Shri Jignesh Hiralal Shah, Ahmedabad V. The ACIT, Central Circle-1(2), Ahmedabad

ITSSA 100/AHD/2021

AI Insights

The case involves multiple appeals by both the assessee, Jignesh Hiralal Shah, and the revenue against the orders of the Commissioner of Income-Tax (Appeals), Ahmedabad, concerning the assessment years 2009-10 to 2015-16. The primary legal issues revolved around the applicability of sections 153A and 153B of the Income Tax Act, 1961, particularly concerning the time limits for completing assessments following a search operation under section 132. The tribunal examined whether the assessments were completed within the statutory time limits and whether the additions made were based on incriminating materials found during the search at the assessee's premises.

• Counselvise Citation: [2023] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 135658 (ITAT-AHMEDABAD)
• Duration Of Justice: 1 year(s) 7 month(s) 11 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax (Search & Seizure) Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 14-03-2023
• Appeal Filed By: Assessee
• Order Result: PartlyAllowed
• Bench Allotted: D
• Next Hearing Date: 13-02-2023
• Assessment Year: misc
• Appeal Filed On: 03-08-2021
• Other Referred Cases: National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. Vs. CIT, Batliboy & Co. Ltd. Vs. DCIT, S Kumars Tyre Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Vs. DCIT, CIT Vs. Kabul Chawla, CIT Vs. Saumya Construction P.Ltd., K. Sudhakar S. Shanbhag Vs. ITO, Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd. Vs. CIT, CIT Vs. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala, Barter Group
• Laws Referred To: Income Tax Act 1961
• Result in Favour of: Assessee
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Keywords: Revision of order; Double taxation relief; Document seized; Opportunity of being heard; Principle of natural justice; Tax effect; Period of limitation; Competent authority; Tax effect; Documents seized; Reassessment proceedings
• Section: 263; 132; 90; 69C; 143(3); 153A; 139(1); 13; 153; 119; 153C

Judgement Text

आयकर आयकरआयकर आयकर अपी अपीअपी अपीलीय लीयलीय लीय अिधकरण अिधकरणअिधकरण अिधकरण, अहमदाबाद अहमदाबादअहमदाबाद अहमदाबाद यायपीठ यायपीठ यायपीठ यायपीठ IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, ‘’D’’ BENCH, AHMEDABAD BEFORE SHRI WASEEM AHMED, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND SHRI SIDDHARTHA NAUTIYAL, JUDICIAL MEMBER Sr.No. IT(SS)A/ITA No. Asstt. Year Name of Appellant Name of Respondent 1-7. IT(SS)A No.100 to 106/Ahd/2021 2009-10 to 2015-16 Jignesh Hiralal Shah, 25, Aryavrat Bunglows, Nr. AUDA Garden, Prahlad Nagar Road, Ahmedabad. PAN : AMBPS4023L A.C.I.T, Central Circle 1(2), Ahmedabad 8-13. IT(SS)A No.93- 98/Ahd/2021 2009-10 To 2014-15 A.C.I.T, Central Circle 1(2), Ahmedabad Jignesh Hiralal Shah, Ahmedabad. PAN : AMBPS4023L 14. ITA No.199/Ahd/2021 2014-15 Jignesh Hiralal Shah, Ahmedabad. PAN: AMBPS4023L D.C.I.T, Central Circle-1(2), Ahmedabad (Applicant) (Responent) Assessee by : Shri R.K. Goyal, A.R Revenue by : Shri Sudhendu Das, CIT. D.R सुनवाई क तारीख/D a t e o f H e a r i n g : 1 4 / 0 2 / 2 0 2 3 घोषणा क तारीख /D a t e o f P r o n o u n c e m e n t : 1 5 / 0 3 / 2 0 2 3 आदेश आदेशआदेश आदेश/O R D E R PER BENCH: The above appeals have been filed by the Revenue and the Assessee against the orders of the Ld. Commissioner of Income-Tax (Appeals), Ahmedabad, arising in the matter of the Assessment Order passed u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 153A(1)(b) of the Act Income Tax Act 1961 (here-in-after referred to as "the Act") relevant to the Assessment Years 2009-2010 to 2014-15. Since, the issues involved in all IT(SS)A No.100/Ahd/2021 and 13 others A.Y. 2009-10 2 these appeals are identical, we proceed to dispose of all the appeals by this common order for the sake of convenience and brevity. 2. First, we take up IT(SS)A No. 100/AHD/2021, an appeal by the Assessee for A.Y 2009-10 as lead year. 2.1 The assessee has raised the following grounds of appeal: 1. The order passed by AO is bad in law and required to be quashed as same has been barred by limitation as same has been passed beyond time- period mention as per provision of section 153Bas stood by Finance Act, 2016 made applicable from 01.06.2016, Tax Effect: N.A. being a technical ground. 2. The order passed by AO is bad in law and required to be quashed as it was passed even beyond time limit prescribed by Section 153B(3) and accordingly order passed by authorities required to be quashed. Tax Effect: N.A. being a technical ground. 3. The order passed by AO is required to be quashed as same has been passed beyond statutory time limit prescribed under section 153B of the Act applicable for relevant period. Tax Effect: N.A. being a technical ground. 4. Ld. CIT (A) erred in law and on facts in dismissing additional ground raised before him by observing that no explanation was submitted to take additional ground at appellate stage ignoring fact that as per various judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court legal ground can be taken at any stage of proceedings and accordingly Ld. CIT (A) ought to have admitted the same and ought to have adjudicate the same. Tax Effect: N.A. being a technical ground. 5. The order passed by AO is required to be quashed as approval from JCIT u/s 153D has been done in mechanical manner without application of mind and in a shorter period of one day. Tax Effect:N.A. being a technical ground.T 6. Ld. AO ought to have passed order u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 153A r.w.s. 153C of the Act as material relied on for making addition has been found from third party and accordingly Assessment order passed u/s 143(3) r.w.s. 153A is without jurisdiction and required to be quashed. Tax Effect: N.A. being a technical ground. 7. Ld. AO erred in law and on facts in relying on material found from third party without receiving/recording satisfaction as mentioned in section 153C of the Act which is mandatory and failing which leads to quashing of assessment order. Tax Effect:N.A. being a technical ground. Your appellant craves leave to add, amend, alter, edit, delete, modify, or change all or any of the grounds of appeal before the appeal is heard and decided. IT(SS)A No.100/Ahd/2021 and 13 others A.Y. 2009-10 3 3. The necessary facts are that a search has been carried out on 04-12-2014 at the assessee’s residence and bank Locker. The search was finally concluded vide Panchnama dated 03-02-2015 i.e. last of the authorization for search under section 132 of the Act was executed. Thereafter, the AO issued notice u/s 153A of the Act on 22-07-2015 for framing the assessment. The time limit for completion of assessment u/s 153B of the Act is 2 years/ 21 month from the end of the financial year in which the last of the authorization for search under section 132 of the Act has been executed i.e. 31-12-2016 or 31-03-2017 as the case may be. 4. However, as per the AO, all the assessments were framed vide order dated 29-12-2017 which was well within the time provided under the statute i.e. 31.12.2017. As per the AO, the time limit of one year for calculating the period of framing the assessment was to be excluded as references for exchange of information as per the agreement under section 90 or section 90A on various different dates were made to the competent authorities and there was no response with respect to certain references made by him (the AO). Therefore, the maximum period of one year was to be excluded while computing the time limit for completion of assessment as per the provision of section 153B of the Act. The relevant observation of the AO stands under: Meanwhile, reference had been made for exchange of information from foreign jurisdictions by competent authority. In view of explanation to Section153B, the reply to last of such references had not been received by o/o Pr.CIT (Central), Ahmedabad within the one year limit defined in explanation to u/s.153B & hence, the time barring date was extended by one year i.e 31/12/2017. 