, , IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, B BENCH, CHENNAI . , . , % BEFORE SHRI V.DURGA RAO, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SHRI G. MANJUNATHA, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER ./ IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 ( BLOCK PERIOD:01.04.1986 TO 31.03.1996 AND 01.04 .1996 TO 15.07.1996 ) MR. T.T.V. DHINAKARAN , 5, IV STREET, VENKATESWARA NAGAR, KARPAGAM GARDENS, ADYAR, CHENNAI-600 020. VS THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, CENTRAL CIRCLE-2 (2) CHENNAI-600 034. PAN: ABKPD 2771Q ( /APPELLANT) ( /RESPONDENT) / APPELLANT BY : MR. S.SRIDHAR, ADVOCATE /RESPONDENT BY : MR. SURESH PERIASAMY, JCIT /DATE OF HEARING : 10.02.2021 /DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT : 09.04.2021 / O R D E R PER G.MANJUNATHA, AM: THIS APPEAL FILED BY THE ASSESSEE IS DIRECTED AGAIN ST THE ORDER OF THE ASSESSING OFFICER PASSED U/S.158BC R.W .S 143(3) R.W.S 254 OF THE ACT, 1961 DATED 31.12.2019 AND PER TAIN TO BLOCK PERIOD 01.04.1986 TO 31.03.1996 AND 01.04.199 6 TO 15.07.1996. 2. THE ASSESSEE HAS RAISED THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS OF APPEAL :- 1. THE ORDER OF THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, CENTRAL CIRCLE - 2(2), CHENNAI DATED 31.12.201 9 FOR THE ABOVE MENTIONED BLOCK PERIOD IS CONTRARY TO LAW , FACTS, ANTI IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE. 2 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 2. THE DCIT ERRED IN COMPLETING THE BLOCK ASSESSME NT ON THE COMPLETE DEFIANCE OF THE PROVISIONS OF SECTI ON 158 BC OF THE ACT WITHOUT ASSIGNING PROPER REASONS AND JUSTIFICATION AND OUGHT TO HAVE APPRECIATED THAT TH E ORDER OF BLOCK ASSESSMENT PASSED IN TERMS OF SECTION 158 BC READ WITH SECTION 143(3)/254 OF THE ACT WAS PASSED OUT OF TIME, INVALID, PASSED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND N OT SUSTAINABLE BOTH ON FACTS AND IN LAW. 3. THE DCIT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT THE FINDINGS RECORDED IN PARA 2.5 OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER IN REJEC TING THE CONTENTIONS WITH REGARD TO THE PROVISIONS GOVER NING THE LIMITATION PRESCRIBED FOR COMPLETING THE BLOCK ASSESSMENT WERE WRONG, ERRONEOUS, UNJUSTIFIED, INCORRECT, INVALID AND NOT SUSTAINABLE BOTH ON FACT S AND IN LAW AND OUGHT TO HAVE APPRECIATED THAT THE MISCONSTRUCTION OF THE RELATED PROVISIONS DISCUSSED IN THE SAID PARA 2.5 WOULD JUSTIFY THE STAND OF THE APPELL ANT IN SUBSTANTIATING THE LIMITATION PRESCRIBED IN SECTION 158BE OF THE ACT WHILE VITIATING THE RELATED FINDINGS REC ORDED BY HIM. 4. THE DCIT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT IN ANY EVENT THE IMPUGNED ORDER IN GIVING EFFECT TO THE ORDER OF THE JURISDICTIONAL BENCH OR THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TR IBUNAL DATED 4.10.2000 WAS NOT PASSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW/NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PURPOSE FOR WHICH TH E ENTIRE MATTER WAS REMANDED BACK TO HIS FILE AND OUG HT TO HAVE APPRECIATED THAT ANY ORDER PASSED IN VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION AND THE PR INCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE SHOULD BE RECKONED AS BAD IN LAW . 5. THE DCIT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT HAVING NOT CONDUCTED THE EFFECT GIVING PROCEEDINGS AS PER THE ORDER OF THE JURISDICTIONAL BENCH OF THE INCOME TAX APPEL LATE TRIBUNAL AND HAVING NOT SHARED THE MATERIALS GATHER ED WHILE PASSING ORIGINAL BLOCK ASSESSMENT ORDER (FIRS T ROUND), THE COMPLETION OF THE BLOCK ASSESSMENT ORDE R IN GIVING EFFECT TO THE ORDER OF THE JURISDICTIONAL BE NCH OF THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL IN SUCH CIRCUMSTA NCES SHOULD BE RECKONED AS BAD IN LAW. 6. THE DCIT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT THE FINDINGS RECORDED IN THIS REGARD IN PARA 2.2 OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER WERE PERVERSE FINDINGS OF FACTS AND OUGHT TO HAVE APPRECIATED THAT THE REPEATED REQUEST FOR SHARING T HE INFORMATION/ DETAILS RELEVANT FOR THE PURPOSE OF COMPLETING THE BLOCK ASSESSMENT WAS WRONGLY REJECTE D, 3 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 THEREBY VITIATING THE INITIATION, CONTINUATION AND COMPLETION OF THE SAID BLOCK ASSESSMENT ON VARIOUS FACETS. 7. THE DCIT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT IN ANY EVEN T THE MATERIALS GATHERED WHICH WERE ADMITTEDLY RECEIVED BEYOND THE DATE OF CONCLUSION OF THE SEARCH SHOULD NOT FORM PART OF THE PRESENT BLOCK ASSESSMENT PROCEEDIN GS FOR MAKING ADDITIONS AND OUGHT TO HAVE APPRECIATED THAT THE MISCONSTRUCTION OF THE PROVISIONS PRESCRIBED IN RELATION THERETO IN CHAPTER XIV B OF THE ACT WOULD MAKE THE BLOCK ASSESSMENT COMPLETED AND DISPUTED IN THE PRESENT APPEAL AS NULLITY IN LAW. 8. THE DCIT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT THE FINDINGS IN RECORDED IN PARA 2.4 OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER IN THIS REGARD WERE WRONG, ERRONEOUS, UNJUSTIFIED, INCORRECT, INVA LID AND NOT SUSTAINABLE BOTH ON FACTS AND IN LAW. 9.THE DCIT ERRED IN ESTIMATING THE AGRICULTURAL INC OME WITH A VIEW TO RESTRICT THE CLAIM OF THE AGRICULTUR AL INCOME EARNED BY THE APPELLANT IN PARA 5 OF THE IMPUGNED O RDER FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEARS COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PER IOD UNDER CONSIDERATION AND CONSEQUENTLY ERRED IN ADDIN G BACK THE DIFFERENTIAL AMOUNT AS UNDISCLOSED INCOME AS PER PAGE NO.12 OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER FORMING PART O F EACH OF THE ASSESSMENT YEARS COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATION WITHOUT ASSIGNING PROPER REASONS AND JUSTIFICATION. 10. THE DCIT ERRED IN ESTIMATING PERSONAL DRAWINGS WITH A VIEW TO RESTRICT SUCH CLAIM HAVING CASCADING IMPA CT IN CASH FLOW IN PARA 6.2 OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER OR THE RELEVANT ASSESSMENT YEARS COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PE RIOD UNDER CONSIDERATION AND CONSEQUENTLY ERRED IN RECAS TING THE CASH FLOW FORMING PART OF EACH OF THE ASSESSMEN T YEARS COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERA TION WITHOUT ASSIGNING PROPER REASONS AND JUSTIFICATION. 11. THE DCIT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT THE COMP UTATION OF THE ASSESSABLE INCOME FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 19 87- 88 COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATIO N IN PARA 7 OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER ON VARIOUS FACETS WAS WRONG. ERRONEOUS, UNJUSTIFIED INCORRECT, INVALID AN D NOT SUSTAINABLE BOTH ON FACTS AND IN LAW. 12. THE DCIT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT THE COMPUTAT ION OF THE ASSESSABLE INCOME FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 1988- 89 4 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATION I N PARA 8 OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER ON VARIOUS FACETS WAS WRONG, ERRONEOUS, UNJUSTIFIED, INCORRECT, INVALID A ND NOT SUSTAINABLE BOTH ON FACTS AND IN LAW. 13. THE DCIT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT THE COMPUT ATION OF THE ASSESSABLE INCOME FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 19 89- 90 COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATIO N IN PARA 9 OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER ON VARIOUS FACETS WAS WRONG, ERRONEOUS, UNJUSTIFIED, INCORRECT, INVALID A ND NOT SUSTAINABLE BOTH ON FACTS AND IN LAW. 14. THE DCIT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT THE COMPUT ATION OF THE ASSESSABLE INCOME FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 19 90- 91 COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATIO N IN PARA 10 OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER ON VARIOUS FACETS WAS WRONG, ERRONEOUS, UNJUSTIFIED, INCORRECT, INVALID A ND NOT SUSTAINABLE BOTH ON FACTS AND IN LAW. 15. THE DCIT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT THE COMPUT ATION OF THE ASSESSABLE INCOME FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 19 91- 92 COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATIO N IN PARA 11.1 & PARA 11.2 OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER ON VARI OUS FACETS WAS WRONG, ERRONEOUS, UNJUSTIFIED, INCORRECT , INVALID AND NOT SUSTAINABLE BOTH ON FACTS AND IN LA W. 16.THE DCIT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT THE COMPUTATI ON OF THE ASSESSABLE INCOME FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 1992- 93 COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATION F ROM PARA 12 OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER ON VARIOUS FACETS WAS WRONG, ERRONEOUS, UNJUSTIFIED, INCORRECT, INVALID A ND NOT SUSTAINABLE BOTH ON FACTS AND IN LAW. 17. THE DCIT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT THE ASSESSME NT OF THREE CASH CREDITS AGGREGATING TO RS1,61,132/- IN APPLYING THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 68 OF THE ACT IN THE COMPUTATION OF UNDISCLOSED INCOME FOR THE ASSESSMEN T YEAR 1992-93 COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK ASSESSMENT PERI OD IN RECORDING PERVERSE FINDINGS OF FACTS WHILE OVERL OOKING HT STAND OF THE APPELLANT IN ESTABLISHING THE GENUI NENESS OF THE TRANSACTION WAS WRONG, ERRONEOUS, UNJUSTIFIE D, INCORRECT, INVALID AND NOT SUSTAINABLE BOTH ON FACT S AND IN LAW. 18. THE DCIT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT THE ASSESSME NT OF EXCESS CASH OUTFLOW OF RS.72,120/- WORKED OUT IN PA RA 12.7 OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER PERTAINING TO THE ASSESS MENT YEAR 1992-93 COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PERIOD UNDER 5 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 CONSIDERATION ON VARIOUS FACETS WAS WRONG, ERRONEOU S, UNJUSTIFIED, INCORRECT, INVALID AND NOT SUSTAINABLE BOTH ON FACTS AND IN LAW. 19. THE DCIT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT THE COMPU TATION OF THE ASSESSABLE/UNDISCLOSED INCOME IN PARA 13.11 OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 1993-94 COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATION F ROM PARA 13 OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER ON VARIOUS FACTS WAS WRONG, ERRONEOUS, UNJUSTIFIED, INCORRECT INVALID AN D NOT SUSTAINABLE BOTH ON FACTS AND IN LAW. 20. THE DCIT ERRED IN ADDING BACK RS.199,318/- IN P ARA 13.3 OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER AS PART OF THE COMPUTATI ON OF UNDISCLOSED INCOME FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 1993-94 COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATION PERTAINING TO THE GIFTS RECEIVED AT THE TIME OF MAR RIAGE AS AGAINST THE CLAIM OF RECEIVING SUCH GIFTS AGGREGATI NG TO RS.5,10,000/- ON THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 68 OF T HE ACT WITHOUT ASSIGNING PROPER REASONS AND JUSTIFICATION. 21. THE DCIT ERRED IN BRINGING TO TAX RS.26,25,000/ - AS THE PRESUMED INVESTMENT IN PURCHASE OF FIVE TIPPERS IN RECORDING WRONG AND ERRONEOUS FINDINGS FROM PARA 13 .4 TO PARA 13.7 OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER IN COMPUTING THE UNDISCLOSED INCOME FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 1993-94 COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATION WITHOUT ASSIGNING PROPER REASONS AND JUSTIFICATION. 22, THE DCIT ERRED IN MAKING THE DISALLOWANCE OF RS.1,68750/- BEING THE RENTAL CHARGES PAID FOR HIRI NG THE TIPPERS IN CONSEQUENCE TO THE ADDITION MADE IN PRESUMING THE APPELLANTS OWNERSHIP OF THE TIPPERS RESULTING IN SEPARATE ADDITION IN THE COMPUTATION O F UNDISCLOSED INCOME FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 1993-94 COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATION WITHOUT ASSIGNING PROPER REASONS AND JUSTIFICATION. 23. THE DCIT ERRED IN BRINGING TO TAX RS12000/- APPEARING IN THE NAME OF SRI K.MUTHUSWAMY IN THE BO OKS OF T.C.V.PACKERS AS UNEXPLAINED CASH CREDIT ON THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 68 OF THE ACT IN PARA 13.9 O F THE IMPUGNED ORDER IN THE COMPUTATION OF UNDISCLOSED INCOME FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 1993-94 COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATION WITHOUT ASSIGN ING PROPER REASONS AND JUSTIFICATION. 6 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 24. THE DCIT ERRED IN COMPUTING THE UNDISCLOSED INCOME FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 1994-95 IN PARA 14.8 OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PERIOD UN DER CONSIDERATION WITHOUT ASSIGNING PROPER REASONS AND JUSTIFICATION. 25. THE DCIT ERRED IN BRINGING TO TAX RS.175,000 /- BEING THE CASH CREDIT APPEARING IN THE CURRENT ACCO UNT OF THE APPELLANT WITH T.C.V. PACKERS AS UNEXPLAINED CA SH CREDIT IN PARA 14.2 OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER ON THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 68 OF THE ACT FOR THE ASSESS MENT YEAR 1994-95 COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATION WITHOUT ASSIGNING PROPER REASONS AND JUSTIFICATION. 26. THE DCIT ERRED IN BRINGING TO TAX RS.4,00,000/- BEING THE PRESUMED INVESTMENT IN PURCHASE OF SHARES OF M/ S T.C.V.ENGINEERING CO. P LTD. AS UNEXPLAINED INVESTM ENT PRESUMABLY U/S 69 OF THE ACT IN PARA 14.3 FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 1994-95 COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PERI OD UNDER CONSIDERATION WITHOUT ASSIGNING PROPER REASON S AND JUSTIFICATION. 