ITO, New Delhi V. Sh. Anil Kumar Jain, Delhi

ITSSA 39/DEL/2014

• Counselvise Citation: [2017] 122 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 3456 (ITAT-DELHI)
• Duration Of Justice: 3 year(s) 20 day(s)
• Appeal Type: Income Tax (Search & Seizure) Appeal
• Pronouncement Date: 13-11-2017
• Appeal Filed By: Department
• Order Result: Dismissed
• Bench Allotted: C
• Next Hearing Date: 15-06-2017
• Assessment Year: misc
• Appeal Filed On: 24-10-2014
• Result in Favour of: Assessee
• Court: TRIBUNAL
• Department Lawyers: NAVIN CHANDRA
• Keywords: Recovery proceedings; Search and seizure; Period of limitation; Block assessment
• Section: 154

Judgement Text

IN THE INCOME-TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, DELHI BENCH C, NEW DELHI BEFORE : SHRI H.S. SIDHU, JUDICIAL MEMBER AND SHRI L.P. SAHU, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER IT(SS)A NO. 39/DEL./2014 BLOCK PERIOD: 01.04.1987 TO 17.12.1997 INCOME - TAX OFFICER, WARD 29(2), NEW DELHI (APPELLANT) VS. ANIL KUMAR JAIN, 2503, DHARAMPURA CHAWRI BAZAR, DELHI. PAN - AAGPJ 2562A (RESPONDENT) APPELLANT BY SHRI NAVIN CHANDRA, CIT/DR RESPONDENT BY NONE ORDER PER L.P. SAHU, A.M.: THIS IS AN APPEAL FILED BY THE REVENUE AGAINST THE ORDER OF LD. CIT(A)- XXV, NEW DELHI DATED 30.07.2014 FOR THE BLOCK PERIO D MENTIONED ABOVE, ON THE FOLLOWING GROUNDS: 1. ON THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE THE LD. CIT(A) WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN HOLDING THAT INTEREST U/S. 220(2) WAS CHARGEABLE AFTER THE DEMAND NOTICE WAS ISSUED CONSEQUENT UPON THE ORDER OF THE INCOME TAX SETTLEMENT COMMISSION. 2. ON THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE THE L D. CIT(A) SHOULD HAVE DIRECTED TO CHARGE INTEREST FROM THE DATE OF ORIGIN AL ASSESSMENT TILL THE ORDER OF ITSC. 3. THE ORDER OF THE CIT(A) SHOULD BE MODIFIED AND THE ORDER OF THE AO SHOULD BE RESTORED. DATE OF HEARING 10.10.2017 DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT 13 .11.2017 IT(SS)A NO. 39/DEL./2014 2 4. ON THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE THE L D. CIT(A) WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN EXAMINING AN ISSUE WHICH WAS COVERED B Y THE ORDER OF ITSC AS PROVIDED U/S. 245-I OF THE I.T. ACT AND HAS THUS GON E BEYOND HIS POWERS. 2. THE BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE ARE THAT CONSEQUENT UPON THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT ON 11.12.1997, THE A SSESSEE FILED RETURN OF INCOME IN RESPONSE TO NOTICE U/S. 158BC, DECLARING UNDISCLOSED INCOME OF RS.2,16,132/- FOR THE BLOCK PERIOD, WHICH WAS ENHAN CED TO RS.48,91,880/- VIDE BLOCK ASSESSMENT U/S. 158BC BY THE ASSESSING O FFICER. THIS ASSESSMENT ORDER TRAVELLED BEFORE THE FIRST APPELLATE AUTHORIT Y AS WELL AS BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL AND ULTIMATELY, THE TRIBUNAL SET ASIDE THE ASSESSMENT PASSED U/S. 158 VIDE ORDER DATED 30.09.2005 IN ITA NOS. 62/DEL. /01 AND 81/DEL./01. DURING THE PENDENCY OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE AO IN RESPONSE TO TRIBUNAL ORDER, THE ASSESSEE CARRIED THE MATTER BEFORE THE S ETTLEMENT COMMISSION, WHO DETERMINED THE UNDISCLOSED INCOME OF THE APPELLANT FOR THE BLOCK PERIOD AT RS.30,25,030/- VIDE ORDER DATED 25.02.2011. PURSUAN T TO THIS ORDER OF SETTLEMENT COMMISSION, THE AO ISSUED A DEMAND NOTIC E U/S. 156 ON 29.03.2011, MENTIONING A SUM OF RS. 24,43,881/- PAY ABLE BY THE ASSESSEE U/S. 220(2) OF THE ACT AS INTEREST COMMENCING FROM AN UN CERTAIN PERIOD TO FEBRUARY, 2011 AND RAISING TOTAL DEMAND OF RS.38,91 ,571/-. HAVING LEARNT THAT THE TOTAL DEMAND OF RS.38,91,571/- INCLUDES AN AMOU NT OF RS.24,43,881/- IT(SS)A NO. 39/DEL./2014 3 CHARGED ON ACCOUNT OF INTEREST U/S. 220(2) FROM AN UNKNOWN DATE TO FEBRUARY, 2011, THE ASSESSEE FILED AN APPLICATION U/S. 154 BE FORE THE AO ON THE AVERMENTS THAT INTEREST U/S. 220(2) COULD BE CHARGE D ONLY IF THE AMOUNT SPECIFIED IN THE DEMAND NOTICE U/S. 156 IS NOT PAID WITHIN THE PERIOD OF 35 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF ITS SERVICES. THE AO DID NOT CONCUR WITH THE AVERMENT OF ASSESSEE AND REJECTED THE APPLICATION U/S. 154 OF T HE ACT VIDE ORDER DATED 31.01.2014. IN APPEAL AGAINST THIS ORDER, THE LD. C IT(A), AFTER CONSIDERING THE ELABORATE SUBMISSIONS OF THE ASSESSEE AND VARIOUS C ASE LAWS REFERRED TO IN THE IMPUGNED ORDER, HELD THAT THE ASSESSEE WAS NOT EXIG IBLE TO INTEREST U/S. 220(2) OF THE ACT FROM THE DATE OF THE NOTICE OF DE MAND RAISED IN THE FIRST ROUND OF LITIGATION WHICH WAS NULLIFIED BY THE ITAT . AGGRIEVED BY THIS ORDER OF LD. CIT(A), THE REVENUE IS IN APPEAL BEFORE THE TRI BUNAL. 