K.A Jacob V. Union of India and Marine Products Export Development Authority (MPEDA) and Chairman, Marine Products Export Development Authority and Secretary, Marine Products Export Development Authority

WP(C)/21678/2021

AI Insights

K.A. Jacob, a former Senior Accountant at MPEDA, was dismissed from service following a disciplinary inquiry that found him guilty of submitting fraudulent medical reimbursement claims. Jacob challenged the inquiry and subsequent disciplinary actions through multiple writ petitions, alleging bias and procedural violations. However, the High Court of Kerala upheld the disciplinary proceedings, finding them to be conducted fairly and the punishment to be appropriate given the nature of the misconduct. The court rejected Jacob's claims of procedural irregularities and bias, emphasizing that he had not cooperated with the inquiry process and had failed to substantiate his allegations.

• Counselvise Citation: [2022] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 815249 (HC-KERALA)
• Appeal Type: Others
• Pronouncement Date: 22-09-2022
• Assessment Year: misc
• Other Referred Cases: United Bank of India v. Biswanath Bhattacharjee [2022 SCC OnLine SC 108], Chamoli District Co-operative Bank Ltd v. Raghunath Singh Rana [(2016) 12 SCC 204], Alahabad Bank and others v. Krishna Narayan Tewari [(2017) 2 SCC 308], Union of India and others v. Ex.Constable Ram Karan [(2022) 1 SCC 373], S.R.Tewari v. The District Board, Agra [1964 SC 1680], Nazuk Jahan and others v. Additional District Judge and others [(1980) 4 SCC 595], Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association v. State of Maharashtra and others [1990 (2) SCC 715], State of Tamil Nadu and others v. M.N.Sundararajan [(1980) 4 SCC 592], Sunil Bharti Mittal v. Central Bureau of Investigation [(2015) 4 SCC 609], State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya [(2011) 4 SCC 584]
• Laws Referred To: Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules 1964, Marine Products Export Development Authority Act, 1972, Central Services (Medical Attendance Rules, 1944)
• Result in Favour of: Revenue
• Court: HIGH COURT
• Department Lawyers: K R RAJKUMAR; C G C RADHAKRISHNAN; P K RAMKUMAR; DIVYA BALAN
• Assessee Lawyers: R KISHORE; G KIRAN
• Keywords: Disciplinary action; Fraudulent Documents; Natural Justice; Proportionality of Punishment; Medical expense reimbursement; Uncontested testimony
• Section: 14; 34; 3(1)(i); 3(1)(ii); 34(1); 7(4); 34(2)(b); 34(2)(d)

Judgement Text

"“CR” IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE V.G.ARUN THURSDAY, THE 22ND DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2022 / 31ST BHADRA, 1944 WP(C) NO. 21678 OF 2021 PETITIONER/S: K.A JACOB AGED 54 YEARS S/O. LATE K.J AUGUSTINE, FORMERLY SENIOR ACCOUNTANT, MARINE PRODUCTS EXPORT DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, RESIDING AT KATTIKKAT HOUSE, THUMBOLI, ALAPPUZHA DISTRICT 688 008 BY ADVS. R.KISHORE (KALLUMTHAZHAM) G.KIRAN RESPONDENT/S: 1 UNION OF INDIA REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE UDYOG BHAWAN, NEW DELHI 110 011 2 MARINE PRODUCTS EXPORT DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (MPEDA) MPEDA HOUSE, PANAMPILLY AVENUE, PB NO. 4272 KOCHI 682 036 REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY 3 THE CHAIRMAN MARINE PRODUCTS EXPORT DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, MPEDA HOUSE, PANAMPILLY AVENUE P.O NO. 4272, KOCHI 682 036 4 SECRETARY SOUGHT TO BE IMPLEADED BY ADVS. SRI.K.R.RAJKUMAR, C.G.C. O.V.RADHAKRISHNAN (SR.) P.K.RAMKUMAR DIVYA C BALAN THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 26.05.2022, THE COURT ON 22.09.2022 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -2- “CR” JUDGMENT Dated this the 22nd day of September, 2022 The petitioner joined as Junior Stenographer in the second respondent/Marine Products Export Development Authority (MPEDA) on 14.05.1986. He was promoted as Accountant/Account Assistant on 30.12.1997 and as Senior Accountant on 14.08.2009. On being promoted as Senior Accountant, the petitioner was posted at the head office of the second respondent. While working at the head office, the petitioner was placed under suspension and issued with Ext.P1 memorandum dated 26.05.2015, proposing to hold an enquiry against him under Rule 14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965. Along with the memorandum, the articles of charge, statement of imputations, list of witnesses and copies of documents were appended. The allegations, based on which W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -3- disciplinary action was initiated against the petitioner, are as under; The petitioner claimed and obtained reimbursement of medical expenses by producing fraudulent documents. Thereby the petitioner caused loss to the MPEDA. Three medical bills dated 20.01.2015 supported by medical certificates issued by Dr.Maya were tampered, by entering the consultation fees which Dr.Maya never charged or received from him. The said bills were recommended for payment by the petitioner himself, in his capacity as Senior Accountant. Thereby, the competent authority was misled into believing that the bills were supported by valid medical certificates. By his action, the petitioner indulged in acts unbecoming of a Government servant and violated Rule 3 (1)(i) to (ii) of the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules 1964. 