5. On appeal before the ld. CIT-A, the assessee submitted that prior to the amendment by the Finance Act 2016 under the provisions of section 153B of the Act, the time limit for passing the assessment order was 2 years from the end of the financial year in which last of the authorization for search under section 132 of the Act was executed. However, after the amendment by the Finance Act 2016, such time limit was reduced to 21 months from the end of the financial year in which last of the authorization for search under section 132 of the Act was executed. Thus, as per the assessee the assessment should have been framed by IT(SS)A No.100/Ahd/2021 and 13 others A.Y. 2009-10 4 the AO by the end of 31 December 2016 as the last of the authorization was executed on 3 rd February 2015 and the assessment order under section 153A r.w.s. 143(3) of the Act was made after 1-6-2016. The assessee in support of its contention has made reference to the provisions of subsection (3) of section 153B of the Act. 5.1 The assessee without prejudice to the above further submitted that even if the period of 2 years is taken for completion of the assessment from the end of the year in which last of the authorization was executed, then also the time limit for passing the assessment order expires by 31 st of March 2017. But the assessment in the present case has been made dated 29 December 2017 much after the expiry date stipulated under the provisions of the law. 5.2 The assessee additionally submitted that certain period of time was to be excluded under the explanation attached with the provisions of section 153B of the Act in the event the reference has been made to the competent authority under an agreement referred to in section 90 or section 90A of the Act and ending with the date on which the information requested is last received by the ld. Commissioner of Income Tax subject to the maximum period of one year. It was submitted by the assessee that the legislature has used the word excluded and not extended meaning thereby the benefit of delay of time available for framing the assessment shall not be extended as observed by the AO. According to the assesse, if the time-limit available to the AO for framing the assessment upon receiving the information from the competent authority is less than 60 days then the time for framing the assessment for 60 days shall be extended as per the first proviso to the explanation to section 153B of the Act. 6. The relevant submission of the assessee before the learned CIT-A is extracted below: Case of assessee Let us see how this gets applied in the present case. In this case last date of period of limitation as per section 153 B (1) (a) is 31.12.2016. IT(SS)A No.100/Ahd/2021 and 13 others A.Y. 2009-10 5 If after exclusion of period of limitation, the Assessing Officer gets less than 60 days, such remaining period shall be extended to 60 days. Explanation. —In computing the period of limitation under this section — xxxxxx (ix) the period commencing from the date on which a reference or first of the references for exchange of information is made by an authority competent under an agreement referred to in section 90 or section 90A and ending with the date on which the information requested is last received by the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner or a period of one year, whichever is less; or shall be excluded: Provided that where immediately after the exclusion of the aforesaid period, the period of limitation referred to in clause (o) or clause (b) of this sub-section available to the Assessing Officer for making an order of assessment or reassessment, as the case may be, is less than sixty days, such remaining period shall be extended to sixty days and the aforesaid period of limitation shall be deemed to be extended accordingly: The legislature never wanted to keep the matter pending even though vital information is received after 1 year from foreign countries covered by DTAA. This is explained as below: (1) Period of limitation available as per section!53B(l)(a) (2) Period excluded as per explanation ix to section 153B (maximum) (3) Balance period available (4) Minimum period required as per proviso to section to explanation to section 1538 21 months 12 months 09 months 02 months(60 days) Period available (3) above 9 months is greater than 2 months and hence no benefit of time is available to AO. Hence, last date for completion of assessment is 31.12.2016 The AO has passed order on 29.12.2107 which is time barred. The assessment need to be quashed. 7. The assessee also submitted that the AO in his order has not specified any date on which the reference was made to the competent authority and the reply received thereto by the Commissioner of Income Tax. As such, the AO without sharing the information has extended the time at his own for completing the assessment which is against the principles of natural justice. 7.1 Without prejudice to the above, the assessee has also submitted that the 1 st reference was made by the Principal DIT dated 8 June 2015 and by the competent authority dated 8 October 2015 and the reply was received by the principal DIT dated 25 th of February 2016. Thus, as per the assessee the time-limit was to be excluded beginning from 8 October 2015 to 25 February 2016 i.e. the period of 3 months and 17 days only. Yet, the time limit for framing the IT(SS)A No.100/Ahd/2021 and 13 others A.Y. 2009-10 6 assessment is up-to 17 April 2017 i.e. a cut-off date but the same was expired much before the completion of the assessment. 7.2 The assessee further assumed that even the period of 1 year has to be excluded, then also it will begin from the 1 st reference i.e. 8 October 2015 and ending on 7 October 2016, then also the time available for framing the assessment was 85 days up-to 31-12-2016 which is much more than the period of 60 days as provided under the 1 st proviso of explanation to section 153B of the Act for completing the assessment dated 31 December 2016. Thus, it was contended by the assessee that the order framed by the AO under section 153A read with section 143(3) of the Act is barred by time by virtue of the provisions of section 153B of the Act. 8. The ld. CIT-A vide letter dated 30-05-2019 called for the remand report which was complied with by the AO vide letter dated 8.11.2019 wherein it was contended that the time limit for completing the assessment was extended by one year on account of the reference made to the competent authority specified under section 90/90A of the Act as there was no response with respect to certain references made by him (the AO). Therefore, the maximum period of one year was to be excluded while computing the time limit for the completion of assessment as the per provisions of section 153B of the Act. As such the time limit was up-to 31-12-2017 for all the assessment years from 2009-10 to 2015-16 whereas the assessment has been framed dated 29-12-2017. Thus, all the assessments were framed within the stipulated time. 8.1 The assessee in rejoinder vide letter dated 02-01-2020 reiterated the earlier submissions made before the ld. CIT-A. 9. However, the ld. CIT-A rejected the admission of technical ground raised by the assessee by observing as under: IT(SS)A No.100/Ahd/2021 and 13 others A.Y. 2009-10 7 5.7 Having considered the facts and the additional grounds raised it is noticed that the assessee has not made any formal and legal request to admit the additional grounds of appeal in the aforesaid letter or subsequently in the present appellate proceedings taking note of the material available on record. Neither any reasons of taking the additional grounds at this stage has been explained so as to justify why the same have not been taken in the original grounds of appeal at the time of filing of the appeal. Thus, the appellant has not satisfied that the grounds raised was bonafide and same could not have been raised earlier for good and sufficient reasons. Even the appellant has not demonstrated that all the facts related to the additional ground were already on record. Thus, the appellant has not fulfilled the requirements for admission of additional ground. Therefore, due to not fulfilling the requirements of law, the additional grounds of appeal are not entertained and the same are hereby rejected by making reliance upon some of the decisions/judgment of the Hon'ble Courts as under; • National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. Vs. CIT (SC) 229 ITR 383 • Batliboy & Co. Ltd. Vs. DCIT (ITAT (MUM) 67 ITD 397 • S Kumars Tyre Manufacturing Co. Ltd. Vs. DCIT (ITAT, Indore) 61 ITD 326 In view of the above discussion, the additional grounds of appeal are dismissed. 