"IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL COCHIN BENCH BEFORE SHRI INTURI RAMA RAO, AM AND SHRI SONJOY SARMA, JM ITA Nos. 504 to 507/Coch/2023 Assessment Years : 2009-10 to 2012-13 M/s. K.K. Tourist Home, .......... Appellant P P VI 617C Peravoor, Kannur, Kerala. [PAN: AACFK 8452 C] vs. Dy. Commissioner of Income Tax .......... Respondent Central Circle-II, Kozhikode. Appellant by: Shri Arun Raj S, Advocate Respondent by: Smt. Veni Raj, CIT-DR Date of Hearing: 12.06.2025 Date of Pronouncement: 01.08.2025 O R D E R Per: Inturi Rama Rao, AM These appeals filed by the assessee are directed against the different orders of the learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals), Kochi-3, [CIT(A)] dated 16.06.2023 for Assessment Years (AY) 2009-10 to 2012-13 respectively. 2. Since identical facts and issues involved in all these appeals, these appeals heard together and disposed of by this common order. Printed from counselvise.com 2 ITA No. 504-507/Coch/2023 M/s. K.K. Builders 3. For the sake of clarity and convenience, the facts relevant to the A.Y. 2009-10 in ITA No.504/Coch/2023 are stated herein. 4. Brief facts of the case are that assessee is a partnership firm, engaged in the business of running tourist homes. The search and seizure operations u/s. 132 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short, 'the Act') were conducted in the business premises of the assessee on 26/09/2012. During the course of such search and seizure operations, certain incriminating material was stated to have been found and seized. According to the Assessing Officer (for short, ‘AO’) the incriminating material so seized, revealed that the assessee earned undisclosed income from the business of sale and purchase of Indian made foreign liquor (IMFL). Based on this information, AO issued notices u/s. 153A of the Act on 21/06/2013 for the AYs 2007-08 to 2012-13. In response to the notices issued u/s. 153A, the assessee filed its return of income on 23/09/2013 declaring income of Rs. 99,19,290/- Against the said return of income, the assessment was completed by the AO vide order dated 30/03/2015 passed u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 153A of the Act at a total income of Rs. 1,82,69,840/-. While doing so, the AO made addition based on the incriminating material on the sale of IMFL of Rs. 66,87,379/- and sale of food Rs. 11,96,727/- and sale of beverages of Rs. 4,66,423/-. 5. Being aggrieved, an appeal was filed before the CIT(A) contending that in absence of seized material, no addition can be Printed from counselvise.com 3 ITA No. 504-507/Coch/2023 M/s. K.K. Builders made pursuant to the assessment made u/s. 153A of the Act. It was further contended that Joint Commissioner of Income Tax (JCIT) mechanically given approval u/s. 153D and, therefore, the assessment order is bad in law. It is further contended that the firm was non-existent as on the date of search and therefore, the consequent search made, is illegal and the proceedings u/s. 153A also are bad in law. The Ld. CIT(A) on due consideration of the submissions made by the assessee, dismissed the appeal by passing a speaking order. The findings of the Ld. CIT(A) are as under:- “11. I have considered the contentions of the appellant. In this regard, it needs to be stated that the appellant or for that matter the CIT(Appeals) cannot impose an artificial restriction on the number of days needed by an Authority to apply his/her mind, when the Act has not given any such stipulation. Hence, the argument of the appellant focusing upon the time available with the JCIT for granting approval does not stand. The argument raised by the appellant against additions made without availability of seized material is also not tenable in view of the discussions already made in this order (supra). The appellant has also raised issues such as interpretation of case laws, common approval for all AYs, spelling mistakes etc., to prove that the JCIT has not applied his mind while giving approval. These issues raised by the appellant are not sufficient to reach a conclusion that the JCIT has not applied his mind while granting approval. The fact that there are contentious issues in an order does not necessarily indicate non application of mind by an authority. The above logic advanced by the appellant would be flawed and frivolous, as by employing the same, the pronouncements of any judicial or quasi-judicial authority can be termed as one delivered without application of mind, such orders being appealable up to the level of Hon'ble Supreme Court. Printed from counselvise.com 4 ITA No. 504-507/Coch/2023 M/s. K.K. Builders 12. In this context, it also has to be appreciated that the JCIT is the monitoring authority as also the approving authority. By virtue of the same constant discussion on search assessment related matters between the AO and his immediate superior (JCIT) is inevitable. The submission of the assessee would suggest that the concept of approval happens only after draft order is put up. But in reality, this is a continuous ongoing process and therefore this argument of the assessee is found to be devoid of merits. 