2. The petitioner gave Ext.P2 reply to the charges which the third respondent/Chairman found W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -4- not satisfactory. Hence, an Inquiry Officer was appointed as per Ext.P3 office order dated 24.07.2015. The inquiry proceedings commenced on 01.10.2015. That day itself the petitioner submitted Ext.P4 application, requesting the Inquiry Officer to call for 14 additional documents. The Inquiry Officer decided to call for 8 additional documents and rejected the request for the other 6, finding those documents to be irrelevant for the inquiry. The details of additional documents were furnished under Ext.P5 communication dated 30.10.2015 and the reason for rejecting the other documents explained in Ext.P6 communication dated 09.11.2015. Being dissatisfied with the explanation, petitioner submitted Exts.P8 and P9 requests for making available the other 6 documents and to summon the additional witnesses. The request was rejected vide proceedings dated 10.12.2015, the date on which the examination of witnesses commenced. Although the petitioner and his Defence Assistant W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -5- were present in the inquiry chamber, they did not cooperate with the inquiry and left the place when Dr.Maya entered the Chamber for the purpose of giving evidence. After completing the chief examination of Dr.Maya, the inquiry was posted to 12.12.2015. In the meanwhile, the petitioner made a written representation to the third respondent expressing lack of confidence in the Inquiry Officer and requesting to stop the inquiry proceedings. The petitioner also filed W.P.(C) No.38260 of 2015 challenging the proceedings. That writ petition was dismissed as per Ext.R2(c) judgment dated 17.12.2015. The challenge against the inquiry having failed, three more witnesses were examined on 21.12.2015. In spite of Dr.Maya being present for cross examination again, the petitioner refused to cross-examine that witness on the premise that it was impossible for his Defence Assistant to travel from Chennai to Cochin within the short span of time granted. Relenting to the petitioner's request, the cross- W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -6- examination of Dr.Maya was adjourned to 22.12.2015 and the Defence Assistant was asked to travel either by road or air, so as to be present for the proceedings. In spite of granting such opportunity, the petitioner and the Defence Assistant failed to appear for cross examining the witness. Consequently, the petitioner was set ex parte and the inquiry continued. 3. Aggrieved by continuance of the inquiry after setting him ex-parte, the petitioner preferred Ext.P17 appeal before the Commerce Secretary and Appellate Authority, Government of India. In the meanwhile, the inquiry was concluded and written submissions were submitted by the presenting officer and the petitioner. Thereafter, Ext.P21 report of inquiry was submitted on 16.02.2016, finding the charges levelled against the petitioner to have been proved through oral and documentary evidence. The inquiry report was forwarded to the petitioner for offering his opinion on the findings therein. W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -7- Accordingly, petitioner submitted Exts.P22 and P23 written submissions. In the meanwhile, the petitioner challenged the inquiry report in W.P. (C) No.6162 of 2016. After considering the findings in the inquiry report and the written submission, the third respondent passed Ext.P24 order on 22.04.2016, finding the petitioner guilty and consequently, dismissing him from the service of MPEDA with immediate effect. W.P.C) No.6162 of 2016 was disposed of thereafter as per Ext.P25 judgment, reserving the petitioner's liberty to urge the grounds in a fresh writ petition. Thereafter, the petitioner again approached this Court by filing W.P.(C) No.21040 of 2016, which was disposed of by Ext.P34(b) judgment dated 19.02.2021, relegating the petitioner to the appellate remedy under Rule 24 of the CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965. Accordingly, the petitioner filed an appeal before the Commerce Secretary, but the same was dismissed as per Ext.P1 (a) order dated 15.07.2021. Aggrieved this W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -8- writ petition is filed seeking the following reliefs; “(a) Call for the records leading to Exhibits P-1, Ext P1(a), P-21 and P-24, the memo charge, enquiry report and order of the disciplinary authority, order of the appellate authority and issue a writ of certiorari or any other quashing appropriate writ, Exts. P-1, P1 (a), interest of Justice. (b) declare that Ext. P-1, Ext.P-1 (a), P-21 and P-24 are legally unsustainable and are null and void of want of jurisdiction. (c) Issue a direction to the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service as Senior Accountant provisionally, pending disposal of the Writ Petition.” 