3. WE HAVE HEARD THE SUBMISSIONS OF BOTH THE PARTIE S AND HAVE GONE THROUGH THE ENTIRE MATERIAL AVAILABLE ON RECORD AND WE FIND NO JUSTIFICATION TO DISCARD THE REASONABLE DECISION REACHED BY THE LD. CIT(A) ON THE ISSUE VIDE IMPUGNED ORDER. THE FINDINGS REACHED BY FIRST APPEL LATE AUTHORITY ARE REPRODUCED HEREIN BELOW FOR READY REFERENCE : I HAVE GIVEN MY THOUGHTFUL CONSIDERATION TO THE GR OUNDS OF APPEAL, THE SUBMISSIONS MADE BY THE APPELLANT AND THE ORDER PASSED U/S 154 OF THE ACT. AS REGARDS THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL NOS. 3 TO 6, THE CONTENTION OF TH E APPELLANT OPPOSING LEVY OF INTEREST FROM AN UNKNOWN DATE TO FEBRUARY. 2011 APP EARS TO BE IN ORDER UPON A CONSIDERATION OF THE ENTIRE ARGUMENTS OF THE APPELL ANT. THE PRIMARY CONTENTION OF IT(SS)A NO. 39/DEL./2014 4 THE APPELLANT THAT WITH THE HON'BLE ITAT'S ORDER TH E EARLIER NOTICE OF DEMAND WAS WIPED OUT AS THE ASSESSMENT ORDER FRAMED BY THE LD. AO WAS SET-ASIDE WITH THE DIRECTION TO THE AO TO FRAME THE ASSESSMENT ORDER A FRESH CANNOT BE REGARDED AS BEREFT OF MERIT. IT ISAN INCONTROVERTIBLE FACT THAT WHEN THE APPELLANT APPROACHED THE HON'BLE SETTLEMENT COMMISSION (FOR SHORT. SC) THERE WAS NO NOTICE OF DEMAND IN OPERATION AGAINST THE APPELLANT WHICH COULD BE SAID TO BE LEGAL, VALID AND ENFORCEABLE AGAINST IT. IT CAN BE GATHERED FROM THE ORDER OF THE HON'BLE SC THE RELEVANT PART OF WHOSE ORDER IS QUOTED BELOW:- 2. IN THIS GROUP OF CASES A SEARCH AND SEIZURE OPE RATION WAS CARRIED OUT ON 11/12/1997. THE BLOCK ASSESSMENTS WERE COMPLETED IN ALL THESE CASES AND THE COMMISSION OF INCOME TAX (APPEALS) PASSED THE APPEL LATE ORDERS. THESE ORDERS WERE SET ASIDE BY THE ITAT AND THE PROCEEDINGS WERE PEND ING BEFORE THE ASSESSING OFFICER WHEN THE APPLICANTS CAME BEFORE THE SETTLEMENT COMMI SSION. ON A PERUSAL OF THE ABOVE PART OF THE HON'BLE SC'S ORDER IT WAS APPARENT THAT THE PROCEEDINGS WERE PENDING BEFORE THE AO. SINCE THE P ROCEEDINGS WERE PENDING THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF ANY DEMAND AGAINST THE APPELLANT . BY IMPLICATION IT MEANT THAT A FRESH NOTICE OF DEMAND WAS REQUIRED TO BE ISSUED AF TER THE CONCLUSION OF THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HON'BLE SC. FURTHER, SECTION 220(2) OF THE ACT READS AS UNDER- 'IF THE AMOUNT SPECIFIED IN ANY NOTICE OF DEMAND UN DER SECTION 156 IS NOT PAID WITHIN THE PERIOD LIMITED UNDER SUB-SECTION (1), THE ASSESS EE SHALL BE LIABLE TO PAY SIMPLE INTEREST AT 3 ONE AND ONE- HALF PER CENT FOR EVERY MONTH OR PART OF A MONTH COMPRISED IN THE PERIOD COMMENCING FROM THE DAY IMMEDIATELY F OLLOWING THE END OF THE PERIOD MENTIONED IN SUB- SECTION (1) AND ENDING WITH THE D AY ON WHICH THE AMOUNT IS PAID:] PROVIDED THAT WHERE AS A RESULT OF AN ORDER UNDER S ECTION 154, OR SECTION 155, OR SECTION 250, OR SECTION 254, OR SECTION 260, OR SEC TION 262, OR SECTION 264 5OR AN ORDER OF THE SETTLEMENT COMMISSION UNDER SUB- SECTION (4) OF SECTION 245D], THE AMOUNT ON WHICH INTEREST WAS PAYABLE UNDER THIS SECTION HAD BEE N REDUCED, THE INTEREST SHALL BE REDUCED ACCORDINGLY AND THE EXCESS INTEREST PAID, I F ANY, SHALL BE REFUNDED:] PROVIDED FURTHER THAT IN RESPECT OF ANY PERIOD COMM ENCING ON OR BEFORE THE 31ST DAY OF MARCH, 1989 , AND ENDING AFTER THAT DALE, SUCH INTE REST SHALL, IN RESPECT OF SO MUCH OF SUCH PERIOD AS FALLS AFTER THAT DATE, BE CALCULATED AT THE RATE OF ONE AND ONE- HALF PER CENT FOR EVERY MONTH OR PART OF A MONTH.]' ON A PERUSAL OF THE ABOVE SECTION IT IS AMPLY CLEAR THAT INTEREST U/S 220(2) OF THE ACT IS CHARGEABLE FROM THE DAY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TH E END OF THE PERIOD MENTIONED IN SUB-SECTION (1) AND ENDING WITH THE DAY ON WHICH THE AMOUNT IS PAID. IN THE CASE AT HAND THE NOTICE U/S 156 WAS ISSUED ON 29/3/2011 AS PER WHICH THE APPELLANT WAS STATUTORILY REQUIRED TO PAY THE DEMAND BY 3 RD APRIL, 2011, THE EARLIER DEMAND NOTICE ETC BASED ON THE FIRST ORDER OF THE AO U/S 158BC OF THE ACT, WHICH WAS SET ASIDE BY