Baddi Barotiwala Nalagarh Development Authority, Solan V. CIT, Shimla

ITA 879/CHANDI/2014

• Counselvise Citation: [2015] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 86201 (ITAT-CHANDIGARH)
• Duration Of Justice: 4 month(s) 30 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 16-03-2015
• Appeal Filed By: Assessee
• Order Result: Dismissed
• Bench Allotted: B
• Next Hearing Date: 12-03-2015
• Assessment Year: 2009-2010
• Appeal Filed On: 17-10-2014
• Result in Favour of: Revenue
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: DR AMA RVEER SINGH
• Assessee Lawyers: CHANDER SHEKHAR VERMA
• Keywords: Charitable institution; Bonafide belief; Period of limitation; Condonation of delay
• Section: 12AA; 11

Judgement Text

IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL CHANDIGARH BENCH B, CHANDIGARH BEFORE SHRI BHAVNESH SAINI, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SHRI T.R.SOOD, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER ITA NO. 879/CHD/2014 (UNDER SECTION 12AA OF THE ACT) BADDI BAROTIWALA NALAGARH VS. THE C.I.T., DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, SHIMLA. BADDI, DISTRICT SOLAN. PAN: AAALB0528J (APPELLANT) (RESPONDENT) APPELLANT BY : SHRI CHANDER SHEKHAR VERMA RESPONDENT BY : DR.AMARVEER SINGH, DR DATE OF HEARING : 12.03.2015 DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT : 16.03.2015 O R D E R PER BHAVNESH SAINI, J.M. : THIS APPEAL FILED BY THE ASSESSEE IS DIRECTED AGAI NST THE ORDER OF LEARNED COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, SH IMLA DATED 17.11.2008 UNDER SECTION 12AA OF THE INCOME T AX ACT, 1961. 2. BRIEFLY, THE FACTS ARE THAT THE ASSESSEE, A GOVE RNMENT BODY FILED REGISTRATION APPLICATION IN PRESCRIBED F ORM FOR GRANT OF REGISTRATION UNDER SECTION 12AA OF THE INCOME TA X ACT, 1961 BEFORE THE LEARNED COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, SHIMLA. THE ASSESSEE AUTHORITY HAS BEEN CONSTITUTED AS A SP ECIAL AREA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VIDE NOTIFICATION OF THE GOVE RNMENT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH. THE ASSESSEE STATED THAT THE AI MS AND 2 OBJECTS FALL UNDER THE DEFINITION OF PUBLIC CHARIT ABLE PURPOSE. THE LEARNED COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX CONSIDERING THE MATERIAL ON RECORD GRANTED REGISTRATION UNDER SECTI ON 12AA OF THE ACT TO THE ASSESSEE AUTHORITY FOR ASSESSMENT YE AR 2008-09 ONLY. HOWEVER, FOR ASSESSMENT YEAR 2009-10 AND SU BSEQUENT ASSESSMENT YEARS, THE LEARNED COMMISSIONER OF INCOM E TAX WAS OF THE VIEW THAT THE OBJECTS OF THE ASSESSEE AU THORITY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED TO BE CHARITABLE PURPOSES BECA USE OF THE AMENDMENT IN SECTION 2(15) OF THE ACT, WHICH IS EFF ECTIVE FROM ASSESSMENT YEAR 2009-10 ONWARDS. THE LEARNED COMMI SSIONER OF INCOME TAX, THEREFORE, HELD THAT FOR ASSESSMENT YEAR 2009- 10 AND SUBSEQUENT ASSESSMENT YEARS, THE ASSESSEE DO ES NOT QUALIFY FOR BEING CONSIDERED AS A CHARITABLE ORGANI ZATION HENCE, DOES NOT QUALIFY FOR REGISTRATION UNDER SECT ION 12AA OF THE ACT. 3. THE ASSESSEE BEING AGGRIEVED AGAINST THE IMPUGNE D ORDER REJECTING THE REGISTRATION APPLICATION UNDER SECTIO N 12AA OF THE ACT FROM ASSESSMENT YEAR 2009-10 AND SUBSEQUENT ASSESSMENT YEARS FILED THE PRESENT APPEAL BEFORE TH E TRIBUNAL. 