13. Further, it also needs to be noted that in the case of Chhagan Chendrakant Bhujbal Vs. Income Tax Officer (136 Taxman.com 24), the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay had observed that \"just because information regarding escapement of income was received at 5.47 p.m. and the Notice u/s 148 was issued by 10.49 p.m. on the same day, it would not mean that there had been non-application of mind. Holding it so would be merely speculative and based on conjecture. Thus, \"application of mind\" cannot be defined solely on the basis of the amount of time taken to form an opinion. No universal timeline can be prescribed for satisfying \"application of mind\". In cases where identical issues are involved, opinion maybe formed in one case and the opinion so formed maybe applied mutatis mutandis in other cases where similar issues are involved. Hence, the amount of time taken to form an opinion in cases involving identical issues may not be substantial, irrespective of the volume of case records.\" 14. In the present case, there is no dispute on the fact that the AO had passed the Assessment Order after obtaining the approval of the JCIT u/s. 153D of the Act vide letter F.No. 48/JCIT/CR- EKM/153D/2014-15 dated 29/03/2015. The issue of non application of mind, raised by the appellant is only a presumption by the appellant not backed by any supporting evidence. The available evidence clearly indicates that the JCIT has given approval and in the absence of anything contrary to prove that JCIT has not applied his mind, the appellant's claim is not sustainable. The appellant has also cited many judicial pronouncements such as Sahara India Vs. CIT [169 Taxman 328]; Goenka Lines Vs. CIT [56 Taxman.com 390]; Ahluwalia Contracts India Vs. CST [215 TIOL-2647 CESTAT-DEL]. The facts of the Printed from counselvise.com 5 ITA No. 504-507/Coch/2023 M/s. K.K. Builders above cited cases are substantially different from the instant case of the appellant, and hence not applicable to the case under appeal. 15. Hence, in view of the facts mentioned above and also in view of the decision of the Hon'ble High Court of Bombay reported in (136 Taxman.com 24) (supra), the ground raised by the appellant is rejected. 6. The learned CIT(A) held that there was no material to hold that the JCIT had accorded approval u/s. 153D mechanically. As regards to the validity of search, the CIT(A) held that the appellate authorities cannot go into the issue of validity of search, in view of the express bar by the statute. Regarding non-existence of firm, the learned CIT(A) confirmed the action of the AO in view of the fact that the issue of dissolution of firm was neither brought to the notice of the Investigation team nor to the AO. 7. Being aggrieved, the assessee is in appeal before the Tribunal in the present appeal. 8. It is submitted that the assessee firm was already dissolved much before the search conducted vide partnership dissolution deed dated 31/10/2011 and therefore, the question of execution of search warrant against the assessee-firm does not arise and consequential assessment made pursuant to notice u/s. 153A is bad in law. It is further submitted that JCIT had accorded approval u/s. 153D mechanically without application of mind and therefore, the Printed from counselvise.com 6 ITA No. 504-507/Coch/2023 M/s. K.K. Builders assessment order passed is void in law. On merits, it is submitted that the addition made does not emanate from the incriminating material. Therefore, the additions are required to be deleted. 9. On the other hand, ld. CIT-DR submitted that the assessee had not intimated to the AO about the dissolution of the firm during the course of assessment proceedings or during the search proceedings. It was submitted that PAN of the assessee was not surrendered and no evidence was filed showing the fact of dissolution of firm, such as, certificate of Registrar of Firms. Further submitted that assessee- firm itself submitted to the jurisdiction u/s. 153A by filing return of income in the name of the firm and offered additional income. The factum of dissolution of the firm was brought to the notice of the AO only on 18/03/2015 while notice u/s. 153A was issued on 01/10/2013. Ld. CIT-DR further submitted that the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of PCIT v. Mahagun Realtors (P) Ltd. (2022) 443 ITR 194 is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. 10. We have heard rival submissions and perused the material on record. 