K. LAKSHMANAN V. UNION OF INDIA

WP(C)/28322/2015

AI Insights

K. Lakshmanan, a Constable in the Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), was subjected to disciplinary action for possessing an unauthorized amount of cash while on duty. Initially, he was found with Rs. 1573, exceeding the permissible limit of Rs. 10 for refreshment during duty hours. Following a departmental enquiry, he was found guilty of gross indiscipline and misconduct, leading to his compulsory retirement. Lakshmanan challenged this decision through various legal avenues, including appeals and revisions, which resulted in his reinstatement but with a modified penalty. He later filed a writ petition challenging the orders related to his disciplinary action and the subsequent treatment of his service period as 'dies non' (non-service period). The High Court dismissed his petition, citing lack of territorial jurisdiction and the merger of earlier orders with the revisional order.

• Counselvise Citation: [2020] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 721605 (HC-KERALA)
• Appeal Type: Others
• Pronouncement Date: 05-05-2020
• Assessment Year: misc
• Result in Favour of: Revenue
• Court: HIGH COURT
• Department Lawyers: T V VINU
• Assessee Lawyers: K B HARSHAN; SOUMINI JAMES
• Keywords: Armed Forces; Breach of Trust; CISF; Disciplinary action; Misconduct; Gross indiscipline; Violation of lawful orders

Judgement Text

"“CR” IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM PRESENT THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE V.G.ARUN TUESDAY, THE 05TH DAY OF MAY 2020 / 15TH VAISAKHA, 1942 WP(C).No.28322 OF 2015(M) PETITIONER/S: K. LAKSHMANAN AGED 45 YEARS S/O.N.P.CHRUKANDAN, NO.902292498 CONSTABLE, CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY FORCE UNIT, SINGARENI COLLIERIES COMPANY LIMITED, SINGARENI, POST NASPUR, ADILABAD, TELANGANA STATE - 504 302. BY ADVS. SRI.K.B.HARSHAN SMT.SOUMINI JAMES RESPONDENT/S: 1 UNION OF INDIA REPRESENTED BY SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE, NEW DELHI - 03. 2 THE DIRECTOR GENERAL CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY FORCE, BLOCK NO.13, CGO COMPLEX, LODHI ROAD, NEW DELHI - 03. 3 THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY FORCE, SOUTH ZONE HEAD QUARTERS, RAJAJI BHAWAN, BESANT NAGAR, CHENNAI - 90. 4 THE GROUP COMMANDANT CENTRAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY FORCE GROUP HEAD QUARTERS, KENDRIYA BHAVAN, COCHIN - 682 030. W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 2 5 K.KORAPPAN PEETHALAM HOUSE, CHEMANGERI P.O., QUILANDI (VIA), KOZHIKODE DISTRICT - 673 304. R1 BY SRI.T.V.VINU, CGC R1 BY ADV. SRI.T.V.VINU CGC THIS WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) HAVING BEEN FINALLY HEARD ON 16-03-2020, THE COURT ON 5.5.2020 DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 3 “CR” JUDGMENT Dated this the 5th day of May, 2020. The petitioner; a Constable in the Central Industrial Security Force, was subjected to disciplinary action while working at the New Mangalore Port Trust. The reason for initiation of disciplinary action was that, on 29.05.2009, while the petitioner was deputed for duty at the KK Gate (out) of the New Mangalore Port from 13 Hrs to 21 Hrs, he was found to be in possession of cash, in excess of the amount declared by him at the time of joining duty. On initiation of the disciplinary action, the petitioner was issued with Ext.P2 Article of Charges and Statement of Imputation dated 6.06.2009. The charges were to the following effect: \"That CISF No.902292498 Constable K. Lakshmanan of CISF Unit, NMPT Mangalore was W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 4 detailed for B' Shift duty on 29.05.2009 from 1300 hrs to 2100 hrs along with No.721370091 HC/GD K. Sreedharan at K.K. Gate-Out. Shri K. Korappan, AC, CISF Unit NMPT Mangalore, while carrying out surprise checking at 2055 hours on 29.05.2009 along with SI/Exe R.R. Singh, In-charge(CIW), Shri K. Korappan directed to SI/Exe R.R. Singh to conduct pocket checking of B' shift duty personnel deployed at K.K. Gate. Accordingly SI/Exe R.R. Singh conducted pocket checking of Constable K.Lakshmanan in presence of No. 753460102 ASI/Exe P.K. Thampy, In-charge, KK Gate and No.773430028 HC/GD Kuttan Pillai K.K., Main Gate-In and found an illegal money of Rs.1573/- (Rupees one thousand five hundred seventy three only) in possession of Constable K. Lakshmanan in various denominations and the amount was seized which was kept hidden between his belt and waist. When asked by Shri K. Korappan as to where the money came from and why he kept such huge amount with him, Constable K. Lakshmanan did not give any satisfactory reply. Immediately a seizure list was prepared wherein signature of witnesses were obtained. In this regard, a GD has been made at Sl. No.1324 at 2117 hours on 29- 05-09 at KK Gate. As per Unit standing instructions, duty personnel are not allowed to keep more than Rs.10/- for refreshment purpose during duty hours. All the Unit personnel including Constable K. Lakshmanan were also furnished a certificate in this regard that he is not involved in any kind of corrupt practices. In spite of this, he kept an illegal money of Rs.1573/- in his person. The above act on the part of No. 902292498 Constable K.Lakshmanan amounts to gross indiscipline, misconduct, breach of trust, violation of lawful orders and an act unbecoming of a member of Armed Force of the W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 5 Union like CISF.