Kakinada SEZ Limited V. Assistant Commissioner Of Income Tax, Circle 2(2) Hyderabad

ITTA/74/2018

AI Insights

The case involves M/s. Kakinada SEZ Limited, which filed an appeal under Section 260 A of the Income Tax Act, 1961, against the order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad. The appeal was initially delayed by 1729 days, prompting the filing of I.A.No. 1 of 2018 to condone the delay. The appellant argued that the delay was due to the departure of a key employee and an office relocation, which led to the misplacement of the case file and a misunderstanding about the appeals filed. The respondent contested the condonation of the delay, citing the inordinate length and lack of satisfactory explanation for the delay. The court, referencing several precedents, held that the delay was inordinate and not adequately explained, leading to the dismissal of both the condonation application and the main appeal.

• Counselvise Citation: [2023] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 805611 (HC-TELANGANA)
• Appeal Type: Others
• Pronouncement Date: 01-08-2023
• Assessment Year: misc
• Other Referred Cases: Basawaraj and another v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Postmaster General and others vs. Living Media India Limited and another, Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department) rep.by Executive Engineer vs. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited
• Laws Referred To: Income Tax Act 1961, Limitation Act
• Result in Favour of: Revenue
• Court: HIGH COURT
• Department Lawyers: K MAMATA CHOUDARY
• Assessee Lawyers: CHALLA GUNARANJAN
• Keywords: Assessment Year 2008-09; Condonation of delay; Income Tax; Inordinate delay
• Section: 260A; 5