27. THE DCIT ERRED IN BRINGING TO TAX RS.2,49,980/ - AS UNEXPLAINED FOREIGN TRAVEL EXPENSES QUANTIFIED AS P ER THE DISCUSSION IN PARA 14.4 TO PARA 14.6 OF THE IMPUGNE D ORDER FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 1994-95 COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATION WITHOUT ASSIGNING PROPER REASONS AND JUSTIFICATION. 28. THE DCIT ERRED IN COMPUTING THE UNDISCLOSED INC OME IN PARA 23 OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER RELATING TO THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 1995-96 COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PERI OD UNDER CONSIDERATION WITHOUT ASSIGNING PROPER REASON S AND JUSTIFICATION OUGHT TO HAVE APPRECIATED THAT TH E ENTIRE COMPUTATION OF UNDISCLOSED INCOME FOR TILE ASSESSME NT YEAR 1995-96 COMPRISED UNDER THE BLOCK PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATION ON VARIOUS FACETS WAS WRONG, ERRONEOU S. UNJUSTIFIED, INCORRECT, INVALID AND NOT SUSTAINABLE BOTH ON FACTS AND IN LAW. 29. THE DCIT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT HAVING NOT B ROUGHT ON RECORD THE SEIZED MATERIALS/EVIDENCE FOR THE ISS UES CONTESTED IN ALL THESE ASSESSMENT YEARS INCLUDING T HE ASSESSMENT YEAR 1995-96 COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PERI OD UNDER CONSIDERATION, THE CONSEQUENTIAL ADDITIONS MA DE AS PART OF THE COMPUTATION OF UNDISCLOSED INCOME FO R ALL THE ASSESSMENT YEARS COMPRISED UNDER THE BLOCK PERI OD 7 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 UNDER CONSIDERATION WERE WRONG, ERRONEOUS, UNJUSTIF IED, INCORRECT, INVALID AND NOT SUSTAINABLE BOTH ON FACT S AND IN LAW. 30. THE DCIT ERRED IN ADDING BACK RS.2,41,82,880/- BEING THE AMOUNT PRESUMED TO BE SPENT FOR ACQUIRING PR STATUS AT SINGAPORE IN PARA 15.2 TO PARA 15.9 OF TH E IMPUGNED ORDER AS UNEXPLAINED INVESTMENT ON THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 69 OF THE ACT IN THE COMPUTA TION OF UNDISCLOSED INCOME RELATING TO THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 1995-96 COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATION WITHOUT ASSIGNING PROPER REASONS AND JUSTIFICATION. 31. THE DCIT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT IN THE ABSEN CE OF SEIZED MATERIALS, THE ADDITION MADE IN THIS REGARD ON PRESUMPTION OF FACTS WAS COMPLETELY UNJUSTIFIED AND OUGHT TO HAVE APPRECIATED THAT THE DEFINITION OF UNDISCLOSED INCOME INCORPORATED IN CHAPTER XIVB OF THE ACT WAS COMPLETELY OVERLOOKED AND BRUSHED ASIDE. 32. THE DCIT ERRED IN ADDING BACK RS.24,00,000/- AS UNEXPLAINED EXPENDITURE U/S 69C OF THE ACT PERTAINI NG TO THE PRESUMED EXPENSES INCURRED FOR ENGAGING THE ADVOCATE/INVESTMENT CONSULTANT AT SINGAPORE IN THE COMPUTATION OF UNDISCLOSED INCOME FOR THE ASSESSMEN T YEAR 1995-96 COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATION AT PARA 16.3 OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER WI THOUT ASSIGNING PROPER REASONS AND JUSTIFICATION. 33.THE DCIT ERRED IN ADDING BACK RS.149,39,600/- AS UNEXPLAINED INVESTMENT U/S 69 OF THE ACT ON THE PRESUMPTION OF INVESTMENT IN M/S MICAM LEATHERS AT PARA 17.4 OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER IN THE COMPUTATION OF UNDISCLOSED INCOME FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 1995-96 COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATION WITHOUT ASSIGNING PROPER REASONS AND JUSTIFICATION. 34. THE DCIT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT HAVING BROUG HT ON RECORD CERTAIN SEQUENCE OF EVENTS WITHOUT ANY SEIZE D MATERIALS, THE PRESUMPTION OF INVESTMENT IN SHARES MADE BY THE APPELLANT SHOULD BE RECKONED AS BAD IN LAW A ND OUGHT TO HAVE APPRECIATED THAT THE PRESUMPTION OF INVESTMENT IN SHARES BY THE APPELLANT WAS WHOLLY UNJUSTIFIED AND ERRONEOUS, THEREBY VITIATING THE RE LATED FINDINGS. 8 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 35. THE DCII ERRED IN ADDING BACK RS.53,12,038/- AS UNEXPLAINED EXPENDITURE ON FOREIGN TRAVEL WITHIN TH E SCOPE OF SECTION 69C OF THE ACT IN RECORDING THE FI NDINGS FROM PARA 18.1 TO PARA 18.14 OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER IN THE COMPUTATION OF UNDISCLOSED INCOME FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 1995-96 COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PERI OD UNDER CONSIDERATION WITHOUT ASSIGNING PROPER REASON S AND JUSTIFICATION. 36. THE DCIT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT THE PRESUMP TION OF FACTS WITH REGARD TO FOREIGN TRAVEL WAS COMPLETE LY ERRONEOUS ON VARIOUS FACTS AND FURTHER OUGHT TO HAV E APPRECIATED THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF SEIZED MATERIALS COUPLED WITH WRONG ESTIMATION OF SUCH EXPENSES WOUL D VITIATE THE RELATED FINDINGS WHILE FORTIFYING HE PL EA FOR COMPLETE DELETION OF THE ADDITION MADE INVOKING SEC TION 69C OF THE ACT. 37. THE DCIT ERRED IN ADDING BACK RS.50,000/- IN PA RA 29 FOR THE PRESUMED PAYMENT OF PROFESSIONAL FEES TO TWO ADVISORS AS UNEXPLAINED EXPENDITURE U/S69C OF THE A CT PERTAINING TO THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 1995-96 COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATION WITHOUT ASSIGN ING PROPER REASONS AND JUSTIFICATION. 38. THE DCIT ERRED IN BRINGING TO TAX RS.45,71,26 ,016/- BEING THE PRESUMED INVESTMENT IN UK FOR THE REASONS STATED IN PAN 20,1 TO PARA 20.7 OF THE IMPUGNED ORD ER IN TERMS OF SECTION 69 OF THE ACT AS UNEXPLAINED INVES TMENT IN THE COMPUTATION OF UNDISCLOSED INCOME FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 1995-96 COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PERI OD UNDER CONSIDERATION WITHOUT ASSIGNING PROPER REASON S AND JUSTIFICATION. 39. THE DCIT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT HAVING NOT BROUGHT ON ANY MATERIAL COMPRISED IN THE SEIZED REC ORD TO SUBSTANTIATE THE PRESUMPTION OF FACTS OF INVESTM ENT IN UK BY REPEATING THE FIRST BLOCK ASSESSMENT ORDER, T HE ASSESSMENT OF PRESUMED INVESTMENT ON VARIOUS FACETS SHOULD BE RECKONED AS BAD TO LAW. 40. THE DCIT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT HAVING NOTIC ED THE FACT OF STAY OF TRIAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS INITIATED BY THE ED, THE ADDITION MADE FOR THE PRESUMED INVESTMENT ON VARIOUS GROUNDS WAS WERE WRONG, ERRONEOUS, UNJUSTIF IED, INCORRECT, INVALID AND NOT SUSTAINABLE BOTH ON FACT S AND IN LAW. 9 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 41. THE DCIT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT THE ORDER OF ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE HAD NOT REACHED FINALITY AN D OUGHT TO HAVE APPRECIATED THAT THE FINDINGS IN THE SAID ORDER ON VARIOUS FACETS WERE WRONG, ERRONEOUS, UNJUSTIFIED, INCORRECT, INVALID AND NOT SUSTAINABLE BOTH ON FACTS AND IN LAW. 42. THE DCIT ERRED IN ESTIMATING THE INCOME AT 8% OF THE SAID INVESTMENT ON PRESUMPTIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS AT PARA 21 OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER AND CONSEQUENTLY ERRE D IN ADDING BACK RS.1,82,85,040/- IN THE COMPUTATION OF UNDISCLOSED INCOME FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 1995-96 COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATION WITHOUT ASSIGNING PROPER REASONS AND JUSTIFICATION. 43. THE DCIT ERRED IN ADDING BACK RS1,86,500/- ON THE GROUND OF IN NOT ESTABLISHING THE LOAN TRANSACTION DISCUSSED IN PARA 22 OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER AS PART OF THE COMPUTATION OF UNDISCLOSED INCOME PERTAINING TO THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 1995-96 COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PERI OD UNDER CONSIDERATION WITHOUT ASSIGNING PROPER REASON S AND JUSTIFICATION. 44. THE DCIT ERRED IN ESTIMATING INCOME/INTEREST ON INVESTMENT IN UK AT THE RATE OF 8% AND CONSEQUENTLY ERRED IN ADDING BACK RS.3,80,32884/- AT PARA 23 OF THE IMPUGNED ORDER IN THE COMPUTATION OF UNDISCLOSED INCOME PERTAINING TO THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 1996-97 COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATION WITHOUT ASSIGNING PROPER REASONS AND JUSTIFICATION. 45. THE DCIT ERRED IN ESTIMATING INCOME/INTEREST ON INVESTMENT IN UK AT THE RATE OF 8% AND CONSEQUENTLY ERRED IN ADDING BACK RS1,19,80,429/- IN THE COMPUTA TION OF UNDISCLOSED INCOME PERTAINING TO THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 1997- 98 (FOR 3 MONTHS) IN PARA 24 OF THE IMPUGNE D ORDER COMPRISED IN THE BLOCK PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERA TION WITHOUT ASSIGNING PROPER REASONS AND JUSTIFICATION. 46.THE DCIT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT HAVING NOT FURNISHED THE COMPLETE INFORMATION/DOCUMENTS/DETAIL S OBTAINED FROM ED AND IN THE POSSESSION OF THE REVEN UE AND FURTHER HAVING NOT PERMITTED THE APPELLANT TO C ROSS EXAMINE THE PERSONS WHO HAD GIVEN STATEMENTS AT VARIOUS STAGES/NOT PERMITTING CROSS VERIFICATION OF THE RELATED DOCUMENTS/DETAILS, THE ADDITIONS MADE IN TH E COMPUTATION OF UNDISCLOSED INCOME FOR ALL THE ASSESSMENT YEARS COMPRISED TINDER THE BLOCK PERIOD 10 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 UNDER CONSIDERATION WERE WRONG, ERRONEOUS, UNJUSTIF IED, INCORRECT, INVALID AND NOT SUSTAINABLE BOTH ON FACT S AND IN LAW. 47. THE DCIT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT THE ESTIMATE D ADDITIONS, THE ADDITIONS MADE ON PRESUMPTIONS OF FA CTS, THE ADDITIONS MADE WITHOUT SEARCH MATERIALS, THE ADDITIONS MADE SOLELY BASED ON THE STATEMENTS WITHO UT CORROBORATING THE EVIDENCES AS PART OF THE COMPUTAT ION OF UNDISCLOSED INCOME FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEARS COMPRIS ED IN THE BLOCK PERIOD UNDER CONSIDERATION WERE WRONG, ERRONEOUS, UNJUSTIFIED, INCORRECT, INVALID AND NOT SUSTAINABLE BOTH ON FACTS AND IN LAW. 48. THE DCIT RAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT HAVING NOTIC ED THE SCOPE OF THE UNDISCLOSED INCOME CHAPTER XIVD OF THE ACT ESPECIALLY THE DEFINITION OF UNDISCLOSED INCOME IN- BUILT THEREIN, THE ADDITIONS MADE AND DISPUTED IN T HE PRESENT APPEAL WERE WRONG, ERRONEOUS, UNJUSTIFIED, INCORRECT, INVALID AND NOT SUSTAINABLE BOTH ON FACT S AND IN LAW. 49. THE DCIT RAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT THERE WAS NO PROPER OPPORTUNITY GIVEN BEFORE PASSING THE IMPUGNE D ORDER AND ANY ORDER PASSED IN VIOLATION OF THE PRIN CIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE IS NULLITY IN LAW. 50. THE APPELLANT CRAVES LEAVE TO FILE ADDITIONAL GROUNDS/ARGUMENTS AT THE TIME OF HEARING. 3. BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE ARE THAT THE ASSESSEE IS AN INDIVIDUAL ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS OF CONTRACT WORK FOR EARTH MOVING. HE WAS PROPRIETOR OF TVC PACKERS, PARTNER O F M/S. VIVEK FINANCE AND MANAGEMENT SERVICES AND ALSO DI RECTOR OF M/S. TVC ENGINEERING PVT.LTD. & M/S. EMERALD PROMO TERS PVT.LTD. THE ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE, CHENNAI HAS L AUNCHED INVESTIGATION AGAINST THE ASSESSEE FOR ALLEGED VIOL ATION OF 11 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 FOREIGN EXCHANGE REGULATION ACT. HE WAS ALSO DETA INED UNDER COFEPOSA ACT FOR ONE YEAR FROM 07.02.1996. THE ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE HAS CONDUCTED SEARCH IN THE PREMISES OF THE ASSESSEE AND ITS ASSOCIATES IN CONNECTION WI TH ALLEGED VIOLATION OF FERA AND SEIZED CERTAIN BOOKS OF ACCOU NT AND DOCUMENTS. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE ENFORCEMENT DIRECTOR ATE HAS CAUSED CERTAIN INQUIRIES AT ABROAD AND PARTICULARLY IN U.K AND SINGAPORE WITH CERTAIN BANKS AND CERTAIN PERSONS AS SOCIATED WITH THE ASSESSEE AND GATHERED PARTICULARS AND DETA ILS IN CONNECTION WITH ALLEGED VIOLATION OF FERA BY THE AS SESSEE. IN ADDITION, CERTAIN DETAILS WERE COLLECTED THROUGH AD DITIONAL CHIEF JUDICIAL METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE COURT, ECONOMIC OF FENCE, EGMORE, CHENNAI-11, BY ISSUE OF LETTER TO THE COMPE TENT AUTHORITY IN U.K. DURING THE COURSE OF INVESTIGATIO N, STATEMENTS WERE RECORDED FROM ASSOCIATES OF ASSESSEE SUCH AS M R. N.C.RANGESH (PROFESSIONAL CONSULTANT FOR THE ASSESS EE), MR.K.RAMACHANDRAN AND MR.S.RAJOO. CONSEQUENT TO THE ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE PROCEEDINGS, INCOME TAX DEP ARTMENT, CHENNAI I.E., DIRECTOR OF INCOME TAX (INVESTIGATION ) HAS REQUISITIONED BOOKS OF ACCOUNT AND DOCUMENTS SEIZE D FROM THE ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE BY ISSUE OF WARRANT OF AUTH ORIZATION 12 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 DATED 12.07.1996. THE BOOKS OF ACCOUNT WERE OBTAINE D FROM THE ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE ON 15.07.1996 AND REQUI SITIONED U/S.132A OF THE ACT, 1961. 4. THEREAFTER, THE ASSESSEE WAS SERVED WITH NOTICE U/S.158BC OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961 ON 21.11.1996 TO FILE RETURN OF INCOME FOR THE BLOCK PERIOD FOR WHICH THE ASSESSEE HAS FILED HIS RETURN OF INCOME IN FORM NO.2B ON 21. 