10. Being aggrieved by the order of the learned CIT-A, the assessee is in appeal before us. 11. The learned AR before us contended that the additional ground raised by the assessee was legal in nature and the proper request for the admission of such ground was made vide letter dated 17 May 2019 which is discernible from the order of the learned CIT-A. Accordingly, it was contended that the learned CIT-A erred in rejecting the legal ground raised during the appellate proceedings 11.1 The learned AR before us has challenged the validity of the assessment framed under section 153A read with section 143(3) of the Act on the ground that order has been passed beyond the time stipulated under the provisions of section 153B of the Act. The Ld. AR of the assessee before us contented that time limit of completion of assessment u/s 153B of the Act was reduced from 1 st June 2016 from two years to 21 months, as the order was passed by the AO after 01-06- 2016. Therefore, the time limit for completion of assessment is 21 months and not of 24 months from the end of the financial year in which the last of the authorization for search under section 132 of the Act has been executed. As per the learned AR, the last of the authorization for search under section 132 of the Act has been executed dated 3-2-2015 i.e. financial year ending as on 31 st March IT(SS)A No.100/Ahd/2021 and 13 others A.Y. 2009-10 8 2015, meaning thereby, the period of 21 months expires on 31 December 2016 for passing the assessment order under the provisions of section 153B read with section 143(3) of the Act. As the reference has been made for the exchange of information under the provisions of section 90/90A of the Act and therefore the maximum period of 1 year has to be excluded while framing the assessment from first of the reference made for exchange of information. As per, the learned AR the 1 st reference was made by the AO dated 8-10-2015 and maximum time to be excluded i.e. one year expires 7-10-2016 but yet the time was available for framing the assessment for 85 days which is more than 60 days as provided in the proviso to explanation under section 153B of the Act. However, according to the learned AR even the date of 1 st reference as mentioned by the revenue is taken reference, then also the assessment has been framed by the AO beyond the stipulated time provided under the provisions of section 153B of the Act. The Ld. AR of the assessee further contended that if the one year from the 08-10-2015 to 07-10-2016 is excluded from the time limit, still 85 days remain to pass the order before 31-12-2016. Therefore, no time limit could be extended as per the provision of section 153B of the Act beyond 7-10-2016 whereas the assessment has been framed dated 31-12-2016. Thus, the AO has no jurisdiction to pass the order after 31-12-2016. Therefore, the order passes by the AO is time barred. 12. On the other hand, the Ld. DR contented that the last reply of the FT& TR reference has not received till the completion of assessment and in that scenario then the additional time limit available for the assessment is one year and not 60 days. 12.1 The Ld. DR further contended that if the notice u/s 153A is issued before 01-06-2016 then the provisions as applicable on such assessment as stood before the amendment by the Finance Act 2016 have to be followed. Therefore, the time limit is applicable in the case on hand is of two years from the end of the financial year in which las of the authorization of search was conducted. Therefore, the IT(SS)A No.100/Ahd/2021 and 13 others A.Y. 2009-10 9 time limit for completion of assessment after adding the extra time limit due to the reference made to FT & TR is up-to 31-03-2018. 12.2 Without prejudice to the above, the Ld. DR also contended that if the time limit is of 21 months from the end of financial year in which search was conducted and after adding the one year due to the reference made to FT & TR, then the time limit will be 31-12-2017. Therefore, all the orders passed by the AO are well within the time limit. The ld. DR vehemently supported the order of the authorities below. 13. We have heard the rival contentions of both the parties and perused the materials available on record. The 1 st controversy arises whether the learned CIT- A erred in rejecting the legal ground raised before him, challenging the validity of the assessment framed under section 153A read with section 143(3) of the Act. In this regard, we note that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of National Thermal Power Co. Limited vs. CIT reported in 229 ITR 383 has held as under:- “ Under section 254 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, the Appellate Tribunal may, after giving both the parties to the appeal an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it thinks fit. The power of the Tribunal in dealing with appeals is thus expressed in the widest possible terms. The purpose of the assessment proceedings before the taxing authorities is to assess correctly the tax liability of an assessee in accordance with law. If, for example, as a result of a judicial decision given while the appeal is pending before the Tribunal, it is found that a non-taxable item is taxed or a permissible deduction is denied, there is no reason why the assessee should be prevented from raising that question before the Tribunal for the first time, so long as the relevant facts are on record in respect of the item. There is no reason to restrict the power of the Tribunal under section 254 only to decide the grounds which arise from the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). Both the assessee as well as the Department have a right to file an appeal/cross-objections before the Tribunal. The Tribunal should not be prevented from considering questions of law arising in assessment proceedings, although not raised earlier. 