Judgement Text

"IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD TUESDAY ,THE FIRST DAY OF AUGUST TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY THREE PRESENT THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY AND THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETW t.A. NO. 1 0F 20'18 IN/AND INCOME TAX TRIBUNAL APPEAL NO: 74 OF 2018 (lncome Tax Tribunal .Appeal Under Section 260 A of the lncome Tax Act 1961 against the order of the lncome Tax Appellate Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench ' B ', Hyderabad in ITA No.213 I Hyd I 2012 ( Assessment Year 2008-09) dated 1 8-01-2013 prefened against the Order of the Commissioner of lncome Tax ( Appeals ) -lll, Hyderabad in ITA No. 0254 / CIT (A) -lll/10-1 1 dated 25-11-2011 prefened against the Order of the Assistant Commissioner of lncome Tax, Cir.cle - 2(2) ,Hyde@bad PAN/GIR No. AACCK567 OR dated 24-12-2010.) Between: M/s. Kakinada SEZ Limited, (Formerly known as Kakinada SEZ Private Limited) 4h floor GMR Aero Towers, Rajiv Gandhi lnternational Airport Shamshabad, Hyderabad -500 108 ...APPELLANT AND Assistant Commissioner Of lncome Tax, Circle 2(2)Hyderabad ...RESPONDENT lA NO: I OF2018 Petition under Section 5 of Limitation Act CPC praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to condone delay of 1729 days in filing the above appeal against the orders passed in lTA.No. 2 1 3/HYD I 21 2 Dated.l 8 lO1 1201 3 Counse! for the Appellant: SRl. CHALLA GUNARANJAN Counsel for the Respondent: Ms. K. MAMATA CHOUDARY S.C. FOR I.T. DEPT The Court delivering the following: Judgment il rl l : ! I : t I : i THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY AND THE HON'BLE SRI JI'STICE LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY LA.NO.1 ()F 2()14 IN/AND I.T.T.A.No.74 OF 2()18 JUDGMENT: (per Hort'ble Sn Justice Laxmi Naragana Alishettg) The present Appeal is filed by the appellant under Section 260- A oi the lncome Tax Act, 196 l, assailing the Order of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (lTA'l'), Bench-B, Hyderabad in I.T.A.No.2 I 3 I Hyd / 2O12, dated 18.01.2013, for the Assessment Year 2OO8-2OO9. As therc is dela5, 66 1729 days in preferring the Appeai, the appellant lilt'r1 I A.No 1 of 2O1l] r.o condone ti-re delay. 2. We have hear,4 3 taken steps to hle the above appeal for the Assessment year 2OOg_Og. Thus, the delay is occurred only due to the above facts and it is neither wilful nor wanton. Therefore, learned counsel for the petitioners prays the Court to condone the delay in preferring the appeal. 8. Per contra, according to learned counsel for respondent, there is inordinate deiay of 1729 days in preferring the appeal and the appeal is liable to be dismissed on that ground alone. 9. The reason stated in the aflidavit are vague, unsatisfactory and the reasons offered by the petitioner is that an employee i.e., Associate General Manager of the company left the company on I 1.03.2013 without informing the case details. 10. Secondly', rhe company changed the Office from GMR HAIL Airport Office, Rajiv Gandhi Intemational Airport, Shamshabad, Hyderabad to 4h floor, GMR Aero Towers, Rajiv Gandhi International Airport, Shamshabad Hyderabad. I 1. The averments made in the affidavit that the employee left the petitioner-company without informing the case details and the company came to kno,*, about non_filing of the appeal for the Assessment Year 2OO7-0g, cannot be valid, proper explanation, that too when ,the1-e is an inordinate delay of 1729 days in preferring the 4 appeal. It is pertinent to note that petitioner is a company and not an individual, therefore, the contention of the petitioner that one of the employees i.e., Associate General Manager had left the petitioner company on 11.03.2013 without informing the case details and further the peLitioner-company chalged their Ofhce, does not inspire the confrdence of this Court, more so, in the light of compliance of statutory requirements, such as, hling of half yearly balance sheet, annual returns, statutory audit etc. Therefore, it is neither expected nor assumed that petitioner-company would depend on one employee of the company. 12. Condonation of delay is not a matter of routine, more so when there is huge inordinate delay and, therefore, the petitioner ought to have offered detailed, cogent reasons, plausible explanation for such delay. 13. In Basawaraj and another v. Special Land Acquisition Oflicerl, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: \"11. The expression \"sufficient cause\" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona frdes cannot be imputed. to tlE partg concemed, whether or not sufllcrent cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a Particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. pide Madanlal v. ' zotl (ra) scc gt 5 ShgamLal I(2OO2 | SCC 535 : AIR 2OO2 SC 10Ol and Ram Nath Saov. GobardlLan Sao [(20O2) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .) 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshll affecr a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. \"A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore ttrat provision to relieve what it considers a distress resultrng from its operation.\" The statutory provision may causc hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving fuU effect to the same. Tho lcgal maxim dura lex sed lex which means'the law is hard but it is tlre taw\", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistentll, been held that, \"inconvenience is not\" a decisive factor to be corrsiclered while interpreting a statute. 15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that vher€ a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicanr has to explain the court as to what was the \"su[fi(]ieDL caust \" u,hich means an adequate and enough reason rr hrc h preventccl him to approach the court within limitation. In (ase a part rs lbund to be negligent, or for want of bona lide on his perrr rn rhe facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted drligentty or remained inactive, there cannot be a Iustified ground ro condone the delay. No court could be justihed rn condonrng such an inordinate delay by imposing any corldnron u'hatsoever. The apptication is to be decided only withirr the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. [n case there was no sulficient cause to prevenr a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutorl.' provrsions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to thc legrslature i l, I I I I I i I i i I 6 14. In Postmaster General and others vs. Living Media India Limited and another2, Hon'ble Apex Court having considered catena of decisions, including Pundlik Jalam Patil (deadf by LRs. Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and another3, wherein it was held that, \"17....... Th.e evidence on record suggests neglect of its own right for long time in preferring app€als. The court cannot enquire into belated and stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity. The court helps those who are vigilant and 'do not slumber over their rights\". and observed that taking very lenient view in condoning thc delay, paJticularly, on the part of the Government and Covernment Undertaking, would not be proper and observed as under:- \"29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fxing time-limit for titigation is based on pubtic policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for tl.e purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to ditatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the taws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy. 3O- Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideratlon In exercising the courts' discretion wherever conferred upon it by thc relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and muttipticity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the landlosers facilitating their rehabititation/resettlement is equalty an integral part of public poticy- Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal riShts accrued in larv by resorting to avoidable titigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that l^'hat is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the landlosers These public interest parameters ought to b€ kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the landlosers to courts of law years after the termination of legat proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being ? (2012) 3 scc 563 ' lzooay tz sc aa8 7 I anv proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest.\" 15. In Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Departmentl rep.by Executive Engineer vs. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limiteda, Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: \"63. ...... [n a ht case ir.r which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in a negligent manner, a short deiay beyond such period can, in the discretion of the court, be condoned, always beanng in mind that the other side of the picture is that the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and justice, what may now be lost by the first party's inaction. negligence or laches.\" 16. Considering the facts of the case and the legal position and also in view of the fact that the reasons for condonation of inordinate delav o[ 1729 days in preferring appeal are not properly explained and no sulficrent cause has been shown for such delay, the I.A.No. I of 20 18 deserves to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. Consequently, the LT.'l'.A.No 74 of 20l8 stands dismissed. 17. Pending miscellaneous applications if any shall stand closed. (202r)6 SCC 460 Sd/.B.S.CHIRANJEEVI JOINT REGISTRAR I t'! SECTION OFFICER //TRUE COPY// To 1. The lncome Tax Appellate Trubunal Hyderabad B Bench, Hyderabad. (with record, if anY) 2. The Commissioncr of lncome Tax ( Appeals ) -III, Hyderabad 3. The Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax , Circle -2(2) , Hyderabad 4. One CC to SRl. CHALLA GUNARANJAN Advocate [OPUC] 5. One CC to Ms. K MAMATA CHOUDARY, Advocate [OPUC] 6. Two CD Copies # '| i I I II' I I I I 1 'I il 1 i ii li tl I i' I HIGH COURT DATED:01 10812023 JUDGMENT |.A.NO. 1 0F 2018 IN/AND lTTA.No.74 of 2018 DISMISSING THE ITTA J u 2 s [lJB2m '^E S TA I€' ( 1 -1,1i.;,,i i r a. + i i i I i "