M/S KLUBER LUBRICATION (INDIA) PVT LTD V. ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER OF COMMERCIAL TAXES

TAET/10/2014

AI Insights

The case involves M/s. Kluber Lubrication (India) Pvt Ltd, which appealed against the order of the Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Bangalore, concerning the levy of entry tax on certain lubricants and base oils for the assessment years 2005-06, 2006-07, and 2007-08. The appellant argued that the products in question were not notified commodities under the relevant tax entry and thus not liable for entry tax. The initial tax demand was based on an inspection report and subsequent reassessment, which the appellant contested. The Joint Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) had earlier ruled in favor of the appellant, a decision later set aside by the Additional Commissioner, leading to this appeal.

• Counselvise Citation: [2014] 140 COUNSELVISE.COM (IT) 726772 (HC-KARNATAKA)
• Appeal Type: Others
• Pronouncement Date: 16-07-2014
• Assessment Year: misc
• Other Referred Cases: ENTRY TAX OFFICER, BANGALORE & ORS. VS. CHANDANMAL CHAMPALAL AND CO. AND ORS., RAJENDRA SINGH VS. SUPERINTENDENT, SANTALAL MEHENDI RATTA (HUF) VS. COMMISSIONER OF TAXES, ASSAM & OTHERS, M/S KUMAR ENTERPRISE VS STATE OF ASSAM, INDIAN ALUMINUM COMPANY VS. ACCT, HYVA INDIA PVT. LTD. BANGALORE VS. ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER OF COMMERCIAL TAXES AND OTHERS, COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS (IMPORT), MUMBAI VS. DILIP KUMAR & COMPANY, BANSAL WIRE INDUSTRIES LTD. VS. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH, COMMISSIONER VS. INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED, KURAIN ABRAHAM VS. STATE OF KERALA, STATE OF KARNATAKA VS. VASAVA DATTA CEMENTS, MEMBER SECRETARY, ANDHRA PRADESH STATE BOARD FOR PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF WATER POLLUTION VS. ANDHRA PRADESH RAYONS LTD., SARASWATI SUGAR MILLS VS. HARYANA STATE BOARD, INDIA CINE AGENCIES VS. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, MADRAS, MAMTA SURGICAL COTTON INDUSTRIES, RAJASTHAN VS. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER (ANTI EVASION), BHILWARA, RAJASTHAN, UNION OF INDIA VS. IND-SWIFT LABORATORIES LTD., CIT VS. CALCUTTA KNITWEARS, DELHI ADMINISTRATION (NCT OF DELHI) VS. MANOHAR LAL, HARYANA FINANCIAL CORPORATION VS. JAGADAMBA OIL MILLS, BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD. VS. N.R.VAIRAMANI, COLLECTOR OF C.EX.CALCUTTA VS. ALNOORI TOBACCO PRODUCTS
• Laws Referred To: Karnataka Entry Tax Act, 1979, Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003, Central Sales Tax Act, 1956, Customs Tariff Act, 1975, Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods Act, 1979
• Result in Favour of: Others
• Court: HIGH COURT
• Department Lawyers: VIKRAM HUILGOL
• Assessee Lawyers: G SHIVADAS
• Keywords: Entry Tax; Petroleum Based Lubricants; Reassessment; Synthetic Based Lubricants; Tax liability
• Section: 3; 5(4); 16

Judgement Text

"1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 16TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2020 PRESENT THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ALOK ARADHE AND THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE H.T.NARENDRA PRASAD T.A.E.T. NO.10 OF 2014 BETWEEN: M/S. KLUBER LUBRICATION (INDIA) PVT LTD 3RD FLOOR, SILVER JUBILEE BLOCK 3RD CROSS, MISSION ROAD BANGALORE-560027. ... APPELLANT (BY SRI. G. SHIVADASS, SR. COUNSEL FOR SMT. SONAL SINGH & SMT. ANUSHA B.M. ADVS.,) AND: ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER OF COMMERCIAL TAXES ZONE-1, VANIJYA THERIGE KARYALAYA, 7TH FLOOR GANDHINAGAR, BANGALORE. ... RESPONDENT (BY SRI. VIKRAM HUILGOL, AGA) - - - THIS TAET IS FILED UNDER SECTION 16 OF THE KARNATAKA ENTRY TAX ACT, 1979, AGAINST THE ORDER DATED 16.7.2014 PASSED IN ZAC-1/BNG/SMR-03/2013-14 ON THE FILE OF ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER OF COMMERCIAL TAXES, ZONE- 1, BANGALORE, SETTING ASIDE THE ORDERS OF APPEAL OF THE FIRST APPELLATE AUTHORITY. R 2 THIS TAET COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, ALOK ARADHE J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING: JUDGMENT This appeal under Section 16 of the Karnataka Entry Tax Act, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the Act for short) has been preferred by the appellant against the order dated 16.07.2014 passed by Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Zone-I, Bangalore. The subject matter of the appeal pertains to the Assessment years 2005-06, 2006-07 and 2007-08. 