03.1997 ADMITTING NIL UNDISCLOSED INCOME. DURING THE COURSE OF BLOCK ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS, THE ASSESSEE WAS EXAMINED O N OATH U/S.131 OF THE ACT ON 25.07.1997. THE ASSESSING OFF ICER HAS ALSO OBTAINED COPIES OF DOCUMENTS FROM THE ENFORCEM ENT DIRECTORATE AND ALSO ADDITIONAL CHIEF METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE U/S.132A OF THE ACT ON 07.08.1997. THE ASSESSING OF FICER HAD ALSO OBTAINED STATEMENT RECORDED BY THE ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE FROM MR. N.C.RANGESH, MR. K.RAMACHANDRA N AND MR.S.RAJOO AND ALSO FROM THE ASSESSEE ON VARIOUS DA TES. SIMULTANEOUSLY, ENQUIRIES WERE ALSO CONDUCTED BY TH E DEPARTMENT WITH MALAYSIAN REVENUE AUTHORITIES THRO UGH FTD REGARDING CERTAIN INVESTMENTS AND RECEIVED DETAILS ON 31.01.2000. BASED ON THE INFORMATION COLLECTED FROM 13 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE, THE ASSESSING OFFICER HAS COMPLETED BLOCK ASSESSMENT ON 30.07.1997 U/S.158BC OF THE INC OME TAX ACT,1961 AND DETERMINED UNDISCLOSED INCOME OF ` 57,43,79,390/- FOR THE BLOCK PERIOD BY MAKING VARIO US ADDITIONS, INCLUDING ADDITIONS TOWARDS INVESTMENTS FOR ACQUIRI NG PR STATUS AT SINGAPORE, INVESTMENTS IN BUSINESS CONCERNS AT U .K, INVESTMENTS IN M/S.MICOM LEATHER EXPORT LTD. AND AD DITION TOWARDS ALLEGED TRAVEL EXPENSES TO ABROAD. 5. THE ASSESSEE HAS CHALLENGED THE BLOCK ASSESSMENT ORDER DATED 30.07.1997 BEFORE THE ITAT. THE ITAT VIDE IT S ORDER DATED 04.10.2010 IN IT(SS)A NO.163/MDS/1997 HAS SET ASIDE THE ASSESSMENT AND DIRECTED THE ASSESSING OFFICER TO REDO THE ASSESSMENT, AFTER TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION ALL THE RELEVANT MATERIALS CONNECTED TO THE PROCEEDINGS AND STRICTLY FOLLOWING PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE AND FURTHER, GIVING R EASONABLE AND SUFFICIENT OPPORTUNITY TO THE ASSESSEE. PURSUANT T O THE ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL, THE ASSESSING OFFICER HAD INITIATED P ROCEEDINGS TO COMPLETE SET ASIDE ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS. DURING T HE COURSE OF ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS, THE ASSESSEE VIDE ITS LE TTERS OF EVEN DATED HAD REQUESTED THE ASSESSING OFFICER TO F URNISH 14 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 COPIES OF DOCUMENTS REQUISITIONED FROM ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE INCLUDING STATEMENTS RECORDED FROM HIM AND HIS ASSOCIATES FOR WHICH THE ASSESSING OFFICER HAS PROV IDED COPIES OF STATEMENT RECORDED FROM THE ASSESSEE AND HIS ASS OCIATES BY THE ENFORCEMENT DIRECTORATE AND ALSO CERTAIN DOCUME NTS COLLECTED FROM ADDITIONAL CHIEF METROPOLITAN MAGIST RATE, EGMORE. THEREAFTER, ON 04.03.2002 THE ASSESSEE HAS FILED A WRIT PETITION BEFORE THE HONBLE MADRAS HIGH COUR T IN W.P NO.7623 OF 2002AND CHALLENGED BLOCK ASSESSMENT PROC EEDINGS CONDUCTED IN PURSUANCE TO FIRST ROUND OF PROCEEDING S. THE HONBLE MADRAS HIGH COURT ON 08.03.2002 HAS PASSED INTERIM ORDER AND STAYED SECOND ROUND BLOCK ASSESSMENT PROC EEDINGS, TILL FURTHER ORDERS AND SAID STAY HAS BEEN EXTENDED VIDE ORDER DATED 11.04.2002. FINALLY, THE HONBLE MADRAS HIGH COURT ON 14.12.2018 HAS DISPOSED OFF WRIT PETITION FILED BY THE ASSESSEE ON THE GROUND THAT THEY ARE DEVOID OF MERITS AND FU RTHER OBSERVED THAT PETITIONER WOULD CO-OPERATE FOR EARLY COMPLETION OF ALL THE PROCEEDINGS AND THE DEPARTMENT TO INITIA TE STEPS TO CONCLUDE ALL THESE PROCEEDINGS BY PROVIDING OPPORTU NITY TO THE PETITIONER AS CONTEMPLATED UNDER THE ACT WITHOUT AN Y FURTHER LAPSE OF TIME. THE SAID ORDER OF THE HONBLE SINGL E JUDGE IN 15 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 W.P NO.7623 OF 2002 WAS RECEIVED BY O/O.THE PCIT ON 13.02.2019. THEREAFTER, THE ASSESSING OFFICER HAD I SSUED NOTICE U/S 143(2) ON 20.02.2019 AND CALLED FOR VARIOUS DET AILS. FURTHER, THE ASSESSING OFFICER HAD ISSUED NOTICE U/S 142(1) ON 17.09.2019 ALONG WITH DETAILED QUESTIONNAIRE, AS DI RECTED BY THE HONBLE HIGH COURT AND ALSO PROVIDED TO THE ASSESSE E AN OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE COPIES OF SWORN STATEMENT, SEIZ ED RECORDS OR OTHER RECORDS AVAILABLE WITH THE DEPARTMENT IN C ONNECTION WITH BLOCK ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS. FURTHER, THE ASS ESSEE VIDE SUBMISSION DATED 02.12.2019 CONTENDED THAT THERE IS NO JURISDICTION FOR BLOCK ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS, BECA USE DOCUMENTS AND EVIDENCES WHICH ARE RECEIVED BY THE DEPARTMENT BEYOND DUE DATE OF CONCLUSION OF SEARCH IS BEING USED TO COMPUTE UNDISCLOSED INCOME FOR THE BLOCK AS SESSMENT. FURTHER VIDE LETTER DATED 24.12.2019, THE ASSESSEE SUBMITTED THAT ASSESSMENT IS TIME BARRED BY LIMITATION AND I S BEYOND TIME LIMIT GIVEN U/S.153(2A) WITH EXPLANATION 1(II)TO SECTION 153, BECAUSE THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 153 (2A) HAS BEEN AMENDED BY THE FINANCE ACT, 2000 W.E.F. 01.06.2001, AS PER WHICH TIME LIMIT FOR COMPLETION OF FRESH ASSESSMENT U/S.143(3 ) IN PURSUANCE TO AN APPELLATE ORDER U/S. 250,254, OR RE VISION ORDER 16 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 U/S 263 OR SECTION 264 SETTING ASIDE OR CANCELLING ASSESSMENT TO ONE YEAR FROM TWO YEARS FROM THE END OF THE FINA NCIAL YEAR IN WHICH SAID ORDER IS RECEIVED BY CHIEF COMMISSIONER / COMMISSIONER. 6. THE ASSESSING OFFICER, AFTER CONSIDERING RELEVAN T SUBMISSIONS OF THE ASSESSEE HAS REJECTED LEGAL GRO UND TAKEN BY THE ASSESSEE CHALLENGING BLOCK ASSESSMENT PROCE EDINGS IN LIGHT OF DOCUMENTS REQUISITIONED U/S.132A AND HAS A LSO REJECTED ANOTHER CONTENTION OF THE ASSESSEE REGARDING LIMI TATION IN LIGHT OF PROVISIONS OF SECTION 153(2A) OF THE ACT ON THE GROUND THAT SUB-SECTION (2A) TO SECTION 153 ENABLES THE ASSESSI NG OFFICER TO COMPLETE THE ASSESSMENT AT ANY TIME BEFORE EXPIR Y OFTWO YEARS FROM THE END OF FINANCIAL YEAR IN WHICH THE O RDER PASSED U/S.146 OR 250, 254 /263 /264, AS THE CASE MAY BE RECEIVED BY CIT/CCIT. SINCE, THE ORDER PASSED BY THE TRIBUNAL O N 04.10.2010 WAS RECEIVED BY O/O. CIT ON 10.11.2000, THE ASSESSING OFFICER SHALL HAVE TIME LIMIT UPTO 31.03. 2003 TO COMPLETE THE ASSESSMENT. FURTHER, SINCE THE ASSESSE E HAS CHALLENGED THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HONBLE HIGH COURT AND GOT STAY FOR PROCEEDINGS, AS PER EXPLANATION (II) P ERIOD OF 17 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 OPERATION OF STAY SHALL BE EXCLUDED FROM LIMITATION AND IF SUCH PERIOD IS EXCLUDED, THE ASSESSING OFFICER IS STILL HAVING TIME UPTO 06.01.2020 TO PASS ASSESSMENT ORDER AND HENCE, THE ORDER PASSED U/S 143(3), R.W.S. 254 ON 31/12/2019 I S WELL WITHIN THE TIME PRESCRIBED UNDER SECTION 153(2A) OF THE AC T. THEREFORE, HE OPINED THAT NO MERIT IN THE ARGUMENTS TAKEN BY T HE LEARNED AR FOR THE ASSESSEE THAT PROCEEDINGS ARE BARRED BY LIMITATION. THE ASSESSING OFFICER HAS ALSO ANALYZED PROVISIONS OF SECTION 153(2A) AND 153(II) AND OBSERVED THAT THE ASSESSEE IS UNDER IMPRESSION THAT BLOCK ASSESSMENT ORDER IN QUESTION IS BEING PASSED IN PURSUANT TO ORDER OF ITAT U/S.254, BUT SA ID PROCEEDINGS IS CONTINUED IN PURSUANT TO THE DIRECTI ONS OF THE HONBLE HIGH COURT AND HENCE, ORDER PASSED UNDER TH E JURISDICTION OF WRIT IS NOT COVERED BY SUB-SECTION (2A) TO SECTION 153 OF THE ACT. THEREFORE, HE OPINED THAT PROVISION S OF SUB- SECTION (3) OF SECTION 153 IS APPLICABLE TO THE PRE SENT CASE, BECAUSE THE PRESENT PROCEEDINGS ARE TAKEN AS PER DI RECTION OF THE HONBLE HIGH COURT IN WRIT, AS PER WHICH, THERE IS NO TIME LIMIT FOR COMPLETION OF ASSESSMENT. ACCORDINGLY, HE HAS REJECTED THE ARGUMENTS OF THE ASSESSEE TAKEN IN LIGHT OF PRO VISIONS OF SECTION 153(2A) OF THE ACT. THEREAFTER, THE ASSESSI NG OFFICER 18 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 HAS COMPLETED THE BLOCK ASSESSMENT U/S.153BCR.W.S 2 54 OF THE ACT ON 31.12.2019 AND DETERMINED TOTAL INCOME AT ` 57,43,79,390/- WHICH IS SAME AS DETERMINED IN THE F IRST ROUND OF PROCEEDINGS VIDE ORDER DATED 30.07.1997. THE REL EVANT FINDINGS OF THE ASSESSING OFFICER ARE AS UNDER: 2.5. FURTHER, VIDE LETTER DATED 24.12.2019, ASSES SEE SUBMITTED THAT THE ASSESSMENT IS TIME BARRED BY LIMITATION AN D IS BEYOND THE TIME LIMIT GIVEN IN SECTION 153 (2A) WITH EXPLA NATION 1(U) TO SECTION 153. THE ABOVE SUBMISSION OF THE ASSESSEE IS NOT ACCEPTA BLE AS THE ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS ARE VERY MUCH WITHIN TIME AS SEEN FROM THE EXPLANATIONS PROVIDED BELOW: FOR BETTER UNDERSTANDING, THE PROVISIONS OF SUB SEC TION (2A) & (3) OF SECTION 153 AS EXIST ON 01.04.2000 NEEDS TO BE ANALYSED AND THE SAME IS PRODUCED HERE UNDER: SECTION. 153: TIME LIMIT FOR COMPLETION OF ASSESSM ENTS AND REASSESSMENTS. (1) NO ORDER OF ASSESSMENT SHALL BE MADE UNDER SECT ION 143 OR SECTION 144 AT ANY TIME AFTER THE EXPIRY OF (A) TWO YEARS FROM THE END OF THE ASSESSMENT YEAR I N WHICH THE INCOME WAS FIRST ASSESSABLE; OR (B) ONE YEAR FROM THE END OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR IN WHICH A RETURN OR A REVISED RETURN RELATING TO THE ASSESSMENT YEAR COMMENCING ON THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 1988, OR ANY EARLIER ASSES SMENT YEAR, IS FILED UNDER SUB-SECTION (4) OR SUB-SECTION (5) OF S ECTION 139, WHICHEVER IS LATER. (2) NO ORDER OF ASSESSMENT, REASSESSMENT OR RECOMPU TATION SHALL BE MADE UNDER SECTION 147 AFTER THE EXPIRY OF TWO YEARS FROM THE END OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR IN WHICH THE NOT ICE UNDER SECTION 148 WAS SERVED: PROVIDED THAT WHERE THE NOTICE UNDER SECTION 148 WA S SERVED ON OR BEFORE THE 31ST DAY OF MARCH, 1987, SUCH ASSE SSMENT, REASSESSMENT OR RECOMPUTATION MAY BE MADE AT ANY TI ME UP TO THE 31ST DAY OF MARCH, 1990. 19 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 (2A,) NOTWITHSTANDING ANYTHING CONTAINED IN SUB-SEC TIONS (1)AND (2), IN RELATION TO THE ASSESSMENT YEAR COMMENCING ON THE 1 ST DAY OF APRIL, 1971, AND ANY SUBSEQUENT ASSESSMENT Y EAR AN ORDER OF FRESH ASSESSMENT UNDER SECTION 146 OR IN P URSUANCE OF AN ORDER UNDER SECTION 250, SECTION 254, SECTION 2 63 OR SECTION 264, SETTING ASIDE OR CANCELLING AN ASSESSMENT, MAY BE MADE AT ANY TIME BEFORE THE EXPIRY OF TWO YEARS FROM THE END OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR IN WHICH THE ORDER UNDER SECTION 146 CANCELLING THE ASSESSMENT IS PASSED BY THE [ASSESSING) OFFICER OR THE ORDER UNDER SECTION 250 OR SECTION 254 IS RECEIVED BY THE [CHIEF COMMISSIONER OR COMMISSIONER OR, AS THE CASE MAY BE , THE ORDER UNDER SECTION 263 OR SECTION 264 IS PASSED BY THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OR COMMISSIONER) (3) THE PROVISIONS OF SUB-SECTIONS (1) AND (2) SHAL L NOT APPLY TO THE FOLLOWING CLASSES OF ASSESSMENTS, REASSESSMENTS AND RECOMPUTATIONS WHICH MAY, [SUBJECT TO THE PROVISION S OF SUB- SECTION (2A),] BE COMPLETED AT ANY TIME (I) WHERE A FRESH ASSESSMENT IS MADE UNDER SECTION 146; (II) WHERE THE ASSESSMENT, REASSESSMENT OR RECOMPUT ATION IS MADE ON THE ASSESSEE OR ANY PERSON IN CONSEQUENCE O F OR TO GIVE EFFECT TO ANY FINDING OR DIRECTION CONTAINED I N AN ORDER UNDER SECTIONS 250, 254, 260, 262, 263, OR 264 [OR IN AN ORDER OF ANY COURT IN A PROCEEDING OTHERWISE THAN BY WAY OF APPEAL OR REFERENCE UNDER THIS ACT); (III) WHERE, IN THE CASE OF A FIRM, AN ASSESSMENT I S MADE ON A PARTNER OF THE FIRM IN CONSEQUENCE OF AN ASSESSMENT MADE ON THE FIRM UNDER SECTION 147. ANALYSIS OF PROVISION OF SUB-SECTION (2A) TAKING RECOURSE TO PROVISIONS OF SUB-SECTION (2A) T O 153, THE ASSESSEE IS OF MISTAKEN BELIEF THAT THE ASSESSMENT GOT TIME BARRED A READY. HERE IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO ANALYSE THE CHRONOLOGY OF VARIOUS EVENTS LEADING TO COMPLETION OF ASSESSMENTS BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER. 1. DATE OF ORIGINAL ASSESSMENT: 30.7.1997 2. DATE OF ORDER OF ITAT: 04.10.2000. 3. DATE OF RECEIPT OF ITAT ORDER BY THE OFFICE OF C IT: 10.11.2000 4. DATE OF ORDER OF THE HONBLE HIGH COURT STAYING ON THE OPINION OF ORDER OF THE HONBLE ITAT : 08.03.2002. 20 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 5. DATE OF ORDER OF THE HONBLE HIGH COURT DIRECTIN G THE ASSESSING OFFICER TO COMPLETE THE ASSESSMENT :14.12 .2018. 