THE HON'BLE ITAT, NEW DELHI, HAVING BEEN RENDERED N UGATORY. THUS, FOR THE PURPOSES IT(SS)A NO. 39/DEL./2014 5 OF SECTION 220(2) OF THE ACT THE DEMAND NOTICE ISSU ED SUBSEQUENT TO THE ORDER OF THE HON'BLE SETTLEMENT COMMISSION WAS THE VALID, LEGAL AND ENFORCEABLE NOTICE. BESIDES THE ABOVE THE PROVISO ONE TO THE SECTION 22 0(2) OF THE ACT, AS QUOTED ABOVE, TALKS OF REDUCTION OF THE AMOUNT OF INTEREST PAYABL E UNDER THIS SECTION IN CASE OF ANY REDUCTION IN THE AMOUNT ON WHICH INTEREST WAS PAYAB LE UNDER THIS SECTION AND REFUND OF THE EXCESS INTEREST CHARGED U/S 220(2) OF THE ACT AS A RESULT INTER-ALIA OF THE ORDER OF THE HON'BLE SC U/S 245D OF THE ACT. BY IMPLICATION IT MEANS THAT THERE MUST BE AN ORDER OF ASSESSMENT IN EXISTENCE BEFORE THE ADMISSION OF AN ASSESSEE'S CASE TO THE HON'BLE SC. IN THE INSTANT CASE THERE W AS NO ORDER IN EXISTENCE SPECIFYING THE INTEREST ETC PAYABLE U/S 220(2) OF THE ACT, HEN CE PROVISO 1 ALSO DOES NOT GET ATTRACTED. AS REGARDS THE APPLICABILITY OF THE TAXATION LAWS ( CONTINUATION & VALIDATION OF RECOVERY PROCEEDINGS) ACT 1964 IT DOES NOT COME INT O PLAY IN THE CASE AT HAND AS FRESH DEMAND NOTICE WAS ISSUED AFTER THE DISPOSAL O F THE CASE BY THE HON'BLE SC AS PER ITS DIRECTIONS CONTAINED IN PAGE NO. 13 OF ITS ORDER. THE FOLLOWING ARGUMENTS FURTHER RAIDED BY THE AR FO R THE APPELLANT DURING THE APPELLATE PROCEEDINGS IN ITS OWN CASE WERE ALSO CON SIDERED AND DISPOSED OFF:- (A) WHETHER THE ORIGINAL NOTICE OF DEMAND ISSUED BY THE AO WHICH HAD ALREADY BEEN NULLIFIED BY THE HONBLE ITAT, NEW DELHI CAN BE SAI D TO BE VALID AND OPERATIVE AFTER THE ORDER OF THE HON'BLE SC. (B) AFTER THE ITAT SET ASIDE THE ORDER OF THE AO FO R DENOVO ASSESSMENT AND THE APPELLANT, BEFORE THE ASSESSMENT COULD BE COMPLETED IN ITS CASE, TOOK THE MATTER TO THE HON'BLE SC, WHETHER THE ORIGINAL DEMAND NOTICE MERELY REMAINED IN ABEYANCE OR SUSPENSION DURING THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS. (C) WHETHER THE ADMISSION OF A PETITION FOR SETTLEM ENT IS BY WAY OF APPEAL OR REVISION AGAINST THE ASSESSMENT. (D) WHETHER THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE HON'BLE SC T ANTAMOUNT TO THE PENDING CONTINUATION OF THE ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS. (E) WHETHER THE ORDER OF THE HON'BLE SC WAS THE FIN AL CONFIRMATION OF THE ASSESSMENT ORDER SET ASIDE BY THE HON'BLE ITAT FOR DE-NOVO ASSESSMENT. (F) WHETHER THE ORDER OF THE HON'BLE SC GETS MERGED WITH THE ORIGINAL ORDER WHICH STOOD SET ASIDE BY THE HON'BLE ITAT. (II). LF IT DO ES NOT, THEN DOES IT NOT GEL MERGED WITH THE ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS PENDING BEFORE THE AO. (G) WHETHER THE ORDER OF THE HON'BLE SC IS THE REST ORATION OF THE SET ASIDE ORIGINAL ASSESSMENT ORDER AND CONSEQUENTLY A REVIVAL OF THE ORIGINAL DEMAND. IT(SS)A NO. 39/DEL./2014 6 (H) WHETHER THE DEMAND CREATED BY THE ERSTWHILE ASS ESSMENT ORDER WHICH WAS SET ASIDE BY THE HON'BLE ITAT, CAN BE SAID TO BE IN OPE RATION TILL THE HON'BLE SC'S FINAL ORDER. HAVING ADDRESSED MYSELF TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS RAIS ED BY THE APPELLANT IN THE COURSE OF APPELLATE PROCEEDINGS, I AM OF THE CONSID ERED VIEW THAT THE ANSWERS TO THE ABOVE ARE IN THE NEGATIVE BARRING ARGUMENT (D)(II) MENTIONED SUPRA WHOSE ANSWER IS IN THE AFFIRMATIVE I.E. THE HON'BLE SC'S ORDER W AS THE CULMINATION OF THE ASSESSMENT PROCEEDINGS PENDING BEFORE THE AO. ASSIS TANCE IS DERIVED FROM THE FOLLOWING FACT SITUATIONS FOR HOLDING AS ABOVE WHIC H ARE OUTLINED BELOW:- (I). IT IS AN UNDISPUTED FACT THAT THE SETTLEMENT A PPLICATION WAS NOT MOVED BY THE APPELLANT AGAINST ANY CONCLUDED ASSESSMENT ORDER. T HEREFORE, THERE WAS NO MERGER OF THE HONBLE SCS ORDER WITH SUCH ORDER, THE HON BLE SCS ORDER BEING THE FIRST ORDER. (II) IT IS ALSO A MATTER OF RECORD THAT THE O RIGINAL ASSESSMENT WAS SET ASIDE. CONSEQUENTLY, THERE WAS NO ORDER IN EXISTENCE. WHEN THERE WAS NO ORDER AT THE TIME OF FILING OF THE PETITION BY THE APPELLANT FOR SETT LEMENT OF ITS CASE BEFORE THE AO NO QUESTION OF REVIVAL OF ANY ORIGINAL DEMAND NOTICE A ROSE. (III). IT IS ALSO AN ADMITTED FACT THAT THE HON'BLE SC NEITHER CONFIRMED ANY ORIGINAL ORDER NOR ANY DEMAND EMANATING THEREFROM. (IV) MOREOVER, NO FURTHER PROCEEDING FOR RECOV ERY OF ANY TAX IN PURSUANCE OF ANY NOTICE OF DEMAND WAS ALSO