\" 2. The petitioner submitted Ext.P3 reply denying the charges and explaining the circumstances under which he happened to be in possession of the excess amount. According to the petitioner, the amount was entrusted with the petitioner one Valsalan, a Crane Operator at the New Mangalore Port, who hails from the neighbourhood of the petitioner's native place. Since the petitioner was proceeding on leave to his native place on 30.05.2009, entrusted the amount along with a letter addressed to his wife and requested to hand over the money and letter to his wife. According to the petitioner, after accepting the money, he had gone to the Cabin of the Shift Supervisor to inform him about the amount in his possession. But before he reached the cabin, petitioner was accosted, searched, and the cash seized. The explanation offered by the W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 6 petitioner having been found to be unsatisfactory, departmental enquiry was ordered against him. On conclusion of the enquiry, Ext.P12 report dated 02.09.2009 was submitted by the Enquiry Officer finding the petitioner guilty of gross indiscipline, misconduct, breach of trust, violation of lawful orders and acts unbecoming of a member of the Armed Forces of the Union. Thereafter, Ext.P14 order dated 22.10.2009 was passed by the disciplinary authority finding the petitioner guilty of the charges and imposing him with the punishment of compulsory retirement from service with full pension and gratuity with immediate effect and directing the period of petitioner's suspension (from 30.05.2009 to 03.09. 2009) to be treated as suspension for all purposes and payment for that period to be limited to the subsistence allowance already paid. 3. Aggrieved by Ext.P14, the petitioner W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 7 preferred Ext.P15 appeal, which was dismissed by the appellate authority under Exhibit P16 order dated 15.01.2010. Challenging Exts.P14 and P16, the petitioner preferred W.P.(C) No. 12035 of 2010 before this Court, which was disposed under Exhibit P17 judgement dated 04.06.2014, relegating the petitioner to his statutory revisional remedy. Accordingly, the petitioner preferred Ext.P18 revision, which was disposed of under Ext.P19 order dated 03.11.2014 in the following manner: “10. NOW THEREFORE, having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstance of the case, I conclude that though the punishment of Compulsory Retirement from service awarded to him by the Disciplinary Authority is appropriate in the case yet on a purely humanitarian count and considering the fact that petitioner had served for more than 19 years in CISF, I am inclined to take a compassionate view and hereby modify the penalty of Compulsory Retirement from service awarded to him by Group Commandant CISF Cochin, vide order dated 22.10.2009 to that of \"Reduction of pay by two stages in the time scale of pay for a period of two years with further direction that he will not earn increments of pay during the period of reduction and that on the expiry W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 8 of such period the reduction will have the effect of postponing his future increments of pay.” 11. NOW THEREFORE, I hereby reinstate the petitioner in service with the above punishment and direct him to report for duty at South Zone HQRS Chennai within 15 days from the date of receipt of this order. If he failed to report for duty within the stipulated period, it will be presumed that he is no more interested to serve in CISF and order of re-instatement will be treated as withdrawn. On reinstatement, the penalty as ordered above shall be given effect to. 12. The intervening period from the date of Compulsory retire from service to the date of joining on re-instatement will be regularized separately. The petitioner would be given an opportunity to submit his representation against the proposal within one month of joining the duty on re-instatement and decision in this regard will be taken after consideration of the representation, if any submitted by the petitioner or after expiry of period of one month, as