6. DATE OF RECEIPT OF THE ORDER OF THE HONBLE HIGH COURT BY OFFICE OF THE PCIT: 13.02.2019. THIS SUB-SECTION ENABLES THE ASSESSING OFF ICER TO COMPLETE THE ASSESSMENT AT ANY TIME BEFORE EXPIRY O F 2 YEARS FROM THE END OF THE F.Y. IN WHICH ORDER U/S 146 OR ORDER U/S 250 OR 254 OR ORDER U/S.263 OR U/S 264 IS PASSED BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER / CIT/CCIT. THE ASSESSEE IS UNDER IMPRESSION THAT THE BLOCK ASS ESSMENT ORDER [IN QUESTION IS BEING PASSED BY ME, CONSEQUEN T TO THE ORDER OF THE HONBLE ITAT U/S.254, THEREFORE THE AS SESSMENT GOT TIME BARRED. THE TIME BARRING DATE FOR PASSING THE ORDER IN THIS CASE IS 31.03.2003 I.E. 2 YEARS FROM THE END OF THE FY 2000- 2001 (ITAT ORDER DATED 10.11.2000) IS 3 1.03.2003. BUT BEFORE THE EXPIRY OF THE 2 YEARS THE ASSESSEE HAD FILED A WRIT ON 08.03.2002. THUS OUT OF 2 YEARS TIME LIMIT, ONE YEA R GOT EXPIRED AND I AM LEFT WITH ONE YEAR FOR PASSING THE ORDER. IT IS NOT THE CASE WHERE I AM PASSING AN O RDER AS PER THE DIRECTIONS OF THE HONBLE ITAT. THE ASSESSEE HAD FI LED A WRIT AND THE ASSESSMENT PROCEEDING HAVE BEEN STAYED BY T HE HONBLE HIGH COURT. THE PRESENT ORDER IS BEING PASS ED BY ME, IN COMPLIANCE TO THE DIRECTION OF THE HONBLE HIGH COURT AND NOT OF THE HONBLE ITAT. THE ORDER PASSED UNDER THE JUR ISDICTION OF WRIT IS NOT COVERED BY SUB-SECTION (2A) OF SECTION 153. IF THE PROVISIONS OF SUB-SECTION (2A) IS ANALYSED CAREFULL Y THEN IT MAKES CLEAR THAT IT COVERS ORDER PASSED U/S.146 BY A.O. OR 250/254/263/264 ORDERS BY CIT/CCIT AND IT DOES NOT COVER ORDER PASSED BY A COURT ORDER UNDER THE WRIT JURISD ICTION. THE HONBLE HIGH COURT HAS DISMISSED THE WRIT OF THE ASSESSEE VIDE ORDER DATED 14.12.2018, WHICH WAS REC EIVED IN THE OFFICE OF THE PCIT ON 13.02.2019.AS DISCUSSED I N THE EARLIER PARA ONE YEAR OUT OF 2 YEAR IS COMPLETED THE BALANC E ONE YEAR PERIOD IS STILL LEFT COMMENCING FROM FEBRUARY 2019 AND ENDING BY FEBRUARY 2020. THEREFORE THE ASSESSMENT IN THE N ORMAL COURSE NEEDS TO BE COMPLETED BY FEBRUARY 2020 AND H ENCE IT IS NOT TIME BARRED EVEN PRESUMING THAT SECTION (2A) IS APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE AS CLAIMED BY THE ASSESSEE . ANALYSIS OF PROVISION OF SUB-SECTION (3) THIS SUBSECTION COVERS ANY FINDING OR DIRECTIO N OR AN ORDER PASSED BY ANY COURT IN A PROCEEDING OTHERWISE THAN BY WAY OF APPEAL OR REFERENCE UNDER THE ACT APART FROM VARIOU S OTHER 21 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 ORDERS. THE ORDER BEFORE ME IS THE ORDER NOT AN ORD ER BY WAY OF REFERENCE OR BY WAY OF AN APPEAL, BUT AN ORDER PASS ED BY HONBLE HC UNDER A WRIT. IN FACT, THE PROVISIONS SU B-SECTION (3) OF 153 IS SQUARELY APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THE A SSESSEES CASE. NO DOUBT THE HIGH COURT HAS REMITTED THE MATT ER BACK TO THE ASSESSING OFFICER AND ITS A CASE OF FULL SET -ASIDE, BUT BECAUSE THE ORDER WAS PASSED CONSEQUENT TO WRIT, TH E PROVISIONS OF RATHER THE ASSESSES CASE FALLS UNDER THE AMBIT OF SUB-SECTION(3) OF SECTION 153. FOR PASSING AN ORDER U/S.153(3), THERE IS NO TIME LIMIT PRESCRIBED UNDER THE ACT. TH EREFORE THERE IS NO QUESTION OF THE ASSESSMENT GETTING TIME-BARRE D IN THIS CASE. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THE RECENT DECISION OF HC OF DELHI IN THE CASE OR NOKIA INDIA (P) LTD. VS DY. CIT (DELHI HIGH COURT), WHERE SOME ISSUES HAVE BEEN PARTLY SET-ASIDE AND RE MANDED BACK TO THE AO. THE OBSERVATION OF THE COURT AND TH E FINDING ON THE APPLICABILITY OF SUBSECTION2A AND SUBSECTION 3 IS AS UNDER: THE HONBLE HIGH COURT OBSERVED THAT IT COULD NOT A GREE WITH THE CONTENTION THAT UNLESS THE ENTIRE ASSESSME NT ORDER IS WHOLLY SET ASIDE, THE TIME LIMIT FOR PASSI NG THE FRESH ORDER UNDER SECTION 153 (2A) TO THE COURT, TH ERE WAS NO WARRANT FOR SUCH AN INTERPRETATION. THE HONBLE HIGH COURT OBSERVED THAT THE OBJECT BEH IND INTRODUCTION OF SUB-SECTION (2A) WAS TO PRESCRIBE A TIME LIMIT FOR COMPLETING THE ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS UPO N THE ORIGINAL ASSESSMENT BEING SET ASIDE OR BEING CANCELLED IN APPEAL. CLEARLY, THE INTENTION WAS NOT TO RESTRICT THE APPLICABILITY OF SUBSECTION (2A) ONLY TO SUCH CASES WHERE THE ENTIRE ORIGINAL ASSESSMENT ORDER I S SET ASIDE. IT WAS NOTED THAT, UNDER THE EXISTING PROVI SIONS OF SECTION 153(3), SUCH FRESH ASSESSMENTS ARE NOT SUBJ ECT TO ANY TIME LIMIT. INDEED, SECTION 153, AS IT STOO D AT THAT TIME, DID NOT PRESCRIBE ANY TIME LIMITS. SECTION 15 3 (3) (II), IN PARTICULAR, DID NOT REQUIRE THE ORDER PASS ED THEREUNDER TO BE ISSUED WITHIN ANY PARTICULAR TIME LIMIT. THE HONBLE HIGH COURT OBSERVED THAT THERE IS A DISTINCTION BETWEEN AN ASSESSMENT THAT IS SET ASI DE AND AN ASSESSMENT ORDER BEING SET ASIDE. WHEN THE ASSESSMENT ON AN ISSUE IS SET ASIDE AND THE MATTER REMANDED, WITH A DIRECTION THAT THE ISSUE HAS TO BE DETERMINED AFRESH, SECTION 153 (2A) OF THE ACT WOUL D GET ATTRACTED. 22 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 THE HONBLE HIGH COURT NOTED THAT ALONG WITH THE INSERTION OF SUB-SECTION (2A), SUB-SECTION (3) UNDE RWENT A SIMULTANEOUS CHANGE. IT WAS EXPRESSLY MADE SUBJE CT TO THE PROVISIONS OF SUB-SECTION (2A). THIS MEANT THAT SECTION 153(3) WOULD THEREAFTER APPLY ONLY TO SUCH CASES WHERE SECTION 153(2A) DID NOT APPLY. IN OTHER WORDS , IN ALL INSTANCES OF AN AO HAVING TO PASS A FRESH ASSESSMENT ORDER UPON REMAND WHERE SECTION 153(2A) WOULD APPLY, THE AO WOULD BE BOUND TO FOLLOW THE TI ME LIMIT IMPOSED BY SUB-SECTION (2A). WHERE THE AO WAS ONLY GIVING EFFECT TO AN APPELLATE ORDER, THEN SECT ION 153 (3) (II) OF THE ACT WOULD APPLY HENCE AS PER THE ELABORATIONS ABOVE, SINCE THE BLOC K ASSESSMENT ORDER IS BEING PASSED BY COMPLYING THE D IRECTIONS OF HONBLE HIGH COURT OF MADRAS UNDER WRIT, DATED 14.12.2018, I AM OF THE VIEW THAT THE BLOCK ASSESSMENT PROCEEDIN GS ARE NOT TIME BARRED AS PER SECTION153(3) OF THE INCOME TAX ACT. BEING AGGRIEVED BY THE ASSESSMENT ORDER, THE ASSESS EE IS IN APPEAL BEFORE US. 7. THE PRELIMINARY ISSUE RAISED BY THE ASSESSEE VID E GROUND NO.2 TO 4 IS WITH REGARD TO VALIDITY OF ASSE SSMENT ORDER PASSED U/S.158BC, R.W.S. 143(3), R.W.S 254 OF THE I NCOME TAX ACT, 1961 DATED 31.12.2019 IN LIGHT OF PROVISIONS O F SECTION 153(2A) OF THE ACT. THE LEARNED A.R FOR THE ASSESSE E SUBMITTED THAT BLOCK ASSESSMENT ORDER PASSED BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER IS WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND OUT OF TIME, BECAUSE TIME LIMIT FOR COMPLETION OF ASSESSMENT IN PURSUANT TO AN ORDER U/ S.254 OF THE ACT BY THE ITAT IS ONE YEAR FROM THE END OF THE FI NANCIAL YEAR IN WHICH SUCH ORDER IS RECEIVED BY THE O/O.CIT / PCI T AND IF SUCH 23 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 DATE IS CONSIDERED, THEN ORDER PASSED BY THE ASSESS ING OFFICER ON 31.12.2019 IS CLEARLY BARRED BY LIMITATION AND N OT SUSTAINABLE BOTH ON FACTS AND IN LAW. THE LD. AR FOR THE ASSES SEE REFERRING TO RELEVANT DATES AND EVENTS SUBMITTED THAT BLOCK A SSESSMENT IN THE NORMAL COURSE OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN COMPLETED B Y THE ASSESSING OFFICER WITHIN ONE YEAR FROM THE END OF T HE MONTH IN WHICH REQUISITION U/S.132A WAS EXECUTED. HOWEVER, I N THE PRESENT CASE, PROCEEDING OF BLOCK ASSESSMENT WAS TA KEN UP AFTER THE ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL IN SETTING ASIDE BL OCK ASSESSMENT ORDER DATED 30.07.1997 FOR FRESH CONSIDERATION / CO MPLETION FOR THE REASONS CAPTURED IN THE ORDER PASSED ON 04.10.2 000. AS PER THE SAID ORDER, ASSESSMENT HAS BEEN SET ASIDE F OR DENOVO ASSESSMENT, AFTER CONSIDERING ALL RELEVANT DOCUMENT S AND ALSO GIVING ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY OF HEARING TO THE ASSES SEE. IN THE PRESENT CASE, THE TRIBUNAL HAS PASSED ITS ORDER ON 04.10.2000. THE SAID ORDER WAS RECEIVED BY O/O. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX ON 10.11.2000.FURTHER, THE PROVISIONS OF SECTIO N 153 (2A) OF THE ACT HAS BEEN AMENDED BY THE FINANCE ACT, 200 0W.E.F 01.06.2001 AND REDUCED TIME LIMIT FOR COMPLETION O F SET ASIDE ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS FROM EXISTING TWO YEARS TO O NE YEAR, AT ANY TIME BEFORE EXPIRY OF ONE YEAR FROM THE END OF THE 24 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 FINANCIAL YEAR, IN WHICH ORDER UNDER SECTION 254 OF THE ACT IS RECEIVED BY COMMISSIONER/CCIT. THE SAID AMENDMENT I S BROUGHT INTO STATUTE TO COVER ORDERS PASSED ON OR AFTER 01.04.2000, WHICH IS CLEARLY EVIDENT FROM THE PROVI SO INSERTED TO CLARIFY THE PURPOSE OF AMENDMENT, AS PER WHICH WHER E AN ORDER U/S.250 OR 254 IS RECEIVED BY CHIEF COMMISSIONER / COMMISSIONER ON OR AFTER 01.04.1999, BUT BEFORE 01 .04.2000, SUCH AN ORDER OF AFRESH ASSESSMENT MAY BE MADE AT A NY TIME UPTO 31.03.2002. THEREFORE, FROM THE AMENDED PROV ISIONS OF SECTION 153(2A), TIME LIMIT FOR COMPLETION OF SET A SIDE ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS HAS BEEN REDUCED TO ONE YEAR FROM THE END OF FINANCIAL YEAR IN WHICH SUCH ORDER HAS B EEN RECEIVED BY O/O. CHIEF COMMISSIONER / COMMISSIONER. HOWEVER, THE ASSESSING OFFICER ON A MISTAKEN OF LAW HAS CONSIDER ED THE PRE- AMENDED TIME LIMIT AVAILABLE AS PER SECTION 153(2A) BY GROSSLY OVERLOOKING AMENDMENT BROUGHT IN BY THE FINANCE ACT , 2000, RESTRICTING TIME LIMIT TO ONE YEAR FROM THE END OF FINANCIAL YEAR IN WHICH ORDER IS RECEIVED BY CIT. IF ONE YEAR PERIOD OF LIMITATION IS CONSIDERED, AS PER AMENDED PROVISIONS OF SECTION153 (2A), THEN THE ORDER PASSED BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER ON 3 1.12.2019 IS CLEARLY BARRED BY LIMITATION AND LIABLE TO BE QU ASHED. 25 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 8. THE LD. AR FURTHER REFERRING TO DATES AND EVENTS SUBMITTED THAT IN THIS CASE, THE ORDER OF THE ITAT WAS PASSED ON 04.10.2000 AND WHICH WAS RECEIVED BY THE O/O. PCIT ON 10.11.2000. SINCE, THE ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL WAS RE CEIVED ON OR AFTER 1-4-2000, AMENDED PROVISIONS OF SECTION 153(2 A) PRESCRIBING RESTRICTED TIME LIMIT WOULD GET ATTRACT ED TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE, AND HENCE, THE AO SHOULD HAVE COMPLETE D ASSESSMENT ON OR BEFORE 31.03.2002 AND NOT ON OR BE FORE 31.03.2003, AS ASSUMED BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER. BE CAUSE OF THE INTERVENING ORDER OF THE HONBLE HIGH COURT IN WRIT AND DISPOSAL OF SAID WRIT ON 14.12.2018 ( COMMUNICATED TO PCIT ON 13.02.2019), THE ASSESSING OFFICER WOULD GET C LEAR 60 DAYS TIME IN VIEW OF THE EXPLANATION REFERRED TO IN PARA (1) TO SECTION 153 OF THE ACT, BECAUSE BALANCE TIME LIMIT AS ON D ATE OF INTERIM ORDER PASSED BY HONBLE HIGH COURT WAS 23 DAYS WHI CH WAS LESS THAN 60 DAYS. THE SAID 60 DAYS WOULD EXPIRE ON 14.04.2019 AND HENCE, THE ORDER PASSED BY THE ASSES SING OFFICER IN THE PRESENT CASE ON 31.12.2019 IS CLEARL Y BARRED BY LIMITATION AND UNSUSTAINABLE IN LAW. 26 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 9. THE LEARNED A.R FOR THE ASSESSEE FURTHER REFERRI NG TO PROVISIONS OF SUB-SECTION (3) OF SECTION 153 OF THE ACT, ARGUED THAT ANOTHER FUNDAMENTAL MISTAKE COMMITTED BY THE A SSESSING OFFICER IN APPLYING SUB-SECTION (3) TO SECTION 153 OF THE ACT, AND ACCORDING TO HIM, EFFECT GIVING ORDER PASSED IS IN CONSEQUENT TO DIRECTION OF THE HONBLE MADRAS HIGH COURT IN DISPO SAL OF WRIT PETITION. THE ABOVE PERCEPTION OF THE ASSESSING OFF ICER IS COMPLETELY ERRONEOUS AND THE HONBLE HIGH COURT IN DISPOSING OF WRIT HAS ONLY PERMITTED THE PARTIES TO COMPLETE THE PENDING PROCEEDINGS CREATED DUE TO THE ORDER OF THE APPELL ATE TRIBUNAL IN SETTING ASIDE ORIGINAL ASSESSMENT ORDER. HENCE, PROVISIONS OF SECTION 153(3) OF THE ACT WAS WRONGLY INVOKED FOR C OMPUTING TIME LIMIT. HE THEREFORE SUBMITTED THAT SUB-SECTIO N (3) OF SECTION 153 OF THE ACT, ENVISAGES FOR COMPLETING T HE ASSESSMENT OR REASSESSMENT BASED ON A FINDING OR D IRECTION OF ANY AUTHORITY OR A COURT, WHILE IN THE PRESENT CAS E, IT IS BASED ON THE ORDER OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL FOR COMPLETI NG FRESH ASSESSMENT DE NOVO IN VIEW OF THE ORDER IN SETTING ASIDE THE ORIGINAL ASSESSMENT ORDER. THEREFORE, THERE IS A C OMPLETE MISDIRECTION ON THE PART OF THE ASSESSING OFFICER IN FALLING BACK TO THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 153(3) OF THE ACT WH ICH IS NOT 27 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 APPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT CASE. HE FURTHER SUBMITTE D THAT THE ASSESSING OFFICER, WHILE ERRONEOUSLY TAKING TIME LI MIT TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE ORDER OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL HAS P LACED RELIANCE ON SAID SUB-SECTION (3) FOR THE PURPOSE OF VALIDATI NG HIS ORDER PASSED BEYOND THE TIME LIMIT PRESCRIBED. THEREFORE, HE SUBMITTED THAT ASSESSMENT ORDER PASSED BY THE ASSES SING OFFICER IS CLEARLY BARRED BY LIMITATION AND NOT SUS TAINABLE IN LAW. IN THIS REGARD, HE RELIED UPON THE DECISION OF HON BLE DELHI HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT VS BHAN TEXTILES P.LTD (2 008) 300 ITR 176 (DEL) AND THE DECISION OF ITAT., DELHI BENC H IN THE CASE OF AWANINDRA SINGH (2019) 104 TAXMANN.COM 171 . 