INITIATED BY THE AO IN TH E INTERREGNUM ON THE BASIS OF ANY ORDER OR DEMAND SERVED UPON THE APPELLANT BEFORE TH E DISPOSAL OF THE APPEAL OR THE OTHER PROCEEDING BY THE HONBLE SC. I ALSO DERIVE SUPPORT FOR HOLDING THE VIEW THAT THE RE WAS NO ORDER IN EXISTENCE AFTER THE ORDER IN THE CASE OF THE APPELLANT WAS SET-ASID E BY THE HONBLE ITAT, NEW DELHI AND BEFORE THE PETITION WAS FILED BY THE APPELLANT BEFORE THE HONBLE SC, FROM THE PRINCIPLES ELABORATED BY THEIR LORDSHIPS IN THE FOL LOWING CASES :- (I). CORA CHAND POREL V. UNION OF INDIA, [1986] 160 ITR 158 (CAL.) IN THE ABOVE CASE THEIR LORDSHIPS ADJUDGED AS UNDER ON THE ISSUE AT STAKE:- ...... THE ONLY POINT URGED BY MR. BAGCHI ASSISTED BY MR. S.S. ROY IS THAT IN THE CASE OF LTO V. SEGHU KUCHIAH SETTY [I964] 52 ITR 538 , THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT A FRESH DEMAND NOTICE HAD TO BE SERVED BEFORE AN ASSESSEE COU LD BE TREATED AS A DEFAULTER WHEN THE AMOUNT OF TAX WAS REDUCED IN APPEAL. IT WA S FURTHER HELD BY THE SUPREME COURT THAT ON THE INCOME-LAX OFFICER'S ORDER BEING R EVISED IN APPEAL, THE DEFAULT BASED ON HIS ORDER AND ALL CONSEQUENTIAL PROCEEDINGS MUST BE TAKEN TO HAVE BEEN SUPERSEDED AND FRESH PROCEEDINGS HAVE TO BE STARTED TO REALIZE HIS DUES AS FOUND BY THE REVISED ORDER. MR. BAGCHI ARGUED THAT AFTER THIS DECISION, THE LAW HAS UNDOUBTEDLY BEEN CHANGED BY THE ACT OF 1964 BUT THE PRESENT CASE, ACC ORDING TO MR. BAGCHI, WILL NOT COME WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE ACT OF 1964 AS THE A CT DEALS WITH CASES WHERE NO SECOND NOTICE UNDER SECTION 29 OF THE ACT HAS BEEN I SSUED AFTER THE DISPOSAL OF THE IT(SS)A NO. 39/DEL./2014 7 APPEAL. THE ARGUMENT OF MR. BAGCHI IS THAT WHEN AFT ER THE REDUCTION OF THE TAX IN APPEAL AFRESH NOTICE UNDER SECTION 29 OF THE ACT WA S ISSUED, THE FIRST NOTICE UNDER SECTION 29 WAS SUPERSEDED AND THE PROCEEDING BASED ON THE FIRST NOTICE THUS CEASED TO EXIST AND THERE COULD NOT BE ANY CONTINUATION OF THE FIRST PROCEEDING WHICH HAD BEEN SUPERSEDED..... IN THE INSTANT CASE, THERE IS NO DI SPUTE THAT THE SAID NOTICE OF DEMAND AS ISSUED. THEREAFTER, THE INCOME-TAX OFFICER FORWARDE D THE CASE TO THE CERTIFICATE OFFICER. AFTER THE REDUCTION OF THE AMOUNT IN APPEAL, ANOTHE R NOTICE UNDER SECTION 29 OF THE ACT WAS ISSUED TO THE ASSESSEE. IN ITO V. SEGHU BUCHIAH SETTY [1964] 52 ITR 538 (SC), IT WAS HELD BY SARKAR J. (AS HIS LORDSHIP THEN WAS), THAT ON THE INCOME-TAX OFFICER'S ORDER BEING REVISED IN APPEAL, THE DEFAULT BASED ON HIS ORD ER AND ALL CONSEQUENTIAL PROCEEDINGS MUST BE TAKEN TO HAVE BEEN SUPERSEDED AND FRESH PROCEEDINGS HAVE TO BE STARTED TO REALISE HIS DUES AS FOUND BY THE REVISED ORDER. HIDAYATULLAH J. (AS HIS LORDSHIP THEN WAS) HELD THA T WHEN AN ASSESSMENT MADE BY THE INCOME-TAX OFFICER IS ALTERED (WHETHER THE TAX ASSE SSED IS REDUCED OR INCREASED) BY REASON OF ANY ORDER UNDER THE ACT, IT IS THE DUTY O F THE INCOME-TAX OFFICER UNDER SECTION 29 OF I.T. ACT TO ISSUE A FRESH NOTICE OF DEMAND IN THE PRESCRIBED FORM AND SERVE IF UPON THE ASSESSEE. SHAH J. (AS HIS LORDSHIP THEN WAS) HELD OTHERWISE. ACCORDING TO HIS LORDSHIP, IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY PROVISION IMPOSING AN OBLIGATION UPON THE INCOME-TAX OFFICER TO ISSUE SUCCESSIVE NOTICES OF DEMAND FROM TIME TO TIME FOR RECOVERY OF THE AMOUNT DUE DURING THE PROCESS OF ASSESSMENT, THE NOTICES OF DEMAND IS SUED BY THE INCOME-TAX OFFICER IN EXERCISE OF THE POWER UNDER SECTION 29 MAY BE ENFORC ED IN THE MANNER PROVIDED BY SECTION 46 AND WITHIN THE PERIOD OF LIMITATION PROV IDED IN SECTION 46(7), EVEN AFTER THE APPEAL AGAINST THE ORDER OF ASSESSMENT BY THE INCOM E-TAX OFFICER IS DISPOSED OF, SUBJECT TO ADJUSTMENT OF THE AMOUNT TO BE RECOVERED IN THE L IGHT OF THE ORDER OF THE APPELLATE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER. A PERSON WHO HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH A NOTICE OF DEMAND WOULD CONTINUE TO BE A DEFAULTER NOTWITHSTANDING THE REDUCTION OF HIS LIABILITY BY AN ORDER OF THE APPELLATE AUTHORITY. THERE IS ONLY ONE EXCEPTION TO THIS RULE AND THAT IS WHEN THE ORDER OF ASSESSMENT IS WHOLLY SET ASIDE.' (II) CIT V. RAJESH KUMAR DINESH KUMAR, [2009] 221 C TR 78(RAJ.) IN THE ABOVE CASE THEIR LORDSHIPS ADJUDGED AS UNDER ON THE ISSUE AT STAKE:- '..... IN ORDER TO APPRECIATE THE