4. IN COLUMN NO.9 OF APPEAL PAPERS IN FORM NO.36, T HE ASSESSEE HAS MENTIONED 17.11.2008 AS THE DATE OF COMMUNICATION OF THE ORDER APPEALED AGAINST. HOWE VER, THE APPEAL IS FILED IN THE OFFICE OF THE TRIBUNAL ON 17 .10.2014. THUS IT WAS TIME BARRED BY 2192 DAYS (APPROXIMATELY SIX YEARS). THE ASSESSEE FILED AN APPLICATION FOR CON DONATION OF DELAY. THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR ASSESSEE REFERRING TO THE APPLICATION FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY IN FILING THE APPEAL HAS 3 SUBMITTED THAT THE ASSESSMENTS FOR ASSESSMENT YEARS 2010-11 AND 2011-12 WERE CONCLUDED ON 19.3.2013 AND 31.1.20 14 RESPECTIVELY. THESE ASSESSMENT ORDERS WERE ASSAIL ED BEFORE THE APPELLATE AUTHORITY. LATER ON, WHEN THE APPLI CANT BROUGHT THE ENTIRE RECORD FOR THE PURPOSE OF FILING THE APPEALS AGAINST THE REGULAR ASSESSMENTS CAME TO KNOW THAT V IDE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 17.11.2008 THE APPLICATION FOR EXEMPTION HAS BEEN PARTLY ALLOWED FOR ASSESSMENT YE AR 2008- 09 ONLY AND THE ORDER HAD NOT BEEN ASSAILED TILL DA TE. IT IS FURTHER STATED THAT THE ASSESSEE WAS ACTING UNDER A DVICE AND THE ASSESSEE WAS INFORMED THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION FOR CHALLENGING THE IMPUGNED ORDER WOULD ARISE WHEN THE APPEALS AGAINST THE ASSESSMENT ORDERS WERE DECIDED. THE L EARNED COUNSEL FOR ASSESSEE, THEREFORE, SUBMITTED THAT THE ASSESSEE WAS UNDER THE BONAFIDE BELIEF FOR NOT FILING THE AP PEAL BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL. THEREFORE, THE DELAY MAY BE CONDONE D. 5. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE LEARNED D.R FOR THE REVEN UE STRONGLY OBJECTED TO THE CONDONATION OF DELAY IN FI LING THE APPEAL BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL BEYOND THE PERIOD OF LIM ITATION AND SUBMITTED THAT THE ASSESSEE HAS FAILED TO EXPLAIN T HE SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR NOT FILING THE APPEAL WITHIN T HE PERIOD OF LIMITATION. THE LEARNED D.R FOR THE REVENUE SUBMI TTED THAT WHEN THE ASSESSEE WAS AWARE OF THE FACT THAT NO REG ISTRATION IS GRANTED TO THE ASSESSEE FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 2009-10 AND SUBSEQUENT ASSESSMENT YEARS, THE ORDERS SHOULD HAVE BEEN CHALLENGED BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL DURING THE PERI OD OF LIMITATION. THE REGISTRATION ORDER UNDER SECTION 12AA OF THE 4 ACT HAS NO CONNECTION WITH THE PASSING OF THE REGUL AR ASSESSMENTS. THE LEARNED D.R FOR THE REVENUE, THE REFORE, SUBMITTED THAT SINCE THERE IS NO SUFFICIENT CAUSE E XPLAINED IN NOT FILING