4. Adv.Kishore R, assailed the findings in the inquiry report and the orders passed by the disciplinary and appellate authorities mainly on the following grounds; (i) The disciplinary proceedings was motivated by personal animosity of the third respondent (ii) the inquiry was conducted in flagrant violation of the principles of natural justice and fair play (iii) the W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -9- punishment imposed is totally disproportionate to the alleged misdemeanor and (iv) the Marine Products Export Development Authority Act, 1972 or the Regulations thereunder does not empower the third respondent to act as appointing authority; consequently, the third respondent is not empowered to function as the disciplinary authority and impose penalty. 5. In elaboration, learned Counsel submitted that the inquiry officer committed gross illegality in not summoning all the documents and witnesses requested by the petitioner. Those documents and witnesses were crucial for the petitioner's defence. In order to claim consultancy fees paid to the medical officer, the employees have to approach an accredited medical officer, as provided under Rules 3(i), (ii) and 6(1),(2) of the Central Services (Medical Attendance Rules, 1944. The documents sought by the petitioner were essential to prove the practice of paying consultation fees W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -10- being followed in the MPEDA and other organisations. The inquiry is vitiated by reason of the petitioner being denied the opportunity to confront the crucial witness with the documents. In support of the contention that failure to provide sufficient opportunity and to produce documents will vitiate an inquiry, Adv.Kishore placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court in United Bank of India v. Biswanath Bhattacharjee [2022 SCC OnLine SC 108] and Chamoli District Co-operative Bank Ltd v. Raghunath Singh Rana [(2016) 12 SCC 204]. It is contended that the infirmities and illegalities committed by the inquiry officer, including the conduct of inquiry ex parte, had materially affected the sanctity of the inquiry. The foundation itself being shaky, the edifice has to crumble. For this proposition, learned Counsel relied on the decision in Alahabad Bank and others v. Krishna Narayan Tewari [(2017) 2 SCC W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -11- 308]. 6. Yet another contention is that the charge, even if accepted, the punishment of dismissal is grossly disproportionate, the amount allegedly received by the petitioner, based on the false claim, being only Rs.1940/-. To buttress the contention that the writ courts can interfere when the punishment is found to be shockingly disproportionate, reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India and others v. Ex.Constable Ram Karan [(2022) 1 SCC 373]. 7. It is contended that as per Section 3(a) of the MPEDA Act, ‘Authority’ means the Marine Product Export Development Authority established under Section 4 and the Chairman is only one among the members of the Authority. Section 34 vests the Authority with the power to make regulations for enabling it to discharge the functions under the Act. Going by Section 34(3), the regulations formulated by the Authority will W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -12- have effect only on it being approved by the Central Government and published in the Official Gazette. No Regulation in terms of Section 34, authorising the Chairman to make appointments, is published till date. To support this contention reference is made to Ext.P26 communication. It is argued that the Chairman not being the appointing authority, he/she cannot function as the disciplinary authority also. As such, the inquiry is vitiated from the very inception and the order of termination is void ab initio. 8. Responding to the challenge, Senior Advocate O.V.Radhakrishnan, appearing for respondents 2 and 3, put forth the following arguments; The petitioner did not challenge the initiation of inquiry by issuance of Ext.P1 memorandum of charges by the Chairman and disciplinary authority/third respondent. Challenging the order of suspension pending inquiry and the memorandum of charges, the W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -13- petitioner filed W.P.(C) No.38260 of 2015. That writ petition was disposed of by Ext.R2(c) judgment, finding the inquiry to have been delayed only due to the non-cooperation of the petitioner. This court specially observed that, if the petitioner co-operates, the inquiry shall be completed in his presence and if he doesn't, the petitioner can be declared ex parte and the inquiry continued. Thereafter, the petitioner participated in the inquiry and requested to summon additional documents and witnesses. The inquiry officer having refused to issue copies of all documents and to summon all witnesses sought by the petitioner, he filed W.P.