"Court No. - 3 Case :- WRIT - A No. - 17228 of 2006 Petitioner :- Krishna Pal Singh Respondent :- Union Of India And Others Counsel for Petitioner :- Gaurav Gautam Counsel for Respondent :- C.S.C.,A.K. Nigam A.S.G.I.,A.K. Singh,S.K. Mishra Hon'ble Surya Prakash Kesarwani,J. Hon'ble Chandra Kumar Rai,J. 1. Heard Sri Gaurav Gautam, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri S.P. Singh, learned Additional Solicitor General of India assisted by Sri Arvind Kumar Singh, learned counsel for respondent nos.1 & 2. 2. This writ petition has been filed praying for the following reliefs: \"1. To issue a writ, order or direction in nature of certiorari calling for the record and quashing the orders dated 18.11.2005 (Annexure-12 to the petition) passed by respondent no.3 in Original Application No.436 of 1998 Krishna Pal Singh Vs. Union of India and Others. 2. To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari calling for the record and to quash the order dated 23.12.1997 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition) passed by respondent no.1. 3. To issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus restraining the respondents from giving effect to the orders dated 23.12.1997 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition) and further restraining the respondents not to proceed with the recovery proceeding against the petitioner.\" 3. This Court on 29.3.2006 has passed the following order, relevant part of which is quoted hereunder: \"1. The petitioner was posted as Sub Post Master in the post office and was in charge of the Post Office Khaga on 4.10.1997 when for certain alleged conduct of the petitioner a First Information Report was lodged at P.S. Khaga, district Fatehpur, which was registered as case Crime No.379 of 1997 under Sections 419, 420, 467 and 468, Indian Penal Code, for involvement in conspiracy and fake investment of Kisan Vikas Patra. Vide order dated 23.12.1997 issued by the Superintendent of Post Offices, Fatehpur Mandal, Fatehpur, recovery of Rs.5,52,900/- was ordered to be made from the petitioner and one Sri Ajay Singh under Section 4 of the Public Accountant Default Act, 1850. The petitioner approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India challenging the order dated 23.12.1997 by filing Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 8807 of 1998 which was dismissed by this Court vide judgment and order dated 24.3.1998 by holding that the writ petition was not maintainable as the petitioner had an alternative remedy of approaching the Central Administrative Tribunal by filing petition there. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad by filing Original Application No.463 of 1998. However, the Tribunal, vide order dated 8.5.1998 dismissed the original application preferred by the petitioner on the ground that it was not maintainable as it did not come within the purview of Section 3(q) of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985. The said order dated 8.5.1998 passed by the Tribunal was challenged by the petitioner before this Court by means of Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.33425 of 1998. This Court, vide judgment and order dated 24.10.1998, had quashed the order of the Tribunal dated 8.5.1998 and directed the Tribunal to decide the Original Application No.436 of 1998 afresh. Thereafter the petitioner filed an application before the Tribunal, which was registered as a Misc. Application No.4120 of 1998 in Original Application No.436 of 1998, which was again rejected by the Tribunal on 31.5.1999 holding that the Original Application against the order dated 23.12.1997 was not maintainable. Once again the petitioner approached this Court challenging the order dated 31.5.1999 by filing Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.28618 of 1999 which was disposed of by this Court vide judgment and order dated 16.8.2002. 2. This Court has held as follows:- \"We are of the opinion that this is certainly a service matter as defined in Section 3(q) of the Administrative Tribunal Act. Hence we set aside the impugned order of the Tribunal dated 31.5.99 and remand the matter to the Tribunal with the direction that the Tribunal should decide the original application very expeditiously.\" 3. The order dated 16.8.2002 has become final between the parties as there is nothing on record to show that the said order has been challenged further in appeal before the Apex Court. 4. Thereafter the Original Application came up for consideration before the Tribunal on 18.11.2005 when once again the Tribunal had dismissed the Original Application as not maintainable notwithstanding the fact that this Court in its judgment and order dated 16.8.2002 has clearly held the case of the petitioner to be a service matter, as mentioned hereinbefore. 5. The question is as to whether the Tribunal which is under the supervisory jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, as held by the Apex Court in the case of L.Ram Chandra Kumar v. Union of India and others, AIR 1997 SC 1125, can ignore or sit in appeal over the judgment, order or direction passed by this Court. This is an important question which needs to be decided at the earliest.\" 4. By the order dated 29.3.2006, notice was issued to the learned Additional Solicitor of India at Allahabad representing the Union of India as also to all the respondents fixing 25.4.2006. 5. Counter affidavit has been filed by the respondents. 6. An interim order was also granted by this Court by the aforesaid order dated 29.3.2003. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned order passed by the Tribunal is not only against judicial propriety, against settled principles of binding decisions but also contemptuous in nature. He further submits that the Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, Allahabad being under supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, cannot sit in appeal over the judgment and order passed by this Court. If the Tribunal was aggrieved by the order passed by the High Court, it was open to the Tribunal to challenge the same before the higher Courts but the Tribunal cannot sit over the order and disobey it. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Promod Kumar Dixit And Another Vs. Central Administrative Tribunal And Others, 2011 (1) ESC 650 (ALL) (DB) (LB) (Para Nos.10, 11 & 12). 