THE APPEAL WITHIN THE PERIOD OF LIMITATI ON, THEREFORE, THE APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE MAY BE DISMISSED BEING T IME BARRED. APART FROM THE ABOVE ARGUMENTS, THE LEARN ED D.R FOR THE REVENUE SUBMITTED THAT THE ISSUE IS COVERED AGA INST THE ASSESSEE BY THE ORDER OF I.T.A.T., CHANDIGARH BENCH IN THE CASE OF PUNJAB URBAN PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT AUTHORI TY VS. CIT, 103 TTJ 988, IN WHICH ON SIMILAR FACTS REGISTR ATION UNDER SECTION 12AA OF THE ACT WAS REJECTED. THE LEARNED D.R FOR THE REVENUE ALSO RELIED UPON THE DECISION OF HON'BLE JA MMU & KASHMIR HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF JAMMU DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS. UNION OF INDIA IN ITA NO.164/2012, IN WHICH ON IDENTICAL FACTS THE APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE HAS BEEN DISMISSED AND THE ORDER HAS BEEN CONFIRMED BY THE HON'BLE SUP REME COURT IN THE MATTER OF JAMMU DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS. UNION OF INDIA VIDE ORDER DATED 21.7.2014. COPY O F THIS ORDER IS ALSO PLACED ON RECORD. 6. WE HAVE CONSIDERED THE RIVAL SUBMISSIONS AND PER USED THE MATERIAL ON RECORD. IT IS NOT IN DISPUTE THAT AFTER PASSING THE IMPUGNED ORDER, THE SAME WAS SERVED IMMEDIATELY UPON THE ASSESSEE. ACCORDING TO THE IMPUGNED ORDER, RE GISTRATION WAS REFUSED TO THE ASSESSEE UNDER SECTION 12AA OF T HE ACT FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 2009-10 AND SUBSEQUENT ASSESSME NT YEARS. THE ASSESSEE, HOWEVER, AVAILED BENEFIT OF IMPUGNED ORDER TILL ASSESSMENT YEAR 2008-09. THEREFORE, IT WAS WITHIN 5 THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE ASSESSEE THAT NO REGISTRATION UNDER SECTION 12AA OF THE ACT HAVE BEEN GRANTED TO THE AS SESSEE FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 2009-10 AND SUBSEQUENT ASSESSME NT YEARS. THE ASSESSEE, HOWEVER, CLAIMED IN THE APPLI CATION FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY THAT AS PER LEGAL ADVICE THE A SSESSEE WAS ADVISED THAT CAUSE OF ACTION FOR CHALLENGING THE IM PUGNED ORDER WOULD ARISE WHEN THE APPEALS AGAINST THE RESP ECTIVE ASSESSMENT ORDERS WERE DECIDED. THIS ARGUMENT IS WITHOUT ANY SUBSTANCE AND IS REJECTED BECAUSE IT IS WELL SE TTLED LAW THAT THE REGISTRATION UNDER SECTION 12AA OF THE ACT TO THE TRUST OR INSTITUTION IS A CONDITION PRECEDENT FOR G RANTING RELIEF UNDER SECTION 11 OF THE ACT. WE ARE FORTIFIED IN OUR VIEW BY THE JUDGMENT OF HON'BLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE O F U.P. FOREST CORPORATION & ANOTHER VS. DCIT, 297 ITR 1 (S C). SINCE THERE WAS NO REGISTRATION GRANTED UNDER SECTI ON 12AA OF THE ACT TO THE ASSESSEE FOR ASSESSMENT YEAR 2009-10 AND SUBSEQUENT ASSESSMENT YEARS, THEREFORE, NO RELIEF U NDER SECTION 11 COULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED TO THE ASSESSEE IN REGULAR ASSESSMENTS FOR ASSESSMENT YEARS 2010-11 AND 2011-1 2 AS IS CLAIMED BY THE LEARNED COUNSEL