(C) No.6162 of 2016 seeking to declare the inquiry to be vitiated by bias. That writ petition was disposed of by Ext.P25 judgment, reserving the petitioner’s liberty to raise the grounds in a fresh writ petition challenging the order of dismissal. In either of the writ petitions, no challenge was raised against the competency of W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -14- the Chairman to function as disciplinary authority. The petitioner is hence estopped from raising the contention as he has acquiesced to the authority of the third respondent and the contention is barred by the principle of waiver. The instant writ petition is also barred by res judicata. In support of the contention reliance is placed on the the Apex Court decisions in Prabhakar v. Joint Director, Sericulture Department and another [(2015) 15 SCC 1] D.Sarojakumari v. R.Helen Thilakom and others [2017(9) SCC 478], Pondicherry Khadi and Village Industries Board v. P.Kulothangan and another [2004(1) SCC 68] and Direct Recruit Class II Engineering Officers' Association v. State of Maharashtra and others [1990 (2) SCC 715]. 9. The inquiry was conducted in strict compliance of the principles of natural justice. The inquiry officer had called for 8 additional documents and summoned 1 additional witness at W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -15- the petitioner’s request. The reason for not summoning the other documents and witnesses was explained to the petitioner. The petitioner wilfully kept away from the inquiry proceedings and failed to cross examine Dr.Maya, the crucial witness. As such, the inquiry officer was justified in accepting the uncontroverted testimony of that witness. 10. Under Section 7(4) of the MPEDA Act, the authority empowered to appoint officers and employees is the Marine Products Exports Development Authority. Ext.R2(b) standing instructions issued by the authority in exercise of the power under Section 7(4) of the Act empowers the Chairman to effect appointments. The standing instructions were approved by the authority on 15.12.1979. In the absence of any rules, formulated by the Central Government, the standing instructions are not subject to any control or restriction. The petitioner was also appointed and promoted by the Chairman in W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -16- exercise of that power. The petitioner accepted his appointment and promotions without protest till his dismissal as per Ext.P24 order of the Chairman and disciplinary authority. Section 34(1) empowers the authority to make regulations not inconsistent with the Act and the Rules made thereunder for enabling it to discharge its functions under the Act. Section 34(2)(b) provides for formulating regulations, authorising the delegation to the chairman, members, director, secretary or other officers of the authority any of the powers and duties under the Act. Section 34(2)(d) provides for regulations with respect to the pay and allowances and leave and other conditions of service of officers and other employees of the Authority. The functions of the Authority enumerated under Section 9 have nothing to do with the service condition of its employees. No regulation with respect to the service conditions have been formulated also. Therefore, the power with respect to disciplinary W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -17- proceedings is traceable to Section 7(4) of the Act and the standing instructions. Therefore, Section 7(4) and 34(2)(b)&(d) deal with different and distinct powers. 11. The expression ‘appointing authority’ is defined in Rule 2a(iii) of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal), Rules, 1965. As per the definition, the ‘Appointing Authority’ in relation to a Government servant means the Authority which appointed the Government servant to such grade or post. It is settled law that the power to appoint ordinarily carries with it the power to determine the appointment also. The legal position is laid down in a plethora of decisions, including the decisions in S.R.Tewari v. The District Board, Agra [1964 SC 1680], Nazuk Jahan and others v. Additional District Judge and others [(1980) 4 SCC 595]. 12. The MPEDA being a body corporate and legal entity established under Section 4(1) of W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -18- the MPEDA Act, it has to function through the Chairman, who is the alter ego of the Authority. The doctrine of ‘alter ego’ is that the legal entity, in this case the MPEDA, acts through living persons and in such a situation, the person who acts (here the chairman) is not speaking or acting for the MPEDA, but as the MPEDA itself. This proposition is dealt with in Sunil Bharti Mittal v. Central Bureau of Investigation [(2015) 4 SCC 609]. 