11. Ground of appeal No.1, challenges the validity of the assessment u/s. 153A on the ground that assessment was made on non-existent firm. From the material on record, it would be evident that assessee-firm never brought to the notice of the Investigation Printed from counselvise.com 7 ITA No. 504-507/Coch/2023 M/s. K.K. Builders team of the Department during the course of 132 operations about the dissolution of the firm. The AO issued notice u/s. 153A based on incriminating material found during the course of search and seizure operations. The assessee had filed its return of income in response to the notice issued u/s. 153A by offering additional income of Rs.99,19,285/-. Thus, the assessee firm itself submitted to the jurisdiction u/s. 153A. It is only during the course of fag end of the assessment proceedings, the assessee-firm brought to the notice of the AO about the dissolution of firm, however, we notice that the assessee-firm not brought on record the conclusive evidence to show the dissolution of firm, in the form of certificate issued by the Registrar of Firms etc. Thus, no conclusive evidence in support of the contention of the assessee that firm was dissolved, was adduced either before the lower authorities or before this Tribunal. Further, we also find that the assessee partnership-firm itself had filed appeals in the name of the assessee before the learned CIT(A) and before this Tribunal also. This conduct of the appellant – assessee consistently held out against the assessee. In our considered opinion, the ratio of the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Mahagun Realtors (P) Ltd. (supra) is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. The relevant paras of the Hon’ble Supreme Court are as under:- “41. In the light of the facts, what is overwhelmingly evident is that the amalgamation was known to the assessee, even at the stage when the search and seizure operations took place, as well as Printed from counselvise.com 8 ITA No. 504-507/Coch/2023 M/s. K.K. Builders statements were recorded by the revenue of the directors and managing director of the group. A return was filed, pursuant to notice, which suppressed the fact of amalgamation; on the contrary, the return was of MRPL. Though that entity ceased to be in existence, in law, yet, appeals were filed on its behalf before the CIT, and a cross appeal was filed before ITAT. Even the affidavit before this court is on behalf of the director of MRPL. Furthermore, the assessment order painstakingly attributes specific amounts surrendered by MRPL, and after considering the special auditor's report, brings specific amounts to tax, in the search assessment order. That order is no doubt expressed to be of MRPL (as the assessee) - but represented by the transferee, MIPL. All these clearly indicate that the order adopted a particular method of expressing the tax liability. The AO, on the other hand, had the option of making a common order, with MIPL as the assessee, but containing separate parts, relating to the different transferor companies (Mahagun Developers Ltd., Mahagun Realtors Pvt. Ltd., Universal Advertising Pvt. Ltd., ADR Home Décor Pvt. Ltd.). The mere choice of the AO in issuing a separate order in respect of MRPL, in these circumstances, cannot nullify it. Right from the time it was issued, and at all stages of various proceedings, the parties concerned (i.e.. MIPL) treated it to be in respect of the transferee company (MIPL) by virtue of the amalgamation order - and section 394 (2). Furthermore, it would be anybody's guess, if any refund were due, as to whether MIPL would then say that it is not entitled to it, because the refund order would be issued in favour of a non-existing company (MRPL). Having regard to all these reasons, this court is of the opinion that in the facts of this case, the conduct of the assessee, commencing from the date the search took place, and before all forums, reflects that it consistently held itself out as the assessee. The approach and order of the AO is, in this court's opinion in consonance with the decision in Marshall & Sons (supra), which had held that: \"an assessment can always be made and is supposed to be made on the Transferee Company taking into account the income of both the Transferor and Transferee Company.\" Printed from counselvise.com 9 ITA No. 504-507/Coch/2023 M/s. K.K. Builders 42. Before concluding, this Court notes and holds that whether corporate death of an entity upon amalgamation per se invalidates an assessment order ordinarily cannot be determined on a bare application of section 481 of the Companies Act, 1956 (and its equivalent in the 2013 Act), but would depend on the terms of the amalgamation and the facts of each case.” 12. Therefore, in the light of the above legal proposition relied on, the contention of the learned counsel for the assessee cannot be accepted. Thus, this ground of appeal No.1 raised by the assessee stands dismissed. 13. In the result, ground No.1 of the appeal stands dismissed. 