FOR ASSESSEE. THE ASSESSEE DESPITE SERVICE OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER WAY BACK IN N OVEMBER, 2008 WAS SLEEPING OVER ITS RIGHT TO CHALLENGE THE S AID ORDER BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL. WHEN THE ASSESSEE HAS BEEN A DVISED THAT THE IMPUGNED ORDER COULD CHALLENGED WHEN REGUL AR APPEALS FOR SUBSEQUENT ASSESSMENT YEARS ARE DECIDED , WOULD CLEARLY INDICATE THAT THE ASSESSEE WAS WELL AWARE O F THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER. AS PER SETTLED LAW WHEN NO REGISTRATION IS GRANTED UNDER SECTION 12AA OF TH E ACT TO THE 6 ASSESSEE FOR ASSESSMENT YEAR 2009-10 AND SUBSEQUENT ASSESSMENT YEARS, THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF MAKING C LAIM OF EXEMPTION FROM INCOME UNDER SECTION 11 OF THE ACT F OR ANY SUBSEQUENT ASSESSMENT YEARS EITHER IN THE REGULAR ASSESSMENTS OR IN THE CONSEQUENTIAL APPEALS FILED B EFORE THE LEARNED CIT (APPEALS). THUS THE ASSESSEE FAILED T O EXPLAIN ANY SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR NOT PRESENTING THE APPEAL WITHIN THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL. SUFFICI ENT CAUSE WOULD MEAN A CAUSE WHICH IS BEYOND THE CONTROL OF T HE ASSESSEE. SUFFICIENT CAUSE MEANS WHICH PREVENTS T HE ASSESSEE ACTING UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES WITHOUT NEGLIGENCE OR INACTION OR WANT OF BONAFIDE. WHEN T HE ASSESSEE WAS AWARE OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER THAT ITS INCOME WOULD NOT BE EXEMPT UNDER SECTION 11 OF THE ACT FROM ASSESSMENT YEAR 2009-2010 ONWARDS, THE ASSESSEE SHO ULD NOT HAVE WAITED FOR FILING OF THE APPEAL IN THE MATTER. IT IS A CLEAR CASE OF NEGLIGENCE OR INACTION OR WANT OF BON AFIDE. THE CONDUCT OF THE ASSESSEE CLEARLY SPEAK AGAINST THE A SSESSEE ITSELF THAT THE ASSESSEE DELIBERATELY DID NOT FILE THE APPEAL WITHIN THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION. 7. IT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO REFER TO SOME JUDICIA L PRONOUNCEMENTS ON THE ISSUE OF DELAY IN FILING THE APPEAL. IN THE CASE OF HIND DEVELOPMENT CORPN. VS. ITO (1979) 118 ITR 873, THE HON'BLE CALCUTTA HIGH COURT HELD THAT A TRIBUNAL CAN CONDONE THE DELAY IF THERE WAS SUFFICIENT CAUSE FOR THE DELAY IN THE SUBMISSION OF THE APPEAL . IN THE CASE OF VEDABAI ALIAS VIJAYANATABAI BABURAO PATIL VS. SHANTARAM BABURAO P ATIL 7 (2002) 253 ITR 798 (SC) WHERE IT WAS HELD THAT WHILE EXERCISING DISCRETION UNDER SECTION 5 OF THE LIMITA TION ACT, 1963, TO CONDONE DELAY FOR SUFFICIENT CAUSE IN NOT FILING THE APPEAL WITHIN THE PERIOD PRESCRIBED, COURT SHOULD A DOPT A PRAGMATIC APPROACH. A DISTINCTION MUST BE MADE BET WEEN A CASE WHERE THE DELAY IS INORDINATE AND A CASE WHERE THE DELAY IS OF A FEW DAYS. THE COURT OBSERVED THAT WHEREAS IN THE FORMER CONSIDERATION OF PREJUDICE TO THE OTHER SIDE WILL BE A RELEVANT FACTOR AND CALLS FOR A MORE CAUTIOUS APPRO ACH. IN THE LATTER CASE NO SUCH CONSIDERATION MAY ARISE AND SUC H A