CONTENTIONS, WE M AY GAINFULLY QUOTE THE PARA 2 OF THE SAID CIRCULAR IN ITS ENTIRETY, WHICH READS AS UNDER : '2. THESE ISSUES WERE COMPREHENSIVELY EXAMINED IN C ONSULTATION WITH THE MINISTRY OF LAW AND THE BOARD HAS BEEN ADVISED: (I) WHERE AN ASSESSMENT ORDER IS CANCELLED UNDER SE CTION 146 OR CANCELLED/SET ASIDE BY AN APPELLATE/REVISIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE CANCELLAT ION/SETTING ASIDE BECOMES FINAL (I.E. IT IS NOT VARIED AS A RESULT OF FURTHER APPEALS/REV ISIONS), NO INTEREST UNDER SECTION 220(2) CAN BE CHARGED PURSUANT TO THE ORIGINAL DEMAN D NOTICE. THE NECESSARY COROLLARY OF THIS POSITION WILL BE THAT EVEN WHEN TH E ASSESSMENT IS REFRAMED, INTEREST IT(SS)A NO. 39/DEL./2014 8 CAN BE CHARGED ONLY AFTER THE EXPIRY OF 35 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF SERVICE OF DEMAND NOTICE PURSUANT TO SUCH FRESH ASSESSMENT ORDER. (II) WHERE THE ASSESSMENT MADE ORIGINALLY BY ITO IS EITHER VARIED OR EVEN SET ASIDE BY ONE APPELLATE AUTHORITY BUT, ON FURTHER APPEAL, THE ORIGINAL ORDER OF THE ITO IS RESTORED EITHER IN PART OR WHOLLY, THE INTEREST PAYABLE UNDE R SECTION 220(2) WILL BE COMPUTED WITH REFERENCE TO THE DUE DATE RECKONED FROM THE OR IGINAL DEMAND NOTICE AND WITH REFERENCE TO THE LAX FINALLY DETERMINED. THE FACT T HAT DURING AN INTERVENING PERIOD, THERE WAS NO TAX PAYABLE BY THE ASSESSEE UNDER ANY OPERATIVE ORDER WOULD MAKE NO DIFFERENCE TO THIS POSITION.' 6. AFTER GOING THROUGH THE SAID PARAS, IT IS CLEAR THAT SUB-PARA-(II) BECOMES APPLICABLE ONLY IN THE EVENTUALITY, WHERE THE ORIGINAL ASSESSM ENT ORDER IS VARIED, OR SET ASIDE BY THE APPELLATE AUTHORITY, AND ON FURTHER APPEAL THE ORIGINAL ORDER OF THE AO IS RESTORED, EITHER WHOLLY OR IN PART. IN THE PRESENT CASE, IT I S NOT SHOWN THAT THE ORIGINAL ASSESSMENT ORDER WAS AT ALL RESTORED ON FURTHER APP EAL AGAINST THE ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL, WHETHER DATED 31ST MARCH, 2005, OR THE EAR LIER ONE, WHETHER WHOLLY OR IN PART, RATHER UNDISPUTEDLY THAT ORDER OF THE TRIBUNA L BECAME FINAL, AND IT WAS ONLY IN COMPLIANCE OF THE ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL, THAT FRESH ASSESSMENT ORDER WAS PASSED. IN OUR VIEW, IN THAT EVENT, THE MATTER IS SQUARELY COVERED BY THE LATER PART OF SUB-PARA- (I), WHICH COMPREHENDS A SITUATION, WHERE EVEN WHEN THE ASSESSMENT IS REFRAINED PURSUANT TO SETTING ASIDE OF THE ORDER BY THE APPEL LATE COURT. 7. LEARNED COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT RELIED UPON TH E JUDGMENT OF HON'BLE SUPREME COURT IN VIBRANT TYRES LTD. V. ITO (2001) 166 CTR (S C) 1 : [2001] 3 SCC 76. 8. EVEN AFTER GOING THROUGH THAT JUDGMENT, WE ARE O F THE VIEW THAT, THAT JUDGMENT RATHER GOES AGAINST THE REVENUE, AND SUPPORTS THE I MPUGNED ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL, INSTEAD OF SUPPORTING THE CONTENTIONS OF THE REVENU E. THUS, THIS CONTENTION DOESN 'T HOLD GOOD. 9. SO FAR AS THE OTHER TWO QUESTIONS FRAMED IN THE APPEALS ARE CONCERNED, HAVING GONE THROUGH THE EARLIER ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL DATED 31S T MARCH, 2005, WHICH WAS MADE AVAILABLE FOR OUR PERUSAL, IN OUR VIEW, WE DO NOT F IND ANY ERROR IN THE FINDING RECORDED BY THE TRIBUNAL. 10. THE APPEALS THUS, HAVE NO FORCE AND ARE DISMISS ED SUMMARILY. (III) CIT V. SIR SHADI LAL ENTERPRISES LTD. [2009] 310 ITR 283 (ALL). IN THE ABOVE CASE THEIR LORDSHIPS ADJUDGED AS UNDER ON THE ISSUE AT STAKE:- SECTION 220(1) OF THE ACT TALKS ABOUT FRESH DEMAND NOTICE THE INTEREST ONLY FROM THE DATE SPECIFIED IN DEMAND NOTICE SECTION 220(2) PROVIDES FOR INTEREST FOR TAX, WHICH IS NOT PAID ON THE AMOUNT OF DEMAND UNDER SECTION 156 FOR EVERY MONTH OR PART OF A MONTH, COMMENCING FROM THE DAY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE DATE BY WHICH IT WAS REQUIRED TO BE PAID BY THE NOTICE OF IT(SS)A NO. 39/DEL./2014 9 DEMAND TILL THE DATE ON WHICH AMOUNT IS PAID. THIS PROVISION COVERS ALL NOTICES OF DEMAND, WHETHER ASSESSMENT, RECTIFICATION, APPEAL O R REVISION. WHERE REVENUE SOUGHT TO CHARGE INTEREST FROM THE DATE ON WHICH THE AMOUN T SHOULD HAVE BEEN PAID IRRESPECTIVE OF THE DATE ON WHICH THE TAX WAS PAYABL E UNDER THE NOTICE OF DEMAND, IT WAS HELD BY THE HIGH COURT IN CIT V. SIR SHADI LAL ENTERPRISES LTD. [2009] 310 ITR 283 (ALL), THAT THE LIABILITY CANNOT ARISE FOR