14. The assessee raised grounds of appeal No. 2 challenging the very validity of assessment order on the ground that the approval u/sec. 153D granted by the JCIT is without application of mind, therefore the assessment order is bad in law. It was submitted that last date of hearing by the AO was on 19/03/2015 at Calicut, but the concerned JCIT was stationed at Kochi and the final assessment orders were passed on 30/03/2015 in all 35 cases. Based on these facts, it was submitted that it is impossible to apply his mind on the entire assessment records and seized material within such a short period, as the AO and the JCIT were located at different places, therefore, it should be presumed to have accorded approval mechanically. In this regard, reliance was placed on the judgment of Hon'ble Orissa High Court in the case of ACIT vs. M/s.Serajuddin & Co. 454 ITR 312 (Orissa) and Pune Tribunal’s decision in the case Printed from counselvise.com 10 ITA No. 504-507/Coch/2023 M/s. K.K. Builders of SMW Ispat (P.) Ltd. vs. ACIT [2024] 163 taxmann.com 119 (Pune – Trib.). On the other hand, ld. CIT-DR vehemently opposed the above submissions and submitted that search and seizure operations were continuously monitored by JCIT and, therefore, it cannot be said that JCIT accorded the approval u/s. 153D mechanically. He further submitted that there is no material brought on record to show that JCIT had given mechanical approval. 15. We have heard the rival submissions and perused the material on record. The issue that arises for our consideration in these grounds of appeal is whether the JCIT had accorded mechanical approval u/s 153D of the Act or not. It is settled position of law that the approval of the superior officer should not be done mechanically, without application of mind. Where the approval is granted mechanically, it would vitiate the assessment order itself. Reliance, in this regard, can be placed in the case of Rajesh Kumar vs. DCIT (2006) 287 ITR 91 (SC) and also Sahara India (Firm) vs. CIT [2008] 300 ITR 403 (SC). The issue whether the JCIT had accorded the approval mechanically or not has to be judged based on the material on the basis of which the JCIT formed the opinion and accorded the approval. In the present case, no material was produced before us to show that JCIT had accorded approval u/sec. 153D mechanically Printed from counselvise.com 11 ITA No. 504-507/Coch/2023 M/s. K.K. Builders except by filing the following communication received by the AO from JCIT:- 16. The above communication is nothing but a covering letter forwarding approval from JCIT to AO. It is not copy of actual approval accorded by JCIT. Based on this material, it is difficult for us to judge whether the JCIT had accorded approval mechanically or not. Thus, the appellant had failed to adduce any evidence to show that the approval was mechanical. No relief can be granted based on the bald submissions. Printed from counselvise.com 12 ITA No. 504-507/Coch/2023 M/s. K.K. Builders 17. As regards to reliance placed by the learned counsel for the assessee on the decision of Pune Bench of this Tribunal in the case of SMW Ispat (P.) Ltd. (supra) the decision is based on the peculiar facts of that case and, therefore, the ratio of the said judgment cannot be applied to the facts of the present case. In any event, in the said decision the decision of Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of Chhagan Chandrakant Bhujbal vs. ITO (2022) 440 ITR 359 (Bom.) was neither referred to nor brought to the notice of the Tribunal. The decision of even non-jurisdictional High Court overrides the decision of the Tribunal. 18. Further, the findings of the learned CIT(A) that the impugned assessments were jointly monitored by the JCIT, remains uncontroverted by the assessee, merely because, the AO and JCIT were located at different places would not mean that there had been non-application of mind, especially when there was a time of 10 days between the last date of hearing by the AO and the date of assessment orders. Therefore, the ratio of Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the case of Chhagan Chandrakant Bhujbal (supra) is squarely applicable in the present appeal. The relevant part of the above judgment reads as under:- “11. As regards the judgment of this court in German Remedies Ltd. (supra), 11 relied upon by Mr. Gopal, we certainly agree with Mr. Gopal that the power vested in the Commissioner under section 151 of the Act to grant or not to grant approval to the Assessing Officer to reopen an assessment is coupled with duty Printed from counselvise.com 13 ITA No. 504-507/Coch/2023 M/s. K.K. Builders and the Commissioner is duty bound to apply his mind to the proposal put up to him for the approval in the light of the material relied upon by the Assessing Officer and such power cannot be exercised casually, in a routine and perfunctory manner. The court held in the facts and circumstances of that case that the approval granted in that case suffers from non-application of mind. It was in the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case. In the case at hand, there is nothing to indicate that there was non-application