CASE DESERVES A LIBERAL APPROACH. NOW IN THE PRESENT CASE DELAY IS NOT OF FEW DAYS BUT OF 2192 DAYS (APPROXIMATELY SIX YEARS). BESIDES, THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO VALID EXPLANATION/R EASON FOR THE DELAY. IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. RAM MOHAN KABR A (2002) 257 ITR 773, THE HON'BLE PUNJAB & HARYANA HIGH COUR T HAS HELD THAT WHERE THE LEGISLATURE SPELLS OUT A PERIOD OF LIMITA TION AND PROVIDES FOR POWER TO CONDONE THE DELAY AS WELL , SUCH DELAY CAN ONLY BE CONDONED ONLY FOR SUFFICIENT AND GOOD REASONS SUPPORTED BY COGENT AND PROPER EVIDENCE. IT IS SETTLED PRINCIPLE OF LAW THAT PROVISIONS RELATING TO THE SP ECIFIED PERIOD OF LIMITATION MUST BE APPLIED WITH THEIR REGOUR AND EFFECTIVE CONSEQUENCES. IN THIS CASE DELAY FOR FILING THE A PPEAL LATE FOR ONLY A FEW DAYS WAS NOT CONDONED . IN THE CASE OF ASSTT. CIT VS. TAGGAS INDUSTRIES DEVELOPMENT LTD. (2002) 80 IT D 21 (CAL.), TRIBUNAL, CALCUTTA BENCH, CALCUTTA DID NOT CONDONE THE DELAY FOR FILING THE APPEAL LATE BY 13 DAYS BECAUSE THE DELAY WAS NOT DUE TO SUFFICIENT CAUSE. 8 8. THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT IN THE RECENT DECISION IN THE CASE OF OFFICE OF THE CHIEF MASTER GENERAL & OTHER S VS. LIVING MEDIA INDIA LTD. & ANOTHER, 348 ITR 7 (SC) HELD AS UNDER : HELD, DISMISSING THE APPLICATIONS, THE DEPARTMENT HAD ITSELF MENTIONED IN IT IS AFFIDAVIT AND WAS AWA RE OF THE DATE OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE DIVISION BENCH OF T HE HIGH COURT AS SEPTEMBER, 11, 2009. EVEN, ACCORDING TO T HE DEPONENT, ITS COUNSEL HAD APPLIED FOR THE CERTIFIED COPY OF THE JUDGMENT ONLY ON JANUARY 8, 2010, AND THE COPY WAS RECEIVED BY THE DEPARTMENT ON THE VERY SAME DAY. THERE WAS NO EXPLANATION FOR NOT APPLYING FOR CERTIFIED C OPY OF THE JUDGMENT ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2009, OR AT LEAST WIT HIN A REASONABLE TIME. THE FACT REMAINS THAT THE CERTIFIE D COPY WAS APPLIED FOR ONLY ON JANUARY 8, 2010, I.E., AFTE R A PERIOD OF NEARLY FOUR MONTHS. NEITHER THE DEPARTME NT NOR THE PERSON IN-CHARGE HAD FILED AN EXPLANATION FOR N OT APPLYING FOR THE CERTIFIED COPY WITHIN THE PRESCRIB ED PERIOD. THE OTHER DATES MENTIONED IN THE AFFIDAVIT CLEARLY SHOWED THAT THERE WAS DELAY AT EVERY STAGE AND THER E WAS NO EXPLANATION AS TO WHY SUCH DELAY HAD OCCASIO NED. THE DEPARTMENT OR THE PERSON CONCERNED HAD NOT EVIN CED DILIGENCE IN PROSECUTING THE MATTER TO THE COURT BY TAKING APPROPRIATE STEPS. THE PERSONS CONCERNED WERE WELL AWARE OR CONVERSANT WITH THE ISSUES INVOLVED INCLUD ING THE PRESCRIBED PERIOD OF LIMITATION FOR TAKING UP T HE MATTER BY WAY OF FILING A SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION IN THE SUPREME COURT. IN THE ABSENCE OF PLAUSIBLE AND ACCEPTABLE EXPLANATION, THE DELAY COULD NOT BE COND ONED MECHANICALLY MERELY BECAUSE THE GOVERNMENT OR A WIN G OF THE GOVERNMENT WAS A PARTY BEFORE THE COURT. THOUGH IN A MATTER OF CONNDONATION OF DELAY