2. Facts leading to filing of this appeal briefly stated are that the appellant is a private limited company and is registered as a dealer under the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003 as well as Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. the appellant has a manufacturing unit at Metagalli, Hebbal Industrial Area, Mysore and a warehouse at Hebbal Industrial Area, Mysore. The appellant is engaged in the business of import and sale of certain specialty lubricants such as lubricating oils and 3 grease which are both petroleum and synthetic based. The synthetic based lubricants are imported under Chapter 34 of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1975 Act' for short) whereas, petroleum based lubricants are imported under Chapter 37 of the 1975 Act Act. The appellant is also engaged in the business of manufacturing such products in the State of Karnataka and is procuring raw materials such as base oils, additives, chemicals and packing materials either locally or through imports. Thus, the appellant undertakes two different business activities in relation to imported lubricants. One of the activities involves pure trading of lubricating oils and grease and the other one involves usage of imported base oil as raw materials for manufacture of lubricating oil and grease. 3. The appellant has been making payment of entry tax in respect of petroleum based lubricating oil in terms of Entry 67 of 3rd Schedule of Karnataka Tax on Entry of Goods Act, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 4 1979 Act' for short) read with Entry 1(viii)(a) of Notification bearing No.FD/11/CET/2002 dated 30.03.2002 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Notification' for short) in case of entry of synthetic based lubricating oil and grease and base oil into the local area, no tax was being paid as it is non notified commodities. The entry tax was also not paid on the import / purchase of lubricants into the local area which are further sold in the course of inter state sales as goods are not meant for use, consumption or sale within the State of Karnataka. The Enforcement Officers of Commercial Taxes Department submitted an inspection report on the applicability of entry tax on the entry of lubricants within the local area for further sales on completion of assessment under the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003 for the Assessment Years 2005-06, 2006-07 and 2007-08. The Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes on the basis of the inspection report, initiated the re-assessment proceedings against the appellant under 5 Section5(4) of the 1979 Act and issued notice dated 25.05.2011 and revised notice dated 01.06.2011 proposing to levy entry tax on causing entry of machinery, base oil, lubricants and other petroleum products, which caused entry in the state at appropriate rates for the Assessment Year 2006-07 and 2007-08 based on Entry 67 of 3rd Schedule read with Notification dated 30.03.2002. The appellant filed a reply in which it was pointed out that the entry relating to petroleum products under the Notification was descriptive, enumerative and exhaustive entry, which notify only specific petroleum products that grease and base oil were not notified commodities and hence outside the purview of entry tax in terms of Section 3 of 1979 Act. It was also submitted that entry tax is leviable on the entry of goods into the local area for purpose of use, consumption or sale within the local area and that purchase turnover of grease and lubricating oil were not liable to entry tax as the said rules had been taken 6 outside the State of Karnataka in the course of inter state sales. However, the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes by an order dated 12.10.2011 did not accept the submission made by the appellant and confirmed the demand of tax including interest and penalty of Rs.19,18,34,865/- and Rs.14,84,45,385/- for Assessment Years 2006-07 and 2007-08. In respect of Assessment Year 2005-06 also, the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Tax confirmed the demand of entry tax by an order dated 25.04.2012 to the extent of Rs.7,34,01,764/- for the Assessment Year 2005-06. The rectification application filed by the appellant was also rejected vide order dated 28.10.2011. 