10. THE LEARNED DR, ON THE OTHER HAND, SUPPORTING THE ORDER OF THE ASSESSING OFFICER SUBMITTED THAT THERE IS NO MERIT IN THE ARGUMENTS OF THE LEARNED A.R FOR THE ASSESSEE THA T ASSESSMENT ORDER PASSED BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER I S BARRED BY LIMITATION, BECAUSE THE ASSESSING OFFICER HAS P ASSED ORDER WITHIN TIME LIMIT AS PROVIDED U/S.153(3) OF THE ACT , WHERE IT IS CLEARLY ENVISAGED THAT IF AN ORDER IS PASSED IN CON SEQUENCE OF OR TO GIVE EFFECT TO ANY FINDING OR DIRECTION CONTA INED IN THE SAID ORDER UNDER SECTION 250/254/263 OR 264 OR IN AN ORDER OF ANY 28 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 COURT IN A PROCEEDING OTHERWISE THAN BY WAY OF APPE AL OR REFERENCE UNDER THIS ACT, PROVISIONS OF SUB-SECTIO N (1),(1A),(1B) AND (2) SHALL NOT APPLY AND HENCE, THERE IS NO TIME LIMIT AS PRESCRIBED FOR COMPLETION OF ASSESSMENT. IN THIS CA SE, THE ASSESSING OFFICER HAS COMPLETED ASSESSMENT IN PURSU ANT TO THE DIRECTION OF THE HONBLE MADRAS HIGH COURT VIDE ORD ER DATED 14.12.2018, WHICH WAS RECEIVED IN THE OFFICE OF PCI T ON 13.02.2019. THE ORDER PASSED UNDER WRIT JURISDICTIO N IS NOT COVERED BY SUB-SECTION (2A) OF SECTION 153 OF THE A CT. IF PROVISIONS OF SUB-SECTION (2A) IS ANALYZED CAREFULL Y, THEN IT MAKES CLEAR THAT IT COVERS ORDERS PASSED BY THE ASS ESSING OFFICER U/S .146 OR ORDERS PASSED BY APPELLATE TRIB UNAL OR COMMISSIONER OR CHIEF COMMISSIONER U/S.250 / 254 / 263 OR 264 OF THE ACT. THEREFORE, IF PROVISIONS OF SECTION 153(3) IS CONSIDERED, THEN TIME LIMIT AVAILABLE FOR COMPLETIO N OF ASSESSMENT IS ENDING BY FEBRUARY, 2020 AND HENCE, ASSESSMENT ORDER PASSED BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER ON 31.12.2019 IS CLEARLY WITHIN TIME PRESCRIBED UNDER THE ACT AND HENCE, THERE IS NO MERIT IN THE ARGUMENTS TAKEN BY THE LEARNED A.R FOR THE ASSESSEE. THE DR FURTHER SUBMITTED THAT CASE LAWS RELIED UPON BY THE LEARNED A.R FOR THE ASSESSEE AR E NOT 29 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE, BECAUS E IN THOSE CASES ORDER WAS PASSED BY ASSESSING OFFICER IN PU RSUANT TO ORDER OF APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, WHEREAS IN THE PRESENT CASE, ASSESSMENT HAS BEEN COMPLETED IN PURSUANT TO THE DI RECTION OF THE HONBLE MADRAS HIGH COURT UNDER WRIT JURISDICTI ON. THEREFORE, UNDER THOSE FACTS, COURTS HELD THAT WHEN SET ASIDE PROCEEDINGS IS TAKEN UP IN PURSUANT TO DIRECTION OF APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, THEN PROVISIONS OF SECTION 153(2A) WILL C OME INTO OPERATION AND NOT SUB-SECTION (3) OF SECTION 153 OF THE ACT. THEREFORE, HE SUBMITTED THAT ORDER PASSED BY THE AS SESSING OFFICER IS CLEARLY WELL WITHIN THE TIME LIMIT PRESC RIBED UNDER THE ACT AND HENCE, ARGUMENTS TAKEN BY LEARNED AR FOR TH E ASSESSEE IS UNSUSTAINABLE IN LAW AND SHOULD BE REJE CTED. 11. WE HAVE HEARD BOTH THE PARTIES, PERUSED MATERIA LS AVAILABLE ON RECORD AND GONE THROUGH ORDERS OF THE AUTHORITIES BELOW. WE HAVE ALSO CAREFULLY CONSIDERED CASE LAWS CITED BY THE LD. COUNSEL FOR THE ASSESSEE ON THE ISSUE OF LI MITATION PRESCRIBED U/S.153(2A) OF THE ACT. THE PRELIMINARY ISSUE RAISED BY THE ASSESSEE ON LIMITATION IN LIGHT OF PROVISION S OF SECTION 153(2A) OF THE ACT NEEDS TO BE ANSWERED AND FOR THI S PURPOSE, 30 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 IT IS NECESSARY TO UNDERSTAND PROVISIONS OF SECTION 153 OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961. FOR BETTER UNDERSTANDING, WE REPRODUCE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 153 OF THE ACT, STOOD AT RELE VANT TIME, WHICH READS AS UNDER:- 153. TIME LIMIT FOR COMPLETION OF ASSESSMENTS AND REASSESSMENTS.(1) NO ORDER OF ASSESSMENT SHALL BE MADE UNDER SECTION 143 OR SECTION 144 AT ANY TIME AFTER THE EXPIRY OF (A) TWO YEARS FROM THE END OF THE ASSESSMENT YEAR I N WHICH THE INCOME WAS FIRST ASSESSABLE ; OR (B) ONE YEAR FROM THE END OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR IN WHICH A RETURN OR A REVISED RETURN RELATING TO THE ASSESSMENT YEAR COMMENCING ON THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 1988, OR ANY EARLIER ASSES SMENT YEAR, IS FILED UNDER SUB-SECTION (4) OR SUB-SECTION (5) OF S ECTION 139, WHICHEVER IS LATER: PROVIDED THAT IN CASE THE ASSESSMENT YEAR IN WHICH THE INCOME WAS FIRST ASSESSABLE IS THE ASSESSMENT YEAR COMMENC ING ON OR AFTER THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 2004 BUT BEFORE THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 2010, THE PROVISIONS OF CLAUSE (A) SHALL HAVE EFFEC T AS IF FOR THE WORDS TWO YEARS, THE WORDS TWENTY-ONE MONTHS HA D BEEN SUBSTITUTED: PROVIDED FURTHER THAT IN CASE THE ASSESSMENT YEAR I N WHICH THE INCOME WAS FIRST ASSESSABLE IS THE ASSESSMENT YEAR COMMENCING ON OR AFTER THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 2005 B UT BEFORE THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 2009 AND DURING THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDING FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF TOTAL INCOME, A REFERENCE UND ER SUB- SECTION (1) OF SECTION 92CA (I) WAS MADE BEFORE THE 1ST DAY OF JUNE, 2007 BUT A N ORDER UNDER SUB-SECTION (3) OF THAT SECTION HAS NOT BEEN MADE BEFORE SUCH DATE; OR (II) IS MADE ON OR AFTER THE 1ST DAY OF JUNE, 2007, THE PROVISIONS OF CLAUSE (A) SHALL, NOTWITHSTANDING ANYTHING CONTAINED IN THE FIRST PROVISO, HAVE EFFECT AS IF F OR THE WORDS TWO YEARS, THE WORDS THIRTY-THREE MONTHS HAD BEEN SU BSTITUTED: 31 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 PROVIDED ALSO THAT IN CASE THE ASSESSMENT YEAR IN W HICH THE INCOME WAS FIRST ASSESSABLE IS THE ASSESSMENT YEAR COMMENCING ON THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 2009 OR ANY SUB SEQUENT ASSESSMENT YEAR AND DURING THE COURSE OF THE PROCEE DING FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF TO INCOME, A REFERENCE UNDER SUB- SECTION (1) OF SECTION 92CA IS MADE, THE PROVISIONS OF CLAUSE ( A) SHALL, NOTWITHSTANDING ANYTHING CONTAINED IN THE FIRST PRO VISO, HAVE EFFECT AS IF FOR THE WORDS TWO YEARS, THE WORDS THREE YEARS HAD BEEN SUBSTITUTED. (1A) NO ORDER OF ASSESSMENT SHALL BE MADE UNDER SEC TION I15WE OR SECTION 11 5WF AT ANY TIME AFTER THE EXPIR Y OF TWENTY- ONE MONTHS FROM THE END OF THE ASSESSMENT YEAR IN W HICH THE FRINGE BENEFITS WERE FIRST ASSESSABLE. (IB) NO ORDER OF ASSESSMENT OR REASSESSMENT SHALL B E MADE UNDER SECTION 11 5WG AFTER THE EXPIRY OF NINE MONTH S FROM THE END OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR IN WHICH THE NOTICE UNDER SECTION 1 15WH WAS SERVED. (2) NO ORDER OF ASSESSMENT, REASSESSMENT OR RECOM PUTATION SHALL BE MADE UNDER SECTION 147 AFTER THE EXPIRY OF ONE YEAR FROM THE END OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR IN WHICH THE NOT ICE UNDER SECTION 148 WAS SERVED: PROVIDED THAT WHERE THE NOTICE UNDER SECTION 148 WA S SERVED ON OR AFTER THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 1999 BUT BEFORE T HE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 2000, SUCH ASSESSMENT, REASSESSMENT OR RECOM PUTATION MAY BE MADE AT ANY TIME UP TO THE 31ST DAY OF MARCH , 2002: PROVIDED FURTHER THAT WHERE THE NOTICE UNDER SECTIO N 148 WAS SERVED ON OR AFTER THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 2005 BUT B EFORE THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 2011, THE PROVISIONS OF THIS SUB-SECT ION SHALL HAVE EFFECT AS IF FOR THE WORDS ONE YEAR, THE WORDS N INE MONTHS HAD BEEN SUBSTITUTED: PROVIDED ALSO THAT WHERE THE NOTICE UNDER SECTION 1 48 WAS SERVED ON OR AFTER THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 2006 BUT B EFORE THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 2010 AND DURING THE COURSE OF THE PRO CEEDINGS FOR THE ASSESSMENT OR REASSESSMENT OR RECOMPUTATION OF TOTAL INCOME, A REFERENCE UNDER SUB-SECTION (1) OF SECTIO N 92CA 32 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 (I) WAS MADE BEFORE THE 1ST DAY OF JUNE, 2007 BUT A N ORDER UNDER SUB-SECTION (3) OF THAT SECTION HAS NOT BEEN MADE BEFORE SUCH DATE; OR (II) IS MADE ON OR AFTER THE 1ST DAY OF JUNE, 2007, THE PROVISIONS OF THIS SUB-SECTION SHALL, NOTWITHST ANDING ANYTHING CONTAINED IN THE SECOND PROVISO, HAVE EFFE CT AS IF FOR THE WORDS ONE YEAR, THE WORDS TWENTY-ONE MONTHS HAD BEEN SUBSTITUTED: PROVIDED ALSO THAT WHERE THE NOTICE UNDER SECTION 1 48 WAS SERVED ON OR AFTER THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 2010 AND D URING THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDING FOR THE ASSESSMENT OR REAS SESSMENT OR RECOMPUTATION OF TOTAL INCOME, A REFERENCE UNDER SUB-SECTION (1) OF SECTION 92CA IS MADE, THE PROVISIONS OF THIS SUB-SECTION SHALL, NOTWITHSTANDING ANYTHING CONTAINED IN THE SE COND PROVISO, HAVE EFFECT AS IF FOR THE WORDS ONE YEAR, THE WOR DS TWO YEARS HAD BEEN SUBSTITUTED. (2A) NOTWITHSTANDING ANYTHING CONTAINED IN SUB-SECT IONS (1), (1A), (1B) AND (2), IN RELATION TO THE ASSESSMENT Y EAR COMMENCING ON THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 1971, AND ANY S UBSEQUENT ASSESSMENT YEAR, AN ORDER OF FRESH ASSESSMENT IN PU RSUANCE OF AN ORDER UNDER SECTION 250 OR SECTION 254 OR SECTIO N 263 OR SECTION 264, SETTING ASIDE OR CANCELLING AN ASSESSM ENT, MAY BE MADE AT ANY TIME BEFORE THE EXPIRY OF ONE YEAR FROM THE END OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR IN WHICH THE ORDER UNDER SECTION 250 OR SECTION 254 IS RECEIVED BY THE PRINCIPAL CHIEF COMM ISSIONER OR CHIEF COMMISSIONER OR PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OR COMMISSIONER OR, AS THE CASE MAY BE, THE ORDER UNDE R SECTION 263 OR SECTION 264 IS PASSED BY THE PRINCIPAL CHIEF COMMISSIONER OR CHIEF COMMISSIONER OR PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OR COMMISSIONER: PROVIDED THAT WHERE THE ORDER UNDER SECTION 250 OR SECTION 254 IS RECEIVED BY THE PRINCIPAL CHIEF COMMISSIONER OR CHIEF COMMISSIONER OR PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OR COMMISSIO NER OR, AS THE CASE MAY BE, THE ORDER UNDER SECTION 263 OR SECTION 264 IS PASSED BY THE PRINCIPAL CHIEF COMMISSIONER OR CH IEF COMMISSIONER OR PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OR COMMISSIO NER, ON OR AFTER THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 1999 BUT BEFORE THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 33 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 2000, SUCH AN ORDER OF FRESH ASSESSMENT MAY BE MADE AT ANY TIME UP TO THE 31ST DAY OF MARCH, 2002: PROVIDED FURTHER THAT WHERE THE ORDER UNDER SECTION 254 IS RECEIVED BY THE PRINCIPAL CHIEF COMMISSIONER OR CHI EF COMMISSIONER OR PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OR COMMISSIO NER OR, AS ,THE CASE MAY BE, THE ORDER UNDER SECTION 263 OR SECTION 264 IS PASSED BY THE PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OR COMMISSI ONER ON OR AFTER THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 2005 BUT BEFORE THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 2011, THE PROVISIONS OF THIS SUB-SECTION SHALL HAVE EFFECT AS IF FOR THE WORDS ONE YEAR, THE WORDS NINE MONTHS HAD BE EN SUBSTITUTED: PROVIDED ALSO THAT WHERE THE ORDER UNDER SECTION 25 4 IS RECEIVED BY THE PRINCIPAL CHIEF COMMISSIONER OR CHI EF COMMISSIONER OR PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OR COMMISSIO NER OR, AS THE CASE MAY BE, THE ORDER UNDER SECTION 263 OR SECTION 264 IS PASSED BY THE PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OR COMMISSI ONER ON OR AFTER THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 2006 BUT BEFORE THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 2010, AND DURING THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS FOR THE FRESH ASSESSMENT OF TOTAL INCOME, A REFERENCE UNDER SUB-S ECTION (1) OF SECTION 92CA (I) WAS MADE BEFORE THE 1ST DAY OF JUNE, 2007 BUT A N ORDER UNDER SUB-SECTION (3) OF SECTION 92CA HAS NOT BEEN MADE BEFORE SUCH DATE; OR (II) IS MADE ON OR AFTER THE 1ST DAY OF JUNE, 2007, THE PROVISIONS OF THIS SUB-SECTION SHALL, NOTWITHST ANDING ANYTHING CONTAINED IN THE SECOND PROVISO, HAVE EFFE CT AS IF FOR THE WORDS ONE YEAR. THE WORDS TWENTY-ONE MONTHS HAD BEEN SUBSTITUTED: PROVIDED ALSO THAT WHERE THE ORDER UNDER SECTION 25 4 IS RECEIVED BY THE PRINCIPAL CHIEF COMMISSIONER OR CHI EF COMMISSIONER OR PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OR COMMISSIO NER OR, AS THE CASE MAY BE, THE ORDER UNDER SECTION 263 OR SECTION 264 IS PASSED BY THE PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OR COMMISSI ONER ON OR AFTER THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 2010, AND DURING THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDING FOR THE FRESH ASSESSMENT OF TOTAL INCOME , A REFERENCE UNDER SUBSECTION (1) OF SECTION 92CA IS M ADE, THE PROVISIONS OF THIS SUB-SECTION SHALL, NOTWITHSTANDI NG ANYTHING 34 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 CONTAINED IN THE SECOND PROVISO, HAVE EFFECT AS IF FOR THE WORDS ONE YEAR, THE WORDS TWO YEARS HAD BEEN SUBSTITU TED. (3) THE PROVISIONS OF SUB-SECTIONS (1), (1A), (LB) AND (2) SHALL NOT APPLY TO THE FOLLOWING CLASSES OF ASSESSMENTS, REASSESSMENTS AND RECOMPUTATIONS WHICH MAY, SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF SUB-SECTION (2A), BE COMPLETED AT ANY TIME (I)[***] (II) WHERE THE ASSESSMENT, REASSESSMENT OR RECOMPUT ATION IS MADE ON THE ASSESSEE OR ANY PERSON IN CONSEQUENCE O F OR TO GIVE EFFECT TO ANY FINDING OR DIRECTION CONTAINED IN AN ORDER UNDER SECTION 250,254, 260,262,263, OR 264 OR IN AN ORDER OF ANY COURT IN A PROCEEDING OTHERWISE THAN BY WAY OF APPEAL OR REFERENCE UNDER THIS ACT; (III) WHERE, IN THE CASE OF A FIRM, AN ASSESSMENT I S MADE ON A PARTNER OF THE FIRM IN CONSEQUENCE OF AN ASSESSMENT MADE ON THE FIRM UNDER SECTION 147. (4) NOTWITHSTANDING ANYTHING CONTAINED IN THE FOREG OING PROVISIONS OF THIS SECTION, SUBSECTION (2) OF SECTI ON 153A AND SUB-SECTION (1) OF SECTION 153B, THE ORDER OF ASSES SMENT OR REASSESSMENT, RELATING TO ANY ASSESSMENT YEAR, WHIC H STANDS REVIVED UNDER SUB-SECTION (2) OF SECTION 153A, SHAL L BE MADE WITHIN ONE YEAR FROM THE END OF THE MONTH OF SUCH R EVIVAL OR WITHIN THE PERIOD SPECIFIED IN THIS SECTION OR SUB- SECTION (1) OF SECTION 153B, WHICHEVER IS LATER. EXPLANATION 1.IN COMPUTING THE PERIOD OF LIMITATIO N FOR THE PURPOSES OF THIS SECTION (I) THE TIME TAKEN IN REOPENING THE WHOLE OR ANY PA RT OF THE PROCEEDING OR IN GIVING AN OPPORTUNITY TO THE ASSES SEE TO BE RE- HEARD UNDER THE PROVISO TO SECTION 129, OR (II) THE PERIOD DURING WHICH THE ASSESSMENT PROCEED ING IS STAYED BY AN ORDER OR INJUNCTION OF ANY COURT, OR (IIA) THE PERIOD COMMENCING FROM THE DATE ON WHICH THE ASSESSING OFFICER INTIMATES THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT OR THE PRESCRIBED AUTHORITY, THE CONTRAVENTION OF THE PROV ISIONS OF CLAUSE (21) OR CLAUSE (22B) OR CLAUSE (23A) OR CLAU SE (23B) OR SUB-CLAUSE (IV) OR SUB-CLAUSE (V) OR SUB-CLAUSE (V OR SUB-CLAUSE 35 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 (VIA) OF CLAUSE (230 OF SECTION 10, UNDER CLAUSE ( OF THE PROVISO TO SUB-SECTION (3) OF SECTION 143 AND ENDING WITH T HE DATE ON WHICH THE COPY OF THE ORDER WITHDRAWING THE