13.1 From the above, it is transpired that the view that the Tribunal is confined only to those issues arising out of the appeal before Commissioner (Appeals) is too narrow a view to describe the powers of the Tribunal. Undoubtedly, the Tribunal has the discretion to allow or not to allow a new ground to be raised. But where the Tribunal is only required to consider the question of law arising from facts which were on record during the assessment proceedings, there is no reason IT(SS)A No.100/Ahd/2021 and 13 others A.Y. 2009-10 10 why such a question should not be allowed to be raised when it is necessary to consider that question in order to correctly assess the tax liability of an assessee. Since, the claim of the assessee is purely legal claim and entire facts are available on record. Thus, it is not justified in not admitting the purely legal ground raised by the assessee for the first time. 13.2 It is the admitted fact that the learned CIT-A on the additional ground raised by the assessee has called for the remand report which was duly supplied by the AO. But thereafter learned CIT-A rejected the ground raised by the assessee at the threshold. The ITAT Mumbai Bench in the case of Shahrukh Khan v. Dy. CIT[2007] 13 SOT 61(Mum.) held that the FAA was precluded with his discretion for refusing to admit the additional evidence when the assessee filed additional evidence before FAA and the FAA called for a remand report on such evidence from the Assessing Officer and after going through the remand report, the FAA concluded that sufficient opportunities were granted to assessee and his case did not fall in any of exception available in sub-rule (1) of rule. Thus we are of the view that, once remand report has been obtained by the learned CIT-A, the additional grounds raised by the assessee should not have been rejected. In view of the above we hold that the learned CIT-A erred in rejecting the additional ground of appeal raised by the assessee and therefore, we proceed to adjudicate the same. 13.3 The 2 nd controversy arises whether the time-limit for framing the assessment under the provisions of section 153A read with section 143(3) of the Act is available for 24 months or 21 months from the end of the financial year in which the last of the authorization of the search was executed. Undeniably, the time limit for framing the of assessment under the provisions of section 153A prior to the amendment of the Finance Act 2016 was 24 months but the same was reduced to 21 months by the Finance Act 2016. The provisions of section 153B of the Act has direct bearing on the issue on hand which is reproduced as under: IT(SS)A No.100/Ahd/2021 and 13 others A.Y. 2009-10 11 153B. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 153, the Assessing Officer shall make an order of assessment or reassessment,— (a) in respect of each assessment year falling within six assessment years 98 [and for the relevant assessment year or years] referred to in clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 153A, within a period of twenty-one months from the end of the financial year in which the last of the authorisations for search under section 132 or for requisition under section 132A was executed; (b) in respect of the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which search is conducted under section 132 or requisition is made under section 132A, within a period of twenty-one months from the end of the financial year in which the last of the authorisations for search under section 132 or for requisition under section 132A was executed: XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX (3) The provisions of this section, as they stood immediately before the commencement of the Finance Act, 2016, shall apply to and in relation to any order of assessment or reassessment made before the 1st day of June, 2016: 1 [Provided that where a notice under section 153A or section 153C has been issued prior to the 1st day of June, 2016 and the assessment has not been completed by such date due to exclusion of time referred to in the Explanation, such assessment shall be completed in accordance with the provisions of this section as it stood immediately before its substitution by the Finance Act, 2016 (28 of 2016).] 13.4 Admittedly, in the case on hand the assessment was framed dated 29 December 2017 meaning thereby the amended provisions for completing the assessment i.e. 21 months from the end of the financial year in which last of the authorization was executed will be applicable. Thus, in the given case, the time limit for passing the assessment order expires on 31 December 2016. Thus, we hold that the assessment was to be framed by the AO within a period of 21 months from the end of the financial year in which the last of the authorization was executed and not in 24 months as alleged by the AO. 13.5 The next controversy arises relating to the period to be excluded for calculating the time limit of 21 months as provided under explanation to section 153B of the Act and the same is extracted hereunder: Explanation.—In computing the period of limitation under this section— ************* (ix) the period commencing from the date on which a reference or first of the references for exchange of information is made by an authority competent under an agreement referred to in section 90 or section 90A and ending with the date on which the information requested is last received by the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner or a period of one year, whichever is less; or (x) *********** IT(SS)A No.100/Ahd/2021 and 13 others A.Y. 2009-10 12 shall be excluded: Provided that where immediately after the exclusion of the aforesaid period, the period of limitation referred to in clause (a) or clause (b) of this sub-section available to the Assessing Officer for making an order of assessment or reassessment, as the case may be, is less than sixty days, such remaining period shall be extended to sixty days and the aforesaid period of limitation shall be deemed to be extended accordingly: 13.6 The above provisions provide that the period commencing from the date of 1 st of the reference made to an authority competent under the provisions of section 90/ 90A of the Act for exchange of information and ending with the date on which the information was received by the Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax shall be excluded subject to the maximum period of 1 year whichever is less. The time for exclusion will begin from the date of the first reference made to the competent authority. In the present case the reference has been made dated 8 October 2015 and if one year is allowed for the purpose of the exclusion, the period of such exclusion will expire on 7 October 2016 but the time limit for framing the assessment is available till 31 December 2016. In other words, the time limit available with the assessing officer for framing the assessment even after exclusion of the period of 1 year is of 85 days which is greater than 60 days as provided under the 1 st proviso to the explanation under section 153B of the Act. Thus, in the given case, the assessee will not get the benefit of the proviso attached to the explanation under section 153B of the Act as the AO has 85 days for framing the assessment in his hands. 13.7 We are conscious to the fact that the legislature has used the word exclude and not to extend the time while calculating the period of making the assessment in a situation where the reference to the competent authority has been made. But the legislature has given the minimum period of 60 days by extending the period of the assessment in a situation where the time available with the AO was less than 60 days after obtaining the reply from the competent authority. Thus, if we see the object behind the period to be excluded provided under the provisions of the Act, the purpose of the same is not defeated. In simple words, as a result of search, various documents are seized by the Income Tax Authorities which are IT(SS)A No.100/Ahd/2021 and 13 others A.Y. 2009-10 13 duly documented by the search team by preparing the Panchanama. Thereafter, the search team hands over the documents along with the appraisal report to the AO having jurisdiction over the assessee. The AO based on seized documents proceeds to frame the assessment which has to be completed within the timeframe provided under the provisions of law. However, the AO during the course of assessment proceedings is empowered to make a reference to the competent authority referred under the provisions of section 90/ 90-A of the Act for overseas/ specified transactions in order to determine the total income of the assessee as per the provisions of law. As such, the AO after making the reference will continue to investigate the matter based on the seized documents which has nothing to do with the reference made to the competent authority. In other words, the AO will complete the assessment based on the seized documents within the timeframe and will wait for the information to be obtained from the competent authority. Once information will be received by the AO from the competent authority, he has been given minimum period of 60 days to process that information in order to determine the taxable income of the assessee where the available time for framing the assessment is less than 60 days. Even the information is not received within the time of 1 year, then also the minimum time is available with the AO of 60 days for framing the assessment. As such, the Revenue authority has given minimum time to the AO for framing the assessment. 