9. Sri S.P. Singh, learned Additional Solicitor General of India assisted by Sri Arvind Kumar Singh, learned counsel for respondent nos.1 & 2 very fairly submits that question as framed above, deserves to be answered in negative i.e. the Tribunal cannot sit in appeal over the judgment, order or direction passed by this Court. He further fairly states that the impugned order of the Tribunal deserves to be quashed and the matter deserves to be remitted back to the Tribunal for decision on the Original Application No.436 of 1998, on merit in accordance with law. 10. We have carefully considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the writ petition. 11. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kishore Samrite Vs. State of U.P. and Others 2013 (2) SCC 398 on the point of judicial discipline and propriety held in Para-29 as under: \"29. Judicial discipline and propriety are the two significant facets of administration of justice. Every court is obliged to adhere to these principles to ensure hierarchical discipline on the one hand and proper dispensation of justice on the other. Settled canons of law prescribe adherence to the rule of law with due regard to the prescribed procedures. Violation thereof may not always result in invalidation of the judicial action but normally it may cast a shadow of improper exercise of judicial discretion.\" 12. On the principles of judicial discipline, propriety and binding precedent, this Court in the recent judgment in the case of Mohan Lal Santwani Vs. Union of India and 3 Others in Writ Tax No.569 of 2022 dated 25.4.2022 held as under:- (a) Judicial discipline and propriety are the two significant facets of administration of justice. The principles of judicial discipline require that the orders of the higher appellate authorities should be followed unreservedly by the subordinate authorities. The mere fact that the order of the appellate authority is not \"acceptable\" to the department in itself an objectionable phrase or that is the subject matter of an appeal can furnish no ground for not following it unless its operation has been suspended by a competent court. If this healthy rule is not followed, the result will only be undue harassment to assessees and chaos in administration of tax laws. (b) Just as the judgments and orders of the Supreme Court have to be faithfully obeyed and carried out throughout the territory of India under Article 141 of the Constitution, so should be the judgments and orders of the High Court by all inferior courts and tribunals subject to supervisory jurisdiction within the State under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution. (c) If an officer under the Income Tax Act, 1961 refuses to carry out the clear and unambiguous direction in a judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court or High Court or the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal then in effect, it is denial of justice and is destructive of one of the basic principles in the administration of justice based on hierarchy of the Court. (d) Unless there is a stay obtained by the authorities under the Income Tax Act, 1961 from higher forum, the mere fact of filing appeal or SLP will not entitle the authority not to comply with the order of the High Court. Even though the authority may have filed an appeal or SLP but either could not obtain a stay or the stay is refused, the order of the High Court must be complied with. Mere filing of an appeal or SLP against the judgment or order of High Court does not result in the assailed judgment or order becoming inoperative and unworthy of being complied with. 13. Para No.11 in the case of Promod Kumar Dixit (supra), Lucknow Bench of this Court has held as under: \"11. On a careful consideration of rival submissions, we are of the considered view that once this Court had given a direction to decide the matter on merit it was not open for the Tribunal to dilute the mandate of the order by declining the admission of Original Application. The order of the Tribunal seems to be bordering on the contempt of the order of the High Court. Pendency of the case in a higher forum does not mean that a litigant has no right to be heard on merit particularly when the High Court has given liberty to move O.A. in view of notification bringing the government organization in question under the jurisdiction of the Central Administrative Tribunal. Besides, Hon'ble the Apex Court had passed the order of status quo only in respect of implementation of the order of the Madras High court. That apart, in the facts and circumstances, the prayer made in the O.A. should have been carefully examined and in case it was found that the reliefs sought in the O.A. were similar to the one being the subject matter of the Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court wherein the order of Madras High Court has been challenged, the Tribunal should have kept the petition pending in stead of rejecting at the outset and then should have disposed it of after the judgment. At least the petitioner should have been given full opportunity of addressing the Tribunal by giving a complete hearing to both the parties. In addition to that, the order of status quo as passed by Hon'ble the Apex Court is dated 21.12.2008 whereas the direction was given to the Tribunal by the subsequent order passed by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court on 03.03.2009 after hearing both the parties, also on the points raised on behalf of respondents during the course of hearing of this petition. Thus, the directions were not given in the ignorance of the order of status quo passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court.\" 14. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case as well as ratio of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kishore Samrite (supra), this Court in Mohan Lal Santwali (supra) as well as Promod Kumar Dixit (supra), the impugned order dated 18.11.2005 passed in Original Application No.436 of 1998 (Krishna Pal Singh Vs. Union of India and Others) passed by respondent no.3 i.e. Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, Allahabad is hereby quashed. The O.A. No.436 of 1998 is restored to its original number. The aforesaid O.A. No.436 of 1998 shall be decided by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Allahabad Bench, Allahabad, on merit, in accordance with law, after affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, expeditiously preferably within a period of three months from the date of production of certified copy of this order before him. 15. The writ petition is allowed to the extent indicated above. Order Date :- 19.10.2022 Rameez Digitally signed by RAMEEZ AHMED Date: 2022.10.20 17:49:52 IST Reason: Location: High Court of Judicature at Allahabad "