of mind. Merely because information was received at 5.47 p.m. and the notice was issued by 10.49 p.m. would not mean that there has been non-application of mind. If we hold that it would be merely speculative and based on conjecture.” The decision of Hon’ble Orissa High Court in the case of M/s Serajuddin & Co. (supra) based on the fact that the assessment orders were totally silent about the AO having written to the ACIT seeking his approval or Addl. CIT having granted such approval. Whereas, in the present case, the assessment orders the AO clearly mentioned that the assessment order is after getting approval as per section 153D of the Act from JCIT, Central Range, Kochi. In the absence of any material to the contrary, it is presumed that the statutory authorities have acted bonafide and lawfully. Therefore, the ratio of the decision of Hon’ble Orissa High Court in the case of M/s Serajuddin & Co. (supra) cannot be applied to the facts of the present case. We are of the considered opinion that the ratio of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court is squarely applicable to the facts of the case. In these circumstances, we do not find any merit in the grounds of appeal. Accordingly, this ground of appeal No. 2 is dismissed. Printed from counselvise.com 14 ITA No. 504-507/Coch/2023 M/s. K.K. Builders 19. Grounds of appeal Nos. 3 to 5 challenges the additions made by the AO as confirmed by the learned CIT(A). The appellant challenges the addition made by the AO on the ground that in the absence of any incriminating material, no addition can be made in the assessment made pursuant to notices issued us 153A of the Act. Without prejudice to the above, it is contended in respect of assessment made u/s. 143(3) r.w.s. 153A, no estimation of income can be made. 20. It is undisputed proposition that in the case of search assessment u/sec. 153A that the addition can be made only based on the incriminating material found during the course of search and seizure operations. Reliance, in this regard, is placed on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of PCIT vs. Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd. [2023] 454 ITR 212 (SC), however, this proposition of law is not applicable to the facts of the present case. The AO made the addition based on the incriminating material found during the course of search and seizure operations marked as CHN/12-13/2/C-1(5) and this material was confronted to the assessee. In the returns of income filed in response to the notice issued u/s. 153A, the appellant filed returns of income disclosing additional undisclosed income. Thus, the appellant itself submitted to the jurisdiction u/s. 153A of the Act. Therefore, the other limb of decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd. (supra) comes into play i.e. once some incriminating evidence is Printed from counselvise.com 15 ITA No. 504-507/Coch/2023 M/s. K.K. Builders found, the AO is empowered to make all other additions irrespective of fact that the addition is based on seized incriminating material or not. The relevant portion of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd (supra) is as follows:- “14. (i) that in case of search under section 132 or requisition under section 132A, the Assessing Officer assumes the jurisdiction for block assessment under section 153A; - (ii) all pending assessments/reassessments shall stand abated; (iii) in case any incriminating material is found/unearthed, even, in case of unabated/completed assessments, the Assessing Officer would assume the jurisdiction to assess or reassess the “total income” taking into consideration the incriminating material unearthed during the search and the other material available with the Assessing Officer including the income declared in the returns; and (iv) in case no incriminating material is unearthed during the search, the Assessing Officer cannot assess or reassess taking into consideration the other material in respect of completed assessments/unabated assessments. Meaning thereby, in respect of completed/unabated assessments, no addition can be made by the Assessing Officer in the absence of any incriminating material found during the course of search under section 132 or requisition under section 132A of the Act, 1961. However, the completed/unabated assessments can be reopened by the Assessing Officer in exercise of powers under section 147/148 of the Act, subject to fulfillment of the conditions as envisaged/mentioned under section 147/148 of the Act and those powers are saved.” 