13.8 Before parting, it is important to note that the word exclusion has been used in the statute and the same cannot be termed as extension. Since the legislature in its wisdom has used for the exclusion, there is no point of interpreting the same. In the case of Keshavji Ravji & Co. v. CIT, [1990] 49 Taxman 87/183 ITR 1 the Apex Court observed as under: "As long as there is no ambiguity in the statutory language, resort to any interpretative process to unfold the legislative intent becomes impermissible. The supposed intention of the Legislature cannot then be appealed to whittle down the statutory language which is otherwise unambiguous. If the intendment is not in the words, it is nowhere else. The need for interpretation arises when the words used in the statute are, on their own terms, ambivalent and do not manifest the intention of the Legislature. " IT(SS)A No.100/Ahd/2021 and 13 others A.Y. 2009-10 14 13.9 In the case of Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit v. State of Maharashtra [Appeal (Civil) No. 2298 of 2001, dated 22-3-2001] their Lordships of the Apex Court held as under: "It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statute that the words of a statute must be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless there is something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest to the contrary. The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. It is yet another rule of construction that when the words of the statute are clear, plain and unambiguous, then the Courts are bound to give effect to that meaning irrespective of consequences. It is said that the words themselves best declare the intention of the Law give. The Courts have adhered to the principle that effort should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the Legislature and it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplus if they can have a proper application in circumstances conceivable within the contemplation of the Statute." 13.10 Though there are various judgments upholding the above principle but we may only mention that Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala [2001] 119 Taxman 352/252 ITR 1 has endorsed the above view by observing as under: "This exercise of purposive interpretation by looking into the object and scheme of the Act and the legislative intendment would arise, in our opinion, if the language of the statute is either ambiguous or conflicting or gives a meaning leading to absurdity." 13.11 Even at the time of hearing, the learned DR was put up the question whether he is having some judicial authority in support of his argument that the period of assessment should be extended by virtue of the word exclusion used in the explanation to section 153B of the Act, but he failed to bring any authority in support of his argument. In view of the above and after considering the facts in entirety, we are pleased to hold that the assessments framed by the AO are barred by time provided under the statute. Accordingly, we quash the assessment framed by the AO. As the assessee has succeeded on the technical ground raised by it, we are not inclined to adjudicate the other technical ground raised by the assessee challenging the validity of the assessment framed by the AO. As such the other technical grounds raised by the assessee becomes infructuous. Thus, we dismiss the same. Hence, the technical grounds raised by the assessee are partly allowed. IT(SS)A No.100/Ahd/2021 and 13 others A.Y. 2009-10 15 13.12 In the result appeal of the assessee is partly allowed. Coming to IT(SS)A No. 93/AHD/2021, an appeal by the Revenue for the AY 2009-10 14. The Revenue has raised following grounds of appeal: 1. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Id. CIT(A) has erred in deleting the additions made by the AO in the order u/s 143(3) r.w.s 153A on legal grounds that the additions should have been made u/s 153C, without appreciating the fact that provisions of section 153C empowers the Assessing Officer to assess or re-assess the income of the person other than searched person, but the assessee being searched person was squarely covered under section 153A. 2. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Id. CIT(A) haserred in accepting the contention of the assessee that the assessment u/s 153Ais to be made solely on the incriminating material found during the search carried out in the case of the concerned assessee and has failed to appreciate that it has added words in Section 153A, which is not permissible in law. 2.1. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Id. CIT(A) has erred in holding that any addition during the assessment u/s.153A has to be confined to the incriminating material found during the course of search u/s.132(1) of the Act, even though, there is no such stipulation in sec.153A of the Act. 2.2. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Id. CIT(A) has erred by not considering the decision of Hon'ble Jurisdiction High Court in its proper perspective in the case of Pr.CIT Vs. Saumya Construction P.Ltd. 387 1TR 529 (Guj), as this judgment lays the principle that assessment should be connected with something found during the search or requisition, viz. incriminating material which reveals undisclosed income. This decision nowhere states that addition u/s 153A can only be made if incriminating material is found during search from the premises of the concerned assessee. 2.3. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Id. CIT(A) has erred in not appreciating that sec.153A requires a notice to be issued requiring the assessee to furnish his return of income in respect of each assessment year falling within six assessment years and to assess or re-assess the total income of those six assessment years, and that the scheme of assessment or reassessment of the total income of a person searched will be brought to naught if no addition is allowed to be made for those six assessment years in the absence of any seized incriminating material. 2.4. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Id. CIT(A) has erred in not appreciating that while computation of undisclosed income of the block period u/s.158BB was to be made on the basis of evidence found as a result of search or requisition of books of accounts, there is no such stipulation in sec.153A and sec.153BI specifically states that the provisions of Chapter-XIV-B, under which sec.158BB falls, would not be applied where a search was initiated u/s.132 after 31/5/2003. 2.5. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Id. CIT{A) has erred in not appreciating that assessment in relation to certain issues not related to the search and seizure may arise in any of the said six assessment years after the search u/s.132 is IT(SS)A No.100/Ahd/2021 and 13 others A.Y. 2009-10 16 conducted in the case of the assessee, and that if the interpretation of the Id. CIT(A) were to hold it will not be possible to assess such income in the 153A proceedings, while no other parallel proceedings to assess such other income can be initiated, leading to no possibility of assessing such other income, which could not have been the intention of the legislature. Further, the AO is duty bound to assess correct income of assessee as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mahalaxmi Sugar Mills, 160 ITR 920(SC). 2.6. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law. the Id. CIT(A) has erred in not appreciating that in all the assessments framed u/s 153A, authorization u/s 132 was issued and incriminating material was found during the course of search in the premises controlled by the searched group which directly belong to the concerned assessee. 3. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Id. CIT(A) has misinterpreted and extrapolated the judgment of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of CIT Vs. Kabul Chawla, 380 ITR 573 (Del) as this judgment lays the principle that an assessment has to be made under this section only on the basis of seized material and the assessment cannot be arbitrary. This decision also nowhere states that addition u/s 153A can only be made if incriminating material is found during search from the premises of the concerned assessee. 3.1. On the facts and circumstances of the case and in taw, the Ld.CIT(A) has erred in not appreciating the decisions of Hon'ble Delhi High court in the case of GIT Vs Anil Kumar Bhatia [211 Taxman 453, 352 ITR (493)] & Kerala High Court in the case of E.N. Gopakumar vs. Commissioner of Income-tax (Central) [2016] 75 Taxmann.com 215 (ker.) wherein Courts held that assessments in a search case can be concluded against interest of assessee including making additions even without any incriminating material being available against assessee in search under section 132. 4. On the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) has erred in deleting the addition of Rs.10,32,25,000/- made u/s 68 considering receipt of unsecured loans as unexplained cash credit, on legal grounds, without going into the merits of the issue, despite the assessee had failed to prove the genuineness of the transaction and creditworthiness of the persons/entities from whom loans were obtained, nor the assessee raised any such legal ground during the course of assessment proceedings before the Assessing Officer. 5. On the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) has erred in deleting the addition of Rs.1,01,38,058/- made u/s 69C on account of interest paid on unexplained unsecured loans, on legal grounds, without going into the merits of the issue, despite the assessee had failed to prove the genuineness of the transaction and creditworthiness of the persons/entities from whom loans were obtained, nor the assessee raised any such legal ground during the course of assessment proceedings before the Assessing Officer. 6. On the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) has erred in deleting the addition of Rs.2,66,43,741/- made on account of change in valuation of closing stock, on legal grounds, without going into the merits of the issue, despite the assessee had failed to reconcile the difference in valuation of closing stock in the return filed u/s 139(1) viz-a-viz 153A, nor the assessee raised any such legal ground during the course of assessment proceedings before the Assessing Officer. 7. On the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) has erred in not considering the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Bombay High Court in K. Sudhakar S. Shanbhag vs. ITO [2000] 161 CTR (Bom) 391: [2000] 241 1TR 865 (Bom) which was rendered by taking notice of the principle laid by the Hon'ble apex Court inC/7"vs. Sun IT(SS)A No.100/Ahd/2021 and 13 others A.Y. 2009-10 17 Engineering Works (P) Ltd. [1992] 107 CTR (SC) 209 : [1992] 198 ITR 297 (SC) to the effect that in reassessment proceedings, an assessee can neither claim nor be allowed a deduction that was not claimed in the original return. Thus, the assessment proceedings initiated on the basis of an action under Section 132 of the Act by issuance of notice u/s 153A also cannot be utilized by the assessee to seek a relief not claimed earlier and thus cannot seek a review of a concluded item . which in this case is the valuation of closing stock. 8. On the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) has erred in allowing the business loss of Rs.12,82,56,632/- in the return u/s 153A which was claimed at Rs.10,31,80,575/- in the regular return u/s 139(1) due to change in working of closing stock, on legal grounds, without going into the merits of the issue, despite the assessee had failed to reconcile the difference in valuation of closing stock in the return filed u/s 139(1) viz-a-viz 153A, nor the assessee raised any such legal ground during the course of assessment proceedings before the Assessing Officer. 9. On the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) has erred in deleting the addition of Rs.1,81,833/-, made on account of deemed income from house property earned on the properties, which have remained unaccounted. 10. On the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) has erred in deleting the addition of Rs.22,76,160/- made on account of undisclosed income, which was not offered in the original return u/s 139. 11. On the facts and circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) has erred in allowing setoff of current year loss against other heads of income. 12. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) . ought to have upheld the order of the A.O. 13. It is, therefore, prayed that the order of the Ld-QIT(A) be set aside and that of the A.O. be restored to the above extent. 15. The first effective issue raised by the Revenue vide ground Nos. 1 to 3 is that the learned CIT(A) erred in holding that the assessment framed under section 153A of the can only be made on the basis of incriminating materials found during the search. 16. The facts in brief are that the assessee is an individual and key person, director/partner in various concern of Barter Group/entry provider group. There was search proceeding under section 132 of the Act carried out at Barter Group dated 04-12-2014 wherein various documents of incriminating nature were found and seized. Accordingly, the proceedings under section 153A of the Act were initiated in the case of the assessee for the year under consideration. Finally, the AO concluded the assessment under section 143(3) r.w.s. 153A of the Act and IT(SS)A No.100/Ahd/2021 and 13 others A.Y. 2009-10 18 assessed the income at 11,50,18,060/- against return income of Rs. 16,55,000/- only. 17. The aggrieved assessee preferred an appeal before of the learned CIT(A). 18. The assessee before the learned CIT(A) submitted that during the search at his premises, no material of incriminating nature was found. Therefore, no addition can be made in the proceedings under section 153A of the Act in the absence of incriminating martial found during the search proceedings. The materials used for making addition in his hand were found from the premises of Shri Ashit Vohra and other third parties in the search proceeding carried in their respective cases which were an independent search. As such, before the utilization of search materials found from the third parties, the procedure under section 153C of the Act was required to be followed but the AO has not done so. Therefore, no addition can be made in his hands on the basis of such materials. 