APPROVA L OR RESCINDING THE NOTIFICATION, AS THE CASE MAY BE, UN DER THOSE CLAUSES IS RECEIVED BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER, OR (III) THE PERIOD COMMENCING FROM THE DATE ON WHICH THE ASSESSING OFFICER DIRECTS THE ASSESSEE TO GET HIS A CCOUNTS AUDITED UNDER SUB-SECTION (2A) OF SECTION 142 AND (A) ENDING WITH THE LAST DATE ON WHICH THE ASSESSEE IS REQUIRED TO FURNISH A REPORT OF SUCH AUDIT UNDER THAT SUB-SE CTION; OR (B) WHERE SUCH DIRECTION IS CHALLENGED BEFORE A COU RT, ENDING WITH THE DATE ON WHICH THE ORDER SETTING ASIDE SUCH DIRECTION IS RECEIVED BY THE PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OR COMMISSIO NER, OR (IV) THE PERIOD COMMENCING FROM THE DATE ON WHICH T HE ASSESSING OFFICER MAKES A / REFERENCE TO THE VALUAT ION OFFICER UNDER SUB-SECTION (1) OF SECTION 142A AND ENDING WI TH THE DATE ON WHICH THE REPORT OF THE VALUATION OFFICER IS REC EIVED BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER, OR (IVA) THE PERIOD (NOT EXCEEDING SIXTY DAYS) COMMENC ING FROM THE DATE ON WHICH THE ASSESSING OFFICER RECEIVED TH E DECLARATION UNDER SUB-SECTION (1) OF SECTION 158A A ND ENDING WITH THE DATE ON WHICH THE ORDER UNDER SUB-SECTION (3) OF THAT SECTION IS MADE BY HIM, OR (V) IN A CASE WHERE AN APPLICATION MADE BEFORE THE INCOME-TAX SETTLEMENT COMMISSION UNDER SECTION 245C IS REJECTE D BY IT OR IS NOT ALLOWED TO BE PROCEEDED WITH BY IT, THE PERI OD COMMENCING FROM THE DATE ON WHICH SUCH APPLICATION IS MADE AND ENDING WITH THE DATE ON WHICH THE ORDER UNDER S UB-SECTION (1) OF SECTION 245D IS RECEIVED BY THE PRINCIPAL CO MMISSIONER OR COMMISSIONER UNDER SUB-SECTION (2) OF THAT SECTI ON, OR (VI) THE PERIOD COMMENCING FROM THE DATE ON WHICH A N APPLICATION IS MADE BEFORE THE AUTHORITY FOR ADVANC E RULINGS UNDER SUB-SECTION (1) OF SECTION 2450 AND ENDING WI TH THE DATE ON WHICH THE ORDER REJECTING THE APPLICATION IS REC EIVED BY THE 36 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OR COMMISSIONER UNDER SUB-SE CTION (3) OF SECTION 245R, OR (VII) THE PERIOD COMMENCING FROM THE DATE ON WHICH AN APPLICATION IS MADE BEFORE THE AUTHORITY FOR ADVANC E RULINGS UNDER SUB-SECTION (1) OF SECTION 245Q AND ENDING WI TH THE DATE ON WHICH THE ADVANCE RULING PRONOUNCED BY IT IS REC EIVED BY THE PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OR COMMISSIONER UNDER SUB-SE CTION (7) OF SECTION 245R, OR (VIII) THE PERIOD COMMENCING FROM THE DATE ON WHICH A REFERENCE OR FIRST OF THE REFERENCES - FOR EXCHANGE OF INFORM ATION IS MADE BY AN AUTHORITY COMPETENT UNDER AN AGREEMENT REFERR ED TO IN SECTION 90 OR SECTION 90A AND ENDING WITH THE DATE ON WHICH THE INFORMATION REQUESTED IS LAST RECEIVED BY THE PRINC IPAL COMMISSIONER OR COMMISSIONER OR A PERIOD OF ONE YEA R, WHICHEVER IS LESS, OR (IX) THE PERIOD COMMENCING FROM THE DATE ON WHICH A REFERENCE FOR DECLARATION OF AN ARRANGEMENT TO BE AN IMPERMIS SIBLE AVOIDANCE ARRANGEMENT IS RECEIVED BY THE PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OR COMMISSIONER UNDER SUB-SECTION (1) OF SECTION L44BA AND ENDING ON THE DATE ON WHICH A DIR ECTION UNDER SUB-SECTION (3) OR SUB-SECTION (6) OR AN ORDE R UNDER SUB- SECTION (5) OF THE SAID SECTION IS RECEIVED BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER, SHALL BE EXCLUDED: PROVIDED THAT WHERE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE EXCLUSION OF THE AFORESAID TIME OR PERIOD, THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION REFERRED TO IN SUB-SECTIONS (1), (1A), (1B), (2), (2A) AND (4) AVA ILABLE TO THE ASSESSING OFFICER FOR MAKING AN ORDER OF ASSESSMENT , REASSESSMENT OR RECOMPUTATION, AS THE CASE MAY BE, IS LESS THAN SIXTY DAYS, SUCH REMAINING PERIOD SHALL BE EXT ENDED TO SIXTY DAYS AND THE AFORESAID PERIOD OF LIMITATION S HALL BE DEEMED TO BE EXTENDED ACCORDINGLY: PROVIDED FURTHER THAT WHERE A PROCEEDING BEFORE THE SETTLEMENT COMMISSION ABATES UNDER SECTION 245HA, THE PERIOD O F LIMITATION AVAILABLE UNDER THIS SECTION TO THE ASSE SSING OFFICER FOR MAKING AN ORDER OF ASSESSMENT, REASSESSMENT OR RECOMPUTATION AS THE CASE MAY BE, SHALL, AFTER THE EXCLUSION OF 37 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 THE PERIOD UNDER SUB-SECTION (4) OF SECTION 245HA, BE NOT LESS THAN ONE YEAR; AND WHERE SUCH PERIOD OF LIMITATION IS LESS THAN ONE YEAR, IT SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN EXTENDED TO ONE YEAR; AND FOR THE PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE PERIO D OF LIMITATION UNDER SECTIONS 149, 153B, 154, 155, 158BE AND 231 A ND FOR THE PURPOSES OF PAYMENT OF INTEREST UNDER SECTION 243 O R SECTION 244 OR, AS THE CASE MAYBE, SECTION 244A, THIS PROVI SO SHALL ALSO APPLY ACCORDINGLY. EXPLANATION 2.WHERE, BY AN ORDER REFERRED TO IN CL AUSE (II) OF SUB-SECTION (3), ANY INCOME IS EXCLUDED FROM THE TO TAL INCOME OF THE ASSESSEE FOR AN ASSESSMENT YEAR, THEN, AN ASSES SMENT OF SUCH INCOME FOR ANOTHER ASSESSMENT YEAR SHALL, FOR THE PURPOSES OF SECTION 150 AND THIS SECTION, BE DEEMED TO BE ONE MADE IN CONSEQUENCE OF OR TO GIVE EFFECT TO ANY FIN DING OR DIRECTION CONTAINED IN THE SAID ORDER. PROVIDED THAT IN RESPECT OF AN ORDER OF ASSESSMENT RELATING TO THE ASSESSMENT YEAR COMMENCING ON THE 1ST DAY OF AP RIL, 2018, THE PROVISIONS OF THIS SUB-SECTION SHALL HAVE EFFEC T, AS IF FOR THE WORDS TWENTY-ONE MONTHS, THE WORDS EIGHTEEN MONT HS HAD BEEN SUBSTITUTED: PROVIDED FURTHER THAT IN RESPECT OF AN ORDER OF ASS ESSMENT RELATING TO THE ASSESSMENT YEAR COMMENCING ON OR AF TER THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 2019, THE PROVISIONS OF THIS SUB-SECT ION SHALL HAVE EFFECT, AS IF FOR THE WORDS TWENTY-ONE MONTHS, TH E WORDS TWELVE MONTHS HAD BEEN SUBSTITUTED.] (2) NO ORDER OF ASSESSMENT, REASSESSMENT OR RECOMPU TATION SHALL BE MADE UNDER SECTION 147 AFTER THE EXPIRY OF NINE MONTHS FROM THE END OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR IN WHICH THE NOT ICE UNDER SECTION 148 WAS SERVED: 46 [PROVIDED THAT WHERE THE NOTICE UNDER SECTION 148 I S SERVED ON OR AFTER THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 2019, THE PROVISI ONS OF THIS SUB- SECTION SHALL HAVE EFFECT, AS IF FOR THE WORDS NIN E MONTHS, THE WORDS TWELVE MONTHS HAD BEEN SUBSTITUTED.] (3) NOTWITHSTANDING ANYTHING CONTAINED IN SUB-SECTI ONS (1) AND (2), AN ORDER OF FRESH ASSESSMENT IN PURSUANCE OF A N ORDER UNDER SECTION 254 OR SECTION 263 OR SECTION 264, SE TTING ASIDE 38 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 OR CANCELLING AN ASSESSMENT, MAY BE MADE AT ANY TIM E BEFORE THE EXPIRY OF NINE MONTHS FROM THE END OF THE FINAN CIAL YEAR IN WHICH THE ORDER UNDER SECTION 254 IS RECEIVED BY TH E PRINCIPAL CHIEF COMMISSIONER OR CHIEF COMMISSIONER OR PRINCIP AL COMMISSIONER OR COMMISSIONER OR, AS THE CASE MAY BE , THE ORDER UNDER SECTION 263 OR SECTION 264 IS PASSED BY THE PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OR COMMISSIONER: 46 [PROVIDED THAT WHERE THE ORDER UNDER SECTION 254 IS RECEIVED BY THE PRINCIPAL CHIEF COMMISSIONER OR CHIEF COMMIS SIONER OR PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OR COMMISSIONER OR, AS THE C ASE MAY BE, THE ORDER UNDER SECTION 263 OR SECTION 264 IS P ASSED BY THE PRINCIPAL COMMISSIONER OR COMMISSIONER ON OR AFTER THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 2019, THE PROVISIONS OF THIS SUB-SECTION SHALL HAVE EFFECT, AS IF FOR THE WORDS NINE MONTHS, THE WORD S TWELVE MONTHS HAD BEEN SUBSTITUTED.] (4) NOTWITHSTANDING ANYTHING CONTAINED IN SUB-SECTI ONS (1), (2) AND (3), WHERE A REFERENCE UNDER SUB-SECTION (1) OF SECTION 92CA IS MADE DURING THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDING FO R THE ASSESSMENT OR REASSESSMENT, THE PERIOD AVAILABLE FO R COMPLETION OF ASSESSMENT OR REASSESSMENT, AS THE CA SE MAY BE, UNDER THE SAID SUBSECTIONS (1), (2) AND (3) SHA LL BE EXTENDED BY TWELVE MONTHS. EXPLANATION 3.WHERE, BY AN ORDER REFERRED TO IN CL AUSE (II) OF SUB-SECTION (3)ANY INCOME IS EXCLUDED FROM THE TOT AL INCOME OF ONE PERSON AND HELD TO BE THE INCOME OF ANOTHER PER SON, THEN, AN ASSESSMENT OF SUCH INCOME ON SUCH OTHER PERSON S HALL, FOR THE PURPOSES OF SECTION 150 AND THIS SECTION, BE DE EMED TO BE ONE MADE IN CONSEQUENCE OF OR TO GIVE EFFECT TO ANY FINDING OR DIRECTION CONTAINED IN THE SAID ORDER, PROVIDED SUC H OTHER PERSON WAS GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY OF BEING HEARD BEFO RE THE SAID ORDER WAS PASSED. 12. THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 153 RELATING TO TIME LIMIT FOR COMPLETION OF ASSESSMENT AND REASSESSMENT HAS BEEN AMENDED SO AS TO PROVIDE TIME LIMIT FOR COMPLETION OF FRESH 39 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 ASSESSMENT TO BE MADE IN A CASE (1) WHERE ORIGINAL ASSESSMENT MADE U/S. 144 HAS BEEN CANCELLED BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER U/S.146 OR (2) ORIGINAL ASSESSMEN T IS SET ASIDE OR CANCELLED IN APPEAL BY THE APPELLATE COMMI SSIONER OR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL OR IN REVISION BY COMMISSIONER. FOR THIS PURPOSE SUB-SECTION (2A) HAS BEEN INSERTED TO SECT ION 153 OF THE ACT. UNDER THIS SUB-SECTION, FRESH ASSESSMENT IN CASE MENTIONED AT (1) MAY BE MADE AT ANY TIME BEFORE EXP IRY OF TWO YEARS FROM THE END OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR, IN WHICH ORIGINAL ASSESSMENT WAS CANCELLED BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER U /S.146 OF THE ACT. IN A CASES MENTIONED AT (2), FRESH ASSES SMENT MAY BE MADE AT ANY TIME BEFORE EXPIRY OF TWO YEARS FROM T HE END OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR IN WHICH ORDER OF THE APPELLATE COMMISSIONER OR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL IS RECEIVED BY COMMISSIONER OR AS THE CASE MAY BE, ORDER IN REVISION IS PASSED BY COMMIS SIONER. IN THE ABOVE CIRCUMSTANCES, ASSESSMENT MAY BE COMPLETE D WITHIN ABOVE MENTIONED TIME LIMIT, EVEN IF, TIME LIMIT SPE CIFIED UNDER SUB-SECTION(1) & (2) OF SECTION 153 FOR COMPLETION OF ASSESSMENT OR REASSESSMENT HAS BEEN EXPIRED. THE AMENDMENT BROUGHT OUT BY THE FINANCE ACT, 2000, HAS REDUCED GENERAL TIME LIMIT PRESCRIBED UNDER SECTION 153(2A) TO ONE YEAR 40 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 AND SUCH AMENDMENT HAS BEEN MADE EFFECTIVE FROM 01.06.2001. SIMULTANEOUSLY, A PROVISO HAS BEEN INSE RTED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THE PURPOSE OF AMENDMENT OF SUB-SECTI ON (2A), AS PER WHICH, WHERE THE ORDER U/S.250 OR 254 IS RECEIV ED BY THE COMMISSIONER /CHIEF COMMISSIONER OR AS THE CASE MAY BE, OR THE ORDER U/S.263 OR 264 IS PASSED BY COMMISSIONER OR CCIT ON OR AFTER 01.04.1999, BUT BEFORE 01.4.2000, SUCH AN ORDER OF FRESH ASSESSMENT MAY BE MADE AT ANY TIME UPTO 31.03 .2002. A PLAIN READING OF SUB-SECTION 153(2A) ALONG WITH PRO VISO THEREUNDER, IT IS VERY CLEAR THAT REVISED TIME LIMI T OF ONE YEAR IS MADE APPLICABLE FOR THOSE ORDERS WHICH WERE RECEIVE D BY COMMISSIONER /CHIEF COMMISSIONER ON OR AFTER 01.4.2 000. THE MEANING THEREBY IS THAT ANY ORDERS PASSED BY APPELL ATE COMMISSIONER OR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL IS RECEIVED BY C OMMISSIONER /CHIEF COMMISSIONER BETWEEN 01.04.1999 TO 31.03.200 0, THEN THOSE ORDERS ARE COVERED UNDER PRE-AMENDED PROVISIO NS OF SECTION 153(2A), AS PER WHICH, TIME LIMIT AVAILABLE FOR THE ASSESSING OFFICER TO COMPLETE THE ASSESSMENT IS TWO YEARS FROM THE END OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR IN WHICH SUCH ORDER W AS RECEIVED BY O/O. COMMISSIONER. IN OTHER WORDS, ANY ORDER OF APPELLATE COMMISSIONER OR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL IS RECEIVED BY T HE 41 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 CIT/PCIT ON OR AFTER 01.04.2000, THEN AMENDED PROVI SIONS OF SECTION 153(2A) IS APPLICABLE, AS PER WHICH ONE YEA R TIME LIMIT IS APPLICABLE FOR COMPLETION OF ASSESSMENT. 