the case may be.” 4. In terms of the direction contained in Ext.P19 order, the petitioner was reinstated in service and posted at CISF unit, CCCL, Singereni and he joined duty on 02.12.2014. Later, Ext.P21 show cause notice dated 22.05.2015 was issued to the petitioner, requiring him to show cause W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 9 against the proposal to treat the period of his service from the date of compulsory retirement (27.10.2009) to the date of rejoining (02.12.2014) as dies non. Upon receipt of Ext.P21, petitioner submitted Ext.P22 reply requesting that he be exonerated from the charges and relieved of the punishment of reduction of pay. Petitioner also requested to regularise the period from the date of suspension and compulsory retirement to the date of his rejoining service as duty. Rejecting the explanation offered and the request made by the petitioner to his reply, Ext.P23 order dated 05.08 2015 was issued, ordering that the intervening period from the date of compulsory retirement of the petitioner from service to the date of his rejoining on reinstatement will be treated as dies non for the purposes of service. 5. The writ petition was thereupon filed, seeking to quash Exts.P14, P16 and P19 orders W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 10 issued by the disciplinary, appellate and revisional authorities, as also Ext. P23 order by which the period between the date of petitioner's compulsory retirement and his reinstatement in service was directed to be treated as dies non. 6. Heard Smt.Soumini James, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Smt.Shalina O.M, learned CGC appearing for the respondents. 7. The learned Counsel for the petitioner advanced elaborate arguments challenging the findings in Ext.P14 and alleging procedural violation in the conduct of disciplinary enquiry. It is the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the appellate as well as the revisional authorities did not consider the factual and legal contentions urged by the petitioner and therefore Exts.P16 and P19 orders are liable to be interfered with. As against Ext.P23 order, the learned Counsel submitted that, W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 11 had the authority considered the sustainability of Exts.P14, P16 and P19, as was requested in Ext.P22 explanation submitted by the petitioner, Ext.P23 order would not have been passed and that the failure to consider the explanation has rendered the order illegal. 8. Opposing the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioner, the learned CGC would submit that this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the Writ petition inasmuch as no part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial limits of this Court. It is contended that having rejoined service in accordance with the direction contained in Ext.P19 revisional order, the petitioner is estopped from challenging the original and appellate orders, since those orders had merged with the revisional order. It is contended that the petitioner has lost his right to challenge those orders, not only on the ground W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 12 of acquiescence and estoppel, but also for reason of delay. 9. In the nature of the contentions urged, it is only appropriate that the issue of territorial jurisdiction be considered and decided, before venturing to consider the challenge against the disciplinary action, the scope of which is even otherwise very limited. 10. The territorial jurisdiction of High Courts to issue various prerogative writs, orders and directions is dealt with in Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Originally, Article 226 of the Constitution reads as under: “226.Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.—(1) Notwithstanding anything in article 32, every High Court shall have powers, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 13 enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. (3) Where any party against whom an interim order, whether by way of injunction or stay or in any other manner, is made on, or in any proceedings relating to, a petition under clause (1), without - (a) furnishing to such party copies of such petition and all documents in support of the plea for such interim order; and (b) giving such party an opportunity of being heard, makes an application to the High Court for the vacation of such order and furnishes a copy of such application to the party in whose favour such order has been made or the counsel of such party, the High Court shall dispose of the application within a period of two weeks from the date on which it is received or from the date on which the copy of such application is so furnished, whichever is later, or where the High Court is closed on the last day of that period, before the expiry of the next W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 14 day afterwards on which the High Court is open; and if the application is not so disposed of, the interim order shall, on the expiry of that period, or, as the case may be, the expiry of the said next day, stand vacated. (4) The power conferred on a High Court by this article shall not be in derogation of the power conferred on the Supreme Court by clause (2) of article 32.” 