19. The learned CIT(A) agreed with the contention of the assessee that in the proceeding under section 153A of the Act, the assessment can only be framed on the basis materials found during the search. The relevant finding of learned CIT(A) in this regards reads as under: 4.16 It is submitted that no material relevant to the addition made by the AO was found or seized in course of searches carried out at Appellant's premises » and/or in his case. The AO used the material allegedly seized at the premises of Shri Asit Vora in course of search conducted in his case independently. As elaborately submitted in the preceding paragraphs, use of material seized in other cases without following the procedure prescribed under the provisions of section 153C and issuing notice under the said section is in violation of law and such addition cannot be sustained and has to be deleted. Now, the only issue that remains to be considered is whether law permits the AO to make addition without any evidence seized during searches in the case of the assessee concerned. On this issue, all the Hon'ble High Courts are unanimous on the point that assessment under section 153A is to be framed on the basis of material found during the course of-search or requisitioned under section 132A of the Act. Any other material or information gathered during the search and survey carried out on third persons, cannot be used for the purpose of section 153A. In case, he decided to use the material seized from third parties in the assessments of the assessee, the only course open to him is invoking provisions of section 153C of the Act which was not done by the AO in the case of appellant. Thus there is non compliance of provisions of section 153C of IT Act and the additions have been made U/S.153A of IT Act which is not in accordance with the judicial pronouncements made by the Hon'ble Courts as discussed in the preceding paras of this order. IT(SS)A No.100/Ahd/2021 and 13 others A.Y. 2009-10 19 4.17 The issue related to addition u/s 153A in the cases in which the proceedings are not abated has been decided in favour of the assessee by the Jurisdictional High Court and Jurisdictional Tribunal as relied upon by the appellant. Legal position on the issue has been discussed comprehensively in the case of CIT vs. Kabul Chawla (2016) 380 ITR 573 (Del- HC) dated 28/08/2015. 4.18 It is a settled position of law at present that the completed assessments can be interfered with by the Assessing Officer while making assessment under section 153A only on the basis of some incriminating material unearthed during the course of search at the place of assessee, which was not produced or not already disclosed or made known in the course of the original assessment proceedings. 4.19 It is therefore submitted that the Assessing Officer has simply gone beyond the scope of the provisions of section 153A of the Act which comes into operation only after a search has been carried out u/s 132 of the Act and to assign power to the Income-tax authorities for a specific purpose only i.e. for unearthing concealed income 4.20 The fact which may require appreciation at this .stage is that even in the assessment order framed u/s.153A, wherein addition made, there is no reference of any incriminating material. It is therefore submitted that on account of this special and very important factual matrix of this case, the provisions of section 153A are not applicable. To strengthen the aforesaid contention, it is submitted that it is very settled position of law as evident from various decisions of Tribunal as well as High court that Assessing Officer has no jurisdiction to make additions in the order passed u/s 153A of the Act which are pertaimiig_to any undisclosed income or seized material when proceedings are_closed and_attained_ finality. In support of its contention the appellant strongly relies on the decision of Hon'ble Gujarat High Court in case of CIT Vs. Saumya Construction Pvt Ltd (Tax appeal No. 24 of 2016) dated 14 th March 2016, the facts and findings of which are restated as under: ******************************************************************* 4.21 It is an undisputed fact that on the date of initiation of the search no assessment proceedings were pending in this assessment year. Therefore, the proceedings were not abated in the case as mentioned in the second proviso to section 153A (1) of the Act. It seems that the AO lost sight of the fact that he was not making an assessment under section 153A (1) of the Act read with its second proviso. As discussed hereinabove, there is no indication in the contents of the assessment order that the addition was made on the basis of any incriminating material found and seized in search at the place of appellant. 4.22 In view of the aforesaid findings and respectfully following the judgments/decisions of Jurisdictional High Court, Jurisdictional Tribunal and other Courts, wherein it has been held that in absence of incriminating material / evidences found at the place of appellant, addition / disallowance cannot be sustained within the pale of section 153A of the Act. In my considered opinion, the action of the AO for making addition not justified. 4.23 In view of the above discussion, it has been noticed that the additions made by the AO in respect of cash credits u/s.68, interest paid on the aforesaid cash credits u/s.69C, addition made on account of change in valuation of closing stock, notional house property income are found legally not sustainable and hence the same are deleted on this legal ground. IT(SS)A No.100/Ahd/2021 and 13 others A.Y. 2009-10 20 20. Being aggrieved by the order of the learned CIT(A), the Revenue is in appeal before us. 21. The learned DR before us vehemently argued that there is no provision under section 153A/153C which restricts the assessment or reassessment in case of search proceedings to the extent of incriminating materials only. 22. On the other hand, the learned AR submitted that there cannot be any addition of the regular items of income or expense already disclosed in the income tax return unless it is based on incriminating materials found during the search proceedings. 22.1 Both the ld. DR and the AR before us vehemently supported the order of the authorities below as favourable to them. 23. We have heard the rival contentions of both the parties and perused the materials available on record. Admittedly, there was search proceeding under section 132 of the Act dated 4 th December 2014 (i.e. during the financial year 2014-15 corresponding to A.Y. 2015-16), carried out in the case of “Barter Group” and in consequence to the same, the proceedings under section 153A of the Act were initiated in case of respondent assessee for the year under consideration. The assessment under section 153A r.w.s. section 143(3) of the Act for the year under consideration i.e. A.Y. 2009-10 was framed after making certain additions on account of unexplained loan credits and interest thereon, deemed house property income and undisclosed income. 