13. Finally it is contended that the argument that the punishment imposed is not proportionate to the alleged misconduct will not lie in the face of the undisputed fact that the petitioner was awarded four penalties during his service period. Further, the gravity of the offence increases by reason of the petitioner being the Senior Accountant, who passed his own bogus claims. 14. Although various factual contentions were urged by the Counsel for the petitioner and W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -19- countered by the Senior Counsel appearing for the MPEDA, I am not venturing to decide those contentions as the writ court is not expected to function as an appellate court in matters relating to disciplinary proceedings. 15. In spite of the strenuous arguments advanced by the Counsel for the petitioner regarding the illegality and impropriety in not providing copies of documents and summoning crucial witnesses, I am not inclined to interfere with the disciplinary proceedings on that ground. The proceedings of the inquiry officer reveals that the inquiry officer had called for eight additional documents and summoned one witness at the petitioner's request. The reason for not summoning the other documents was clearly stated in the reply given to the petitioner. It is pertinent to note that the petitioner had challenged the inquiry proceedings before this Court in W.P.(C) No.38260 of 2015. That writ petition was dismissed on 17.12.2015 with the W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -20- observation that if the petitioner co-operates, the inquiry shall be completed in his presence, and if he doesn't, the petitioner shall be declared ex parte and the inquiry continued. Even after the judgment, the petitioner did not co- operate with the inquiry which is evident from the fact that, in spite of Dr.Maya, the crucial witness being present for cross-examination on 21.12.2015, the petitioner refused to cross- examine that witness on the premise that it was impossible for his Defence Assistant to travel from Chennai to Kochi on short notice. Thereupon, the inquiry was adjourned to the next day (22.12.2015), for providing an opportunity for the Defence Assistant to be present for cross- examining Dr.Maya. In spite of such opportunity being granted, neither the petitioner nor the Defence Assistant were present on 22.12.2015. Therefore, the inquiry officer set the petitioner ex parte by a detailed order, in accordance with the direction in Ext.R2(c) judgment. Having thus W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -21- failed to co-operate with the inquiry, even in the face of clear cut direction from this Court, the petitioner is estopped from challenging the inquiry proceedings by contending that the relevant documents were not summoned and copies furnished. The facts in United Bank of India, (supra), are entirely different. Therein, the documents summoned at the request of the delinquent employee were untraceable. One of the charges levelled against the delinquent employee was unauthorised removal of those documents. The said charge was not proved. In that context, the Apex Court observed that the involvement of the employee had to be proved by more definitive evidence and not mere suspicion. In the very same judgment, the Apex Court referred to the observation in B.C.Chaturvedi v. Union of India and others [(1995) 6 SCC 749] that, judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made and is meant to ensure that the individual W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -22- receives fair treatment. It is settled law that while exercising the power of judicial review, the writ court does not act as an appellate authority, in the absence of compelling circumstances will not appreciated the evidence. In this context, the following observation in State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaya [(2011) 4 SCC 584] assumes relevance; \"7. ...If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record.” Going by the above principles, it can unhesitatingly be held that the inquiry was conducted in a fair manner and it was the W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -23- petitioner who had failed to cooperate with the inquiry, despite this Court's direction. The challenge against inquiry and as to the veracity of the evidence given by Dr.Maya are hence liable to be rejected. 16. For this Court to appreciate the contention that the Chairman is not empowered to initiate disciplinary proceedings and impose punishment, the petitioner will have to first get over the bar of estoppel and obstacle created by his acquiesce to the authority of the Chairman and waiver of his right to challenge authority by participating in the inquiry. As held in Prabhakar (supra), if a party having a right stands by and sees another acting in the manner inconsistent with that right and makes no objection while the act is in progress, he cannot complain after works. In D.Sarojakumari (supra), the Apex Court observed that once a person takes part in the process of selection and is not found fit for appointment, the said person is estopped W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -24- from challenging the process of selection. In Pondicherry Khadi (supra), the principles of res judicata under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, including the principle of constructive res judicata was found applicable to industrial adjudication. 