13. IN THIS LEGAL BACKGROUND, IF YOU EXAMINE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE, WE FIND THAT THE ORDER OF THE TRIBUNA L WAS PASSED ON 04.10.2000 (RECEIVED IN THE OFFICE OF THE CIT ON 10-11-2000) AND AS PER AMENDED PROVISIONS OF SECTION 153(2A) OF THE ACT, FRESH ASSESSMENT ORDER OUGHT TO HAVE COMPLETED IN N ORMAL COURSE BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER, AT ANY TIME BEFORE EXPIRY OF ONE YEAR FROM THE END OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR IN WHIC H ORDER U/S.254 OF THE ACT WAS RECEIVED BY THE COMMISSIONER /CHIEF COMMISSIONER. THE ASSESSING OFFICER HAS STARTED FRE SH BLOCK ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS ON THE PREMISE OF 2 YEARS T IME LIMIT AS PER OLD PROVISIONS OF SECTION 153(2A). THE ASSES SEE MEANWHILE CHALLENGED BLOCK ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS B Y FILING WRIT AND THE HONBLE MADRAS HIGH COURT AT THE FAG E ND OF THE LIMITATION PERIOD, NAMELY ON 08.03.2002 STAYED BLOC K ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS AND SUCH STAY WAS IN FORCE U PTO 14.12.2018, I.E TILL DISPOSAL OF WRIT PETITION FILE D BY THE ASSESSEE. BECAUSE OF STAY, THE LIMITATION PERIOD F OR COMPLETING 42 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 FRESH BLOCK ASSESSMENT ACCORDINGLY, WAS EXTENDED IN VIEW OF THE EXCLUSION OF SUCH PERIOD AS CONTEMPLATED IN EXP LANATION 1(II) TO SECTION153 OF THE ACT. FURTHER, WHEN THE H ONBLE HIGH COURT PASSED STAY ORDER ON 8-3-2002, THE BALANCE TI ME AVAILABLE WITH THE AO FOR COMPLETION OF ASSESSMENT WAS 23 DAYS. THE HONBLE HIGH COURT IN W.P.NO7623 OF 2002 HAS VACATED STAY IN VIEW OF THE DISPOSAL OF WRIT PETIT ION FILED BY THE ASSESSEE ON 14.12.2018 AND SUCH ORDER WAS RECEIVED BY THE OFFICE OF THE CIT ON 13-02-2019 AND AS A CONSEQUEN CE, THE ASSESSING OFFICER SHOULD GET CLEAR 60 DAYS FROM T HE DATE OF RECEIPT OF ORDER FOR COMPLETING FRESH ASSESSMENT I N LIGHT OF PROVISO (II) BELOW EXPLANATION 1 TO SECTION 153 OF THE ACT. THEREFORE, EVEN IF 60 DAYS IS EXCLUDED, ASSESSMENT ORDER OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN COMPLETED ON OR BEFORE 14.04.2019. BUT , IN THIS CASE THE ASSESSING OFFICER HAS PASSED ASSESSMENT OR DER ON 31.12.2019 AND THEREFORE, IN OUR CONSIDERED VIEW TH E ASSESSMENT ORDER IS CLEARLY BARRED BY LIMITATION AS PER AMENDED PROVISIONS OF SECTION 153(2A) OF THE ACT. 14. THE LEARNED DR FOR THE REVENUE, ALTHOUGH VEHEME NTLY OPPOSED APPLICABILITY OF AMENDED PROVISIONS OF SECT ION 153(2A) 43 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 OF THE ACT TO THE PRESENT CASE ON THE SOLE GROUND T HAT SAID AMENDMENT HAS BEEN GIVEN EFFECT FROM 01.06.2001 ONW ARDS, BUT FACT REMAINS THAT PROVISIONS OF SECTION 153(2 A) PRESCRIBED LIMITATION PERIOD FOR PASSING EFFECT GIVING ORDERS WHILE STARTING POINT THOUGH FALLS BEFORE THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE AMENDED PROVISIONS PRESCRIBING RESTRICTED TIME LIMIT, THE COMPLETION OF PENDING EFFECT GIVING ORDERS IN VIEW OF THE TRANSIT IONAL PROVISIONS BY VIRTUE OF SIMULTANEOUS INSERTION OF T HE PROVISO SHOULD FALL IN NEW REGIME THEREBY GIVING HARMONIOUS INTERPRETATION OF THE COMBINED READING OF THE AMEN DED SUB- SECTION AND THE PROVISO INSERTED SIMULTANEOUSLY, IT IS VERY CLEAR THAT THE PROVISO TAKES CARE OF ORDERS RECEIVED FROM 01.04.1999 TO 31.03.2000 WHICH ARE PENDING FOR PASSING EFFECT GIVING ORDERS ON THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF AMENDMENT BEING 0 1.06.2001 BY GRANTING TIME LIMIT OF TWO YEARS TO PASS ORDERS ON OR BEFORE 31.03.2002. HENCE, THERE CANNOT BE ANY ADDITIONAL PROTECTION REQUIRED AS WELL NOT INTENDED BY THE LEGISLATURE FO R THE ORDERS RECEIVED AFTER 31.03.2000 FOR WHICH THE TIME LIMI T INTENDED TO BE RESTRICTED AS ONE YEAR INSTEAD OF TWO YEARS. THE APPROACH OF THE ASSESSING OFFICER IN ASSUMING TIME LIMIT FOR TW O YEARS ON THE FACTS OF THE CASE COULD BE LEGALLY ACCEPTABLE ONLY IN THE 44 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 ABSENCE OF PROVISO AND HOWEVER, BY INSERTION OF THE EXPRESS PROVISO SIMULTANEOUSLY, THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE AS SESSING OFFICER IS FULLY NEGATED. SINCE, THE APPELLATE TRIB UNAL ORDER UNDER CONSIDERATION BEING PASSED / RECEIVED ON 10.1 1.2000, THE RESTRICTED TIME LIMIT SHOULD ALONE BE MADE APPLICAB LE AND IF SAID RESTRICTED TIME LIMIT IS ACCEPTED AS APPLICABLE TO THE PRESENT CASE, THE EFFECT GIVING ORDER SHOULD HAVE BEEN COMP LETED ON OR BEFORE 31.03.2002. HOWEVER, IN VIEW OF THE INTERVEN ING STAY ORDER OBTAINED FROM MADRAS HIGH COURT ON 08.03.2002 AND VACATED ON 14.12.2018 AND RECEIVED BY THE O/O. PCI T/CIT ON 13.02.2019, THE TIME LIMIT FOR COMPLETING THE EFFE CT GIVING PROCEEDINGS SHOULD BE RECKONED AS ONLY 60 DAYS, IN VIEW OF REMAINING TIME AVAILABLE AS ON THE DATE OF STAY ORD ER PASSED BY THE HIGH COURT WAS ONLY 23 DAYS WHICH IS LESS THAN 60 DAYS AS PER EXPLANATION 1(II) TO SECTION 153 OF THE ACT. IF SUCH 60 DAYS IS CONSIDERED FROM THE DATE OF RECEIPT OF ORDER OF HIG H COURT, I.E 13.02.2019, THE ASSESSING OFFICER OUGHT TO HAVE PAS SED THE ORDER ON 14.04.2019. SINCE, THE IMPUGNED ORDER GIVI NG EFFECT WAS PASSED ON 31.12.2019, IN OUR CONSIDERED VIEW, W HICH IS BEYOND 60 DAYS TIME AVAILABLE FOR THE ASSESSING OFF ICER AND 45 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 HENCE, IT CAN BE SAFELY CONCLUDED THAT ASSESSMENT O RDER PASSED BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER IS BARRED BY LIMITA TION. 15. THE ASSESSING OFFICER, WHILE PASSING GIVING EFF ECT ORDER REJECTED THE PLEA OF THE ASSESSEE, APPLICATION OF P ROVISIONS OF SECTION 153(2A) OF THE ACT, ON THE GROUND THAT PROV ISO TO SUB- SECTION (3) TO SECTION 153 OF THE ACT WILL BE APPLI CABLE AND AS PER SAID SECTION, THERE IS NO TIME LIMIT PRESCRIBED FOR COMPLETING THE ORDER. ACCORDING TO THE ASSESSING OFFICER, HE H AS COMPLETED ASSESSMENT, AS PER DIRECTION OF THE HONBLE HIGH CO URT IN WRIT JURISDICTION, BUT NOT AS PER ORDER OF ITAT IN SETTI NG ASIDE ASSESSMENT ORDER VIDE ITS ORDER DATED 04.10.2000.TH E ASSESSING OFFICER HAS DISCUSSED THE ISSUE IN LIGHT OF DECISION OF HONBLE DELHI HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF NOKIA ENTER PRISES VS. DCIT(SUPRA) AND HELD THAT PRESENT ORDER IS BEING PA SSED IN COMPLIANCE TO THE DIRECTION OF THE HIGH COURT AND AS SUCH, THE PROVISIONS OF SUB-SECTION (3) OF SECTION 153 IS S QUARELY APPLICABLE TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE. IF SUCH PROVIS ION IS APPLIED, THEN THERE IS NO QUESTION OF ASSESSMENT GETTING TIM E BARRED. 46 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 16. WE HAVE GIVEN OUR THOUGHTFUL CONSIDERATION TO T HE REASONS GIVEN BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER TO CONSIDER TIME LIMIT PRESCRIBED UNDER SUB-SECTION (3) OF SECTION 153 OF THE ACT AND FIND THAT THE ASSESSING OFFICER HAS MADE FUNDAMENTA L MISTAKE IN APPLYING SUB SECTION (3) OF SECTION 153, BECAUSE THE PRESENT ASSESSMENT IS COMPLETED IN PURSUANT TO THE ORDER OF APPELLATE TRIBUNAL IN SETTING ASIDE THE ASSESSMENT ORDER . WE FURTHER NOTED THAT TRIBUNAL HAS SET ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED BY ASSESSING OFFICER FOR DE NOVO CONSIDERATION IN ACCO RDANCE WITH MATERIAL AVAILABLE ON RECORD AND AFTER AFFORDING RE ASONABLE OPPORTUNITY OF HEARING TO THE ASSESSEE. WE FURTHER NOTED THAT TRIBUNAL HAS CONSIDERED FUNDAMENTAL ISSUE RAISED BY THE ASSESSEE IN LIGHT OF PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE AND HAS NOT GONE INTO DISCUSS VARIOUS ADDITIONS MADE BY THE ASS ESSING OFFICER IN THE ASSESSMENT ORDER. FROM THE ABOVE IT IS CLEAR THAT ASSESSMENT ORDER IS SET ASIDE IN TOTAL FOR FRESH CO NSIDERATION BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER. THEREFORE, WHEN THE ORDER IS SET ASIDE FOR DE NOVO ASSESSMENT, THEN IT IS AS GOOD AS AFRESH AS SESSMENT IS MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW AND THE EARLIER ASSESSM ENT MADE BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER IS EITHER CANCELLED OR NON -EST IN THE EYES OF LAW. THEREFORE, IN OUR CONSIDERED VIEW ABOV E 47 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 PERCEPTION OF THE ASSESSING OFFICER IN APPLYING PRO VISIONS OF SUB-SECTION (3) OF SECTION 153 OF THE ACT IS COMPLE TELY ERRONEOUS, BECAUSE THE HONBLE HIGH COURT IN DISPOS ING OF WRIT HAS ONLY PERMITTED THE PARTIES TO COMPLETE PENDING PROCEEDINGS AROSE OUT OF ORDER OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL IN SET TING ASIDE THE ORIGINAL ASSESSMENT ORDER. FURTHER, THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 153(3) OF THE ACT ENVISAGES FOR COMPLETION OF ASSES SMENT OR REASSESSMENT BASED ON A FINDING OR DIRECTION OF ANY APPELLATE AUTHORITY OR COURT. WHILE IN THE PRESENT CASE, IT IS BASED ON THE ORDER OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL FOR COMPLETING FRE SH ASSESSMENT DE NOVO, IN VIEW OF THEIR ORDER IN SETTI NG ASIDE ORIGINAL ASSESSMENT ORDER. THE COURTS HAVE INTERPRE TED THE TERM FINDING OR DIRECTION, AS PER WHICH FINDING OR DIRE CTION MEANS WHILE DISPOSING OF APPEAL, ANY APPELLATE AUTHORITY MAKES A DIRECTION OR FINDING IN CONNECTION WITH ANY ISSUE O R ANY PERSON, THEN SUCH FINDING OR DIRECTION NEEDS TO BE FOLLOWED BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER IN TRUE SPIRIT AND HENCE, A PROVI SION IS PROVIDED BY WAY OF SUB-SECTION (3) WITHOUT ANY LIMI TATION, BECAUSE IN SUCH CASES THE ROLE OF ASSESSING OFFICER IS LIMITED TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE FINDINGS OR DIRECTION OF APPELLA TE AUTHORITY OR COURT. BUT, IN A SITUATION, WHERE ORDER IS SET ASID E WITHOUT ANY 48 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 RESTRICTION AS TO FINDING OR DIRECTION, THEN SUCH A N ORDER IS SET ASIDE IN TOTO AND THE ASSESSING OFFICER SHALL COMPL ETE THE ASSESSMENT DE NOVO, AS IF SUCH ASSESSMENT WAS NOT M ADE IN EARLIER OCCASION. IN SUCH SITUATION, TIME LIMIT PRE SCRIBED U/S.153(2A) IS APPLICABLE, BUT NOT PROVISIONS OF SE CTION 153(3) OF THE ACT. 17. IN THIS CASE, THE ASSESSING OFFICER HAS APPLIED PROVISIONS OF SECTION 153(3) OF THE ACT, IN VIEW OF THE DISMIS SAL OF WRIT PETITION OF THE ASSESSEE BY THE HONBLE MADRAS HIGH COURT. HOWEVER, THE FACT REMAINS THAT IMPUGNED ORDER WAS P ASSED TO GIVING EFFECT TO THE ORDER OF APPELLATE TRIBUNAL DA TED 04.10.2000 PASSED IN FIRST ROUND AND NOT AT INSTANCE OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DECISION IN PERMITTING THE ASSESSING OFFICER TO CON TINUE PROCEEDING INITIATED IN CONSEQUENT TO THE ORDER OF APPELLATE TRIBUNAL. THEREFORE, RELIANCE PLACED BY THE ASSESSI NG OFFICER ON THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 153 (3) OF THE ACT IS COM PLETELY MISPLACED AND MISDIRECTED. BECAUSE, UNDER THE EXIST ING PROVISIONS OF SECTION 153(3), SUCH FRESH ASSESSMENT S ARE NOT SUBJECTED TO ANY TIME LIMIT, BECAUSE SAID SUB-SECTI ON, IN PARTICULAR, DID NOT REQUIRE ORDER PASSED THEREIN TO BE ISSUED 49 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 WITHIN ANY PARTICULAR TIME LIMIT FOR SIMPLE REASON THAT IT WOULD GET ATTRACTED TO A FINDING OR DIRECTION CONTAINED IN TH E APPELLATE ORDER. SINCE, THE DECISION OF THE HONBLE MADRAS HI GH COURT HAS ONLY PERMITTED TO PASS EFFECT GIVING ORDER IN PURSU ANT TO THE ORDER OF TRIBUNAL REFERRED HEREINABOVE, AND THUS, Q UESTION OF APPLICATION OF SUB-SECTION (3) TO SECTION 153 IS TO TALLY INCORRECT. WE, FURTHER OURSELVES UNABLE TO AGREE WITH THE CONT ENTION OF THE ASSESSING OFFICER THAT WHEN THE ORDER OF ASSESSMENT IS COMPLETED IN PURSUANT TO THE ORDER OF HIGH COURT IN WRIT JURISDICTION, THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 153 IS COME INTO OPERATION, BECAUSE THE ASSESSING OFFICER HIMSELF HAS ADMITTED THAT IMPUGNED ASSESSMENT ORDER WAS PASSED IN PURSUANT TO DIRECTION OF THE TRIBUNAL PASSED U/S.254 OF THE INC OME TAX ACT, 1961, WHICH IS EVIDENT FROM FACT THAT IN FIRST PAGE OF ASSESSMENT ORDER, HE HAS MENTIONED THAT SAID ORDER IS PASSED U/S.143(3) R.W.S 254 OF THE ACT. THEREFORE, APPLICA TION OF SUB- SECTION (3) OF SECTION 153 IN THE GIVEN FACTS AND C IRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE IS COMPLETELY MISPLACED, WHEN THERE IS SPECIFIC PROVISION BY WAY OF SUB-SECTION (2A) OF SECTION 153 FOR COMPLETING THE ORDER PASSED U/S.250 OR 254 OR 263 O R 264 OF THE INCOME TAX ACT, 1961. THE OBJECT BEHIND INTRODUCTIO N OF SUB- 50 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 SECTION (2A) WAS TO PRESCRIBE TIME LIMIT FOR COMPL ETING ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS UPON ORIGINAL ASSESSMENT BE ING SET ASIDE OR BEING CANCELLED IN APPEAL. THUS, WHEN ASSE SSMENT IS SET ASIDE AND MATTER IS REMANDED, WITH A DIRECTION THAT ISSUE HAS TO BE DETERMINED AFRESH, SECTION 153(2A) OF THE ACT WOULD GET ATTRACTED. FURTHER, WHAT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE I S THAT ALONG WITH INSERTION OF SUB-SECTION (2A), SUB-SECTION (3) UNDERWENT SIMULTANEOUS CHANGE, AS PER WHICH, IT WAS EXPRESSLY MADE SUBJECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF SUB-SECTION (2A), TH IS MEANS THAT SECTION 153(3) WOULD THEREAFTER APPLY ONLY TO SUCH CASES, WHERE SECTION 153(2A) WOULD NOT APPLY. IN OTHER WORDS, IN ALL INSTANCES OF ASSESSING OFFICER HAVING TO PASS A FRESH ASSESSM ENT ORDER UPON REMAND, WHERE SECTION 153(2A) WOULD ONLY APPLI CABLE, THE ASSESSING OFFICER WOULD BE BOUND TO FOLLOW THE TIME LIMIT IMPOSED BY SUB-SECTION (2A), WHEREAS THE ASSESSING OFFICER WAS ONLY GIVING EFFECT TO AN APPELLATE ORDER ON ANY FINDING OR DIRECTION, THEN SECTION 153(3) OF THE ACT WOULD APP LY. IN THIS CASE, ON PERUSAL OF ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL DATED 04. 