11. While interpreting Article 226, the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Election Commission v.Saka Venkata Rao [AIR 1953 SC 210], had held that the writ of a High Court would not run beyond the territories which are subject to its jurisdiction and further that, the person or the authority affected by the writ must be amenable to court's jurisdiction either by residence or location within those territories. It was held that the rule of cause of action attracting jurisdiction applicable to suits is based on statutory enactment and cannot apply to writs issued under Article 226 of the Constitution, since on reference is made to any W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 15 cause of action in Article 226 and that on the other hand, the insistence is on the presence of the person or authority within the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction. Similar view was followed by another Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in K.S. Rashid and Son v. Income Tax Investigation Commission [AIR 1954 SC 207]. The Bench was of the view that the exercise of power conferred by Article 226 was subject to twofold limitation viz; that the power is to be exercised in relation to the territory over which it exercises jurisdiction and that the person or authority on whom the High Court is empowered to issue the writ must be within those territories. 12. The aforementioned judgments came up for consideration before 5 a Larger Bench of the Apex Court in Lt. Col. Khajoor Singh v.The Union of India [AIR 1961 SC 532]. The Larger Bench approved W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 16 the earlier decisions and opined that unless there are clear and compelling reasons which cannot be denied, writ court cannot exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution beyond its territorial jurisdiction. The interpretation given in the aforesaid decisions resulted in undue hardship and inconvenience to the citizens in invoking writ jurisdiction. As a result, clause (1-A) was inserted in Article 226 by the Constitution (Fifteenth) Amendment Act, 1963, subsequently renumbered as clause (2) by the Constitution (Forty-second) Amendment Act, 1976. The relevant part of Article 226, as amended, reads as under: “226.Power of High Courts to issue certain writs.—(1) Notwithstanding anything in Article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories, directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 17 warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. (2) The power conferred by clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government, authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. (3)-(4)** Thus, by the incorporation of Article 226(2), the jurisdiction of the High Courts was enlarged by conferring High Courts with the power to issue writs, directions or orders to any Government, authority or person, if the cause of action for the exercise of such power had arisen, wholly or in part, within the territorial limits of that High Court, even if the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. 13. The amended provision gave rise to the question as to how the term 'cause of action' is W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 18 to be understood in the context of Article 226(2). This was considered and answered in State of Rajasthan v. Swaika Properties [ (1985) 3 SCC 217] in the following manner: “The expression 'cause of action' is tersely defined in Mulla's Code of Civil Procedure: “The ‘cause of action’ means every fact which, if traversed, it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court.” In other words, 'cause of action' was explained to be a bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. On the facts of that case it was held that mere service of notice by the Special Officer, Town Planning Department, Jaipur under Section 52(2) of the Rajasthan Urban Improvement Act, 1959 at the registered office of the respondents situated at Calcutta, within the territorial limits of the State of West Bengal, would not give rise to a cause of action within W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 19 that territory, unless the service of such notice was an integral part of the cause of action. The entire cause of action culminating in the acquisition of the