17. I also find merit in the distinction between Sections 7(4), 34(1) and 34(2)(d) of the MPEDA Act pointed out by the Senior Counsel. Under Section 7(4), the Authority is empowered to appoint officers and employees, for the efficient performance of its functions. In exercise of the power under Section 7(4), the MPEDA issued Ext.R2(b) Standing Instructions applicable to all recruitments and promotion of the Authority's employees. Therefore, the appointment of employees is covered by the Standing Instructions. On the other hand, Section 34(2)(d) authorises the Authority to make regulations providing for pay and allowances and leave and other conditions of service of officers and other W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -25- employees of the authority. In this regard, it is pertinent to note that the power under Section 34 is to make regulations for enabling the authority to discharge its functions under the Act. The functions of the Authority enumerated under Section 9 makes no mention regarding recruitment or service conditions of the employees. From the above, it is clear that Section 34(2)(d) of the Act does not relate to the power to make appointment of officers and employees, which power is conferred on the Authority under Section 7(4) of the Act. Yet another pertinent aspect is that the petitioner was appointed by the Chairman and had accepted the promotions granted to him by the Chairman without demur. For the aforementioned reasons, the challenge against the Chairman's power to initiate disciplinary proceedings and effect termination is rejected. 18. Having found the Chairman to be having the power to effect appointments, it follows that the Chairman also has the power to impose W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -26- penalty, including termination from service. The power to terminate the appointment by dismissal or otherwise is a necessary adjunct of the power to appoint. As held in S.R.Tewari (supra), the power to appoint ordinarily carries with it the power to terminate the appointment. The said view has been reiterated in a series of decisions including State of Tamil Nadu and others v. M.N.Sundararajan [(1980) 4 SCC 592], paragraph 9 of which is extracted hereunder; “9. The question is, whether the expression “appointments” used in this Government Order, dated June 13, 1973, will include “termination” of service or “compulsory retirement” from service, also. It is a fundamental principle of interpretation that unless a contrary intention appears from the context, a power to appoint should include a power to terminate the appointment, including termination of the person appointed by his compulsorily retirement in accordance with the terms and conditions of his service. This fundamental principle underlies Section 16 of the General Clauses Act. In other words, the power to terminate the appointment by compulsory retirement or W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -27- otherwise is a necessary adjunct of the power of appointment and is exercised as an incident to or consequences of the power. There is nothing in the Government Order No. 1782, dated June 27, 1973, which militates against this rule of construction.” 19. The other major contention is of the punishment being grossly disproportionate to the alleged misconduct. In support of this contention, learned Counsel for the petitioner relied on the decision in United Bank of India (supra). Having gone through the judgment, I am not unable to understand as to how the observations and findings therein would come to the petitioner's aid. In that case, the allegation was that the delinquent employee had threatened the complainant, a Doctor, and had misbehaved, abused and injured the complainant and even made false allegations of sexual harassment in relation to the employee's wife. The Apex Court refused to interfere with the penalty of removal from service, finding that no sympathy could be extended to the employee. In W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -28- the petitioner's case, although the amount involved is small, the fact remains that the petitioner had claimed the amount based on a fabricated document. Moreover, the petitioner in his capacity as Senior Accountant had forwarded the claim for sanction. Added to this is the fact that the petitioner was imposed with penalty for misdemeanor on previous occasions also. The totality of the above circumstances deters this Court from interfering with the punishment imposed, particularly taking into account the conduct of the petitioner during the course of inquiry. 20. No valid ground is seen raised as regards the challenge against the appellate order (Ext.P24) and more importantly, the appellate authority was not originally made a party to this writ petition. Hence, the challenge against the appellate order is also rejected. 