WOULD NEVER REVISIT. DURING EFFLUX OF TIME NEWER CAUSES WOULD SPROUT UP NECESSITATING NEWER PERSONS TO SEEK LEGAL REMEDY BY APPROACHING THE COURTS. SO A LIFE SPAN MUST BE FIXED FOR EACH REMEDY. UNENDING PERIOD FOR LAUNCHING THE REMEDY MAY LEAD TO UNENDING UNCERTAINTY AND CONSEQUENTIAL ANARCHY. LAW OF LIMITATION IS THUS FOUNDED ON PUBLIC POLICY. IT IS ENSHRINED IN THE MAXIM INTEREST REIPUBLICAE UP SIT FINIS LITIUM (IT IS FOR THE GENERAL WELFARE T HAT A PERIOD BE PUTT TO LITIGATION). RULES OF LIMITATION ARE NOT MEANT TO DESTROY THE RIGHT OF THE PARTIES. THEY ARE MEANT TO SEE THAT PARTIES DO NOT RESORT TO DILATORY TACTICS BUT SEEK THEIR REMEDY PROMPTLY. THE IDEA IS THAT EVERY LEGAL REMEDY MUST BE KEP T ALIVE FOR A LEGISLATIVELY FIXED PERIOD OF TIME. A COURT KNOWS THAT REFUSAL TO CONDONE DELAY WOULD RESULT FORECLOSING A SUITOR FROM PUTTING FORTH HIS CAUSE. THERE IS NO PRESUMPTION THAT DELAY IN APPROACHING THE COURT IS ALWAYS DELIBERATE. THIS COURT HAS HELD THAT THE WORDS 'SUFFICIENT CAUSE' UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE LIMITATION ACT SHOULD RECEIVE A LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION SO AS TO ADVANCE SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE VIDE SHAKUNTALA DEVI LAIN VS. KUNTAL KUMARI [AIR 1969 SC ITA NO . 75 TO 79 /RJT/2017 8 575] AND STATE OF WEST BENGAL VS. THE ADMINISTRATOR, HOWRAH MUNICIPALITY [AIR 1972 SC 749]. IT MUST B E REMEMBERED THAT IN EVERY CASE OF DELAY THERE CAN BE SOME LAPSE ON THE PART OF THE LITIGANT CONCERNED. THAT ALONE IS NOT ENOUGH TO TURN DOWN HIS PLEA AND TO SHUT THE DOOR AGAINST HIM. IF THE EXPLANATION DOES NOT SMACK OF MALA FIDES OR IT IS NOT PUT FORTH AS PART OF A DILATORY STRATEGY THE COURT MUST SHOW UTMOST CONSIDERATION TO THE SUITOR. BUT WHEN THERE IS REASONABLE GROUND TO THINK THAT THE DELAY WAS OCCASIONED BY THE PARTY DELIBERATELY TO GAIN TIME THEN THE COURT SHOULD LEAN AGAINST ACCEPTANCE OF THE EX PLANATION. WHILE CONDONING DELAY THE COULD SHOULD NOT FORGET THE OPPOSITE PARTY ALTOGETHER. IT MUST BE BORNE IN MIND THAT HE IS A LOOSER AND HE TOO WOULD HAVE INCURRED QUIET A LARGE LITIGATION EXPENSES. IT WOULD BE A SALUTARY GUIDELINE THAT WHEN COURTS CON DONE THE DELAY DUE TO LACHES ON THE PART OF THE APPLICANT THE COURT SHALL COMPENSATE THE OPPOSITE PARTY FOR HIS LOSS.' 6. WE DO NOT DEEM IT NECESSARY TO RE - CITE OR RECAPITULATE THE PROPOSITION LAID DOWN IN OTHER DECISIONS. IT IS SUFFICE TO SAY THAT THE HON 'BLE COURTS ARE UNANIMOUS IN THEIR APPROACH TO PROPOUND THAT WHENEVER THE REASONS ASSIGNED BY AN APPLICANT FOR EXPLAINING THE DELAY, THEN SUCH REASONS ARE TO BE CONSTRUED WITH A JUSTICE ORIENTED APPROACH. 7 . IN THE LIGHT OF THE ABOVE, IF WE EXAMINE THE EXP LANATION O F THE ASSESSEE, THEN IT WOULD REVEAL THAT AT THE RELEVANT TIME, THE ASSESSEE WAS FACING FINANCIAL HARDSHIP. THE DIRECTORS AND THE FAMILY MEMB ER S OF THE DIRECTORS WERE ABSCONDING. THEY HAVE NO RESOURCES TO FILE APPEAL IN TIME. THE ASSESSEE WOUL D NOT ACHIEVE ANYTHING BY MAKING THE APPEAL TIME BARRED, THEREFORE, IT CANNOT BE ALLEGED THAT THE ASSESSEE HAS ADOPTED A STRATEGY OF DELAY ING FILING OF APPEAL BEFORE THE LD.CIT(A). CONSIDE RING THE HARDSHIP S FACED BY THE MANAGEMENT AS ALLEGED IN THE AFFIDA VIT FILED BY THE DIRECTOR, WE CONDONE THE DELAY IN FILING THE APPEALS. 8 . SINCE THE LD.CIT(A) HAS NOT ADJUDIC A TED THE ISSUES ON MERIT, BECAUSE, THESE APPEALS WERE DISMISSED ON ACCOUNT OF BEING TIME ITA NO . 75 TO 79 /RJT/2017 9 BARRED, THEREFORE, WE SET ASIDE ALL THE ISSUES, TO THE FILE OF THE LD.CIT(A) FOR ADJUDICATION ON MERIT. 9 . IN THE RESULTS, APPEAL S OF THE ASSESSEE ARE ALLOWE D FOR STATISTICAL PURPOSE . ORDER PRONOUNCED IN THE CO URT ON 31 ST OCTOBER, 201 7 AT RAJKOT . S D / - S D / - ( RAJPAL YADAV) JUDICIAL MEMBER ( PRAMOD KUMAR ) ACCOUNTANT MEMBER