4. The appellants thereupon filed appeals before the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) who by an order dated 12.09.2012 by placing reliance on subsequent clarifications issued by the government regarding entry 'petroleum products' and decision of the Supreme Court held entry tax was not leviable on goods 7 brought into the local area for purpose of re-export outside the local area. It was further held that the demand of tax was unsustainable on purchase of synthetic based lubricating oil, which was a non notified commodity. The appellate authority also granted exemption on the purchase of lubricating oil into the State of Karnataka, which was subsequently re-exported outside the State by way of inter state sales or export sales by relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in 'ENTRY TAX OFFICER, BANGALORE & ORS. VS. CHANDANMAL CHAMPALAL AND CO. AND ORS.', (1994) 4 SCC 463. 5. The Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes issued a notice dated 07.08.2013 and initiated suo motu revision proceeding under Section 15 of 1979 Act proposing to set aside the order of Joint Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) on the ground that the order passed by the appellate authority was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. 8 The Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes by an order 16.07.2014 rejected the contentions of the appellant and set aside the order of Joint Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) and held that lubricating oils, base oils and grease insofar as they are used, consumed and sold within the local area are exigible to tax. However, exemption was granted for purchase of said goods which were re-exported outside the state by inter state sales. The revisional authority observed that the decision of the appellate authority to allow exemptions on entry tax on petroleum based lubricating oil considering extent of sales turnover was incorrect and directed the Assessing Authority to rely on records maintained by Central Excise and to determine the purchase turnover for purposes of exemption for re exports. In the aforesaid factual background, the appellant is before this court. 6. Learned Senior counsel for the appellant at the outset submitted that initiation of suo motu revision 9 proceeding under Section 15 of the 1979 Act is per se without jurisdiction as two conditions for initiation of the proceedings that the order passed by the lower authority should be erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of revenue is not satisfied. It is also submitted that meaning of the expression 'erroneous' has to be understand to the jurisdictional irregularity on the part of the adjudicating authority and the power under Section 15 cannot be initiated merely on account of disagreement with the order passed by the adjudicating authority. In support of aforesaid submission, reliance has been placed on decisions in 'RAJENDRA SINGH VS. SUPERINTENDENT', (1990) 79 STC 10 (GAU), 'SANTALAL MEHENDI RATTA (HUF) VS. COMMISSIONER OF TAXES, ASSAM & OTHERS', 2002 VIL 09 GAU, and 'M/S KUMAR ENTERPRISE VS STATE OF ASSAM', 2017 VIL 393 GAU. 7. It is further submitted that under Section 3 of the 1979 Act, entry tax shall be levied on entry of any 10 goods which are specified in First Schedule into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein and the rates are specified by the State Government by Notification. It is also submitted that levy of entry tax on any product is contingent on fulfillment of two conditions firstly, product has to be specified in First Schedule and secondly, the same has also to be specified in the Notification issued by the State Government. Our attention has also been invited to Entry 67 as well as Entry 103 and the Notification dated 30.03.2002 issued under Section 3 of the 1979 Act providing for rate of tax for each of the goods specified in Entry 67. While inviting our attention to Entry 67 as well as Sl.No.1 of the Notification, it is pointed out that products mentioned therein are petroleum products and the products identified in Entry 67 and Sl.No.1 of the Notification are commonly such products which are classified under Chapter 27 of the 1975 Act. It is also urged that synthetic based lubricating oil classifiable 11 under Section 34 of the 1975 Act is a distinct product from petroleum based lubricating oil classifiable under Chapter 27 of the 1975 Act and synthetic based lubricating oil not being a petroleum product is not covered under the impugned entry. It is also pointed out that the revisional authority while framing the issue has clearly noted that synthetic based lubricating oils are distinguishable from petroleum based lubricating oils yet, has failed to give effect to the aforesaid distinction. It is also urged that grease and base oil are not specifically enumerated in the specification and therefore, they cannot be subjected to entry tax and grease and base oil not being similar to tar cannot be classified within the expression tar and others, which has been clarified by the department by way of Circulars. 