21. Insofar as the petitioner has failed to prove the allegation of bias, mala fides, and W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -29- violation of the principles of natural justice, and the challenge on the ground of lack of authority of the third respondent being found unsustainable, I find absolutely no valid ground to interfere with the order of the disciplinary authority, as confirmed by the appellate authority. As far as the proportionality of punishment is concerned, the legal position is clear that the scope for interference under Article 226 is very limited. On the uncontroverted facts also, I see no reason to interfere with the penalty. In the result, this writ petition is dismissed. Sd/- V.G.ARUN JUDGE Scl/ W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -30- APPENDIX OF WP(C) 21678/2021 PETITIONER EXHIBITS Exhibit P1 TRUE COPY OF THE MEMORANDUM ISSUED BY THE 3RD RESPONDENT CHAIRMAN , ALONG WITH THE STATEMENT OF ARTICLES OF CHARGES, STATEMENT OF IMPUTATION OF MISCONDUCT LIST OF RELIED DOCUMENTS AND LIST OF WITNESSES Exhibit P1A THE TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER OF THE 1ST RESPONDENT DISMISSING THE APPEAL FILED BY THE PETITIONER DATED 15TH JULY 2021 Exhibit P1B THE TRUE COPY OF THE CIRCULAR NUMBERED AS CGEWCC/MEDICAL/COCHIN-2013-14 DATED 23-08-2013 STATING THAT THE SAID DR. MAYA IS DESIGNATED AS AUTHORISED MEDICAL ATTENDANT FOR CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES Exhibit P1C TRUE COPY OF THE OFFICE MEMORANDUM ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA DATED 17TH MARCH 2011 STATING THE CONSULTATION FEES FOR AUTHORISED MEDICAL ATTENDANT. Exhibit P2 TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY GIVEN DATED 27- 06-2015 Exhibit P3 TRUE COPY OF THE OFFICE ORDER APPOINTING THE INQUIRY OFFICER DATED 24-07-2015 Exhibit P4 TRUE COPY OF THE SUBMISSION DATED 1- 10-2015 Exhibit P5 TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER NO. 11/4/2015/VIG/HO DATED 30-10-2015 FROM THE INQAUIRY OFFICER ADDRESSED TO THE 2ND RESPONDENT Exhibit P6 A TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER NO. ENG/KAJ/2015-2 DATED 09-11-2015 FROM THE 2ND RESPONDENT ADDRESSED TO THE PETITIONER. Exhibit P7 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION DATED 10-11-2015 W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -31- Exhibit P8 A COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 07-12-2015 Exhibit P9 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION DATED 08-12-2015 Exhibit P10 A TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER DATED 10-12- 2015 FROM THE 4TH RESPONDENT REJECTING THE REQUEST Exhibit P11 A COPY OF THE DAILY ORDER SHEET DATED 10-12-2015 Exhibit P12 A COPY OF THE DAILY ORDER SHEET DATED 10-12-2015 WHICH IS NOT SIGNED Exhibit P13 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION BY THE PETITIONER DATED 16-12-2015 Exhibit P14 A TRUE COPY OF ORDER DATED 18-12-2015 Exhibit P15 A TRUE COPY DAILY ORDER SHEET NO. 10 DATED 22-12-2015, THE EXAMINATION DOCTOR DR. MAYA Exhibit P16 A TRUE COPY OF EXAMINATION OF SMT. DEEPA, CHIEF ACCOUNTS OFFICER AS PER ORDER SHEET NO. 10 Exhibit P17 THE TRUE COPY OF THE APPEAL DATED 31- 12-2015 Exhibit P18 THE TRUE COPY OF THE BRIEF SUBMITTED BY THE PRESENTING OFFICER DATED 26-05- 2015 Exhibit P19 THE TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM REPLY SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER DATED DATED 9-2-2016 Exhibit P20 THE TRUE COPY OF THE INTERIM REPLY SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER DATED 12- 02-2016 Exhibit P21 THE TRUE COPY OF THE REPORT OF ENQUIRY SUBMITTED BY THE INQUIRY OFFICER TO THE RESPONDENT DATED 16-02-2016 Exhibit P22 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY DATED 14-04- 2016 FILED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE 3RD RESPONDENT Exhibit P23 A TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY DATED 19-04- 2016 FILED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE 3RD RESPONDENT. Exhibit P24 A TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO. 11-04- 2015/VIG/HO DATED 22-04-2016 ISSUED BY THE 2ND RESPONDENT DISMISSING THE PETITIONER FROM SERVICE WITH IMMEDIATE EFFECT. Exhibit P25 A TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 18- W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -32- 05-2016 IN W.P(C) NO. 6162 OF 2016(U) Exhibit P26 A TRUE COPY OF THE MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE ADVICE NO. FTS.NO 1962/ADV.B/2015 DATED 28-07-2015 Exhibit P27 A TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER NO. 7/4/2014-EPIMP) DATED 29-01-2016 FROM THE RESPONDENT ADDRESSED TO THE 2ND RESPONDENT Exhibit P28 A TRUE COPY OF THE AFORESAID REPRESENTATION SENT BY THE PETITIONER TO THE 3RD RESPONDENT DATED 06-05-2016 Exhibit P29 THE TRUE COPY OF THE ESSENTIALITY CERTIFICATE ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER'S WIFE DATED 01-02-2013 Exhibit P29A THE TRUE COPY OF THE ESSENTIALITY CERTIFICATE ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER'S SON DATED 01-02-2013 Exhibit P29B THE TRUE COPY OF THE ESSENTIALITY CERTIFICATE ISSUED TO THE PETITIOENR'S DAUGHTER DATED 01-02-2013 Exhibit P29C THE TRUE COPY OF THE ESSENTIALITY CERTIFICATE ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER'S SON DATED 30-05-2013. Exhibit P29D THE TRUE COPY OF THE ESSENTIALITY CERTIFICATE ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER'S WIFE DATED 30-05-2013. Exhibit P29E THE TRUE COPY OF THE ESSENTIALITY CERTIFICATE ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER'S DAUGHTER DATED 30-05-2013. Exhibit P29F THE TRUE COPY OF THE ESSENTIALITY CERTIFICATE ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER'S WIFE DATED 06-12-2013. Exhibit P29G THE TRUE COPY OF THE ESSENTIALITY CERTIFICATE ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER'S SON DATED 26-12-2013. Exhibit P29 h THE TRUE COPY OF THE ESSENTIALITY CERTIFICATE ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER DATED 26-12-2013 Exhibit P29i THE TRUE COPY OF THE ESSENTIALITY CERTIFICATE ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER'S DATED 26-12-2013 DAUGHTER DATED 06-01- 2014 Exhibit P29J THE TRUE COPY OF THE ESSENTIALITY CERTIFICATE ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER'S SON DATED 28-02-2014. W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -33- Exhibit P29K THE TRUE COPY OF THE ESSENTIALITY CERTIFICATE ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER'S WIFE DATED 07-03-2014 Exhibit P29L THE TRUE COPY OF THE ESSENTIALITY CERTIFICATE ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER'S DAUGHTER DATED 07-03-2014 Exhibit P29M THE TRUE COPY OF THE ESSENTIALITY CERTIFICATE ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER DATED 21-06-2014 Exhibit P29N THE TRUE COPY OF THE ESSENTIALITY CERTIFICATE ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER'S SON DATED 02-07-2014 Exhibit P29O THE TRUE COPY OF THE ESSENTIALITY CERTIFICATE ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER'S DAUGHTER DATED 11-07-2014 Exhibit P29P THE TRUE COPY OF THE ESSENTIALITY CERTIFICATE ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER'S SON DATED 18-08-2014 Exhibit P29Q THE TRUE COPY OF THE ESSENTIALITY CERTIFICATE ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER'S WIFE DATED 01-09-2014 Exhibit P29 R THE TRUE COPY OF THE ESSENTIALITY CERTIFICATE ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER'S DAUGHTER DATED 01-09-2014 Exhibit P29S THE TRUE COPY OF THE ESSENTIALITY CERTIFICATE ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER'S WIFE DATED 07-11-2014 Exhibit P29 T THE TRUE COPY OF THE ESSENTIALITY CERTIFICATE ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER DATED 07-11-2014 Exhibit P29 U THE TRUE COPY OF THE ESSENTIALITY CERTIFICATE ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER'S DAUGHTER DATED 07-11-2014 Exhibit P29V THE TRUE COPY OF THE ESSENTIALITY CERTIFICATE ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER'S WIFE DATED 10-11-2014 Exhibit P29W THE TRUE COPY OF THE ESSENTIALITY CERTIFICATE ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER DATED 24-12-2014 Exhibit P29X THE TRUE COPY OF THE ESSENTIALITY CERTIFICATE ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER'S DAUGHTER DATED 24-12-2014 Exhibit P29 Y THE TRUE COPY OF THE ESSENTIALITY CERTIFICATE ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER'S SON DATED 24-12-2014 W.P .(C) No.21678 of 2021 -34- Exhibit P30 THE TRUE COPY OF THE COMPLAINT SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER DATED 07- 102-15 BEFORE THE ASSISTANT POLICE COMMISSIONER COCHIN. Exhibit P30A THE TRUE COPY OF THE RECEIPT ISSUED TO THE PETITIONER FROM THE OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT POLICE COMMISSIONER DATED 07-10-2015 Exhibit P30B THE TRUE COPY OF THE COMPLAINT PETITIONER PREFERRED BEFORE THE CHAIRMAN CGEWCC WHO WAS THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER INCOME TAX REGARDING THE MALPRACTICE OF DR. MAYA BEING AN AUTHORISED MEDICAL ATTENDANT DATED 25- 10-2016 Exhibit P30C THE TRUE COPY OF THE COMPLAINT PETITIONER PREFERRED BEFORE THE CHAIRMAN SD PHARMACY DATED 27-10-2015 AGAINST THE ACTS OF DR. MAYA Exhibit P30D THE TRUE COPY OF THE RTI REPLY ISSUED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT DATED 03-10-2018 REGARDING QUERY ABOUT DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST THE CHAIRMAN Exhibit P31 THE TRUE COPY OF THE SALARY CERTIFICATE OF THE PETITIONER DATED 26-11-2013 Exhibit P32 THE TRUE COPY OF THE SALARY CERTIFICATE DATED 08-12-2014 OF THE PETITIONER. Exhibit P33 THE TRUE COPY OF THE AFFIDAVIT ISSUED BY BEENA JENNY DATED 23RD JULY 2021 Exhibit P34 THE TRUE COPY OF THE LETTER SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER BEFORE THE 3RD RESPONDENT DATED 19-12-1997. Exhibit P34A THE TRUE COPY OF THE AFFIDAVIT SUBMITTED BY THE MEDICAL ATTNENDANT OF DR. MAYA DATED 05-02-2020 Exhibit P34B THE TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT OF THIS HON'BLE COURT IN WP(C) NO. 21040/2016 DATED 19TH FEBRUARY 2021 "