PERIOD BEF ORE THE TAX WAS DUE. THERE COULD BE NO LIABILITY FOR INTEREST PRIOR TO THAT DATE. THERE COULD HAVE BEEN NO POSSIBLE CONTROVERSY TO JUSTIFY REVENUES APPEAL TO THE HIGH COURT.' ' THE TRIBUNAL IN EMKAY SHARE AND STOCK BROKERS P. L TD. V. DY. CIT [20131 28 ITR (TRIB) 64 (MUMBAI), HELD THAT WHERE THE ORIGINAL DEM AND NOTICE HAS BEEN DISPENSED WITH AND AFRESH DEMAND NOTICE TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE APPELLATE ORDER HAS BEEN ISSUED, EVEN THOUGH A REASSESSMENT IS MADE SUBSEQUENTLY, IN TEREST UNDER SECTION 220(2) CANNOT BE LEVIED FROM THE DATE OF THE ORIGINAL DEMAN D NOTICE. IT HAS TO BE REWORK FROM THE DATE OF THE DEMAND NOTICE CONSEQUENT TO THE ASS ESSMENT UNDER SECTION 147. THE MATTER WAS, THEREFORE, REMANDED TO WORK OUT THE INT EREST IN THE LIGHT OF THIS LAW. WHERE INTEREST FOR DELAYED PAYMENT WAS SOUGHT TO BE LEVIED UNDER SECTION 220(2) FROM THE DATE OF ORIGINAL ASSESSMENT, THOUGH SUCH ASSESS MENT HAD BEEN SET ASIDE IN APPEAL, BUT RESTORED AFRESH, IT WAS HELD IN SMT. K. INDIRA R ANI VS. CIT [2004] 271 ITR 570 (KER), THAT THE INTEREST CAN BE LEVIED ONLY FOR DELAY, IF A NY, IN PAYMENT OF FRESH DEMAND. SINCE THE ORIGINAL DEMAND ON APPELLATE ORDER GOT CANCELLE D, THERE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN A REASONABLE CONTROVERSY WITH THE ASSESSEE'S CLAIM THA T INTEREST SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THE PERIOD OF ACTUAL DELAY WITH REFERENCE TO A VALID DE MAND, HI FACT, THE BOARD CIRCULAR NO. 334, DATED 3'( APRIL 1982 [1982] 135 ITR (ST.) 10 C ONCEDED THIS POSITION OF LAW THAT ONCE AN ASSESSMENT IS CANCELLED OR SET ASIDE BY AN APPELLATE OR REVISIONAL AUTHORITY, THERE CAN BE NO INTEREST LEVIED IN RESPECT OF SUCH D EMAND, SO THAT IT WOULD MAKE NO DIFFERENCE TO THIS POSITION OF LAW, EVEN IF THE ORI GINAL DEMAND IS RESTORED IN THE FRESH ASSESSMENT. THOUGH THIS DECISION RELATES TO INTERES T PAYABLE BY THE ASSESSEE, THIS VIEW ACCORDS WITH THE LAW IN RESPECT OF INTEREST PAYABLE BY GOVERNMENT AS DECIDED IN SANDVIK ASIA LTD. VS. CIT [2004] 267 ITR 78 (BOM.). IT WAS POINTED OUT, THAT THOUGH THE DECISION WAS ADVERSE TO THE TAXPAYER IN RESTRICTING THE INTEREST RECEIVABLE BY HIM, THE SAME LOGIC WOULD APPLY AND WOULD SPARE LIABILITY, EX CEPT WHERE THE ASSESSEE DELAYS PAYMENT AFTER A VALID DEMAND. THIS DECISION OF THE HIGH COURT CONFIRMS SUCH AN INFERENCE. (V) THE HIGH COURT ALSO POINTED THAT INTEREST UNDER SECTION 220(2) IS LEVIABLE ONLY ONE MONTH AFTER SERVICE OF DEMAND NOTICE. THE CHARGE OF INTEREST UNDER 220(2), FROM AN ANTERIOR DATE WAS HELD TO BE UNJUSTIFIED IN MANISH D . SHAH V. CM. BETGERI, CIT (2009J)318 ITR 397 (BOM.). (VI) INTEREST UNDER SECTION 220(2) FOR THE DELAYED PAYMENT OF TAX HAS TO BE RECKONED FROM THE DATE OF DEMAND. WHERE THE ASSESSMENT HAS BE EN THE SUBJECT MATTER OF APPEAL , THE DEMAND MAY GET MODIFIED, BUT NOT FOR THE PERIOD FOR WHICH INTEREST IS LEVIABLE. IN A CASE, WHERE THE TRIBUNAL HAD ONLY REMANDED TWO ISSUE S TO THE ASSESSING OFFICER, THE DATE OF ASSESSMENT WOULD CONTINUE TO BE THE SAME. TH E INFERENCE HOWEVER, WOULD BE DIFFERENT, IF THE ASSESSMENT IS SET ASIDE FOR AFRES H ASSESSMENT. THIS WAS THE VIEW TAKEN IT(SS)A NO. 39/DEL./2014 10 BY THE TRIBUNAL IN DY. CIT V. A.S. KRISHNA AND COMPA NY P. LTD. (2009) 319 ITR (AT) 414 (VISAKHAPATNAM). IN COMING TO THE CONCLUSION, THE T RIBUNAL REFERRED TO BOARD CIRCULAR NO. 334 DATED APRIL 3, 1982 [1982] 135 ITR (2001] 2 47 ITR 821 (SC). THE FACT, THAT THE DEMAND MAY BE REVISED WILL BE RELEVANT ONLY FOR THE P URPOSES OF QUANTIFICATION OF ARREARS OF TAX ON WHICH INTEREST IS LEVIABLE. THE TR IBUNAL DISTINGUISHED THE DECISION IN SMT. B. INDRA RANI'S EASE (SUPRA) WHERE THE CLAIM W ITH REFERENCE TO FRESH DEMAND NOTICE WAS ENTERTAINED ONLY BECAUSE SUCH DEMAND WAS IN PURSUANCE OF A FRESH ASSESSMENT ORDER MADE AFTER THE ORIGINAL ASSESSMENT HAD BEEN SET ASIDE IN APPEAL. (VII). WHERE AN AMOUNT BECOMES PAYABLE ON A FRESH ASSESSMENT AFTER THE ORIGINAL ASSESSMENT HAS BEEN SET ASIDE IN APPEAL, THE AMOUNT COULD BE TREATED AS HAVING BECOME DUE ONLY FROM THE DATE OF WHICH IT HAD BECOME DUE IN CONSEQUENCE OF FRESH ASSESSMENT AND NOT EARLIER FOR PURPOSES OF LEVY OF INTEREST UNDER SECTION 220 (2) FOR DELAYED PAYMENTS. IT WAS SO DECIDED BY THE HIGH COU RT IN CIT V. RAJESH KUMAR DINESH KUMAR [2010] 325 ITR 346 (RAJ.). REVENUE HAD SOUGHT TO RELY UPON THE DECISION IN VIKRANT TYRES LTD'S CASE (SUPRA), WHICH IT WAS FOUN D, DOES NOT SUPPORT REVENUE'S CASE. SPECIAL LEAVE AGAINST THE DECISION OF THE HIGH COUR T IN THIS CASE WAS ALSO DISMISSED [2010] 323 ITR (ST.) 51 ' THE UNDERTONES IN ALL THE ABOVE REFERRED CASES WERE AS FOLLOWS:- (A) THAT IN THE CASE OF ITO V. SEGHU BUCHIAH SETTY [1964] 52 ITR 538, THE SUPREME COURT HELD THAT A FRESH DEMAND NOTICE HAD TO BE SER VED BEFORE AN ASSESSEE COULD BE TREATED AS A DEFAULTER WHEN THE AMOUNT OF TAX WAS R EDUCED IN APPEAL. (B) THAT THE LAW HAS UNDOUBTEDLY BEEN CHANGED BY TH E ACT OF 1964. CASES WHERE NO SECOND NOTICE UNDER SECTION 29 OF THE ACT WAS ISSUE D AFTER THE DISPOSAL OF THE APPEAL WILL COME WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE ACT OF 1964 AS THE SAID ACT DEALS WITH THE SITUATION WHERE NO SECOND NOTICE WAS ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT. (C) THAT AFTER A FRESH NOTICE IS ISSUED THE FIRST N OTICE IS SUPERSEDED AND THE PROCEEDING BASED ON THE FIRST NOTICE THUS CEASES TO EXIST. THERE CANNOT BE ANY CONTINUATION OF THE FIRST PROCEEDINGS WHICH HAVE BE EN SUPERSEDED. (D) THAT IN ITO V. SEGHU BUCHIAH SETTY [1964] 52 TT R 538 (SC), IT WAS HELD BY SARKAR J. (AS HIS LORDSHIP THEN WAS), THAT ON THE INCOME-T AX OFFICER'S ORDER BEING REVISED IN APPEAL, THE DEFAULT BASED ON HIS ORDER AND ALL CONS EQUENTIAL PROCEEDINGS MUST BE TAKEN TO HAVE BEEN SUPERSEDED AND FRESH PROCEEDINGS HAVE TO BE STARTED TO REALISE HIS DUES AS FOUND BY THE REVISED ORDER. (E) THAT IT IS THE DUTY OF THE INCOME-TAX OFFICER T O ISSUE A FRESH NOTICE OF DEMAND IN THE PRESCRIBED FORM AND SERVE IT UPON THE ASSESSEE AFTER A FRESH ASSESSMENT ORDER IS PASSED. (F) THAT A PERSON WHO HAS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH A N OTICE OF DEMAND WOULD CONTINUE TO BE A DEFAULTER NOTWITHSTANDING THE REDUCTION OF HIS LIABILITY BY AN ORDER OF THE APPELLATE AUTHORITY. THERE IS ONLY ONE EXCEPTION TO THIS RULE AND THAT IS WHEN THE ORDER OF ASSESSMENT IS WHOLLY SET ASIDE (AS HAPPENE D IN THE INSTANT CASE). IT(SS)A NO. 39/DEL./2014 11 (G) THAT ORDERS CANCELLED/SET ASIDE BY AN APPELLATE /REVISIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE CANCELLATION/SETTING ASIDE BECOMES FINAL (I.E. IT I S NOT VARIED AS A RESULT OF FURTHER APPEALS/REVISIONS), NO INTEREST UNDER SECTION 220(2 ) CAN BE CHARGED PURSUANT TO THE ORIGINAL DEMAND NOTICE. (IN THE INSTANT CASE THERE WAS NO VARIATION OF THE ASSESSMENT ORDER BY WAY OF FURTHER APPEAL OR REVISI ON. RATHER THE APPELLANT TOOK THE MATTER TO THE HON'BLE SC EVEN BEFORE THE AO COULD P ASS AN ORDER AND RAISE A DEMAND). (H) THAT INTEREST CAN BE CHARGED ONLY AFTER THE EXP IRY OF 35 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF SERVICE OF DEMAND NOTICE PURSUANT TO SUCH FRESH ASS ESSMENT ORDER. (I) THAT WHERE THE ORIGINAL ORDER OF THE ITO IS RES TORED ON FURTHER APPEAL EITHER IN PART OR IN WHOLE OR IS EITHER VARIED OR EVEN SET AS IDE BY ONE APPELLATE AUTHORITY, THE INTEREST PAYABLE UNDER SECTION 220(2) WILL BE COMPU TED WITH REFERENCE TO THE DUE DATE RECKONED FROM THE ORIGINAL DEMAND NOTICE AND W ITH REFERENCE TO THE TAX FINALLY DETERMINED. (IN THE CASE AT HAND THERE WAS NO CONCL UDED ASSESSMENT ORDER AFTER THE INITIAL ORDER WAS SET ASIDE). (J) THAT THE FACT THAT DURING AN INTERVENING PERIOD , THERE WAS NO TAX PAYABLE BY THE ASSESSEE UNDER ANY OPERATIVE ORDER WOULD MAKE NO DI FFERENCE TO THIS POSITION. (K) THAT WHERE FRESH ASSESSMENT ORDER WAS PASSED IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE ORDER OF THE TRIBUNAL THE INTEREST PAYABLE UNDER SECTION 220 (2) WILL BE COMPUTED WITH REFERENCE TO THE DUE DATE RECKONED FROM THE ORIGINA L DEMAND NOTICE AND WITH REFERENCE TO THE TAX FINALLY DETERMINED. (NO FRESH ASSESSMENT ORDER WAS PASSED IN COMPLIANCE WITH HON'BLE ITAT'S ORDER HERE). (L) THAT THE LIABILITY CANNOT ARISE FOR PERIOD BEFO RE THE TAX WAS DUE. THERE COULD BE NO LIABILITY FOR INTEREST ON TAXES DUE PRIOR TO THA T DATE. (M) THAT INTEREST UNDER SECTION 220(2) CANNOT BE LE VIED FROM THE DATE OF THE ORIGINAL DEMAND NOTICE. IT HAS TO BE REWORKED FROM THE DATE OF THE DEMAND NOTICE CONSEQUENT UPON THE ASSESSMENT UNDER SECTION 147. (N) THAT THE INTEREST CAN BE LEVIED ONLY FOR DELAY, IF ANY, IN PAYMENT OF FRESH DEMAND. SINCE THE ORIGINAL DEMAND