8. It is also submitted that decision of the Supreme Court in 'INDIAN ALUMINUM COMPANY VS. ACCT', AIR 2001 SC 795 was rendered in the context 12 of Entry 11 of Schedule 1 to the 1979 Act prior to its amendment in 1992 and the aforesaid entry was materially different from the entry in question and the word 'all' was conspicuously missing from the impugned entry and due regard has to be given to the aforesaid aspect of the matter while determining the scope of the entries. It is also urged that decision of this court in 'HYVA INDIA PVT. LTD. BANGALORE VS. ADDITIONAL COMMISSIONER OF COMMERCIAL TAXES AND OTHERS', 2012 (74) KAR.L.J. 68 (HC) (DB), is per incuriam as the same has been solely decided on the basis of decision in the case of INDIAN ALUMINUM COMPANY supra without taking into account the amended entry. In support of aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed on decisions in 'COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS (IMPORT), MUMBAI VS. DILIP KUMAR & COMPANY', 2018 (361) ELT 577 (SC), 'BANSAL WIRE INDUSTRIES LTD. VS. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH', 2011 (269) E.L.T. 145 (SC), 13 'COMMISSIONER VS. INDIAN OIL CORPORATION LIMITED', (2004) 3 SCC, and 'KURAIN ABRAHAM VS. STATE OF KERALA', 2008 (224) ELT 354 (SC). 9. On the other hand, learned Additional Government Advocate submitted that Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes has rightly invoked powers under Section 15 of the Act to pass the impugned order as the order passed by the first appellate authority was erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue. It is further submitted that expression 'erroneous' means the error envisaged is one of fact or law and includes the order which are not in accordance with law or wrongly interpret the law. It is also submitted that in the instant case, the first appellate authority erred in holding that goods in question are not taxable resulting in prejudice being caused to the revenue. In support of aforesaid submissions, reliance has been placed on decision of this 14 court in 'STATE OF KARNATAKA VS. VASAVA DATTA CEMENTS', ILR 2004 KAR 3036. 10. It is also submitted that the issue with regard to taxability of base oil and grease under the Notification is squarely covered by judgment of the Supreme Court in Indian Aluminum Company supra, which has been followed by division bench of this court in Hyva India supra. It is also urged that in Hyva India, a division bench of this court while relying on Indian Aluminum Company supra has held that the use of words 'tar and others' after the items specifically mentioned in Sl.No.1(viii) of Notification would refer to petroleum products other than those specifically mentioned in the entry and Sl.No.1 of the Notification. It is contended that non mentioning of specific product in the entry and Notification does not mean that the petroleum products is not taxable as the words used are 'tar and others'. 15 11. It is also urged that in the instant case also oil and grease which are admittedly petroleum products do not find specific mention neither in Entry 67 nor in Sl.No.1 of the Notification. It is also submitted that the contention that the words 'and others' in Sl.No.1(viii) of Notification must be read only with preceding word 'tar' has been rejected by this court in HYVA INDIA supra in view of decision of INDIAN ALUMINUM COMPANY supra. Alternatively it is submitted that even assuming that the judgment in Hyva India does not lay down the correct law, the issue with regard to the validity of its correctness has to be referred to a larger bench and this bench cannot deal with the matter on merits. In this connection, reliance has been placed on decision of Supreme Court in 'NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. VS. PRANAY SETHI', (2017) 16 SCC 680. 12. It is also argued that even goods classified under CETH 3403 can contain petroleum oils upto 69% and therefore, mere classification of lubricating oils 16 under CETH 3403 does not automatically mean that they are not petroleum products. It is also submitted that petroleum products are widely understood to mean products manufactured from petroleum and the meaning of the expression 'petroleum products' has been considered by Supreme Court in expression reference No.1/2001 'ASSOCIATION OF NATURAL GAS & ORS. VS. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.', (2004) 4 SCC 489 wherein it has been held that natural gas is a petroleum product. It is also submitted that so long as any product is manufactured from petroleum the same can be classified as a petroleum product and mere fact that synthetic lubricating oils which contain synthetic additives are classified under CETH 3403 would not mean that they are not petroleum products. It is contended that impugned order has been passed after due application of mind and cannot be said to be erroneous. 17 13. By way of rejoinder, learned Senior counsel for the appellant submitted that the finding recorded by the appellate authority that the lubricating oil is synthetic based product and the aforesaid finding ahs not been recorded by the revisional authority. It is submitted that all the circulars, which are binding on the revenue have been issued after the decision of the Supreme Court in INDIAN ALUMINUM COMPANY supra. It is also submitted that decisions of the courts have to be examined in the context of fact situation and the judgment of the court cannot be construed as statutes. It is also submitted that if a product is not covered under an entry, the same cannot be subjected to entry tax. In support of aforesaid submission, reliance has been placed on 'CARL BECHEM LUBRICANTS (INDIA) PVT. LTD. VS. STATE OF KARNTAKA AND ORS.', 2013 (76) KAR. LJ 374 (HC) (DB)I and decision of the Supreme Court in 'COLLECTOR OF 18 C.EX.CALCUTTA VS. ALNOORI TOBACCO PRODUCTS', 2004 (170) E.L.T. 135 (SC). 14. We have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. Section 3 of the 1979 Act is the charging Section, which mandates that there shall be levy and collection of tax on entry of any goods specified in First schedule into a local area for consumption, use or sale therein at such rates not exceeding 5% of the value of goods as may be specified retrospectively or prospectively by the State Government by a Notification. The aforesaid Section further provides that different dates on different rates may be specified in respect of different goods or different classes of goods or different local areas. First Schedule to the Act specifies the items or goods, on which tax is levied. Entry 11 of the Schedule applicable upto 30.04.1992 reads as under: 19 Entry 11: All petroleum products, that is to say,' Petrol, diesel, crude oil, lubricating oil, transformer oil, brake or clutch fluid, bitumen (asphalt), tar and others, but excluding LPG, kerosene and naptha for use in the manufacture of fertilizers. 15. Thereafter, First Schedule was inserted in the Act by Act No.3 of 1995 with effect from 01.05.1992. Entry 67 as well as Entry 103 in the aforesaid schedule read as under: Entry 67: Petroleum products: that is to say: petrol, diesel, crude oil, lubricating oil, transformer oil, brake or clutch fluid, bitumen (asphalt), tar and others, excluding aviation fuel, liquid petroleum gas (LPG), kerosene and naptha for use in the manufacturer of fertilizers. Entry 103: Goods other than those specified in any of entries in this Schedule, but excluding those specified in the second Schedule. 20 16. Thereafter, the State Government in exercise of powers under Section 3(1) of the 1979 Act issued a Notification. The relevant extract of which reads as under: Sl. No. Commodity Rate of Tax (1) (2) (3) 1. (i) Crude oil 2% (ii) Diesel 5% (iii) Super Light Diesel Oil 5% (iv) Furnace oil 5% (v) Naphtha other than for use in manufacture of fertilizers 5% (vi) Low Sulphur Heavy Stock 5% (vii) Rectified Spirit, Neutral Spirit, Ethyl Alcohol 4% (viii) Petroleum products: that is to say: (a) Lubricating oil, (b) Transformer oil, (c) Brake fluid or Clutch fluid, (d) Bitumen (asphalt) (e) Tar and others Excluding liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), Aviation Fuel and Kerosene 5% 17. Thereafter, the Finance Department of Government of Karnataka issued Circulars. By Circular 21 dated 12.04.2006, it was provided that petroleum products, which are similar to 'tar' would be covered by the words 'and others'. Similar view was taken in the Circular dated 02.05.2006 and it was provided that benzene, toluene and xylene are not covered under the Entry 'tar and others' or under any other sub entry, therefore, they are not petroleum products specified in the Notification. Thereafter, by Circular dated 09.04.2013, the Circular dated 12.04.2006 was withdrawn. However, the Circular dated 02.05.2006 issued by the Finance Department of Government of Karnataka is in force. 