21. As regards, the addition made based on extrapolation in the search assessment, the issue stands settled by the judgment of the Hon'ble Jurisdictional High Court in the case of CIT vs. Hotel Printed from counselvise.com 16 ITA No. 504-507/Coch/2023 M/s. K.K. Builders Meriya (332 ITR 537). The relevant portion of the judgment is as follows:- “9. ……….. It cannot be expected that the assessee would retain documents regarding the concealment of income. If documents for every concealment are insisted to be searched, practically the provision for block assessment would be defeated. We cannot shut our eyes to the legislative intent. Here, what was disclosed that for sale, no bills are issued, but paper slips are issued with the price. Though carbon copy is retained it didn't contain the sale price. Sale slips are destroyed then and there. Cash books are maintained by recording the 80% of the price of liquor at a later date. When such practices are adopted, nobody can expect evidence for every year in a block period. What is possible is only to have a best judgment assessment on the basis of the evidence collected during search. The assessing officer is authorised and empowered to make block assessment in a judicious manner on the basis of the materials disclosed during the search under Sec.132 of the IT Act. 10. No person other than the partner of the respondent had in unambiguous terms stated that 20% of the sales out turn is suppressed and only 80% is recorded in the account books and it was the practice from the very beginning. So, it is just and appropriate to presume that there was uniform concealment of income in all assessment years during the block period. There is no material on record to show that the concealment of the sales out turn during any of the assessment year in the block period is lesser than the concealment detected under Sec.132 of the IT Act. There is no whisper in the statement given by the partner of the respondent or any of the employees that there was any change of the rate of concealment in any year during the block period. No good reason was given to reject the above mentioned statement of the partner and employees recorded during search. Oral evidence was corroborated by the documentary evidence. So, it is just and appropriate to conclude that the concealment was same in all the years during the block period. Adding to that we find that when it is revealed in a search under Sec.132 of IT Act that the assessee was following a particular method to conceal the income, it is just Printed from counselvise.com 17 ITA No. 504-507/Coch/2023 M/s. K.K. Builders and reasonable to presume that the same practice was followed by the assessee throughout all the assessment years in the block period for the purpose of block assessment.” (emphasis added) 22. As regards the contention of the assessee that no addition can be made in the assessment made pursuant to notice u/s 153A, based on the statement of third party placing reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Delhi High Court in the case of Anand Kumar Jain, this contention cannot be accepted in view of the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Abhisar Buildwell P. Ltd (supra), wherein it was held that once the AO assumes jurisdiction u/s. 153A, in case any incriminating material is found/unearthed, even in case of unabated/completed assessments, the AO would assume the jurisdiction to assess or reassess the “total income” taking into consideration the incriminating material unearthed during the search and the other material available with the AO including the income declared in the returns of income. 23. On merits of the addition, on mere perusal of the assessment order, it is evident that the AO made the addition based on the contents of the seized material. When the seized material was confronted to the assessee, the same was admitted by the assessee during the course of recording statement u/s. 132(4) of the Act. Thus, the AO brought a clinching evidence on record to show that the assessee is deriving income from sale of liquor, food etc. As Printed from counselvise.com 18 ITA No. 504-507/Coch/2023 M/s. K.K. Builders regards the allowance of expenditure incurred to earn the income, the same cannot be allowed in view of the proviso inserted to section 69C of the Act which expressly prohibits the allowance of expenditure as a deduction in case of addition made on account of unexplained expenditure. Thus, we do not find any merit in this ground of appeal raised by the assessee and accordingly appeal is dismissed. 24. In the result, appeal filed by the assessee is dismissed. 25. Our findings in the above appeal in ITA No. 504/Coch/2023 shall apply mutatis mutandis to the appeals in ITA Nos. 505,506 & 507/Coch/2023 also. 26. In the result, all the appeals in ITA Nos. 504 to 507/Coch/ 2023 filed by the assessee are dismissed. Order pronounced on 01st August, 2024 under Rule 34 of The Income Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963. Sd/- Sd/- (SONJOY SARMA) JUDICIAL MEMBER (INTURI RAMA RAO) ACCOUNTANT MEMBER Cochin, Dated: 04th August, 2025 vr/- Printed from counselvise.com 19 ITA No. 504-507/Coch/2023 M/s. K.K. Builders Copy to: 1. The Appellant 2. The Respondent 3. The Pr. CIT concerned 4. The Sr. DR, ITAT, Cochin 5. Guard File By Order Assistant Registrar ITAT, Cochin Printed from counselvise.com "