ON APPELLATE ORDER GOT CA NCELLED, THERE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN A REASONABLE CONTROVERSY WITH THE ASSESSEE'S C LAIM THAT INTEREST SHOULD BE LIMITED TO THE PERIOD OF ACTUAL DELAY WITH REFERENC E TO A VALID DEMAND. (SMT. B. INDIRA RANI VS. CIT [2004] 271 ITR 570 (KER)). (O) THAT ONCE AN ASSESSMENT IS CANCELLED OR SET ASI DE BY AN APPELLATE OR REVISIONAL AUTHORITY, THERE CAN BE NO INTEREST LEVIED IN RESPE CT OF SUCH DEMAND, SO THAT IT WOULD MAKE NO DIFFERENCE TO THIS POSITION OF LAW EVEN IF THE ORIGINAL DEMAND IS RESTORED IN THE FRESH ASSESSMENT. IT(SS)A NO. 39/DEL./2014 12 (P) THAT IN A CASE, WHERE THE TRIBUNAL HAD ONLY REM ANDED TWO ISSUES TO THE ASSESSING OFFICER, THE DATE OF ASSESSMENT WOULD CON TINUE TO BE THE SAME. THE INFERENCE HOWEVER, WOULD BE DIFFERENT, IF THE ASSES SMENT IS SET ASIDE FOR A FRESH ASSESSMENT. (DY. CIT V. A.S. KRISHNA AND COMPANY P. LTD. [2009] 319 ITR (AT) 414 (VISAKHAPATNAM), (BOARD CIRCULAR NO. 334 DATED APRI L 3, 1982 (1982) 135 ITP [2001] 247 ITR 821 (SC). (Q). THAT WHERE AN AMOUNT BECOMES PAYABLE ON A FRES H ASSESSMENT AFTER THE ORIGINAL ASSESSMENT HAS BEEN SET ASIDE IN APPEAL, T HE AMOUNT COULD BE TREATED AS HAVING BECOME DUE ONLY FROM THE DATE OF WHICH IT H AD BECOME DUE IN CONSEQUENCE OF FRESH ASSESSMENT AND NOT EARLIER FOR PURPOSES OF LEVY OF INTEREST UNDER SECTION 220 (2) FOR DELAYED PAYMENT (HIGH COU RT IN CIT V. RAJESH KUMAR DINESH KUMAR [2010] 325 ITR 346 (RAJ.), (VIKRANT TY RES LTD'S CASE (SUPRA) [2010] 323 ITR (ST.) 51. ON A COMPOSITE CONSIDERATION OF THE OVERTONES OF TH E PRINCIPLES AS DESCRIBED ABOVE THE INEVITABLE CONCLUSION IS THAT THE CHARGEABILITY U/S 220(2) OF THE ACT ARISES FROM THE FRESH DEMAND NOTICE ISSUED BY THE AO PURSUANT T O THE ORDER OF THE HON'BLE SC IN THE CASE OF THE APPELLANT. IN ADDITION TO THE ABOVE THE HON'BLE DELHI HIGH COU RT IN THE CASE OF L.N. GADODIA & SONS P LTD VS DCIT, [2007] 207 CTR DEL 669, HAS CAT EGORICALLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY STATED THAT IS NOT OPEN FOR THE AO TO CHARGE INTERE ST U/S 220(2) OF THE IT ACT, 1961, WHICH IS NOT INDICATED IN THE SETTLEMENT COMMISSION 'S ORDER. ACCORDINGLY, IT IS DIRECTED THAT THE AO SHALL RECONSIDER THE SAME STRI CTLY IN THE LIGHT OF THE ORDER MADE BY THE SETTLEMENT COMMISSION.' IN THE INSTANT CASE, THE HON'BLE SC DID NOT INDICATE THAT INTEREST U/S 220(2) WAS CHARGEABLE IN THE APPE LLANT'S CASE. HAVING REGARD TO THE ABOVE FACTUAL AND LEGAL DISCUS SION IT SHALL BE AMPLY CLEAR THAT IN THE PECULIAR FACTUAL MATRIX OBTAINING IN THIS CASE, THE AO WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN HOLDING THE CHARGEABILITY OF INTEREST U/S 220(2) OF THE ACT FROM THE DATE OF ORIGINAL NOTICE OF DEMAND AS SUSTAINABLE IN LAW WHEN THERE WAS NO ORDE R IN EXISTENCE AFTER THE ORIGINAL ASSESSMENT ORDER BY REASON OF WHICH THE OR IGINAL DEMAND NOTICE WAS RAISED, WAS SET-ASIDE FOR DE-NOVO ASSESSMENT. FOR THE REASONS ELABORATED BY ME HEREINABOVE, I AM OF THE FIRM OPINION THAT THE APPELLANT WAS NOT EXIGIBLE TO INTEREST U/S 220(2) O F THE ACT FROM THE DATE OF THE NOTICE OF DEMAND RAISED IN THE FIRST ROUND OF LITIG ATION WHICH WAS NULLIFIED BY THE HON'BLE ITAT, NEW DELHI BY DIRECTING DE-NOVO CONSID ERATION OF THE FACTS OF THE CASE. ACCORDINGLY GROUNDS 3 TO 6 ARE ALLOWED. 4. THE ABOVE ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUE ON THE ANVIL OF VARIOUS DECISIONS, RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF LAW AND OTHER ATTENDING FACT S AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE IT(SS)A NO. 39/DEL./2014 13 CASE MADE BY THE LD. CIT(A), STANDS UNCONTROVERTED ON BEHALF OF THE REVENUE TO SUPPORT THE GROUNDS RAISED IN THE PRESENT APPEAL . WE, THEREFORE, FIND NO JUSTIFICATION TO INTERFERE WITH THE IMPUGNED ORDER. ACCORDINGLY, THE APPEAL OF THE REVENUE DESERVES TO BE DISMISSED BEING BEREFT O F MERITS. 5. IN THE RESULT, THE APPEAL OF THE REVENUE IS DISM ISSED. ORDER PRONOUNCED IN THE OPEN COURT ON 13.11.2017. SD/- SD/- (H.S. SIDHU) (L.P. SAHU) JUDICIAL MEMBER ACCOUNTANT MEMBER DATED: 13.11.2017 *AKS* COPY OF ORDER FORWARDED TO: (1) THE APPELLANT (2) THE RESPONDENT (3) COMMISSIONER (4) CIT(A) (5) DEPARTMENTAL REPRESENTATIVE (6) GUARD FILE BY ORDER ASSISTANT REGISTRAR INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL DELHI BENCHES, NEW DELHI