18. In the backdrop of aforesaid relevant statutory provisions referred to supra, we may advert to well settled principles of construction of taxing statutes. It is well established rule of interpretation of taxing statutes in words of Lord Simonds that subject is not to be taxed without clear words for that purpose and that every Act of Parliament must be read according to 22 natural construction of its words. The aforesaid principle was referred to with approval by Supreme Court in 'MEMBER SECRETARY, ANDHRA PRADESH STATE BOARD FOR PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF WATER POLLUTION VS. ANDHRA PRADESH RAYONS LTD.', AIR 1989 SC 611, 'SARASWATI SUGAR MILLS VS. HARYANA STATE BOARD', AIR 1992 SC 224, 'INDIA CINE AGENCIES VS. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, MADRAS', (2008) 17 SCC 385, 'MAMTA SURGICAL COTTON INDUSTRIES, RAJASTHAN VS. ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER (ANTI EVASION), BHILWARA, RAJASTHAN', (2014) 4 SCC 87. It is equally well settled legal position that in a taxing Act, one has to look at merely what is clearly said. There is no rule for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to tax. Nothing has to be read in, nothing is to be implied, one can only look fairly at the language used. [See: 'UNION OF INDIA VS. IND- 23 SWIFT LABORATORIES LTD.', (2011) 4 SCC 635 AND 'BANSAL WIRE INDUSTRIES LTD. VS. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH', (2011) 6 SCC 545, 'CIT VS. CALCUTTA KNITWEARS', 2014 (6) SCC 444] [See: Principles of Statutory Interpretation, Justice G.P.Singh, 14th Edition, Page 879]. 19. Now we may advert to the facts of the case in hand. The first appellate authority has recorded a finding that the product of the assessee is synthetic based. The aforesaid finding has not been disturbed by the revisional authority. From perusal of the Entry 67 as well as Sl.No.1 of the Notification, it is evident that Entries seem to cover only petroleum based lubricating oil on which entry tax is being paid by the appellant. The synthetic based lubricating oil is not a petroleum product and is therefore, not covered under the entry. Similarly, the grease and base oil have also not been specifically enumerated in the Notification and therefore, the same also cannot be subjected to entry tax. It is also pertinent 24 to mention here that grease and base oil not being similar to tar cannot be classified within the expression 'tar and others' which are already been clarified by the revenue department vide Circular dated 02.05.2006. It is trite law that the Circulars issued by the department are binding on it. 20. The following words of Lord Denning in the matter of applying the law of precedent have become locus classicus. \"Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect, in deciding such cases, one should avoid the temptation to decide cases (as said by Cordozo) by matching the colour of one case against the colour of another. To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive.\" *** 25 \"Precedent should be followed only so far as it marks the path of justice, but you must cut the dead wood and trim off the side branches else you will find yourself lost in thickets and branches. My plea is to keep the path to justice clear of obstructions which could impede it.\" 21. It is well settled in law that a decision of the court is only an authority for what it decides and not what can logically be deduced therefrom. It cannot be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it and such a mode of reasoning assumes that law is necessarily a logical code, whereas it must be acknowledged that law is not always logical. It is equally well settled legal position, that court should not place reliance on a decision without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision, on which reliance is placed. [See: 'DELHI ADMINISTRATION (NCT OF DELHI) VS. MANOHAR LAL', AIR 2002 SC 3088 and 'HARYANA FINANCIAL 26 CORPORATION VS. JAGADAMBA OIL MILLS', (2002) 3 SCC 496]. It is well settled in law that observations of the courts are neither to be read as Euclid's theorems nor as provisions of a statute and should not be taken out of their context. The observations must be read in the context, in which they appear to have been stated. The Judges interpret statutes and they do not interpret judgments. [See: 'BHARAT PETROLEUM CORPORATION LTD. VS. N.R.VAIRAMANI', (2004) 8 SCC 479]. 