23.1 On appeal by the assessee, the learned CIT (A) deleted the addition made by the AO on technical ground by holding that there was no material of incriminating nature found in the course of the search with reference to year under consideration, therefore the year under consideration being unabated/completed assessment year, no addition should be made in absence of IT(SS)A No.100/Ahd/2021 and 13 others A.Y. 2009-10 21 incriminating material. The learned DR before us vehemently argued that there is no provision under section 153A/153C which restricts the assessment or reassessment in case of search to the extent of incriminating material only. 23.2 In this regard, we find that it has been settled by various Hon’ble Court including Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court that the unabated/completed assessment cannot be disturbed in the absence of any incriminating material/ documents found during the search proceedings whereas the assessment/ reassessment can be made with respect to abated assessment years. The word 'assess' in section 153A/153C of the Act is relatable to abated proceedings (i.e. those pending on the date of search) and the word 'reassess' to the completed assessment proceedings. The Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in the case of Saumya Construction reported in 81 taxmann.com 292 has held that there cannot be any addition of regular items shown in the books of accounts until and unless, certain materials of incriminating nature were found during the course of search. The word incriminating has not been defined under the Act but it refers to those materials/ documents/ information which were collected during the search proceedings and not produced in the original assessment proceeding. Simultaneously, these documents had bearing on the total income of the assessee. Now coming to the case, we note that there was no incriminating document relating to the additions made by the AO with reference to the year under consideration has been found during the search which would have made basis for the addition in the assessment. 23.3 At the time of hearing, the learned DR has not brought anything on record contrary to the finding of the learned CIT (A). Accordingly, we hold that there cannot be any addition of the regular items which were disclosed by the assessee in the regular books of accounts. In holding, so we draw support and guidance from the judgment of Hon’ble Gujarat High Court in case of Saumya Construction (P.) Ltd (supra) wherein it was held as under: Thus, while in view of the mandate of sub-section (1) of section 153A in every case where there is a search or requisition, the Assessing Officer is obliged to issue notice to such IT(SS)A No.100/Ahd/2021 and 13 others A.Y. 2009-10 22 person to furnish returns of income for the six years preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search is conducted or requisition is made, any addition or disallowance can be made only on the basis of material collected during the search or requisition. In case no incriminating material is found, the earlier assessment would have to be reiterated. 23.4 In view of the above, we hold that there cannot be any addition to the total income of the assessee of the regular items as made by the AO in the present case. Accordingly, we do not find any infirmity in the order of the learned CIT (A). Hence, we uphold the same. Thus, the ground of appeal of the Revenue is hereby dismissed. 23.5 Since we have decided the issue on technical grounds, therefore the issue raised by the revenue on merit vide ground 4 to 13 become infructuous. As such, issues raised on merit by the Revenue become infructuous and accordingly, the same are dismissed. 23.6 In the result, the appeal of the Revenue is hereby dismissed. Coming to IT(SS)A No. 101 to 106/AHD/2021 appeals by the Assessee for A.Y. 2010-11 to 2015-16 24. At the outset, we note that the issues raised by the assessee in its grounds of appeal for the AY 2010-11 to 2015-16 are identical to the issues raised by the assessee in IT(SS)A No. 100/AHD/2021 for the assessment year 2009-10. Therefore, the findings given in IT(SS)A No. 100/AHD/2021 shall also be applicable for the assessment years 2010-11 to 2015-16. The appeal of the assessee for the assessment 2009-10 has been decided by us on technical ground vide paragraph No. 13 of this order in favour of the assessee. The learned AR and the DR also agreed that whatever will be the findings for the assessment year 2009-10 shall also be applied for the assessment years 2010-11 to 2015-16. Hence, the grounds of appeals filed by the assessee are hereby partly allowed. IT(SS)A No.100/Ahd/2021 and 13 others A.Y. 2009-10 23 25. Coming to ITA No. 199/AHD/2021, an appeal by the Assessee for A.Y. 2014-15 25.1 The issue raised by the assessee is that the Ld. PCIT erred in holding the order of the AO as erroneous in so far prejudicial to the interest of revenue u/s 263 of the Act. 26. At the outset, we find that there is a delay in filing the appeal by the assessee for 79 days. At this juncture, it is important to note that there was a lock down in the country due to outbreak of covid-19 and the Hon’ble Supreme Court condoned the delay vide order dated 15-03-2020 in the case of Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, reported in 125 taxmann.com 151 for certain period of time. As such, the period of 79 days falls during the covid-19 period. Thus, we condone the delay and proceed to adjudicate the issue on merit. 27. In the present case, the Assessment Order was framed by the AO u/s 143(3) of the Act, r.w.s 153A of the Act, dated 29/12/2017 which has been made subject to the revision under the provisions of section 263 of the Act by the Ld. PCIT. Undeniably, the Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax, has been empowered to call for and examine the record of any proceeding and if he considers that the order passed by the AO is erroneous in so far prejudicial to the interest of revenue he may pass such order by revising the same as deem necessary. Now, before adverting the issue whether the assessment order is erroneous in so far prejudicial to the interest of revenue, it is pertinent to note that such order has been quashed by ITAT on account of limitation of time. The order of the ITAT has already been reproduced somewhere in the present order. Thus, there remains no ambiguity that the order which is subject matter of revision has been quashed and therefore, the same cannot be subject to the proceedings specified u/s 263 of the Act. Accordingly, we hold that the order passed u/s 263 of the Act by Ld. PCIT is not sustainable in the eyes of law. Hence, the grounds of appeal of the assessee are partly allowed. IT(SS)A No.100/Ahd/2021 and 13 others A.Y. 2009-10 24 27.1 In the result the appeal filed by the assesse is partly allowed. 28. Coming to IT(SS)A No. 94 to 97/AHD/2021 appeals by the Revenue for A.Y. 2010-11 to 2013-14 28.1 At the outset, we note that the issues raised by the Revenue in its grounds of appeal for the AY 2010-11 to 2013-14 are identical to the issues raised by the Revenue in IT(SS)A No. 93/AHD/2021 for the assessment year 2009-10. Therefore, the findings given in IT(SS)A No. 93/AHD/2021 shall also be applicable for the assessment years 2010-11 to 2013-14. The appeal of the Revenue for the assessment 2009-10 has been decided by us on technical ground vide paragraph No. 23 of this order against the revenue. The learned AR and the DR also agreed that whatever will be the findings for the assessment year 2009-10 shall also be applied for the assessment years 2010-11 to 2013-14. Hence, the grounds of appeals filed by the Revenue is hereby dismissed. 29. Coming to IT(SS)A No. 98/AHD/2021, an appeal by the Revenue for A.Y. 2014-15 29.1 At the outset, we note that the assessee is also in counter appeal for the year under consideration vide IT(SS) No. 105/AHD/2021 wherein the validity of the assessment has been challenged on account of limitation. The ground of appeal of the assessee on validity of assessment order has been decided by us vide paragraph No. 24 of this order where we have quashed the assessment order. Hence, once the validity of the assessment itself has been quashed by us, the grounds of appeal raised by the Revenue on merit of the addition become infructuous. Thus, the same are hereby dismissed accordingly. 29.2 In the result appeal of the Revenue is hereby dismissed. IT(SS)A No.100/Ahd/2021 and 13 others A.Y. 2009-10 25 30. In the combined results, all the appeals filed by assessee are partly allowed and all the appeals filed by the revenue are hereby dismissed. Order pronounced in the Court on 15/03/2023 at Ahmedabad. Sd/- Sd/- (SIDDHARTHA NAUTIYAL) JUDICIAL MEMBER (WASEEM AHMED) ACCOUNTANT MEMBER (True Copy) Ahmedabad; Dated 15/03/2023 Manish