WHEN THERE WAS NO GROSS NEGLIGENCE OR DELIBERATE INACTION OR LACK OF BONAF IDE, A LIBERAL CONCESSION HAD TO BE ADOPTED TO ADVANCE SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE, IN THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES , THE CLAIM ON ACCOUNT OF IMPERSONAL MACHINERY AND INHERI TED 9 BUREAUCRATIC METHODOLOGY OF MAKING SEVERAL NOTES CO ULD NOT BE ACCEPTED IN VIEW OF THE MODERN TECHNOLOGIES BEING USED AND AVAILABLE. CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT THERE WAS NO PROPER EXPLANATION OFFERED BY THE DEPARTMENT FOR THE DELAY EXCEPT MENTIONING OF VARIOUS DATES, THE DEPARTMENT HAD FAILED TO GIVE ACCEPTABLE AND COGENT REASONS SUFFICIENT TO CONDONE SUCH A HUGE DELAY. BY THE COURT : UNLESS GOVERNMENT BODIES, THEIR AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES HAVE REASONABLE AND ACCEPTABLE EXPLANATION FOR THE DELAY AND THERE WAS BONA FIDE EFFORT, THERE IS NO NEED TO ACCEPT THE US UAL EXPLANATION THAT THE FILE WAS KEPT PENDING FOR SEVE RAL MONTHS OR YEARS DUE TO CONSIDERABLE DEGREE OF PROCEDURAL RED-TAPE IN THE PROCESS. GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS ARE UNDER A SPECIAL OBLIGATION TO ENSUR E THAT THEY PERFORM THEIR DUTIES WITH DILIGENCE AND COMMITMENT. CONDONATION OF DELAY IS AN EXCEPTION A ND SHOULD NOT BE USED AS AN ANTICIPATED BENEFIT FOR GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS. THE LAW SHELTERS EVERYONE UNDER THE SAME LIGHT AND SHOULD NOT BE SWIRLED FOR THE BENEFIT OF A FEW. THE LAW OF LIMITATION BINDS EVER YBODY INCLUDING THE GOVERNMENT. 9. THUS RELYING ON THE ABOVE JUDGMENTS AND CONSIDER ING THE FACTS OF THE CASE, WE HOLD THAT THE ASSESSEE FAILED TO EXPLAIN THAT THE DELAY IN FILING THE APPEAL WAS DUE TO SUFF ICIENT CAUSE. THEREFORE, THE DELAY IN FILING THE APPEAL SHOULD NO T BE CONDONED. 10. THE LEARNED D.R FOR THE REVENUE ALSO REFERRED TO THE ORDER OF THE I.T.A.T., CHANDIGARH BENCH IN THE CASE OF PUNJAB URBAN PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (SUPRA), THE DECISION OF HON'BLE JAMMU & KASHMIR HIGH COURT IN THE CASE O F JAMMU DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY VS. UNION OF INDIA (SUP RA) AND 10 AS CONFIRMED BY THE HON'BLE SUPREME COURT ON MERITS IN WHICH ON IDENTICAL FACTS NO RELIEF HAVE BEEN GRANTE D TO THE ASSESSEE. HOWEVER, SINCE THE APPEAL OF THE ASSESS EE IS TIME BARRED, THEREFORE, THERE IS NO NEED TO DISCUSS THE JUDGMENTS IN DETAIL. 11. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE DISCUSSION, WE HOLD THAT THE APPEAL OF THE ASSESSEE IS TIME BARRED AND IS ACCORD INGLY DISMISSED. 12 IN THE RESULT, THE APPEAL FILED BY THE ASSESSEE IS DISMISSED IN LIMINE. ORDER PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON THIS 16 TH DAY OF MARCH, 2015. SD/- SD/- (T.R.SOOD) (BHAVNESH SAINI) ACCOUNTANT MEMBER JUDICIAL MEMBER DATED : 16 TH MARCH, 2015 *RATI* COPY TO: THE APPELLANT/THE RESPONDENT/THE CIT(A)/TH E CIT/THE DR. ASSISTANT REGISTRAR, ITAT, CHANDIGARH