22. The aforesaid words were referred to by Supreme Court in 'COLLECTOR OF CENTRAL EXCISE VS. ALLURY TOBACCO PRODUCTS', 2004 (170) E.L.T. 135 (SC) and it has been held that courts should not place reliance on the decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed and observations of the courts are neither to be read as Euclids theorems nor as provisions of statute. It has 27 further been held that observations made by the court must be read in context in which they appear to have been stated and the judgments of the courts are not to be construed as statutes. 23. In INDIAN ALUMINUM COMPANY supra, the Supreme Court dealt with Entry 11 of the First Schedule to the 1979 Act and also took note of Entry 67 and held that both the entries viz., Entry 11 and Entry 67 mention petroleum products, whereas, in Entry 11 the first words are 'all petroleum products', whereas, the expression 'all' is missing in Entry 67. It was held that the use of words 'and others' would refer to petroleum products other than those which are specifically mentioned therein. It was also held that the entries are clear, unambiguous and clearly indicate the taxability of any type of petroleum product except those which are specifically excluded by the said entries. However, it is pertinent to mention here that the aforesaid observations were made in the context of the issue 28 whether levy of tax on furnace oil under Entry 11 of First Schedule to the Act is permissible. The aforesaid decision was followed by a bench of this court in HYVA INDIA supra and while dealing with the issue whether hydraulic oil would be covered by entry relating to petroleum products viz., tar and others and held that the aforesaid entry is wide enough to cover hydraulic oil also in view of law laid down by the Supreme Court in INDIAN ALUMINUM COMPANY supra. 24. The aforesaid decisions have to be understood in the context in which they have been rendered. Entry 67 seeks to cover only petroleum based lubricating oil. However, in the instant case, the appellate authority has recorded a finding that the product of the appellant is synthetic based lubricating oil, base oil and grease which are not covered under Entry 67. It is pertinent to note that synthetic based lubricating oil is classifiable under Section 34 of 1975 Act and therefore, is a distinct product from petroleum 29 based lubricating oil, which is classifiable under Chapter 27 of the 1975 Act. It is also noteworthy that revisional authority while framing the issues have clearly noted that synthetic based lubricating oil are distinguishable from petroleum based lubricating oils. In CARL BECHEM LUBRICANTS (INDIA) PVT. LTD. supra, a division bench of this court held that if a product does not fall within the entry, the same cannot be subjected to entry tax. Similarly, the grease and base oil are not specifically enumerated in the Notification and therefore, cannot be subjected to entry tax. The decisions rendered by Supreme Court in Indian Aluminum Company supra and Hyva India by a bench of this court are not applicable to the fact situation of the case. In view of well settled rules of interpretation of taxing statutes, since, in Entry No.67 of First Schedule of 1979 Act, there is no mention of synthetic based lubricating oil, base oil and grease, therefore, the same cannot be subjected to entry tax as 30 it would contravene Article 265 of the Constitution of India. 25. Therefore, it is not necessary for us to refer the issue with regard to the correctness of the view taken by division bench decision of this court in Hyva India supra as the aforesaid decision was rendered in altogether a different factual background. Therefore, the revisional authority could not have concluded in the fact situation of the case that the tribunal has failed to decide or has decided erroneously any question of law. For the reasons assigned by us, it is not necessary for us to deal with the other contention raised by learned counsel for the parties viz., revisional authorities could have invoked suo motu powers under Section 16 of the Act . In view of preceding analysis, the order dated 16.07.2014 passed by the Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Zone-I, Bangalore insofar it is 31 prejudicial to the interest of the appellant is hereby quashed. In the result, the appeal is allowed. Sd/- JUDGE Sd/- JUDGE ss "