land under Section 52(1) of the Act was held to have arisen within the State of Rajasthan viz; within the territorial jurisdiction of the Rajasthan High Court. It was held that the answer to the question as to whether service of notice is an integral part of the cause of action within the meaning of Article 226(2) of the Constitution must depend upon the nature of the impugned order giving rise to a cause of action. The court held that if the respondents were aggrieved by the acquisition of their lands situated at Jaipur and wanted to challenge the validity of the notification issued by the State Government of Rajasthan under Section 52(1) of the Act by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the remedy of the respondents for W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 20 the grant of such relief had to be sought by filing such a petition before the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, where the cause of action wholly or in part arose. 14. In Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu [(1994) 4 SCC 711], the petitioner, Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) had, through its consultant, Engineers India Limited (EIL), issued an advertisement in the newspapers inviting tenders for setting up of Kerosene Recovery Processing Unit in Gujarat. In the advertisement, it was mentioned that the tenders containing offers were to be communicated to EIL, New Delhi. After the final decision was taken by the Steering Committee at New Delhi, the respondent NICCO moved the Calcutta High Court praying that ONGC be restrained from awarding the contract to any other party. It was pleaded in the petition that NICCO came to know of the tender from the publication in W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 21 the Times of India, within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. The High Court entertained the writ petition and directed the ONGC to consider the offer of NICCO along with others. The Apex Court, while setting aside the order passed by the Calcutta High Court, held as under: “6. ...Therefore, in determining the objection of lack of territorial jurisdiction the court must take all the facts pleaded in support of the cause of action into consideration albeit without embarking upon an enquiry as to the correctness or otherwise of the said facts. In other words the question whether a High Court has territorial jurisdiction to entertain a writ petition must be answered on the basis of the averments made in the petition, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial. To put it differently, the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition. 8. From the facts pleaded in the writ petition, it is clear that NICCO invoked the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court on the plea that a part of the cause of action had arisen within its territorial jurisdiction. According to NICCO, it became aware of the contract proposed to be given by ONGC on reading the advertisement which appeared in the 'Times of India' at Calcutta. In response, the advertisement, NICCO submitted its bid or tender from its Calcutta office and revised the rates subsequently. On W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 22 learning that it was considered ineligible NICCO sent representations, including fax messages, to EIL, ONGC, etc., at New Delhi, demanding justice. The Steering Committee finally rejected the offer of NICCO and awarded the contract to CIMMCO at New Delhi on 27-1-1993. Therefore, broadly speaking, NICCO moved the Calcutta High Court claiming that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court because it became aware of the advertisement in Calcutta, it submitted its bid or tender from Calcutta and made representations demanding justice from Calcutta on learning about the rejection of its offer. The advertisement itself mentioned that the tenders should be submitted to EIL at New Delhi; that those would be scrutinised at New Delhi and that a final decision whether or not to award the contract to the tenderer would be taken at New Delhi. Of course, the execution of the contract work was to be carried out at Hazira in Gujarat. Therefore, merely because it read the advertisement at Calcutta and submitted the offer from Calcutta and made representations from Calcutta would not, in our opinion, constitute facts forming an integral part of the cause of action. So also the mere fact that it sent fax messages from Calcutta and received a reply thereto at Calcutta would not constitute an integral part of the cause of action. Besides the fax message of 15-1- 1993, cannot be construed as conveying rejection of the offer as that fact occurred on 27-1-1993. We are, therefore, of the opinion that even if the averments in the writ petition are taken as true, it cannot