10.2000, IT IS VERY CLEAR THAT ENTIRE ASSESSMENT ORDER HAS BEEN SE T ASIDE TO THE FILE OF THE ASSESSING OFFICER FOR DE NOVO ASSES SMENT BECAUSE OF FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTION RAISED BY THE ASSE SSEE IN 51 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 LIGHT OF PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE AND UNDER TH OSE FACTS, THE TRIBUNAL HAS MADE CATEGORICAL OBSERVATION THAT BECA USE OF VIOLATION OF PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE, ASSESSM ENT HAS BEEN SET ASIDE FOR DE NOVO CONSIDERATION. THE TRIBUNAL F URTHER OBSERVED THAT WHILE DOING SET ASIDE ASSESSMENT PROC EEDINGS, THE ASSESSING OFFICER WAS DIRECTED TO CONSIDER ALL MATERIALS AVAILABLE IN RESPECT OF VARIOUS ISSUES AND FURTHER DIRECTED THE ASSESSING OFFICER TO GIVE AN OPPORTUNITY OF HEARING TO THE ASSESSEE. THE MEANING THEREBY IS THAT ASSESSMENT IS BEING SET ASIDE FOR DE NOVO ASSESSMENT AND THUS, THERE IS NO QUESTION OF APPLICATION OF PROVISIONS OF SECTION 153(3)(II) OF THE ACT. 18. COMING BACK TO CASE LAWS RELIED UPON BY THE LEA RNED A.R FOR THE ASSESSEE. IN THIS REGARD, THE LEARNED AR RE LIED UPON DIRECT DECISION OF HONBLE DELHI HIGH COURT IN THE CASE OF CIT VS. BHAN TEXTILE PVT.LTD. (2008) 300 ITR 176(DEL), WHEREIN THE HONBLE HIGH COURT UNDER IDENTICAL CIRCUMSTANCES HELD THAT WHERE THE ASSESSING OFFICER WAS DIRECTED BY COMMIS SIONER (APPEALS) TO PASS FRESH ORDER U/S.144, MEANING THE REBY THAT ASSESSMENT ORDER WAS SET ASIDE OR CANCELLED AND THERE WAS NO INDEPENDENT FINDING OR DIRECTION WHICH THE ASSES SING OFFICER 52 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 WAS REQUIRED TO COMPLY WITH, IT WAS LIMITATION U/S. 153(2A) WHICH WAS APPLICABLE AND NOT LIMITATION U/S.153(3)(II) OF THE ACT. THE HONBLE HIGH COURT, WHILE CONFIRMING ORDER OF THE T RIBUNAL QUASHED IMPUGNED ORDER PASSED BY THE ASSESSING OFF ICER BY HOLDING THAT THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 153(3) HAS N O APPLICATION, WHERE ORDER OF THE ASSESSING OFFICER HAS BEEN SET ASIDE BY THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL OR APPELLATE COMMISSIONER. IN TH E SAID DECISION, THE REVENUE HAS OPTED TO CHALLENGE ONLY A PPLICABILITY OF SECTION 153(3) OF THE ACT AND APPARENTLY NOT OBJ ECTED TO DECISION OF THE APPELLATE TRIBUNAL IN APPLYING AMEN DED PROVISIONS INCORPORATING RESTRICTED TIME LIMIT FOR COMPLETING THE EFFECT GIVING PROCEEDINGS PERTAINING TO THE PROCEED INGS AS ON 01.06.2001, CONSEQUENT TO THE APPELLATE ORDER RECEI VED BY THE O/O. COMMISSIONER OR PCIT AFTER 01.04.2000. IN THIS CASE, FACTS ARE IDENTICAL TO FACTS CONSIDERED BY THE HONBLE DE LHI HIGH COURT AND HENCE, THIS CASE IS SQUARELY COVERED BY T HE DECISION OF HONBLE DELHI HIGH COURT. 19. THE ASSESSEE HAS ALSO RELIED UPON THE DECISION OF ITAT, DELHI BENCHES IN THE CASE OF AWANINDRA SINGH VS. DC IT (2019) 104 TAXMANN.COM 171, WHERE THE TRIBUNAL HAS ACCEPTE D SIMILAR 53 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 ARGUMENT FOR QUASHING THE EFFECT GIVING ORDER PASSE D BEYOND PRESCRIBED TIME LIMIT OF ONE YEAR IN APPLYING AMEND ED PROVISIONS TAKING EFFECT FROM 01.06.2001. THE RELEV ANT FINDINGS OF THE TRIBUNAL ARE AS UNDER:- 45. IN THE ABOVE PROVISO, THE LEGISLATURE HAS PROVI DED THAT WHERE THE ORDER UNDER SECTION 250 IS RECEIVED BY TH E CHIEF COMMISSIONER OR THE COMMISSIONER ON OR BEFORE THE 1 ST DAY OF APRIL, 1999 BUT BEFORE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 2000, IN T HOSE CASES, ORDER OF FRESH ASSESSMENT CAN BE MADE AT ANY TIME U P TO 31ST MARCH, 2002. MEANING THEREBY, THE OLD PROVISION OF SECTION 153(2A) WOULD BE APPLICABLE IN RESPECT OF CASES WHE RE THE ORDER OF SET ASIDE IS RECEIVED BY THE COMMISSIONER BEFORE THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 2000. BY NECESSARY IMPLICATION, I T HAS TO BE HELD THAT WHEN THE ORDER OF SET ASIDE UNDER SECTION 250 BY THE CIT(A) IS RECEIVED BY THE COMMISSIONER OR THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER AFTER THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 2000, THE NEW PROVISION WOULD BE APPLICABLE. IN THE CBDTS CIRCULAR WHICH I S THE EXPLANATORY NOTES ON THE PROVISIONS RELATING TO DIR ECT TAXES IN FINANCE ACT, 2001, AGAIN, THE CBDT HAS CLARIFIED TH AT WHERE THE APPELLATE OR REVISIONARY ORDER MENTIONED IN SECTION 153(2A) HAS BEEN RECEIVED OR PASSED, AS THE CASE MAY BE, ON OR AFTER 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 1999 BUT BEFORE THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 2000, THE EXISTING TIME LIMIT WILL CONTINUE. THEREFORE, IN OU R OPINION, THE EXISTING TIME LIMIT I.E., THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION OF TWO YEARS WOULD BE APPLICABLE ONLY WHERE THE 28 ITA-300/DEL/2001 & 5 OTHERS APPELLATE OR REVISIONARY ORDER SETTING ASIDE AN ASS ESSMENT IS RECEIVED OR PASSED BEFORE 1ST APRIL, 2000. IF THE C ONTENTION OF THE REVENUE THAT THE AMENDED PROVISION OF SECTION 1 53(2A) WOULD BE APPLICABLE IN RESPECT OF THE CASES WHERE T HE APPELLATE OR REVISIONARY ORDER IS RECEIVED OR PASSED AFTER 1S T JUNE, 2001, THERE WAS NO NECESSITY OF PROVISO TO SECTION 153(2A ) AND THE SAID PROVISO WOULD BECOME REDUNDANT. IT CANNOT BE P RESUMED THAT THE LEGISLATURE WOULD PROVIDE A PROVISO WHICH IS REDUNDANT. THAT IN THE CBDTS CIRCULAR NO.14 OF 2001 PARAGRAPH 68.3, IT HAS BEEN CLEARLY PROVIDED THE PERIOD OF TWO YEARS PROVIDED FOR MAKING SUCH ASSESSMENTS OR REASSESSMENTS IS MORE TH AN NECESSARY CONSIDERING THAT THE SCOPE OF SUCH ASSESS MENT OR REASSESSMENT IS GENERALLY LIMITED TO A FEW SPECIFIC ISSUES. WITH 54 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 A VIEW TO BRINGING ABOUT AN EARLY FINALIZATION OF S UCH PROCEEDINGS, THE ACT HAS AMENDED SUB-SECTIONS (2) A ND (2A) OF SECTION 153 TO REDUCE THE TIMELIMIT FOR MAKING SUCH ORDERS OF ASSESSMENT, REASSESSMENT OR RECOMPUTATION TO ONE YE AR. THUS, THE LEGISLATURE HAS TAKEN A CONSCIOUS DECISIO N TO REDUCE THE PERIOD OF TWO YEARS FOR MAKING REASSESSMENT OF SET ASIDE MATTERS TO ONE YEAR. THEY HAVE ALSO CONSCIOUSLY PRO VIDED THAT THE OLD PROVISIONS OF TWO YEARS WOULD BE APPLICABLE WHERE SUCH ORDER OF SET ASIDE WAS PASSED OR RECEIVED ON OR BEF ORE 1ST APRIL, 2000. THUS, TO OUR MIND, THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT WHE RE THE ORDER OF SET ASIDE IS PASSED BY THE CIT(A) UNDER SECTION 250 AFTER 1 ST DAY OF APRIL, 2000, THE NEW PROVISION OF SECTION 153(2A) PROVIDING THE TIME LIMIT OF ONE YEAR WOULD BE APPLI CABLE. 46. WE FIND THAT HON'BLE JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT HAS ALSO CONSIDERED THE APPLICABILITY OF LIMITATION UNDER SE CTION 153(2A) IN THE CASE OF BHAN TEXTILE P.LTD. (SUPRA). THE FAC TS OF THE SAID CASE ARE THAT THE ASSESSMENT IN RESPECT OF THE ASSE SSEE WAS COMPLETED UNDER SECTION 144 ON 31ST MARCH, 1999. TH E ASSESSEE, AGGRIEVED BY THE ASSESSMENT 29 ITA-300/DE L/2001 & 5 OTHERS ORDER, PREFERRED AN APPEAL BEFORE THE CIT( A) WHO PASSED AN ORDER DATED 12TH MAY, 2000 WHEREIN THE CI T(A) PASSED THE FOLLOWING ORDER :- IT WAS ALSO THE CASE OF LEARNED COUNSEL THAT THE ADDITIONS WERE MADE WITHOUT ANY BASIS AND THERE WAS NO HISTORY OF CASE WHICH COULD JUSTIFY SUCH AN ASSESSM ENT. I HAVE CONSIDERED THIS ARGUMENT ALSO. IT IS TRUE THAT THERE IS NO HISTORY OF CASE IN RESPECT OF THE ADDITIONS M ADE IN THE ASSESSMENT ORDER. AT LEAST NOTHING IS MENTIONED IN THE ORDER IN THIS RESPECT. IT IS ALSO FELT THAT THE LEARNED ASSESSING OFFICER COULD HAVE SPECIFICALLY GRANTED O NE MORE OPPORTUNITY TO THE APPELLANT TO STATE HIS CASE IN RESPECT OF THE MATTERS COVERED IN THE QUESTIONNAIRE . THIS IS SO BECAUSE THE APPELLANT COULD HAVE THOUGHT THAT THE PROCEEDINGS MAY BE DROPPED AFTER HEARING THE PRELIMINARY OBJECTION. THOUGH IT IS MENTIONED IN TH E NOTE THAT THE AUTHORISED REPRESENTATIVE DID NOT AGREE TO FILE ANY DETAIL. YET THE ASSESSING OFFICER COULD HAVE GR ANTED ONE MORE OPPORTUNITY, PARTICULARLY WHEN THE MATTER HAD REMAINED PENDING UP TO MARCH 31, 1999. IT IS ALSO S EEN THAT THE ASSESSMENT WAS TAKEN UP ON MARCH 5, 1999, 55 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 WHILE THE INITIAL NOTICE HAD BEEN ISSUED ON NOVEMBE R 27, 1997, AND THERE WAS NO FOLLOW UP OF THE CASE IN THE INTERREGNUM. IN VIEW OF THIS, I AM OF THE VIEW THAT THE LEARNED ASSESSING OFFICER SHOULD HAVE GRANTED ONE M ORE OPPORTUNITY TO THE APPELLANT ON PROPOSED ADDITIONS. THEREFORE, IT IS HELD THAT IT WILL BE THE INTEREST OF THE JUSTICE TO RESTORE THE MATTER TO THE FILE OF THE AS SESSING OFFICER, SO THAT ONE MORE OPPORTUNITY MAY BE GIVEN TO THE APPELLANT TO FILE EVIDENCE AND STATE HIS CASE IN RE SPECT OF THE MATTERS COVERED IN THE SHOW-CAUSE NOTICE DATED MARCH 5, 1999. THEREAFTER, THE LEARNED ASSESSING OF FICER MAY PASS ORDER UNDER SECTION 144 TAKING THE EXPLANA TION INTO ACCOUNT. THEREFORE, THIS MATTER IS RESTORED TO THE FILE OF THE ASSESSING OFFICER. THUS, GROUND NO.2 OF THE APPEAL IS TREATED AS ALLOWED. 47. WHEN THE MATTER WAS TAKEN UP BY THE ASSESSING O FFICER, HE ISSUED A NOTICE UNDER SECTION 143(2) OF THE ACT ON 24TH FEBRUARY, 2003. THE ASSESSEE CLAIMED THE NOTICE TO BE BARRED BY LIMITATION IN VIEW OF PROVISIONS OF SECTION 153( 2A). SINCE THE ASSESSEE DID NOT COOPERATE WITH THE ASSESSING OFFIC ER, HE COMPLETED THE ASSESSMENT ONCE AGAIN AS 30 ITA-300/D EL/2001 & 5 OTHERS ORIGINALLY FRAMED. ON APPEAL, LEARNED CI T(A) UPHELD THE ASSESSMENT ORDER. THE ASSESSEE PREFERRED AN APP EAL TO THE ITAT WHICH HELD THE ASSESSMENT TO BE BARRED BY LIMI TATION UNDER SECTION 153(2A). HON'BLE JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT UPHELD THE ORDER OF THE ITAT. 48. WE FIND THAT THE PRECISE DISPUTE BEFORE THE HO N'BLE JURISDICTIONAL HIGH COURT WAS WHETHER IN RESPECT OF SUCH AN ORDER OF SET ASIDE, SECTION 153(2A) WAS APPLICABLE OR SECTION 153(3)(III) WAS APPLICABLE AND HON'BLE JURISDICTION AL HIGH COURT HELD THAT SECTION 153(2A) WAS APPLICABLE. HOWEVER, THE FACTS ARE IDENTICAL. THAT IN THE SAID CASE ALSO, THE ORDE R OF SET ASIDE WAS RECEIVED ON 12TH MAY, 2000 I.E., AFTER THE 1ST DAY OF APRIL, 2000 BUT BEFORE 1ST JUNE, 2001 AND NOTICE UNDER SEC TION 143(2) ISSUED ON 24TH FEBRUARY, 2003 WHICH WAS HELD TO BE BARRED BY LIMITATION. THUS, THIS DECISION ALSO SUPP ORTS THE CASE OF THE ASSESSEE. IN ANY CASE, AFTER CONSIDERING THE PROVISO TO SECTION 153(2A) AS WELL AS THE MEMORANDUM EXPLAININ G THE PROVISIONS OF FINANCE ACT, 2001, WE ARE CLEARLY OF THE OPINION THAT THE AMENDED PROVISIONS WOULD BE APPLICABLE WHE RE THE 56 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 APPELLATE ORDER IS PASSED OR RECEIVED AFTER 1ST APR IL, 2000. AS PER AMENDED PROVISION, THE SET ASIDE ASSESSMENT IS TO BE COMPLETED WITHIN ONE YEAR FROM THE END OF THE FINAN CIAL YEAR IN WHICH APPELLATE ORDER SETTING ASIDE THE ASSESSMENT WAS RECEIVED. IN THIS CASE, ORDER OF LEARNED CIT(A) IS DATED 27TH NOVEMBER, 2000 THOUGH THE EXACT DATE OF RECEIPT OF SUCH ORDER BY THE CIT IS NOT GIVEN BEFORE US BUT IT CAN BE REA SONABLY PRESUMED THAT IT WAS RECEIVED WITHIN THE FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED ON 31ST MARCH, 2001, ESPECIALLY WHEN NO CONTRARY CL AIM IS MADE BY THE REVENUE. IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, THE SET ASIDE ASSESSMENT WAS TO BE COMPLETED BEFORE 31ST MARCH, 2 002 WHILE THE SET ASIDE ASSESSMENT IS COMPLETED ON 31ST MARCH, 2003 WHICH IS CLEARLY BARRED BY LIMITATION. IN VIEW OF THE ABOVE, WE QUASH THE ASSESSMENT ORDER DATED 31ST MARCH, 200 3. ONCE THE IMPUGNED ASSESSMENT ORDER IS 31 ITA-300/DEL/200 1 & 5 OTHERS QUASHED, THE OTHER GROUNDS RAISED IN THE ASS ESSEES APPEAL DO NOT REQUIRE ANY ADJUDICATION. 20. IN THIS VIEW OF THE MATTER AND CONSIDERING FAC TS & CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, WE ARE OF THE CONSIDERED VIEW THAT PROVISIONS OF SECTION 153(3) OF THE ACT HAS NO APPL ICATION AND PROVISIONS OF SECTION 153(2A) SHOULD BE APPLIED AS DISCUSSED IN PRECEDING PARAGRAPHS. AS PER AMENDED PROVISIONS OF SECTION 153(2A) OF THE ACT, TIME LIMIT FOR COMPLETION OF AS SESSMENT IN PURSUANT TO ORDER OF THE APPEAL COMMISSIONER U/S 25 0 OR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL U/S. 254 IS ONE YEAR FROM THE EN D OF THE FINANCIAL YEAR IN WHICH SUCH AN ORDER WAS RECEIVED BY OFFICE OF COMMISSIONER / PCIT. IN THIS CASE, ORDER OF THE APP ELLATE TRIBUNAL WAS PASSED ON 04.10.2000 AND SUCH AN ORDE R WAS 57 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 RECEIVED BY THE OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER ON 10.11 .2000. AS PER THE AMENDED PROVISIONS OF SECTION 153(2A), THE IMPUGNED ASSESSMENT ORDER OUGHT TO HAVE BEEN PASSED ON OR BE FORE 31.03.2002. BECAUSE OF THE INTERVENING ORDER OF THE HIGH COURT IN WRIT AND STAY OF PROCEEDINGS ON 08.03.2002 AND SUBSEQUENT DISPOSAL OF SAID WRIT PETITION ON 14.12.2018 (COMMU NICATED TO O/O.PCIT ON 13.02.2019), THE PERIOD COVERED UNDER OPERATION OF STAY SHALL BE EXCLUDED WHILE COMPUTING PERIOD O F LIMITATION, AS PER EXPLANATION 1(II) TO SECTION 153 OF THE ACT AND IF SUCH PERIOD IS EXCLUDED, THEN THE ASSESSING OFFICER WI LL GET 60 DAYS CLEAR TIME FOR COMPLETION OF ASSESSMENT, IN VIEW O F EXPLANATION REFERRED TO IN SECTION 153 OF THE ACT, BECAUSE BAL ANCE TIME AVAILABLE AS ON DATE OF INTERIM ORDER PASSED BY H IGH COURT WAS 23 DAYS, WHICH IS LESS THAN 60 DAYS. SINCE TH E ORDER OF HONBLE HIGH COURT IN WRIT PETITION WAS RECEIVED I N THE OFFICE OF PCIT ON 13.02.2019 AND THE ASSESSING OFFICER HAS S IXTY DAYS CLEAR TIME TO PASS ORDER GIVING EFFECT ORDER AND IF SUCH 60 DAYS IS CONSIDERED FOR LIMITATION PERIOD, THEN THE ASSES SING OFFICER OUGHT TO HAVE PASSED ASSESSMENT ORDER ON 14.04.2019 . IN THIS CASE, THE IMPUGNED ORDER WAS PASSED ON 31.12.2019. THEREFORE, WE ARE OF THE CONSIDERED VIEW THAT THE A SSESSMENT 58 IT(SS)A NO.1/CHNY/2020 ORDER PASSED U/S. 158BC R.W.S 143(3) / 254 DATED 31 .12.2019 IS BARRED BY LIMITATION AND LIABLE TO BE QUASHED. ACCO RDINGLY, THE ASSESSMENT ORDER IS QUASHED. 21. THE ASSESSEE HAS RAISED VARIOUS GROUNDS TO CHA LLENGE ADDITIONS MADE BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER IN THE ASS ESSMENT. SINCE THE ASSESSMENT ORDER PASSED BY THE ASSESSING OFFICER IS ANNULLED, BECAUSE THE ORDER IS BARRED BY LIMITATI ON, OTHER GROUNDS TAKEN BY THE ASSESSEE CHALLENGING VARIOUS A DDITIONS BECOME ACADEMIC IN NATURE AND DOES NOT REQUIRE SP ECIFIC ADJUDICATION. HENCE, ALL OTHER GROUNDS TAKEN BY TH E ASSESSEE ARE DISMISSED AS INFRUCTUOUS. 22. IN THE RESULT, APPEAL FILED BY THE ASSESSEE IS ALLOWED. ORDER PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT O N 9 TH APRIL, 2021 SD/- SD/- ( . ) ( . ) (V.DURGA RAO) (G.MANJUNATHA ) # / JUDICIAL MEMBER # / ACCOUNTANT MEMBER /CHENNAI, & /DATED 9 TH APRIL, 2021 DS () *) /COPY TO: 1. APPELLANT 2. RESPONDENT 3. + () /CIT(A) 4. + /CIT 5. ) / /DR 6. 2 /G