be said that a part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Calcutta High Court. W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 23 15. Later, in Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd., [(2002) 1 SCC 567], the Honourable Supreme Court held that in order to confer jurisdiction on a High Court to entertain a writ petition or a special civil application as in this case, the High Court must be satisfied from the entire facts pleaded in support of the cause of action that those facts do constitute a cause so as to empower the court to decide a dispute which has, at least in part, arisen within its jurisdiction. That, each and every fact pleaded by the respondents in their application does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the court's territorial jurisdiction, unless the facts pleaded have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. It was held that, facts which have no bearing with the lis or the dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 24 as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the court concerned. 16. Ambica Industries v. Commissoiner of Central Excise [(2007) 6 SCC 769] considered the impact of Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure and held that though the provisions of the CPC would not apply to writ proceedings, the phraseology used in Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure and clause (2) of Article 226, being in pari materia, the decisions of the Apex Court, rendered on interpretation of Section 20(c) CPC, shall apply to writ proceedings also. With regard to the expression “cause of action” used in Clause (2) of Article 226, it was opined that even if a small fraction thereof accrues within the jurisdiction of the Court, the Court will have jurisdiction in the matter, though the doctrine of forum conveniens may also have to be considered. 17. In Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India, W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 25 [(2014) 9 SCC 329] the Apex Court made an elaborate precedential survey and expressed the view that on a plain reading of the amended provisions in clause (2), it is clear that the High Court can issue a writ even when the person or the authority against whom the writ is issued is located outside its territorial jurisdiction, if the cause of action wholly or partially arises within the court's territorial jurisdiction. The Court observed that 'cause of action' for the purpose of Article 226(2) of the Constitution, for all intent and purpose must be assigned the same meaning as envisaged under Section 20(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure. 18. The learned counsel for the petitioner would contend that Ext.P9 order having been issued by the disciplinary authority stationed at Cochin, the cause of action had arisen within the territorial limits of this court. The argument is W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 26 attractive at first blush. It is true that the authoritative pronouncements of the Apex Court leave no room for doubt that this court will have jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition if any part of the cause of action had arisen within the State of Kerala. But, as far as the instant case is concerned the order of the disciplinary authority had merged with the appellate order. The petitioner had challenged the original and the appellate orders before this court and by Ext. P13 judgment, he was relegated to his revisional remedy. Thereupon the petitioner availed the revisional remedy. By Ext.P19 order the revisional authority stationed at New Delhi modified the penalty imposed on the petitioner and directed reinstatement of the petitioner in service. The petitioner having rejoined service in terms of Ext. P19 order, his cause of action based on Ext.P13 order of the disciplinary authority cannot W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 27 survive. It is pertinent to note that the petitioner did not challenge Ext.P19 order dated 03.11.2014 till the issuance of Ext.P23 consequential order dated 05.08.2015. Further, as rightly contended by the learned CGC, the challenge against Exts.P13 and P16 are liable to be repelled based on the principles of acquiescence, estoppel and merger. That being the case the challenge gets confined to Exts.P19 and P23 orders, both of which are issued from the CISF Headquarters at New Delhi and pertains to the service of the petitioner, a personnel stationed at Singareni in the State of Telangana. As such, no part of the cause action with respect to Exts. P19 and P23 having arisen within the territorial limits of this Court, the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 cannot be exercised to entertain the writ petition and render a decision on merits. W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 28 In the result, the writ petition is dismissed. The parties to suffer their respective costs. Sd/- V.G.ARUN JUDGE Scl/5.5. W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 29 The following corrections are effected in the Judgment dated 05.05.2020 in W.P.(C) No.28322/2015 as per the order dated 05.08.2020 in I.A.No.1/2020 in W.P.(C) No.28322/2015(M). “In page No.25 at paragraph 18, the words 'Ext.P9' are corrected as 'Exhibit P14'. In page No.26, line No.10, the words 'Exhibit P13' are corrected as 'Exhibit P17'. In page No.26, last line, the words 'Exhibit P13' are corrected as 'Exhibit P14'. In page No.27, line No.6, the words 'Exhibit P13 and P16' are corrected as 'Exhibit P14' and P16'. Sd/- DEPUTY REGISTRAR ded/18.08.2020 W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 30 APPENDIX PETITIONER'S/S EXHIBITS: EXHIBIT P1 EXHIBIT P1. TRUE COPY OF THE LEAVE APPLICATION. EXHIBIT P2 EXHIBIT P2. TRUE COPY OF CHARGE MEMORANDUM DATED 06.06.09 WITH SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS. EXHIBIT P3 EXHIBIT P3. TRUE COPY OF REPLY DATED 11.06.09 SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER. EXHIBIT P4 EXHIBIT P4. TRUE COPY OF REPRESENTATION DATED 21.06.09. EXHIBIT P5 EXHIBIT P5. TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY DATED 23.06.09 ISSUED BY THE DEPARTMENT. EXHIBIT P6 EXHIBIT P6. TRUE COPY OF LETTER DATED 05.06.09. EXHIBIT P7 EXHIBIT P7. TRUE COPY LETTER DATED 29.07.09. EXHIBIT P8 EXHIBIT P8. TRUE COPY OF THE LIC CERTIFICATE. EXHIBIT P9 EXHIBIT P9. TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY DATED 13/14 JUNE 2009. EXHIBIT P10 EXHIBIT P10. TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY DATED 17.08.09. EXHIBIT P11 EXHIBIT P11. TRUE COPIES OF STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES AND THEIR DEPOSITIONS. EXHIBIT P12 EXHIBIT P12. TRUE COPY OF ENQUIRY REPORT DATED 02.09.09. W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 31 EXHIBIT P13 EXHIBIT P13. TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY DATED 19.09.09 TO THE ENQUIRY REPORT. EXHIBIT P14 EXHIBIT P14. TRUE COPY OF THE FINAL ORDER DATED 22.10.09. EXHIBIT P15 EXHIBIT P15. TRUE COPY OF APPEAL MEMORANDUM DATED 02.11.09. EXHIBIT P16 EXHIBIT P16. TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 15.01.2010 IN APPEAL. EXHIBIT P17 EXHIBIT P17. TRUE COPY OF THE JUDGMENT DATED 04.06.2014 IN W.P. (C)NO.12035/2010. EXHIBIT P18 EXHIBIT P18. TRUE COPY OF THE REVISION PETITION FILED BY THE PETITIONER. EXHIBIT P19 EXHIBIT P19. TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 03.11.2014 IN REVISION. EXHIBIT P20 EXHIBIT P20. TRUE COPY OF THE REPRESENTATION DATED 26.01.2015 SUBMITTED BY THE PETITIONER. EXHIBIT P21 EXHIBIT P21. TRUE COPY OF THE SHOW CAUSE NOTICE DATED 22.05.2015. EXHIBIT P22 EXHIBIT P22. TRUE COPY OF THE REPLY DATED 08.06.2015 TO THE SHOW CAUSE NOTICE. EXHIBIT P23 EXHIBIT P23. TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER DATED 05.08.2015. RESPONDENTS EXHIBITS: EXHIBIT R4 (A): TRUE COPY OF THE CHARGE MEMORANDUM NO.V-15014/NMPT/DISC./MAJ-KL/09-1942 DATED 06.06.2009 ISSUED BY THE DY. COMMANDANT, CISF UNIT NMPT, MANGALORE. W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 32 EXHIBIT R4 (B): TRUE COPY OF THE MEMO NO.V-15014/ NMPT/DISC/MAJ-KL/09/2236 DATED 23.06.2009 ISSUED BY THE DY.COMMANDANT, CISF UNIT NMPT, MANGALORE. EXHIBIT R4 (C): TRUE COPY OF THE STANDING INSTRUCTIONS OF CISF UNIT NMPT MANAGALORE. EXHIBIT R4(D): TRUE COPY OF THE FINAL ORDER NO.15014/KL/MAJ/NMPT /GHC/ AD.V / 2009- 1510 DATED 22.10.2009 ISSUED BY THE GROUP COMMANDANT, CISF GROUP HQ, COCHIN. EXHIBIT R4(E): TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO. V-11014/41/KL/2009/L&R(SZ)78 DATED 15.01.2010, ISSUED BY THE DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL (SZ) CHENNAI. EXHIBIT R4 (F): TRUE COPY OF JUDGMENT DATED 04.06.2014 IN W.P(C).NO.12035 OF 2010, OF THIS HON'BLE COURT. EXHIBIT R4(G): TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO. V-14013/ 142/2010/L&R/1064 DATED 03.11.2014 ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR GENERAL/CISF, NEW DELHI. EXHIBIT R4(H): TRUE COPY OF THE ORDER NO. V-14013/ 142/2010/L&R/943 DATED 05.08.2015 OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL / CISF, NEW DELHI. EXHIBIT R4(I): TRUE COPY OF CROSS EXAMINATION HELD IN BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND 5TH RESPONDENT/PW-1. EXHIBIT R4(J): TRUE COPY OF THE SEIZURE LIST PREPARED BY PW-II, PW-III AND PW-IV IN PRESENCE OF THE PETITIONER. EXHIBIT R4(K):TRUE COPY OF THE GD NO.1324 DATED 29.05.2009 OF THE 5TH RESPONDENT/PW-I. W.P.(C) No. 28322 of 2015 33 EXHIBIT R4(L): TRUE COPY OF THE SEIZURE REPORT DATED 30.05.2009 TO THE DY. COMMANDANT, CISF UNIT NMPT MANGALORE VERIFIED PETITION TO CONDONE THE DELAY ATED THIS 11TH DAY OF MARCH, 2016. "